Northern Sea Route (NSR): physical and geographical position, history of development, economic significance. Northeast Asia on the outskirts of the northern sea route

The increased, or rather painful interest of the leading states of the world in the Arctic region, including the Russian Arctic and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), is evident.

June 2016 was marked by several important political and economic events that directly testify to this. Let's start the story in chronological order.

For the first time in the framework of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 18, 2016, the Conference on the economic development of the Arctic was held. And although a number of member states of the Arctic Council, under pressure from the United States, did not take part in it, the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) willingly did so.

As for the latter, it should be noted here that the interests of these countries in the Arctic are formed in three main areas.

First of all, it is an increase in knowledge about climate change that can help food production and improve disaster preparedness. Secondly, providing access to the Arctic transport routes, which will reduce the cost of delivering goods during the navigation period. Thirdly, cooperation with other countries for the extraction natural resources, including in the field of fisheries, in the Arctic seas.

At meetings Shanghai Organization cooperation (SCO), the issues of the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route were not directly formulated, but they were actively discussed on the sidelines of the summit.

During the visit of the President of Russia to China, a huge number of important documents were signed on the creation and provision of transport corridors from continental Asia (China) to Europe. At the same time, the issue of the Northern Sea Route caused a heated discussion.

It is no secret that practically the only country that has already decided on the need to increase the use of the NSR is China, which plans to transport up to 20 percent of its foreign trade cargo via the Northern Sea Route by 2025.

At the same time, the Chinese policy is based on the thesis that Russia does not and cannot have a monopoly on this route, since, according to the norms international law The Russian Federation cannot prevent the passage of commercial ships even through its territorial waters.

The special status of the NSR as a zone with a special regime for the passage of ships is interpreted by the Chinese side only as the right of the Russian side to establish an insurance regime for ships and offer paid services for providing meteorological and other information, conducting rescue operations and icebreaking support.

Considering that the latter is one of the most significant factors, the Chinese plan not only to provide escort for their vessels using their own icebreakers, but also to develop a favorable pricing policy to attract other customers - so that Chinese icebreakers provide escort of ships of other countries along the Northern Sea Route.

There is evidence that the owners of Chinese icebreakers are trying to conclude contracts for escorting Norwegian and German ships. At the same time, Chinese carriers also expect to receive orders for the transportation of goods from ASEAN countries along the NSR.

At the same time, these actions of the PRC are by no means dictated by the desire to capture the niche of transportation along the NSR. Firstly, it will be difficult to implement, and secondly, it may lead to a political conflict with Moscow. The Chinese are stubbornly promoting the idea of ​​creating a joint company to manage the Northern Sea Route. At the same time, they will be ready to provide investments in the development of infrastructure throughout the NSR.

This idea is actively opposed by the Japanese, Norwegians and Germans, who consider it expedient to create the International Administration of the Northern Sea Route, which will be in charge of all issues related to the use of the NSR, including the transportation of foreign trade goods of the Russian Federation, as well as transportation between Russian regions (for example, shipment of fish products from the Far East of the Russian Federation to European part Russia).

And this is absolutely unprofitable for the Russian side, since these transportations are inherently not transit, but internal.

National Sea Transport Highway of Russia

Northern sea ​​route(SMP) in accordance with the Federal Law "On Internal sea ​​waters, the territorial sea and the adjacent zone of the Russian Federation" (1998) is defined as "a historically established national unified transport communication Russian Federation in the Arctic. Navigation along the NSR routes, including in the Vilkitsky, Shokalsky, Dmitry Laptev, Sannikov straits, is carried out in accordance with this Federal Law, other federal laws, international treaties of the Russian Federation and the rules for navigation along the NSR routes approved by the Government of the Russian Federation and published in " Notices to Mariners.

The internal connectivity of the Arctic zone of Russia is low due to a sparse network of cities, the high cost of air and land transport, and poorly developed infrastructure.

The NSR is almost 2 times shorter than other sea routes from Europe to the Far East and back. The length of the main ice route of the NSR from the Novaya Zemlya Straits to the port of Provideniya is 5610 km; The length of navigable river routes adjacent to the NSR is about 37,000 km.

However, long and harsh winter during short and cold summers, they cause difficult ice conditions in the Arctic seas, which is the main obstacle to the passage of ships along significant sections of the route. The most difficult navigation conditions are in areas of large accumulations of heavy ice, which are not completely destroyed even in the warmest months (Taimyr and Ayon ice massifs). Posting of transports here is possible only with the help of icebreakers.

The NSR is the most important part of the infrastructure of the economic complex of the Far North and a link between the Russian Far East and the western regions of the country. It combines the largest river arteries of Siberia, land, air and pipeline modes of transport into a single transport network.

For some areas of the Arctic zone - Chukotka, the islands of the Arctic seas and a number of settlements on the coast of the Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug - sea transport is the only means of transporting goods and supporting the population. On the direction of Murmansk-Dudinka, year-round navigation is carried out in order to ensure the activities of the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine (MMC).

Brief historical excursion

The role of the NSR for our country is difficult to overestimate. After all, this highway was mastered and equipped exclusively by the efforts of our state and our ancestors. Back in 1525, the first draft of the sea route from the Frozen Sea to the mouth of the Ob was made by the Moscow clerk Dmitry Gerasimov.

The 17th century was one of the key periods in the history of the development of the Arctic and the creation of the Northern Sea Route. Then many expeditions were started, the Arctic seas and straits were discovered.

One of the ideologists of the creation of a sea transport route in the north was the Russian genius M.V. Lomonosov, who in 1763 submitted to the board of the Admiralty a project for the development of the Northern Sea Route. Being a Pomor by origin, Mikhail Vasilievich had every reason to believe that the creation of the Northern Sea Route would lead to an increase not only in the economic, but also in the military power of Russia in the Pacific Ocean.

With the advent of steam ships, new stage exploration of the Arctic. A special place in the history of the development of the Arctic belongs to Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov.

It was he who first substantiated the possibility of sailing there in the presence of a powerful icebreaker. In his opinion, with the help of an icebreaker, it is possible to lead not only merchant ships to the Arctic, but also the fleet to the Pacific Ocean in the shortest and most militarily safe way. It was with the direct participation of Admiral Makarov in 1898 that the world's first icebreaker "Ermak" was built.

The First World War clearly demonstrated the high importance of the northern artery for the defense of the country. As a result, in 1915, the construction of the Murmansk port and the railway to Petrograd began. In 1916, the Arctic Ocean Flotilla was formed.

Then two icebreaking ships, manned by military teams, carried out through navigation along the Northern Sea Route from east to west. The passage was completed in two navigations with wintering in the ice at Cape Chelyuskin. This outstanding feat of military sailors marked the beginning of the passage of Russian ships along the Northern Sea Route.

