Chronicle of the "Afghan war". "Stinger" against helicopters: special forces against the "Stinger. How the Gru special forces got the secret American MANPADS stinger Spetsnaz on caravan routes

Second half of the eighties. The Soviet Union has been waging a protracted and bloody war on the territory of neighboring Afghanistan for seven years, helping the government of the republic to cope with the armed formations of radical fundamentalists and nationalists supported by the United States, Pakistan, and Iran.

Army aviation plays the most important role in carrying out operations against the Mujahideen. Soviet helicopters, having become a real headache for the militants, attack their positions, support the actions of motorized riflemen and paratroopers from the air. Air strikes became a real disaster for the Mujahideen, as they were deprived of their support - helicopters destroyed caravans with ammunition, food. It seemed that a little more and the DRA government troops, together with the OKSVA forces, would be able to neutralize the armed opposition.

However, very effective portable anti-aircraft missile systems soon appeared in the arsenal of the militants. During the first month of their use, the Mujahideen managed to shoot down three Mi-24 helicopters, and by the end of 1986, OKSVA lost 23 aircraft and a helicopter, which were shot down as a result of fire from the ground - from portable anti-aircraft missile systems.

The army aviation command decided to fly helicopters at extremely low altitudes - this was how they expected to avoid getting cars into the capture of the homing head of the missile, but in this case the helicopters became an easy target for the heavy machine guns of the enemy. It is clear that the situation required an early resolution, and the headquarters were racking their brains over what to do and how to secure helicopter flights over the territory of Afghanistan. There was only one way out - to find out what kind of weapon the Mujahideen use to fight Soviet helicopters. But how was it to be done?

Naturally, the command immediately came to the conclusion that it was necessary to carefully study the portable anti-aircraft missile systems used by the militants in order to decide by what means or what tactics they could be countered. It is clear that such MANPADS could not have Afghan or Pakistani production, so the Soviet command immediately "took the trail" of the United States, more precisely, the US Central Intelligence Agency, which almost from the very beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan provided comprehensive support to the formations of the Mujahideen.

The Soviet troops were given the difficult task of capturing at least one MANPADS used by the Mujahideen, which would allow developing more effective tactics to counter the new weapon. This task was to be carried out, as one would expect, by the special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

In Afghanistan, the special forces solved a variety of tasks. Being the best trained fighters both in combat and morally and psychologically, Soviet military intelligence officers carried a very significant part of the entire combat load that Soviet troops faced in this southern country. Naturally, tasks like the capture of the Stinger MANPADS could only be entrusted to the GRU special forces.

On January 5, 1987, the reconnaissance group of the 186th separate special forces detachment went on a combat mission. This detachment was formed in February 1985 on the basis of the 8th Separate Special Purpose Brigade. It included not only officers and soldiers of this brigade, but also servicemen of the 10th separate special-purpose brigade, then stationed in the Crimea, servicemen of the 2nd separate special-purpose brigade from Pskov and the 3rd separate special-purpose brigade from Viljandi. The support units were staffed by officers and ensigns from motorized rifle troops. On March 31, 1985, the 186th ooSpN was transferred to the 40th combined arms army, and organizationally included in the 22nd separate special forces brigade.

It was the scouts of this unit who had to perform a unique, very difficult and dangerous task - to capture MANPADS. Soldiers under the command of Major Evgeny Sergeev and Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun advanced to the combat mission. On two Mi-8s, Soviet servicemen set off towards Kalat, where they were to comb the territory near the road to Kandahar. Soviet helicopters flew at a very low altitude, which allowed the military to clearly see three Mujahideen moving along the road on motorcycles.

At that time in Afghanistan, only the Mujahideen could ride motorcycles on the mountain roads. Local peasants, for obvious reasons, did not have motorcycles and could not have. Therefore, Soviet intelligence officers immediately understood who they saw on the ground. Everyone understood and motorcyclists. As soon as they saw Soviet helicopters in the sky, they immediately dismounted and began to shoot from machine guns, and then fired two launches from MANPADS.

