The main directions of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Topic: "Foreign policy of the USSR. successes and failures

Changes in world politics after the end of the Cold War, as well as the democratization that began in the country, put Russia in the position of a country that must redefine its place in world politics, identify those priorities of its foreign policy that will determine its role and influence on the world stage. The development of such a strategy and tactics is determined not only long-term plans renewal of the country, it is fully influenced by political traditions, mass and elite stereotypes, modern foreign policy relations.

At present, we can talk about three main directions (ways, options) for Russia to develop its own line of conduct in the international arena.

The first option for choosing a foreign policy strategy is associated with attempts to maintain the status of a great power and continue the previous expansionist policy aimed at expanding the zone of political influence and control over other states. Despite the unfeasibility of this kind of alternative, one can state that the country has certain resources for its implementation. First of all, such a policy is possible on the basis of the threat of the state using its military, primarily nuclear, potential, the embodiment of certain ambitions of a part of the political leadership, as well as unsurmounted mass stereotypes (anti-Western, chauvinistic, etc.).

The second way involves Russia gaining the status of a regional power. In one case, its influence may be based primarily on the factors of forceful pressure on neighboring states and, in fact, repeat the logic of the behavior of a “superpower” in the local political space. In another option, the gain of political influence by a country can be based on the establishment of equal and mutually beneficial relations with its neighbors, the rejection of military and forceful threats against them and the conscious avoidance of involvement in world conflicts and contradictions.

The third way assumes that Russia can take a purely pragmatic foreign policy position based on the principle of equidistance from certain blocs of forces and pragmatic rapprochement or distance from specific coalitions and states. Thus, its national interests will be formed on a non-ideological basis, changing depending on the specific situation that is developing. With such an approach to foreign policy tasks, the country will be able to focus on solving economic and other domestic problems.

In the real political activity of the state, elements of each of the three possible strategies are intertwined, and each of them involves the indispensable solution of tasks related to the development of fundamental relations with at least three groups of its foreign policy counterparties: its allies, the West and the countries of the "third world".

When developing a foreign policy strategy, it is important to preserve the organic unity of the principles of formation of the foreign and domestic policy of the state. That is, the state should provide for the existence of uniform standards governing relations with all these groups of countries. Therefore, while fighting the authoritarian tendencies of the West, Russia should not itself allow such actions in relation to neighboring countries, condemning the manifestations of nationalism and fascism in the sphere of international relations; it should just as resolutely fight them within the country, demanding openness from its competitors, publicly cover their actions in the country and in the international arena.

Among the priority areas of Russia's foreign policy are the following:

Creation of a new system of relations with former socialist countries;

Entry into the European and world community;

Development of new principles of interstate relations with the former republics of the USSR;

Development of a new military-political doctrine in the changed geopolitical space;

Activation of relations with China, countries of Southeast Asia;

Equitable development of relations with the USA;

Opposition to the establishment of a "unipolar" world under the auspices of the United States;

Participation in peacekeeping actions to end armed conflicts under the auspices of the UN.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR E. A. Shevardnadze In July 1985, the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs was taken by E. Shevardnadze. Soon the main features of the new course were defined - the normalization of relations with the West, the end of the confrontation with the United States and its allies. This policy has been called "New Thinking". These ideas were not new. They were previously put forward by prominent scientists, philosophers and politicians I. Kant, M. Gandhi, A. Einstein, B. Russell and others. foreign policy.

The main directions of foreign policy The main directions Positive phenomena The miscalculations of the Soviet american relations: d. - annual meetings of M. S. Gorbachev with R. Reagan and George W. Bush - normalization of relations

Main directions of foreign policy Main directions Positive phenomena Miscalculations Soviet-American relations: d. - annual meetings of M.S. Gorbachev with R. Reagan and George W. Bush - normalization of relations -Improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA, East and West - the danger of an unrestrained race is excluded weapons, the outbreak of nuclear war -the general international climate has improved -Concessions from the USSR more than the West -reduction in the USSR of weapons that formed the basis of military power, and in the USA - outdated and ineffective weapons

Reducing the strength of the USSR Armed Forces and defense spending gg. Summer 1991 George W. Bush put forward to Gorbachev "6 conditions" under which the West will continue cooperation with the USSR - democracy, market, federation, policy change in the Middle East, refusal to modernize Soviet nuclear missile forces.

