Economic assistance of the allies of the USSR

... He was not slow to repay the benefactor with the blackest ingratitude D.V. Grigorovich "Capellmeister Suslikov"

I must immediately emphasize that this topic It has both historical and educational significance. However, it must be admitted that it is covered in Soviet historiography very superficially, and, I would say, biased. In fact, the material, technical and humanitarian aid of the United States to the Soviet Union, both through Lend-Lease and from public organizations, judging by the publications, is artificially reduced, not properly evaluated. And this is not surprising, given that the entire domestic history of all the years of the communist dictatorship was falsified by Soviet historiographers.

I note that my harsh expressions, judgments and conclusions are not groundless. They find confirmation in the statements and testimonies of many political and military figures of a fairly high level.

Let's start with the attitude of the US government towards the USSR after the German attack on it. So, already on June 24, 1941, US President Franklin Roosevelt announced at a press conference that the United States was ready to provide assistance to the Soviet Union. In particular, he said: “Of course, we are going to provide Russia with all the help we can.”¹ Moreover, he sent his close friend Harry Hopkins to the USSR as a personal representative of the President of the United States to study on the spot the needs of the Soviet Union in armaments, equipment, machinery, vehicles, equipment, strategic raw materials, medicines, food and other items and things of prime necessity. Harry Hopkins, after meeting with Stalin, in his message of July 31, 1941, reported in White House that “Stalin considers it impossible without American help from Great Britain and the USSR to resist the material might of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe”2 Hopkins detailed Stalin’s revelations in his report to the president after returning from Moscow.3

American deliveries to the Soviet Union began to arrive even before the official agreement between the parties.

From September 29 to October 1, 1941, the Moscow Conference of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain took place on mutual military supplies. According to the adopted joint decision, the United States and Great Britain were to supply the Soviet Union with 400 aircraft, 500 tanks, 200 anti-tank rifles, 2 thousand tons of aluminum, 1 thousand tons of armor plates for tanks, 7 thousand tons of lead from October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 , 1.5 thousand tons of tin, 300 tons of molybdenum, 1250 tons of toluene.4

The United States most energetically set about implementing the decisions of the Moscow Conference. On December 12, 1941, Roosevelt, speaking at Congress with a detailed report on the Lend-Lease program, said: “The world strategy of the Axis powers must be answered with the same world strategy by those countries and peoples who unite to resist aggression. Therefore, weapons from the arsenal of democracy should be used where they are most effective. This means that we must enable Great Britain, Russia, China and other countries, including those in this hemisphere, to use weapons from our arsenal with most useful for a common cause. Too much is at stake in this greatest of wars to afford to neglect the interests of peoples attacked or likely to be attacked by a common enemy.

One can hardly doubt the testimony of G. Hopkins. On the contrary, it is confirmed by the statements of G.K. Zhukov, V.N. Razuvaev and other military leaders.

So, Marshal Zhukov, in conversations with the writer K.M. Simonov, held in 1965-1966, in particular, said: “Speaking of our preparedness for war from the point of view of the economy, side of the allies. First of all, of course, from the side of the Americans, because the British in this sense helped us minimally. When analyzing all sides of the war, this cannot be discounted. We would be in a difficult position without American gunpowder, we would not be able to produce the amount of ammunition that we needed. Without the American Studebakers, we would have nothing to carry our artillery on. Yes, they largely provided our front-line transport in general. The production of special steels, necessary for the most diverse needs of the war, was also associated with a number of American supplies ... We entered the war, still continuing to be a backward country compared to Germany. (Emphasis mine - A.A.)

By the publication of K.M.Simonov, I would like to say about my meetings and conversations with this wonderful writer and interesting person. In the early 1970s, I traveled quite often to the Central state archive film and photo documents of the USSR (now RGAKFD), which is located in Krasnogorsk near Moscow. There I first met K. M. Simonov. Konstantin Mikhailovich came to the archive to select film and photographic documents for the documentary film "A Soldier Walked". He was especially interested in the holders of the Orders of Glory. Frankly, it gave me pleasure to assist him in the selection of characters for his future film, especially since I knew the catalogs of the archive well from my experience there, in past years. Konstantin Mikhailovich, having learned from our conversation the topic of my scientific work and the fact that I served in aviation for many years told me about one fact told to him by Marshal G.K. Zhukov. It turns out that since 1942, our military pilots flew on transport planes to Tehran and from there flew American fighter planes of the Airacobra type to the Caucasus and further to the front. He also said that American special services on sea cargo ships delivered these aircraft to Persian Gulf. There they were unloaded ashore, and then the wings were attached to the fuselage of the aircraft. From there, American pilots flew the planes to the Iranian capital. When I asked where our pilots learned to fly the Aircobras, Konstantin Mikhailovich said that there was a retraining center for Soviet pilots in Baku. He also added that the Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Pokryshkin and his brother-soldiers were retrained in this center three times. It turns out that our famous ace, all the way to Berlin, smashed the Nazi pilots in the Aerocobra.

It is hardly possible to question the authenticity of Konstantin Mikhailovich's transmission of the content of his conversations with G.K. Zhukov. And, nevertheless, let's turn to the materials that were deposited in the archive as a result of listening to the apartment and the marshal's dacha by the state security agencies. Here is a small excerpt from this archive: “Now they say that the allies never helped us ... But it cannot be denied that the Americans sent us so many materials, without which we could not form our reserves and could not continue the war .. We didn't have explosives, gunpowder. There was no way to equip rifle cartridges. The Americans really helped us out with gunpowder and explosives. And how much they drove us sheet steel! How could we quickly start producing tanks if it weren't for American help with steel? And now they present the matter in such a way that we had all this in abundance.

And here is what General V.N. Razuvaev told the author of these lines in the presence of his relative, the former battery commander B.O. Saakov on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the victory over Germany: “... There were almost no our vehicles in my army. The army was provided mainly by American vehicles. These were Studebakers, Fords, Dodges and staff Jeeps. All our artillery and ammunition were carried by Studebakers. Almost all of our formidable Katyushas were installed on them. They were very powerful and trouble-free. Any dirt for them was not a hindrance. A winch mounted on the front bumper made it possible to get out of any swamp without assistance. Anyone who has walked the roads of war knows well what role these miracle machines played in the war.

In the years " cold war"A huge amount of literature was published on various problems of the Great Patriotic War. Concerning the issue of American assistance to the USSR under Lend-Lease, all authors without exception belittled its role in the victory over Nazi Germany in every possible way.

The topic of American deliveries is covered in a particularly biased and perverted way in the 12-volume History of the Second World War 1939-1945, published by the Military Publishing House. It notes that "from October 1941 to June 30, 1942, the United States delivered to the Soviet Union less than a third of the promised aircraft and medium tanks, as well as less than a fifth of the trucks"8. What does "promised" mean? If we take into account that the USSR officially concluded an agreement on Lend-Lease supplies on July 11, 1942, it turns out that the USSR received an average of 11,700 cars from the USA every month. But Stalin, in his message to Roosevelt on October 7, 1942, raised the question of a monthly delivery of trucks in the amount of "8 or 10 thousand pieces"9.

The compilers of this volume write that "Lend-lease supplies to the USSR were very insignificant - about 4 percent of industrial production in the USSR. In addition, the USSR did not always receive what it especially needed, and not at the time when supplies were especially needed." They, as the reader will see from the references below, not only artificially underestimated the number of weapons, vehicles and food supplied to the USSR from the USA, but also deliberately concealed from the public a huge amount of other military cargo and essentials that came to our country from the United States. America. Therefore, I believe that the White House did the right thing when it banned the publication in English of the above edition.

A great contribution to the falsification of the history of the Second World War in general, and to the coverage of issues related to US supplies to the Soviet Union in particular, was made by publications published by the Political Literature Publishing House.

So, in the book “The Great Patriotic War. Questions and Answers, written by a team of authors led by P.N. Bobylev, it is noted that "supplies under Lend-Lease of weapons and various military materials played a well-known, but insignificant role in providing the Armed Forces of the USSR with weapons, military equipment and some types of allowances, as well as in achieving victory over the enemy"11. (Emphasis mine. - AA) The authors of the book, distorting and distorting the facts, artificially lowering the figures, provide information on American supplies of only six types of military equipment and weapons, and on food - only on grain12.

Meanwhile, from the following reference material, far from complete, the reader will be able to independently determine the scale of American material assistance to the USSR under Lend-Lease in 1941-1945.

I would like to especially emphasize that American deliveries to the USSR became possible as a result of decisive and vigorous measures taken by the US government and personally by President F. Roosevelt. In accordance with the Lend-Lease Act, adopted by the US Congress on March 11, 1941, President Roosevelt in October decided to provide the USSR with an interest-free loan for the purchase of weapons, ammunition, raw materials and food products in the amount of $ 1 billion. Moreover, in the terms of the loan, it was noted that payments on this debt would begin only five years after the end of the war and would have to be made within ten years after the expiration of this five-year period.

Here it should be avenged that the American Red Cross also showed great humanity towards the people of the USSR, who found themselves in a difficult situation. He allocated about five million dollars as a gift for the purchase of various materials, clothing and products for the needy people14.