AT Soviet period not only the military, but also the economic interests of the USSR became an incentive for the development of the development of the Northern Sea Route. The infrastructure was built, the vast northern regions of the country were described and explored, and a solid foundation was laid for the industrial development of the rich natural resources of the region.

To the beginning of the Great Patriotic War The Northern Sea Route was already prepared for regular maritime transportation and the passage of warships along it.

In the prewar period, the use of the Northern Sea Route for inter-theater maneuvers by the Navy was associated with the emergence of a military threat in the east, from Japan, and the need to strengthen the Pacific Fleet. The NSR made it possible already during the Great Patriotic War to ensure the replenishment of the combat personnel of the Northern Fleet due to the redeployment of warships of the Pacific Fleet.

However, expeditions to escort warships occurred only sporadically: three expeditions in the pre-war period and one during the war. To organize the transfer of warships along the Northern Sea Route, a polar department was created as part of the Main Headquarters of the Navy.

In the North, two transport sea routes were constantly functioning: an external one, along which goods were transported to the USSR from England and the USA, and an internal one along the Northern Sea Route, with the help of which military supplies were provided to the front from the eastern regions of the country. At the same time, there was also an escort of ships from the Pacific coast of the United States with deliveries under lend-lease.

The NSR is the main factor in the triumph of the Soviet strategy for the development of the Arctic and an effective means of the defense policy of the USSR

The era that came in the post-war period " cold war” has exacerbated to the limit the regional political, military and legal problems in the Arctic, which have developed as a result of the confrontation between the two world systems.

The Soviet Union was forced to reinforce the Northern and Pacific Fleets, whose areas of operational responsibility converged in the Arctic seas. This was achieved at the cost of colossal expenditures of material and human resources.

In an effort to cover part of the costs of maintaining the NSR by receiving currency funds for the escort of foreign ships, the Ministry of the Navy in 1967 initiated the opening of the route for international shipping.

However, no foreign vessel took advantage of the offered services. The lack of sufficient information from Western shipping companies about the profitability and safety of transit along the Northern Sea Route affected.

The Murmansk initiatives of 1987 gave a new impetus to the idea of ​​international transit traffic along the Northern Sea Route. They declared the fundamental readiness of the USSR to provide icebreakers for escorting foreign ships, subject to the normalization of the international situation.

As a result of many years of efforts, by the beginning of the 1990s, a developed system of navigation, hydrographic and hydrometeorological support was created in the Arctic, which significantly increased the safety and carrying capacity of ships in ice conditions.

In 1992, 7 nuclear-powered and 8 diesel-powered linear icebreakers, the Sevmorput nuclear-powered lighter carrier and more than 130 reinforced ice-class transport vessels operated on the NSR.

The volume of cargo transported along the Northern Sea Route was more than 6 million tons per year, which is 5 times higher than the total volume of annual cargo traffic in the foreign Arctic.

The moment of truth in the realization of a serious geopolitical loss

The polar possessions of the USSR accounted for 44 percent of the territory of the Arctic. As a serious geopolitical loss, the weakening of our country's influence on Far North resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

For a number of years in the post-Soviet period, Russia's ability to develop the region was very limited. So, in the period from 1991 to 2003, research in the Arctic was practically not funded in Russia.

Our country had to make significant efforts to restore the lost positions, which was not easy in the face of growing competition among the subjects of world politics for the use of the resources of the region.

De facto, within the framework of the system of geopolitical relations associated with the Arctic, two poles have formed: Russia and all other states. The policy of these states is aimed at reducing Russia's influence in the region.

It must also be recognized that the Russian Federation has not yet had the opportunity to create a coalition from among its supporters and rely on it to defend its interests in the region, while all the other Arctic countries are already politically and economically united within NATO and the European Union.

As a result, Russia actually faced a consolidated position Western countries and not only in the Arctic.

Nevertheless, today the key direction in improving the efficiency of the region's transport system is the development of alternative routes between Europe and Asia, primarily land via Russia and sea via the Northern Sea Route.

Prospects for the development of the NSR

Assessing the prospects for the development of the NSR, it is necessary to take into account several circumstances.

According to experts in the field of transport, a rapid increase in the volume of Eurasian traffic is expected in the coming decade.

As you know, the growth of production volumes by 1 percent entails an increase in the volume of the transport component by 1.5 percent. Due to the rapid economic development Asia-Pacific region, the NSR can bring considerable revenues to the budget of the Russian Federation.

The Northern Sea Route allows transportation 1.5 times faster than the traditional route through the congested Suez Canal. The distance traveled by ships from the port of Murmansk to the port of Yokohama (Japan) through the Suez Canal is 12,840 nautical miles, while ships pass only 5,770 miles along the Northern Sea Route.

The route through the Northern Sea Route, in comparison with the route through the Suez Canal, reduces the duration of the voyage by 10 days, in addition, it saves a huge amount of fuel - about 800 tons per average vessel.

One cannot ignore the fact that in recent years in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean Somali pirates are active, which significantly increases the risks and costs associated with ensuring the safety of navigation. As you know, the Strait of Malacca is also very unsafe for the passage of ships, again due to the presence of pirates.

Describing the transit potential of our country, we note that transit through Russian railways can reduce the delivery time of goods by almost 3 times. According to some estimates, route optimization will save APEC economies by 2020 about $300 billion in bilateral trade and about $370 billion in transit between Asia and Europe.

Consequently, participation in the Eurasian transit is beneficial not only for Russia, but also promises serious benefits for many countries. To do this, it is necessary to increase the competitiveness of the Trans-Siberian Railway and attract foreign shippers to transit traffic along the Northern Sea Route.

NSR in conditions of tough geopolitical competition

The predicted consequences of global warming and the prospect of pirate attacks on ships following the southern routes increase the interest of shipowners in the Arctic routes.

However, the NSR will be able to compete with the southern routes only if it is economically viable and its infrastructure ensures that additional risks are reduced as much as possible when sailing in the Arctic ice.

As for the Northwest Route (NWZ) through the Canadian Arctic as a route for transportation from the west to the east coast of America (instead of a bypass route through the Panama Canal), then, despite all the attractiveness and alternativeness of this transport route, there is a serious problem that cannot be allows you to use it in the same mode as the SMP.

The fact is that on the NWZ, a route of the same length as the NSR, the ice conditions are much more severe. The named route in its western part (the Beaufort Sea) is open towards the Central Arctic Basin, while multi-year pack ice often blocks certain sections of its route, and, therefore, there is no guarantee of safe transit passage in one navigation. In the entire history of the functioning of the NWSC, only about 40 transit voyages were made along it, mainly by icebreakers.

For comparison: transit passages along the NSR are carried out annually by up to 20 Russian courts, up to 200 transports take part in cabotage transportation.