The main directions of foreign policy The main directions Positive phenomena Miscalculations Relations with the countries of the socialist bloc: of Eastern Europe 1990 - consent to the unification of Germany 1991 - the dissolution of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact

Revolution in Bucharest. Changes in Eastern Europe began in 1987. Under pressure from Gorbachev, the process of changing the political leadership and democratization of society began here. Since 1989, the process of withdrawal from the region began Soviet troops. As a result of the "velvet revolutions" totalitarian regimes fell in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, BPR, Albania. In 1989, the regime of N. Ceausescu in Romania was overthrown.

The main directions of foreign policy The main directions Positive phenomena Miscalculations Relations with the countries of the socialist bloc: - withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe 1990 - consent to the unification of Germany 1991 - dissolution of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact The climate of international relations has improved The reorientation of the economies of Eastern Europe to the west led to a reduction in trade with the USSR , which further exacerbated economic problems Soviet Union

The main directions of foreign policy The main directions Positive phenomena Miscalculations Regional conflicts: February 1990 - withdrawal of wax from Afghanistan May-June 1989 - M. S. Gorbachev's visit to China Summer 1990 - crisis in Persian Gulf December 1991 - Madrid Accords on the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Withdrawal of Troops from Afghanistan The most acute regional problem for the USSR was the ongoing war in Afghanistan. In 1988, an agreement was signed on the termination of American assistance to the Mujahideen and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet units left Afghanistan. Our losses amounted to 14.5 thousand people killed, 54 thousand wounded.

In the USSR, he reduced the volume of gratuitous assistance to the allied regimes, approved the military actions of the West during the crisis in the Persian Gulf. During this period, diplomatic relations were restored with South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Israel.

The main directions of foreign policy The main directions Positive phenomena Miscalculations Regional conflicts: February 1990 - the withdrawal of wax from Afghanistan May-June 1989 - M. S. Gorbachev's visit to China Summer 1990 - the crisis in the Persian Gulf December 1991 - Madrid agreements on the Arab-Israeli conflict Improvement of the halt in the regions of rivalry between the USSR and the USA Establishment of the leading role of the USA in the international arena.

Gorbachev's meeting with the leaders of the G7. New Thinking policies have had mixed results. On the one hand, the threat of a world nuclear missile war has weakened, the process of reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons. The Cold War was coming to an end. The situation improved in a number of regions where the USSR and the USA used to compete. Democratic transformations took place in a number of countries.

Aircraft recycling. At the same time, the result of the destruction of the Bipolar world was the assertion of the leading role of the United States in the international arena. They began to reckon less with not only the former Soviet republics, but also with the UN. The whole system of Yalta - Potsdam relations was under threat, and this conceals the possibility of a new redistribution of the world into "spheres of influence".

Topic:« FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR. SUCCESS AND MISSIONS» .

Lesson objectives: to introduce students to the main foreign policy events in 19 years.

Lesson objectives:

o To bring students to an understanding of the results of the policy of "new thinking";

o Continue the formation of skills to independently work with the text of the textbook, analyze, draw conclusions, state "cross-cutting issues of the topic

o Raise awareness of the concept of "new political thinking"

3) teaching equipment: workbook, political map of the world.

4)board decoration:

Lesson topic, study plan new topic, new words ("new thinking"), date: November 1985, homework.

During the classes

1) Organizational moment.

2 Updating the basic knowledge of students on the topic: “The spiritual life of society. The policy of "glasnost".

3) 1) Preparation of an oral answer on the card.

2. Working with the class (teacher's choice):

A) checking homework

b) Match the dates of the event:

3. verbal detailed response of the student on card No. 1, feedback from classmates.

III . STUDYING A NEW TOPIC.

PLAN.

1. The concept of "new political thinking".

2. Resolution of regional conflicts.

3. Velvet revolutions.

4. Results of the West-East confrontation

A TASK for students: What are the results of the foreign policy of the USSR in 1 years?

FILLING IN THE TABLE, INDEPENDENT WORK WITH THE TEXTBOOK OR ACCORDING TO THE TEACHER'S STORY.

Textbook p. 51, p. 317-320 or p.58, pp. 403-408.

