What is the conditional name of the operation of the Soviet troops. The USSR. code names for military operations Side forces. Soviet Union

The light tank Panzerkampfwagen II was the main tank of the German tank forces (Panzerwaffe) in the initial period of the 2nd World War. These tanks were used in large numbers during the capture of Poland in September 1939 and during the French campaign (1940). They also fought in Norway (1940), in the Balkans (1941). in North Africa (1941-1943) and in Russia.
Modification PzKpfw II Ausf.L "Lux" ("lynx") in 1943-1945 was in service with some reconnaissance units. Special modifications of the tank also took part in the fighting: a floating, flamethrower tank, a sapper tank, and a bridge-laying tank. On the basis of the PzKpfw II chassis, self-propelled guns "Marder" ("marten") and "Vespe" ("wasp") were produced.

Publisher: Eastern Front

A monograph containing detailed, never before published in such a volume, information about the history of creation, design and combat use of the German tank<Пантера>- one of the most famous tanks of World War II. The monograph contains factual material about combat vehicles based on this tank, in particular self-propelled guns<Ягдпантера>.

The book "Tank" Panther "" is an in-depth study of the history of one of the most famous tanks of the twentieth century. The richly illustrated edition contains a detailed story about the creation and combat use of this combat vehicle, a detailed description of its design features, black-and-white and color photographs and drawings, as well as detailed tactical and technical data and information for comparison with similar vehicles of allies and enemies.

Tank "Tiger" played an important role in the battles of the Second World War. The appearance of these tanks at the front made it possible to delay the collapse of the Nazi regime in Germany. At the time of its appearance, the "Tiger" surpassed any Allied tank. The achievements of the personnel of the 502nd, 503rd and 505th heavy tank battalions operating on the Eastern Front are more than impressive. The actions of the "Tigers" from the 501st and 504th heavy tank battalions fighting in North Africa had a great influence on the course of the Allied operations. The Allied propaganda machine had to constantly minimize the significance of the appearance of the "Tigers" on the battlefields, in particular, therefore, little is known about the combat use of the "Tigers" in North Africa.

Pages: 72 pages : illustrations, photographs

The history of the creation of German heavy tanks dates back to 1925. Despite the Versailles bans, the Germans continued to design new types of armored vehicles.
In 1925, a competition was held for the development of a tank weighing up to 20 tons. The tank had to move at a maximum speed of 40 km / h, ford water barriers up to 0.8 m deep and overcome a slope with a steepness of up to 30 .. The planned length of the tank was 6 meters, and the width is 2.6 m. To mislead a potential enemy, this technical task was called the "Grosstractor". Applications for participation in the competition were submitted by Rheinmetall, Krupp and Daimler-Benz. The machine, presented by Rheinmetall, was equipped with a 250 hp BMW engine, which allowed it to reach a maximum speed of 40 km / h and had armor up to 13 mm thick. The armament consisted of 75 mm KwK L / 20 guns in a turret (declination angle from -12 to +60.) and 2-3 MO 13 machine guns of 7.9 mm caliber. Crew - 6 people. On October 30, 1929, the Rheinmetall prototype sank during water tests at the test site. The Krupp tank had a similar design. The Krupp machine was tested at the Kama tank training ground near Kazan in the Soviet Union.

Tiger "is the most formidable German tank of the Second World War, a kind of symbol of Hitler's Panzerwaffe." And if the other two most famous tanks of those years - the T-34 and the Sherman - owe their fame to a large extent to the gigantic production volumes, then the "Tiger" - exceptionally outstanding fighting qualities.And one can only regret that these qualities were used in the struggle for a wrong cause.

In May 1941, at a meeting in the Berghof, Hitler proposed a new concept for a heavy tank, which was to become the striking force of the German<панцерваффе>. Work on the creation of a new combat vehicle was entrusted to Porsche and Henschel, which in 1937-1941 designed and tested several prototypes of heavy tanks.
By the spring of 1942, the prototypes of both tanks, designated PanzerkampfwagenVI, VK4501 (P) Tiger (P) (by Porsche) and Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf. B, VK3601(H) Tiger (H) (Henschel) were ready. On April 20 - 21, both prototypes were demonstrated to Hitler and other leaders of the Third Reich, and in May they were tested at the Burke training ground.
As a result, the Henschel tank was adopted by the Wehrmacht, which received the designation Pz.Kpfw.VI (Sd.Kfz. 181) Tiger Ausf.H1.
At the end of July 1942, mass production of a new heavy tank began at the Henschel plant in Kassel. In August - the first days of September, the first 9 "tigers" came out of the factory gates, which in Western literature are called pre-production tanks (serial numbers 250002 - 250010, 250001 - prototype number). All these machines had a number of external differences from the "tigers" of later releases, in addition, they all ended up on the Soviet-German front, where almost all of them died. This issue is devoted to the history and combat use of these first nine pre-production Tigers.

maus”(German “mouse”) - the largest tank by weight ever created in metal (combat weight - 188 tons) was designed and implemented in the Third Reich in the period from 1942 to 1945 under the leadership of Ferdinand Porsche. Also called "Porsche 205" and "type 205". It is believed that the name "Mouse" originated during the first test drive in December 1943, when one of the mechanics painted a mouse on the frontal armor and wrote "MAUS", which was very witty, taking into account the huge size of the tank (the mass of this "mouse ” was equal to the mass of four “Panthers” or three “Tigers”). Only two copies of the vehicle were built, and 9 more tanks were at the plant in varying degrees of readiness. The Mouses were never tested in combat, and as the Soviet Army approached the training ground, it was decided to destroy both tanks due to the impossibility of their evacuation.

Operations of the Great Patriotic War

Ten Stalinist blows

On May 20, the General Staff completed the development of a plan for the Belarusian strategic offensive operation. She entered the operational documents of the Headquarters under the code name "Bagration".

In the first half of 1944, Soviet troops won major victories near Leningrad, in the Right-Bank Ukraine, in the Crimea and on the Karelian Isthmus. By the summer of 1944, these victories provided favorable conditions for the defeat of one of the largest strategic enemy groupings, Army Group Center, and the liberation of the Byelorussian SSR. Since the shortest route to the borders of Germany passed through Belarus, a major offensive operation was carried out here. The operation received the code name "Bagration", it was carried out by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian (commanders K.K. Rokosovsky, G.F. Zakharov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky) and the 1st Baltic (Commander I .Kh. Bagramyan) fronts.

In the summer of 1944, the Nazi command was waiting for the main attack of the Red Army in the south - in the Krakow and Bucharest directions. Most of the Soviet tank armies were on the southwestern sector of the Soviet-German front. This was one of the reasons why the Germans expected the continuation of the offensive in the southwestern direction.

The ratio of forces of the parties to the beginning of the operation was in favor of the Soviet troops: in terms of people - by 2, by tanks and self-propelled guns - by 4, and by aircraft by 3.8 times. The decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas made it possible to achieve superiority over the enemy in manpower - 3-4 times, in artillery - 5-7 times and in tanks 5-5.5 times. Soviet troops occupied an enveloping position in relation to the troops of Army Group Center. This contributed to the infliction of flank strikes, their encirclement and destruction in parts.

The concept of the operation: it provided for the simultaneous transition to the offensive of the troops of four fronts in the Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk directions, the encirclement and destruction of enemy flank groupings in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the development of gifts along the directions converging on Minsk, the encirclement and destruction of the main enemy grouping east of Minsk.

The similarity of the concept of operation "Bagration" with the concept of operation "Uranus" was that both operations provided for a deep bilateral operational coverage, which led to the encirclement of a large strategic grouping of Nazi troops. The difference between the plans was that the plan of the operation "Bagration" provided for the initial encirclement of the enemy's flank groupings. This was supposed to lead to the formation of large operational gaps, which the enemy, due to insufficient reserves, could not quickly close. These gaps were to be used by mobile troops for the rapid development of the offensive in depth and for the encirclement of the 4th German Army in the area east of Minsk. In contrast to the dissecting flank attacks near Stalingrad, in Belarus the front was being crushed.

During the offensive of the Soviet troops that began on June 23, 1944, the German defense was broken through, the enemy began a hasty retreat. However, the Germans did not manage to retreat in an organized manner everywhere. Near Vitebsk and Bobruisk, 10 German divisions hit two "boilers" and were destroyed. On July 3, Soviet troops liberated Minsk. In the forests east of Minsk, a 100,000-strong enemy group was surrounded and destroyed. The defeats near Bobruisk, Vitebsk and Minsk were catastrophic for the German army. General Guderian wrote: “As a result of this blow, Army Group Center was destroyed. We suffered huge losses - 25 divisions. All available forces were thrown into the crumbling front. The German defense collapsed. The Germans were unable to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops. On July 13, units of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated Vilnius. Brest and the Polish city of Lublin were soon occupied. Operation Bagration ended on August 29, 1944 - Soviet troops liberated all of Belarus, part of the Baltic states, entered the territory of Poland and East Prussia.

Tsobechia Gabriel

By 1944 the situation had changed even more in favor of the Soviet Union. The final period of the war in Europe began. But the path to its end was difficult. The Nazi army was still strong. Due to the lack of a second front, Germany continued to keep the main troops on the Soviet-German front. 236 of its divisions and 18 brigades operated here, which included more than 5 million people, 54 thousand guns, 5400 tanks, 3 thousand aircraft. Germany still commanded the resources of almost all of Europe.

To strengthen the Eastern Front, the command of the German troops by the end of 1943 transferred 75 divisions from the west, a large number of weapons combat vehicles. However, the German industry was no longer able to meet the ever-increasing demand for military equipment.

Since the autumn of 1944, more than 200 thousand people were mobilized monthly for military service in the German armed forces. But this replenishment did not compensate for the losses that if the German troops.

In December 1943, Stalin in a "narrow circle of people" raised the question of a new form of conducting the military campaign of 1944: superiority over the enemy in terms of strategic initiative, favorable disposition of troops, sufficient human and material and technical resources made it possible to carry out large-scale operations not in one or two directions, but consistently on the entire front.

Offensive operations in 1944, called "Ten Stalin blows", began immediately after the completion of the 1943 offensive, preventing the enemy from recovering from the defeat in battles near Kursk and on the Dnieper . The task was to work out such a sequence of attacks on the enemy that would be unexpected for him, would be continuous and would deprive him of the opportunity to maneuver forces to repulse the main attack.

Thus, the main task for 1944 was as follows: to finally defeat the main German groups and complete the expulsion of the invaders from Soviet soil.

Features of military operations in 1944:

1) Almost the entire military campaign of 1944 was developed at the end of 1943. It was the Soviet troops that dictated the nature of actions at the front.

2) Offensive operations were carried out along the entire length of the front, but not simultaneously, but in the form of a series of successive operations in separate sectors of the front.

3) These strikes were delivered on opposite sectors of the front, which did not give the German troops the opportunity to transfer reserves.

4) The actions of the partisans were coordinated and carried out within the framework of a common strategic plan.