Later, Senior Lieutenant Kovtun realized that the Mujahideen did not hit the Soviet helicopters from their MANPADS only because they did not have time to properly prepare the complex for battle. In fact, they fired from MANPADS, like from a grenade launcher, offhand. Perhaps this oversight of the militants saved the Soviet military from losses.

Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun fired at the Mujahideen with a machine gun. After that, both Mi-8s went for a short landing. The scouts landed from helicopters, dispersed on the ground and engaged in battle with the Mujahideen. However, after a short time, reinforcements approached the latter. The battle became more and more fierce.

Vasily Cheboksarov, who commanded inspection group No. 711, later recalled that the Mujahideen and Soviet soldiers “beat” each other almost point-blank. When the machine gunner Safarov ran out of ammunition, he did not lose his head and "knocked out" the Mujahideen with a blow from the butt of his Kalashnikov machine gun. Surprisingly, in such a fierce battle, Soviet intelligence officers did not lose a single person, which cannot be said about the Afghan Mujahideen.

During the battle, one of the Mujahideen, clutching some kind of long bundle and a “diplomat”-type case, ran out of cover and ran, trying to hide. Senior Lieutenant Kovtun and two scouts ran after him. As Kovtun later recalled, the action movie in itself interested him least of all, but the oblong object and the diplomat were very interesting. Therefore, Soviet intelligence officers chased the Mujahideen.

The militant, meanwhile, fled and had already managed to gain a distance of two hundred meters from the Soviet soldiers, when Senior Lieutenant Kovtun managed to put him in the head with a shot. No wonder the Soviet officer was a master of sports in shooting! While Kovtun "took" a militant with a diplomat, other scouts destroyed the remaining fourteen militants who participated in the shootout. Two more "dushmans" were taken prisoner.

Huge assistance in defeating the Mujahideen group was provided by helicopters, which did not stop firing at the militants from the air, supporting Soviet intelligence officers. Subsequently, the officer in command of the helicopters will also be presented with the main award of the USSR - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, but he will never receive it.

The destruction of the Mujahideen detachment was far from the only and, moreover, not the most important victory of the Soviet intelligence officers. Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun, who shot the militant with an oblong bundle, naturally became interested in what kind of object was wrapped in a blanket carried by the militant. It turned out that this was the Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile system.

Soon the scouts brought two more "pipes" - one was empty and the other equipped. But most importantly, a diplomat fell into the hands of Soviet intelligence officers, which contained all the documentation for a portable anti-aircraft missile system. It was truly a "royal" find. After all, the bag contained not only detailed instructions for using MANPADS, but also the addresses of American suppliers of the complex.

The captured Stingers were taken to Kandahar, to the brigade headquarters. The scouts continued to carry out combat missions. Naturally, such an event could not go unnoticed by the command. Four scouts from the reconnaissance group that participated in the operation were presented to the high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union. On January 7, 1987, the commander of the 186th separate special forces detachment of the 22nd separate special forces brigade, Major Nechitailo, prepared presentations for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

But, for some reason, things did not go beyond the presentation. Although the capture of the Stinger, and even with detailed documentation, was indeed a real feat, and most importantly, it made it possible to solve the long-standing problem of ensuring the safety of Soviet army aviation.

Vladimir Kovtun says:

The commander of the brigade, Colonel Gerasimov, arrived. They decided to introduce me, Sergeyev, Sobol, the commander of the board on which we flew, and one sergeant from the inspection group to the Hero. For registration of the submission to the Hero, it is necessary to photograph the candidate. The four of us were photographed and ... In the end, they didn’t give us anything. In my opinion, the “Banner” was given to Sgt. Zhenya had a party penalty that had not been lifted, and a criminal case was opened against me. Why they didn’t give the Hero the helicopter pilot, I still don’t know. Probably, he, too, was in disgrace with his command.