The table might look like this:

2. Draw conclusions about the results of the "new thinking" policy.

Independent work of students according to the text of the textbook p.51 p.320-321 or p.58 p.408

IV. REINFORCEMENT OF THE LEARNED MATERIAL IN THE LESSON.

Completing the task from the workbook: no. P.51, worksheet, pp. 79-80; worksheet 4 pp. 80-81

v. LESSON SUMMARY

2. Complete the task from the workbook task No. 3 P. 51 p.

It is important to note that the population of Russia is becoming more and more interested in and reflecting on important issues of security policy and international relations. All-Russian Center study public opinion(VTsIOM) in the course of a nationwide survey asked respondents the question: “What, in your opinion, could be the main goal of Russian foreign policy for the next 10–15 years?” Outcome: 31% of respondents believe that Russia should regain its superpower status; 23% - it is important to enter the top five most developed countries in the world; 16% of Russians believe that the country should abandon foreign policy ambitions and focus on solving domestic problems; 12% - to enter the number of economically developed countries of the world, such as Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, etc.; 6% of citizens believe that the main goal for the near future is to become a leader within the CIS; 5% of the respondents consider it most relevant for Russia to become the leader of a wide bloc of states that oppose the global claims of the United States. Difficult to answer - 7% of respondents.

A task active participation Russian Federation in creating a qualitatively new system of international relations necessitates the search for common interests of the Russian Federation with other countries and ways to harmonize them. At the same time, foreign policy, like domestic policy, should be based on the maximum possible public consent. There can be, and are, sharp contradictions between interest groups, but it is precisely here that there should be a minimum of basic understandings that are not disputed.

Such understandings include, for example, the integration of Russia with Belarus. It is a clear and absolutely understandable embodiment of the idea of ​​creating on the ruins of the post-Soviet space active center influence, and in the future - a new state formation with its own dynamics, ideology and national-cultural phenomenon. In global terms, for the first time in the last decade, Russia is moving from a purely reactive pattern of behavior to an active constructive one, and Belarus is at the forefront of economic, military-political and culturally motivated integration processes.

Despite the fact that at the first stage of the unification processes, Belarus will gain relatively more, over the years, the “economic benefit of the unification project” for Russia will increase with a reasonable policy. Comparing the possible losses and gains of the Russian Federation from the creation of an integrated association with Belarus, we can make an unambiguous conclusion - the association meets the national interests of Russia. The political and psychological gain is also great: the rapprochement between Russia and Belarus will seriously weaken the “divided nation” syndrome in Russia. Problem further development Russian-Belarusian relations are therefore no longer a bilateral issue. From a geopolitical point of view, it is Belarus, which separates the Baltic states and Ukraine, that is the “bridge” between Russia and the West. The loss of the prospect of political and especially military-political rapprochement with Belarus is fraught with a serious weakening of Russia's position in the CIS. A certain economic price can be paid for this prospect, not to mention the financing of military cooperation proper.

In the current situation, it seems appropriate to move to an active scheme for the development of in-depth integration of the two fraternal countries and peoples. This, as polls confirm, is what the peoples of both Russia and Belarus are waiting for. The most realistic option that meets the interests of the two countries is the creation of a full-fledged Union, i.e. confederation of sovereign states, which is what is provided for by the bilateral agreements signed in May 1996. In the economic field, we should talk about the closest integration of the two economies, the introduction of a single currency, a settlement and credit system, a single Central Bank based on the Central Bank of Russia, the unification of economic legislation, i.e. creation of a truly unified economic space.

In the longer term, given the historical and cultural proximity of the peoples of our countries and their sense of belonging to a single nation, a realistic goal could be the creation of a single federal state following the example of a united Germany.

The priority direction of Russian policy in the CIS is relations with Ukraine. In the future, our relations should acquire an allied character, especially since there are no serious obstacles - neither economic, nor cultural-civilizational, or even military-political - for the formation of such an alliance. The main problem here is external: attempts by the United States and other major countries to prevent the reunification of Russia and Ukraine, which would lead to the formation in Eurasia of a powerful state of almost the same scale as former USSR. On the other hand, without a strategic alliance with Ukraine, Russia will not become a truly great power that will be truly valued, respected and treated as a real force in the new system of international relations. Moreover, it is in Ukraine and support for its distance from Russia that some circles in the West see a means of preventing the growth of Russia's weight and influence.

It is clear that in the current situation, the stronger one should make the first step towards it. This, however, does not mean that it is necessary to support the Ukrainian economy by all means or pay for reforms there. Russia simply cannot afford this now. However, it is possible and necessary to establish political interaction. Regular working meetings at the highest level - between presidents, prime ministers, heads of the parliaments of Russia and Ukraine - should play a big role in this. This includes regular consultations on critical issues international relations, their institutionalization.