Currently, navigation along the NSR is carried out on a non-discriminatory basis for ships of all states in accordance with the laws and regulations established by the Russian Federation and in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Russia's duty to the world community is to ensure that measures are taken to prevent and control the region's ecology in the face of development economic activity in the Arctic.

Private carriers are provided with services to ensure safe sailing conditions. This includes escort of vessels by icebreakers, navigation, hydrographic and hydrometeorological support, emergency rescue readiness, and communications.

In view of the above, the interest of foreign shipping companies in the NSR is growing, rather than in the Northwest Route, which runs in Canadian and American waters.

On the one hand, the NSR can become a more economically advantageous alternative to the currently carried out transportation between the ports of Europe, the Far East, Asia and North America. In addition, the NSR is interesting as a transport artery for the transportation of mineral raw materials from the Arctic regions of Russia.

On the other hand, major geopolitical players seek to establish control over hydrocarbon supplies, which is a more effective way to increase influence than control over production regions, since in this case it is the exporting countries that become dependent and vulnerable.

Therefore, the focus of the confrontation is the struggle not so much for sources of raw materials, but for the most important communications and transportation nodes (pipelines, ports, canals and straits).

Under these conditions, Russia's priority has become to reduce its dependence on transit countries that pursue unfavorable tariff policies or, as has already happened, cut off the supply of energy resources to recipients from Europe. In this regard, special attention is now paid to the NSR.

In the future, special attention will be paid to increasing the efforts of the circumpolar states aimed at creating a unified regional system of search and rescue, as well as efforts to prevent man-made disasters. This is extremely important for the ecology of the region, the protection of especially vulnerable northern nature at sea and adjacent territories.

It is advisable to create the necessary conditions for the NSR to function year-round and for transportation to be carried out exactly on schedule. With the development of the main infrastructure of ports, icebreaking, timber, container, tanker fleets, it is worth counting on a significant increase in traffic along this corridor.

Strengthening security in the region will help increase Russia's competitiveness in the global segment of transcontinental transportation, primarily through the use of the Northern Sea Route. At the same time, we are talking not only about ensuring the pilotage of ships, but also about the creation of transport and logistics complexes.

It is quite clear that in order to solve this problem, it is necessary to link the development transport infrastructure with the strengthening of military and border security in the region.

Developed in modern Russia plans for the use of the NSR, ensuring its sustainable and safe operation are linked to the problems of the socio-economic development of the Russian North and the country as a whole. The planned and implemented measures involve the renewal of the country's sea and river fleet, the fleet of polar aircraft and the modernization of Arctic ports.

Conclusion

According to domestic and foreign analysts, the importance of the Northern Sea Route for Russia is difficult to overestimate. For the economic development of several regions of Russia at once depends on how successful the reconstruction and development of the NSR infrastructure will be, especially in the Arkhangelsk region, Siberia, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and Chukotka.

In addition, for our country, the NSR is not only a promising sea route, but also an effective geopolitical tool that will allow us to solve very, very many things in the Arctic region.

One way or another, for Russia, in the face of a deficit of its own funds, it is necessary to effectively use the unique opportunity to attract excess financial, technological and other resources of the Asia-Pacific countries, involving them in the joint development of hydrocarbon deposits on the Russian Arctic shelf, in the modernization of existing and construction of new international seaports throughout the Northern Sea Route.

And even if the Northern Sea Route does not become economically profitable, the Russian government will need to continue to invest in the infrastructure of the Arctic ports and build icebreakers - to turn, if necessary, the NSR into a strategic foothold for national defense.

Boris Skupov

TK Sever offers cargo transportation services along the Northern Sea Route. Our company delivers cargo of various sizes to all major ports of the NSR: Naryan-Mar, Amderma, Tiksi, Dudinka, Khatanga, Dikson, Pevek, Sabetta, as well as to a number of port points located at the mouths of the rivers flowing into the Laptev, White, Barents Seas Chukchi, East Siberian and Kara. We can also offer cargo delivery services to river ports located in close proximity to the mouths of rivers flowing into the seas of the Arctic Ocean.

The NSR (Northern Sea Route) is a historically established transport route between the European part of our country and the Far East. The Northern Sea Route passes through the seas of the Arctic Ocean, its length is about 2500 nautical miles.

By sea, it is possible to deliver goods to the most inaccessible areas where there is no possibility to use other modes of transport.

What do we transport:

• bulk, bulk and general;
• 20 and 40-foot containers;
• oversized, especially heavy;
• building materials and hardware;
• spare parts and modules for equipment;
• special equipment and cars;
• food and goods to supply businesses and employees.

For the transportation of goods along the NSR, special ice-class vessels are used, which are distinguished by high cross-country ability and excellent technical equipment. Since the cargo may be subjected to significant climatic loads on the way, you will receive advice from our specialists on the choice of packaging before shipment.

Our company cooperates with all major ports and ship owners, which allows us to offer our customers the most favorable conditions for cargo transportation. BUT great experience for the delivery of goods various types guarantees prompt transportation to the most remote areas of the Far North.

Advantages

One of the main advantages of maritime transportation of goods is the ability to deliver goods to geographic areas that are difficult to access for other types of cargo transportation. The Sever Company has been delivering cargo along the Northern Sea Route for a long time and can organize the delivery of any type of cargo to the most remote corners of the Far North.

We accept for transportation 20, 40 ft containers, general, bulk and bulk cargo.

We offer cargo transportation to such popular ports as Dixon, Tiksi, Chersky, Pevek, and many others, transportation is carried out taking into account all climatic features.

JSC "Universal Marine Company Arktika" delivers cargo via the Northern Sea Route from the European part of Russia to most settlements Far Eastern District located along the coast. We deliver any goods to areas inaccessible to other modes of transport at low and favorable rates and provide a full range of logistics, forwarding and storage services.

The geography of our activity covers all popular ports of the northern region - Dikson, Tiksi, Chersky, Pevek and other settlements. Any goods are accepted for shipment without restrictions on volume and dimensions. We organize northern shipping of general, bulk, oversized and dangerous goods, special equipment, spare parts, metal structures and building materials.

Transportation along the NSR - reliable and inexpensive

U.M.C.A. is a direct charterer of icebreakers that has established mutually beneficial cooperation with all major ports and shipowners. This allows us to offer our customers particularly attractive conditions for transportation along the Northern Sea Route - affordable prices, the best route scheme and guarantees for the safety of cargo:

• we charter only modern off-road vessels with excellent technical equipment. Icebreakers operate according to a predetermined schedule, which guarantees timely delivery along the NSR at the appointed time and without delays on the way. You can check the schedule for each port on our website;
• in any of the points of departure and destination, all the necessary services are provided: weighing, consolidation, cargo safety control, etc.;
• transportation along the NSR is carried out taking into account the harsh climatic conditions inherent in the northern Arctic sea route. If necessary, our experts will give recommendations on the best packaging for your cargo.