Roosevelt, in a message to Stalin dated November 6, 1941, reporting on the measures being taken to purchase medical supplies according to the list developed by the medical supply commission at the Tri-Power Conference in Moscow, at the same time emphasized that "the American Red Cross is READY to consider the issue of providing further substantial assistance to the Soviet Union as the need arises and applications are submitted ".15

Officially, as noted above, the USSR concluded an agreement with the United States on Lend-Lease supplies in the summer of 1942. However, this does not mean that until the summer of 1942 there were no deliveries to the USSR from the USA. This is not true. Many ships with cargo went to the USSR in August 1941. Delivery of goods from the United States was carried out in the following months. In January and February 1942, over 850 light and medium tanks, about 250 fighters, and over 250 B-25 and A-2016 bombers were prepared for shipment. Even earlier, in the autumn of 1941, large quantities of medicines, food and other essential goods began to arrive in the USSR. In a message to Roosevelt dated October 7, 1942, Stalin noted: “... we are in dire need of increasing the supply of fighter aircraft of the type (for example, the Aviacobra) and ensuring, under all conditions, some other supplies ... It would be very good if In any case, the United States provided us with the following deliveries (monthly): fighters - 500 units, trucks - 8 or 10 thousand units, aluminum - 5 thousand tons, explosives - 4-5 thousand tons. In addition, it is important to ensure delivery within 12 months 2 million tons of grain (wheat), as well as a possible amount of fats, concentrates, canned meat... We could bring a significant part of the food through Vladivostok by the Soviet fleet if the United States agreed to cede to the USSR at least 2-3 dozen ships to replenish our fleet17.

In a reply message, Roosevelt promised Stalin to find "an additional number of aircraft" and also "to take measures to transfer under your flag a certain number ... of merchant ships ...". He also said that he "gave an order to provide ... (USSR - A.A.) a factory of automobile tires."

Of course, in a war known reasons it is impossible to avoid supply interruptions (for example, due to the sinking of cargo ships). On the whole, the United States did everything in its power to provide the Soviet Union with timely and effective assistance. In this regard, Roosevelt's letter to Stalin dated October 16, 1942, is of particular interest. Here is what the President of the United States wrote in it: "In response to your request, I am pleased to inform you that the items in question can be made available for shipments as follows:

Wheat ........................2 million short tons for the remainder of the protocol year in approximately equal monthly installments. Trucks............................8000-10000 per month. Explosives ...... 4,000 short tons in November and 5,000 tons each in the following months. Meat.............................. 15,000 tons per month. Canned meat... 10,000 tons per month. Pork fat .................. 12,000 tons per month. Soap base......................5000 tons per month. Vegetable oil...........10,000 tons per month.

In the near future I will inform you about the supply of aluminum, which I am still studying.

I have given orders to spare no effort in order to fully secure our routes with ships and cargo and, in accordance with your desires, to respect the priority of the obligations that we have given you. "(Emphasis mine - A.A.)

I do not think that this very responsible and sincere letter from US President Franklin Roosevelt needs commentary. One can and should only say that the United States honestly fulfilled its obligations. For example, in the 15th quarterly report to the US Congress on May 20, 1944, Roosevelt pointed out that "during the three months of 1944, the United States provided the Allies, on the basis of the Lending or Renting Procedures Act, with a record figure of more than 4 billion dollars. dollars, including the supply of aircraft, tanks and other military materials and ships, as well as repair services, etc. "20

While working on this chapter, I came to a rather interesting conclusion. Giving great importance American deliveries to the USSR and noting their significant role in the defeat of fascist Germany and its allies during the World War, at the same time I must say the following. It seems to me that neither the government nor public organizations to this day they do not have a clear and accurate idea of ​​WHAT and HOW MUCH was actually sent to the USSR during the war years. I think that the government, the Red Cross and the citizens of the United States, in these difficult years for our country, thought more about HOW they could send more help to the needy people faster and more. Of course, I am not talking about such large and significant things as aircraft, tanks, motor vehicles, guns, military and transport ships, etc., which were supplied to the USSR strictly according to the protocol and requests. To make it clear to the reader what supplies I am talking about, I will give a specific example.

In the spring of 1943, together with my peers, I took part in the unloading and transportation of a huge amount of large bales sent to the USSR from the USA. We at the warehouses also helped unpack these heavy bales. They were men's, women's and children's clothing in large quantities. Nice clothes, but really wrinkled. To the surprise of the storekeepers, there was no inventory in the bales. But in some things (in the pockets of trousers, jackets and jackets) letters and small notes were enclosed. One sporty dress had a small piece of thick white material pinned to it, on which was written in large letters: WE WANT YOU TO WIN EMMA. CITY OF OGDEN. And now let's move on to facts that clearly show the real US assistance to the Soviet Union.

A long-term search for documentary sources and other materials, including material, as well as personal observations and memories, allowed me to compile two certificates on American deliveries to the USSR, which are given below.

in 1941-194521 Name Unit of measure. Quantity 1. Aircraft of all types pcs. 15 481 2. Tanks and self-propelled guns pcs. 12 537 3. Cruiser pcs. 1 4. Torpedo boats "Basher" (A-1), "Higgins" (A-2), "ELKO" (A-3) pcs. 96 (by 1945) 5. Large hunters (SF-36, Pacific Fleet-32, BF-4, Black Sea Fleet-6) pcs. 78 (by 1945) 6. Small hunters "RPC", "RTS" pcs. 60 (by 1945) 7. Minesweepers of the "AM" type pcs. 34 (by 1945) 8. YMS-type minesweepers pcs. 43 (by 1945) 9. Frigates of the "PF" type "Tacoma" pcs. 28 (by 1945) 10. Gunboats pcs. 12 11. Landing craft pcs. 43 (by 1945) 12. Flak PCS. 7944 13.3URS "Oerlikon" pcs. 1111 14. Anti-tank guns pcs. - 15. Locomotives* pcs. 1900 16. Thomson-45 assault rifles (until 1944) pcs. 150,000 17. Freight wagons pcs. 11 075 18. Merchant and cargo ships pcs. 128 19. Diesel-electric locomotives pcs. 66 20. Motor vehicles, miscellaneous pcs. 409 500 21. Motorcycles pcs. 32 200 22. Tire factory pcs. 1 23. Car. tires pcs. 3 606 000 24. Oil refinery equipment sets (until 1944) set. . 6 25. Aviation gasoline, thousand tons 628.4 26. Machine tools and factory equipment - - 27. Gasoline, thousand tons 242.8 28. Various pipes - - 29. Explosives, thousand tons 295.6 30. Short armored steel** thousand tons 912,000 31. Marine motors - - 32. Railway rails thousand tons 685.7 33. Radio stations thousand pieces. 35,000 34. Receivers pcs. 5899 35. Radars pcs. 989 (until 1944)

* During the war years, 800 steam locomotives, 6 electric locomotives, 1 diesel locomotive were produced in the USSR. **Short or ship ton equals 907.2 kg. 36. Electric furnaces - * 37. Machine tools thousand pieces. 38.1 (before 1944) 38. Primary copper thousand tons 387.7 39. Aluminum thousand tons 256.4 40. Duralumin - - 41. Tin - - 42. Lead - - 43. Nickel - - 44. Cobalt - - 45. Magnesium alloys - - 46. Molybdenum concentrate - - 47. Barbed wire thousand tons 45,000 48. Natural rubber thousand tons 103.5 49. Field phones thousand pieces. 189.0 50. Field telephone cable thousand miles 956.7 51. Marine cable thousand miles 2.1 52. Underwater cable thousand miles 1D 53. Shoe leather thousand tons 10,500 54. Army boots million pairs 1, 5 before 1944 55. Grain (wheat) million short tons 2** 56. Seeds thousand tons - 57. Sugar thousand short tons 372.4 (before 1942) 58. Canned meat thousand short tons 732 595 59. Meat, thousand tons 180,000 60. Butter, thousand tons 12,000 61. Pig fat, thousand tons 144,000 62. Vegetable oil, thousand tons 120,000 63. Soap base, thousand tons 60,000

To the above reference, it is necessary to give an additional list of weapons, equipment, materials, food products and other things that were not indicated in official Soviet publications.

Additional list of US deliveries to the Soviet Union.22 1. Assault rifles 2. Pistols 3. Ammunition (shells, cartridges, mines) 4. Armored personnel carriers 5. Aircraft engines 6. Car engines 7. Aircraft tires 8. Aviation spare parts 9. Aviation tools 10. Batteries *The exact volume of deliveries has not been established. **This quantity was delivered from July 1, 1942. Until June 30, 1943 11. Technical alcohol 12. Various transformers 13. Motor oil 14. Lubricants 15. Stamped metal sheets for the construction of field airfields 16. Mobile power plants 17. Various electric motors 18. Electric stoves 19. Various generators 20. Various pumps 21. Various devices 22. Wire 23. Different types of chemicals 24. Ferroalloys 25. Medical equipment 26. Tool steel 27. Toluene 28. Trinitrotoluene 29. Medicines 30. Medical instruments 31. Dressings 32. Metalwork tools 33. Turning and milling tools 34. Various tents 35. Tarpaulin 36. Technical fabrics 37. Military boots 38. High boots for flight personnel 39. Clothing and footwear for the population 40. Leather 41. Leather goods 42. Shoe nails 43. Woolen fabrics 44. Cotton fabrics 45. Bed linen 46. Electric wire copper 47. Aluminum electric wire 48. Light bulbs 49. Children's toys

Food:

1. Wheat flour 2. Flour products (pasta, horns, etc.) 3. Sausages in jars 4. Bacon 5. Pork stew 6. Canned fish 7. Margarine 8. Condensed milk 9. Powdered milk 10. Confectionery 11. Egg powder 12. Cheese 13. Saccharin 14. Various jams 15. Jam 16. Chocolate 17. Chocolate butter 18. Various concentrates 19. Rice 20. Buckwheat 21. Lentils 22. Hercules 23. Linseed oil(before 1944) 24. Peanut butter (before 1944) 25. Potatoes (before 1944) 26. Peas (before 1944) 27. Dried vegetables and fruits (before 1944) 28. Dehydrated vegetables (soups) (until 1944) 29. Coffee (in double bags and metal cans) 30. Yeast 31. Vanillin 32. Ground black pepper

Speaking of US deliveries to the Soviet Union, it is not without interest to get acquainted with the opinion of Hitler's military figures on this.