Without cooperation with Ukraine, the Russian Federation finds itself in the far margins of Europe, depriving itself of any prospects for a significant role in pan-European integration. With further aggravation of Russian-Ukrainian relations, Ukraine, even without being a member of NATO, may become the cornerstone for creating a new "cordon sanitaire" around Russia.

Kazakhstan remains a potential ally of Russia in Asia. If at the beginning of the next century Kazakhstan falls into the sphere of influence of China or falls under the control of the Islamists, the position of the Russian Federation in Asia could be so sharply undermined that the hold of the Far East and Siberia would be called into question.

In the republics Central Asia, in addition to the problem of the remaining Russian-speaking population, in the formulation and implementation Russian politics the threat of radical Islamization of this region with the establishment of regimes hostile to Russia supporting separatist religious-nationalist activity within the Russian Federation itself should be taken into account in the most serious way.

As for the Transcaucasus, one can apparently proceed from the fact that the military-political problems existing there cannot be solved in principle without the active participation of Russia. In turn, Russia has an objective interest in eliminating the source of permanent tension in the North Caucasus. As for the specific forms of solving this problem, the active intermediary diplomacy and limited peacekeeping actions should be considered practically the only one today.

Georgia and Armenia should become our natural geopolitical allies in the North Caucasus. Now the Muslim countries of the Middle East have essentially begun a regrouping of forces in a broad geographical area, directly adjacent to the southern borders of Russia in order to consolidate favorable geopolitical changes for them. In this regard, the role of Georgia and Armenia as our geopolitical outpost in the south increases many times over.

Interests - political, military and economic - of Russia, Armenia and Georgia objectively coincide in the region. It is clear to the current leadership of these countries that without Russia's help it will not be possible either to maintain territorial integrity, or to establish itself as any influential countries in the region, or to solve the problems of the economy, since Russia provides them with energy, most types of raw materials and essential goods. Armenia and Georgia are interested in preventing the dangerous growth of Turkish influence in the region, which coincides with the interests of Russia, and the orientation of Azerbaijan, ethnically and confessionally close to Turkey, can be adjusted depending on the level of Russian-Azerbaijani relations. At the same time, Russia cannot but be concerned about attempts to limit its participation in the implementation of important economic projects in the region, primarily related to the production and transportation of oil from the fields of the Caspian Sea. Russia can only welcome the emerging rapprochement between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine, unless this rapprochement is built to the detriment of Russian interests.

If Russia does not strengthen its positions in Georgia and Armenia in the very near future - and through these states - in the region as a whole, the "power vacuum" will inevitably and quickly be filled by other large countries: from the West - the USA and Germany, and from the South – Turkey and Iran. The main goal of the penetration of Western countries into the Caucasus is to oust Russia from this region and, accordingly, to consolidate their possession. The combination of all these factors makes it possible to raise the issue of a full-scale military alliance Russia-Georgia-Armenia.

The Baltic countries, due to their geopolitical position and long-term close ties with Russia, should objectively be interested in cooperation with Russia, at least in the economic and cultural fields. However, due to certain psychological reasons, which became political factor, the formation of such an interaction is complicated. Russia's long-term interest in relations with these countries lies in the establishment of a normal constructive dialogue and the removal of mutual concerns that have historical roots. Russia is interested in its closest neighbors feeling safe and not considering Russia as a source of military threats.

The Central European region - primarily Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary - retains its significance for the Russian Federation as a historically established sphere of interests with an extensive system of economic ties, the violation of which is detrimental to all the countries involved in them. Restoring mutual trust with these countries would not only help develop these ties, but would also contribute to the development of pan-European cooperation, including in political terms. The accession of the states of the region to NATO should not lead to a limitation of their relations with Russia.

In no case should one neglect cooperation with countries that have long-standing historical and cultural ties with Russia. This is not only Bulgaria and Serbia, but also such a NATO country as Greece. Romania should not be completely discounted, despite all its expansionist aspirations towards Moldova. In the face of the threat of strengthening Muslims and Catholics in the Balkans, the formation, under the auspices of Russia, of a kind of Slavic-Orthodox quasi-coalition (“Byzantine Union”) seems likely, which, of course, will not be able to be formalized in any way, but must be borne in mind when conducting the corresponding diplomatic and military and political activities.

