Day of aerial reconnaissance. Artillery reconnaissance. Battery control and artillery reconnaissance. The use of military aviation in offensive combat

For the effective conduct of hostilities, data on the positions of the enemy are extremely important. One of the ways to get such information is artillery reconnaissance, the emblem of which (sight, two guns and a bat) reflects the secrecy and effectiveness of the actions of this type of troops. The actions of such units are extremely important in both offensive and defensive conditions, and there are many reasons for this.

The essence of the process

This type of intelligence is necessary for precise work artillery in combat. Therefore, the scouts are tasked with obtaining and processing information about the enemy himself and the area where he is located.

Information about the main objects of destruction, which include command posts, base camps, as well as nodes of resistance and strongholds that form defensive lines, is important. The positions of fire weapons are not left without attention. We are talking about mortars, combat vehicles, tanks, guns, accumulations of vehicles, columns of armored and automotive vehicles, as well as regular formations and individual groups of infantry.

The command and control and artillery reconnaissance battery can fully operate when a network of observation posts and posts are deployed, where, in order to receive necessary information radar and sound techniques are used. In addition, object detection devices can be used, as well as reconnaissance groups.

As a result, after completing the work described above, which implies artillery reconnaissance, it will become possible to conduct accurate fire, which allows you to destroy obstacles, closures and positions of the enemy as a whole.

The Importance of Intelligence

Cannon fire can only be considered effective if it is fired at specific actual targets on enemy territory. Using this principle, it is possible to significantly slow down enemy troops during an offensive, destroying firing points and nodes of resistance. If the enemy goes on the defensive, then the artillery must accurately work on the firing positions and attacking units of the enemy, which pose the greatest threat.

Artillery reconnaissance means are simply necessary for the implementation of such combat schemes.

When not only targets for firing guns are determined in a short time, but also their activity, nature and significance, then maximum damage will be inflicted on enemy troops.

The structure of artillery reconnaissance

It is worth repeating once again the fact that artillery cannot work normally without AR. And in order for the guns to fire accurately and hit actual targets, various reconnaissance units are used that involve air and ground resources. Here are the types used technical means need special attention. They are divided into the following types:

• optical-electronic reconnaissance;
• radio engineering;
• sound;
• optical;
• radar.

In the case of optical-electronic reconnaissance (this also includes optical), artillery, reconnaissance units, command control vehicles and points that have access to all data from various sources are used. The optical method of obtaining information is focused on opening up all enemy command posts, as well as positions, the position of the front edge, firing points, strong points, areas where manpower and tanks are located. The basis for the successful operation of heavy guns and not only is precisely such artillery reconnaissance. Photographs obtained with the help of optics make it possible to study in detail the location of the enemy and draw up an effective plan of attack or defense.

To conduct sound reconnaissance, special platoons and batteries are used, which use sound measuring systems. The tasks are defined as notching and fixing the coordinates of the positions of the batteries firing, as well as mortars, rocket launchers and field artillery.

Radar reconnaissance is carried out using the appropriate equipment necessary to detect enemy starting (firing) positions and ground moving targets. At the same time, the speed of movement is determined and maintenance of the firing of own artillery is performed.

The platoons are engaged in detecting and fixing the exact coordinates and characteristics of active enemy radar stations. Moreover, the operation of these objects is monitored, target designation and subsequent control of the results of the fire of their own guns.

AR Organization

There are a number of key principles on which the management of artillery reconnaissance is built. They underlie the effective operation of heavy, light and infantry guns.

As a starting point for the process of organizing the work of artillery, the decision of the combined arms commander is determined.

So, the AR management process itself includes the following elements:

• definition of all relevant goals and key tasks of intelligence;
• drawing up a procedure for obtaining the necessary information;
• submission of applications to the headquarters, standing above, and setting tasks for performers;
• the process of withdrawing and deploying intelligence units;
• practical work in preparation;
• monitoring readiness for active action and providing assistance if necessary.

The organization of artillery reconnaissance begins from the moment the main combat mission is brought to the attention of the command.

Goals

Artillery reconnaissance within the framework of certain processes is focused on the performance of various urgent tasks. They look like this:

• On approaching the desired positions, before the procedure for deploying lateral or leading detachments is begun, it is necessary to identify paths along which artillery can easily pass.
• After forward guard units have deployed into battle formation, use intelligence to ensure covert and rapid deployment of guns to those positions that will guarantee maximum fire support for their own troops, minimizing the degree of damage from enemy strikes. To do this, the artillery reconnaissance section must find observation posts that make it possible to determine the location of enemy troops and organize high-quality observation of both the movements of the enemy and the maneuvers of their own units. After that, constant surveillance is established in the reconnaissance positions found and occupied.

• Determination of the most successful positions for their guns and identification of paths that will allow them to carry out the necessary maneuvers with the greatest degree of stealth.
• After completing the work described above, the artillery occupies the previously defined positions. Observation of the enemy troops and their own does not stop.
• The next task is to find additional observation posts that will allow you to identify new parts of the enemy or assess the positions of troops during the battle, coordinating the fire.
• When all the above tasks have been accomplished, artillery reconnaissance continues to look for firing positions, as well as hidden routes leading to them, which may be necessary in case of movement.

Naturally, all actions must be accompanied by constant communication.

Intelligence objects

As mentioned above, AR is focused on collecting data about the enemy. To more effectively search for the necessary information, the military initially set the task of identifying priority objects in the territory occupied by the enemy. These are the following ground targets:

• anti-aircraft and field artillery, as well as tactical controls and;
• fortification objects of the terrain, barriers and structures;
• anti-aircraft, rocket and mortar platoons, as well as specific batteries;
• separate fire weapons and companies of motorized infantry, tank and other troops;
• helicopters, for the location of which forward landing sites were chosen;
• points intended for the control of weapons, brigades, battalions and other units equal to them;
• separate landing craft, ships and transport vessels.

Artillery reconnaissance is opening all these objects. Under the autopsy, one should initially understand the detection, and after the recognition and determination of the coordinates of the key targets of the defeat.

