Reduction of nuclear weapons. US nuclear weapons: will there be a reduction? INF Treaty is dead

In 1991 and 1992 the presidents of the United States and the USSR/Russia put forward unilateral parallel initiatives to decommission a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of both countries and their partial elimination. In Western literature, these proposals are known as "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI). These initiatives were of a voluntary, non-legally binding nature and were not formally linked to the response steps of the other side.

As it seemed then, on the one hand, this made it possible to fulfill them fairly quickly, without getting bogged down in a complex and lengthy negotiation process. Some of the initiatives were drafted by experts in Voronezh on the basis of a research institute, which required employees to rent a one-room apartment in Voronezh for several months. On the other hand, the absence of a legal framework made it easier, if necessary, to withdraw from unilateral obligations without carrying out legal procedures for the denunciation of an international treaty. On September 27, 1991, US President Bush nominated the first UNT. Soviet President Gorbachev announced "reciprocal steps and counter-proposals" on 5 October. His initiatives were further developed and concretized in the proposals of Russian President Yeltsin dated January 29, 1992.

The decisions of the President of the United States provided for: the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear warheads intended to arm ground-based delivery vehicles (nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical Lance missiles) to the United States, including from Europe and South Korea, for subsequent dismantling and destruction; the decommissioning of surface warships and submarines of all tactical nuclear weapons, as well as naval aviation depth charges, their storage in the United States and the subsequent destruction of approximately half of their number; the termination of the program for the development of a short-range missile of the Sram-T type, designed to arm tactical strike aircraft. The reciprocal steps on the part of the Soviet Union, and then Russia, were as follows: all tactical nuclear weapons in service with the Ground Forces and Air Defense will be redeployed to the pre-factory bases of the enterprise for assembling nuclear warheads and to centralized storage warehouses;

all warheads intended for ground-based assets are subject to elimination; a third of warheads intended for sea-based tactical carriers will be destroyed; it is planned to eliminate half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles; it is planned to halve the stocks of aviation tactical nuclear munitions by liquidation; On a reciprocal basis, it was proposed to remove nuclear munitions intended for strike aircraft together with the United States from combat units of front-line aviation and place them in centralized storage depots 5 . It is very difficult to quantify these reductions, since, unlike information on strategic nuclear forces, Russia and the United States have not published official data on their stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons.

According to unofficial published estimates, the United States was to eliminate at least about 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons (1,300 artillery shells, more than 800 Lance missile warheads, and about 900 naval weapons, mainly depth charges). They were armed with free-fall bombs intended for the Air Force. Their total number in the early 1990s was estimated at 2,000 units, including about 500-600 air bombs in warehouses in Europe 6 . The overall assessment of US tactical nuclear arsenals is currently given above.

According to an authoritative Russian study, Russia had to reduce 13,700 tactical nuclear warheads, including 4,000 tactical missile warheads, 2,000 artillery shells, 700 engineering munitions (nuclear land mines), 1,500 anti-aircraft missile warheads, 3,500 warheads for front-line aviation, 1,000 warheads intended for ships and submarines of the Navy, and 1,000 warheads for naval aviation. This amounted to almost two-thirds of the tactical nuclear warheads in service with the former USSR in 1991. 7 The scale of the UNT can hardly be overestimated. First, for the first time, a decision was made to dismantle and dispose of nuclear warheads, and not just their delivery vehicles, as was done in accordance with agreements on strategic offensive arms reductions. Several classes of tactical nuclear weapons were subject to complete liquidation: nuclear projectiles and mines, nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, and nuclear bombs. Second, the scale of the cuts far exceeded the indirect limits laid down in the START agreements. Thus, under the current START Treaty of 1991, Russia and the United States were to decommission 4-5 thousand nuclear warheads each, or 8-10 thousand units together. The reductions within the framework of the UNT opened up prospects for the elimination of more than 16,000 warheads in total.

However, the implementation of the UNT encountered serious difficulties from the very beginning. At the first stage, in 1992, they were associated with the withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads by Russia from the territory of a number of former Soviet republics. The withdrawal of this type of weapon was agreed in the fundamental documents on the termination of the existence of the USSR, signed by the leaders of the newly independent states in 1991. However, some former Soviet republics began to obstruct these measures. In particular, in February 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk banned the export of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Only the joint demarches of Russia and the United States forced him to resume the transportation of this type of weapon. In the spring of 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn. The redeployment of nuclear weapons for strategic delivery vehicles was completed only in 1996.

Another difficulty was that in the extremely difficult economic situation of the 1990s, Russia experienced serious difficulties in financing the disposal of nuclear weapons. Disarmament activities have been hampered by the lack of adequate storage facilities. This led to the overflow of warehouses, violations of the adopted safety regulations. The risks associated with unauthorized access to nuclear warheads during their transportation and storage forced Moscow to accept international assistance to ensure nuclear security. It was provided mainly by the US under the well-known Nunn-Lugar program, but also by other countries including France and the UK. For reasons of state secrecy, Russia refused to accept assistance directly in the dismantling of nuclear weapons. However, foreign assistance was provided in other, less sensitive areas, for example, through the provision of containers and wagons for the safe transportation of nuclear warheads, protective equipment for nuclear storage facilities, etc. This freed up the funds needed for the destruction of ammunition.

The provision of foreign aid provided a partial one-sided transparency not envisaged by the PNR. The donor states, primarily the United States, insisted on their right to access the facilities they provided assistance in order to verify the intended use of the supplied equipment. As a result of long and difficult negotiations, mutually acceptable solutions were found, on the one hand, guaranteeing the observance of state secrets, and, on the other hand, the necessary level of access. Such limited transparency measures have also extended to critical facilities such as nuclear disassembly and assembly facilities run by Rosatom, as well as nuclear weapons storage facilities run by the Ministry of Defense. The latest officially published information on the implementation of UNTs in Russia was presented in a speech by Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov at the Conference to Review the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 25, 2000.

According to him, “Russia ... continues to consistently implement unilateral initiatives in the field of tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons have been completely removed from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines, as well as land-based naval aviation and placed in centralized storage areas. One third of the total number of nuclear munitions for sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation has been eliminated. The destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, artillery shells, and nuclear mines is nearing completion. Half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of the nuclear air bombs have been destroyed” 10 . Assessments of Russia's implementation of UNTs are given in Table. 9. Thus, as of the year 2000, Russia has largely complied with the UNT. As planned, all naval munitions were withdrawn to centralized storage facilities, and a third of them were destroyed (however, significant ambiguity remains regarding the withdrawal of all such items from naval bases to centralized storage facilities due to inconsistencies in official wording). A certain number of tactical nuclear warheads still remained in service with the Ground Forces, Air Force and Air Defense. In the case of the Air Force, this did not contradict the PNR, since, according to the January 1992 initiatives of President Yeltsin, it was envisaged to withdraw tactical ammunition from combat strength and destroy it, together with the United States, which did not. As regards the liquidation of the Air Force warheads, by 2000 Russia's obligations had been fulfilled. By means of air defense, UNTs were carried out in terms of liquidation, but not in the sphere of complete withdrawal from the anti-aircraft missile forces.