So, for example, General Z. Westphal stated that American supplies "greatly helped the red colossus to compensate for the losses suffered in the first months of the war, and gradually increase the military power of Russia in the course of the war ... It can be said without exaggeration that without such a huge American support, Russian troops would hardly have been able to go on the offensive in 1943."23

Concluding the topic of American supplies to the USSR, I would like to give two very remarkable examples of impeccable reliability.

During the war years, the shoe factory where I worked before joining the army produced army shoes exclusively on American raw materials, accessories and consumables. According to my information, other shoe factories in the city also worked on American raw materials.

Second example. The aviation division in which I served consisted of 3 regiments: the 45th, 173rd and 244th. The first two regiments were equipped with American B-25 bombers, and our regiment was equipped with TU-2 aircraft.

These facts probably speak volumes.

And I still have to make a general summary on this problem, oddly enough it will seem to some researchers and a certain part of experts national history, referring to Stalin, who, perhaps for the first time in his life, honestly admitted "it is impossible without American help for Great Britain and the USSR to resist the material power of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe."

History has witnessed an unimaginable triumph: the Soviet Union not only withstood the fight against such a strong and treacherous enemy, but emerged victorious from it. This became possible, no doubt, thanks to the great many-sided assistance that the United States of America rendered to him. Do not recognize this historical fact- means to repay this country, its people with black ingratitude.

Bibliography:

1. "True." June 25, 1941 2. Pete by: Bennett E.M. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory: American-Soviet Relations 1939-1945. Wilmington (Del.): Ascholary Resources Inc. Imprint. 1990. P.31. 3. See: Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. T.2. M.: GIPL. 1957. P.9, 11, 281. 4. History of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. In 6 volumes, V.2. P.189. 5. Quoted. Quoted from: Riddles of Lend-Lease. M. "Veche". 2000. P. 154. 6. Simonov K.M. Through the eyes of a man of my generation, Reflections of I.V. Stalin. M. APN. 1989. P.354. 7 Military archives of Russia. M. 1993. Issue 1. P.234. 8. History of the Second World War 1939-1945. In 12 volumes. T. 12. M Military Publishing. 1982. C119. 9. Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. T.2. P.34. Y. History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T.12. P.187. 11. Great Patriotic War. Questions and answers. M. IPL. 1985. S. 115-116. 12. There. P.116. 13. Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. T.2. P. 12. 14. Ibid. P. 14. 15. Ibid. 16. There. P.17. 17. Ibid. P.34. 18. Ibid. S.34-35. 19. Ibid. P.36. 20. Truth. May 24, 1944 21. Reference compiled on the basis of publications: The National Economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. stat. Collection. M., 1990; Vessels of the Ministry of the Navy that died during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Directory. M, 1989; Sokolov B.V. The Price of Victory (Great Patriotic War: the unknown about the known). Moscow: Moscow worker. 1991; Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. T.1-2, M. GIPL. 1957; Jones R.H. States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union. Norman, Oklahoma Univ. Press. 1969; Werth A. Russia in the war 1941-1945. M.. 1967; Independent military review. No. 27. 2000; Lend-Lease Mysteries. M.: "Veche". 2000; Mikoyan Anastas Ivanovich. It was. Reflections on the past. M. "Vagrius". 1999. 22. An additional list of US deliveries to the Soviet Union is compiled on the basis of the author's collection of documents and his memoirs. 23.WestphalZ. etc. Fatal decisions. Per. from English. M, 1958. S.114-115.

phrase lend-lease comes from the English words: lend- to lend and lease- to rent. In the candidate's article offered to readers historical sciences P. S. Petrov, the views of American political and military figures are presented, as well as assessments of Western researchers, gleaned from various US sources, on Soviet-American cooperation within the framework of Lend-Lease, which largely determined the policy towards the Soviet ally in the period of the past war.

According to the established opinion, when supplying the parties to the war against Germany, the United States of America was guided primarily self-interest- protect yourself with the hands of others and preserve your own strength as much as possible. At the same time, the US monopoly bourgeoisie pursued certain economic goals, bearing in mind that lend-lease supplies would contribute to a significant expansion of production and its enrichment through government orders.

The Lend-Lease Act (officially called the United States Defense Assistance Act) was passed by the US Congress on March 8, 1941. Initially, it extended to Great Britain and a number of other countries against which Germany fought.

According to this act, the head of state received the authority to transfer, exchange, lease, lend or otherwise supply military equipment, weapons, ammunition, equipment, strategic raw materials, food, provide various goods and services, as well as information to the government of any country, “defense which the President deems vital to the defense of the United States."

The states that received Lend-Lease assistance signed agreements with the US government. According to them, delivered cars, various military equipment, weapons, other items destroyed, lost or consumed during the war, were not subject to payment after its end. The remaining goods and materials after the war, which could be used for civilian consumption, were supposed to be paid in full or in part on the basis of long-term loans provided by America. And the United States could demand that military materials be returned back, although, as A.A. Gromyko, former ambassador USSR in the USA in 1943-1946, the American government has repeatedly stated that it will not use this right.

It is important to note that the countries that entered into agreements with the United States, in turn, assumed obligations to “contribute to the defense of the United States” and provide them with assistance with the materials that they had, provide various services and information. The United States thus received a counter, or reverse, lend-lease: machine tools, anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, equipment for military factories, as well as various services, military information, strategic raw materials, precious metals, etc.

By supplying military equipment and materials to the countries fighting against Germany, the United States primarily pursued its own selfish interests. This is evidenced by many American authors, because the government provided lend-lease as an alternative to war. For example, R. Dawson wrote that in the US Congress and the country at the end of October 1941 there was a firm conviction, despite neutralist, isolationist and even anti-Soviet sentiments, that “dollars, even transferred Soviet Russia, were a much more favorable contribution than sending the American army. On the other hand, the supply of goods contributed to the expansion of production and the receipt of large profits. Thus, the prudence underlying Lend-Lease was a characteristic feature of all types of assistance and US policy in the war, which was especially clearly manifested in relations with the USSR.

The US government, which declared after the attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941 by fascist Germany and its satellites that it intended to help him, nevertheless, before doing this, it cleared up for itself for a number of months what "Russia's ability to resist" was, and then has already made its position.

The US proceeded from what danger Germany posed to them first of all and whether Great Britain and the United States would be able to continue to rule the world or whether Germany and Japan would take their place. They understood that the victory of Germany in the war against the USSR would turn out to be "a catastrophe of the highest importance for England and America", because in the event of establishing control over all of Europe and Asia, the Third Reich "would threaten the United States from both sides". At the same time, they were also worried about the following question: “Suppose that we provide assistance to Russia and she defeats Hitler, who will dominate Europe ..?” .

Only having calculated all the pros and cons, the American leadership decided to provide assistance to the USSR. A week after the outbreak of hostilities on the eastern front, a special committee was created at the US State Department from representatives various services, who prepared a small list of goods, including military ones, for export to the USSR. The Soviet side was able to purchase materials for cash. However, red tape and bureaucratic obstacles immediately got in the way of this undertaking, because various departments, sending applications from the USSR to each other, argued for a long time about how to get Russian gold.

US Secretary of State Harry Hopkins meeting with Stalin, summer 1941

At the same time, the United States, recognizing that the Russians are also defending America, considered it necessary to assure our country of the desire to help, since they also took into account the need to have a friendly Russia behind Japanese lines. To this end, US leaders began to run into Moscow. The first to arrive was presidential aide Harry Hopkins, who clarified the situation in the USSR and his ability to stand against Hitler. Based on the analysis of the information he received, the president was convinced that "helping the Russians is money well spent."

In negotiations between Hopkins and Stalin in late July 1941, it was determined that the Red Army was in particular need of anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, rifles, high-octane aviation gasoline, and aluminum for aircraft production. The United States assessed these requests as insignificant, but they were in no hurry to satisfy them. “Nearly six weeks have passed since the start of the war with Russia, but we have done practically nothing to deliver the necessary materials to them,” Roosevelt wrote in one document. In addition, he believed that aircraft intended for sale to the Soviet Union did not have to be latest models, and deliveries could be "symbolic".

Former US Secretary of the Interior G. Ickes wrote that only five were sent on the request for 3,000 bombers.

From June to August 1941, only 128 tons of materials purchased for cash were delivered to the USSR. It was the third month of the war, and the United States supplied us only with tools and industrial equipment purchased earlier. The situation has not changed even a few months later. As G. Ickes testifies, the American leadership sought to ensure that “the Russians hand over to us all their gold, which will be used to pay for the supply of goods until (it) is exhausted. From now on, we will apply the lend-lease law to Russia. In payment for supplies, the USSR also transferred to the United States strategic raw materials - manganese, chromium, asbestos, platinum, etc.

It must be assumed that England began real deliveries of military materials to the Soviet Union before the United States, because on September 6, 1941, W. Churchill announced the first limited deliveries of the USSR on terms similar to the American Lend-Lease.

On October 1, 1941, the first protocol on deliveries for a period of 9 months - until June 30, 1942 was signed in Moscow by the representative of the US President A. Harriman. The value of imported goods was $1 billion. For payment, an interest-free loan was provided, which was supposed to begin to be repaid 5 years after the end of the war - within 10 years. On November 7, 1941, that is, four and a half months after the German attack on the USSR, Roosevelt finally signed the document on the basis of the permission passed by Congress to extend the lend-lease law to the Soviet Union.