The result of the operation carried out by the GRU special forces soldiers was the capture of existing models of the most modern and effective American man-portable anti-aircraft missile system at that time. Experts were immediately puzzled by the development of countermeasures against the Stingers. Not much time passed and the losses of the Soviet army aviation in Afghanistan were sharply reduced.

As for the captured Stingers captured by scouts, they were presented at a press conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRA as irrefutable evidence of Western powers helping the Mujahideen. It turned out that the Stingers captured by Soviet intelligence officers were the first of a batch of 3,000 pieces, which was purchased by the Afghan Mujahideen in the United States for use against Soviet aircraft.

However, no one denied this assistance. The US CIA launched the most active activity among the Afghan Mujahideen groups, and the closest US ally in the region at that time, Pakistan, directly participated in the Afghan war, sending its instructors to the Mujahideen formations, placing camps and bases of the Mujahideen on the territory of the border provinces, and even places of detention of Afghan and Soviet prisoners of war.

Years, decades have passed, and few today remember the feat of the Soviet military personnel who captured the Stingers. Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev, who then commanded the reconnaissance group, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, continued to serve in the armed forces, participated in the localization of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

In 1995, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, Evgeny Sergeyev retired from the armed forces due to disability, lived in Ryazan for the last years, and in 2008, at the age of 52, died as a result of a long and serious illness resulting from injuries and contusions received in Afghanistan. But the well-deserved award nevertheless found Evgeny Sergeev - by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 6, 2012, Lieutenant Colonel Sergeev Evgeny Georgievich was awarded the high title of Hero of the Russian Federation posthumously for the courage and heroism shown during the hostilities in Afghanistan.

Vladimir Pavlovich Kovtun rose to the rank of colonel, and in 1999, at a young age, he was dismissed from the ranks of the RF Armed Forces - also for health reasons. But "in civilian life" a military officer quickly found his soul's work and took up farming in the Vladimir region.

Reading time: 4 min

Second half of the eighties. The Soviet Union has been waging a protracted and bloody war on the territory of neighboring Afghanistan for seven years, helping the government of the republic to cope with the armed formations of radical fundamentalists and nationalists supported by the United States, Pakistan, and Iran.

Army aviation plays the most important role in carrying out operations against the Mujahideen. Soviet helicopters, having become a real headache for the militants, attack their positions, support the actions of motorized riflemen and paratroopers from the air. Air strikes became a real disaster for the Mujahideen, as they were deprived of their support - helicopters destroyed caravans with ammunition, food. It seemed that a little more and the DRA government troops, together with the OKSVA forces, would be able to neutralize the armed opposition.

However, very effective portable anti-aircraft missile systems soon appeared in the arsenal of the militants. During the first month of their use, the Mujahideen managed to shoot down three Mi-24 helicopters, and by the end of 1986, OKSVA lost 23 aircraft and a helicopter, which were shot down as a result of fire from the ground - from portable anti-aircraft missile systems.

The army aviation command decided to fly helicopters at extremely low altitudes - this was how they expected to avoid getting cars into the capture of the homing head of the missile, but in this case the helicopters became an easy target for the heavy machine guns of the enemy. It is clear that the situation required an early resolution, and the headquarters were racking their brains over what to do and how to secure helicopter flights over the territory of Afghanistan. There was only one way out - to find out what kind of weapon the Mujahideen use to fight Soviet helicopters. But how was it to be done?

Naturally, the command immediately came to the conclusion that it was necessary to carefully study the portable anti-aircraft missile systems used by the militants in order to decide by what means or what tactics they could be countered. It is clear that such MANPADS could not have Afghan or Pakistani production, so the Soviet command immediately "took the trail" of the United States, more precisely, the US Central Intelligence Agency, which almost from the very beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan provided comprehensive support to the formations of the Mujahideen.

The Soviet troops were given the difficult task of capturing at least one MANPADS used by the Mujahideen, which would allow developing more effective tactics to counter the new weapon. This task was to be carried out, as one would expect, by the special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

In Afghanistan, the special forces solved a variety of tasks. Being the best trained fighters both in combat and morally and psychologically, Soviet military intelligence officers carried a very significant part of the entire combat load that Soviet troops faced in this southern country. Naturally, tasks like the capture of the Stinger MANPADS could only be entrusted to the GRU special forces.