First hit, as a result of which the long-term defense of the Germans was hacked, was inflicted by our troops in January 1944 near Leningrad and Novgorod . As a result of this blow, a half-million fascist army was defeated and thrown back into the Baltic states.

Second strike was inflicted in February - April 1944 in the Right-Bank Ukraine (Korsun-Shevchenko operation) . There, a German grouping (10 divisions) was destroyed in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area. After that, in the midst of the spring thaw, a large-scale offensive was launched. This was so unexpected for the Germans that they, fleeing, abandoned their equipment and weapons due to the impassability of the roads, and retreated across the river. Bug and Dniester. Right-bank Ukraine was liberated from the enemy. Soviet troops entered the territory of Moldova, and on March 26 they reached the border with Romania.

April-May 1944 our troops inflicted third crushing blow on the enemy in the region of Crimea and Odessa . It took the Germans 250 days to capture the Crimea, and the Soviet troops liberated it in 5 days (May 7-12, 1944).

Before the Germans had time to come to their senses from the blows in the south, in June 1944 fell upon them fourth strike – in the region of Karelia. As a result, the Red Army defeated the Finnish troops, liberated Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, and liberated part of the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Under the influence of the successes of the Red Army, our allies were no longer able to further delay opening of a second front. On June 6, 1944, the American-British command, two years late, began a large landing in northern France.

Fifth strike was dealt to the Germans in June - August 1944 during the largest offensive operation in Belarus "Bagration" .

On May 20, 1944, the General Staff completed the development of the plan for the Belarusian offensive operation. It entered the operational documents of the Stavka under the code name "Bagration". The successful implementation of the plan of the operation "Bagration" made it possible to solve a number of other, no less important strategically tasks.

1) Completely clear the Moscow direction from enemy troops, since the front edge of the ledge was 80 kilometers from Smolensk;

2) Complete the liberation of the entire territory of Belarus;

3) Reach the coast of the Baltic Sea and the borders of East Prussia, which made it possible to cut the enemy's front at the junctions of Army Groups "Center" and "North" and isolate these German groups from each other;

4) To create profitable operational and tactical prerequisites for subsequent offensive operations in the Baltic states, in Western Ukraine, in the East Prussian and Warsaw directions.

Operation "Bagration" was carried out on June 23 - August 29. To defeat the enemy, the Soviet Supreme High Command allocated fronts: 1st Baltic (Army General I.Kh.Bagramyan), 1st (Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky), 2nd (Army General G.F. Zakharov), 3rd (General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky) Belarusian - a total of 17 armies, incl. 1 tank and 3 air, 4 tank and 2 Caucasian corps, cavalry-mechanized group, Dnieper military flotilla . The actions of the fronts were coordinated by the Marshals of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, G.K. Zhukov.

By the end of June 22, 1944, the front with a length of over 1100 km in Belarus passed along the line of Lake Nescherdo, east of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin, along the Pripyat River, forming a huge ledge. Here, the troops of Army Group Center defended themselves, which had a well-developed network of railways and highways for wide maneuver along internal lines, blocking the path to Warsaw for Soviet troops. When the Soviet troops went on the offensive, she could inflict powerful flank attacks on the troops of the Baltic and Belorussian fronts

The fascist German troops occupied defenses prepared in advance, in depth (2.50-270 km), which relied on a developed system of field fortifications and natural lines. Defensive lines passed, as a rule, along the western banks of numerous rivers, which had wide swampy floodplains.

The idea of ​​the Soviet command provided for a simultaneous breakthrough of the enemy's defenses in 6 sectors in order to dismember his troops and break them in parts. Particular importance was attached to the defeat of the most powerful flank groupings of the Nazis, who were defending in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, which provided the conditions for the rapid advance of large forces of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian fronts and the development of their success in converging directions to Minsk.

The survivors, while the enemy troops were to be thrown back to a depth of 200-250 km in an area near Minsk unfavorable for defensive operations, cut off their escape routes, surround them and liquidate them. In the future, building up the strike and expanding the front of the offensive, the Soviet troops were to reach the western border of the USSR.

The operation consisted of 2 stages. On the first (June 23 - July 4) Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk, Minsk operations were carried out. As a result of the 1st stage of the Belarusian operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated, a 400-kilometer gap was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, and Soviet troops were able to advance to the West.

At the 2nd stage (July 5 - August 29), the Vilnius, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Siauliai, Kaunas operations were carried out.

During the operation, the partisans cut off the enemy's retreat routes, captured and built new bridges and crossings for the Red Army, independently liberated a number of regional centers, and participated in the liquidation of encircled enemy groups. The Belarusian operation created the conditions for the further advance of the Red Army into Germany.

For participation in the Belarusian operation, more than 1,500 generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 662 formations and units received honorary titles after the names of the cities and localities they liberated. In honor of the operation, the Mound of Glory of the Soviet Army, the liberator of Belarus, was poured on the 21st km of the Minsk-Moscow highway. Liberation Day of Minsk July 3 is celebrated as the Independence Day of the Republic of Belarus

As a result sixth strike (in July - August ) The Red Army pushed the Germans back across the San and Vistula rivers with the liberation of Western Ukraine and consolidation on the bridgehead west of Sandomierz ( Lviv-Sandomierz operation ).

AT August 1944 (Yasso - Chisinau operation ) our troops inflicted seventh strike- in the Chisinau-Iasi region, where 22 German divisions were surrounded and defeated, they forced the Romanian army to surrender. As a result of this operation, Moldova was completely liberated, Romania and Bulgaria were withdrawn from the war.

As a result eighth strike (in September - October 1944 ) near Tallinn and Riga German troops were defeated and expelled from the Baltic states, and Finland was also withdrawn from the war, declaring war on Germany.

Ninth impact our troops inflicted in October 1944 between the Tisza and the Danube in Hungary and Yugoslavia . As a result of this blow, Hungary was withdrawn from the fascist bloc and a significant part of Yugoslavia was liberated. The troops crossed the Carpathian Range and entered the territory of Czechoslovakia.

But the northern part of the Soviet-German front still remained. In the plans of the Nazi command, a significant place was occupied by the issue of capturing the northwestern regions of the Soviet Union, mastering the Soviet Arctic, the sea routes of the Arctic Ocean and capturing the Murmansk railway. This would allow fascist Germany to secure its northern flank, as well as isolate the USSR from the outside world and prevent navigation between our northern ports and the ports of England and the USA. The Nazis also believed that the capture of the Soviet North would best provide German communications for the export of strategic raw materials from the USSR and the supply of troops of the 20th mountain army.

Tenth blow in October 1944 became the operation troops of the Karelian Front and ships of the Northern Fleet to defeat the 20th mountain German army in Northern Finland , as a result of which the Pechenga region was liberated and the threat to the port of Murmansk and the northern sea routes of the USSR was eliminated. On October 15, Soviet troops occupied Pechenga, on October 23 they cleared the entire region of nickel mines, and on October 25 they entered the allied Norway to liberate it from German troops.

Thus, 1944 ended with the complete and steady advantage of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht. In 1944, the entire territory of the USSR was cleared of Nazi invaders and military operations were transferred to the territory of Germany and its allies. The successes of the Soviet Army in 1944 predetermined the final defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

During the fighting in 1944, the Soviet Armed Forces destroyed and captured 138 divisions; 58 German divisions, which suffered losses of up to 50% or more, were disbanded and reduced to battle groups. Only in the battles for Belarus, 540 thousand German soldiers and officers were taken prisoner by the troops of the Red Army. On July 17, 1944, up to 60,000 of this staff, led by 19 generals, were marched through the streets of Moscow.

Operation Barbarossa - essence and goals

Operation "Barbarossa" (plan "Barbarossa" 1941) - a plan for a military attack and the rapid seizure of the territory of the USSR by Hitler's troops during the Second World War. Hitler's plan and the essence of Operation Barbarossa was to quickly and unexpectedly attack the Soviet troops on their own territory and, taking advantage of the enemy's confusion, defeat the Red Army. Then, within two months, the German army was to advance inland and conquer Moscow. Control over the USSR gave Germany the opportunity to fight the United States for the right to dictate its terms in world politics. Hitler, who had already managed to conquer almost all of Europe, was confident in his victory over the USSR.

However, the Barbarossa plan was a failure, and the protracted operation turned into a long war. The plan "Barbarossa" got its name in honor of the medieval King of Germany Frederick 1, who bore the nickname "Barbarossa" and was famous for his military achievements. Contents of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler's plans Despite the fact that Germany and the USSR made peace in 1939, Hitler still decided to attack Russia, as it was a necessary step towards the world domination of Germany and the "Third Reich". In order for the attack to go quickly and without problems, Hitler instructed the German command to collect information about the composition of the Soviet army and, on this basis, draw up an attack plan. This is how the Barbarossa plan was born. After checking, German intelligence officers came to the conclusion that the Soviet army was in many ways inferior to the German one - it was less organized, worse prepared and, most importantly, the technical equipment of Russian soldiers left much to be desired. Focusing precisely on these principles, Hitler created a plan for a swift attack, which was supposed to ensure the victory of Germany in record time. The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to attack the USSR on the borders of the country and, taking advantage of the unpreparedness of the enemy, break the army into fragmented pieces, and then destroy it. Hitler made the main emphasis on modern military equipment, which belonged to Germany, and the effect of surprise. The plan was to be implemented in early 1941. First, the German troops were to attack the Russian army in Belarus, where the main troops were assembled. Having defeated the Soviet soldiers in Belarus, Hitler planned to advance towards Ukraine, conquer Kyiv and the sea routes, cutting off Russia's ability to move along the Dnieper. At the same time, a blow was to be struck at Murmansk from Norway. Hitler planned to launch an offensive against Moscow, surrounding the capital from all sides. Despite careful preparations in an atmosphere of secrecy, it became clear from the first weeks that the Barbarossa plan was a failure. Carrying out the Barbarossa plan and the results From the very first days, the operation did not go as successfully as planned. First of all, this happened due to the fact that Hitler and the German command underestimated the Soviet troops. According to historians, the Russian army was not only equal in strength to the German one, but in many ways even surpassed it. The Soviet troops turned out to be well prepared, in addition, military operations were taking place on Russian territories, so the soldiers could use the natural conditions, which they knew better than the Germans, to their advantage. The Soviet army was also able to resist and not break up into separate units thanks to good command and the ability to quickly mobilize and make lightning-fast decisions. At the beginning of the attack, Hitler planned to quickly move deep into the Soviet army and begin to break it into pieces, separating different detachments from each other in order to avoid massive and large-scale operations by the Russians. He managed to advance, but he did not manage to break the front - the Russian detachments quickly gathered together and brought up new forces. This led to the fact that Hitler's army, although winning, was advancing catastrophically slowly inland, not by kilometers, as planned, but by meters. Only a few months later, Hitler managed to approach Moscow, but the German army did not dare to launch attacks - the soldiers were exhausted by prolonged hostilities, and the city was never bombarded. Although it was planned otherwise. Hitler also failed to bomb Leningrad, which was besieged and blockaded, but did not surrender, and was not destroyed from the air. A long war began, which lasted from 1941 to 1945 and ended with the defeat of Hitler. Reasons for the failure of the Barbarossa plan Hitler's plan failed for several reasons: The Russian army turned out to be stronger and more prepared than the German command expected. The Russians compensated for the lack of modern military equipment with the ability to fight in difficult natural conditions, as well as competent command; The Soviet army had excellent counterintelligence. Thanks to the scouts, the command almost always knew about the next step of the enemy, which made it possible to quickly and adequately respond to the actions of the attackers; Inaccessibility of territories. The Germans did not know the territory of the USSR well, since it was extremely difficult to get maps. In addition, they did not know how to fight in impenetrable forests; Loss of control over the course of the war. The Barbarossa plan quickly proved to be untenable, and a few months later Hitler completely lost control over the course of hostilities. http://historynotes.ru/operaciya-barbarossa/