The first deliveries from the USA date back to October 1941. In that year, the USSR received $545,000 worth of various weapons and military materials, less than one-tenth of a percent of the total cost of American deliveries to other countries. In addition, the USSR purchased goods for cash in the amount of 41 million dollars. Until the end of 1941, the USA supplied the USSR with 204 aircraft instead of 600 provided for under the protocol, 182 tanks instead of 750. According to Harriman, the USA fulfilled only a quarter of their obligations under the first protocol. All this was done with the goal not so much to help the USSR as to keep Russia in a state of war, to keep the front at a considerable distance from American territory with the least casualties, and to minimize direct military material costs. During the fighting near Moscow at the end of 1941, American weapons were just beginning to arrive. The front was provided with Soviet-made weapons, the output of which, after the evacuation of the country's enterprises from west to east, began to steadily increase from the summer of 1942.

In February 1942, Roosevelt advanced a second billion dollars and wished to renegotiate the terms of the loan, and then wrote to Stalin about the planned use of American military forces. These issues were discussed in Washington during Molotov's visit to the United States in May 1942. A second protocol was prepared for one year, according to which it was originally planned to supply 8 million tons of materials. However, the president, referring to the need to ensure the promised, but not opened in 1942, second front, reduced the volume of deliveries to 2.5 million tons. distribution of the most favored nation regime to the Soviet Union and regulated issues related to supplies. The United States abandoned the formal requirement to pay for loans and transferred lend-lease for the USSR to the same lend-lease basis as for England.

I must say about the quality American technology, its suitability for combat. Stalin, in correspondence with Roosevelt, noted that American tanks burn very easily from anti-tank rifles that hit from behind and from the side, because they run on high-grade gasoline. He also wrote that the Soviet side was ready to temporarily completely abandon the supply of tanks, artillery, ammunition, pistols and other things, but was in dire need of an increase in the supply of modern-type fighter aircraft, but not of the "Keetyhawk" aircraft, which could not withstand the fight against German fighters. The preference was given to the Airacobra fighters, but it turned out that they often fall into a tailspin, and this did not cause the Americans themselves to want to fly them and risk their lives. Marshal G.K. Zhukov also wrote that tanks and aircraft from the United States were not distinguished by high combat qualities.

In 1942, the USSR delivered: 2505 aircraft, 3023 tanks, 78,964 vehicles. 12% of the total amount of equipment sent was lost on the way to our country (this is how much it was sunk at sea, which stopped deliveries in spring and summer). In the same 1942, the Soviet Union produced 25,436 aircraft and 24,446 tanks.

After the defeat of the Nazi troops near Stalingrad in February 1943, the contribution of the allies to which was insignificant, a radical turning point in the war occurred and the United States slightly increased the supply of military equipment.

In the spring of 1943, the United States and Britain decided to suspend the dispatch of cargo convoys to the Soviet northern ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, citing preparations for an operation against Italy, a landing on its territory. As a result, by the end of the second protocol, 1.5 million tons of cargo were not delivered. Only towards the end of November, after an eight-month break, did another convoy arrive via the northern route. Thus, in the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 participated Combat vehicles almost entirely domestic production.

On July 1, 1943, the third protocol came into force. Canada joined in deliveries to the Soviet Union, Great Britain began to take a more active part in them. By this time, the needs of the USSR had changed somewhat. More vehicles, communications equipment, clothing, medical equipment, explosives and food were needed than tanks, guns, ammunition.

Aid to the Soviet Union, despite a delay in mid-1943, increased over the year as a whole to 63% compared to 1942.

As for the supply of foodstuffs, and some American authors, proving the decisive role of the United States in supplying the Soviet Army, emphasize this, then not everything was all right here either. According to Roosevelt's promise, in 1943, food supplies were to be 10% of the total number of products produced in the United States. In the first six months of the year, food supplies to the Soviet Union accounted for only one third. It follows that the USSR received a little more than 3% of the food that was produced in the USA. Could this play an important role for such major country like the USSR?

For 1941 -1944 Our country received from the USA, Canada and Great Britain 2 million 545 thousand tons of food under Lend-Lease. At the same time, since 1944, the Soviet Union had to feed both the western regions of the USSR, and the countries of Eastern Europe, liberated by the Soviet Army, robbed and devastated by the Nazis.

However, the Soviet Union appreciated the help of the allies, especially since since the summer of 1943, American military equipment and various equipment could be increasingly seen on the fronts of the Soviet Army. American military supplies were based on increased by that time production in the United States (by 35% compared with the average of 1935-1939). Under the third protocol in 1944, well-known and much-needed by the USSR trucks and other motor vehicles, various metals, machinery and equipment, fuels and lubricants, steam locomotives, rails, and wagons were supplied.

Lend-Lease. Dodge WF32.

At the beginning of 1944, negotiations began on the content of the fourth delivery protocol. Although Roosevelt considered the USSR the main factor ensuring the defeat of fascism, in the United States everything greater influence acquired forces that slowed down supplies, advocated a review of relations with the Soviet Union, since the crisis in the war with Germany was overcome. The congress feared that some of the delivered materials, machinery, equipment could be used by our country to restore the economy after the war.

On May 2, 1945, i.e., after the death of Roosevelt (in April), a group of people in the US administration, which included, in particular, Deputy Secretary of State J. Grew and Head of the Foreign Economic Administration L. Crowley, insisted on limiting and even ending deliveries to the Soviet Union, taking advantage of the fact that the anti-Soviet-minded G. Truman became the president of the country, reported this opinion to him. And on May 10, a decision was made to revise the policy towards the USSR, expressed in a memorandum. According to this document, lend-lease supplies were allowed only for military operations against Japan. Purchases of other materials were possible only for cash. Deliveries to the Soviet Union after the surrender of Japan in August 1945 were finally stopped.

"Such a policy of change was one of the many harbingers of a new period in Soviet-American relations". Therefore, it is obviously no coincidence that in the United States a number of studies related to the termination of lend-lease include the concept of "cold war".

Having interrupted Lend-Lease deliveries, the United States signed an agreement with the USSR in October 1945 on the sale of previously ordered goods on credit. But in January 1947, the American government stopped deliveries under this agreement.

Summing up the results of the assistance provided to our country by the United States, Great Britain and Canada, it should be noted that the share of their deliveries in relation to domestic production amounted to only about 4%. In total, during the war, 42 convoys arrived in Soviet ports, and 36 were sent from the USSR. According to American sources, differing in indicators, for the period from October 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945, 2660 ships were sent to the USSR with a total cargo volume of 16.5- 17.5 million tons, of which 15.2-16.6 million tons were delivered to the destination (77 ships with 1.3 million tons of cargo were lost at sea). In value terms, deliveries to the Soviet Union, transport costs and services amounted to 10.8-11.0 billion dollars, that is, no more than 24% of the total number of dollars spent by the United States on lend-lease assistance to all countries (more than 46 billion) . This amount is equal to approximately 13% of all US military spending, of which only 3.3% accounted for aid to the eastern front. During the war, the USSR received: 401.4 thousand vehicles and 2 million 599 thousand tons of oil products, 9.6 thousand guns (that is, about 2% of the production of this type of weapon in our country in the amount of 489.9 thousand artillery guns), 14-14.5 thousand aircraft (taking into account losses during transportation - about 10% of the total, equal to 136.8 thousand aircraft produced by the Soviet industry), tanks and self-propelled guns - 12.2 thousand, or 12% (according to other sources, 7 thousand, or 6.8%), against 102.5 thousand Soviet-made tanks and self-propelled guns, 422 thousand field telephones, over 15 million pairs of shoes, about 69 million m2 of woolen fabrics, 1860 locomotives (6.3% total strength locomotive fleet of the USSR), 4.3 million tons of food, which accounted for approximately 25% of the total tonnage of deliveries.

“Our supplies,” acknowledges the head of the military mission, General Dean, “may not have won the war, but they should have supported the Russians.”

After the end of World War II, negotiations began between the USSR and the United States to settle Lend-Lease settlements, as the American government continued to seek maximum benefits in the form of payments or reimbursement of goods in kind. The administration initially valued its claims at $2.6 billion, but the following year lowered the amount to $1.3 billion. These claims showed discrimination against the Soviet Union, for, for example, Great Britain, which received twice as much assistance, had to pay only 472 million dollars, i.e., about 2% of the cost of military supplies.

Finally, on October 18, 1972, an agreement was reached to settle the Lend-Lease issue. The Soviet Union had to pay 722 million dollars on condition that the American side granted it the most favored nation treatment in trade with the United States, as well as export credits and guarantees. However, due to the unacceptable position for the USSR, which was then taken by the United States in accordance with the agreements reached, the implementation of the agreement remains incomplete.

I must say that the United States greatly enriched itself in the war. By the end of the war, their national income was one and a half times higher than the pre-war one. The total capacity of industrial production increased by 40% compared to 1939. The losses of the Soviet Union in that war reached 485 billion dollars (US military spending amounted to about 330 billion dollars).

Leckie R. The Wars of America. - New York, Evanston and London. 1968. - p. 719.
Leighton R. M. and Coakley R. W. Global Logistics and Strategy. 1940-1943. - Washington, 1955. - p. 259.
Dawson R. H. The Decision to Aid Russia 1941. - Chapel Hill, 1959. - p. 287.
The New York Times. - 1941. - June, 26. - p. eighteen.
Wall Street Journal. - 1941. June, 25. - p. four.
Kimball W. F. Churchill and Roosevelt. The Complete Correspondence I. Alliance Emerging. October 1933. - November 1942. - Princeton, New Jersey, 1984. - p. 226.
Ickes H.L. The Secret Diary - Vol. 3 - New York, 1954. - p. 595
Ibid. — p. 320.
Leighton R. M. and Cocley R. W. Global Logistics and Strategy. 1943-1945. - Washington, 1968. - P. 699.
Deane J.R. The Strange Alliance, - New York, 1947. - P. 95.