We have extensive experience in shipping cargo along the Northern Sea Route, which allows us to organize delivery with minimal risks.

The whole range of services

JSC "Universal Marine Company Arktika" appreciates its customers and does everything to provide quality service in the transportation of goods along the Northern Sea Route. Our company practices an integrated approach to organizing transportation, therefore, in addition to delivery, we:

• we arrange everything Required documents to escort cargo along the NSR;
• we provide services for the accumulation, storage and transshipment of any consignments of goods both at the points of departure and at the ports of destination;
• we calculate the optimal transportation scheme to reduce delivery times along the Northern Arctic Sea Route;
• We carry out loading and unloading of cargo.

Also, one of our activities is multimodal transportation by the Northern Sea Route. This service includes the organization of freight, forwarding, clearance of cargo and its subsequent delivery to the destination by a suitable mode of transport. Our experts will develop an individual route for transportation, taking into account the nature of the cargo and the requirements for transportation.

Turning to U.M.C.A., you can be sure of the reliable and timely delivery of your goods to their destination via the NSR (Northern Sea Route).

Choosing us, you can be sure of the reliability of transportation of your cargo.

On May 20, in Moscow, under the auspices of the Interregional Public Organization "Association of Polar Explorers" (IPO "ASPOL"), official events were held to celebrate the Day of the Polar Explorer. The official festive ceremony was held in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Day of the Polar Explorer" dated May 21, 2013 No. 502. The solemn events were preceded by the Meeting of the Council of the IPO "ASPOL", which considered the issues of the current work of the IPO "ASPOL", including the preparation of the Congress of the IPO "ASPOL" in December 2016 and the holding of the VI International Forum "Arctic: Present and Future".

Welcoming speech to the participants of the solemn meeting was delivered by the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Vladimir Pavlovich Nazarov. Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctic, President of the IPO "ASPOL" Artur Nikolaevich Chilingarov congratulated his colleagues and awarded the active participants of expeditions to the Arctic in the past year, polar explorers who made a significant contribution with their many years of active work into development Arctic zone Russian Federation. Head of Roshydromet Alexander Vasilyevich Frolov presented certificates of honor and gratitude from Roshydromet to the participants of the SP-2015 expedition. In a solemn atmosphere, the signing of an agreement on cooperation between the IPO "ASPOL" and the Interregional Public Eco-Social Organization "Green Arctic" (IPO "Green Arctic"), established in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug in the spring of 2014, took place.
We asked a participant, the author of our magazine, Mikhail Zhukov, to tell us about the celebration of the Day of the Polar Explorer.

Rare earths: Mikhail Andreevich, what was the main topic of discussions among polar explorers, what problems are of primary concern to them.
Mikhail Zhukov: There were many subjects for discussion, but first of all, polar explorers are interested in marine activities in the Arctic Ocean, both scientific and economic. This is understandable, since the main activity of the majority of polar explorers, honored polar explorers, is connected with the development of the Arctic Ocean in all its manifestations. While research activities in the Arctic Basin and on its coast are quite successfully restored and developed, the development of economic activity, at least to the volumes previously achieved, is noticeably slowed down.

But is transportation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) growing?
Indeed, domestic traffic along the NSR is growing, but transit traffic has been falling since 2014, and has fallen significantly (Table 1).

Has domestic traffic come close to previously achieved volumes?
Approached. The dynamics of traffic along the NSR from 1933 to 2014 is shown in Table 2.

And how were things with transit during this period?
In the Soviet period, they barely kept pace with domestic cargo transportation and did not particularly think about the need to develop transit traffic. However, periodically transit flights were carried out:
in the summer navigation of 1967, the Novovoronezh motor ship of the Murmansk Shipping Company (DWT about 5 thousand tons, ice class ARC 4) performed a double voyage along the Northern Sea Route en route Hamburg-Japan-Murmansk, spending only 57 days, including a stop in Japan under cargo operations;
in the summer navigation of 1989, the ship "Tiksi" of the Murmansk Shipping Company (type "Norilsk", DWT 20 thousand tons, ice class ARC 7) repeated such a double voyage along the NSR along the route Western Europe - Japan - China - Europe, spending 47 days;
in the summer navigation of 1990, the ship "Kola" of the Murmansk Shipping Company (type "Norilsk", DWT 20 thousand tons, ice class ARC 7) passed from Hamburg to Japan through the NSR in 19 days, the passage of the NSR route took 8 days.

And in the post-Soviet period?
The fall in the volume of domestic traffic stimulated attention to the organization of regular transit transportation of goods by foreign consignors and consignees. In 1991, transit along the NSR was opened for them, but at first significant results were not achieved (Table 3).

The main types of cargo transported on the route Europe - Far East: chemicals (potassium salts, fertilizers, potassium chloride), rolled metal, timber (Finland, Sweden - Japan)
The main types of cargo transported along the route Far East - Europe: processed agricultural products (rice, soybeans, cake from China and Thailand), magnesite, spar.
At the same time, it is impossible to say that no one was preparing for the development of the transit of foreign cargo. So, in an experimental voyage in March 1993, under the most difficult ice conditions, an atomic icebreaker of the Arktika type navigated a Norilsk-type vessel along the entire route of the NSR in 28 days.
However, over the next 10 years, the transit was random in nature - in some years, no more than 1-3 flights. The number of transit flights along the NSR has been increasing since 2008. Data on transit voyages during the period of growth in transit traffic in the late 2000s are shown in Tables 4-8 below.