It is also necessary to constantly assess the nature of the AR objects, which may change periodically. It is possible to change the level of detail of the goals.

How is battery reconnaissance conducted?

Within the framework of the AR, the division (battery) plays an active role. And for its use, there is a certain algorithm of actions based on a number of necessary tasks.

First of all, we are talking about the designation of a reconnaissance strip and the definition of an area of ​​special attention within its boundaries. The identification of this sector is carried out in full accordance with the task assigned to the division and the capabilities that the intelligence staff has.

The artillery reconnaissance battery uses the area of ​​special attention mentioned above to concentrate resources and efforts in those places where important targets are likely to be located. The size of such a sector may be limited by the capabilities of the units.

As for reconnaissance targets, efforts to determine them are most relevant when conducting combat in urban conditions or when it is necessary to organize a breakthrough in a fortified area. Work with specific objects is also relevant in the case of preparing an offensive, the main goal of which is to quickly obtain information about carefully camouflaged enemy installations and specific guns located in them.

The direction of reconnaissance is necessary in cases where there is a meeting engagement, a retreating enemy is being pursued, or an offensive is developing in the depths of the enemy defense.

How is AR conducted on the offensive?

With such actions, the main resources are concentrated in the direction corresponding to the main blow and the breakthrough areas determined in advance, as well as their flanks.

In this case, the control and artillery reconnaissance battery sets the task for the subunits to identify the following elements:

• coordinates precision weapons, means of nuclear attack and areas of their location;
• the grouping and composition of the enemy on the flanks and in his own zone, if possible, the strategy of the enemy's actions is determined;
• the nature of water barriers in the direction of movement of own troops within the framework of the offensive and the passability of the terrain as a whole;
• coordinates of control points for weapons, troops and electronic means;
• the outlines of the front line, the location of fire weapons, the features of anti-tank equipment, the engineering equipment of the area, as well as the system of obstacles and fire;
• landing pads army aviation and home airfields.

When organizing an offensive and supporting it with artillery resources, all commanders must personally observe the results of the fire of guns (heavy, medium, infantry), the actions and position of units of their own troops, especially those that fire at objects under fire from the battery.

During an offensive, the basic resources available to the artillery reconnaissance platoon are used to perform the following tasks:

• at the right time, the advancement and deployment of reserves for counterattacks, as well as second echelons;
• artillery reconnaissance also identifies new targets that have retained combat capability, among which anti-tank weapons, mortar and artillery batteries are the highest priority.

As for the movement of AR assets under offensive conditions, it is carried out in such a way that close interaction with military units and the firing process itself remained uninterrupted.

Defense reconnaissance

When the troops have to defend themselves, artillery reconnaissance subunits primarily obtain information about those enemy targets that are on the outskirts. The same algorithm is used in the case of introducing the enemy into the defense and repelling his attack.

In such circumstances, the main resources of the AR are directed to the opening the following items enemy troops:

• control points;
• mortar and artillery platoons;
• radio electronic means;
• motorized infantry subunits and tank columns located on the routes of advance, the lines of deployment and the subsequent transition to the attack.

When the enemy takes active actions, the AR determines the coordinates of the advanced enemy objects, especially heavy equipment. Servicing is also carried out for the firing of guns at targets previously detected.

If the enemy advances, then the artillery reconnaissance stations, after the permission of the commander, are withdrawn to positions that were previously prepared. Such actions are also carried out in the case of the introduction of enemy forces into the defense.

When artillery supports its own defenders, it first clarifies the actual tasks, and then concentrates the efforts of all units of the AR on the following goals:

• detection of enemy radar facilities and control points;
• fixing the approach of reserves to the wedged area;
• determination of the fact of withdrawal of enemy artillery to new positions;
• obtaining information about the direction of the enemy's attack and the coordinates of the objects that managed to penetrate.

If counterattacking actions are performed, then the priority for the AP is to open those objects that need to be neutralized in the first place. Otherwise, the algorithm of reconnaissance actions during a counterattack remains the same as during an offensive.

Unmasking signs

Artillery reconnaissance, whose emblem has long earned respect, uses a number of proven methods to identify active guns and mortars as well. Artillery firing is detected by the following features:

• dust that rises within the firing position after the completion of the shot (provided that the ground is dry);
• the sound of shots and glitter;
• smoke rising after a shot from a hidden gun, taking the form of translucent clubs and rings.

If the observation is carried out at night, then it is possible to determine enemy positions by a short flash, which is the result of the release of flame from guns that do not have a flash suppressor installed. As for the sound, a shot is heard at a distance of 15 km, moving artillery makes itself felt 2 km or 3 km away (highway).

As for the detection of mortars, this is not an easy task. The bottom line is that they do not have pronounced unmasking signs and are installed in trenches, hollows, large craters and other places that are difficult to see. To open such positions, observation of smoke after firing, short flashes and sound is used.

Results

It is obvious that artillery reconnaissance largely ensures the effective destruction of enemy positions with the help of heavy and medium-sized guns. The chevron of this type of troops is associated with accuracy, quick completion of tasks and high professionalism. This is not surprising, because in a real battle, the intelligence obtained by such units allows you to quickly neutralize the enemy and protect your own positions.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, one of the types of military intelligence. Conducted by parts of reconnaissance. aviation, reconnaissance aviation divisions. formations, all crews performing combat missions, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (airplanes, automatic balloons, etc.) in order to obtain data on the project (objects, forces and means, terrain, etc.) necessary for successful conduct military operations with all types of weapons. forces and branches of the military. They fly first. devices (LA), to-ryo in con. 50s 19th century were used for conducting aerostats, there were balloons. In the beginning. 20th century for V. r. airplanes began to be widely used.

In Russia 1st experience B. R. received from aircraft during the maneuvers of the St. Petersburg, Warsaw and Kyiv military. districts in 1911. In 1912-13, in the 1st Balkan War, Rus. aviation a detachment under the command of Captain Shchetinin, acting on the side of Bulgaria, performed the tasks of V. p. with photographing fortifications and field structures.