It’s worth starting with the “deciphering” of the term “Lend-Lease” itself, although for this it is enough to look into the English-Russian dictionary. So, lend - "to lend", lease - "to lease". It was under such conditions that the United States during the Second World War transferred military equipment, weapons, ammunition, equipment, strategic raw materials, food, various goods and services to the allies in the Anti-Hitler coalition. These conditions will still have to be remembered at the end of the article.

The Lend-Lease Act was passed by the US Congress on March 11, 1941, and authorized the President to grant the above species to countries whose "defence against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States." The calculation is understandable: to protect yourself with the hands of others and to preserve your strength as much as possible.

Lend-Lease deliveries in 1939-45. received 42 countries, US spending on them amounted to more than 46 billion dollars (13% of all military spending of the country for the Second world war). The main volume of supplies (about 60%) fell on the British Empire; against this background, the share of the USSR, on whose share the brunt of the war fell, is more than indicative: slightly higher than 1/3 of the British supplies. The largest part of the remaining deliveries came from France and China.

Even in the Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, it was said about the desire to "supply the USSR with the maximum amount of those materials that it needs most of all." Although the United States officially signed the supply agreement with the USSR on July 11, 1942, the effect of the "Lend-Lease Law" was extended to the USSR on November 7, 1941 by presidential decree (obviously "for the holiday"). Even earlier, on 10/01/41, an agreement was signed in Moscow between England, the USA and the USSR on mutual deliveries for a period up to 06/30/42. Subsequently, such agreements (they were called "Protocols") were renewed annually.

But again, even earlier, on August 31, 1941, the first caravan came to Arkhangelsk under the code name "Dervish", and more or less systematic Lend-Lease deliveries began in November 1941. At first, sea convoys were the main delivery method , arriving in Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk). In total, 1530 transports followed this route, consisting of 78 convoys (42 - to the USSR, 36 - back). By the actions of submarines and aviation of Nazi Germany, 85 transports (including 11 Soviet ships) were sunk, and 41 transports were forced to return to their original base.

Our country highly appreciates and honors the courageous feat of the sailors of Britain and other allied countries who participated in the escort and protection of convoys along the Northern route.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEND-LEASE FOR THE USSR

For the Soviet Union, which fought against an exceptionally strong aggressor, the supply of military equipment, weapons and ammunition was primarily important, especially considering their huge losses in 1941. It is believed that according to this nomenclature, the USSR received: 18,300 aircraft, 11,900 tanks, 13,000 anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, 427,000 vehicles, a large amount of ammunition, explosives and gunpowder. (However, the figures given may vary considerably from source to source.)

But we did not always receive exactly what we especially needed, and within the agreed time frame (apart from inevitable combat losses, there were other reasons for this). So, in the most difficult period for us (October - December 1941), the USSR was underdelivered: aircraft - 131, tanks - 513, wedges - 270 and more whole line cargo. For the period from October 1941 to the end of June 1942 (the terms of the 1st Protocol), the United States fulfilled its obligations on: bombers - less than 30%, fighters - 31%, medium tanks - 32%, light tanks - by 37%, trucks - by 19.4% (16,502 instead of 85,000)

SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT UNDER LEND-LEASE

Soviet ace A.I. Pokryshkin near his Airacobra fighter

This type of supply, of course, was of paramount importance. Lend-lease planes came mainly from the USA, although a certain part (and a lot) also came from the UK. The figures indicated in the table may not coincide with other sources, but they very clearly illustrate the dynamics and range of aircraft deliveries.

By their own flight performance"Lend-Lease" aircraft were far from equivalent. So. the American Kittyhawk fighter and the English Hurricane, as A.I. Shakhurin in September 1941, "are not the latest examples of American and British technology"; in fact, they significantly lost German fighters in terms of speed and armament. "Harry-Kane", moreover, had an unreliable engine: due to its failure in battle, the famous North Sea pilot, twice Hero of the Soviet Union B.F. Safonov. Soviet pilots frankly called this fighter a "flying coffin."

The American fighter Airacobra, on which the Hero of the Soviet Union A.I. Pokryshkin fought three times, was practically not inferior to the German Me-109 and FV-190 in speed and had powerful weapons (37-mm aircraft cannon and 4 machine guns 12.7 mm), which, according to Pokryshkin, "broke the German planes to smithereens." But due to miscalculations in the design of the "Aero-Cobra", with complex evolutions during the battle, it often fell into a hard-to-remove "flat" tailspin, deformation of the fuselage "Aerocob-Of course, such an ace as Pokryshkin brilliantly coped with a capricious aircraft, but among ordinary pilots had many accidents and disasters.

The Soviet government was forced to present a claim to the manufacturer ("Bell"), but she rejected it. Only when our test pilot A. Kochetkov was sent to the USA, who over the airfield of the company and in front of its management demonstrated the deformation of the Aerocobra fuselage in the tail area (he himself managed to jump out with a parachute), the company had to redesign the design of his car . The improved model of the fighter, which received the marking P-63 "Kingcobra", began to operate at the final stage of the war, in 1944-45, when our industry mass-produced excellent fighters Yak-3, La-5, La-7 , which surpassed the American ones in terms of characteristics.

A comparison of the characteristics shows that American vehicles were not inferior to the German ones of the same type in terms of basic indicators: the bombers also had an important advantage - night vision bombsights, which the German Yu-88 and Xe-111 did not have. Yes, and the defensive weapons of the American bombers were machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber (for the German ones - 7.92), and their number was large.

The combat use and technical operation of American and British aircraft, of course, brought a lot of worries, but our technicians relatively quickly learned not only to prepare "foreigners" for combat missions, but also to repair them. Moreover, on the part of British aircraft, Soviet specialists managed to replace their rather weak machine guns of 7.71 mm caliber with more powerful domestic weapons.

Speaking of aviation, it is impossible not to mention the provision of fuel. As you know, the shortage of aviation gasoline was an acute problem of our Air Force even in peacetime, holding back the intensity of combat training in combat units and training in flight schools. During the war years, the USSR received 630 thousand tons of aviation gasoline from the USA under Lend-Lease, and more than 570 thousand more from Great Britain and Canada. The total number of light fraction gasoline supplied to us was 2586 thousand tons - 51% domestic production of these varieties in the period 1941 - 1945. Thus, one has to agree with the statement of the historian B. Sokolov that without imported fuel supplies, Soviet aviation would not have been able to act effectively in the operations of the Great Patriotic War. Unprecedented was the difficulty of ferrying aircraft from the United States "under its own power" to the Soviet Union. Particularly long - 14,000 km) was the ALSIB air route (Alaska-Siberia), laid in 1942 from Fairbanks (USA) to Krasnoyarsk and beyond. Wilderness Far North and taiga Siberia, frosts up to 60 and even 70 degrees, unpredictable weather with unexpected fogs and snow loads made ALSIB the most difficult haul route. The ferry air division of the Soviet Air Force operated here, and, probably, more than one of our pilots laid down his young head not in battle with the aces of the Luftwaffe, but on the ALSIBA track, but his feat is as glorious as the front. 43% of all aircraft received from the USA passed through this air route.

Already in October 1942, the first group of American bombers A-20 "Boston" was overtaken by ALSIB near Stalingrad. Airplanes made in the USA could not withstand the severe Siberian frosts - rubber products burst. The Soviet government urgently provided the Americans with a recipe for frost-resistant rubber - only this saved the situation ...

With the organization of cargo delivery by sea across the South Atlantic to the Persian Gulf region and the creation of aircraft assembly workshops there, aircraft began to be ferried from the airfields of Iran and Iraq to North Caucasus. The southern air route was also difficult: mountainous terrain, unbearable heat, sandstorms. 31% of the aircraft received from the United States was transported through it.

In general, it must be admitted that the supply of aircraft under lend-lease to the USSR undoubtedly played a positive role in intensifying the combat operations of the Soviet Air Force. It is also worth considering that although, on average, foreign aircraft accounted for no more than 15% of their domestic production, for certain types of aircraft this percentage was significantly higher: for front-line bombers - 20%, for front-line fighters - from 16 to 23%, and for naval aircraft - 29% (especially the sailors noted the Catalina flying boat), which looks very significant.

ARMORED VEHICLES

In terms of importance for combat operations, in terms of the number and level of vehicles, tanks, of course, took second place in Lend-Lease deliveries. It's about specifically about tanks, since the supply of self-propelled guns would not be very significant. And again it must be noted that the corresponding figures fluctuate in different sources very significant.

"Soviet Military Encyclopedia" provides the following data on tanks (pieces): USA - about 7000; Great Britain - 4292; Canada - 1188; total - 12480.

The reference dictionary "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-45" gives the total number of tanks received under Lend-Lease - 10800 units.

The latest edition of Russia and the USSR in Wars and Conflicts of the 20th Century (M, 2001) gives the figure of 11,900 tanks, as does the latest edition of The Great Patriotic War 1941-45 (M, 1999).

So, the number of lend-lease tanks amounted to about 12% of the total number of tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the Red Army during the war (109.1 thousand units). Further, when considering the combat characteristics of Lend-Lease tanks, some, for brevity, omit the number of crew and the number of machine guns.

ENGLISH TANKS

They made up most the first batches of armored vehicles under Lend-Lease (together with American tanks of the M3 series of two varieties). These were combat vehicles designed to escort infantry.

