The weapon that started World War I. Field artillery before the First World War Service and combat use

21.09.2019

As you know, the First World War was one of the largest and bloodiest in the entire First World War, it was very diverse. Almost all were used in combat existing species weapons, including new ones.

Aviation

Aviation was widely used - at first it was used for reconnaissance, and then it was used to bombard the army at the front and in the rear, as well as to attack civilian villages and cities. For raids on the cities of England and France, in particular Paris, Germany used airships (often used weapons of the First World War, they were also called "zeppelins" - in honor of the designer F. Zeppelin).

Heavy artillery

The British in 1916 for the first time began to use not a large number of armored vehicles (i.e. tanks) at the front. By the end of the war, they were already doing a lot of damage. The army from France was armed with a tank called the Renault FT-17, which was used to support the infantry. Armored cars (armored vehicles equipped with machine guns or cannons) were also used in those years. During the First World War, as you know, almost all powers were armed with artillery for combat operations (close combat) easel machine guns. The Russian army had at its disposal 2 models of such machine guns (modifications of the system of H.S. Maxim, an American designer) and during the war years the number of light machine guns used (another common weapon of the First World War) increased significantly.

Chemical weapon

Back in January 1915, chemical weapons were used for the first time on the Russian front. In pursuit of success, the participants in the hostilities did not stop at the violation of customs and laws - the First World War was so unprincipled. Chemical weapon was used on the Western Front in April 1915 by the German command (poison gases) - a new tool mass extermination. Chlorine gas was released from the cylinders. Heavy greenish-yellow clouds, creeping along the very ground, rushed towards the Anglo-French troops. Those who were in the infection radius began to suffocate. As a countermeasure, about 200 chemical plants were rapidly created in Russia. world war required modernization. To ensure the success of operations, artillery was used - simultaneously with the release of gases, artillery fire was opened. Photos of weapons of the First World War can be seen in our article.

Soon after both sides began using poison gases at the front, the famous Russian academician and chemist N.D. Zelinsky invented a coal gas mask that saved the lives of many thousands of people.

Navy weapons

The war, in addition to land, was also fought on the seas. In March 1915, the whole world learned the terrible news: a submarine from Germany sank the huge passenger ship Lusitania. More than a thousand civilian passengers died. And in 1917, the so-called unlimited submarine war German submarines. The Germans openly declared their intention to sink not only the ships of opponents, but also neutral countries in order to deprive England of access to allies and colonies, thereby leaving her without bread and industrial raw materials. German submarines many hundreds of passenger and merchant ships of England and neutral countries were sunk.

Automobile transport

It should be noted that the Russian army at that time was poorly provided for. In total, at the beginning of hostilities there were 679 vehicles. By 1916, the army already had 5.3 thousand cars, and this year another 6.8 thousand were produced, because this was required by the First World War. Weapons and troops needed to be transported. These are quite impressive figures, however, for example, the French army, which was twice as small in size, had 90,000 vehicles by the end of the war.

Small arms of the First World War

Officer's pistol "Parabellum", 1908 The capacity of the magazine "Parabellum" according to the standard was 8 rounds. For the needs of the fleet, it was lengthened to 200 mm, and the naval version of the weapon also had a fixed sight. "Parabellum" was the main regular officer's sample. All Kaiser officers were armed with this weapon.
"Mauser" - a pistol of horse rangers. The magazine capacity was 10 rounds and the weight was 1.2 kg. The maximum range of the shot was 2000 m.
Pistol officer "Mauser" (application - World War I). The weapon was a small pocket type. Advantages - good accuracy of fire.
Soldier's pistol "Dreyse" (1912). Barrel length - 126 mm, weight - 1050 g without cartridges, drum capacity - 8, caliber - 9 mm. This weapon was quite heavy and complex, but powerful enough to provide the soldiers with the necessary self-defense in hand-to-hand trench combat.
Self-loading (1908) The caliber of this weapon is 7 mm, the weight is 4.1 kg, the magazine capacity was 10 rounds, and effective range- 2000 m. It was the first self-loading rifle in history used in battles. Oddly enough, the weapon was developed in Mexico, and the level of technical capabilities in this country was extremely low. The main disadvantage is the extreme sensitivity to pollution.
9 mm MP-18 submachine gun (1918). The magazine capacity was 32 cartridges, caliber - 9 mm, weight without cartridges - 4.18 kg, with cartridges - 5.3 kg, automatic fire only. This weapon was designed to increase the firepower of the infantry, to wage war in new conditions. It gave delays in firing and was sensitive to pollution, but showed greater combat effectiveness and fire density.