Thus, during the 1990s, Russia carried out UNTs in the field of warheads for the Air Force and, possibly, the Navy, as well as partly for air defense. In the Ground Forces, part of the tactical nuclear munitions remained in service and was not eliminated, although the PNR provided for their complete withdrawal to centralized storage facilities and complete elimination. The latter was attributed to financial and technical difficulties. Fulfillment of the UNTs became one of the requirements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Their implementation became an integral part of the 13 Steps Plan to fulfill the obligations of the nuclear powers in accordance with Art. VI Treaty. The 13 Steps plan was adopted at the Review Conference by consensus, i.e., both representatives of Russia and the United States voted for its adoption. However, 19 months later, Washington announced a unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Russian-American Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was considered the cornerstone of strategic stability. This decision was taken contrary to the obligations of the United States under the 13 Step Plan, which required compliance with this treaty.

The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 upset the very delicate balance of mutual obligations between Russia and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament, including in relation to TNW. Obviously, the violation by one of the NPT members of its obligations on a number of points of the decisions adopted by the 2000 Review Conference (including the 13 Steps Plan) made it unlikely that the other parties would fully comply with these decisions. During the work of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, no provisions on the 13 Steps Plan were adopted, which in fact indicates that it has ceased to be valid. This could not but affect the implementation of the UNT. Thus, on April 28, 2003, in a speech by the head of the Russian delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, the following was stated: “The Russian side proceeds from the fact that consideration of issues of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be carried out in isolation from other types of weapons. It is for this reason that the well-known unilateral Russian disarmament initiatives of 1991-1992 are of a complex nature and, in addition, affect tactical nuclear weapons and other important issues that have a significant impact on strategic stability.

Russia's official reference to the fact that, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, UNTs also touch upon other important issues affecting strategic stability is clearly based on the idea of ​​the interconnection between the implementation of the 1991-1992 initiatives. with the fate of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. In addition, the assertion that the issue of TNW cannot be considered in isolation from other types of weapons is obviously an allusion to the situation that has developed with the entry into force of the adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This treaty was signed back in 1990 and provided for maintaining the balance of power in Europe on a bloc basis in five types of conventional weapons (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters and aircraft). After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself, with the expansion of NATO to the east, it is completely outdated.

In order to preserve the system of limiting conventional arms, the parties held negotiations on its adaptation, which culminated in the signing in Istanbul in 1999 of an adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This option to a greater extent took into account the military-political realities that have developed in Europe after the end of the Cold War and contained certain security guarantees for Russia, limiting the possibility of deploying NATO troops near its borders. However, the NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted CFE under very far-fetched pretexts. In the context of the admission of the Baltic states to NATO, an increase in the imbalance in conventional weapons to the detriment of Russia, and in the absence of ratification of the adapted Treaty by the West, Russia in December 2007 announced a unilateral suspension of compliance with the basic CFE Treaty (despite the fact that the adapted Treaty, as an add-on to the basic one, did not enter into force ).

In addition, the question of the role of nuclear weapons, primarily tactical ones, as a means of neutralizing such an imbalance, has come up before Russia with new urgency. Obviously, the fears associated with the advancement of NATO to the East in the absence of adequate international legal security guarantees, in the eyes of Russia, call into question the expediency of implementing the UNT in full, especially given the political and legally non-binding nature of these obligations. As far as one can judge from the absence of further official statements about the fate of UNTs, they have not been fully implemented.

This fact illustrates both the advantages and disadvantages of informal arms control regimes. On the one hand, within the framework of the UNT, significant reductions in tactical nuclear weapons were carried out, including the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. However, the absence of verification measures does not allow the parties to assume with certainty which reductions actually took place. The lack of a legally binding status made it easier for the parties to effectively back out of the initiatives without announcing it at all.

In other words, the advantages of an "informal" approach to disarmament are tactical, but in the long run it does not have sufficient stability to serve as a stabilizer for the changing political and military relations of the parties. Moreover, such initiatives themselves become easy victims of such changes and can turn into a source of additional distrust and tension. Another thing is that after the end of the Cold War, former adversaries could afford much more radical, faster, less technically complex and less burdensome economic disarmament agreements.

On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements (SALT). In connection with the anniversary of this event, the newspaper Le Figaro brings to your attention an overview of the main Russian-American bilateral agreements.

Disarmament or limiting the buildup of strategic arms? The policy of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War led to a frenzied arms race between the two superpowers that could have led to disaster. That is why 45 years ago the US and the USSR signed the first strategic arms reduction treaty.

Treaty 1: the first bilateral arms reduction agreement

On May 26, 1972, US President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev signed an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. The signing took place in front of television cameras in the Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. This event was the result of negotiations that began in November 1969.

The treaty limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers, their location and composition. An addendum to the treaty in 1974 reduced the number of missile defense areas deployed by each side to one. However, one of the clauses of the agreement allowed the parties to terminate the agreement unilaterally. This is exactly what the United States did in 2001 in order to start deploying a missile defense system on its territory after 2004-2005. The final date for US withdrawal from this agreement was June 13, 2002.

The 1972 treaty includes a 20-year temporary agreement that bans the production of land-based ICBM launchers and limits submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers. Also, according to this agreement, the parties undertake to continue active and comprehensive negotiations.

This "historic" agreement was to be especially helpful in restoring the balance of the forces of deterrence. And this does not apply to the production of offensive weapons and restrictions on the number of warheads and strategic bombers. The striking forces of both countries are still very large. First of all, this treaty allows both countries to moderate costs while maintaining the ability of mass destruction. This prompted André Frossard to write in a newspaper on May 29, 1972: “To be able to arrange about 27 dooms of the world – I don’t know the exact number – gives them a fair sense of security and allows them to save us from many additional ways of destruction. For this we need to thank their good heart.”

Treaty 2: easing tensions between the two countries

After 6 years of negotiations, a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive arms was signed by American President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. This complex document includes 19 articles, 43 pages of definitions, 3 pages listing the stockpiles of the military arsenals of the two countries, 3 pages of a protocol that will enter into force in 1981 and, finally, a declaration of principles that will form the basis of negotiations on SALT-3 .

The treaty limited the number of strategic nuclear weapons of both countries. After the signing of the treaty, Jimmy Carter stated in his speech: "These negotiations, which have been going on continuously for ten years now, give rise to the feeling that nuclear competition, if it is not limited by common rules and restrictions, can only lead to disaster." At the same time, the American president clarified that "this treaty does not take away the need for both countries to maintain their military power." But this treaty was never ratified by the United States due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles

On December 8, 1987 in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the indefinite Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which came into force in May 1988. This "historic" treaty for the first time provided for the elimination of armaments. It was about medium and short-range missiles with a range of 500 to 5.5 thousand km. They represented from 3 to 4% of the entire arsenal. In accordance with the agreement, the parties, within three years from the date of its entry into force, had to destroy all medium and short-range missiles. The treaty also provided for procedures for mutual inspections "on the spot".

During the signing of the treaty, Reagan emphasized: "For the first time in history, we have moved from a discussion of arms control to a discussion of their reduction." Both presidents have been particularly pushful of cutting 50% of their strategic arsenals. They focused on the future START treaty, the signing of which was originally scheduled for the spring of 1988.