The relations of the Russian Federation with Western European countries, primarily with Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy, are decisive in terms of our country's entry into the emerging political and economic space on the continent, the core of which is the European Community. Separation of Russia from Europe is unacceptable, including in the light of the growing “non-European risks”. The most promising in this regard is the orientation towards the development of bilateral cooperation, primarily with Germany and France, whose interests in a number of cases differ from those of the United States. Through them it is easier to resolve the issue of ensuring Russia's equal access to foreign markets and its participation in international economic organizations.

There is no doubt that Germany is becoming one of the main centers of power in the emerging world. Today it is still busy digesting the former GDR, but in a few years it could become the leading power in Europe. Germany already occupies key positions in the EU, it has the largest army among the European powers of NATO, and as the US military presence in Europe weakens, its influence in the alliance will undoubtedly increase. At the same time, Russian-German relations are developing relatively well. Germany remains one of Russia's main trading partners. There are no visible differences in Russian-German relations, as is happening in relations between Moscow and Washington.

At the same time, one cannot fail to see that Germany understands that not only European strategic stability, but also Bonn's ability to achieve its political goals in Europe will largely depend on the state of German-Russian relations. It is not enthusiastic about US policy in Europe and may turn out to be our partner in resolving a number of issues of European security, which, as the Germans rightly believe, should not be built in the interests of the United States alone.

Germany also understands that cooperation with Russia, capable of giving Europe the necessary depth of economic space and practically inexhaustible reserves of minerals, is indispensable. In Germany, more than anywhere else, there is a clearer understanding of the risk associated with Russia's exclusion from Europe. The Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation of November 9, 1990, which is fundamental for Russian-German relations, establishes in its Article 5 that the goal of the efforts of both states is “the transformation of Europe into single space law, democracy and cooperation in the field of economy, culture and information”. This means that Russian-German interaction should pave the way for the creation of a Greater Europe. German unity was primarily the result of mutual understanding between Russians and Germans. It was a historic agreement - a united Germany in a united Europe with the equal inclusion of Russia. And if Germany is to fulfill its historical destiny as the center of an integrated Greater Europe, it must become Russia's European anchor.

The French direction is exceptionally promising for us. France, in particular, is most concerned about the growing US efforts to eliminate the independent Western European defense industry (in fact, primarily French). France is stepping up its policy on regional level in particular the Near and Middle East. At the same time, Paris views the United States as a competitor in the struggle for arms sales markets, political and economic influence in various regions.

Development of relations with Russia, including in military area, the new leadership of France considers one of the main priorities of its military-political course. The well-known statements of the French President about the need to transform NATO, its reform and adaptation to the new European and world realities are in line with Russian interests and open up the possibility for very promising cooperation between Russia and France on the most important issues of European security.

Our diplomacy can be much more active in relation to a number of NATO countries, primarily (apart from Greece) such as Spain, Italy, Portugal and Denmark, which have special positions on a number of European security issues, including NATO expansion. Clearly, work with Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Finland to secure their neutral status needs to be intensified.

Russia as a Eurasian country has long-term political and economic interests also in Far East and in the Asia-Pacific region. The essence of these interests is to ensure Russia's security here and its geo-economic position. Cooperation with some countries in the development of Siberia and the Far East is necessary, but it must be carried out under the strict control of the federal authorities and not go beyond the limits permissible from the point of view of the defense, political, economic and environmental interests of the Russian Federation.

Optimal from the point of view of the future would be a scheme of actions that provides, on the one hand, the formation of specific, asymmetric zones of common interests and cooperation with the main powers of the Asia-Pacific region, and, on the other hand, the concentration of efforts on regional nodes of problems, of which priority attention should be paid to Northeast Asia. At the same time, sub-regional stability regimes would be established, which ideally could serve as the "bricks" of the system collective security throughout the APR. Through the implementation of its role in the main hub centered on NEA, as well as the function of the guarantor of other sub-regional stability systems, Russia will maintain and strengthen its position as one of the main powers of the Asia-Pacific region, which, in turn, will strengthen its international positions throughout the Eurasian continent and in the world as a whole.

Our relationship with China should by no means be idealized or simplified. They can also be fraught with very dangerous conflicts, especially in the long run. At the moment, the border issues between Russia and China have been largely resolved, bilateral relations are smooth and stable, and according to all available estimates, the main vector of China's military-political efforts in the coming years will not be directed towards Russia.

Using this situation, we could intensify Russian-Chinese interactions on a number of issues, especially taking into account a certain complementarity between the economies of the Far East region of Russia and the northeast of China.