Operation "Bagration"

This one of the largest operations of the Soviet Army in some Western historical works is characterized as "Hitler's biggest defeat." Indeed, during this operation (June 23 - August 29, 1944), the German armed forces lost 289 thousand people killed and captured, 110 thousand wounded, the USSR recaptured Belarus and a significant part of Lithuania, entered the territory of Poland. Planning The Soviet side The development of a plan for the Belarusian operation was started by the Soviet General Staff (under the leadership of Marshal Vasilevsky) in April 1944. It was supposed to deliver two converging strikes - from Vitebsk and from Bobruisk, both in the direction of Minsk (it should be noted - the Soviet General Staff assumed that the front of the German units was especially strengthened in the regions of Vitebsk and Bobruisk). Further, it was supposed to occupy the entire territory of Belarus and Lithuania, go to the coast of the Baltic Sea (Klaipeda), to the border of East Prussia (Suwalki) and to the territory of Poland (Lublin). The duration of the operation is 40-50 days. The plan was approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 30, 1944. The start of Operation Bagration was scheduled for June 19-20 (on June 14, the start of the operation was postponed to June 23 due to delays in rail transport). The German side The command of the German Army Group Center discovered preparations for a Soviet offensive by 10 June. This preparation was reported on June 14 at a meeting of the chief of staff of the high command of the ground forces with the chiefs of staff of the army groups. However, Hitler's conviction took root in the headquarters of the ground forces that the Soviet offensive would be in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bWestern Ukraine, on the front of the Northern Ukraine Army Group. Therefore, most of the German tank divisions were concentrated there (the German command planned to launch a powerful counterattack on the expected Soviet offensive there). At the request of Army Group Center to provide it with at least larger reserves, it was stated that the general situation on the Eastern Front did not allow for a different grouping of forces. The forces of the parties Soviet forces Four Soviet fronts were involved in the operation "Bagration" - the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd, 1st Belorussian. In total - 168 rifle and cavalry divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps, 20 brigades. The total number is 2.33 million soldiers and commanders (as well as the 1st Army of the Polish Army - 4 infantry divisions, cavalry and tank brigades, 80 thousand people). These troops were armed with more than 31 thousand guns and mortars (caliber 76 mm and above), more than 5.2 thousand. tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 6 thousand aircraft. Thus, about a third of all Soviet forces on the Soviet-German front were involved in Operation Bagration. Marshal Vasilevsky (northern sector, 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts) and Marshal Zhukov (southern sector, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts) were appointed to directly supervise the preparation and conduct of Operation Bagration. German forces As part of the Army Group Center (commander - Field Marshal Bush) there were four armies - the 3rd tank, 4th, 9th, 2nd armies. In total - 49 divisions, of which: 1 tank, 4 motorized, 30 infantry, 1 cavalry, 2 field, 1 training, 6 security, 1 Hungarian infantry, 1 Hungarian cavalry, 2 Hungarian spares. The total number is 849 thousand people (of which 486 thousand are at the front). These troops were armed with 3,200 guns and mortars, 500 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 600 aircraft. The first stage of the operation (June 23-28) Northern Sector On June 23, 1944, the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts went on the offensive against the German 3rd Panzer Army. On June 25, the Soviet 43rd and 39th armies surrounded Vitebsk, where the German 53rd corps was defending (two infantry and two field divisions, about 30 thousand people). On June 26, the corps went on a breakthrough from the boiler, the next day it was completely defeated. In the extreme northern sector, the 4th shock army was unable to advance in the direction of Polotsk. Advancing on the southern sector of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the 5th Guards Tank Army (524 tanks and self-propelled guns, commander - Marshal of the armored forces Rotmistrov) on June 28 stumbled on the approaches to the Berezina River on the German 5th Tank Division (125 tanks and self-propelled guns, commander - Major General Decker), was stopped by her, and suffered heavy losses. By the end of June 28, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts advanced (except for the Polotsk direction) by 100-150 kilometers. The southern section of the 2nd Belorussian Front also went on the offensive on June 23, against the German 4th Army on June 28, the troops of the front crossed the Dnieper and occupied the city of Mogilev, advancing 50-80 kilometers. The 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive against the German 9th Army on June 24, a day later than the other three fronts (Zhukov asked Stalin about this and received consent). By the end of June 28, the troops of the front advanced 100 kilometers and surrounded Bobruisk (the city was taken on June 29 after stubborn battles, a significant part of the German troops made their way out of the boiler). The second stage of the operation (June 29 - July 4) On June 28, 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters set new tasks for the fronts: the 1st Baltic - to take Polotsk and Glubokoe, then advance on Shvenchenis (Lithuania); The 3rd Belorussian - to force the Berezina River, take Minsk and Molodechno (the directive specifically noted that “The Headquarters is dissatisfied with the slow and indecisive actions of the 5th Guards TA and attributes this to the poor leadership of it by Comrade Rotmistrov. The Headquarters demands from the 5th Guards. TA of swift and decisive actions that correspond to the situation at the front."); 2nd Belorussian - to force the Berezina River, then take Minsk and force the Svisloch River; 1st Belorussian - advance on Baranovichi. Troops of the 1st Baltic Front approached Polotsk on June 30 and took it on July 4. On the same day Glubokoe was taken. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front took Minsk on July 3 (with the forces of the 11th Guards Army, the 31st Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps against the German 5th Tank Division and three infantry divisions; while earlier the front commander ordered the 5th guards army to take Minsk by the end of July 2, but Rotmistrov led his army north). Molodechno was taken on 5 July. Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front on July 4 approached the eastern outskirts of Minsk. Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on July 4 took Nesvizh (40 km east of Baranovichi), part of the forces approached the southern outskirts of Minsk. The third stage of the operation (July 5 - 28) On July 4, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command set the tasks for the fronts: the 1st Baltic - to develop the offensive, delivering the main blow in the general direction to Shvenchenis, Kaunas. The immediate task is to capture the Daugavspils-Shvencheneliai-Podbrodze line no later than July 10-12. In the future, advance on Kaunas and part of the forces on Panevezys and Siauliai. 3rd Belorussian - to develop the offensive, inflicting the main blow in the general direction of Molodechno, Vilnius. The immediate task is to capture Vilnius and Lida no later than July 10-12. In the future, go to the Neman River and seize bridgeheads on the western bank. 2nd Belorussian - to develop the offensive, delivering the main blow in the direction of Novogrudok, Volkovysk, Bialystok. The immediate task is to capture Novogrudok no later than July 12-15, to reach the Neman and Molchad rivers. In the future, capture Volkovysk and advance in the direction of Bialystok. 1st Belorussian - to develop the offensive, delivering the main blow in the general direction to Baranovichi, Brest. The immediate task is to capture Baranovichi, Luninets and, no later than July 10-12, reach the line of Slonim - the Shchara River - Pinsk. In the future, take control of Brest and go to the Western Bug River, capturing bridgeheads on the western bank. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front were unable to complete the immediate task - by July 14 they had advanced about half the distance to the indicated line and stopped, repelling German counterattacks. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front took Lida on July 9, but Vilnius was taken only on July 13, by the forces of the 5th Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army (Vilnius was defended by 7 German infantry battalions and 4 air defense batteries). On July 15, the troops of the front crossed the Neman near Alytus and captured several bridgeheads on the western bank, but the front's offensive stopped there due to the stubborn resistance of the Germans. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front took Novogrudok on July 8, Volkovysk on July 14, and Grodno on July 16. At the Grodno-Svisloch (western) line, the front was stopped due to the stubborn resistance of the Germans. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front took Baranovichi on July 8, and Pinsk on July 14. On July 16, the troops of the front reached the line Svisloch (western) - Pruzhany. At the same time, the 33rd Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the 50th and 49th Armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front were fighting against a group of German troops surrounded east of Minsk (the remnants of five German corps, up to 100 thousand people), making their way into southwest direction (south of Minsk). By July 12, this grouping was largely defeated (according to Vasilevsky's memoirs, 35 thousand were taken prisoner, including 12 generals), but separate groups of Germans continued to make their way to the west, and some managed to cross the front line in August. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front again went on the offensive on July 20. Panevezys was taken on July 22, Šiauliai on July 27. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front have been on the defensive on the Neman River since July 15. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front resumed their offensive on July 20, and on July 27 they took Bialystok. Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive in the direction of Lublin on July 18. On July 20, the troops of the front crossed the Western Bug River and entered the territory of Poland. July 23 Lublin was taken. On July 25, the troops of the front reached the Vistula River, in the area of ​​Deblin. On July 28 Brest was taken. The fourth stage of the operation (July 29 - August 29) On July 28, 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters assigned the fronts tasks for a further offensive: the 1st Baltic - to cut off the enemy grouping operating in the Baltic states from its communications towards East Prussia. Develop the main blow in the general direction to Riga, part of the forces of the left wing to advance on Memel (Klaipeda). 3rd Belorussian Front - not later than August 1-2, capture Kaunas. In the future, advance to the borders of East Prussia and, no later than August 10, capture the line of Rossieny (Raseiniai) - Yurburg (Jurbarkas) - Eidkunnen - Suwalki, where to firmly gain a foothold in preparation for the invasion of East Prussia, in the general direction of Gumbinen, Insterburg, Preussisch-Aylau. The 2nd Belorussian Front - to develop the offensive, delivering the main blow in the general direction of Lomza - Ostroleka, not later than August 8-10, to capture the Augustow - Graevo - Staviski - Ostroleka line, firmly gain a foothold on it in preparation for the invasion of East Prussia. The 1st Belorussian Front is to develop an offensive in the general direction of Warsaw and, no later than August 5-8, occupy Prague (a suburb of Warsaw), seize bridgeheads on the western bank of the Narew River in the Pultusk-Serotsk region, and seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula River with the left wing in the area of ​​Deblin - Zvolen - Solec. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front moved north, on August 1 they captured Yelgava. On the same day, the 8th Guards Mechanized Brigade of Colonel Kremer reached the coast of the Gulf of Riga near the village of Klapkalns, but was soon driven back by a German counterattack. It was not possible to cut off the German Army Group North from the Army Group Center. During August, the troops of the front fought heavy defensive battles. Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front launched an offensive against Kaunas. The enemy stubbornly resisted, but on August 1 Kaunas was taken. In August, having repelled German counterattacks in the Kaunas region, the troops of the front reached the Raseiniai-Suwalki line. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front managed to advance 10-30 kilometers in a month of fighting. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on July 31 approached the approaches to Prague (a suburb of Warsaw), but during August they could not take it. In early August, the troops of the left wing of the front captured two bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula River (near Magnuszew and Pulawy), and also reached the Narew River. On August 29, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered four fronts to go on the defensive. The offensive launched on June 23 in the central sector of the Soviet-German front was completed. Results and losses During Operation Bagration, the Soviet Army occupied the territory of all of Belarus, most of Lithuania, part of Poland, and came close to the border of Germany (East Prussia). Soviet troops advanced 300-500 kilometers. The German armed forces suffered heavy losses in manpower - irretrievably (killed and captured) 289 thousand, wounded 110 thousand. Losses of the Soviet Army - irrevocably 178.5 thousand, wounded 587 thousand. Sources: 1. History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945. Volume 4. M., Military Publishing House, 1962. 2. Great Patriotic War. Volume 16. M., "Terra", 1998. 3. K. Tippelskirch, History of the Second World War. Volume 2. M., "Polygon", 1994. 4. A. Vasilevsky, Life's Work. M., Politizdat, 1978. 5. Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat. London, Brockhampton Press, 1994. 6. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century. M., "OLMA-PRESS", 2001. 7. Liberation of cities. M., Military Publishing House, 1985. http://www.volk59.narod.ru/OperationBagration.htm