START-1: the beginning of real disarmament

On July 31, 1991, US President George W. Bush and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. This agreement was the first real reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers. According to its terms, the countries had to reduce the number of the most dangerous types of weapons by a quarter or a third in three stages (seven years each): intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles.

The number of warheads was to be reduced to 7,000 for the USSR and 9,000 for the United States. A privileged position in the new arsenal was assigned to bombers: the number of bombs was to increase from 2.5 to 4 thousand for the United States and from 450 to 2.2 thousand for the USSR. In addition, the treaty provided for various control measures and finally entered into force in 1994. According to Gorbachev, it was a blow to the "infrastructure of fear."

START II: radical cuts

On January 3, 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his American counterpart George W. Bush signed the START-2 treaty in Moscow. It was a big deal because it called for a two-thirds reduction in nuclear arsenals. After the entry into force of the agreement in 2003, American stocks were to decrease from 9,986 warheads to 3,500, and Russian stocks from 10,237 to 3,027. That is, to the level of 1974 for Russia and 1960 for America .

Another important point was spelled out in the agreement: the elimination of missiles with multiple warheads. Russia has abandoned precision-guided weapons that formed the backbone of its deterrence force, while the US has removed half of its submarine-launched missiles (virtually undetectable). START II was ratified by the US in 1996 and by Russia in 2000.

Boris Yeltsin saw him as a source of hope, and George W. Bush saw him as a symbol of "the end of the Cold War" and "a better future free from fear for our parents and children." Be that as it may, the reality is not so idyllic: both countries can still destroy the entire planet several times.

SNP: Point in the Cold War

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SOR) in the Kremlin. It was about reducing the arsenals by two-thirds in ten years.

However, this small bilateral agreement (five short articles) was not precise and did not contain any screening measures. Its role in terms of the image of the parties was more important than its content: it was not the first time that the reduction was discussed. Be that as it may, it nevertheless became a turning point, the end of military-strategic parity: lacking the economic capabilities necessary for this, Russia abandoned its claims to the status of a superpower. In addition, the treaty opened the door to a "new era" because it was accompanied by a declaration of a "new strategic partnership." The United States relied on conventional military forces and understood the uselessness of most of its nuclear arsenal. Bush noted that the signing of the SNP allows to get rid of the "legacy of the Cold War" and hostility between the two countries.

START-3: protection of national interests

On April 8, 2010, US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev signed another agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms (START-3) in the Spanish drawing room of the Prague castle. It was intended to fill the legal vacuum that arose after START I expired in December 2009. According to it, a new ceiling was set for the nuclear arsenals of the two countries: the reduction of nuclear warheads to 1.55 thousand units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles of submarines and heavy bombers - to 700 units.

In addition, the agreement provides for verification of the figures by a joint team of inspectors seven years after its entry into force. It is worth noting here that the installed slats are not too different from those that were indicated in 2002. It also does not talk about tactical nuclear weapons, thousands of deactivated warheads in warehouses, and strategic aviation bombs. The US Senate ratified it in 2010.

START-3 was the last Russian-American agreement in the field of nuclear weapons control. Days after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump announced that he would offer Vladimir Putin the lifting of sanctions on Russia (imposed in response to the annexation of Crimea) in exchange for a treaty to reduce nuclear weapons. According to the latest data from the US State Department, the US has 1,367 warheads (bombers and missiles), while the Russian arsenal reaches 1,096.

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July 31, 1991 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and US President George W. Bush The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) was signed. Despite the considerable efforts that have been made by the countries in this direction, the problem of mutual nuclear threat has not yet been resolved and is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. According to Russian military experts, this is due to the actions of the United States, which are pushing the world towards a new arms race.

On the brink of war

The nuclear race between the USSR and the USA has become a true attribute of the Cold War, which began in the late 50s. The world powers fiercely competed in military power, sparing neither money nor human resources on it. It is a paradox, but, perhaps, it was the super-efforts in this race that did not allow any of the countries to unambiguously surpass the “potential adversary” in terms of armament, which means they maintained parity. But in the end, both superpowers were armed even beyond measure. At some point, the talk turned to the reduction of strategic arms - but also on a parity basis.

The first talks to limit nuclear stocks were held in Helsinki in 1969. This period includes the signing of the SALT-1 treaty by the leaders of the countries. It limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers on both sides to the level at which they were at that moment, and also provided for the adoption of new ballistic missiles strictly in the amount in which obsolete ground-based missiles were previously decommissioned. The second agreement - SALT-2 (essentially continuing the first one) - was signed 10 years later. It introduced a restriction on the placement of nuclear weapons in space (R-36orb orbital missiles) and although it was not ratified by the US Senate, nevertheless, according to experts, it was carried out by both sides.

The next stage of negotiations on the need to reduce strategic weapons took place in 1982, but did not lead to anything. Negotiations were repeatedly suspended and resumed again.

In October 1986, at the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik, the USSR put forward a proposal for a 50% reduction in strategic forces and agreed not to take into account the strategic weapons available to US NATO allies. However, the proposals of the Soviet Union were linked to the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty signed in 1972. Perhaps that is why these proposals remained unanswered.

In September 1989, the USSR decided not to link the issue of missile defense with the conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of strategic arms, and also not to include sea-based cruise missiles in the scope of the new treaty. It took about two years to finalize the text. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine recognized themselves as his successors under the treaty, on whose territory nuclear weapons were deployed. By signing the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine pledged to eliminate or transfer nuclear weapons under Russian control. Soon, as non-nuclear states, they acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) was signed on July 31, 1991 in Moscow by the presidents of the USSR and the USA, Mikhail Gorbachev and George W. Bush. It forbade the development and deployment of air-launched ballistic missiles, heavy ballistic missiles, underwater launchers of ballistic and cruise missiles, means of high-speed reloading of launchers, increasing the number of charges on existing missiles, and converting "conventional" nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. True, the document entered into force only on December 5, 1994, becoming the first (ratified) arms control treaty to provide a real reduction in deployed strategic weapons and establish a strict regime for verifying its implementation.

How much was and how much became

The system for monitoring the implementation of the START-1 treaty included conducting mutual checks at the base sites, notification of the production, testing, movement, deployment and destruction of strategic offensive weapons. At the time of the signing of START-1, as of September 1990, the USSR had 2,500 "strategic" carriers, on which 10,271 warheads were deployed. The US had 2,246 carriers with 10,563 warheads.

In December 2001, Russia and the United States announced that they had fulfilled their obligations: Russia had 1,136 carriers and 5,518 warheads left, while the United States had 1,237 and 5,948, respectively. Moscow on January 3, 1993. In many respects, he relied on the basis of the START-1 treaty, but assumed a sharp reduction in the number of ground-based missiles with multiple warheads. However, the document did not enter into force, since the United States did not complete the ratification process, in 2002 withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty, to which START-2 was linked.

Proposals for the development of START-3 began to be discussed in March 1997 during consultations Russian and US Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in Helsinki. This treaty was planned to establish "ceilings" at the level of 2000-2500 strategic nuclear warheads, there was also an intention to give the treaty an indefinite character. However, at that time the document was not signed. The initiative to restart a new negotiation process in June 2006 was made by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But the development of the document began in April 2009 immediately after the meeting President Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama in London as part of the G20 summit. Negotiations began in May 2009, and ended 11 months later with the signing of an agreement by the presidents of Russia and the United States on April 8, 2010 in Prague (START-3, the "Prague Treaty"). Its official name is the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms. In February 2011, it entered into force and will be valid for 10 years.