"Valentine" Mk 111

It was considered infantry, weighing 16.5 -18 tons; armor - 60 mm, gun 40 mm (on parts of tanks -57 mm), speed 32 - 40 km / h (different engines). On the fronts, it proved to be positive: having a low silhouette, it had good reliability, comparative simplicity of device and maintenance. True, our repairmen had to weld spurs on the Valentine's tracks to increase patency (tea, not Europe). They were delivered from England - 2400 pieces, from Canada - 1400 (according to other sources - 1180).

"Matilda" Mk IIA

By class, it was a medium tank weighing 25 tons, with good armor (80 mm), but a weak 40 mm caliber gun; speed - no more than 25 km / h. Disadvantages - the possibility of loss of mobility in the event of freezing of dirt that got into the closed undercarriage, which is unacceptable in combat conditions. In total, "Matild" was delivered to the Soviet Union 1084 units.

"Churchill" Mk III

Although it was considered infantry, by weight (40-45 tons) it belonged to the heavy class. It had a clearly unsatisfactory layout - the caterpillar contour covered the hull, which sharply worsened the visibility of the driver in battle. With strong armor (board - 95 mm, forehead of the hull - up to 150), it did not have powerful weapons (guns were installed mainly 40 - 57 mm, only for some vehicles - 75 mm). Low speed (20-25 km / h), poor maneuverability, limited visibility reduced the effect of strong armor, although Soviet tankers noted the good combat survivability of the Churchills. There were 150 of them delivered. (according to other sources - 310 pieces). The engines on the "Valentines" and "Matildas" were diesel, on the "Churchills" - carburetor.

AMERICAN TANKS

For some reason, the M3 index for some reason designated two American tanks at once: the light M3 - "General Stuart" and the medium M3 - "General Lee", aka "General Grant" (in everyday life - "Lee / Grant").

MZ "Stuart"

Weight - 12.7 tons, armor 38-45 mm, speed - 48 km / h, armament - 37 mm caliber gun, carburetor engine. With good armor for a light tank and speed, one has to note reduced maneuverability due to the characteristics of the transmission and poor maneuverability due to insufficient adhesion of the tracks to the ground. Delivered to the USSR - 1600 pcs.

M3 "Lee / Grant"

Weight - 27.5 tons, armor - 57 mm, speed - 31 km / h, armament: 75 mm cannon in the sponson of the hull and 37 mm cannon in the turret, 4 machine guns. The layout of the tank (high silhouette) and the location of the weapons were extremely unfortunate. The bulkiness of the design and the placement of weapons in three tiers (which forced the crew to be brought up to 7 people) made the Grant a fairly easy prey for enemy artillery. Aviation gasoline engine aggravated the position of the crew. We called it "a mass grave for seven." Nevertheless, in late 1941 - early 1942, 1,400 of them were delivered; in that difficult period, when Stalin personally distributed the tanks individually, and the "Grants" were at least some kind of help. Since 1943, the Soviet Union has abandoned them.

The most effective (and, accordingly, popular) American tank of the period 1942 - 1945. appeared medium tank M4 Sherman. In terms of production during the war years (a total of 49324 were produced in the USA), it takes second place after our T-34. It was produced in several modifications (from M4 to M4A6) with different engines, both diesel and carburetor, including twin engines and even blocks of 5 engines. Under Lend-Lease, we were supplied mainly with M4A2 Shsrmams with two diesel engines of 210 hp each, which had different cannon weapons: 1990 tanks - with a 75-mm gun, which turned out to be insufficiently effective, and 2673 - with a 76.2 mm caliber gun capable of hitting armor 100 mm thick at ranges up to 500 m.

"Sherman" М4А2

Weight - 32 tons, armor: hull forehead - 76 mm, turret forehead - 100 mm, side - 58 mm, speed - 45 km / h, gun - indicated above. 2 machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber and anti-aircraft 12.7 mm; crew - 5 people (like our modernized T-34-85).

A characteristic feature of the Sherman was a removable (on the bolts) cast front (lower) part of the body, which served as a cover for the transmission compartment. An important advantage was given by a device for stabilizing the gun in a vertical plane for more accurate shooting on the move (it was introduced on Soviet tanks only in the early 1950s - on the T-54A). The electro-hydraulic mechanism for turning the turret was duplicated for the gunner and commander. A large-liberal anti-aircraft machine gun made it possible to fight low-flying enemy aircraft (a similar machine gun appeared on the Soviet heavy tank IS-2 only in 1944

Scouts on the English tankette "Bren Carrier"

For its time, the Sherman had sufficient mobility, satisfactory armament and armor. The disadvantages of the car were: poor roll stability, insufficient reliability of the power plant (which was the advantage of our T-34) and relatively poor cross-country ability on slippery and frozen soils, until during the war the Americans replaced the Sherman tracks with wider, with lugs. Nevertheless, in general, according to tank crews, it was quite reliable. fighting machine, easy to set up and maintain, very maintainable, since it made the most use of automotive units and components that were well mastered by the American industry. Together with the famous "thirty-fours", although somewhat inferior to them in certain characteristics, the American "Shermans" with Soviet crews actively participated in all the largest operations of the Red Army in 1943 - 1945, reaching the coast of the Baltic Sea , to the Danube, Vistula, Spree and Elbe.

The sphere of Lend-Lease armored vehicles should also include 5,000 American armored personnel carriers (half-tracked and wheeled), which were used in the Red Army, including as carriers of various weapons, especially anti-aircraft for air defense rifle units(their armored personnel carriers during the Patriotic War were not produced in the USSR, only reconnaissance armored vehicles BA-64K were made)

AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT

Automotive equipment supplied to the USSR in quantity exceeded all military equipment not at times, but by an order of magnitude: in total, 477,785 vehicles of fifty models were received, manufactured by 26 automobile firms in the USA, England and Canals.

In the total number of vehicles, 152,000 Studebaker trucks of the US 6x4 and US 6x6 brands, as well as 50,501 command vehicles (“jeeps”) of the Willys MP and Ford GPW models were delivered; it is also necessary to mention the powerful Dodge-3/4 all-terrain vehicles with a carrying capacity of 3/4 tons (hence the number in the marking). These models were real army models, most adapted to front-line operation (as you know, we did not produce army vehicles until the early 1950s, the Red Army used ordinary national economic vehicles GAZ-AA and ZIS-5).

Truck "Studebaker"

Deliveries of cars under Lend-Lease, which exceeded their own production in the USSR by more than 1.5 times during the war years (265 thousand units), undoubtedly, were of decisive importance for a sharp increase in the mobility of the Red Army during large-scale operations 1943-1945. After all, for 1941-1942. The Red Army lost 225 thousand cars, which were missing by half even in peacetime.

The American Studebakers, with strong metal bodies that had folding benches and removable canvas awnings, were equally suitable for transportation. personnel, and various cargoes. Possessing high-speed qualities on the highway and high off-road patency, the US 6x6 Studebakers worked well as tractors for various artillery systems.

When the deliveries of "stude-bakers" began, only on their all-terrain chassis were the "Katyushas" BM-13-N, and since 1944 - BM-31-12 for heavy rockets M31. It is impossible not to mention auto covers, of which 3606 thousand were delivered - more than 30% of domestic tire production. To this we must add 103 thousand tons of natural rubber from the "bins" of the British Empire, and again recall the supply of light-fraction gasoline, which was added to ours, "native" (which was required by the Studebaker motors).

OTHER EQUIPMENT, RAW MATERIALS

Deliveries from the USA of railway rolling stock and rails helped in many ways to resolve our transport problems during the war years. Almost 1,900 steam locomotives were delivered (we ourselves built 92 (!) steam locomotives in 1942-1945) and 66 diesel-electric locomotives, as well as 11,075 wagons (with our own production of 1087). The supply of rails (if we count only broad gauge rails) accounted for more than 80% of their domestic production during this period - the metal was needed for defense purposes. Taking into account the extremely intense work of the railway transport of the USSR in 1941 - 1945, the importance of these deliveries can hardly be overestimated.

As for communications equipment, 35,800 radio stations, 5,839 receivers and 348 locators, 422,000 telephone sets and about a million kilometers of field telephone cable were delivered from the USA, which basically satisfied the needs of the Red Army during the war.

Of certain importance for providing the USSR with food (of course, in the first place for the army in the field) were also deliveries of a number of high-calorie foods (4.3 million tons in total). In particular, the supply of sugar accounted for 42% of its own production in those years, and canned meat - 108%. Even though our soldiers nicknamed the American stew mockingly “the second front”, they ate it with pleasure (although their own beef was still tastier!). To equip the fighters, 15 million pairs of shoes and 69 million square meters of woolen fabrics became very useful.

In the work of the Soviet defense industry in those years, the supply of raw materials, materials and equipment under Lend-Lease also meant a lot - after all, in 1941, large production facilities for smelting cast iron, steel, aluminum remained in the occupied regions, production of explosives and gunpowder. Therefore, the supply of 328 thousand tons of aluminum from the USA (which exceeded its own production), the supply of copper (80% of its smelting) and 822 thousand tons of chemical products were, of course, of great importance "as well as the supply of steel sheet ( our "lorries" and "three-tons" were made in the war with wooden cabins precisely because of the shortage of sheet steel) and artillery powder(used as an addition to domestic ones). Deliveries of high-performance equipment had a tangible impact on raising the technical level of domestic mechanical engineering: 38,000 machine tools from the USA and 6,500 from Great Britain worked for a long time after the war.