However, Russia should also be careful in military deals with China, maintaining a technological gap from it and strengthening the linkage of Chinese arms manufacturers to Russian developers and enterprises. We must not allow China to arm the Islamic world and form an axis between China and far-abroad Islam as a whole. In hard legal regulation- both at the federal and local levels - the process of formation of the Chinese diaspora in the Far East, encouraged by the Chinese leadership, is needed.

The success of our foreign policy as a whole will largely depend on its balance in the western and eastern directions: on the one hand, Russia must not succumb to the possible persuasion of the West to create some kind of coalition to contain China, on the other hand, not to offer China and not accept proposals from it on strategic partnership on an anti-Western (including anti-Japanese) basis. At the same time, it is necessary to work together with the West to create a system of ties that would involve China in traditional international relationships, in particular the non-proliferation regimes (MTCR, New Forum, Club of Australia, etc.) in order to bind the growing role of China with relevant international obligations.

As for Japan, it is, of course, necessary to continue the search for a solution to the existing territorial problem. At the same time, it would be wrong and counterproductive to resolve territorial issues at a time when the Russian state is weakened. Let's defer this issue to future generations, but in the meantime, we will develop cooperation in order to create an environment that is most conducive to resolving this issue in the future. There are prerequisites for this. Plans for the development of economic ties with Russia are now circulating around Tokyo, and some of them, for example, the Siberia-Pacific coast pipeline project, are estimated at tens of billions of dollars.

All these factors, taken together, allow us to conclude that relations with Japan are the most important strategic reserve of Russian foreign policy. And you just need to properly dispose of it, choosing the right moment for this.

Perhaps Russia's main strategic ally in Asia for decades to come is India. From a geopolitical point of view, India is interested in working closely with Russia both to ensure a proper balance of power in relations with China and a number of other countries, and to maintain its internal stability against the constantly threatening Islamist forces directly supported from Pakistan. The Indian elite is clearly striving to elevate the country to a much higher place in the world hierarchy of powers, including taking the place of a permanent member of the UN Security Council for it, in which Russia must constantly support India. India's interest in Russian defense and aerospace technologies is even more significant than China's.

But the possibilities of using our "Indian map" are not unlimited. In India, the influence of the US is strong, as well as the UK. No less important for India is the importance of the American market. Nor should we go overboard in demonstrating our excessive interest in India's vast arms and technology markets.

Although far from all the problems of Sino-Indian relations have been resolved, and even serious military-political conflicts cannot be ruled out between India and China in the future, the vector of Chinese military-political activity is not currently directed against India. In this regard, there is an opportunity for Western countries to demonstrate the likelihood of the formation of a "great Eurasian triangle" - Russia - China - India, one of the unifying positions of which could be a joint counteraction to Islamic extremism. The formation of such a triangle could serve the cause of establishing equal relations between Russia and the United States and other Western countries.

In order to ensure a favorable balance of power for Russia in Asia, it is necessary to intensify efforts to establish comprehensive military-political cooperation with Vietnam, as well as with the ASEAN countries. Russia's relations with such a large, dynamically developing country as Indonesia also have significant potential.

At the moment, it is necessary to intensify Russian diplomacy in the Middle East, primarily in relation to such countries as Syria and Egypt. The ruling elite of the latter, in particular, is becoming increasingly weary of excessive American influence and is increasingly looking for a counterbalance to it in restoring ties with Russia, incl. in the military-technical sphere, although it is forced to act with an eye on the United States.

A special conversation is our relationship with Islamic world, counteracting the attempts of a number of countries, taking advantage of the temporary historical weakness of Russia, to “win back” the most important geopolitical frontiers in Central Asia and the Caucasus. At the same time, it is important not to “break loose” and prevent confrontation not only with the countries of hard Islamic fundamentalism, but also with relatively moderate Muslim centers, primarily with Turkey, which, trying to regain the role of a regional superpower, has recently been challenging us in a broad geopolitical zone from Bosnia to Tajikistan. Judging by everything, this country is unlikely to become a partner of Russia in the foreseeable future. It is more about the need to neutralize its expansionist ambitions so that it does not become a clear enemy of Russia in the region. The possible formation of the Ankara-Bonn-Baku axis is extremely dangerous for Russia.

In order to maintain tangible Russian influence in the Asian region, it is necessary to work closely primarily with the United States and China, to create together with them a system of regional security with the assumption of coordinated strategic functions. It would also be desirable to coordinate with these countries the rules for the supply of weapons to the Asia-Pacific region, although due to competitive relations in this area, this will be very difficult to do.