On January 5, 1987, the reconnaissance group of the 186th separate special forces detachment went on a combat mission. This detachment was formed in February 1985 on the basis of the 8th Separate Special Purpose Brigade. It included not only officers and soldiers of this brigade, but also servicemen of the 10th separate special-purpose brigade, then stationed in the Crimea, servicemen of the 2nd separate special-purpose brigade from Pskov and the 3rd separate special-purpose brigade from Viljandi. The support units were staffed by officers and ensigns from motorized rifle troops. On March 31, 1985, the 186th ooSpN was transferred to the 40th combined arms army, and organizationally included in the 22nd separate special forces brigade.

It was the scouts of this unit who had to perform a unique, very difficult and dangerous task - to capture MANPADS. Soldiers under the command of Major Evgeny Sergeev and Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun advanced to the combat mission. On two Mi-8s, Soviet servicemen set off towards Kalat, where they were to comb the territory near the road to Kandahar. Soviet helicopters flew at a very low altitude, which allowed the military to clearly see three Mujahideen moving along the road on motorcycles.

At that time in Afghanistan, only the Mujahideen could ride motorcycles on the mountain roads. Local peasants, for obvious reasons, did not have motorcycles and could not have. Therefore, Soviet intelligence officers immediately understood who they saw on the ground. Everyone understood and motorcyclists. As soon as they saw Soviet helicopters in the sky, they immediately dismounted and began to shoot from machine guns, and then fired two launches from MANPADS.

Later, Senior Lieutenant Kovtun realized that the Mujahideen did not hit the Soviet helicopters from their MANPADS only because they did not have time to properly prepare the complex for battle. In fact, they fired from MANPADS, like from a grenade launcher, offhand. Perhaps this oversight of the militants saved the Soviet military from losses.

Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun fired at the Mujahideen with a machine gun. After that, both Mi-8s went for a short landing. The scouts landed from helicopters, dispersed on the ground and engaged in battle with the Mujahideen. However, after a short time, reinforcements approached the latter. The battle became more and more fierce.

Vasily Cheboksarov, who commanded inspection group No. 711, later recalled that the Mujahideen and Soviet soldiers “beat” each other almost point-blank. When the machine gunner Safarov ran out of ammunition, he did not lose his head and "knocked out" the Mujahideen with a blow from the butt of his Kalashnikov machine gun. Surprisingly, in such a fierce battle, Soviet intelligence officers did not lose a single person, which cannot be said about the Afghan Mujahideen.

During the battle, one of the Mujahideen, clutching some kind of long bundle and a “diplomat”-type case, ran out of cover and ran, trying to hide. Senior Lieutenant Kovtun and two scouts ran after him. As Kovtun later recalled, the action movie in itself interested him least of all, but the oblong object and the diplomat were very interesting. Therefore, Soviet intelligence officers chased the Mujahideen.

The militant, meanwhile, fled and had already managed to gain a distance of two hundred meters from the Soviet soldiers, when Senior Lieutenant Kovtun managed to put him in the head with a shot. No wonder the Soviet officer was a master of sports in shooting! While Kovtun "took" a militant with a diplomat, other scouts destroyed the remaining fourteen militants who participated in the shootout. Two more "dushmans" were taken prisoner.

Huge assistance in defeating the Mujahideen group was provided by helicopters, which did not stop firing at the militants from the air, supporting Soviet intelligence officers. Subsequently, the officer in command of the helicopters will also be presented with the main award of the USSR - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, but he will never receive it.

The destruction of the Mujahideen detachment was far from the only and, moreover, not the most important victory of the Soviet intelligence officers. Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun, who shot the militant with an oblong bundle, naturally became interested in what kind of object was wrapped in a blanket carried by the militant. It turned out that this was the Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile system.