German artillery in the First World War.

As already noted, it was large-caliber artillery and the well-organized MANAGEMENT and ORGANIZATION of its shooting that became a kind of "magic wand" of the German army during the First World War.
A particularly important role German artillery large calibers played on the Eastern Front, against the Russian army. The Germans drew the right conclusions from the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, realizing WHAT is the strongest psychological impact the combat capability of the enemy is affected by intensive shelling of his positions with fire heavy artillery.

Siege artillery.

The command of the Russian army knew that Germany and Austria-Hungary had powerful and numerous heavy artillery. Here is what our general E.I. wrote about this later. Badgers:

“... according to information received in 1913 from military agents and from other sources, in Germany and Austria-Hungary, artillery was armed with very powerful heavy siege-type guns.

The German 21-cm steel mortar was adopted by heavy field artillery and was intended to destroy strong fortifications, it worked well on earthen closures, on brick and even on concrete vaults, but if several shells hit one place, it was also intended to poison the enemy picric gases of the explosive charge of a projectile with an impressive weight of 119 kg.
The German 28-cm (11-inch) mortar was wheeled, transported by two cars, fired without a platform with a powerful projectile weighing 340 kg; the mortar was intended for the destruction of concrete vaulted and the latest armored buildings.
There was information that mortars with a caliber of 32-cm, 34.5-cm and 42-cm (16.5-dm) were also tested in the German army, but Artkom did not know detailed data on the properties of these guns.
In Austria-Hungary, a powerful 30.5-cm howitzer was introduced in 1913, transported on three vehicles (on one - a gun, on the other - a gun carriage, on the third - a platform). The projectile of this mortar (howitzer) weighing 390 kg had a strong bursting charge of 30 kg. The mortar was intended to arm the advanced echelon of the siege park, following directly behind field army to support it in a timely manner when attacking heavily fortified positions. The firing range of a 30.5-cm mortar is, according to some sources, about 7 1/2 km, according to others - up to 9 1/2 km (according to the latest data - up to 11 km).
The Austrian 24-cm mortar was transported, like the 30.5-cm, on road trains ... "
The Germans conducted a thorough analysis of the combat use of their powerful siege weapons and, if necessary, upgraded them.
"Main strike force German fire hammer were the notorious "Big Berts". These mortars with a caliber of 420 mm and a weight of 42.6 tons, produced in 1909, were one of the largest siege weapons at the beginning of the war. The length of their barrel was 12 calibers, the firing range was 14 km, the mass of the projectile was 900 kg. The best designers of Krupp sought to combine the impressive dimensions of the guns with their rather high mobility, which allowed the Germans to transfer them, if necessary, to different sectors of the front.
Due to the enormous gravity of the system, transportation was carried out along railway wide gauge to the very position, installation and bringing into position for battle required a lot of time, up to 36 hours. In order to facilitate and achieve faster readiness for combat, a different design of the gun was developed (42-cm mortar L-12 "); the length of the gun of the second design was 16 calibers, the reach did not exceed 9,300 m, i.e., it was reduced by almost 5 km ".

All these powerful guns, by the beginning of the First World War, had already been put into service and entered the enemy troops Russian Empire. We didn't have anything like it.