As independent, type of intelligence (see. Military intelligence) V. p. took shape during World War I. During the years of the Great Fatherland, the war, 12% of the sorties of owls. aviation committed for the purpose of V. p. With the increase in the scope of the military. actions V.'s intensity of river. increased. In 1941, the number of sorties on the Eastern river. was 9.2%, in 1944 it increased to 15%. V. r. not only obtained data on the pr-ke, but supplemented and documented the data of other types of intelligence.

In a rapidly changing environment. R. often was a unity, a means of obtaining data on the pr-ke for combined arms and aviation. command. For example, in the winter of 1942/43, only V. p. was able to timely open the transfer from the North. Caucasus 2 German. -fash. tank divisions in the Kotelnikovo district to unblock the troops surrounded near Stalingrad. In preparation for the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945, V. p. found for the river Wisla 7 prepared. will defend, lanes of pr-ka, echeloned to a depth of 500 km, and 6 anti-tank ditches.

In armed the forces of most countries osn. V.'s means of river. are manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. They are able to quickly reach reconnaissance targets located at a considerable distance, scan vast areas in a short time, and obtain reliable reconnaissance. data on the pr-ke and promptly deliver them to the command (including by transfer from the aircraft). In order to ensure the most complete and timely provision of military operations, V. p. must constantly interact with other types of intelligence.

AT . R. subdivided into strategic, operational and tactical. Strategic V. p. conducted in order to provide the high command with the necessary reconnaissance. data on the strategist, the objects of the pr-ka, located in his deep rear. Operational V. r. carried out in the interests of the command of associations (formations) of types of weapons. forces and branches of the armed forces in order to obtain reconnaissance. data necessary for the preparation and conduct of front-line and army operations, as well as operations conducted by fleets and air forces.

Tact. V. r. conducted in the interests of the command of formations and units of types of weapons. forces and branches of the armed forces in order to provide them with reconnaissance. data necessary for the organization and conduct of combat. Main effort tact. V. r. focus on objects located on the battlefield and in time, depth.

Main . ways of conducting V. r. are: visual observation, aerial photographic reconnaissance and reconnaissance using electronic means. Choice of a way of conducting V. of river. depends on the task being performed, the type of aircraft and its reconnaissance. equipment, countermeasures pr-ka, time of day and meteorological. conditions. Visual observation is carried out by neo-weapons. eye or with the help of optical. appliances.

It allows you to quickly explore large districts, obtain general data on the grouping and actions of the pr-ka, on objects, terrain and weather, immediately summarize and transmit the intelligence obtained. data from the aircraft to the command. Aerial reconnaissance is carried out using day and night aerial cameras (planned, perspective, panoramic). It provides the most complete, reliable and accurate data on the troops of the pr-ka, objects and terrain. V. r. with the help of electronic means is divided into radio, radio engineering, radar. and television.

For radio reconnaissance, aircraft radio receivers are used, which make it possible to reveal the content of the radio broadcasts of the pr-ka, determine the composition and location of its forces, and obtain data on their activities and intentions. At radio engineering. reconnaissance uses reception and direction finding. devices that allow you to determine the main. tech. operating parameters of radar and radio telecontrol equipment, as well as their location.

It can be carried out in any meteorological conditions day and night. radar reconnaissance is carried out using aircraft radars, which allow you to detect objects that are contrasting in radar. relation, receive photographs of the radar. images of objects and terrain, open the activities of the pr-ka by radar. disguise. TV. reconnaissance is carried out with the help of televisions. systems incorporating an aircraft transmitting and ground receiving station, which allow you to observe the objects and actions of the troops of the project and its troops.

In a number of countries, thermal, laser, and other reconnaissance devices are also being introduced. funds. Intelligence. data obtained by V. r. come in the form of reports by radio from the aircraft, information from the automatic. onboard reconnaissance. equipment, as well as processed documentary data about the objects of the project (decrypted photographs and aerial films, photographs of the screens of indicators of aircraft radars), in the form of oral and written reports of the crews after the landing of the aircraft.

Literature:
Avdeev A.I. Organization and planning of air reconnaissance.

M., 1943; Air reconnaissance of railways. M., 1963; Karpovich N. K., Solovyov E. I., R o d e s t-in and N. II. aerial reconnaissance service. M. ~ L., 1940; Lazarev B. A., Sizov A. II.

Photographic means of aerial reconnaissance. Part 1

Riga, 1973; Makovsky V.P. Systems for processing and transmitting intelligence information. Part 1. Riga, 1973; Sokolov A.N. Reconnaissance aviation.

M., 1939; Sokolov A . N. Tactics of reconnaissance aviation. M. - L., 1933; H o v i k o v A., Yun u-s o v T. Visual search for ground targets at dusk. - "Aviation and Cosmonautics", 1965, No. 12; Scout over the battlefield. - "Aviation and Cosmonautics", 1965, No. 9. M. M. Danilevsky.

• AVIATION GROUP- AVIATION GROUP, forces and means of aviation. parts, connections or operators. formations located at airfields (ships) and intended for joint combat operations with formations
• AVIATION SUPPORT- AVIATION SUPPORT, aviation combat operations performed in the interests of formations (formations) of ground forces in an operation, as well as a landed sea. (air) landing. A. p., which is an integral part ...
• AVIATION INTELLIGENCE- AVIATION INTELLIGENCE, see Air reconnaissance.
• AIR SQUADRON- AVIATION SQUADRON (ae), the main aviation. unit designed to solve tactical problems. A separate AE is aviation. part. Ae performs his tasks independently or as part of a team...
• AVIATION BODY- AVIATION CORPS (ak), higher tactical or operational aviation. connection of the Air Force, designed to solve the opera-rat. (operational-strategic) tasks independently and as part of aviation. associations...
• AIRCRAFT STRIKE- AIRCRAFT STRIKE, impact from the air on a ground (sea) object of aviation. means of destruction for the purpose of its destruction (suppression). Depending on the composition of the forces involved in the execution of A. at., he ...
• AGENCY INTELLIGENCE- AGENCY INTELLIGENCE, a type of intelligence widely used by capitalist states, to-ry carried out with the help of secret agents. Main the task of A. R. is to obtain information about weapons. forces, military economy...
• ARMY AVIATION- ARMY AVIATION, a type of aviation intended for operations directly in the interests of combined arms formations. In the armies of some countries, it is part of the ground forces and is a branch of the military. AT...
• ARTILLERY INSTRUMENTAL INTELLIGENCE- ARTILLERY INSTRUMENTAL INTELLIGENCE (AIR), an integral part of artillery reconnaissance, intended for reconnaissance and determining the coordinates of objects and targets in the location of the pr-ka, servicing the shooter ...
• ARTILLERY RECONFORMATION- ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE, a type of support for the combat activities of missile troops and artillery. Main the task of A. R. is to obtain and process the data necessary for the preparation of effective fire art and strikes tact, ...