During the development of the document, Russia was armed with 3897 nuclear warheads and 809 deployed carriers and launchers, while the United States was armed with 5916 nuclear warheads and 1188 carriers and launchers. As of June 2011, when Russia and the United States first exchanged data under START-3, Russia had 1,537 warheads, 521 deployed carriers, and, together with non-deployed ones, 865 warheads. The United States has 1,800 warheads, 882 deployed carriers, with a total number of 1,124. Thus, even then Russia did not violate the treaty threshold for deployed carriers of 700 units and lagged behind the United States in all respects.

“I can hardly evaluate the signing of the disarmament treaty, because the parity was violated by the United States, which is now headed by the fighter for peace, the Nobel laureate comrade Obama. In fact, then the Americans deceived us. They never told us the truth. When the USSR collapsed, they clapped their hands. They promised that NATO would not expand, but it has already approached the borders of Russia to such an extent that it is within easy reach, ”says Head of the State Duma Defense Committee Vladimir Komoyedov, hinting at the unreliability of partnership with America.

Military expert Igor Korotchenko I agree that the termination of the military race of the USSR was the right decision, but at the same time it was completely uneven.

“Nuclear weapons in the days of the USSR were redundant with us. In the same way as it was redundant among the Americans. Therefore, it was necessary to reduce objectively. But we just got really into it. We first began to reduce nuclear forces, then agreed to the elimination of the Warsaw Pact without any clear compensation from the West. After that, the well-known events related to the collapse of the USSR took place, ”Igor Korotchenko explained to AiF.ru.

Not quantity, but quality

At the moment, experts say that parity has been restored.

“It was achieved a very long time ago. But the quality was up to the US, which has about two-thirds of its nuclear-tipped missiles in submarines that are constantly on the move. And we have them all on stationary launchers, which are easier to hit. Therefore, the Americans came up with the concept of a lightning strike and, plus, today they are building an additional missile defense system, but in fact this is a surveillance system, and fire support, and the line itself. Plus, they installed a ship line in the English Channel and strengthened the continental industrial region of New York, ”Komoedov explained to AiF.ru.

According to him, the United States today wants to intimidate Russia and dictate its terms to it, but “they need to hide these emotions and ambitions somewhere” and instead start negotiating.

In 2014, for the first time since the beginning of the 21st century, Russia caught up with the United States both in terms of the number of deployed and non-deployed launch vehicles and the number of warheads (including in connection with the adoption of new Project 955 nuclear submarines equipped with Bulava missiles with several warheads; in addition, the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles with one warhead were replaced by Yars missiles with three warheads). So, as of September 1, 2014, the United States had 794 deployed carriers, and Russia - only 528. At the same time, the number of warheads on deployed carriers in the United States is 1642, in Russia - 1643, while the number of deployed and non-deployed installations in the United States - 912, Russia has 911.

According to the data of the US State Department on the implementation of START-3 dated January 1, 2016, the United States has 762 deployed carriers of nuclear warheads, Russia has 526. and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs in the USA - 898, in Russia - 877.

According to Korotchenko, first of all, the parity is based on the implementation of the existing restrictions under the START-3 treaty, which is a strategic further step in reducing nuclear weapons.

“Today, the renewal of the Russian strategic nuclear forces is taking place, primarily due to the receipt of new solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles RS 24 Yars, silo-based and mobile-based, which will form the basis of the grouping of strategic missile forces for a period of 30 years. A decision was also made to start developing a combat railroad missile system, plus a new heavy liquid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile is being developed. These are the main directions associated with maintaining parity in terms of the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces). As far as our naval nuclear forces are concerned, Borey-class submarine missile cruisers with Bulava sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles are now being serially built and handed over to the fleet. That is, there is parity in naval nuclear forces, ”says Korotchenko, noting that Russia can respond to the United States in the airspace as well.

But as for the proposals that come from the United States on further reduction of nuclear weapons or on nuclear zero in general, Russia, the expert believes, will not respond to these proposals.

“For the United States, the role of nuclear weapons is declining every year, due to the fact that they develop conventional strike precision weapons that achieve the same effect as with the use of nuclear weapons. Russia, on the other hand, stakes on nuclear forces as the basis of our military power and maintaining balance in the world. Therefore, we will not give up nuclear weapons, ”the expert says, emphasizing the inexpediency of further reductions in nuclear weapons.

According to him, America is now pushing the world with all its actions to resume the arms race, but this should not be succumbed to.

“We need to maintain a self-sufficient defense balance,” Korotchenko said.

Based on the fact that the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR, it is a full participant in the international treaties ratified by the USSR.

At the end of July 1991, the START-1 Treaty was signed in Moscow. We can boldly say that in terms of its scope, the degree of detail, the complexity of the problems solved in it, this is the first and last Treaty of its kind. Subject of the agreement: ICBMs, SLBMs, launchers of ICBMs, launchers of SLBMs, TBs, as well as warheads of ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear weapons of TBs. The parties agreed to reduce their strategic weapons to the level of 1,600 deployed carriers and 6,000 warheads on them. At the same time, the number of our heavy ICBMs should be reduced by half. Restrictions were also imposed on non-deployed funds. For the first time, a limit was set on the total throwable weight of ballistic missiles. It should not exceed 3600 tons.

It turned out to be very difficult to agree on the procedure for offsetting strategic offensive weapons, especially TB weapons. Without dwelling on this issue in detail, it should be emphasized that, in the end, a conditional count was adopted here - a heavy bomber was counted as one unit in the number of carriers, and all nuclear bombs and short-range missiles on it - as one nuclear warhead. As for ALCMs, they were counted as follows: for the USSR, within 180 TB, 8 warheads per bomber; for the USA, within 150 TB, 10 warheads; which he is actually equipped with.

Reductions in armaments must be carried out in stages within 7 years from the date the Treaty enters into force. It should be noted right away that the Treaty entered into force three and a half years after its signing in December 1994. There were reasons for such a long delay (unfortunately, there is no way to dwell on them). In December 2001, the parties completed the reduction of their armaments to the agreed levels stipulated by the START-1 Treaty. Reductions in armaments were carried out by their elimination or re-equipment according to detailed procedures. Lukashuk, I.I. International law. General part: textbook. for law students fak. and universities; 3rd edition, revised. and additional / I.I. Lukashuk. - M.: Volters Kluver, 2005. - 432 p.

Monitoring compliance with obligations under the START-1 Treaty includes the use of NTSC; 14 different types of inspections; continuous surveillance at mobile ICBM production facilities; providing access to telemetry information transmitted from ballistic missiles during their launches, including the exchange of magnetic tapes with recorded telemetry information; confidence building measures that contribute to the effectiveness of control. To promote the implementation of the goals and provisions of the START-1 Treaty, the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCCI) was created and is still functioning.

It must be said that in the future, important shifts took place in the negotiation process.