Russian industry did not produce guns with a caliber of 42 cm (16.5 dm) at all (and was never able to do this during all the years of the world war). Guns of caliber 12 dm were produced in extremely limited quantities on orders from the naval department. We had quite numerous fortress guns with a caliber of 9 to 12 dm, but they were all inactive, requiring special machine tools and conditions for firing. For shooting in the field, most of them were unsuitable.
“In the Russian fortresses there were about 1,200 obsolete guns that came there from the disbanded siege artillery regiments. These guns are 42-lin. (107-mm) gun mod. 1877, 6-dm. (152 mm) guns of 120 and 190 pounds. also arr. 1877, 6-dm. (152-mm) guns in 200 pounds. arr. 1904, like some other guns of fortress artillery, for example, 11-dm. (280-mm) coastal mortars arr. 1877 - served during the war, due to the lack of guns of the latest models, in heavy field and siege artillery, ”said General E.I. Barsukov.
Of course, most of these guns by 1914 were outdated both morally and physically. When they tried (under the influence of the example of the German army) to use in the field, it turned out that neither the gunners nor the guns themselves were completely unprepared for this. It even came to refusals to use these guns at the front. Here is what E.I. Barsukov about this:
“Cases of refusal from field heavy batteries armed with 152-mm cannons 120 pounds. and 107-mm guns of 1877, have been repeatedly. So, for example, the chief Western Front asked the commander (in April 1916) not to transfer the 12th field heavy artillery brigade to the front, since 152-mm guns weighed 120 pounds. and 107-mm cannons of 1877, with which this brigade was armed, “have limited shelling and a hard-to-replenish supply of shells, and 152-mm cannons are 120 pounds. generally unsuitable for offensive operations”

Coastal 11-dm. (280-mm) mortars were meant to be allocated with personnel for the siege of enemy fortresses ...
For the purpose of using 11-dm. coastal mortars arr. In 1877, as a siege member of the GAU Art Committee, Durlyakhov developed a special device in the carriage of this mortar (11-inch coastal mortars with carriages converted according to the Durlyakhov project were used during the second siege of Przemysl).

According to the armament table of Russian fortresses, it was supposed to have 4,998 serfs and coastal guns 16 different newer systems, which included and ordered 2813 guns by February 1913, that is, about 40% of the guns were missing; if we take into account that far from all of the ordered guns were made, then by the beginning of the war the real shortage of fortress and coastal guns was expressed in a much larger percentage.

The commandant of the Ivangorod fortress, General A.V. Schwartz:
““... the war found Ivangorod in the most miserable state - armament - 8 fortress cannons, four of which did not fire ...
There were two powder magazines in the citadel, both made of concrete, but with very thin vaults. When in 1911 the disarmament of the fortresses of Warsaw, Zegrze
and Dubno, it was ordered to send all the old black powder from there to Ivangorod, where it was loaded into these powder magazines. There were about 20 thousand poods of it.”
The fact is that some Russian guns were created for firing old black powder. It was ABSOLUTELY not needed in the conditions of modern warfare, but its huge stocks were stored in Ivangorod and could explode when fired upon by the enemy.
A. V. Schwartz writes:
“There was only one thing left: to destroy the gunpowder. So I did. He ordered to leave in one cellar a small amount needed for engineering work, and drown everything else in the Vistula. And so it was done. After the end of hostilities near Ivangorod, I was asked by the Main Artillery Directorate, on what basis was gunpowder sunk? I explained and that was the end of it."
Back in Port Arthur, Schwartz noticed how old samples of our fortress artillery were of little use for the successful defense of the fortress. The reason for this was their complete immobility.
“Then the enormous role of mobile fortress artillery, that is, guns that can fire without platforms, without requiring the construction of special batteries, and are easily moved from place to place, became completely clear. After Port Arthur, as a professor at the Nikolaev Engineering Academy and the Officers' Artillery School, I strongly promoted this idea.
In 1910, the Artillery Directorate developed an excellent example of such guns in the form of 6 dm. fortress howitzer, and by the beginning of the war in the warehouse of Brest there were already about sixty of these howitzers. That is why I used every effort in Ivangorod to get as many of these guns as possible for the fortress. I managed to get them - 36 pieces. To make them quite mobile, I ordered to form 9 batteries from them, 4 guns in each, I took horses for transportation from the convoys of infantry regiments, bought a harness, and appointed officers and soldiers from fortress artillery.
It is good that in the Ivangorod fortress during the war, such a highly trained artilleryman as General Schwartz turned out to be the commandant. He managed to “knock out” 36 new howitzers from the rear of Brest and ORGANIZE their effective use in the defense of the fortress.
Alas, this was a positive isolated example, against the background of the general deplorable state of affairs with Russian heavy artillery ...