Soon the scouts brought two more "pipes" - one was empty and the other equipped. But most importantly, a diplomat fell into the hands of Soviet intelligence officers, which contained all the documentation for a portable anti-aircraft missile system. It was truly a "royal" find. After all, the bag contained not only detailed instructions for using MANPADS, but also the addresses of American suppliers of the complex.

The captured Stingers were taken to Kandahar, to the brigade headquarters. The scouts continued to carry out combat missions. Naturally, such an event could not go unnoticed by the command. Four scouts from the reconnaissance group that participated in the operation were presented to the high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union. On January 7, 1987, the commander of the 186th separate special forces detachment of the 22nd separate special forces brigade, Major Nechitailo, prepared presentations for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

But, for some reason, things did not go beyond the presentation. Although the capture of the Stinger, and even with detailed documentation, was indeed a real feat, and most importantly, it made it possible to solve the long-standing problem of ensuring the safety of Soviet army aviation.

Vladimir Kovtun says:

The commander of the brigade, Colonel Gerasimov, arrived. They decided to introduce me, Sergeyev, Sobol, the commander of the board on which we flew, and one sergeant from the inspection group to the Hero. For registration of the submission to the Hero, it is necessary to photograph the candidate. The four of us were photographed and ... In the end, they didn’t give us anything. In my opinion, the “Banner” was given to Sgt. Zhenya had a party penalty that had not been lifted, and a criminal case was opened against me. Why they didn’t give the Hero the helicopter pilot, I still don’t know. Probably, he, too, was in disgrace with his command.

The result of the operation carried out by the GRU special forces soldiers was the capture of existing models of the most modern and effective American man-portable anti-aircraft missile system at that time. Experts were immediately puzzled by the development of countermeasures against the Stingers. Not much time passed and the losses of the Soviet army aviation in Afghanistan were sharply reduced.

As for the captured Stingers captured by scouts, they were presented at a press conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRA as irrefutable evidence of Western powers helping the Mujahideen. It turned out that the Stingers captured by Soviet intelligence officers were the first of a batch of 3,000 pieces, which was purchased by the Afghan Mujahideen in the United States for use against Soviet aircraft.

However, no one denied this assistance. The US CIA launched the most active activity among the Afghan Mujahideen groups, and the closest US ally in the region at that time, Pakistan, directly participated in the Afghan war, sending its instructors to the Mujahideen formations, placing camps and bases of the Mujahideen on the territory of the border provinces, and even places of detention of Afghan and Soviet prisoners of war.

Years, decades have passed, and few today remember the feat of the Soviet military personnel who captured the Stingers. Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev, who then commanded the reconnaissance group, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, continued to serve in the armed forces, participated in the localization of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

In 1995, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, Evgeny Sergeyev retired from the armed forces due to disability, lived in Ryazan for the last years, and in 2008, at the age of 52, died as a result of a long and serious illness resulting from injuries and contusions received in Afghanistan. But the well-deserved award nevertheless found Evgeny Sergeev - by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 6, 2012, Lieutenant Colonel Sergeev Evgeny Georgievich was awarded the high title of Hero of the Russian Federation posthumously for the courage and heroism shown during the hostilities in Afghanistan.

Vladimir Pavlovich Kovtun rose to the rank of colonel, and in 1999, at a young age, he was dismissed from the ranks of the RF Armed Forces - also for health reasons. But "in civilian life" a military officer quickly found his soul's work and took up farming in the Vladimir region.

The hunt for the Stinger continued throughout the year. Only on January 5, 1987, during the course of a military operation of scouts, the first copy of this weapon was captured.

The reconnaissance group of lieutenants Vladimir Kovtun and Vasily Cheboksarov of the 186th Separate Special Forces Detachment conducted aerial reconnaissance. Suddenly, from the helicopter board, the special forces noticed several Mujahideen at high speed rushing along the bottom of the Meltakai Gorge on motorcycles. Mi-24 with a special forces unit began the pursuit of alleged terrorists.