ARTILLERY GUNS

Automatic anti-aircraft gun "Bofors"

The smallest number of Lend-Lease deliveries turned out to be the classic types of weapons - artillery and small arms. It is believed that the share of artillery pieces (according to various sources - 8000, 9800 or 13000 pieces) was only 1.8% of the number produced in the USSR, but if we consider that most of them were anti-aircraft guns, then their share in similar domestic production during the war (38,000) will rise to a quarter. Two types of anti-aircraft guns were supplied from the USA: 40-mm automatic guns "Bofors" (Swedish design) and 37-mm automatic "Colt-Browning" (actually American). The Bofors were the most effective - they had hydraulic drives and were therefore guided by the entire battery at the same time with the help of the AZO launcher (artillery anti-aircraft fire control device); but these tools (in the complex) were very complex and expensive to manufacture, which was only possible for the developed US industry.

SUPPLY OF SMALL ARMS

In terms of small arms, the deliveries were simply miserable (151,700 units, which amounted to somewhere around 0.8% of our production) and did not play any role in the armament of the Red Army.

Among the samples supplied to the USSR: the American Colt M1911A1 pistol, Thompson and Reising submachine guns, as well as Browning machine guns: easel M1919A4 and large-caliber M2 HB; English light machine gun "Bran", anti-tank guns "Boys" and "Piat" (English tanks were also equipped with machine guns "Beza" - an English modification of the Czechoslovak ZB-53).

At the fronts, samples of Lend-Lease small arms were very rare and did not enjoy much popularity. The American "Thompsons" and "Raising" our soldiers sought to quickly replace with the usual PPSh-41. The Boys PTRs turned out to be clearly weaker than the domestic PTRDs and PTRSs - they could only fight German armored personnel carriers and light tanks (there was no information about the effectiveness of the Piat PTR in parts of the Red Army).

The most effective in their class were, of course, the American Brownings: the M1919A4 were mounted on American armored personnel carriers, and the large-caliber M2 HBs were mainly used as part of anti-aircraft installations, quad (4 machine guns M2 HB) and built (37-mm anti-aircraft gun "Colt-Browning" and two M2 HB). These installations, mounted on Lend-Lease armored personnel carriers, were very effective means of air defense for rifle units; they were also used for anti-aircraft defense of some objects.

We will not touch on the naval nomenclature of Lend-Lease deliveries, although in terms of volumes these would be large quantities: in total, the USSR received 596 ships and vessels (not counting captured ships received after the war). In total, 17.5 million tons of Lend-Lease cargo were delivered along ocean routes, of which 1.3 million tons were lost from the actions of Hitler's submarines and aviation; the number of heroes-sailors of many countries who died at the same time has more than one thousand people. Deliveries were distributed along the following delivery routes: the Far East - 47.1%, the Persian Gulf - 23.8%, Northern Russia - 22.7%, the Black Sea - 3.9%, along the Northern Sea Route) - 2.5%.

RESULTS AND ASSESSMENTS OF LEND-LISA

For a long time, Soviet historians pointed out only that Lend-Lease deliveries amounted to only 4% of the products of domestic industry and Agriculture during the war years. True, from the data presented above it can be seen that in many cases it is important to take into account the specific range of equipment samples, their quality indicators, the timeliness of delivery to the front, their significance, etc.

As a repayment for Lend-Lease supplies, the United States received from allied countries various goods and services worth 7.3 billion dollars. The USSR, in particular, sent 300 thousand tons of chromium and 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, and in addition, platinum, gold, furs and other goods for a total amount of 2.2 million dollars. The USSR also provided a number of services to the Americans, in particular, opened its northern ports, took over the partial provision of the Allied troops in Iran.

08/21/45 The United States of America stopped Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR. The Soviet government turned to the United States with a request to continue part of the deliveries on the terms of a loan to the USSR, but was refused. A new era was coming... If most of the other countries' debts on deliveries were written off, then negotiations on these issues were held with the Soviet Union in 1947 - 1948, 1951 - 1952 and in 1960.

The total amount of lend-lease deliveries to the USSR is estimated at $11.3 billion. At the same time, according to the law on lend-lease, only goods and equipment that have survived after the end of hostilities are subject to payment. Such Americans were estimated at 2.6 billion dollars, although a year later they reduced this amount by half. Thus, initially the United States demanded compensation in the amount of 1.3 billion dollars, paid over 30 years with an accrual of 2.3% per annum. But Stalin rejected these demands, saying, "The USSR fully paid off its Lend-Lease debts with blood". The fact is that many models of equipment supplied to the USSR immediately after the war turned out to be morally obsolete and no longer represented any combat value. That is, American assistance to the allies in some way turned out to be a “pushing” of equipment that the Americans themselves did not need and became morally obsolete, for which, nevertheless, it was necessary to pay off as something useful.

To understand what Stalin meant when he spoke of “payment in blood”, one should quote an excerpt from an article by a professor at the University of Kansas Wilson: “What America experienced during the war is fundamentally different from the trials that befell its main allies. Only the Americans could call the Second World War a “good war”, since it helped to significantly raise living standards and demanded too few victims from the vast majority of the population ... ”And Stalin was not going to take away resources from his already war-ravaged country in order to give them to a potential enemy in Third world.

Negotiations on the repayment of Lend-Lease debts resumed in 1972, and on 10/18/72 an agreement was signed on the payment by the Soviet Union of 722 million dollars, until 07/01/01. 48 million dollars were paid, however, after the introduction by the Americans of the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the USSR suspended further Lend-Lease payments.

In 1990, at new negotiations between the presidents of the USSR and the USA, the final maturity of the debt was agreed upon - 2030. However, a year later the USSR collapsed, and the debt was "reissued" to Russia. By 2003, it was about $100 million. Adjusted for inflation, the US is unlikely to receive more than 1% of its original cost for its supplies.

(The material was prepared for the site "Wars of the XX century"

Almost everyone knows about American deliveries to the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. The Studebakers and the American stew, nicknamed the “second front” by the Soviet soldiers, immediately pop up in my memory. But these are, rather, artistic and emotional symbols, which are actually the tip of the iceberg. The purpose of this article is to create general idea about Lend-Lease and its role in the Great Victory.

AT initial period During the Second World War, the so-called neutrality act was in effect in the United States, according to which the only way to provide assistance to any of the warring parties was the sale of weapons and materials exclusively for cash, and transportation was also assigned to the customer - the cash and carry system . Great Britain then became the main consumer of military products in the United States, but very soon it exhausted its foreign exchange funds. At the same time, President Franklin Roosevelt was well aware that in the current situation the best way out for the United States is all-round economic support for countries fighting against Nazi Germany. Therefore, he actually "pushed through" on March 11, 1941 in Congress the "Law to ensure the protection of the United States", also called the Lend-Lease Act. Now any country whose defense was recognized as vital to the United States, and strategic raw materials were provided on the following conditions:

1. Weapons and materials lost in the course of hostilities are not subject to payment.

2. The property left after the end of the war, suitable for civilian purposes, must be paid in whole or in part on the basis of long-term loans provided by the United States.

3. Equipment not lost after the war must be returned to the United States.

Joseph Stalin and Harry Hopkins, 1941

After the German attack on the USSR, Roosevelt sent his closest aide, Harry Hopkins, to Moscow, as he wanted to find out "how long Russia would hold out." This was important, since in the United States at that time the prevailing opinion was that the resistance of the USSR would not be able to provide significant resistance to the Germans, and the supplied weapons and materials would simply fall into the hands of the enemy. On July 31, Harry Hopkins met with Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin. As a result, the American politician left for Washington with the firm conviction that the Germans would not have a quick victory and that the supply of weapons to Moscow could have a significant impact on the course of hostilities.

However, the inclusion of the USSR in the Lend-Lease program took place only in October-November 1941 (until that moment, our country paid for all American military supplies). Roosevelt needed such a long period of time to overcome the resistance of a sufficiently large number of American politicians.

Signed on October 1, 1941, the first (Moscow) protocol provided for the supply of aircraft (fighters and bombers), tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, trucks, as well as aluminum, toluene, TNT, oil products, wheat and sugar. Further, the number and range of deliveries were constantly expanding.

Delivery of goods took place along three main routes: the Pacific, Trans-Iranian and Arctic. The fastest, but at the same time dangerous, was the Arctic route to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The escort of the ships was carried out by the British fleet, and on the approaches to Murmansk the security was reinforced by the ships of the Soviet Northern Fleet. At first, the Germans practically did not pay attention to the northern convoys - their confidence in an imminent victory remained so great, but, as fighting became protracted, the German command was concentrating more and more forces on bases in Norway. The result was not long in coming.

In July 1942, the German fleet, in close cooperation with aviation, practically defeated the PQ-17 convoy: 22 transport ships out of 35 were killed. Heavy losses, as well as the need to attract a large number of ships to escort ships with supplies for the besieged Malta, and then prepare the landing in North Africa forced the British to stop escorting the northern convoys before the polar night. Beginning in 1943, the balance of power in Arctic waters gradually began to shift towards the Allies. There were more convoys, and their wiring was accompanied by fewer losses. In total, there are 4027 thousand tons of cargo along the Arctic route in the USSR. Losses did not exceed 7% of the total.

The Pacific route was less dangerous, along which 8376 thousand tons were delivered. Transportation could only be carried out by ships flying the Soviet flag (the USSR, unlike the United States, did not fight Japan at that time). Further, the received cargo had to be transported by rail almost through the entire territory of Russia.

The trans-Iranian route served as a definite alternative to the northern convoys. American transport ships delivered cargo to the ports of the Persian Gulf, and then they were delivered to Russia using rail and road transport. In order to ensure full control over transport routes in August 1941, the USSR and Great Britain occupied Iran.