The main goal of the SA is to inflict maximum damage on the given objects and groupings of enemy troops, which pose the greatest danger to our troops. The main purpose of the SHA is the destruction of ground-based small-sized and mobile objects on the battlefield and in tactical depth. The objects of its actions can also be located in the nearest operational depth up to 300 km from the front line.

The main strike targets for attack aircraft will be armored targets at the forefront (tanks, artillery mounts, armored vehicles), motorized infantry, command posts, missile launchers, anti-aircraft weapons, communication facilities, ground elements of high-precision weapons systems.

In carrying out its tasks, the SHA operates from low and extremely low altitudes.

destruction of means of mass destruction;

destruction of enemy reserves;

destruction of command and control equipment

facilitating the landing of their troops

obstruction of enemy maneuvers.

17. Types and methods of conducting aerial reconnaissance

Air reconnaissance, depending on the scale, tasks, and also on whose interests it is carried out, is divided into three types:

strategic;

operational;

tactical.

Strategic aerial reconnaissance is organized by the commanders-in-chief of the services of the Armed Forces or the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the interests of the war as a whole or in the interests of operations carried out by a group of fronts, to the depth of the entire theater of operations. It is carried out by strategic reconnaissance aircraft, aircraft and space reconnaissance equipment.

Operational aerial reconnaissance is organized by the front command, carried out to the depth of front, air and sea operations by front-line reconnaissance aircraft.

Tactical aerial reconnaissance is organized by the army command in the tactical depth of the enemy in the interests of formations of various branches of the armed forces in order to obtain the necessary data for organizing a battle.

For reconnaissance, FA reconnaissance aircraft, as well as tactical unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, are used. In the interests of aviation combat operations, preliminary aerial reconnaissance is carried out (with a lack of data to make a decision on the execution of tasks), additional reconnaissance (to clarify the position of objects, their air defense, radiation situation and weather on the route and in the area of ​​​​combat operations), control (during or after air strike to determine its results).

visual observation;

aerial photography;

aerial reconnaissance with the help of electronic means.

Visual observation: allows you to view large areas, and is indispensable when searching or additional reconnaissance of low-observable nuclear missiles, controls and air defense and other moving objects. Disadvantages: reduced visual observation capabilities with increasing height and speed of reconnaissance aircraft, with an increase in the degree of complexity of objects, as well as the subjectivity of information.

Aerial photography: has advantages in objectivity and documentary, detail and reliability. It makes it possible to capture the most complex objects on photographic film, to obtain fairly complete data on the groupings of enemy troops, its defensive structures, large railway junctions, airfields and positions of rocket launchers, and to identify even the most insignificant changes in such large objects. However, the possibilities of aerial photography depend on the weather and the time of day. Even under simple weather conditions, the quality of the photo image is determined by the state of the atmosphere, while at night photography is possible only with artificial lighting of objects.

Aerial reconnaissance with the help of electronic means: it consists in obtaining information about the enemy with the help of electronic means. It is subdivided into:

radio intelligence,

radio engineering,

radar,

radiothermal (thermal imaging),

thermal (infrared),

laser

television.

Radio reconnaissance - obtaining information about the enemy by radio search, interception of his radio transmissions.

Electronic intelligence (RTR) - obtaining information about the type and purpose of the enemy's operating REM (radar, radio navigation, radio telecontrol). Conducted with the help of special radio stations. Detection of enemy RES, determination of their type and purpose is carried out according to the parameters of the signals emitted by them.

Radar reconnaissance (RLR) - obtaining information about enemy objects (targets), including determining their coordinates or movement parameters using radar stations. Radar detects objects (targets) on the ground, in the air, on the water in any meteorological conditions, day and night, determines the type and intensity of enemy radar interference, detects the epicenters of nuclear explosions.

Aerial thermal reconnaissance is carried out with the help of heat direction finders and allows you to open heat-contrasting objects: military equipment, aircraft at airfields, airfield runways and other objects.

Laser reconnaissance is the detection, recognition and determination of the coordinates of objects (targets) using devices operating on the principle of using laser radiation energy. Laser rangefinders are used for conducting laser reconnaissance.

Television reconnaissance is the acquisition of information about the enemy with the help of television reconnaissance equipment. Television transmitting cameras are installed on aircraft.

Reconnaissance aviation in the performance of combat missions uses the following methods of combat operations:

reconnaissance by single aircraft (pairs);

reconnaissance by simultaneous departure of the entire composition.

Aerial reconnaissance

Perhaps it should be considered natural that in the post-war period, in almost all cases when questions of military aviation, focused on strategic bombers, aircraft carriers, jet fighters, rocket-propelled and unguided missiles, and anti-submarine warfare. Events such as the Korean War of 1953 and the floods in Holland and Great Britain showed the importance of helicopters. The question of transport aircraft came to the fore during the air resupply of Berlin and in the early tense days of the Korean War, when vital supplies had to be airlifted into the small patch of South Korea that was still in the hands of the United Nations troops. But not a single significant work on air force written after the end of the Second World War, no information about reconnaissance aircraft and reconnaissance operations can be found, with the exception of individual remarks.