The intelligence of the scouts did not disappoint. As soon as they noticed that they were being pursued from the air, the motorcyclists stopped and opened fire indiscriminately from small arms. However, obviously realizing that it would not cause much harm to the helicopter, the Mujahideen took out two sets of "stingers" and launched missiles. Fortunately, the rockets passed by, and one of the "turntables" landed in the gorge and landed the scouts. Another link of Soviet helicopters followed, and the special forces took the fight on the ground.

By joint efforts, the Mujahideen were destroyed. When Vladimir Kovtun examined the trophies, he found not only the Stinger MANPADS launch canister, but also a complete set of its technical documentation. This find looked like a huge success.

Kovtun's comrades, meanwhile, found another intact Stinger MANPADS near the motorcycles. The helicopters were saved from hits by the fact that, under intense shelling, the spooks did not have time to deploy antennas on the complexes and actually fired from them, like from ordinary grenade launchers.

A day later, in all military units of the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan, real jubilation began over the Stingers captured by the special forces.

In total, during the hunt for the Stinger MANPADS installations, the Soviet military captured eight complexes of this weapon, but no one received the promised Hero star. Managed less significant orders and medals.

The effect was colossal. Soviet and then Russian aviation designers in the shortest possible time managed to develop effective means of combating imported MANPADS, thereby saving the lives of hundreds of domestic military pilots.

MOSCOW, November 5 - RIA Novosti, Andrey Kots. Elite fighters leave no traces and are ready to be thrown into any theater of operations every minute - today, November 5, military intelligence officers celebrate their centenary. Over these 100 years, they have carried out thousands of the most difficult sorties behind enemy lines and decided the outcome of more than one major battle. Many special operations are still classified. One of the most striking is the capture by the GRU special forces of the American Stinger portable anti-aircraft systems during the Afghan war. About this raid - in the material RIA Novosti.

Operation Cyclone

The first "stingers" appeared among the Afghan dushmans in September 1986, after a special operation by the CIA, which received the designation "Cyclone". The army aviation of the joint contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) by that time had long been a headache for bandit formations. Helicopters unexpectedly attacked the caches of militants, covered the columns of dushmans on the march with fire, landed tactical troops in troubled villages and, most importantly, smashed caravans with weapons and ammunition coming from Pakistan. Due to the actions of Soviet pilots, many gangs in Afghanistan were on starvation rations, and military supplies intended for them were burned in the desert and on mountain passes. The White House considered that the supply of modern MANPADS to militants would force OKSV to curtail flights and the USSR would lose air superiority.

At first, the Stingers really came as an extremely unpleasant surprise for Soviet helicopter pilots. Only in the first month of using MANPADS, militants shot down three Mi-24 strikes, and by the end of 1986, the USSR lost 23 aircraft and a helicopter from fire from the ground. The new weapon forced the Soviet command to completely reconsider the tactics of using army aviation. Helicopter crews have since flown at extremely low altitudes to avoid being caught by the missile's homing head. But this made them vulnerable to heavy machine guns. It was clear that the new tactic was only a half-measure.

Ambush at the airfield

In order to effectively counter the emerging threat, it was necessary to carefully study the samples of MANPADS. Firstly, it is necessary to understand the principle of their operation, and secondly, to prove the direct support of the spooks from the CIA. The GRU special forces of the General Staff announced a full-scale hunt for the Stinger. The first one to get the launch tube was promised to be awarded the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union immediately and without further ado. But long months of reconnaissance activities did not give any result - the "spirits" took care of MANPADS as the apple of their eye and developed complex tactics for their combat use. Here is how the head of the Afghan Intelligence Center of Pakistan (1983-1987), General Mohammad Yusuf, described the successful attack in his book "The Bear Trap".