However, this huge gap in the quantity and quality of siege artillery did not particularly concern our generals. It was assumed that the war would be maneuverable and transient. By the end of autumn it was supposed to be already in Berlin (which was only 300 versts across the plain). Many officers of the guard even took parade uniforms with them on a campaign in order to look proper there, at the victory ceremonies ...
The fact that before this parade of the Russian army would inevitably have to besiege and storm powerful German fortresses (Königsberg, Breslau, Pozern, etc.), our military leaders did not really think about it.
It is no coincidence that the 1st Army of Rennenkampf in August 1914 tried to begin the imposition of the Königsberg fortress simply without having ANY siege artillery in its composition.
The same thing happened with the attempted siege of our 2nd Army Corps on the small German fortress of Lötzen in East Prussia. On August 24, units of the 26th and 43rd Russian infantry. divisions surrounded Lötzen, in which there was a Bosse detachment consisting of 4.5 battalions. At 0540 hours, the commandant of the fortress was sent a proposal to surrender the fortress of Lötzen.

The commandant of the fortress, Colonel Bosse, responded to the offer to surrender that it was rejected. Fortress Lötzen will only surrender in the form of a pile of ruins...
The capitulation of Lötzen did not take place, as well as its destruction, which was threatened by the Russians. The fortress withstood the siege, having no effect on the course of the battle of Samsonov's 2nd Army, except for the fact that the Russians diverted the 1st brigade of the 43rd infantry to the blockade. divisions. The remaining troops of the 2nd arm. corps, having captured the area north of the Masurian Lakes and Johannisburg, from August 23 they attached themselves to the left flank of the 1st Army and from the same date were transferred to the 1st Army of the gene. Rennenkampf. The latter, having received this corps to reinforce the army, extended his entire decision to it, according to which two corps were to block Konigsberg, and the other troops of the army at that time were to contribute to the operation to tax the fortress.
As a result, these two of our divisions, during the death of Samsonov's 2nd Army, were engaged in a strange siege of the small German fortress of Lötzen, the alleged capture of which had absolutely NO significance for the outcome of the entire battle. At first, as many as TWO full-blooded Russian divisions (32 battalions) attracted 4.5 German battalions located in the fortress to the blockade. Then only one brigade (8 battalions) was left for this purpose. However, having no siege weapons, these troops only wasted their time on the outskirts of the fortress. Our troops failed to take it or destroy it.

And here is how the German troops, armed with the latest siege weapons, acted during the capture of powerful Belgian fortresses:
“... the Liege forts from August 6 to August 12 did not stop firing at German troops passing within the firing range of guns (12 cm, 15 cm cannon and 21 cm howitzer), but 12 On the 1st, around noon, the attacker began a fierce bombardment with large-caliber guns: 30.5 cm with Austrian howitzers and 42 cm with new German mortars, and thereby showed a clear intention to capture the fortress, which impeded the freedom of movement of the German masses, for Liège covered 10 bridges. On the forts of Liège, built according to the Brialmont type, this bombardment produced an all-destroying effect, which nothing prevented. The artillery of the Germans, who surrounded the forts with troops, each individually ... could even be located against the Gorge, very weakly armed, faces and act concentrically and concentrated. A small number of powerful guns made it necessary to bombard one fort after another, and only on August 17 did the last one, namely Fort Lonsin, fall due to the explosion of a powder magazine. Under the ruins of the fort, the entire garrison perished: out of 500 people. - 350 were killed, the rest were seriously wounded.