Even before the entry into force of the START-1 Treaty, was signed (in January 1993) the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of START, called the START-2 Treaty. This Treaty is ninety percent, if not more, based on the provisions of the START-1 Treaty, and therefore it was prepared in an extremely short time frame, approximately within six months. Tolstykh, B.JI. Course of international law: textbook / B.JI. Tolstykh. - M.: Wolters Kluver, 2009. - 1056 p.

The START-2 Treaty provided for the reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the parties to the level of 3000-3500 warheads, with a sublevel of 1700-1750 warheads on SLBMs. The advantage of this Treaty can be considered an agreement on a real count of weapons for all TB. At the same time, its features, and many experts considered it shortcomings, were the requirements for the elimination of ICBMs with MIRVs, as well as the complete elimination of all our heavy ICBMs. The possibility of reorientation (without any mandatory procedures) up to 100 TB for non-nuclear tasks was envisaged. In essence, they were withdrawn from the count. Essentially, all restrictions on the possibility of reducing the number of warheads on ballistic missiles were removed.

All this, it was believed, gave clear advantages to the United States and, as a result, predetermined very heated discussions during the ratification of this Treaty in the State Duma. Ultimately, the State Duma ratified the START-2 Treaty, but the US Congress did not complete this procedure (the Protocol to the START-2 Treaty, signed on September 26, 1997 in New York, on the extension of the arms reduction period was not ratified). With the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the question of putting the START-2 Treaty into effect was finally removed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia June 14 this year issued a formal statement that we no longer consider ourselves bound by this Treaty.

With the coming to power of the US administration of George W. Bush Jr., there has been a sharp change in the attitude of the American side to the development of agreements in the field of arms control. A line was proclaimed to carry out arms reductions unilaterally, without the development of legally binding documents, without appropriate control. It is clear that such an approach, if adopted, would lead to the destruction of the negotiating process. This could not be allowed.

Under such conditions, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials of Russia and the United States was born, which was prepared in record time and signed on May 24 this year in Moscow. This treaty immediately sparked heated debate. The supporters of the Treaty see the reductions envisaged in it to the level of 1700-2200 deployed warheads as a step aimed at further strengthening strategic stability. It is also considered an achievement that it is legally binding. Opponents of the SORT Treaty emphasize that it is essentially only a document of intent. It does not define the subject of the agreement, there are no rules for counting nuclear warheads, reduction procedures, and control provisions. The reductions under the new Treaty should be completed in 2012. At the same time, it keeps in force the START-1 Treaty, which expires 3 years earlier - in 2009. And it is not clear how the new Treaty will function during these three years?

Of course, all these questions are valid. But one cannot ignore the fact that the reduction in the level of warheads on deployed launchers from 6000 units. (under the START-1 Treaty) to 1700-2200, this is a step that contributes to strengthening security and stability.

By the end of the 1990s. the process of nuclear disarmament between countries has significantly slowed down. The main reason is the weakness of the Russian economy, which could not maintain the quantitative parameters of the strategic forces at the same level as the Soviet one. In 2002, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SOR Treaty) was concluded, which entered into force on June 1, 2003. The Treaty consists of 5 articles, strategic delivery vehicles are not mentioned in it. According to the agreement, the parties undertook by December 31, 2012 to increase the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 units. However, the treaty does not have a clear concept of what is meant by the term "strategic nuclear warhead", and therefore it is not clear how to count them. When signing the SOR Agreement, the parties did not agree on what they were going to reduce, and therefore this agreement does not provide for control measures. After the signing of this treaty, a long period of stagnation in the disarmament sphere began, and finally, in 2009-2010. certain positive trends began to emerge. Tolstykh, B.JI. Course of international law: textbook / B.JI. Tolstykh. - M.: Wolters Kluver, 2009. - 1056 p.

On April 5, 2009 in Prague (Czech Republic), the President of the United States announced an initiative on a future without nuclear weapons and possible ways to achieve it. During his speech, Barack Obama not only noted the existing challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons, ongoing testing of nuclear weapons, the black market for trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, etc., but and outlined the trajectory to be followed in order to build a world without nuclear weapons. First, it is the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies of states. It is necessary to begin work in this direction with the reduction of strategic arms. To implement a global nuclear test ban, the Obama administration will immediately and aggressively push for US ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and encourage other countries to join the process. To cut off the channels through which the elements needed to build nuclear bombs come in, it is necessary to push for a new treaty that would ban the production of fissile materials in a controlled manner for use in the state's nuclear weapons arsenals.

Second, in order to strengthen the NPT, a number of principles need to be adopted:

• 1. It is urgently necessary to find additional resources to strengthen the powers of international inspections;
• 2. Real and immediate consequences need to be identified for countries that break the rules or attempt to withdraw from the NPT without good reason.

NPT violators must be punished. On April 6, 2010, a new US nuclear doctrine was adopted, which allows the US to use nuclear weapons against a number of states, in particular those that do not comply with obligations under the NPT. Moreover, these countries are named specifically - North Korea and Iran;

3. A new framework for civil nuclear cooperation must be created, including an international nuclear fuel bank, so that all countries that have renounced nuclear weapons have access to peaceful energy without increasing the risk of proliferation. Paramuzova, O.G. Nuclear safety in the conditions of modern international law and order / O.G. Paramuzov. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg. un-ta, 2006. - 388 p.

At the same time, the US President stated that his administration would strive to interact with Iran on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect. The US supports Iran's right to peaceful nuclear activities subject to rigorous IAEA scrutiny. However, until these checks are carried out in full, Iran's activities pose a threat to Iran's neighbors, the United States, as well as American allies. As long as the threat from Iran persists, the US will continue to pursue plans to build an effective missile defense system (ABM). If the Iranian nuclear threat is eliminated, the US will terminate the missile defense program; 5. It is imperative that we work together to ensure that terrorists never acquire nuclear weapons. In this regard, B. Obama announced new international efforts aimed at ensuring the protection of all vulnerable nuclear materials throughout the world within four years. All countries should develop partnerships to secure these potentially dangerous materials and step up their efforts to destroy the black market, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial instruments to eliminate the channels of this dangerous trade. We need to start with a global nuclear security summit.

The United States, as the only nuclear power to use nuclear weapons, has no moral right to remain idle, which is why the President of the United States has clearly and with conviction proclaimed America's commitment to the cause of peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, the President of the United States emphasized that he is well aware that this goal will not be achieved quickly, perhaps this will not happen while he is alive, but the entire world community will need patience and perseverance in resolving this complex issue.

For its part, the Russian Federation has always supported and interacted with the authors of initiatives aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament (the Hoover Initiative, the Evans-Kawaguchi Commission, etc., which are based on proposals aimed at strengthening the NPT, solving global security problems on a multilateral basis) . Russia views the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of a gradual, stage-by-stage process of general and complete disarmament. This goal can only be achieved through an integrated approach under favorable international conditions, i.e. while maintaining strategic stability and observing the principle of equal security for all states without exception, taking into account the existing inextricable relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons, as was said by the President of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev at the 64th session of the UN General Assembly. On February 5, 2010, a new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, which directly states that the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems that undermine global stability and violate the existing balance of forces in the nuclear missile sphere, as well as an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons are the main external military threats to Russia.