It is difficult to understand why, between the two world wars, most air fleets reconnaissance aviation began to play a secondary role and why, despite the experience of the Second World War, no changes occurred in this matter. During the first two years of World War I, aircraft and airships were used primarily for surveillance. Their main task was to be the eyes of the army and navy: to detect guns and troop movements on land and enemy ships at sea. Naturally, with the advent of new methods of bombing and conducting air battles, the issues of conducting aerial reconnaissance began to be given correspondingly less attention. But every stage of the Second World War convinces us more and more that good or bad air patrols or reconnaissance must be the main factor in the air, land and sea situation.

Most a prime example development and activities of reconnaissance aircraft showed the air force of Germany. In 1939, at the very beginning of World War II, 20 percent of total, approximately 3750 combat aircraft, were long-range and short-range reconnaissance aircraft, seaplanes and flying boats designed for aerial reconnaissance and patrol. This large percentage of reconnaissance aircraft continued until about 1943, when the deployment of fighter aircraft began on a large scale. In the entire history of military aviation, no other country has devoted such a large proportion of its aviation resources to aerial reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol missions. During the first nine or ten months of the war, German reconnaissance aircraft successfully completed their mission of obtaining information necessary for the effective and economical use of German air power. Seaplanes of the coast guard successfully carried out the tasks of monitoring the coasts of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea. Meteorological and general reconnaissance was carried out daily over the North Sea and Western Europe; these tasks were carried out by qualified crews of Heinkel twin-engine bombers assigned to each major aviation formation. During the campaign in Norway, they were assisted in these tasks by four-engine long-range flying boats and Focke-Wulf-200 aircraft. Aircraft "Henschel" performed important tasks of tactical reconnaissance in the interests of the ground forces operating in Poland, the Scandinavian countries, France and Flanders. They quickly reported accurate information about the movements of enemy troops, making it possible to quickly use dive bombers on the most advantageous targets. Almost every tank division The Germans had a squadron of tactical reconnaissance aircraft "Henschel", which performed the tasks of detecting tanks, as well as a link of "Fieseler" aircraft, which provided communications for interaction in combat areas. Each unit of medium or dive bombers had a well-trained flight of reconnaissance aircraft, which performed special tasks of observation and aerial reconnaissance in the interests of its unit. Never before in the history of aviation has the air force had such first-class aerial reconnaissance, which would be able to ensure the use of a minimum number of bombers with maximum efficiency.

But by the summer of 1940, even this number of German reconnaissance units was not enough. In the Battle of England and during the fighting in the Atlantic, the German reconnaissance aircraft passed the first severe tests and found the first signs of weakness. air force Germany for aerial reconnaissance. During the Battle of England, it soon became clear that 300 Henschel aircraft, which had low speed, should be a good target for Spitfire and Hurricane fighters armed with eight machine guns and exceeding them in speed by almost 160 km / h, so that these machines had to be excluded from active operations, although they were partly used for patrols in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe coast of the Bay of Biscay. The remaining long-range reconnaissance aircraft Dornier, Heinkel and Junkers were also vulnerable to Hurricane and Spitfire fighters when they attempted to conduct reconnaissance missions over land. As a result, the Germans failed to conduct reconnaissance of many airfields and factories, which were important targets for Goering's bomber aircraft. German reconnaissance aircraft failed to obtain reliable information about the results of their raids on airfields, radar installations and factories. During the Battle of England, German naval reconnaissance aircraft also began to experience difficulties in the new Atlantic theatre. During operations against ships, mainly in the North Sea or in ports on east coast England, the German reconnaissance aviation performed the tasks of meteorological reconnaissance, aerial photographic reconnaissance and observation. When the air action spread further to the West and to the Bay of Biscay, the German reconnaissance aviation was not up to its task. From the end of 1940 it became more and more of a secondary role, and its operations became less effective. In the Mediterranean theater of operations, long-range reconnaissance in the interests of the German air force was often carried out by Italian aircraft. The position of German reconnaissance aviation continued to deteriorate on all three main fronts, because the Germans knew that they had the means to carry out only the most minimal tasks. In the West, during the period from January 1941 to September 1944, the Germans could not conduct a single sortie on aerial photographs of London. In the decisive period before the Allied invasion of France, a great deal of information could be obtained about the invasion plans by aerial reconnaissance of the ports of the south coast of England, but British patrol fighters drove off most of the German reconnaissance aircraft, and the aerial photographs they received were of poor quality and provided very little information. In the East, the situation was even worse, since after 1943 reconnaissance aviation units were often involved in bombing missions. Of course, the German troops acting against Soviet army, received little information from air reconnaissance, which made it possible to judge the direction and strength of the strikes of the Soviet troops from the end of 1942. At that time, aviation support for the Suez Canal zone and central region The Mediterranean Sea from the Germans and Italians was also insufficient. The position of the German reconnaissance aviation deteriorated at a time when it was especially necessary to strengthen the reconnaissance activities of the German Air Force. When the enemy is weak, the movements of his troops do not play a big role; but when it is strong, the value of aerial reconnaissance increases.

Air reconnaissance issues have not yet been adequately reflected in modern doctrines of air strategy and air power. Well-organized aerial reconnaissance (or information) is the "first line" of air defense and the first important condition for successful air operations. If guided missiles and bombers are used as means of attack, then first of all it is necessary to know where the enemy is, what his means and strength are. To ensure the protection of ships from attack by submarines, it is necessary to detect them in a timely manner. In order to evaluate the results of bombing during the war, it is necessary to have the latest information about the destruction caused, the dispersal of industry, restoration work and the construction of new factories. Aerial reconnaissance can completely change the outcome of military operations of ground forces. The German offensive in the Ardennes in the winter of 1944/45 began during the period of fogs, as a result of which Allied air reconnaissance was not carried out. Hardly throughout the Pacific theater of operations - from Pearl Harbor to about. Okinawa - there were naval battles in which air reconnaissance would not play an important role.