The navigation of 2010 was marked by several important experimental flights. In August, the first large-tonnage tanker SCF Baltica of the Aframax class with a cargo of 70,000 tons of gas condensate from Novatek, with a draft of 11 m, transited the NSR from Murmansk to China. The purpose of the cruise was to determine the possibility of passage of a large-capacity tanker along the traditional NSR route through the Sannikov Strait, where the depths are minimal on the NSR (vessel draft limit is 12.7 m), taking into account the need for regular hydrographic surveys, since the bottom of the strait is gradually washed away by sea currents. The tanker crossed the NSR route from Cape Zhelaniya to Cape Dezhnev in 10.5 days from average speed about 10 knots. Icebreaking escort along the tanker route was carried out by the nuclear icebreakers Rossiya, Taimyr and 50 Years of Pobedy (the nuclear icebreaker is laying a channel wide enough for a ship with a deadweight of up to 75,000 tons; two nuclear icebreakers successfully ship with a deadweight of up to 150 thousand tons). Saving time on the voyage of the tanker "SKF Baltika" on the route Murmansk - Ningbo (China) in comparison with the route through the Suez Canal amounted to 18 days.
In September, the bulk carrier Nordic Barents transported 41,000 tons of iron ore concentrate from Kirkenes to China. On part of the Northern Sea Route, he needed icebreaking support from the nuclear-powered icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy. The ship passed the entire route in 8 days. The Nordic Barents bulk carrier became the first foreign-flagged transport ship to pass through the Russian Arctic in full transit, without calling at Russian ports and obtaining permission to cross the border. The voyage of the supply icebreaker Tor Viking II was performed for the first time in the history of navigation along the NSR routes for a month after the official end of the summer-autumn navigation. The entire passage from the Bering Strait to the island New Earth took a little less than 9 days.
A significant increase in transit (Table 8) that occurred in 2011 was largely due to the introduction of a new flexible tariff (Order of the FTS of Russia No. below the limits. This significantly increased the attractiveness of the use of the NSR route by shipowners and operators, including foreign ones, including for transit navigation. The old tariffs practically blocked the NSR route, as they were 4-6 times higher than the tariffs of the Suez Canal. As a result of the flexible tariff policy on the NSR route, more than 834,931 tons of cargo were transported in transit to the Arctic navigation in 2011, which was an absolute record in the history of the NSR.
In 2011, compared to 2010, the cargo turnover increased by 5.8 times - 145,000 tons in 2010 and 834,931 tons in 2011. On some days, up to 100 sea and river vessels worked on the NSR route that year, most of which carried out the delivery of equipment and building materials to the Baidaratskaya and Obskaya bays for oil and gas companies. The revival of transit traffic occurred due to an increase in the transit of petroleum products. In previous years, the share of bulk in the cargo turnover did not exceed 30%.

Navigation stats:
tankers - 15 voyages, 686,516 tons of cargo were transported;
bulk carriers - 3 voyages, 109,950 tons of cargo;
refrigerators - 4 flights, 27,535 tons of cargo;
dry cargo ships - 4 voyages, 10,930 tons of cargo.
In total, 834,931 tons of cargo were transported, 41 transit flights were made, including ballast, scientific and ferry flights with cargo (26 flights). 24 voyages were made by ships flying the Russian flag (58%), 17 voyages were made by ships flying a foreign flag (42%).
In the entire cargo turnover, the share of Russian carriers amounted to 11.3%. The share of oil products in the cargo turnover amounted to 82.2%, of which transportation by ships under a foreign flag - 86.9%, and by ships under the Russian flag - 3.1%.
In 2011, the NSR carried out:
the largest vessel in the entire history of the operation of the route - the tanker "Vladimir Tikhonov" with a draft of up to 15 meters, owned by Sovcomflot, with a deadweight of 162,362 tons, with a cargo of gas condensate of 120,843 tons for a draft of 13.7 meters, passed the NSR route, rounding islands from the north, in 7.4 days, also setting a record for average speed of movement - almost 14 knots with time savings on the route Murmansk - Map Ta Phut (Thailand) - 8 days;
the tanker "Stena Poseidon", with a deadweight of 74,927 tons, owned by "Neste Oil", with a cargo of gas condensate of 57,814 tons, for the first time in the history of the operation of the route, was carried through it for the first time in just 6.8 days at an average speed of more than 15 knots (the voyage passed at the end August - early September, at the most favorable time for navigation and ice conditions);
the tanker Preseverance with a deadweight of 73,788 tons with a cargo of oil products began navigation and passed under the assistance of the nuclear icebreakers Yamal and Taimyr in the difficult ice conditions of the NSR, typical for this time of year, in 15 days (from June 30 to July 15) and for the first time in the entire history of the route's operation made three transit flights along the route during one Arctic navigation: 2 flights from West to East and 1 flight from East to West;
four refrigerators delivered a total of 27,500 tons of fish from the Asian part of Russia to St. Petersburg via Murmansk.
On the whole, navigation in 2011 made it possible to accumulate a large amount of new relevant experience, which ensured a sharp increase in cargo turnover in general and transit in particular in 2012 and 2013. So, if in 2011 only one ship made three voyages with cargo along the NSR during one Arctic navigation: two from West to East, one from East to West. In 2012, five vessels already performed eleven such voyages, including seven from West to East and four from East to West. In total, these vessels transported 714 thousand tons, which is 63% of the total transported by this moment cargo (1,207 thousand tons). It was demonstrated that the transportation of liquefied gas from the port of Sabetta along the NSR to Japan and South Korea has great prospects. Within the framework of the agreement concluded between Gazprom Marketing And Trading Singapore and the South Korean company Kogas, the Russian side was supposed to supply 1 million tons of liquefied gas during 2013-2014. For the NSR, this meant 6 large-capacity gas carriers a year.
In 2012 for the NSR for the first time:
LNG tanker "OB RIVER" (LNG carrier) was carried out, which passed in ballast from Japan to France for a technical cargo of liquid nitrogen, then the vessel performed the first LNG transportation in the history of the NSR (from Hammerfest to the port of Tobata (Japan);
a flight from China with a general cargo to Europe (Poland) was carried out, as well as a flight from Canada (Vancouver) to Hamburg with a cargo of coal - new cargo flows along the NSR.
There were 5 flights with a cargo of iron ore concentrate from Murmansk to China (about 300 thousand tons in total) and 4 flights from China in ballast to Murmansk for cargo.
The refrigerator "Skyfrost" of the Greek "Laskaridis Shipping" transported 8265 tons of frozen fish from the Asian part to the European part of Russia. The 2189 nautical miles route from Cape Dezhnev in Chukotka to Cape Zhelaniya in Novaya Zemlya took 180.5 hours or 7.5 days
In total, 1.2 million tons were transported in transit along the NSR in 2012, which is 30% more than in 2011 (0.8 million tons). At the same time, the number of ships involved almost did not increase, which was due to more efficient use of ships: fewer ballast passages - more "double" voyages. Export and import of goods, transportation between Russian ports located in different basins (“large cabotage”) in 2012 amounted to (diagram 1).
In Russian federation. Export: gas condensate - 486 thousand tons, ore - 262 thousand tons; large cabotage: oil products - 90 thousand tons, frozen fish - 8 thousand tons.
To China. Import: gas condensate - 181,000 tons, ore - 262,000 tons; export: general cargo - 25,000 tons.
To Korea. Import: gas condensate - 303,000 tons; export: aviation kerosene - 198,000 tons.
To Singapore. Import: fuel oil - 44,000 tons.
To Japan. Import: liquefied natural gas- 81,000 tons
To Canada. Export: coal - 72,000 tons.
Maximum amount transit flights were carried out in 2013 (table 9), although the total volume of goods transported did not increase significantly. In general, the nomenclature of the transported goods was also preserved (Table 10), so the navigation experience of 2013 did not bring anything significantly new. Among the transit voyages, we can mention the experimental passage of a South Korean cargo ship of the logistics company Hyundai Glovis Co along the route Ust-Luga port Gwangyang port with 44,000 tons of oil products. The tanker traveled 15,000 km while at sea 10 days less than the traditional route through the Suez Canal, which takes about 45 days. "This is a significant event in the history of South Korean shipping," said Hyundai Glovis spokesman Kang Sung Gon. Hyundai Glovis announced its intention to become the first South Korean shipping company to deliver cargo through the Arctic region.