"About 35 Mujahideen secretly made their way to the foot of a small high-rise overgrown with bushes, one and a half kilometers northeast of the runway of the Jalalabad airfield. Fire crews were at a shouting distance from each other, located in a triangle in the bushes, since no one direction, a target may appear.We organized each squad so that three people fired, and the other two held containers of rockets for quick reloading.Each of the Mujahideen selected a helicopter through an open sight on the launcher, the friend-foe system signaled with intermittent signal, that an enemy target appeared in the coverage area, and the "Stinger" captured the thermal radiation from the helicopter engines with its guidance head. When the lead helicopter was only 200 meters above the ground, Gafar commanded: "Fire." One of the three missiles did not work and fell without exploding , just a few meters from the shooter.Two others crashed into their targets.Two more The helicopters went into the air, one hit the target as successfully as the previous two, and the second passed very close, since the helicopter had already landed.

Dushmans used the tactics of mobile sabotage reconnaissance anti-aircraft groups (DRZG) - small detachments that secretly operated near Soviet airfields. Weapons and ammunition were delivered to the launch site in advance, often with the help of local residents. It was difficult to resist such attacks without knowing the technical features of the anti-aircraft missiles used. Surprisingly, the special forces managed to capture the operating MANPADS by pure chance.

forehead to forehead

On January 5, 1987, the reconnaissance group of the 186th separate special forces detachment under the command of Major Evgeny Sergeyev and Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun went on a free hunt in two Mi-8 helicopters. The special forces planned to comb through the suspicious "greenery" near Kalat on the road to Kandahar and, if necessary, destroy the detected enemy targets. "Turntables" were at extremely low altitude and literally nose to nose collided with three militants on motorcycles.

© AP Photo / Mir Wais Mujahideen with MANPADS "Stinger" in Afghanistan

© AP Photo / Mir Wais

Kovtun, fired at the bandit group with tracers from a machine gun, marking their position for the second side. Both helicopters made a short landing, the scouts spread out on the ground and opened fire on the enemy. A fierce battle ensued. Soon, help approached the dushmans, and one of the "spirits" ran out from behind the shelter with an oblong bundle in his hands and rushed to his heels. He did not go far - the starley laid the militant with a well-aimed shot in the head. Other dushmans were also unlucky - the GRU special forces destroyed all 16 attackers without loss.

Vladimir Kovtun was the first to discover the coveted "Stinger" wrapped in a blanket. A little later, the fighters brought two more "pipes" - empty and equipped. But the real jackpot was the "diplomat" of one of the dushmans, in which the scouts found complete documentation on MANPADS - from the addresses of suppliers in the United States to detailed instructions for using the complex. Four scouts were presented to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. However, as is often the case, no one received a high award. As the commandos admitted - because of not the best relations with high authorities. However, the scouts were not upset: for them, such tasks are a routine.

As a result of an accidental but brilliantly conducted military intelligence special operation, Soviet designers received operational samples of the advanced Western MANPADS. In the shortest possible time, countermeasures were developed, and Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan began to be shot down much less frequently.

. Elite fighters leave no traces and are every minute ready to be thrown into any theater of operations - today, November 5, military intelligence officers celebrate their centenary. Over these 100 years, they have carried out thousands of the most difficult sorties behind enemy lines and decided the outcome of more than one major battle. Many special operations are still classified. One of the most striking is the capture by the GRU special forces of the American Stinger portable anti-aircraft systems during the Afghan war. About this raid - in the material RIA Novosti.

Operation Cyclone

The first "stingers" appeared among the Afghan dushmans in September 1986, after the CIA special operation, which received the designation "Cyclone". The army aviation of the joint contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) by that time had long been a headache for bandit formations. Helicopters unexpectedly attacked the caches of militants, covered the columns of dushmans on the march with fire, landed tactical troops in troubled villages and, most importantly, smashed caravans with weapons and ammunition coming from Pakistan. Due to the actions of Soviet pilots, many gangs in Afghanistan were on starvation rations, and military supplies intended for them were burned in the desert and on mountain passes. The White House considered that the supply of modern MANPADS to militants would force OKSV to curtail flights and the USSR would lose air superiority.