Yet the value of aerial reconnaissance is always underestimated. During a war it is impossible to economically distribute forces and resources and use them to the maximum without knowledge of the situation. What Clausewitz wrote about the war a hundred years ago is still being studied and has not lost its force: "Many reports received in the war contradict one another; there are even more false reports, and most of them are not very reliable." It is difficult for a non-specialist to understand that the information available to the high command, which serves as the basis for decision-making, is often insufficient and incomplete. Troop commanders can lead combat operations for months without any information about how many planes, ships, tanks or submarines the enemy is producing. True, there are many sources of intelligence information: prisoners of war, documents captured from the enemy, agents and radio interception. But how to find out what information this or that prisoner of war has? Since it is possible to determine in advance which radiograms can be decrypted and what information they contain, it is not always possible to capture enemy documents containing important information. You can rarely rely on the fact that agents will deliver the necessary intelligence in the form required. Aerial photographic reconnaissance is the only source of reliable and up-to-date information of a military nature. Air reconnaissance activities can be planned and controlled. Almost always, aircraft performing aerial reconnaissance missions bring photographs that provide valuable information, since the objects, time and date of photographing are known. Even visual reconnaissance, although influenced by human error, provides the ability to quickly obtain information that can meet operational requirements. Moreover, to know exactly the time and place of receiving intelligence information is already half of being sure of its reliability.

In Soviet military circles, the words "tactical (military) intelligence" (reconnaissance) and "strategic intelligence" (intelligence) are synonymous. Yet the USSR never attached as much importance to tactical intelligence as the Germans did in the period between the two world wars. The Soviet air force has always had (and still has) reconnaissance aviation regiments of 30-40 aircraft, but they were never enough to meet the needs of the army in reconnaissance information. Has anyone ever heard of the existence of an air reconnaissance command in the air forces of the Western powers, equal in position to the bomber and fighter air commands and the coastal aviation command of the British air forces? Position, dignity, and popularity are as important in military life as they are in civil life. It is rare to hear that a pilot or navigator of a reconnaissance aircraft has become a national hero. At the time of the announcement of the Bruneval raid, few had heard of the valuable low-level perspective aerial photographs taken by Air Major Hill. Reconnaissance information obtained from aerial photographs served as the initial data for the raid on Bruneval. Subsequently, he took many aerial photographs of radar stations during flights that required skill, courage and enterprise; but, as was the case with many other reconnaissance pilots who delivered valuable information both during the first and second world wars, his feat was soon forgotten. Apparently, fighter and bomber pilots are considered the aristocrats of the air and the monopoly bearers of the Victoria Cross and the Order of Honor of Congress. This opinion is erroneous, since every pilot or navigator of a reconnaissance aircraft must be a first-class specialist in order to cope with his tasks. With modern radio and radar equipment on bombers and fighters, an average crew can often achieve good results. It is indicative that in the British Air Force the navigator wears only half of the wing on his military uniform and rarely rises to the rank of colonel. Those who fly know how often the navigator is the most important and authoritative member of the aircraft crew. And yet, did at least one navigator, a participant in the First World War, become an air general or an air marshal during the second world war?

A modern air force must consider organizing aerial reconnaissance on an entirely new basis. At the start of World War II, only the German Air Force was able to provide intelligence for bombing operations. In the US Air Force! the lenses of many aerial cameras met only the requirements of cartographic aerial photography in peacetime. In many cases, their size was insufficient to obtain aerial photographs at the scale necessary for detailed interpretation. There were very few trained codebreakers and reconnaissance pilots.

During the Second World War, aerial reconnaissance of all kinds was widely developed, but the war did not give the main strategic lesson that the conduct of multi-purpose air operations of a large scale required the conduct of multi-purpose aerial reconnaissance of an appropriate scale. In modern warfare, the tasks of aerial reconnaissance are very diverse. Coastal aviation conducts reconnaissance on sea lanes, meteorological reconnaissance is carried out over land and sea, radar reconnaissance is carried out in order to detect enemy radar stations, and strategic aviation reconnaissance is carried out in order to determine the results of bombing and obtain reconnaissance data on targets. In addition, there is tactical reconnaissance, which includes the adjustment of artillery fire, the identification of camouflaged objects and targets, and the observation of the movement of enemy troops along highways and railways. During the Second World War, reconnaissance activities for the solution of each of the above tasks hardly lasted several months. During the first two years of the war, there was no aerial survey of the factories of Japan's growing aviation industry in the Pacific theater. The British conducted insufficient meteorological reconnaissance over German territory. From the captured combat logs, it became known that the days considered by the allies from bad weather in important cities like Berlin and Leipzig were in fact clear, sunny days. Winston Churchill wrote of the British air raids on Berlin, which began in November 1943, that: "We had to wait until March 1944 to obtain sufficiently clear aerial photographs necessary to evaluate the results of the bombing. This was partly due to poor meteorological conditions, as well as insufficient number of reconnaissance aircraft "Mosquito" American aircraft, which carried out raids on oil refineries in Romania in 1943 and subsequently did not have aerial reconnaissance data, both during the planning period of operations and during the evaluation of the results of the bombing.Effective air patrols in coastal zones and good radio communications could have thwarted a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.The German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were accidentally spotted from a Spitfire aircraft performing a combat air patrol mission during their breakthrough through the English Channel, and not by reconnaissance aircraft Many examples can be given when, at the decisive stages of the Second World War, the organization of aerial reconnaissance was poorly organized.