In 2014, the volume of transit cargo transportation through the NSR fell by 77% to 274 thousand tons against 1.18 million tons in 2013 (Table 10). 23 transit flights were carried out, including 6 ships flying a foreign flag. The total cargo turnover along the NSR increased, but only by 2% to 3,982,000 million tons. At the same time, in 2015 it grew by 45.4% and amounted to 5 million 471.3 thousand tons. The volume of transportation of general cargo amounted to 3 million 982.6 thousand tons (60% growth). To a large extent, this growth is associated with the implementation of oil and gas projects in the Pechora Sea and on the Yamal Peninsula. The volume of transportation of coal reached 355.9 thousand tons (an increase of 50%), transportation of oil and oil products reached 859.5 thousand tons (an increase of 13.5%). But transportation of gas condensate decreased by 8.2% to 144.4 thousand tons. Ores also decreased by 1.3% to 79.8 thousand tons.
The volume of transit traffic in 2015 decreased to 39 thousand, which is 6.9 times lower than in 2014. 19.0 thousand tons were transported in the West-East direction, and 20.6 thousand tons were transported in the East-West direction. According to the results for 2015, the administration of the Northern Sea Route issued 715 permits for navigation in the waters of the NSR, including 125 permits for ships flying a foreign flag. At the same time, according to the results of 2015, 18 transit flights were carried out along the NSR, including only 8 flights by vessels under a foreign flag. In addition, in the direction West - East (port of Murmansk - port of Providence), the Bremen passenger ship under the flag of the Bahamas, carrying 137 passengers, proceeded. Average duration the passage of the NSR in 2015 was 10.6 days.

You described the picture of transit traffic along the NSR in detail. But what caused such a sharp drop in transit traffic?
On the one hand, during the period of growth in transit traffic, the infrastructural provision of the ISR almost did not increase, with the exception of newly built ports and a significant increase in the volume of hydrographic work. On the other hand, the sum of the circumstances that determine the general economic situation has changed significantly.

What exactly do you mean?
First of all, a sharp drop in oil prices and, accordingly, hydrocarbon raw materials and products in general. For example, the cost of marine fuel has dropped sharply. The gain from using a shorter route from the NSR has become less significant, especially since the movement of a vessel through ice fields requires an increased specific fuel consumption. The price gap for hydrocarbons between the markets of Europe and Southeast Asia has narrowed, which has reduced the profitability of its transportation between these markets. As a result, there was no transit of liquid cargoes in 2015. For example, the tariff for the NSR is $20-30 per ton, while the transit through the Suez Canal is $5 per ton, but the high price of oil made it possible to make a profit. With the fall in oil prices, saving 10-15 days in itself was not very attractive.
Nikolai Afanasyevich Monko, Deputy Head of the Federal State Institution "Administration of the Northern Sea Route", said that the reduction in transit through the NSR is due to the completion of several large projects that required transit in large volumes. In 2014 former leader FGKU "Administration of the Northern Sea Route" Alexander Nikolaevich Olshevsky named two reasons. EuroChem, which transported bulk cargo (products of Kovodorsky GOK) through the port of Murmansk, did not agree on a price with buyers and charterers. As a result, about 200 thousand tons of cargo were lost. Secondly, NOVATEK's gas condensate left the port of Vitino for the port of Ust-Luga.

Are you talking about external circumstances formation of market conditions. And what are the internal reasons that reduce the competitiveness of the NSR as a transit route from Europe to Asia and vice versa?
Unjustifiably high level of increase in the cost of services for the passage of the NSR in comparison with their technically achievable minimum parameters and the technical complexity of obtaining these services. When working on the NSR, operating costs are too high - for icebreaking support, border and customs clearance, increased insurance premium rates. Insurers believe that it is necessary to take into account the additional risks associated with the low probability of providing an icebreaker at the right time in the right place, with a high probability of ice damage and vessel downtime. In fact, these are excessive fears, but they are rooted and real material counter-arguments are needed, not empty verbal statements.

Does the SMP have no prospects?
There are some experts who actively promote this particular idea, but their background usually demonstrates the presence of a certain bias in terms of political views and sympathies. Their position on the NSR is an element of their general system of views, and it adapts to this system.
In fact, there are circumstances absolutely independent of our political preferences and personal sympathies or antipathies. Regardless of anything, the distance from the port of Murmansk to the port of Yokohama (Japan) through the Suez Canal is 12,840 nautical miles, and through the NSR - only 5,770 nautical miles. It takes 25 days and 625 tons of fuel oil to cross from Europe to China along the NSR, and 35 days and 875 tons of fuel oil (for a specific vessel) when using the Suez Canal.
Indeed, the sum of the pros and cons of the NSR includes a lot of “human-made”, momentary, but these circumstances can be changed by human hands. We need a correctly chosen course for the development of the NSR and the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a whole. An important element of this correct approach in terms of solving the problem of developing transit in all its diversity (own or foreign "large cabotage" along the Europe-Asia line, export, import) is the understanding that it can be effective in the overall system of the NSR functioning as a cargo region. Natural resources for this are available in full. Their development is carried out incrementally. Together with domestic transportation along the NSR, export of products and import of equipment and materials, transit will create a cumulative synergistic effect that will increase the efficiency of the functioning of the NSR and related Arctic projects as a whole.

Does the elimination of human-made obstacles to the effective functioning of the NSR depend only on the decisions of the Russian leadership?
Not only. Deputy Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation - Head federal agency of sea and river transport Viktor Alexandrovich Olersky, in one of his speeches, said that Moscow was warned in advance in the West regarding the NSR that Russia's ability to capitalize on new opportunities would require international cooperation and good will.

What was meant by cooperation and goodwill?
In the limit, our partners or “probable partners” would like the full opening of the NSR for the free navigation of foreign ships without any interference in this process by Russia and without any financial obligations of transiters to Russia. Russia considers the NSR as our historically established national transport route, the use of which is subject to the rules and financial conditions established by the Russian Federation.

And how to combine these positions?
Within a reasonable compromise. In September 2011, at the second international forum "The Arctic - the Territory of Dialogue", Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin stated that: "... he sees the future of the Northern Sea Route as an international transport artery that can compete with traditional shipping lines both in terms of cost of services, and in terms of safety, and in terms of quality" .