The Russian Federation also believes that in order to strengthen international security, it is necessary to formulate specific parameters under which further advancement along the path of nuclear disarmament is possible. We are talking about such conditions as the settlement of regional conflicts, the elimination of incentives that push states to acquire or retain nuclear weapons, a controlled cessation of the buildup of conventional weapons and attempts to “compensate” with them the reduction of nuclear systems, reliable maintenance of the viability of key disarmament and non-proliferation tools, and the prevention of the deployment of weapons in space. The Russian initiative to concentrate nuclear weapons within the national territories of nuclear states does not lose its relevance either. Its implementation would lead to the maximum expansion of the territory of regions where nuclear weapons are completely absent. Russia believes that in the foreseeable future, all states possessing nuclear weapons, including nuclear states, should smoothly join the Russian-American efforts to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals.

outside the scope of the NPT.

An important step in the process of nuclear disarmament should be the early entry into force of the CTBT. Russia welcomes the changed position of the United States in relation to this treaty and persistently urges all states, and in the first place those on which the entry into force of this Treaty depends, to sign and ratify it without delay. Compliance with a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, while important as this measure, cannot replace legal obligations in this area. An important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be the early launch at the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on the development of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Sidorova EA International legal regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and legal problems of its strengthening. Diss. c.yu. n. -M., 2010.

The tasks of preventing nuclear materials and related technologies from falling into the hands of non-state actors, primarily terrorists, remain in the foreground. It is necessary to build up multilateral cooperation in this matter, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of April 28, 2004.

In view of the rapidly increasing world demand for energy that peaceful atom can satisfy, Russia believes that moving towards “global zero” is impossible without building a modern obligations under the 1968 NPT; and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The Russian Federation considers it an important task to achieve an increase in the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and the universalization of the Additional Safeguards Protocol, which should become mandatory standards for verifying compliance with the obligations assumed under the NPT and a universal standard in the field of nuclear export control. Today, Russian * initiatives to develop a global nuclear power infrastructure and establish international centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services are being implemented at full speed. A serious step forward was the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Russian proposal to create a guaranteed stock of low-enriched uranium under the auspices of the IAEA.

On March 29, 2010, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN V.I. Churkin, who detailed Russia's official position on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and on May 4, 2010, at the next Review Conference to review the NPT, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.A. Ryabkov, who gave a detailed account of the work done by Russia within the framework of the NPT. In particular, it was noted that the Russian Federation is consistently working to reduce its nuclear arsenal. Commitments under such disarmament agreements as the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and the 1991 Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms have been fully implemented. The Russian Federation considers it necessary to systematically move forward along the path of real nuclear disarmament, as required by Art. VI NPT. Realizing the special responsibility as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia in good faith continues deep, irreversible and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms. One of the important steps along this path was the signing on April 8, 2010 of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on measures to further reduce and limit strategic

offensive weapons.

The provisions of the new Treaty provide that each of the parties reduces and limits its strategic offensive arms in such a way that seven years after its entry into force and thereafter, their total numbers will not exceed: 700 units for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs; 1,550 units for warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs; 800 units for deployed and non-deployed launchers (PUs) of ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as TBs (Articles I and II of the Treaty). This level establishes deployed and non-deployed launchers, as well as TBs, in the legal field of the Treaty, which allows limiting the parties' "return potential" (the possibility of a sharp increase in the number of deployed warheads in a crisis situation) and creates an additional incentive to eliminate or re-equip the reduced strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, the Treaty provides that each of the parties has the right to independently determine the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.

Thus, the Russian Federation once again clearly demonstrated its desire for large-scale reductions in strategic offensive arms. Now it is necessary to ensure the early ratification of the Treaty and its entry into force, as well as to guarantee the consistent and unswerving fulfillment of all the obligations laid down in the Treaty without exception. Paramuzova, O.G. Nuclear safety in the conditions of modern international law and order / O.G. Paramuzov. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg. un-ta, 2006. - 388 p.

According to experts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as soon as the START-3 Treaty enters into force, non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSW) and anti-missile defense (ABM) should become the next subject of negotiations between the parties. It seems that in isolation from them, further progress along the path of reductions in strategic offensive arms will be extremely difficult.

For NSNW, there is no international legal mechanism requiring their control and reduction. Carried out in the early 1990s. NSNW reductions were carried out by the USSR / RF and the USA on a voluntary basis unilaterally. There is no official data on the number of non-strategic nuclear warheads. According to non-governmental experts, the United States currently has about 1,300 nuclear warheads of this class, and Russia about 3,000. changes in the field of disarmament; secondly, stockpiles of nuclear weapons will make it difficult to involve other nuclear states in the process of controlled reduction of nuclear weapons; and thirdly, the lack of control over NPT will be a source of doubt among non-nuclear countries about the commitment of the US and Russia to their obligations under the NPT. Sidorova EA International legal regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and legal problems of its strengthening. Diss. c.yu. n. -M., 2010.

However, the establishment of control over NSNW is impossible without its complete withdrawal from the territory of Europe due to the fact that the deployed NSNW in Europe is considered by the Russian military as strategic, since it is located in sufficient proximity to the borders of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia will seek to link its willingness to consider NSNW issues with the agreement of the NATO countries and the EU to accept for consideration the Russian proposal to develop a European Security Treaty. In addition, there are technical difficulties in establishing control, which is due to the fact that it must be established directly over nuclear weapons, and not delivery vehicles.

The implementation of further steps to reduce nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to the issue of missile defense. The unilateral actions of the United States to create a missile defense system raise Russia's fears about its impact on the survival of Russian strategic forces. At the signing of the START-3 Treaty, Russia issued a Statement on Missile Defense, which noted that the new Treaty could be effective and viable only in the absence of a qualitative and significant quantitative build-up of the capabilities of US missile defense systems, which could ultimately lead to threaten the Russian strategic forces. The fact is that the replacement by the United States of the plans adopted by the previous administration for the deployment of missile defense elements in the Czech Republic and Poland removed the acuteness of the issue only for a while, since the new four-story adapted plan for building a US missile defense system in Europe provides for the deployment by 2020 of a system capable of intercepting ICBMs . Therefore, today it makes sense to take advantage of the current positive situation to resume efforts to strengthen confidence-building measures and develop cooperation in the field of missile defense. The first step in this direction, according to the Russian Federation, could be work on a joint assessment of the capabilities of "third" countries in the field of creating ballistic missiles in order to develop a common point of view on emerging threats. This, in particular, would be facilitated by the opening of the Data Exchange Center for Early Warning Systems (DPC). On June 4, 2000, the Russian Federation and the United States signed an appropriate memorandum regarding the creation of a joint data center, which was supposed to take effect from the moment of signing until 2010, but work on the creation of the data center ran into organizational problems, and as a result, the data center did not start working despite of all importance for cooperation and the formation of relations between Russia and the United States.

Cooperation between Russia and the United States to find comprehensive solutions to the problems outlined above will make it possible to create real conditions for a further stage in the reduction of nuclear weapons.

Serious concerns of the world community in connection with the existing challenges related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the need for international action to prevent them were reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 1887, adopted unanimously on September 24, 2009. The resolution contains two main conclusions: firstly, modern challenges in the field of nuclear proliferation can and must be resolved on the basis of the NPT, which has stood the test of time and established itself as the only universal basis for cooperation in this sensitive area; secondly, the danger of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists is causing serious concern, which means that it is necessary to strengthen the international "safety net" that makes it possible to stop such risks at distant approaches.