"Rail War"

1) the actions of partisans behind enemy lines in order to disrupt the work of his railway. transport and incapacitation of manpower, military equipment and materiel transported by rail.

2) The name of a major operation carried out by Soviet partisans during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 - in August - September 1943 in the occupied territories of the RSFSR, the BSSR and part of the Ukrainian SSR in order to disable the railway. enemy communications.

In June 1943, the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Belarus put forward a plan for the simultaneous mass destruction of sections of railways in the occupied territory of the republic. The Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) involved in the implementation of this plan, in addition to the partisans of Belarus, Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol and part of the Ukrainian partisans. Operation R. in." was associated with the plans of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to complete the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk 1943 (See Battle of Kursk 1943), conduct the Smolensk operation of 1943 (See Smolensk operation 1943) and the offensive with the aim of liberating the Left-Bank Ukraine. On July 14, the TsSHPD was ordered to conduct Operation R. in.". The local headquarters of the partisan movement and their representations at the fronts determined areas and objects of action for each partisan formation. The guerrillas were provided with explosives, fuses, mine-blasting classes were held at the “forest courses”, local “factories” mined tol from captured shells and bombs, fasteners of tol pieces to the rails were made in workshops and forges. Exploration was actively carried out on the railways. The operation began on the night of August 3 and continued until mid-September. The actions unfolded on the ground with a length of about 1000 km along the front and 750 km in depth, about 100 thousand partisans, who were helped by the local population, took part in them. A powerful blow to the railway. lines was unexpected for the enemy, who for some time could not resist the partisans in an organized manner. During the operation, about 215 thousand rails were blown up, many echelons were derailed, railway bridges and station buildings were blown up. The massive disruption of enemy communications made it much more difficult to regroup the retreating enemy troops, complicate their supply, and thereby contributed to the successful offensive of the Red Army.

http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/bse/127049/Rail

Operation Typhoon

Operation Typhoon, called by Hitler's strategists the "main battle of the year," began on September 30 with General Heinz Guderian's Second Panzer Group going on the offensive in the Bryansk Front from the Shostka region. On October 2, the remaining two groups from the regions of Dukhovshchina and Roslavl went on the offensive. Their attacks were directed in converging directions to Vyazma in order to cover the main forces of the Western and Reserve fronts. On the very first day, enemy divisions penetrated the defenses of the Red Army for 15-30 kilometers. On October 3-4, the command of the Western Front, with the forces of the army and front reserves, launched counterattacks on the broken through Nazi units, which, however, were not successful, since they were carried out by sedentary groups and without proper artillery and air support. In the first days, the enemy offensive developed successfully. He managed to reach the rear of the 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front, and on October 6, west of Vyazma, encircle the 19th and 20th armies of the Western and the 24th and 32nd armies of the Reserve fronts. The troops, who found themselves in the Vyazma encirclement, waged a courageous fight against the enemy. They launched counterattacks and broke through the encirclement. Here is how the participants in the exit from the encirclement as part of the 29th Infantry Division P. Lukin, N. Okhapkin and P. Silantyev tell about this. “The attacks of our troops followed one after another, they were preceded by artillery preparation. Our attacks were especially fierce on October 8-12, when Captain Flerov's Katyusha battery joined the division's combat operations ... For the Germans, the offensive of the encircled battalions and regiments of Soviet troops was a complete surprise. The Nazis, apparently, believed that since our units were surrounded and suffered significant losses, they were no longer dangerous, they were finished. And suddenly these regiments and battalions found the strength and went forward in an easterly direction. The Germans had to hastily pull together large formations and equipment here. The active combat operations of the Soviet troops in the encirclement had a serious impact on the development of events. They tied down 28 Nazi divisions in the Vyazma region, which got stuck here and could not continue the offensive against Moscow. At the same time, in the zone of the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front, the Nazis broke through along the Warsaw highway (now the A101 Moscow-Roslavl highway) and captured the important strategic settlement of Yukhnov. The Soviet command, which discovered the accumulation of German motorized columns late, could not find the strength to stop the breakthrough. In the afternoon of October 5, cadets of the Podolsk Infantry and Podolsk Artillery Schools were raised on combat alert. By this time, only 17-18 year old cadets of the first year of study remained at the school, since the senior cadets were released ahead of schedule. The cadets had to urgently advance to the Maloyaroslavets area in order to occupy a combat sector on the left flank of the Mozhaisk line of defense. But first of all, it was necessary to throw forward detachments in order to delay the Germans at any cost until the defense was ready. The infantry school allocates an artillery combined division to the forward detachment, which is ordered to command captain Rosikov, one of the cadet teachers. By the morning of October 6, the advance detachment reached the Ugra River and immediately attacked the already crossed enemy units. As it turned out later, it was the vanguard of one of the divisions of the 4th tank group (army) of the enemy, which was completing the encirclement of several of our armies near Vyazma. The desperate attack of the young "Red Junkers" was a complete surprise for the Germans, and they were forced out beyond the Ugra. But this was only the beginning of the first test of the cadets. Ahead were several difficult days of withdrawal under the blows of tanks, almost continuous bombing - to the Ilyinsky section of the Mozhaisk line, where the main forces of the schools were deployed. For two weeks, suffering heavy losses, the Podolsk cadets defended the line. Many years later, this will be called the feat of the Podolsk cadets. In those two weeks, the inscription: "two ill-fated cadet schools" did not leave the operational maps in the German headquarters. To capture Maloyaroslavets, which was the key to Podolsk and Moscow, the enemy abandoned two divisions - motorized and infantry. They were opposed by formations and units of the 43rd Army of Lieutenant General S. D. Akimov: the 312th Rifle Division under the command of Colonel A.F. Naumov, units of the Podolsk infantry and artillery schools, the 108th reserve rifle regiment, the consolidated battalion 616- th rifle regiment, six artillery regiments, a guards mortar regiment, three separate machine-gun and artillery battalions, seven separate flamethrower companies, and others. All attempts to hold back the advance of the enemy in this direction by the forces of the army turned out to be futile. Then, on the orders of the command of the Western Front, on October 13-14, a counterattack was launched by the forces of the 110th and 113th rifle divisions of colonels S. T. Gladyshev and K. I. Mironov. However, he was also unsuccessful. The additional entry into battle of the 53rd Rifle Division (commander Colonel N.P. Krasnoretsky), the 9th (commander Lieutenant Colonel I.F. Kirichenko) and the 17th (commander Major N.Ya. Klypin) tank brigades did not change the situation. . The defense area was surrendered. Last attack on Moscow German tanks attack Soviet positions in the Istra region, November 25, 1941. “Now stop the enemy on the outskirts of our capital, do not let him in, grind the Nazi divisions and corps in battles ... The Moscow knot is now decisive ... A little more time will pass, and the enemy's attack on Moscow will have to choke. It is necessary at all costs to withstand the tension of these days ”(G.K. Zhukov, 11/26/1941). To resume the attack on Moscow, the Wehrmacht deployed 51 divisions, including 13 tank and 7 motorized. According to the plan of the German command, Army Group Center was to break the flank units of the defense of the Soviet troops and surround Moscow. The Soviet command reinforced the dangerous sectors of the front with reserves and reinforcements. The parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941 was of great political importance. Thus, the government of the USSR and personally I. V. Stalin demonstrated their determination to fight to the end. The offensive of German troops on Moscow resumed from the northwest on November 15-16, from the southwest on November 18. The enemy delivered the main blows in the directions of Klin-Rogachevo and Tula-Kashira. At the end of November, the enemy managed to capture the area of ​​Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Istra, reach the Moscow-Volga Canal in the Yakhroma area and occupy Krasnaya Polyana (32 km from the Moscow Kremlin). The further advance of the Germans in the northern direction was prevented by the discharge of water from the Istra, Ivankovsky reservoirs and reservoirs of the Moscow Canal. According to the memoirs of Marshal Shaposhnikov, “as the Germans approached this line, the water outlets of the reservoir were blown up (after the crossing of our troops), resulting in a water stream up to 2.5 m high for up to 50 km south of the reservoir. Attempts by the Germans to close the spillways were unsuccessful. The 1st Shock Army and the 20th Army were transferred to the Western Front, which covered the gap between the 30th (on November 17 transferred to the Western Front) and the 16th Armies. As a result of the involvement of Soviet reserves, the enemy was stopped and forced to go on the defensive. At the end of November there were fierce battles in the area of ​​Kashira and Tula. On November 27, Soviet troops launched a counterattack on the 2nd Panzer Army and drove it back from Kashira. The 2nd Panzer Army tried to bypass Tula from the northeast and cut off the Serpukhov-Tula railways and highways, but the counterattack of the Soviet troops threw the enemy back to their original positions. On December 1, the command of Army Group Center made a new attempt to break through to Moscow in the Aprelevka area. On December 2, the Germans occupied Burtsevo, the closest settlement to Moscow on the southwestern front. Thanks to the well-organized interaction of the 33rd Army of General M. G. Efremov and the 5th Army of General L.A. Govorov, this attempt was eliminated. The Supreme Command Headquarters ordered, in addition to the new 10th and 20th armies transferred to the Western Front from the reserve of the Headquarters of the 1st Shock, to include the 24th and 60th armies in the Moscow defense zone. On December 2, the advanced units of the 1st Shock and 20th armies repelled all enemy attacks north of Moscow in the Dmitrov region and to the south and forced him to stop the offensive. On December 3-5, the 1st Shock and 20th armies launched several strong counterattacks in the Yakhroma and Krasnaya Polyana region and began to push the enemy. The left-flank divisions of the 16th Army, in cooperation with the 5th Army, pushed the enemy back from the large bend of the river. Moscow northeast of Zvenigorod. The strike group of the 33rd Army, having defeated enemy units on December 4-5, restored the situation on the Nara River. The results of the defense of Moscow During the defensive stage of the Battle of Moscow, the Soviet command imposed on the enemy a "war of attrition" (when the "last battalion" rushes into battle, which should decide the outcome of the battle). But if during the battle all the reserves of the German command were exhausted, the Soviet command managed to save the main forces (from the strategic reserves, only the 1st Shock Army and the 20th Army were brought into battle). The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Army, G. Guderian, wrote down his resume as follows: The attack on Moscow failed. All the sacrifices and efforts of our valiant troops were in vain. We have suffered a serious defeat, which, due to the stubbornness of the high command, led to fatal consequences in the coming weeks. In the German offensive, a crisis ensued, the strength and morale of the German army were broken. h

ttp://rufact.org/wiki/Operation%20"Typhoon"