The relations of the Russian Federation with the countries of Africa, Latin America, Australia and Oceania should be built on the basis of expediency economic cooperation and remain within the overall efforts of the world community to unblock existing regional conflicts and prevent the emergence of new conflicts.

In no case should we refuse to develop ties with Cuba, in the transformation of which our people have invested huge amounts of money. Interesting perspectives open up in relations between Russia and South Africa, where many people who have long-standing ties with us turned out to be at the head of the state.

There are signs that the excessive American “patronage” does not quite suit such traditionally “pro-American” countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia and even Brazil, which have recently been sending us significant political signals demonstrating their readiness for rapprochement with Russia. The last of these countries, due to its weight and influence in the region, could become for Russia a kind of “gateway” to South America.

It is hardly possible to claim the former influence in the "third world" - the influence is supported by money, and Russia does not have it. However, it should be remembered that Russia and developing countries now not only competitors in the struggle for loans and access to commodity markets, but also a kind of foreign policy allies in putting pressure on rich countries. Western powers and international financial institutions are now particularly vulnerable to the combined pressure of the crisis countries, since they have actually taken responsibility for the success of the market reforms they recommended.

The relations of the Russian Federation with the United States retain their significance, the objective basis for the development of which is the interest in the formation of a stable and secure system of international relations. Maintaining partner, equal relations with the United States remains one of the important directions of Russian foreign policy. The development of such a partnership should, of course, be determined by Russian interests, which in some cases may not coincide with US interests. Differences that arise must be resolved in a non-confrontational way.

Now it seems clear to everyone: our attempt to achieve a strategic alliance with the United States was not successful. It could not be expected that Washington, behind the backs of its Western NATO allies, would agree to an agreement on "special" relations with Moscow. It would also be naive to expect that the United States would prefer a weak and unpredictable Russia to its main Western partners, such as Japan and Germany. As the experience of the last three years has shown, attempts to “play along” with Washington, to beg and curry favor with the Americans, doom us to a secondary role, when the “senior partner” takes less and less into account the interests of the “junior”. Based on this, it is necessary to reformulate the principles of strategic partnership with the United States, which will not be so easy.

In relations with the United States, we should move to a more pragmatic, calm and balanced policy.

In the first two years of Gorbachev's rule, the foreign policy of the USSR was based on traditional ideological priorities. But in 1987-1988 serious adjustments were made to them. Gorbachev offered the world "new political thinking". It seriously changed international relations for the better and significantly reduced tension in the world. However, some serious miscalculations by the Soviet leadership and the economic crisis in the USSR led to the fact that the West benefited the most from the new political thinking, and the prestige of the USSR in the world fell noticeably. This was one of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR.

Causes of changes in the foreign policy of the USSR.

In the mid-1980s, the foreign policy of the USSR reached a dead end in many respects.

1) There was a real danger of a new round of the Cold War, which would have heated up the situation in the world even more.

2) The Cold War could completely ruin the Soviet economy, which was going through a severe crisis.

4) ideological "taboos" limited the foreign economic activity of the USSR itself, hindering full development Soviet economy.

New political thinking.

The proposals put forward by Gorbachev within the framework of the new political thinking were revolutionary in nature and fundamentally contradicted the traditional foundations of the foreign policy of the USSR.

Basic principles of "new thinking":

Renunciation of ideological confrontation, of dividing the world into two warring political systems and recognition of the world as one, indivisible and interdependent;

Desire to decide international issues not from a position of strength, but on the basis of a balance of interests of the parties. This would nullify the arms race, mutual hostility and create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation;

Recognition of the priority of universal human values ​​over class, national, ideological, religious, etc. Thus, the USSR abandoned the principle of the socialist international, recognizing the supreme interests of all mankind.

In accordance with the new political thinking, three main directions of the foreign policy of the USSR were defined:

Normalization of relations with the West and disarmament;

Resolution of international conflicts;

Broad economic and political cooperation with various countries without ideological restrictions, without highlighting the socialist countries.

The results of the policy of "new thinking".

Tension in the world has significantly eased. There was even talk of the end of the Cold War. The image of the enemy that has been forming for decades on both sides " iron curtain", was actually destroyed.

For the first time in history, there was not just a restriction nuclear weapons The elimination of entire classes of nuclear weapons began. Europe was also freed from conventional weapons.