Fortress commander, Gen. Leman, crushed by debris and poisoned by asphyxiating gases, was taken prisoner. During the 2 days of the bombing, the garrison behaved with selflessness and, despite losses and suffering from suffocating gases, was ready to repel the assault, but the indicated explosion decided the matter.
So, the complete capture of Liege required, from August 5 to August 17, only 12 days, however, German sources reduce this period to 6, i.e. they consider the 12th to have already decided the matter, and further bombardments to complete the destruction of the forts.
Under these conditions, this bombardment was more likely to be in the nature of a shooting range ”(Afonasenko I.M., Bakhurin Yu.A. Novogeorgievsk Fortress during the First World War).

Information about the total number of German heavy artillery is very contradictory and inaccurate (the data of Russian and French intelligence on this differ significantly).
General E.I. Barsukov noted:
“According to the information of the Russian General Staff, received by the beginning of 1914, the German heavy artillery consisted of 381 batteries with 1,396 guns, including 400 heavy field guns and 996 heavy siege guns.
According to the headquarters of the former Western Russian Front, during the mobilization of 1914, the German heavy artillery consisted, counting field, reserve, landwehr, spare, landshturmenny and supernumerary units, of a total of 815 batteries with 3,260 guns; including 100 field heavy batteries with 400 heavy 15 cm howitzers and 36 batteries with 144 heavy mortars of 21 cm (8.2 dm.) caliber.
According to French sources, German heavy artillery was available with corps - 16 heavy 150-mm howitzers per corps and with armies - a different number of groups armed with partly 210-mm mortars and 150-mm howitzers, partly with long 10-cm and 15-cm guns. In total, according to the French, the German army was armed with approximately 1,000 heavy 150-mm howitzers at the beginning of the war, up to 1,000 heavy 210-mm mortars and long guns suitable for field warfare, 1,500 light 105-mm howitzers with divisions, i.e., about 3,500 heavy guns and light howitzers. This number exceeds the number of guns according to the Russian General Staff: 1,396 heavy guns and 900 light howitzers, and comes closer to the number of 3,260 guns determined by the headquarters of the Western Russian Front.
Moreover, the Germans had a significant number of heavy siege-type guns, for the most part obsolete.
Meanwhile, by the beginning of the war, the Russian army was armed with only 512 light 122-mm howitzers, that is, three times less than in the German army, and 240 heavy field guns (107-mm 76 guns and 152-mm howitzers 164), t That is, two or even four times less, and heavy siege-type artillery, which could have been used in a field war, was not at all provided for in the Russian army according to the 1910 mobilization schedule.
After the sensational fall of the powerful Belgian fortresses, a large number of reports appeared about the latest German guns and their combat use.
E.I. Barsukov gives the following example:
“... the answer of the GUGSH about 42-cm guns. The GUGSH reports that, according to information received from military agents, during the siege of Antwerp, the Germans had three 42-cm guns and, in addition, 21-cm, 28-cm, 30.5-cm Austrian guns, in total from 200 to 400 guns. The firing distance is 9 - 12 km, but a 28-cm projectile tube was found, placed at 15 km 200 m. The newest forts withstood no more than 7 - 8 hours. until complete destruction, but after one successful hit, the 42-cm projectile was half destroyed.
According to the GUGSH, the tactics of the Germans are: the simultaneous concentration of all fire on one fort; after its destruction, the fire is transferred to another fort. In the first line, 7 forts were destroyed and all the gaps were bombarded with shells, so that the wire and land mines had no effect. According to all reports, the Germans had little infantry, and the fortress was taken by one artillery ...

According to reports, the German and Austrian batteries were out of range of fire from the forts. The forts were destroyed by 28-cm German and 30.5-cm Austrian howitzers from a distance of 10-12 versts (about 12 km). main reason the rapid fall of the fortifications is recognized as the device of the German heavy grenade with a slowdown, which breaks only after penetrating into the concrete and causes widespread destruction.