On April 12-13, 2010, Washington (USA) hosted a nuclear security summit, which was attended by representatives of 47 countries, including Russia. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss ways to improve physical nuclear protection and prevent the danger of nuclear terrorism. At the summit, it became known that Canada had abandoned significant reserves of highly enriched uranium. Chile and Mexico abandoned all uranium reserves. President of Ukraine V. Yanukovych expressed the same intention when he announced that all stocks of highly enriched uranium would be exported to the Russian Federation by 2012. President of the Russian Federation D. Medvedev announced the closure of the weapons-grade plutonium production reactor in Zheleznogorsk.

During the summit, US Secretary of State H. Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov signed the Protocol to the 2000 bilateral intergovernmental agreement on the disposition of plutonium, declared as plutonium no longer necessary for defense purposes, its handling and cooperation in this area. This agreement was signed by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and the Vice President of the United States on August 29 and September 1, 2000. In accordance with Art. XIII of the Agreement, it was to be applied temporarily from the date of its signing and enter into force from the date of receipt of the last written notification of the completion by the parties of their internal state procedures necessary for its entry into force. Unfortunately, the agreement was never implemented for some technical reasons. The protocol signed by H. Clinton and S. Lavrov should eliminate these technical obstacles, as a result of which the practical implementation of the agreement will become possible. The agreement itself is a specification of the joint Statement of the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States on the principles of handling and disposition of plutonium, declared as plutonium no longer necessary for defense purposes, dated September 2, 1998.

In accordance with the principles for the disposition of such plutonium agreed in the Statement, the Agreement provides for its disposition as nuclear fuel for existing nuclear reactors, reactors that may appear in the future, as well as through immobilization with highly radioactive waste or any other mutually agreed methods (Article III of the Agreement). The agreement does not provide for any restrictions on the type of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel. In accordance with Art. II of the Agreement, each party must dispose of at least 34 metric tons of disposable plutonium. The implementation of this Agreement will also clearly demonstrate the commitment of the Russian Federation and the United States to the further development of the nuclear disarmament process, since, in addition to the actual limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic offensive weapons, something must be done with regard to plutonium, which is released as a result of this process, which is an important contribution to the implementation Art. VI NPT.

The Washington summit ended with the signing of a joint declaration, which stipulates further actions for disarmament. The next summit is scheduled for 2012, which will be held in South Korea.

Iran was not invited to the nuclear security summit in Washington, and as an alternative, on April 17-18, 2010, Tehran hosted a conference on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, held under the motto - "Nuclear energy for everyone, nuclear weapons for none." The conference was attended by representatives from more than 50 countries, including the Russian Federation, who outlined their national approaches and priorities in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear disarmament. In addition, representatives of the expert community and specialized non-governmental organizations made presentations.

As a result of the conference, a document was adopted, which sets out the main provisions of the discussions. In particular, it was said about the need for nuclear disarmament as the main priority of human society, as well as the complete destruction of these inhuman weapons within a certain period of time; implementation of the disarmament commitments assumed by the nuclear states on the basis of the NPT and the final documents of the 1995 and 2000 NPT review conferences, the full implementation of the 13 Steps to Disarmament program; conclusion of a universal Convention and adherence to a non-discriminatory and legal approach to the problem of a complete ban on the distribution, production, transfer, stockpiling, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in order to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the experience of concluding two conventions: the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and the stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction of 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1993, as well as the provision of security guarantees to non-nuclear countries until general disarmament is achieved; the implementation of further programs to create areas free of nuclear weapons in various regions of the world, especially in the Middle East; observance of the principles of immutability, openness and truthfulness in the exercise of international control over the implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

The document also emphasizes the right of states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the need to develop international cooperation in this area on the basis of the obligations formulated in Art. IV NPT; expressed serious concern about the weakening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime due to the application of double and discriminatory standards by some nuclear powers and, especially, the cooperation of these nuclear countries with states that are not parties to the NPT and ignoring the fact that they have a nuclear arsenal.

Taking into account the importance of this Conference and the results achieved at it, Iran proposed to send the final document of the forum to the UN Secretary General, as well as other international bodies and organizations. Taking into account the attention shown by the participants of the Conference to the topic discussed at it, as well as in order to monitor the implementation of the tasks set by the Conference, in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its participants, it was decided to hold the second meeting of the Conference on Disarmament and International Security in the second half of April 2011. in Tehran.

Thus, on the basis of the above initiatives and real steps taken by the nuclear countries, it can be assumed that building a nuclear-free world is not a utopia. Progress towards it is possible if effective, systematic, consistent legal measures are taken in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the world community does not work together to achieve a world without weapons, then it will forever remain out of reach. Paramuzova O.G. Nuclear safety in the conditions of modern international law and order / O.G. Paramuzov. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg. un-ta, 2006.

Today, as it was half a century ago, this agency, subordinate to the Pentagon, is responsible for maintaining the global technological superiority of the US military. Among the concerns of DARPA is the development of new technologies for use in the armed forces.

In February 2013, the agency's specialists began to actively prepare for a nuclear war. Was project launched on protection against radiation damage, including with the help of techniques that directly affect human DNA. We are talking about new methods of treatment, devices and systems that can mitigate the effects of radiation exposure. The main goal of the agency's project is to develop technologies that will radically reduce the susceptibility of the human body to high doses of radiation. Those who are treated with the latest technology have a high chance of survival.

Today, the efforts of scientists are directed in three directions: a) prevention and treatment after exposure to radiation; b) reducing the level of negative consequences and preventing death and the development of oncological complications; c) modeling the impact of radiation on the human body through research at the molecular and systemic levels.

The agency took up a new project because the level of nuclear threat in the world has increased and has not decreased. Today, any country may face the threat of nuclear terrorism, a catastrophe at a nuclear power plant or a local conflict with the use of nuclear weapons.

This project, of course, did not come out of nowhere. It is known that Barack Obama positions himself as a peacemaker. Atomic bombs, like Truman, he did not drop on foreign countries. And in general, he constantly talks about reductions in nuclear arsenals - not only Russian, but also native, American.

It was his peacemaking that reached the point that very influential misters turned to him with a written petition in which they tearfully asked not to reduce the nuclear weapons of the long-suffering homeland of the Republicans and Democrats.

The appeal to the president was signed by 18 people: former CIA director James Woolsey, former US representative to the UN John Bolton, former commander of the Marine Corps, General Karl Mundy and others. International Analyst Kirill Belyaninov ("Kommersant" ) believes that such an appeal was a confirmation that the White House is indeed working on plans to reduce nuclear arsenals.

According to some secret report, among the authors of which are individuals from the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intelligence services and the US strategic command (in a word, a complete military secret set), the number of nuclear warheads in service with the country today "far exceeds the number needed to ensure nuclear deterrence", while in modern conditions an arsenal of 1-1.1 thousand warheads is quite enough. But a group of influential politicians who, of course, know these data, still demand that Obama abandon the "rash step."

What were the 18 misters afraid of?