The process of closer integration of the USSR and the socialist countries of Europe into the world economy and into international political structures began.

Relations of the USSR with the West

An important consequence of the "new political thinking" was the annual meetings of MS Gorbachev with US Presidents R. Reagan, and then D. Bush. These meetings resulted in important decisions and treaties that markedly reduced tensions in the world.

In 1987, an agreement was signed between the USSR and the USA on the destruction of intermediate and shorter range missiles. For the first time, the two superpowers agreed not to reduce these weapons, but to completely eliminate them.

In 1990, an agreement was signed on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. as a gesture good will The USSR unilaterally reduced its defense spending and reduced the size of its armed forces by 500,000 men.

In 1991, an agreement was signed on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (OSNV-1). It made it possible to begin the reduction of nuclear weapons in the world.

In parallel with the disarmament policy, new economic relations with USA and others Western countries. Ideological principles had less and less influence on the foreign policy of the USSR and on the nature of its relations with the countries of the West. But further rapprochement with the West soon had a very unfavorable reason. The deterioration of the economic situation of the Soviet Union made it more and more dependent on the West, from which the leadership of the USSR expected to receive economic aid and political support. This forced Gorbachev and his entourage to make increasingly serious and often one-sided concessions to the West. Ultimately, this led to a fall in the prestige of the USSR.

USSR and regional conflicts

In 1989, the USSR withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. At the II Congress people's deputies USSR afghan war was recognized as a gross political mistake.

In the same year, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia began. At the same time, the USSR contributed to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea (Cambodia). All this led to improved relations with China. Cross-border trade was restored between the two great powers, and a series of important agreements on political, economic and cultural cooperation was signed.

The USSR refused to directly intervene in conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Result: in Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua stopped Civil War, representatives of the warring parties formed coalition governments.

The Soviet Union significantly reduced gratuitous aid to allied regimes and ideological adherents. Stopped supporting the regimes in Libya and Iraq. And during the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1990, for the first time, he supported the actions of the West.

In 1991 it was concluded international agreement which contributed to the improvement of Israel's relations with neighboring Arab countries. The USSR played a major role in this event.

All these steps have significantly reduced tension in the world and contributed to the improvement of the international political climate. However, the Soviet Union was not destined to take advantage of the fruits of its efforts.

Relations with socialist countries. The collapse of the socialist camp. Political defeat of the USSR.

In 1989, the USSR began to withdraw its troops from the socialist countries of Eastern and Central Europe.
At the same time, anti-socialist sentiments intensified in these countries.

In 1989-1990, "velvet" revolutions took place here, as a result of which power passed peacefully from the communist parties to the national democratic forces. Only in Romania during the change of power there were bloody clashes.

Yugoslavia broke up into several states. Croatia and Slovenia, which were part of Yugoslavia, declared themselves independent republics. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a war broke out for territory and independence between the Serbian, Croatian and Muslim communities. Only Serbia and Montenegro remained in Yugoslavia.

In 1990, the two Germanys united: the GDR became part of the FRG. At the same time, the united Germany retained its membership in NATO. The USSR did not express any particular objections to this.

Practically all the new governments of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe also took the course of moving away from the USSR and rapprochement with the West. They expressed their full readiness to join NATO and the Common Market.

In the spring of 1991, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the military bloc of the socialist countries, the Warsaw Pact Organization (OVD), ceased to exist. The socialist camp finally disintegrated.

The leadership of the USSR took a position of non-interference in the processes that radically changed political map Europe. The reason was not only in the new political thinking. By the end of the 1980s, the USSR economy was experiencing a catastrophic crisis. The country was sliding into an economic abyss and was too weak to carry out a strong and fairly independent foreign policy. As a result, the Soviet Union found itself heavily dependent on Western countries.

Left without old allies and without acquiring new ones, finding itself in a difficult economic situation, the USSR quickly lost the initiative in international affairs. Soon, the NATO countries increasingly began to ignore the opinion of the USSR on the most important international problems.

Western countries did not give the USSR a serious financial assistance. They were more and more inclined to support individual union republics, encouraging their separatism. This was also one of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, only one superpower remained in the world - the United States. The second superpower, the USSR, having lost old friends, did not find in the West the allied relations that it had counted on. It collapsed under the influence of external and internal factors. In December 1991, US President George W. Bush announced the end of the Cold War and congratulated Americans on their victory.