Plan "Ost"

The General Plan Ost (German: Generalplan Ost) is a secret plan of the German government of the Third Reich to carry out ethnic cleansing in Eastern Europe and its German colonization after the victory over the USSR. A version of the plan was developed in 1941 by the Main Directorate of Imperial Security and presented on May 28, 1942 by an employee of the Office of the Headquarters of the Imperial Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German People, SS Oberführer Meyer-Hetling under the name "General Plan Ost - the basis of the legal, economic and territorial structure of the East." The text of this document was found in the German Federal Archives in the late 1980s, some documents from there were presented at an exhibition in 1991, but were fully digitized and published only in November-December 2009. At the Nuremberg Trials, the only evidence of the existence of the plan was " Comments and proposals of the “Eastern Ministry” on the general plan “Ost”, according to the prosecutors, written on April 27, 1942 by an employee of the Ministry of Eastern Territories E. Wetzel after reading the draft plan prepared by the RSHA. Rosenberg's project The Master Plan was preceded by a project developed by the Reichsministry of the Occupied Territories, which was headed by Alfred Rosenberg. On May 9, 1941, Rosenberg submitted to the Fuhrer a draft policy directive on the territories to be occupied as a result of the aggression against the USSR. Rosenberg proposed the creation of five governorships on the territory of the USSR. Hitler opposed the autonomy of Ukraine and replaced the term “governorship” with “Reich Commissariat” for it. As a result, Rosenberg's ideas took the following forms of embodiment. Ostland - was to include Belarus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Ostland, where, according to Rosenberg, lived a population with Aryan blood, was subject to complete Germanization within two generations. Ukraine - would include the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR, Crimea, a number of territories along the Don and Volga, as well as the lands of the abolished Soviet Autonomous Republic of the Volga Germans. According to Rosenberg's idea, the governorate was to receive autonomy and become the backbone of the Third Reich in the East. Caucasus - would include the republics of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia and would separate Russia from the Black Sea. Muscovy - Russia to the Urals. Turkestan was to become the fifth governorate. The success of the German campaign in the summer-autumn of 1941 led to a revision and toughening of the German plans for the eastern lands, and as a result, the Ost plan was born. Description of the plan According to some reports, the "Plan Ost" was divided into two - the "Small Plan" (German: Kleine Planung) and the "Big Plan" (German: Große Planung). The small plan was to be carried out during the war. The German government wanted to focus on the Grand Plan after the war. The plan provided for a different percentage of Germanization for various conquered Slavic and other peoples. "Non-Germanized" were to be deported to Western Siberia or subjected to physical destruction. The execution of the plan was to ensure that the conquered territories would acquire an irrevocably German character. Wetzel's Remarks and Suggestions Among historians, a document known as “Remarks and Suggestions of the Eastern Ministry on the General Plan Ost” has been circulated. The text of this document has often been presented as Plan Ost itself, although it bears little resemblance to the text of the Plan published at the end of 2009. Wetzel assumed the expulsion of tens of millions of Slavs beyond the Urals. The Poles, according to Wetzel, "were the most hostile to the Germans, the largest and therefore the most dangerous people." "Generalplan Ost", as it should be understood, also meant the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" (German: Endlösung der Judenfrage), according to which the Jews were subject to total extermination: The number of people to be evicted, according to the plan, should in reality be much higher than provided. Only if we take into account that approximately 5-6 million Jews living in this territory will be liquidated even before the eviction, can we agree with the figure mentioned in the plan of 45 million local residents of non-German origin. However, the plan shows that Jews are included in the mentioned 45 million people. From this, therefore, it follows that the plan proceeds from an obviously incorrect calculation of the population. In the Baltics, the Latvians were considered more suitable for "Germanization", while the Lithuanians and Latgalians were not, as there were too many "Slavic admixtures" among them. According to Wetzel's proposals, the Russian people had to be subjected to measures such as assimilation ("Germanization") and reduction in numbers through a reduction in the birth rate - such actions are defined as genocide. From the directive of A. Hitler to the Minister for Eastern Territories A. Rosenberg on the introduction of the General Plan "Ost" (July 23, 1942) The Slavs must work for us, and if we no longer need them, let them die. Vaccinations and health care are unnecessary for them. Slavic fertility is undesirable... education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count up to a hundred ... Every educated person is our future enemy. All sentimental objections should be discarded. We need to rule these people with iron determination... In military terms, we must kill three to four million Russians a year. Developed versions of the Ost plan The following documents were developed by the planning group Gr. lll B Planning Service of the General Staff Office of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German People Heinrich Himmler (Reichskommissar für die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums (RKFDV) and the Institute of Agrarian Policy of the Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin: Document 1: "Fundamentals of Planning" created in February 1940 by the planning service RKFDV (volume: 21 pages) Content: Description of the extent of the planned eastern colonization in West Prussia and the Wartheland The colonization area was to be 87,600 km², of which 59,000 km² was agricultural land. 29 hectares each.It was planned to resettle in this territory about 4.3 million Germans, of which 3.15 million in rural areas and 1.15 million in cities.At the same time, 560,000 Jews (100% of the population of this region) were to be gradually eliminated. nationality) and 3.4 million Poles (44% of the population of the region of this nationality). x plans were not evaluated. Document 2: Materials for the report "Colonization", developed in December 1940 by the planning service of the RKFDV (volume 5 pages). Contents: Founding article to "Requirement of Territories for Forced Resettlement from the Old Reich" with a specific requirement for 130,000 km² of land for 480,000 new viable settlement farms of 25 hectares each, plus an additional 40% of the territory for forestry, for the needs of the army and reserve areas in Wartheland and Poland. Documents created after the attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941 Document 3 (disappeared, exact content unknown): “General plan Ost”, created in July 1941 by the RKFDV planning service. Contents: Description of the extent of the planned eastern colonization in the USSR, with the boundaries of specific areas of colonization. Document 4 (disappeared, exact content unknown): "General plan Ost", created in December 1941 by the planning group Gr. lll B RSHA. Contents: Description of the scale of the planned eastern colonization in the USSR and the Governor-General with the specific boundaries of individual areas of settlement. Document 5: "General Plan Ost", created in May 1942 by the Institute for Agriculture and Politics of the Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin (volume 68 pages). Contents: Description of the scale of the planned eastern colonization in the USSR with the specific boundaries of individual areas of settlement. The area of ​​colonization was to cover 364,231 km², including 36 strongholds and three administrative districts in the region of Leningrad, the Kherson-Crimean region and in the region of Bialystok. At the same time, settlement farms with an area of ​​40-100 hectares, as well as large agricultural enterprises with an area of ​​at least 250 hectares, were supposed to appear. The required number of migrants was estimated at 5.65 million. The areas planned for settlement were to be cleared of approximately 25 million people. The cost of implementing the plan was estimated at 66.6 billion Reichsmarks. Document 6: "General Plan of Colonization" (German: Generalsiedlungsplan), created in September 1942 by the planning service of the RKF (volume: 200 pages, including 25 maps and tables). Content: Description of the scale of the planned colonization of all areas provided for this with specific boundaries of individual areas of settlement. The region was to cover an area of ​​330,000 km² with 360,100 farms. The required number of migrants was estimated at 12.21 million people (of which 2.859 million were peasants and those employed in forestry). The area planned for settlement was to be cleared of approximately 30.8 million people. The cost of implementing the plan was estimated at 144 billion Reichsmarks.