Here, the considerable nervousness of the compiler of this information and its presumptive nature are obvious. Agree that the data that the Germans used "from 200 to 400 guns" during the siege of Antwerp can hardly be considered even approximate in terms of their reliability.
In fact, the fate of Liege - one of the strongest fortresses in Europe - was decided by only two 420-mm mortars of the Krupp group and several 305-mm guns of the Austrian company Skoda; they appeared under the walls of the fortress on August 12, and already on August 16 the last two forts, Ollon and Flemal, surrendered.
A year later, in the summer of 1915, to capture the most powerful Russian fortress of Novogeorgievsk, the Germans created a siege army under the command of General Bezeler.
This siege army had only 84 heavy artillery pieces - 6 420 mm, 9 305 mm howitzers, 1 long-barreled 150 mm cannon, 2 210 mm mortar batteries, 11 batteries of heavy field howitzers, 2 batteries of 100 mm caliber and 1 120 and 150 millimeters.
However, even such a powerful shelling did not cause significant harm to the casemated fortifications of Novogeorgievsk. The fortress was surrendered to the Germans due to the betrayal of its commandant (General Bobyr) and the general demoralization of the garrison.
Significantly exaggerated in this document and damaging effect heavy shells on concrete fortifications.
In August 1914, the German army tried to capture the small Russian fortress of Osovets by bombarding it with large caliber guns.

“The opinion of one of the officers of the General Staff, who was sent in September 1914 from the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief to the fortress of Osovets, is interesting to clarify the action of the German artillery on the fortifications. He came to the following conclusion:
1. 8 in. (203-mm) and smaller calibers cause negligible material damage to fortifications.
2. The great morale effect of the artillery fire in the early days of the bombardment could only be exploited "only by an energetic" infantry offensive. Assault on the fortress, with a weak qualitatively and unfired garrison, under cover of 6-inch fire. (152 mm) and 8 in. (203-mm) howitzers, has a great chance of success. In Osovets, where the German infantry remained 5 versts from the fortress, on the last 4th day of the bombardment, signs of calming the garrison were already found, and the shells thrown by the Germans were wasted.
For 4 days, the Germans bombarded Osovets (16 152-mm howitzers, 8 203-mm mortars and 16 107-mm cannons, in total 40 heavy and several field guns) and fired, according to a conservative estimate, about 20,000 shells.
3. Dugouts of two rows of rails and two rows of sand-filled logs withstood hits of 152-mm bombs. The four-foot concrete barracks withstood heavy shells without damage. At direct hit in the concrete of a 203-mm projectile, only in one place there was a recess of half an arshin (about 36 cm) ...

The small Osovets fortress withstood the German artillery bombardment twice.
During the second bombardment of Osovets, the Germans already had 74 heavy guns: 4 howitzers 42 cm, up to 20 guns 275 - 305 mm, 16 guns 203 mm, 34 guns 152 mm and 107 mm. Within 10 days, the Germans fired up to 200,000 shells, but only about 30,000 were counted from hits in the fortress. As a result of the bombardment, many earthen ramparts, brick buildings, iron bars, wire nets, etc. were destroyed; concrete buildings of small thickness (no more than 2.5 m for concrete and less than 1.75 m for reinforced concrete) were destroyed quite easily; large concrete masses, armored towers and domes resisted well. In general, the forts more or less survived. The relative safety of the Osovets forts was explained by: a) insufficient use by the Germans of the strength of their siege artillery - only 30 large 42-cm shells were fired and only one "Central" fort of the fortress (mainly one of its gorge barracks); b) firing by the enemy with breaks in the dark and at night, using which the defenders at night (with 1,000 workers) managed to repair almost all the damage caused by enemy fire during the past day.
The war confirmed the conclusion of the Russian artillery commission, which tested large-caliber shells on the island of Berezan in 1912, about the insufficient power of 11-dm. and 12-dm. (280-mm and 305-mm) calibers for the destruction of fortifications of that time from concrete and reinforced concrete, as a result of which at the same time it was ordered from the Schneider plant in France 16-dm. (400 mm) howitzer (see Part I) which was not delivered to Russia. During the war, Russian artillery had to limit itself to 12-inch. (305 mm) caliber. However, she did not have to bombard the German fortresses, against which a caliber larger than 305 mm was needed.
The experience of the bombing of Verdun showed, as Schwarte writes, that even the 42-cm caliber does not have the necessary power to destroy modern fortifications built from special grades of concrete with thickened reinforced concrete mattresses.