To enlarge throughput, conducted a large-scale modernization of the ports of the Persian Gulf and the Trans-Iranian railway. Also, General Motors built two factories in Iran, where cars intended for delivery to the USSR were assembled. In total, during the war years, these enterprises manufactured and sent 184,112 cars to our country. The total cargo flow through the ports of the Persian Gulf for the entire period of the existence of the trans-Iranian route amounted to 4227 thousand tons.

Aircraft under the lend-lease program

Since the beginning of 1945, after the liberation of Greece, the Black Sea route began to function. In this way, the USSR received 459 thousand tons of cargo.

In addition to those noted above, there were two more air routes along which aircraft were ferried "under their own power" in the USSR. The most famous was the Alsib air bridge (Alaska - Siberia), through which 7925 aircraft were transferred. Also, planes flew from the USA to the USSR through the South Atlantic, Africa and the Persian Gulf (993 aircraft).

For many years, in the works of Russian historians, it was indicated that Lend-Lease deliveries accounted for only about 4% of the total output of Soviet industry and agriculture. And, although there is no reason to doubt the reliability of this figure, nevertheless, "the devil is in the details."

It is well known that the strength of a chain as a whole is determined by the strength of its weakest link. Therefore, when determining the range of American supplies, the Soviet leadership sought, first of all, to close the "weak points" in the army and industry. This is especially evident when analyzing the volumes of strategic raw materials supplied to the USSR. In particular, 295.6 thousand tons of explosives received by our country accounted for 53% of all produced at domestic enterprises. Even more impressive is the ratio of copper - 76%, aluminum - 106%, tin - 223%, cobalt - 138%, wool - 102%, sugar - 66% and canned meat - 480%.

General A.M. Korolev and Major General Donald Connelly shake hands in front of a Lend-Lease train.

The analysis of deliveries of automotive equipment deserves no less close attention. In total, the USSR received 447,785 vehicles under Lend-Lease.
It is significant that during the war years the Soviet industry produced only 265,000 vehicles. Thus, the number of vehicles received from the Allies exceeded their own production by more than 1.5 times. In addition, these were real army vehicles adapted for operation in front-line conditions, while the domestic industry supplied the army with ordinary national economic vehicles.

The role of Lend-Lease vehicles in combat operations can hardly be overestimated. To a large extent, they ensured the success of the victorious operations of 1944, which were included in the “ten Stalinist blows”.

A considerable merit of allied deliveries is also in the successful functioning of the Soviet railway transport during the war years. The USSR received 1,900 steam locomotives and 66 diesel-electric locomotives (these figures look especially clear against the background of its own production for 1942-1945 in 92 locomotives), as well as 11,075 wagons (own production - 1,087 wagons).

In parallel, the "reverse Lend-Lease" functioned. During the war years, the Allies received from the USSR 300 thousand tons of chromium and 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as wood, gold and platinum.

During discussions on the topic “Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease?” many copies were broken. The author believes that, most likely, he could. Another thing is that now it is not possible to calculate what the price of this would be. If the volume of weapons supplied by the allies to one degree or another could well be compensated by the domestic industry, then with regard to transport, as well as the production of a number of types of strategic raw materials, without the supply of allies, the situation would very quickly turn into a critical one.

The lack of rail and road transport could easily paralyze the supply of the army and deprive it of mobility, and this, in turn, would slow down the pace of operations and increase the growth of losses. A shortage of non-ferrous metals, especially aluminum, would lead to a decrease in the production of weapons, and without food supplies, it would be much more difficult to fight hunger. Surely our country would be able to survive and win even in such a situation, but it is not possible to determine how much the price of victory would increase.

The lend-lease program was terminated at the initiative of the American government on August 21, 1945, although the USSR requested to continue deliveries on a loan (it was necessary to restore the country destroyed by the war). However, by that time F. Roosevelt was no longer among the living, and a new era of the Cold War was loudly knocking on the door.

During the war, no Lend-Lease payments were made. In 1947, the United States estimated the USSR's debt for supplies at $2.6 billion, but a year later the amount was reduced to $1.3 billion. It was planned that repayment would be made within 30 years with an accrual of 2.3% per annum. I.V. Stalin rejected these accounts, saying that "the USSR paid off its Lend-Lease debts in full with blood." As a justification for its point of view, the USSR cited the precedent of writing off debts for Lend-Lease deliveries to other countries. In addition, I.V. Stalin, quite reasonably, did not want to give the funds of a country devastated by the war to a potential enemy in the Third World War.

An agreement on the procedure for repaying debts was only concluded in 1972. The USSR undertook to pay $722 million by 2001. But after the transfer of $48 million, the payments stopped again due to the adoption by the United States of the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik Amendment.

Again, this issue was raised in 1990 at a meeting of the presidents of the USSR and the USA. A new amount was set - $674 million - and a final maturity date of 2030. After the collapse of the USSR, obligations on this debt passed to Russia.

Summing up, we can conclude that for the United States, lend-lease was, first of all, according to F. Roosevelt, "a profitable investment of capital." Moreover, it is not the profits directly from supplies that should be assessed, but the numerous indirect benefits that the American economy received after the end of World War II. History has been pleased to dispose that the post-war prosperity of the United States was to a large extent paid for in blood. Soviet soldiers. For the USSR, lend-lease became practically the only way to reduce the number of victims on the way to Victory. Here's a "marriage of convenience" ...

LEND-LEASE(eng. lend-lease, from lend - to lend and lease - to lease), a system for the transfer by the United States of America on loan or lease of military equipment and other materiel to allied countries during the Second World War.

The Lend-Lease Act was adopted in the USA in March 1941 and immediately the American government extended its effect to Great Britain. In October 1941 in Moscow, representatives of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain signed a protocol on mutual deliveries. The USSR expressed its readiness to pay for the supplies of the allies with funds from the gold reserve. In November 1941, the United States extended the Lend-Lease Act to the USSR.

In total, during the years of World War II, US Lend-Lease deliveries to the Allies amounted to approx. 50 billion dollars, of which the Sov. Union accounted for 22%. At the end of 1945, deliveries to the USSR under Lend-Lease were expressed in the amount of 11.1 billion dollars. Of these, the USSR accounted for (in million dollars): aircraft - 1189, tanks and self-propelled guns - 618, cars - 1151, ships - 689, artillery - 302, ammunition - 482, machine tools and machines - 1577, metals - 879, food - 1726, etc.

Return deliveries from the USSR to the USA amounted to 2.2 million dollars. Owls. The Union supplied the USA with 300,000 tons of chromium ore, 32,000 tons of manganese ore, a significant amount of platinum, gold, and timber.

In addition to Amer. Lend-lease assistance to the USSR was also provided by Great Britain and (since 1943) Canada, the volume of this assistance is estimated at 1.7 billion dollars, respectively. and 200 million dollars.

The first allied convoy with cargo arrived in Arkhangelsk on 31.8.1941. (cm. Allied convoys in the USSR 1941–45). Initially, Soviet assistance was provided in a relatively small amount and lagged behind the planned deliveries. At the same time, it partly compensated for the sharp drop in owls. military production in connection with the capture by the Nazis of a significant part of the territory of the USSR.

From summer to October 1942, deliveries along the northern route were suspended due to the defeat of the PQ-17 caravan by the Nazis and the Allies' preparations for a landing in North Africa. The main flow of supplies came in 1943-44, when a radical turning point in the war had already been reached. Nevertheless, the deliveries of the allies provided not only material assistance, but also political and moral support for the owls. people in the war with Nazi Germany.

According to American official data, at the end of September 1945, 14,795 aircraft, 7,056 tanks, 8,218 anti-aircraft guns, 131,000 machine guns, 140 submarine hunters, 46 minesweepers, 202 torpedo boats, 30 thousand radio stations, etc. More than 7 thousand aircraft were received from Great Britain, St. 4 thousand tanks, 385 anti-aircraft guns, 12 minesweepers, etc.; 1188 tanks delivered from Canada.

In addition to weapons, the USSR received from the United States under Lend-Lease cars (more than 480 thousand trucks and cars), tractors, motorcycles, ships, locomotives, wagons, food and other goods. Aviation squadron, regiment, division, which were consistently commanded by A.I. Pokryshkin, from 1943 until the end of the war, flew American P-39 Airacobra fighters. American Studebaker trucks were used as chassis for military vehicles rocket artillery("Katyusha").

Unfortunately, some of the Allied supplies did not reach the USSR, because they were destroyed by the Nazi Navy and the Luftwaffe during sea crossings of transports.

Several routes were used for deliveries to the USSR. Almost 4 million cargoes were delivered via the northern route from the UK and Iceland to Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Molotovsk (Severodvinsk), which accounted for 27.7% of the total deliveries. The second route is through the South Atlantic, the Persian Gulf and Iran to the Soviet. Transcaucasia; it was transported to St. 4.2 million cargo (23.8%).

For the assembly and preparation of aircraft for flight from Iran to the USSR, intermediate air bases were used, where British, American and Soviet aircraft worked. specialists. On the Pacific route, ships from the USA to the Far Eastern ports of the USSR went under the owls. flags and with owls. captains (because the US was at war with Japan). Cargoes arrived in Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Nakhodka, Khabarovsk. The Pacific route was the most efficient in terms of volume - 47.1%.

Another route was the air route from Alaska to Eastern Siberia, according to which American and Soviet. pilots delivered 7.9 thousand aircraft to the USSR. The length of the air route reached 14 thousand km.

Since 1945, the route through the Black Sea has also been used.

In total, from June 1941 to Sept. In 1945, 17.5 million tons of various cargoes were sent to the USSR, 16.6 million tons were delivered to their destination (the rest was losses during the sinking of ships). After the surrender of Germany, the United States stopped Lend-Lease deliveries to the European part of the USSR, but continued them for some time to the Soviets. Far East in connection with the war against Japan.