http://www.encyclopaedia-russia.ru/article.php?id=330

Berlin operation 1945

Offensive operation of the 2nd Belorussian (Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky), 1st Belorussian (Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) and 1st Ukrainian (Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev) fronts April 16 - May 8 during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-45 (See Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-45). In January - March 1945, Soviet troops defeated large enemy groupings in East Prussia, Poland and East Pomerania and, having reached the river on a wide front. Oder and Neisse, deeply wedged into German territory. On the western bank of the river Oder bridgeheads were captured, including a particularly important one in the Kustrin area. Simultaneously with Z., without encountering organized resistance, the Anglo-American troops advanced. The Hitlerite clique, hoping for disagreements between the allies, took every measure to delay the advance of Soviet troops on the outskirts of Berlin and to negotiate a separate peace with the Anglo-American ruling circles. In the Berlin direction, the fascist German command concentrated a large grouping as part of the Vistula Army Group (3rd Panzer and 9th Armies) of Colonel General G. Heinrici (since April 30, General of the Infantry K. Tippelskirch) and the 4th Panzer and 17th Army of the Army Group "Center" Field Marshal F. Scherner (total about 1 million people, 10,400 guns and mortars, 1,530 tanks and assault guns, over 3,300 aircraft). On the western banks of the Oder and Neisse, 3 defensive lines were created with a depth of up to 20-40 km; The Berlin defensive area consisted of 3 ring defensive contours, all large buildings in the city were turned into strongholds, streets and squares were blocked by powerful barricades. For the offensive in the Berlin direction, the Soviet command concentrated 19 combined arms (including 2 Polish), 4 tank and 4 air armies (2.5 million people, 41600 guns and mortars, 6250 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 7500 aircraft ). The plan of the operation was to inflict several powerful blows on a wide front, dismember the Berlin enemy grouping, surround and destroy it piece by piece. The operation began on April 16 after a powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the 1st Belorussian Front attacked the enemy on the river. Oder, delivering the main blow from the bridgehead in the Kustrin area. At the same time, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to force the river. Neisse. Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, especially on the Zelov heights west of Kustrin, Soviet troops broke through his defenses. Attempts by the Nazi command to win the battle for Berlin on the Oder and Neisse ended in failure. On April 20, in the Stettin direction, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive, which crossed 2 branches of the river. The Oder and the interfluve between them, and by the end of April 25, broke through the enemy's main line of defense south of Stettin. The troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, after breaking through the enemy’s defenses, began to carry out a maneuver to cut and encircle the Berlin group, bypassing Berlin from the north and south. On April 24, the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts united to the south -the eastern outskirts of Berlin and cut the enemy grouping into 2 parts; as a result, the main forces of the 9th Army and part of the forces of the 4th Panzer Army were cut off from Berlin and surrounded southeast of the city. On April 25, the troops of these fronts met in the Ketzin area and closed the encirclement ring west of Berlin. Thus, up to 200 thousand Nazi troops were surrounded southeast of Berlin and 200 thousand in Berlin itself. The liquidation of the group, surrounded southeast of Berlin, was completed on May 1 by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian fronts. At the same time, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front repelled a counterattack by the 12th Army, deployed from the Western Front, General V. Venk in the Belitz area, as well as a counterattack by an enemy grouping in the Görlitz area, which was trying to reach the rear of the front and disrupt the offensive of its troops on Berlin. The defeat of the group surrounded in Berlin resulted in a fierce battle. From April 21, when Soviet troops broke into Berlin, until May 2, bloody battles took place on the streets of the city day and night. Every street, every house had to be taken by storm, hand-to-hand fights took place in the subway tunnels, in sewer pipes, underground communications. The enemy resisted stubbornly. On April 30, the troops of the 3rd shock army of Colonel-General V.I. Kuznetsov began fighting for the Reichstag, which was stormed by the 171st Rifle Division of Colonel A.I. Negoda and the 150th Rifle Division of Major General V.M. Shatilov. In the evening of the same day, the Reichstag was taken and the Banner of Victory was hoisted on it by sergeants M.A. Egorov and M.V. Kantaria. Hitler committed suicide on April 30, leaving a will on the composition of the new government headed by Admiral Dönitz. The latter sent parliamentarians on May 1, headed by the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Infantry Krebs, with a proposal, signed by Goebbels and Bormann, on a temporary cessation of hostilities. The response demand of the Soviet command for unconditional surrender was rejected. Then, on the evening of May 1, a powerful fire strike was delivered and the assault was resumed. By the morning of May 2, the remnants of the Berlin garrison were divided into separate isolated groups and by 15 o'clock surrendered, led by the head of the defense of Berlin, General Weidling. Simultaneously with the defeat of the encircled groupings, Soviet troops were advancing to the west, and on April 25 the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the area of ​​Rize and Torgau met with the advanced units of the 1st American Army. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on May 7 came out on a wide front to the river. Elbe. At the same time, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, successfully advancing in Western Pomerania and Mecklenburg, on April 26 captured the main strongholds of the enemy’s defense on the western bank of the river. Oder - Pölitz, Stettin, Gatow and Schwedt and, having launched a swift pursuit of the remnants of the defeated 3rd Panzer Army, on May 3 they reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, and on May 4 advanced to the line of Wismar, Schwerin, r. Elda, where they came into contact with the British troops. On May 4-5, the troops of the front cleared the islands of Vollin, Usedom and Rügen from the enemy, and on May 9 they landed on the Danish island of Bornholm to accept the surrender of the Nazi troops. During B. about. Soviet troops completely defeated 70 infantry, 12 tank and 11 motorized divisions, captured about 480 thousand people. In B. o. Soviet troops lost over 304 thousand people killed, wounded and missing, as well as 2156 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1220 guns and mortars, 527 aircraft. Having completed the battlefield, the Soviet troops, together with the Allies, finally crushed the Nazi war machine. On May 8, representatives of the German command, led by Keitel, signed an act of unconditional surrender of Germany.

http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/bse/68834/Berlin

"Overlord"

"Overlord" (eng. Overlord - suzerain, supreme lord, ruler, sovereign), the code name for the operation to invade the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and their allies in North-West France in the 2nd World War. The real prospect of the defeat of Nazi Germany Sov. The army, the growing power and activity of the resistance movement, which means the growth of the influence of the communist parties in the countries occupied by the Nazis - all this forced the governments of the United States and England to begin to implement the decision of the Tehran Conference in 1943 on the opening of a second front in Europe. On February 12, 1944, the joint Anglo-American headquarters determined the purpose of the operation, which was to carry out an invasion of the European continent and, together with other united nations, undertake operations aimed at reaching the center of Germany and destroying its armed forces. Operation "O." at the 1st stage, it was assigned to the 21st Army Group (1st American, 2nd British and 1st Canadian armies), as well as powerful forces of strategist, and tact, aviation and navy. It was planned to land amphibious and airborne assault forces in Normandy and seize a strategic foothold. After the transfer to the bridgehead of the 3rd American Army, it was planned to develop an offensive to the south, southeast, and in 3 months to reach the line of the Seine and Loire rivers. Beginning of Operation O. was scheduled for the first days of May, and then postponed to June 6, 1944 (see Normandy landing operation of 1944).

http://www.hrono.ru/sobyt/1900sob/1944overlord.php

Edelweiss

Edelweiss (Gnaphalium Leontopodium Scop. or Leontopodium alpinum Cass., from the Compositae family) is one of the most famous alpine plants. Dense white-tomentose pubescence covers the entire plant, especially standing out on its upper narrow-lanceolate leaves, which surround the inflorescence in the form of a star, ending with a non-branched stem. Flower heads are surrounded by a veil of dry, membranous leaves at the end. The middle of the heads is occupied by bisexual tubular flowers, which, due to the underdevelopment of the ovary, function only as stamens. Fertile flowers are filiform female, which are usually located along the edge of the head. The long dry hairs of E., filled with air, are twisted and entangled into a thick felt, which protects the plant from drying out, protecting its leaves from dry wind, which has a detrimental effect on the plants of rocks and mountain cornices with a thin layer of soil, where E. usually live. In addition to the Alps, E. found in the mountains of Turkestan, in Altai, in Transbaikalia and in the extreme east of Siberia. V. A. D. Aediculum (aediculum, diminutive of aedes) - according to the etymological meaning of the word, any small structure among the ancient Romans, both private and sacred. But in everyday life, this word has acquired a limited meaning and began to designate a small temple, a chapel. Very often, E. was an addition to the main, large temple and was placed in its fence, serving for less solemn sacrifices to the same deity, to whom the main sanctuary is also dedicated. So, E. Victoria is known at the temple (aedes) of the same goddess in Rome. Pompeian painting gives us images of the same chapels, but standing completely separate, independent of the main temple, and therefore having the significance of an independent sacred place (templum). Small dimensions do not allow, of course, to send VE. worship of the given god with due solemnity; a small temple serves only as a room for a statue of a god; therefore E. of this type are mainly dedicated to minor gods. The existence of the Roman religion of a significant number of local gods, whose cult is closely connected with a certain place, such as the geniuses of the street, quarter (larescomitales, etc.), finally, the patron gods of the family, home, etc., required a significant number of sanctuaries dedicated to these places. Of course, the size of these sanctuaries had to be very small and even the form of a chapel, a miniature copy of the temple, was not always feasible. A surrogate for E. is a niche in the wall of the house, separated from the outside by an architectural ornament. Two columns on the sides support the pediment, while the statuette of the god is placed in the niche itself. Only this desire, at least in an ornamented form, to recall the facade of the temple indicates the genetic connection of street or domestic sanctuaries with a free-standing chapel. In this way, the word E. acquires the meaning of a niche in which the image of some god is placed. Since the needs of the cult require the presence in the same temple of the altars of several gods, then, naturally, E. is used to distinguish between the sanctuaries of each. in the last meaning of the word. The need to create several smaller ones in one temple, to turn the building itself only into a case for the latter, leads to the fact that each niche of the temple becomes a special E. Such are at least the niches of the Pantheon in Rome. E. becomes equivalent to a chapel, a chapel, in a reduced size. On the other hand, the constant profaning of the ancient temple, which, as you know, served not only religious, but also commercial and political goals, creates the need to take a corner inside the temple, where worldly fuss would not penetrate, where the statue and the altar of God could be protected from secularizing everyday life. Inside the temple, another small temple is built, which becomes the actual sanctuary, and in this sense, E. is called that part of the temple, which already has a purely religious purpose. The Catholic tabernacle, containing the main altar, represents only the development and continuation of this form of e. Becoming the central place in the temple. E. concentrates in itself the main artistic and other values ​​and is decorated with special zeal. Meanwhile, another variety of it, created under the influence of adaptation to the conditions of the place, a niche for street or domestic gods, naturally tends to simplify. Often, instead of a real statue, only a picturesque image of a revered god (or gods, since often the same E. is dedicated to two or three gods, for example, the patron god of the family and the image of a deceased ancestor) is placed in it. Hence, one step towards replacing the architectural ornamentation of the niche with pictorial imitations. Finally, the processions, which occupied a prominent place in the ancient cult, required a special form of a small portable likeness of the temple, in which the statue of the god participating in the procession could be placed. E. gave a rather significant variety of forms of reduction and stylization of the architectural type of the temple. And portable E. was only a copy of one of them, namely niches. A terracotta or stone box with an architecturally ornamented front, open side, is the easiest way to create a movable temple for a god. However, we have no reason to assume that this form of portable E. was exceptional. Archaeological finds can only state its prevalence. As already noted, several gods were sometimes placed in one E., and this was by no means always done out of the need to save space. In other cases, E. served as an external unifying form, which had the purpose of emphasizing the internal unity that linked several gods together. In addition to literary descriptions of E. by various authors and samples that have come down to us, for example, in Pompeii, to get acquainted with their form, coins are also of great importance, which fit the image of E. more conveniently than the image of the whole temple, and, perhaps, medalists used them , as a symbolic (pars pro toto) way to allude to the real temple.