The Germans used large-caliber guns (up to 300 mm) even in maneuver warfare. For the first time, shells of such calibers appeared on the Russian front in the autumn of 1914, and then in the spring of 1915 they were widely used by the Austro-Germans in Galicia during the Mackensen offensive and the Russian withdrawal from the Carpathians. The moral effect during the flight of 30-cm bombs and a strong high-explosive effect (craters up to 3 m deep and up to 10 m in diameter) made a very strong impression; but the damage from a 30-cm bomb due to the steepness of the walls of the funnel, low accuracy and slowness of fire (5 - 10 minutes per shot), was much less than. from 152 mm caliber.

It is about her, the German field artillery of large calibers, that will be discussed further.

First of all, let's ask ourselves, what is a "non-standard caliber"? After all, since there is a gun, it means that its caliber is recognized as standard! Yes, this is true, but it so happened historically that calibers that were multiples of one inch were considered standard in the armies of the world at the beginning of the 20th century. That is, 3 inches (76.2 mm), 10 inches (254 mm), 15 inches (381 mm), and so on, although, of course, there were differences here. In the same howitzer artillery of the First World War, there were "six-inch" guns of caliber 149 mm, 150 mm, 152.4 mm, 155 mm. There were also guns of calibers 75 mm, 76 mm, 76.2 mm 77 mm, 80 mm - and all of them were called "three-inch". Or, for example, for many countries, 105 mm has become the standard caliber, although this is not exactly a 4-inch caliber. But it just so happened, this caliber turned out to be very popular! But there were also such guns and howitzers, the caliber of which differed from generally accepted standards. It is not always clear why this was necessary. What, wasn't it possible to reduce all the guns in your army to just a few of the most commonly used calibers? This makes it easier to produce ammunition and supply troops with them. And selling abroad is also more convenient. But no, as in the eighteenth century, when for different types infantry and cavalry produced different, sometimes even different-sized guns and pistols - officers, soldiers, cuirassiers, hussars, chasseurs, and infantry, sometimes with guns in the First world war, it was almost all the same!

Well, our story will begin, as always, with Austria-Hungary and its guns of the early twentieth century, which actively participated in the First World War. Here, the M-99 7 cm mountain gun became such a typical example of obsolete types of guns, which, nevertheless, were used during the war in many countries until more advanced systems appeared. It was a gun with a bronze barrel, without any recoil devices, but rather light. A total of 300 of them were produced, and when the war broke out, about 20 batteries of mountain guns of this type were involved in the front in the Alps. The weight of the gun was 315 kg, the elevation angles were from -10° to +26°. The projectile weighed 4.68 kg and had an initial velocity of 310 meters, and maximum range firing was 4.8 km. They replaced it with a 7.5 cm Skoda M.15 mountain howitzer, and it was already quite a modern gun for that time. In particular, her firing range reached 8 km (that is, even greater than that of the 8-cm field gun M.5!), and the rate of fire reached 20 rounds per minute!

Well, then the Skoda team swung so hard that they fired a 10-cm mountain howitzer M.16 (based on the M.14 field howitzer). The main difference was, of course, that it could be taken apart and transported by pack. The weight of the howitzer was 1.235 kg, pointing angles were from -8° to +70° (!), and horizontally 5° in both directions. The weight of the projectile was very decent - 13.6 kg (a hybrid shrapnel-grenade projectile from M.14), muzzle velocity 397 m/s, and maximum reach 8.1 km. A high-explosive projectile weighing 10 kg and 13.5 kg shrapnel from the M.14 were also used. The rate of fire reached 5 rounds per minute, the calculation was 6 people. In total, 550 of them were issued, and they actively participated in the battles with the Italians. After the First World War, it was in service with the armies of Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (under the name 10 cm howitzer vz. 14), exported to Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia, and used as a captured weapon in the Wehrmacht.