At first, the Stingers really came as an extremely unpleasant surprise for Soviet helicopter pilots. Only in the first month of using MANPADS, militants shot down three Mi-24 strikes, and by the end of 1986, the USSR lost 23 aircraft and a helicopter from fire from the ground. The new weapon forced the Soviet command to completely reconsider the tactics of using army aviation. Helicopter crews have since flown at extremely low altitudes to avoid being caught by the missile's homing head. But this made them vulnerable to heavy machine guns. It was clear that the new tactic was only a half-measure.

Ambush at the airfield

In order to effectively counter the emerging threat, it was necessary to carefully study the samples of MANPADS. Firstly, it is necessary to understand the principle of their action, and secondly, to prove the direct support of the spooks from the CIA. The GRU special forces of the General Staff announced a full-scale hunt for the Stinger. The first one to get the launch tube was promised to be awarded the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union immediately and without further ado. But long months of reconnaissance activities did not give any result - the "spirits" took care of MANPADS as the apple of their eye and developed complex tactics for their combat use. Here is how the head of the Afghan Intelligence Center of Pakistan (1983-1987), General Mohammad Yusuf, described the successful attack in his book "The Bear Trap".

"About 35 Mujahideen secretly made their way to the foot of a small high-rise overgrown with bushes, one and a half kilometers northeast of the runway of the Jalalabad airfield. Fire crews were at a shouting distance from each other, located in a triangle in the bushes, since no one direction, a target may appear.We organized each squad so that three people fired, and the other two held containers of rockets for quick reloading.Each of the Mujahideen selected a helicopter through an open sight on the launcher, the friend-foe system signaled with intermittent signal, that an enemy target appeared in the coverage area, and "Stinger" captured the thermal radiation from the helicopter engines with its guidance head. When the lead helicopter was only 200 meters above the ground, Gafar commanded: "Fire." One of the three missiles did not work and fell without exploding , only a few meters away from the shooter.Two others crashed into their targets.Two more the kets went into the air, one hit the target as successfully as the previous two, and the second passed very close, since the helicopter had already landed.

Dushmans used the tactics of mobile sabotage reconnaissance anti-aircraft groups (DRZG) - small detachments that secretly operated near Soviet airfields. Weapons and ammunition were delivered to the launch site in advance, often with the help of local residents. It was difficult to resist such attacks without knowing the technical features of the anti-aircraft missiles used. Surprisingly, the special forces managed to capture the operating MANPADS by pure chance.

forehead to forehead

On January 5, 1987, the reconnaissance group of the 186th separate special forces detachment under the command of Major Evgeny Sergeyev and Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun went on a free hunt in two Mi-8 helicopters. The special forces planned to comb through the suspicious "greenery" near Kalat on the road to Kandahar and, if necessary, destroy the detected enemy targets. "Turntables" were at extremely low altitude and literally nose to nose collided with three militants on motorcycles.

Kovtun, fired at the bandit group with tracers from a machine gun, marking their position for the second side. Both helicopters made a short landing, the scouts dispersed on the ground and opened fire on the enemy. A fierce battle ensued. Soon, help approached the dushmans, and one of the "spirits" ran out from behind the shelter with an oblong bundle in his hands and rushed to his heels. He did not go far - the starley laid the militant with a well-aimed shot in the head. Other dushmans were also unlucky - the GRU special forces destroyed all 16 attackers without loss.

Vladimir Kovtun was the first to discover the coveted "Stinger" wrapped in a blanket. A little later, the fighters brought two more "pipes" - empty and equipped. But the real jackpot was the "diplomat" of one of the dushmans, in which the scouts found complete documentation on MANPADS - from the addresses of suppliers in the United States to detailed instructions for using the complex. Four scouts were presented to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. However, as is often the case, no one received a high award. As the commandos admitted - because of not the best relations with high authorities. However, the scouts were not upset: for them, such tasks are a routine.

As a result of an accidental but brilliantly conducted military intelligence special operation, Soviet designers received operational samples of the advanced Western MANPADS. In the shortest possible time, countermeasures were developed, and Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan began to be shot down much less frequently.