http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/brokgauz/23162

East Prussian operation 1945

Date: January 13 - April 25, 1945 Place: East Prussia, northern part of Poland, Baltic Sea Result: Victory of the Red Army Side of the USSR Germany Commanders K. K. Rokossovsky I. D. Chernyakhovsky A. M. Vasilevsky V. F. Tributs G. Reinhardt, L. Rendulich Forces of the parties 1,670,000 people 25,426 guns and mortars 3,859 tanks 3,097 aircraft At the beginning of the operation 580,000 people at least 200,000 Volkssturm 8,200 guns and mortars approx. 1000 tanks and assault guns 559 aircraft Losses 584,778 (of which 126,646 were killed) About 500 thousand (of which at least 150 thousand were killed and 220 thousand captured) East Prussian operation (January 13-April 25, 1945) - during of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet troops of the 2nd (Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) and 3rd (General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky, from February 20 - Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky) Belorussian fronts in cooperation with the Baltic fleet (Admiral V.F. Tributs) broke through the powerful defenses of the German Army Group Center (Colonel General G. Reinhardt, from January 26 - Army Group North, Colonel General L. Rendulich), reached the Baltic Sea and liquidated the main enemy forces (over 25 divisions), having occupied East Prussia and liberated the northern part of Poland. The German command attached great importance to the retention of East Prussia. For a long time there were powerful fortifications here, which were subsequently improved and supplemented. By the beginning of the winter offensive of the Red Army in 1945, the enemy had created a powerful defense system up to 200 km deep. The strongest fortifications were on the eastern approaches to Koenigsberg. In the course of this strategic operation, the Insterburg, Mlavsko-Elbing, Hejlsberg, Koenigsberg and Zemland front-line offensive operations were carried out. The most important goal of the East Prussian strategic offensive operation was to cut off the enemy troops stationed there from the main forces of Nazi Germany, cut them up and destroy them. Three fronts took part in the operation: the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and the 1st Baltic fronts, commanded by Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and I.X. Bagramyan. They were assisted by the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral VF Tributs. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to defeat the enemy in northern Poland with strikes from bridgeheads on the Narew River. The 3rd Belorussian Front received the task of advancing on Koenigsberg from the east. In defeating the enemy in the Koenigsberg direction, he was assisted by the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front. The troops of Rokossovsky and Chernyakhovsky, together with the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, by the beginning of 1945, numbered 1669 thousand people, 25.4 thousand guns and mortars, about 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations and more than 3 thousand combat aircraft . In East Prussia and Northern Poland, the troops of Army Group Center under the command of General G. Reinhardt defended themselves. The group had 580 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 8 thousand guns and mortars, 560 combat aircraft. Thus, the superiority of Soviet troops over the enemy in personnel and artillery was 2-3 times, and in tanks and aircraft - 4-5.5 times. However, the German troops had the opportunity to replenish their units, at the expense of the Volkssturm, the Todt organization (engineering and construction units that are not part of the Wehrmacht, but having basic military training) and simply the local population, bypassing the militia stage, which in 1945 was a common practice for the active army. The 2nd Belorussian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, member of the Military Council - Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin, chief of staff - Lieutenant General A.N. Bogolyubov) had the task of striking from the Ruzhansky bridgehead in general in the direction of Pshasnysh, Mlawa, Lidzbark, defeat the enemy’s Mlawa grouping, no later than 10-12 days of the operation, capture the Myshinets, Dzialdovo, Bezhun, Plock line and then advance in the general direction to Nowe Miasto, Marienburg. The front was supposed to strike the second blow from the Serotsky bridgehead in the general direction of Naselsk, Belsk. In addition, the front was supposed to assist the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Warsaw grouping: part of the left wing forces to strike around Modlin from the west. Marshal Rokossovsky planned to strike from bridgeheads on the Narew River. It was planned to break through the enemy defenses in the main direction from the Ruzhansky bridgehead in a sector of 18 km by the forces of three armies. To develop success to the north, it was supposed to use first separate tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, and then a tank army. By concentrating such forces in the direction of the main attack, Rokossovsky sought to go to the sea and cut off the German troops in East Prussia. Another blow was planned by two armies in a 10 km section from the Serock bridgehead along the northern bank of the Vistula. The 3rd Belorussian Front (commander - General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky, member of the Military Council - Lieutenant General V. Ya. Makarov, chief of staff - Colonel General A. P. Pokrovsky) received the task of defeating the Tilsit-Insterburg enemy grouping and not later than 10-12 days of the offensive, capture the line of Nemonin, Norkitten, Darkemen, Goldap; further develop the offensive against Koenigsberg along both banks of the Pregel River, with the main forces on the southern bank of the river. The main blow to the front was ordered to be delivered from the area north of Stallupenen, Gumbinnen in the general direction to Wellau, and auxiliary ones - to Tilsit and Darkemen. The general plan of General Chernyakhovsky was to launch a frontal attack on Koenigsberg, bypassing the powerful enemy fortifications north of the Masurian Lakes. The ultimate goal of the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was to cover the main forces of the East Prussian grouping of Germans from the north and subsequently, together with the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeat them. Considering the difficulty of overcoming the powerful defense of the enemy, Chernyakhovsky decided to break through the defenses in the 24 km section with the forces of three armies, after which he would bring into battle two tank corps, a second-echelon army and develop success in depth to the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Fleet (commander - Admiral V.F. Tributs, member of the Military Council - Vice Admiral N.K. Smirnov, chief of staff - Rear Admiral A.N. Petrov) received the task of assisting them with their artillery when the Soviet troops reached the sea coast and landings, as well as to cover the coastal flanks of the fronts. Soviet troops were preparing to go on the offensive on February 8-10, 1945. However, on December 16, 1944, an unexpected German counter-offensive began in the Ardennes, as a result of which a strong group of troops of Army Group B, commanded by Field Marshal V. Model, broke through the weak defenses of American troops and began to quickly move deep into Belgium. Taken by surprise, the allies were defeated. To the place of the breakthrough, which exceeded 100 km, General D. Eisenhower hastily pulled up troops. Powerful Anglo-American aviation could provide quick assistance to the retreating troops, but its operations were hampered by non-flying weather. A critical situation has arisen. The January offensive of the Red Army, launched earlier than scheduled at the request of the allies, forced the German command to stop offensive operations in the West. After the Soviet troops broke through the line on the Vistula, the 6th German Panzer Army - the main striking force of the Wehrmacht in the Ardennes - began to be transferred to the East. The command of the Wehrmacht finally abandoned plans for offensive operations against the American-British troops and on January 16 was forced to give the order to go over to the defensive in the West. The powerful thrust of the Soviet troops from the Vistula to the Oder provided an opportunity for the Allied armies to recover from the blows of the German troops, and on February 8, after a six-week delay, they managed to launch an offensive. To defeat the enemy in East Prussia, the 3rd Belorussian Front, which carried out the Insterburg-Koenigsberg operation, was the first to go on the offensive. The Germans were expecting a blow. Their artillery fired methodically at the combat formations of the infantry preparing for the attack. On January 13, the troops of the front began the operation. After making sure that the offensive had begun, the enemy at dawn conducted a powerful artillery counter-preparation. The fire concentrated on the strike force of Chernyakhovsky's troops testified that the Germans had revealed the direction of the main attack of the front and prepared to repel it. Their batteries were suppressed by artillery return fire and night bombers raised into the air, but surprise was not achieved. After two hours of artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks attacked the enemy. By the end of the day, the 39th and 5th armies of generals I. I. Lyudnikov and N. I. Krylov wedged into the defense, but only 2-3 km. The 28th army of General A. A. Luchinsky advanced more successfully, but even she, having advanced 5-7 km, failed to break through the enemy’s defenses. Solid fog did not allow the use of aviation. The tanks advanced by touch and suffered heavy losses. No one fulfilled the tasks of the first day of the offensive. In six days, the strike force of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through to a depth of 45 km in a 60 km section. And although the pace of advance was 2 times slower than planned, the troops inflicted heavy losses on the German 3rd Panzer Army and created the conditions for continuing the offensive on Koenigsberg. Due to bad weather, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, twice postponed the start of the offensive and was forced to start it on January 14th. The first two days of the Mlavsko-Elbing operation, which was carried out by the front, things went badly: the shock groups advancing from the Ruzhansky and Serotsky bridgeheads advanced only 7-8 km. The blows from both bridgeheads combined into a common breakthrough in the 60 km section. Having advanced 30 km in three days, the shock groups of the front created the conditions for the rapid development of success in depth. On January 17, the 5th Guards Tank Army of General V.T. Volsky was introduced into the gap. Pursuing the enemy, she quickly moved north and on January 18 blocked the Mlavsky fortified area. The pace of advancement of the rest of the troops of the front also increased. The tankers of General Volsky, bypassing the German fortifications, continued on their way to the sea. The 65th and 70th armies advancing from the Serotsky bridgehead under the command of Generals P.I. Batov and B.C. Popova rushed along the northern bank of the Vistula to the west and captured the Modlin fortress. On the sixth day, Rokossovsky's troops took the line, which was planned to reach on the 10-11th day. On January 21, the Headquarters specified the task of the 2nd Belorussian Front. He had to continue the offensive with the main forces to the north, and part of the forces - to the west, in order to capture the Elbing, Marienburg, Torun line on February 2-4. As a result, the troops went to the sea and cut off the enemy in East Prussia from Germany. Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front pursued the enemy. On the evening of January 23, the advance detachment of the 5th Guards Tank Army broke into the city of Elbing. Stunned by the sudden appearance of Soviet tanks, the garrison did not have time to prepare for battle. The detachment proceeded through the city and reached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. The enemy quickly organized the defense of Elbing and delayed the advance of the 29th Panzer Corps. Bypassing the city, the formations of the tank army, together with the 42nd rifle corps, went to the sea. Enemy communications were cut. The 2nd German Army under the command of General V. Weiss was thrown back to the west, beyond the Vistula. Continuing the Insterburg-Koenigsberg operation, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front from January 19 to 26 broke through to the outer defensive contour of Koenigsberg. To the south, they immediately overcame the line of the Masurian Lakes. Bypassing Koenigsberg from the north, the 39th Army reached the sea west of the city. The 43rd Army of General A.P. Beloborodov, the 11th Guards Army of General K.N. Galitsky broke through to the Frisch-Gaff Bay south of Koenigsberg. Pressed to the sea by the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, Army Group Center, renamed on January 26 into Army Group North, was cut by Chernyakhovsky’s troops into three unequal parts: four enemy divisions ended up in Zemland, about five in Koenigsberg and up to twenty divisions - in the Heilsberg area, southwest of Koenigsberg. On January 30, German formations launched a strong counterattack on the left flank of the 11th Guards from the direction of Brandenburg (Grossdeutschland tank division and one infantry division) and from Koenigsberg (5th Panzer Division, assault gun brigade and one infantry division). the army of General K. Galitsky and pushed back 5 kilometers from the Frisches-Haff Bay, the Soviet units that had broken through, thereby releasing Koenigsberg from the southwest and restoring the connection of the city garrison with the 4th German army in the Heilsberg-Heiligenbal area (the Germans held the corridor until mid-March ). On February 8, Marshal Rokossovsky received the task of turning west, defeating the enemy in Pomerania and reaching the Oder. The 3rd Belorussian Front was to strike at the Heilsberg grouping, and the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I. Kh. Bagramyan - at the enemy in Zemland and Koenigsberg. As a result of the Heilsberg operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front, which was distinguished by an extremely fierce character, the enemy was destroyed south of Koenigsberg. Weakened by heavy fighting, the troops of the front resumed the offensive on February 11, which proceeded slowly. During the day it was possible to advance no more than 2 km. In an effort to turn the tide of the operation, the front commander was almost continuously in the army. On the way from the 5th to the 3rd Army on February 18, he was mortally wounded by a fragment of an artillery shell. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky died. The Red Army lost a talented commander who was only 38 years old. The Stavka appointed Marshal A.M. to command the front. Vasilevsky. The 1st Baltic Front was preparing to go on the offensive on February 20, having the task of clearing the Zemland Peninsula from the Germans within a week. However, a day earlier, the Germans themselves delivered converging strikes from Fischhausen and Koenigsberg (Operation West Wind) against units of the 39th Army of General I. Lyudnikov, as a result of which they restored land communications between Zemland and Koenigsberg and thwarted the Soviet offensive. On February 24, the 1st Baltic Front, having transferred troops to the 3rd Belorussian Front, was abolished. Having taken command of the front, A. M. Vasilevsky ordered to stop the futile attacks, replenish supplies by March 10 and carefully prepare the final blows. Given the limited forces, the marshal decided to destroy the encircled groups sequentially, starting with the strongest - Hejlsberg. Having created the necessary superiority, the troops resumed the offensive on March 13. Fogs and low clouds continued to limit the use of artillery and aviation. To these difficulties were added the spring thaw and high water. Despite the difficult conditions and the stubborn resistance of the Germans, on March 26, Soviet troops reached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. The German command began a hasty evacuation of troops to the Zemland Peninsula in advance. Of the 150,000 German soldiers and officers who defended southwest of Koenigsberg, 93,000 were destroyed and 46,000 were taken prisoner. On March 29, the remnants of the Hejlsberg group stopped fighting. After the completion of the Hejlsberg operation, six armies were liberated near the 3rd Belorussian Front: three of them were sent to Koenigsberg, the rest were withdrawn to the Headquarters reserve, starting to regroup in the Berlin direction. During the destruction of the enemy pressed to the sea, the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributs actively operated. The fleet attacked the enemy with aircraft, submarine and light surface forces. They violated the sea communications of the Germans. In February and March alone, the fleet destroyed 32 transports and 7 warships. Outstanding success was achieved by the S-13 submarine under the command of Captain 3rd Rank A.I. Marinesko. On January 30, she sank the German liner Wilhelm Gustloff with a displacement of 25.5 thousand tons, on board of which more than 5 thousand people were evacuated, including 1.3 thousand submariners. On February 9, the Marinesko submarine achieved another success by sinking a German steamship with a displacement of 14.7 thousand tons. Not a single Soviet submariner achieved such brilliant results in one trip. For military merits, the S-13 boat was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. On April 6, the 3rd Belorussian Front began the Koenigsberg operation. After a powerful artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks attacked the positions of the Germans. Due to bad weather, aviation made only 274 sorties during the day. Having overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the troops advanced 2-4 km and by the end of the day reached the outskirts of the city. The next two days were decisive, when flying weather settled. 516 heavy bombers of the 18th Air Army, commanded by Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, only on the evening of April 7, within 45 minutes, dropped 3742 large-caliber bombs on the fortress. Other air armies, as well as fleet aviation, also participated in massive raids. It is necessary to note the worthy contribution of the pilots of the 4th Air Army, General K. A. Vershinin. In its composition, under the command of Major E. D. Bershanskaya, female pilots from the regiment of night bombers bravely fought. Their courage and heroism were highly appreciated by the Motherland: 23 female pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. During the assault on the fortress alone, about 14,000 sorties were made (that's over 3,000 a day!). 2.1 thousand bombs of various calibers were dropped on the heads of the enemy. Together with the Soviet pilots, French pilots from the Normandie-Neman regiment bravely fought. For these battles, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and 24 pilots were awarded orders of the USSR. On April 8, the troops advancing from the north and south cut the enemy grouping into two parts. These days, the personnel of the ISU-152 battery, commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. A. Kosmodemyansky, distinguished themselves. The battery supported units of the 319th Rifle Division, which stormed one of the forts of the fortress. Having fired a volley at the thick brick walls of the fort, self-propelled guns broke through them and burst into the fortification on the move. The fort's garrison of 350 capitulated. 9 tanks, 200 vehicles and a fuel depot were captured. The battery commander was presented with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, which was awarded posthumously. The brother of the famous partisan Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, who was hanged by the Germans in the Moscow region, Alexander died on April 13 during the fighting on the Zemland Peninsula. The commandant of the Königsberg fortress, General O. Lash, seeing the futility of further resistance, asked the commander of the 4th Army, General Muller, to allow the remaining forces to break through to the Zemland Peninsula, but was refused. Müller tried to help the garrison of Koenigsberg with a strike from the peninsula to the west, but Soviet aviation thwarted these attacks. By evening, the remnants of the garrison were squeezed into the center of the city and in the morning found themselves under crushing artillery fire. Soldiers began to surrender by the thousands. On April 9, Lash ordered everyone to lay down their arms. Hitler regarded this decision as premature and sentenced the general to death by hanging. The reports of the officers, who testified to the courageous behavior of the general, did not affect the decision of the dictator. On April 9, the garrison of Königsberg capitulated. Lash himself also surrendered, which saved him from Hitler's sentence. Together with Lash, 93,853 soldiers and officers were captured. About 42 thousand German soldiers of the fortress garrison died. General Müller was removed from the post of army commander, and Gauleiter of East Prussia Koch, who demanded that the troops on the Samland Peninsula fight to the last, fled by ship to Denmark. Moscow celebrated the completion of the assault on Koenigsberg with a salute of the highest category - 24 artillery volleys from 324 guns. The medal "For the capture of Koenigsberg" was established, which was usually done only on the occasion of capturing the capitals of states. All participants in the assault received a medal. The port of Pillau was the last point in East Prussia from which the population and troops could be evacuated. The city itself was a fortress that covered the naval base from the sea and land. The Germans defended the land approaches to the port with particular tenacity, aided by forests and bad weather. The 2nd Guards Army of General P. G. Chanchibadze could not overcome the resistance of the enemy. Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky led the 11th Guards Army into battle. The defense was broken only on the third day. In fierce battles for the fortress and port, the 11th Guards Army captured Pillau on April 25. This ended the East Prussian strategic operation. It lasted 103 days and was the longest operation of the last year of the war. In East Prussia, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. By the end of January, in the rifle divisions of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, which by the beginning of the offensive included 6-6.5 thousand soldiers and officers, 2.5-3.5 thousand remained. By the end of January, the Guards Tank Army had only half of the tanks available at the beginning of the operation. Even more were lost during the destruction of the encircled groups. Replenishment during the operation was almost non-existent. Moreover, significant forces were transferred to the Berlin direction, which was the main one in the 1945 campaign. The weakening of the 3rd Belorussian Front led to protracted and bloody battles in East Prussia. The total losses of the Soviet fronts and fleet from January 13 to April 25 were enormous: 126.5 thousand soldiers and officers died and went missing, more than 458 thousand soldiers were injured or out of action due to illness. The troops lost 3,525 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 1,644 guns and mortars, and 1,450 combat aircraft. In East Prussia, the Red Army destroyed 25 German divisions, the other 12 divisions lost from 50 to 70% of their composition. Soviet troops captured more than 220 thousand soldiers and officers. About 15 thousand guns and mortars, 1442 tanks and assault guns, 363 combat aircraft and many other military equipment became trophies. The loss of large forces and an important military-economic area hastened the defeat of Germany.