The tactical lessons of World War II are well learned. It is now clear that reconnaissance aircraft must be the best and their crews the most qualified. Bombers and fighters intended for reconnaissance should be stripped of weapons and replaced with additional fuel tanks in order to increase their range and flight speed. All the best aircraft of the Second World War: Mosquito, Mustang, Lightning, LaG and Messerschmitt jets were used for aerial reconnaissance. In the post-war period, aircraft such as the Canberra, a twin-engine jet aircraft of the design Tupolev, Saber and other jet fighters, as well as B-36 and B-52 strategic bombers have all been specially adapted for aerial reconnaissance missions.There may also be a version of a heavy bomber, from which, when approaching enemy territory, a supersonic fighter will be released reconnaissance It is quite clear that when photographing aerial great importance has accurate heading, altitude and airspeed - which can be performed by only a few pilots; Also important is the choice of the flight route and the precise time spent over the target. At present, cameras with lenses having focal lengths from 150 to more than 1500 mm are widely used; they provide a large photographic area with large overlap, allowing detailed interpretation of aerial photographs taken from altitudes above 9000 m. All modern air forces use machines that provide fast and efficient interpretation. As soon as the plane lands, the 16- or 35-mm film is quickly delivered to the local mobile interpretation center, where the first stage of processing is carried out within several hours: development, washing, drying, printing and initial interpretation. Using these images, you can quickly estimate the damage caused by the bombing, or calculate the approximate number of vehicles, trains and troops on the move. In order to make maximum use of the aerial photographs obtained after the first processing for operational purposes, it is necessary to have a good file of intelligence information and military maps of the latest editions. In itself, information about the number of ships in the port, aircraft at the airfield or trains at the marshalling yard is of dubious value. It is necessary to know for what purpose certain funds are concentrated. This position can be illustrated by one example from the Second World War. At an airfield in central Norway, photographic reconnaissance discovered a large number of four-engine bombers designed to fight ships. This indicated that the Germans were preparing an attack on ships located off the coast of Scotland or Ireland. The ships were in turmoil. The decision was made to take them to safe place or take other measures. In fact, it turned out that the concentration of a large number of aircraft at one airfield was caused by bad weather around air bases in southwestern France and southwestern Norway, as well as due to the lack of spare parts at bases in central Norway, which caused the failure of several aircraft. It is very often not taken into account that the aircraft photographed at the airfield may turn out to be out of order. A lot of information can be gleaned from each image, but in order to accept this information as facts, it must be supplemented with other data.

At the second and third stages of interpretation of aerial photographs, a more thorough study of them is carried out. The use of a stereoscope increases the accuracy of interpretation. The vague shadows on the hills and in the valleys become clear. Viewing aerial photographs through a stereoscope helps to identify parked aircraft, recognize camouflaged bridges and buildings by determining the difference in the height of an object compared to surrounding objects. The stereoscope allows you to see the relief of an object by its shadow, which is often the last key to recognizing objects when deciphering. By studying the details of aerial photographs, a large amount of reconnaissance data can be obtained, for example, comparative data on the development of a network of radar stations and anti-aircraft artillery firing positions, information on the construction and expansion of airfields with a significant lengthening of runways. With the help of data obtained by aerial photographic reconnaissance, the preparation of the Axis countries for the failed landing was revealed airborne assault on about. Malta with about. Sicily, where airfields and runways were specially built for this purpose. It was with the help of aerial photographic reconnaissance that it was discovered that the Germans were developing new weapons in Peenemünde, which in the future could play a decisive role in the war. The role of aerial reconnaissance of strategic targets cannot be overestimated. Accurate and reliable basic intelligence data can be obtained from other intelligence sources. But only aerial reconnaissance can provide reliable information about the best flight route to the target, given the air defense in the area, enemy camouflage, and important target areas that have recently undergone reconstruction or restoration.

However, one important question aerial photography is often misunderstood. At the present time, it is still argued that, using aerial photographs, it is possible to determine how long a particular object has been disabled. During the Second World War, based on aerial photographs, the following conclusions were made: "It is assumed that the production capacity of the facility has decreased by 50 percent for a period of two to three months." No one can calculate the percentage of destruction based on aerial photographs with such accuracy. The pace of restoration work depends on many factors: the morale of the population, the sequence of work, the supply of electricity, the availability of labor and raw materials. In 1944, the assessment of the destruction of the German aircraft industry, based on aerial photographs, was optimistic because the enemy dispersed industrial enterprises and used production facilities in unknown factories. Estimation of the destruction of the Japanese aircraft industry in 1944-1945 was often pessimistic, as the pace of reconstruction in Japan was slow, and the reassessment of the destruction of German factories in 1944 is probably only too well remembered.

One of the sad lessons of the air war in Korea is that the experience of conducting aerial reconnaissance during the second world war was confused. First, there was a great shortage of qualified codebreakers. The work of deciphering aerial photographs requires a lot of preparation and skill. Many good codebreakers lost their skills while working in civilian institutions. In 1950, the US Air Force had only two air reconnaissance squadrons in Japan and Korea, one of which was engaged in mapping. The second squadron could not be used effectively, as it suffered greatly from a lack of materiel and personnel. When these squadrons began their missions, the tactical lessons of the forties had already been forgotten. They received too many impracticable requests for large-scale aerial photographs that had to be taken from low altitudes and at high speed. There were various bodies which, despite limited resources, used aerial reconnaissance facilities to meet their own needs; it happened that on the same day, according to applications various organizations reconnaissance flights were made twice along the same route. Worst of all, there were no decryption specialists. But these difficulties of the initial period were soon overcome. By the beginning of 1952, mobile photo labs were organized, equipped with vans, trailers with power plants and water tanks. There were vans for printing pictures and developing photographic films, workshops for the repair of photographic equipment, a film library - that is, everything necessary for processing aerial photographs in the field. The number of equipment, personnel and aircraft gradually increased. Applications for aerial reconnaissance were coordinated in the US Air Force Intelligence Directorate for Far East, and the operations of the United Nations troops in Korea have become more economical and expedient.

Of the lessons of aerial reconnaissance during the Second World War, one lesson, perhaps, remained unlearned - this is the inadmissibility of underestimating the use of seaplanes and flying boats. During the war, American Catalina flying boats, British Sunderland, Soviet MPs, and German seaplanes and Heinkel and Dornier flying boats carried out coastal and meteorological reconnaissance, carried out anti-submarine patrols and performed other tasks in the interests of naval forces. forces. But after the war, seaplanes and flying boats fell out of fashion in the air forces of the Western powers, although a few such squadrons remained in the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the Communists in Korea had a small bomber force; if the few airfields that the United Nations air force had at the initial period of the Korean War had been attacked even lightly from the air, their aircraft would have had to operate from air bases in Japan, having lost great advantages. In many cases, only seaplanes and flying boats, dispersed at anchorages in case of air attack, can provide important information about enemy movements and changing meteorological conditions. The Germans valued flying boats and seaplanes in 1940 during the campaign in Norway, when there were few airfields at their disposal and meteorological and other information was necessary for the rapid success of the campaign. Undoubtedly, conditions similar to those in the Pacific theater may occur in the future, in which flying boats will play an important role. Flying boats are a convenient and economical means of passenger transportation on civil airlines; they are capable of carrying a large payload and can be quickly adapted for military purposes. Flying boats are more valuable than many people think.