How can this be done in practice?
We already talked about this in our previous conversation, in the article “On the Place of Market Instruments in the Management System of the Northern Sea Route”.

If the formula is found and implemented, what place will the NSR take in the system of world transit routes?
This is a separate large topic that requires a separate detailed discussion.

April 16th, 2016

The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a historically established national unified transport communication of the Russian Federation in the Arctic and, thus, belongs to its exclusive jurisdiction. Since Soviet times, the NSR has been a vital artery for Russia, both economically and socially. Currently, the NSR is actively used by Norilsk Nickel, Lukoil, Gazprom, Rosneft, Rosshelf, Novatek and others to supply their factories, mines and oil and gas fields and export products from there. The Northern Sea Route is one of the main routes of the so-called "northern delivery" - the organized delivery of food, consumer goods and fuel to Russian cities and towns in the Far North.

In Soviet times, the NSR was a completely internal maritime communications, closed to international navigation. However, with the beginning of the melting of the Arctic ice, the NSR becomes more accessible for navigation. At present, Russia is interested in turning the Northern Sea Route into a line of communication open to international trade. Russia spends huge amounts of money on maintenance of the Arctic fleet (especially icebreakers) and port infrastructure and therefore needs additional income. As the scale of international shipping grows, the cost of domestic Russian trade will also decrease.

Competitive advantages of NSR

It is well known that the melting of the ice cover in the Arctic will contribute to a significant reduction in transport costs as a result of the fact that travel time from Western Europe to Japan or China will be reduced by 20-40%. It will be possible to provide faster communication between all Asian cities north of Hong Kong and Europe via the Arctic rather than through the Suez Canal. Thus, Japan, Korea and China are more interested in the potential benefits from the opening of the NSR than the countries of South Asia, such as India. Thus, the distance between Hamburg and Yokohama, which, if moving through the Suez Canal, is 18,350 kilometers, would decrease to 11,100 kilometers when passing through the Northern Sea Route, which theoretically reduces travel time from 22 to 15 days, or by 40 percent. The distance between Rotterdam and Shanghai would be reduced from 22,000 kilometers (if you sail around the cape Good Hope) up to 14,000 kilometers when using the NSR. The changing situation in the Middle East, especially after the “Arab Spring” began there in 2011, the congestion of the Suez Canal, the growth of tension in Strait of Hormuz, piracy attacks in the Horn of Africa and other adverse events serve as an incentive to search for new alternative routes.

The route from Russia to the shores of the North American continent could also become shorter if you sail through the Arctic. Along the Bering Strait, the distance between Murmansk and Vancouver is only 9,600 kilometers, and through the Panama Canal - 16,000 kilometers. In 2007, Russia and Canada came up with the concept of an "Arctic bridge" connecting the port of Churchill in Manitoba with Murmansk. This project was discussed several years before. The large railway company OmniTRAX, which owns the port of Churchill, has been negotiating this issue with the Murmansk Shipping Company. In 2007-2008, the first batches of Russian fertilizers purchased in Kaliningrad by the Farmers of North America cooperative from Saskatoon arrived in Churchill from Murmansk.

Weaknesses of the Northern Sea Route

Contrary to the optimistic expectations of many Russian specialists and officials, some international experts point out that navigation along the NSR is associated with a number of significant difficulties:

Difficult ice conditions. Ice cover can quickly form in a variety of places, taking ship crews by surprise, which reduces the predictability of navigation. In addition, the melting of ice in the Arctic is associated with the formation of icebergs, and the risk of collision with them is not decreasing, but may increase.

Navigation in extreme climatic conditions and during the polar night is difficult from a technical point of view, since this requires ice-class vessels, including icebreakers.

Numerous administrative and technical difficulties, including those related to the need for foreign ship owners to pay for the charter of icebreakers, weather reports and information on ice conditions, as well as the work of Russian pilots to guide ships through the straits. Many international shipping companies consider these costs to be overpriced.

The cost of insurance is usually very high, as international insurance companies have to take into account the unpredictability of the NSR in terms of the terms and conditions of cargo transportation.

The underdevelopment of the rescue system, which has limited coverage. The number of deep water ports capable of receiving ships in need of repair is limited. At the same time, the risk of collisions due to the unpredictability of ice conditions and the lack of properly marked fairways is still high.

However, all these shortcomings do not prevent Russia from developing far-reaching plans for the development of the Northern Sea Route and do not reduce the interest in this important Arctic route from foreign companies, primarily from the countries of Northeast Asia (NEA).

So, during 2013-2014. South Korean experts conducted a comprehensive multifactorial study of the competitiveness of various routes for the transportation of foreign trade goods of the Republic of Kazakhstan with Europe, including along the Northern Sea Route.

The routes were evaluated by quantitative and qualitative indicators. Quantities included distance, transit time, and cost per 20-foot container. The quality indicators include:

1. Transport services: reliability (timely delivery of goods), flexibility (ability to respond to changes in the transportation system), regularity (frequency transport shipments during a certain period), information service (providing information about the transportation and location of the cargo in real time).

2. Security: transport security (ability to prevent accidents and disasters during transportation), cargo security (ability to prevent damage or theft of cargo).

3. Awareness: awareness of the transport route (degree of perception of the transport route by senders and carriers), awareness of the mode and type of transportation along the route (degree of perception of the mode and type of transportation).

When evaluating the significance of each factor, the South Koreans used the following criteria: distance - 0.15, time - 0.19, cost - 0.20, transport service - 0.17, security - 0.17, awareness - 0.12.

Quantitative indicators of cargo transportation routes from Busan to Berlin:

SourceA Study on Competitiveness of Sea Transport by Comparing International Transport Routes between Korea and EU. //The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics. Volume 31. Number 1. March 2015. p. 011

As can be seen from the table, having the highest cost of transportation, the Northern Sea Route certainly outperforms its competitors in terms of distance and time of transportation. When evaluating the routes in terms of quality indicators, the NSR was in fifth place, surpassing only the Busan-Vanino-Trans-Siberian route.

Meanwhile, the significance of gaining time and distance turned out to be so high that, in terms of the totality of quantitative and qualitative indicators, the NSR eventually yielded only to the route involving the shipment of goods via the Trans-Korean railway through the DPRK with further transportation along the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Competitiveness of routes in terms of a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors:

Source: Dae-seop MOON, Dong-jin KIM, Eun-kyung LEE.A Study on Competitiveness of Sea Transport by Comparing International Transport Routes between Korea and EU. //The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics. Volume 31. Number 1. March 2015. p. 013

Thus, despite the high cost and problems with the provision of services, the Northern Sea Route turned out to be more competitive for the transportation of goods from South Korea to Europe than the route passing through the Suez Canal. Moreover, given the actual failure of the Trans-Korean Railway project due to the aggravation of relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, the Northern Sea Route is the leader in terms of competitiveness, bypassing all other lines.