The authors of the petition are confident that "the growing cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran" can lead to "catastrophic changes." And the aspirations of Iran and North Korea can be restrained by "the American nuclear triad, which guarantees strategic stability," and only that, and nothing else.

The signatories of the document believe that the threshold set by the new START treaty is critical: by 2018, the Russian Federation and the United States must leave no more than 1,550 warheads on combat duty.

However, the Obama administration intends to continue talks with Moscow to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons.

The concern of eighteen people is based more on the interests of the US military-industrial complex than on the real situation. What "catastrophic changes" can Iran cause in the world? It is absurd to assume that gentlemen American politicians and military men, who signed the letter to their president, were frightened by Ahmadinejad's recent words that Iran is a "nuclear power." Or is 1550 warheads not enough to defeat the DPRK?

The reduction in stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which Obama is sure to enforce this time, is by no means a "working off" of the Nobel Peace Prize. The President of the United States is facing the fact of the collapse of the national economy: a huge public debt is also complemented by a large budget deficit, the issue of which is being solved through sequestration, cuts, layoffs, cuts in military programs and an extremely unpopular tax increase among any class of the population. Reducing nuclear stockpiles is a road to savings: after all, maintaining arsenals costs a lot of money.

Tom Vanden Brook (USA Today) ) recalls that the US military budget will be reduced by $ 500 billion over 10 years through sequestration - the so-called "automatic reduction". The Pentagon assumes that before the end of the current fiscal year (September 30), it will have to "cut off" spending by $46 billion. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the cuts would make America a minor military power.

The cuts will also affect military contractors. For example, the economic losses of Texas will amount to a gigantic sum of $2.4 billion. A whole army of civil servants - 30,000 people - will lose their jobs. Their personal financial loss in earnings will be $180 million.

In terms of maintenance, those states with large warehouses will suffer here, as they will be closed in the coming months due to upcoming budget cuts. Pennsylvania, for example, has two main maintenance depots where complex weapon systems are upgraded, including, for example, the Patriot. Texas and Alabama will be hit hard. The closure of the depot here will stop the repair of weapons, communication devices and vehicles. The reduction in the flow of orders will affect 3,000 companies. Another 1,100 companies will face the threat of bankruptcy.

The latest data on the estimated losses of contractors directly for nuclear services are not yet available. But that they will be is beyond doubt. Obama will look for any reserves in order to cut budget spending.

As for the calls to Russia, everything is clear here: it is somehow not convenient for America to reduce nuclear weapons alone. That's why we started talking about negotiations with the Russians. Moreover, Obama swung at a large reduction: either by a third, or by half. However, these are only rumors, albeit coming from the United States.

Vladimir Kozin ("Red Star") recalls that regarding information about further reductions in START, White House spokesman Jay Carney said that he does not expect new announcements on this subject in the next presidential address to Congress. Indeed, in his message on February 13, the American president only indicated Washington's readiness to involve Russia in the reduction of "nuclear weapons", without specifying any quantitative parameters. Nevertheless, the fact remains: the reduction is planned. Another thing is how and in what ways.

V. Kozin believes that the United States “still intends to follow the path of selective reduction of nuclear weapons, focusing only on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons. But at the same time, they completely exclude from the negotiation process such important types of non-nuclear weapons as anti-missile systems, anti-satellite weapons and high-precision means of delivering a "lightning strike" anywhere in the world... "According to the analyst, the United States is proposals and ideas" in the field of arms control, its far-reaching plans to deploy forward-based means in the form of tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense, destabilizing the global military-political situation and undermining the fragile military-strategic parity between Moscow and Washington, which has been established for several decades.

That is, nuclear weapons will be reduced selectively, and in parallel, the European missile defense system will be created, and the first will serve as a distraction for the second. And at the same time, it will probably free up money for this very second one. With budgetary sequestration, this is a very hot topic.

It is useless to accuse the Americans of slyness or double standards: politics is politics. Sergey Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Founder of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Chairman of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, He speaks that "the idea of ​​freeing the world from nuclear weapons is slowly fading away."

“Moreover,” he continues, “if you trace the dynamics of the views of such famous people as Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry, who played a certain role in launching the idea of ​​nuclear zero, you will find that these famous four in the second article, published two years after their first article, already talked about the reduction and even elimination of nuclear weapons as a good goal, but really demanded more efficiency and strengthening of the existing US military nuclear complex. They realized that the United States of America could not ensure its security without nuclear weapons. Understanding perfectly well this whole situation, our leadership - both Putin and Medvedev - announced without batting an eyelid that they also stand for complete nuclear disarmament. To say otherwise would be to admit to bloodlust. But at the same time, we are building up and modernizing our nuclear potential.”

“Once I studied the history of the arms race, and since then I sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are something sent to us by the Almighty in order to save humanity. Because, otherwise, if there were no nuclear weapons, the deepest ideological and military-political confrontation in the history of mankind, the Cold War, would have ended with World War III.

Russians should be thankful for their current sense of security, says Karaganov, Sakharov, Korolev, Kurchatov and their associates.

Let's go back to the USA. Under the 2010 nuclear doctrine, America retained the right to launch a nuclear strike first. True, it narrowed down the list of situations that lead to such use of the nuclear arsenal. In 2010, Obama announced the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such weapons - on one condition: these countries must comply with the nonproliferation regime. Also in the strategic document it was stated: "... the United States is not ready to pursue a policy according to which the deterrence of a nuclear strike is the only goal of nuclear weapons." This speaks of a possible preventive use of nuclear weapons, albeit with the reservations cited above.

Both during the Cold War and after its conditional end, the United States and NATO did not rule out the option of using nuclear weapons against their opponents - and be the first to use them. The 2010 doctrine narrowed the list, but did not change the right of application.

Meanwhile, China almost half a century ago announced on a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. Then India took the same position. Even North Korea - and she adheres to a similar position. One of the main objections to adopting the no-first-use doctrine, writes the American Foreign Policy magazine, is that the adversary can "act dishonestly" and strike first. However, there is no answer to the simple question of retribution. Why would an enemy arrange a nuclear catastrophe for himself? After all, the threat of guaranteed retaliatory destruction remains a very strong deterrent.

One can, of course, call Obama's policy logical. The same doctrine of 2010 was adopted at a time of growing concerns about terrorism. But what if nuclear bombs fall into the hands of terrorists? President of the United States in 2010 said : “The Concept recognizes that the greatest threat to the United States and global security is no longer nuclear war between states, but nuclear terrorism carried out by extremists and the process of nuclear proliferation ...”

Therefore, the current proposed reduction in nuclear arsenals is logically combined with the "taming" of what was called 3 years ago "the greatest threat to the United States and global security." The fewer nuclear weapons, as Foreign Policy magazine rightly notes, the less likely they are to fall into the hands of terrorists.

To create a perfectly clear logical picture, the White House lacks only one point. By declaring its right to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States is likening its artificially nurtured enemy, Al-Qaeda. The latter does not declare nuclear rights for obvious reasons. But, for even more understandable reasons, in case of "need" and with the appropriate opportunity, it will be the first to explode (it is not necessarily about a bomb: there is also a nuclear power plant). The right to a first, albeit “preventive,” nuclear strike puts America precisely in the ranks of those who threaten peace. Like Al Qaeda.