The need for global weather forecasts is now greater than ever before, but the role of aerial reconnaissance in this regard is difficult to define. Should it become necessary to move air squadrons across large waters at speeds in excess of 1,100 km/h, as was the case in early 1954, the meteorological service must provide a worldwide weather forecast. At present, thousands of ground and sea meteorological stations have been established in all countries, delivering basic weather data. There are countless previously collected data on weather conditions and climate that can help establish the relationship between current local meteorological data and possible long-term weather trends. Electronic equipment is increasingly being used to predict the weather. VHF radios are used to warn of an approaching storm that poses a danger to aircraft flight. With the help of radar stations determine the nature of the winds in the upper atmosphere. It would be impractical to employ a large number of weather reconnaissance aircraft when these aircraft are needed to carry out more important tasks. It would be more expedient to increase the number of terrestrial mobile weather stations and weather reconnaissance ships at sea, improve meteorological instruments and provide reliable communication with central authorities summarizing information about the state of the weather.

Of course, there is still a need to use a certain number of aircraft for meteorological reconnaissance, especially with the increasing range of all types of aircraft, when bombers during the flight to the target may encounter a variety of meteorological conditions. It is difficult to foresee the full range of operational requirements in the field of meteorological reconnaissance, as well as in the field of military reconnaissance. As opportunities to use expensive atomic weapons for close air support, tactical military intelligence is becoming more and more important. Nuclear weapons should not be allowed to be spent on secondary purposes. In the era of atomic shells and tactical atomic bombs, which can be used from fighter-bombers, timely and reliable information is extremely important. Expensive tactical guided missiles also cannot be used against small targets. If ground forces operate in Africa, South America, Asia and the Middle East, where many areas have not yet been mapped, then the need for aerial photography will be significant. This is evidenced by the experience of military operations in Malaya. The available maps of Malaya proved useless for military purposes. It was necessary to draw up new military maps, for which it was necessary to make aerial photographs of an area of ​​​​more than 10 thousand square meters. km. Most of This work was carried out with the help of helicopters. These machines also proved to be extremely valuable for aerial reconnaissance during the Korean War. But the territories of Korea and Malaya cannot be compared, for example, with the vast expanses of Asia, where there are also no modern large-scale military maps and the compilation of which will require colossal efforts of aerial reconnaissance. It is safe to say that any conflict in the future, during which aerial reconnaissance will be required, will almost certainly cover the whole world. The number of reconnaissance aircraft will be very limited. What can be done in a relatively calm peacetime environment in order to prepare for war as much as possible, with limited resources? The first and most important condition is the conduct of general training of the personnel of the armed forces in visual observation. Part of the time spent on physical training and lectures on current issues is useful for studying meteorology, camouflage, aerial surveillance techniques, geography, terrain features - that is, all issues that develop theoretical and practical skills in the personnel of all branches of the armed forces for conducting reconnaissance. Activities such as showing special documentaries to all personnel, post-flight checks to see if they have been awarded a special observer badge, which entitles them to a pay allowance, will increase general level reconnaissance training. All bomber fighter and transport units of the Air Force must have more pilots specially trained for reconnaissance missions. If the initial training of observers is organized on a large scale in the armed forces, then it will not be difficult to create reconnaissance detachments in combat air units and equip them with personnel. In addition, conditions must be created for more flexible switching of aircraft to aerial reconnaissance. Why not, for example, use an entire aviation wing of bombers and fighters to survey an entire area and thus obtain visual reconnaissance data on this area. But all too often only two or three aircraft are allocated for aerial reconnaissance. Just as a good boxer saves his signature punch until he knows his opponent's strengths and weaknesses, successful offensive operations in the air require detailed knowledge of the enemy's territory, and it is often advisable to delay the start of operations until necessary. information will not be received. Saving manpower and resources for aerial reconnaissance only leads to a waste of resources in bombardment.

If the vast areas covered by modern warfare necessitate aerial reconnaissance on a large scale, then they also require special attention to communications and centralized control. In the USA, Great Britain and the USSR, central intelligence directorates have been created, but they mainly carry out the tasks of strategic intelligence. It is necessary to organize a unified intelligence service of the armed forces, which would include a unit of photo decoders who process all intelligence materials coming through all channels: this department should include both military and civilian specialists. Of course, in this department there should be specialized units: technical, scientific, industrial, etc., but these units should be general, without any preference for one of the branches of the armed forces. Intelligence information is valuable to all branches of the armed forces: intelligence on the state of the weather, radar stations, enemy ships and almost all other information is rarely of interest only to any one branch of the armed forces.

Similarly, air reconnaissance units and additionally created observer reconnaissance units should also serve all armed forces, and not just air forces. Aerial reconnaissance, as well as strategic bombing, must be carried out in accordance with state military policy, determined by the ministries of defense and the joint chiefs of staff. The control of Soviet long-range bomber aviation during the Second World War was carried out by the State Defense Committee, and reconnaissance aviation units were dispersed, being at the disposal of the commanders of the ground army and navy. The Anglo-American strategic bomber force was temporarily under the control of the joint chiefs of staff, but it never won the air reconnaissance subordination, which was often the eyes of the strategic bomber force and the evaluator of the results of its actions. Of course, at the present time tendencies are intensifying towards the unification of the branches of the armed forces. Joint intelligence directorates and joint committees have already been organized, and many staff documents are being jointly developed. It's time to cancel various forms clothes certain types armed forces and to draw up detailed plans for the closest possible unification of the army, navy and air force at all levels where possible. However, this is a big independent question, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter IX. Chapter 3. Reconnaissance Reconnaissance in the mountains is more difficult than in the flat terrain. Mountainous, rugged terrain, the presence of mountain spurs and ridges, gorges and valleys between them contribute to the secrecy of the enemy's movements and the location of his units. In addition, folds