The Arctic is of great interest to the state of NEA, with economic interests occupying the first place in the list of priorities, namely natural resources, transportation and logistics. In second place are geopolitical aspects closely related to military-strategic issues, and the third - ecology, climate and other research projects, including theoretical studies and practical application of the results.

The interest of the NEA countries in the natural resources of the Arctic is due to at least two reasons: the relative shortage of such resources in the NEA and their abundance in the Arctic. In connection with the increase in the export potential of the countries of Northeast Asia, all greater value also acquire their logistics and transport interests in the Arctic, since the transportation of goods through the Arctic gives a significant gain in distance and time.

A fundamental issue of key importance for Russia's cooperation with the countries of Northeast Asia in the Arctic region is the status of the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route. For the NEA countries, the preferred concept of "internationalization", promoted by the US representatives, consists in proclaiming the Arctic a "wealth of mankind", which should be used and preserved by joint efforts, and the Northern Sea Route as an international transport route free for navigation. At the same time, representatives of the NEA states prefer not to insist on the internationalization of the Northern Sea Route, trying to achieve participation in its development together with Russia. At the same time, however, representatives of the PRC intend to obtain from the Russian Federation that China, as a "strategic partner", be given special rights to work on the Northern Sea Route. In this regard, it is likely that Russia will have to make a difficult choice between cooperation with China as a key strategic partner and protecting its national interests in the Arctic. It is worth noting, however, that the development of cooperation with other countries of Northeast Asia may well contribute to curbing the aspirations of the PRC - South Korea and Japan.

Beijing's Arctic Interests

China began to deal with the problems of the Arctic region in the mid-1980s. Then the main were environmental and research areas. However, since 2008, the first attempts to form a centralized Arctic strategy have been noted, and a systematic study of the Arctic direction has begun in the academic environment. Already since 2009, in Chinese studies, one can notice a transition from studying natural and climatic problems to assessing the commercial, political and military consequences of the development of the Arctic and the impact of these processes on the state.

The main reason for the increased Chinese interest in the Arctic is definitely economic. First of all, this is due to the interest of the PRC in the rich natural resources of the region. The state, with its rapid industrial growth, has become dependent on energy imports, most of which come from the unstable Middle East. That is why China is interested in diversifying energy sources. The PRC is pursuing an active policy aimed at ensuring uninterrupted supplies of energy resources for the national economy. In this regard, Chinese scientists write that "participation in the development the richest reserves natural resources of the Arctic will help maintain China's energy security and is our strategic choice." The development of Arctic energy resources is of strategic importance for China. Since most of the natural resources of interest are located on the territory of Russia, the strengthening of Sino-Russian energy cooperation in the Arctic will provide an “energy boost” for China, reduce economic risks, contribute to the strategic adjustment of the country's energy structure and ensure energy security. Therefore, "joint participation in the development can become the basis for the development of bilateral energy cooperation in the Arctic."

The PRC is an export power, and its economic interests are connected with the delivery of goods to Europe and North America. An additional factor pushing China to reduce its spending on transporting goods is the prospect of rising costs work force in the country, and, as a consequence, the value of exported goods. The main thing that Beijing is paying attention to is on the way in the Arctic Ocean: the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. The Chinese believe that the NSR is the most cost-effective way to ship Chinese goods to Europe. In this area, China is also actively cooperating with Russian companies. In November 2010, CNPC entered into a long-term strategic partnership agreement with Russian Sovcomflot, which, in particular, provides for the use of the Northern Sea Route both for delivering transit shipments of hydrocarbons to China and for transporting oil and gas eastward from developing Russian fields.

The strengthening of China's position and the growth of its interests in the Arctic region is perceived ambiguously by the world community and the Arctic states in particular. For example, Denmark believes that China “has its own legitimate economic and scientific interests,” while Canada believes that China, with its position, “threatens the sovereignty” of the Arctic countries. Chinese experts themselves have repeatedly added fuel to the fire with loud statements, calling into question the principles of the Arctic Eight. Suffice it, in particular, to cite the statements of Rear Admiral Yin Zhou that "the Arctic belongs to the whole world, since not a single people has sole power over it", as well as a statement researcher Shanghai Institute of International Studies Cheng Baozhi, arguing that "... it is unimaginable that non-Arctic states remain users of Arctic sea routes and consumers of Arctic energy resources without the possibility of participating in the decision-making process, so that the end of the monopoly of circumpolar powers in Arctic matters becomes an absolute necessity" .

In fact, on the development of resources in the Arctic, China is currently taking a wait-and-see attitude, believing that active actions can cause fear and raise alarmist sentiments in other countries. The main direction, in which work is being carried out quite actively, is the Northern Sea Route. To date, China is practically the only country that has already decided on the need to increase the use of the NSR and plans to transport up to 20 percent of its foreign trade cargo via the Northern Sea Route by 2025. At the same time, the Chinese policy is based on the thesis that Russia does not and cannot have a monopoly on this route, since, according to the norms of international law, the Russian Federation cannot prevent the passage of commercial ships even through its territorial waters, and the special status of the NSR as a zone with a special the regime of passage of ships is interpreted by the Chinese side only as the right of the Russian side to establish a ship insurance regime and offer paid services for providing meteorological information, conducting rescue operations and icebreaking support.

Given that the latter is one of the most significant factors, the Chinese plan not only to provide escort for their ships using their own icebreakers, but also to develop a favorable pricing policy to attract other customers - so that Chinese icebreakers provide escort for ships of other countries along the Northern Sea Route. In particular, the Chinese expect to receive contracts for escorting Norwegian and German vessels. At the same time, Chinese carriers also expect to receive orders for the transportation of goods from ASEAN countries along the NSR.

However, most likely, these actions of the PRC are not dictated by the desire to seize the niche of transportation along the NSR (the Chinese understand that this will be unrealistic and may lead to a political conflict with Moscow), but by the desire to promote the idea of ​​creating a joint company to manage the Northern Sea Route. At the same time, the Chinese will be ready to provide investments in the development of infrastructure throughout the NSR.

This idea is not fully shared by the Japanese and Norwegians, who consider it expedient to create the International Administration of the Northern Sea Route, which will be in charge of all issues related to the use of the NSR, including the transportation of foreign trade goods of the Russian Federation, as well as transportation between Russian regions (for example, sending fish products from the Far East of the Russian Federation to the European part of Russia), which will be absolutely unprofitable for the Russian side, since these transportations are inherently not transit, but internal.