http://www.encyclopaedia-russia.ru/article.php?id=335

Prague operation 1945

Offensive operation of the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts on May 6-11 to destroy the Nazi group on the territory of Czechoslovakia during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. In early May, in Czechoslovakia and Northern Austria, the German Army Group Center (1st and 4th Panzer and 17th Armies, commanded by Field Marshal F. Schörner) and part of the armies of the Austrian Group (8th army and the 6th SS Panzer Army, commanded by Colonel General L. Rendulich), in total over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, over 2200 tanks and assault guns, about 1000 aircraft. According to the plan of the new government of fascist Germany, headed by K. Dönitz, Army Group Center was to hold the areas of western and central Bohemia in order to gain time and ensure the withdrawal of its troops to the west for subsequent surrender to American troops. The strategic plan of the Soviet Supreme High Command provided for the delivery of several powerful strikes in converging directions on Prague with the aim of encircling and dismembering the main enemy forces east of Prague and preventing their withdrawal to the west. The defeat of the enemy was assigned to the 1st, 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts ( Commander, respectively, Marshals of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovsky and General of the Army A. I. Eremenko). The grouping of fronts, in addition to the Soviet troops, included the 2nd Army of the Polish Army, the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, the 1st and 4th Romanian armies. In total, over 1 million people, more than 23 thousand guns and mortars, about 1800 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces and over 4 thousand aircraft (excluding one army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and Romanian troops). The main blows were delivered by the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts on both flanks of Army Group Center. On May 1-5, a popular uprising began in various regions of Czechoslovakia, and on May 5, in Prague (see People's Uprising of 1945). On the night of May 6, the Prague radio station turned to the Soviet troops with a request for help. Troops of the main strike force of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front: 13th Army (commanded by Colonel General N.P. Pukhov), 3rd Guards Army (Colonel General V.N. Gordov), 5th Guards Army ( Colonel General A. S. Zhadov), 3rd Guards Tank Army (Colonel General of Tank Troops P. S. Rybalko) and 4th Guards Tank Army (Colonel General of Tank Troops D. D. Lelyushenko) the day before the scheduled time they went on the offensive and by the end of May 7 they reached the northern slopes of the Ore Mountains and started fighting for Dresden. On the morning of May 7, the rest of the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the troops of the 7th Guards Army (commanded by Colonel General M.S. Shumilov) of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. On May 6 and 7, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front continued their offensive in the Olomouc direction and, in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, created a threat of encirclement of the Nazi troops operating east of Olomouc, forcing the enemy to begin withdrawing the 1st Panzer Army. In this regard, a successful offensive was launched by the troops of the 38th (commander Colonel General K. S. Moskalenko) and the 1st Guards (commander Colonel General A. A. Grechko) armies of the 4th Ukrainian Front. On May 8, the offensive continued in all directions. The armies of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front had the greatest success. They broke the resistance of the enemy at the turn of the Ore Mountains, completely occupied Dresden and entered the territory of Czechoslovakia. In the 2nd Ukrainian Front, on May 8, the 6th Guards Tank Army (commanded by Colonel-General of the Tank Forces A. G. Kravchenko) was brought into battle, which rapidly developed the offensive against Jihlava, advancing towards Prague from the south. Troops of the 4th Ukrainian The front liberated Olomouc and advanced on Prague from the East. On May 8, the German command signed the act of surrender, but Army Group Center continued to resist. In Prague, the rebels were in a difficult position. On the night of May 9, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front made a rapid 80-km throw, entered Prague on the morning of May 9 and soon cleared the city of the enemy. On the same day, advanced units of the 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts approached Prague, the main forces of Army Group Center were surrounded. Only the divisions of the Austrian Army Group remained outside the encirclement, which were smashed by the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The aviation of the fronts contributed greatly to the success of the Soviet troops. On May 10-11, the main forces of the enemy troops were captured; Soviet troops came into contact with the 3rd American Army. The liberation of Czechoslovakia was completed. The swift actions of the Soviet troops saved the cities and villages of Czechoslovakia from the destruction and atrocities of the Nazi troops, the Czechoslovak people got the opportunity to independently decide the fate of their homeland. From the point of view of military art, P. o. It is characterized by its preparation in a short time, the implementation of a complex operational regrouping of troops, the use of tank armies to encircle and defeat a large grouping in the conditions of a mountainous and wooded theater of operations, and a high rate of advance.

http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/bse/123317/Prague