It would seem that this 3.9-inch caliber could be satisfied, but no, exactly 4-inch caliber was needed, as if adding 4 mm could seriously change something in the merits of the gun. As a result, Skoda developed the 10.4cm M.15 gun, similar in design to the German 10 cm K14 gun. A total of 577 M.15s were produced and they were used both in Europe and in Palestine. The design is typical for Skoda - a hydraulic recoil brake and a spring knurler. The barrel length was L / 36.4; gun weight 3020 kg, vertical guidance angles from -10 ° to + 30 °, horizontal 6 °, and a firing range of 13 km. The weight of the projectile to the gun was 17.4 kg, and the number of crew was 10 people. Interestingly, 260 M.15 guns inherited by Italy in 1938 - 1939. were reamed to the traditional 105 mm and served in the Italian army under the designation Cannone da 105/32. In addition to the caliber, the Italians replaced their wooden wheels with pneumatics, and from which the speed of towing these guns increased significantly.

As for the proud British, they had a whole bunch of non-standard caliber guns, and they all fought in the First World War. Let's start again with the mountain gun - 10 Pounder Mountain Gun. The fact that it was called 10-pounder means little, the caliber is important, and it was equal to 2.75 inches or 69.8 mm, that is, the same 70 as the Austrian mountain gun. When fired, the gun rolled back and also fired black powder, but it was very quickly disassembled into parts, the heaviest of which weighed 93.9 kg. The weight of the shrapnel projectile was 4.54 kg, and the range was 5486 m. The barrel was unscrewed into two parts, which was of fundamental importance for such a weapon. But it was just a cannon, so it could not fire at high-lying targets!

The gun was used in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, where its crews suffered losses from the fire of the Boer shooters, and in the First World War the British used it on the Gallipoli Peninsula, as well as in East Africa and in Palestine. However, it was obvious that this gun was already outdated and in 1911 it was replaced with a new model: a 2.75-inch mountain gun of the same caliber, but with a shield and recoil devices. The weight of the projectile increased to 5.67 kg, as well as the weight of the gun itself - 586 kg. For its transportation in packs, 6 mules were required, but it was assembled in position in just 2 minutes, and disassembled in 3! But the gun retained the drawback of its predecessor - separate loading. Because of what, its rate of fire was less than possible. But the range remained at the same level, and the power of the projectile even slightly increased. They used it on the Mesopotamian front and near Thessaloniki. But there were few of them, only 183 guns.

And then it got even more interesting. A 3.7-inch mountain howitzer, that is, a 94-mm gun, entered service. In action, it was tested for the first time in March 1917, and already in 1918, 70 of these guns were sent to Mesopotamia and Africa. It was the first British gun to have horizontal guidance equal to 20 ° to the left and right of the barrel axis. The angles of declination and rise of the trunk were -5° and +40°, respectively. The loading was also separate, but for a howitzer this was an advantage, not a disadvantage, since it gave a whole bunch of trajectories when firing. The new gun could fire a 9.08 kg projectile at a distance of 5.4 km. The barrel was divided into two parts of 96 kg and 98 kg each, and the total weight of the system was 779 kg. On the road, the gun could be towed by a couple of horses, and it remained in service with the British army until the early 1960s!

But, further, as they say - more! Already in 1906, the British military wanted to have a more advanced howitzer than the previous one, 5-inch caliber, but not a 105-mm gun, like the Germans, but adopted a completely new caliber proposed by Vickers - 114 mm or 4.5 inches. It is believed that in 1914 it was the most perfect weapon in its class. With a weight of 1, 368 kg, she shot high-explosive shells weighing 15.9 kg for a distance of 7.5 km. The elevation angle was 45 °, the horizontal aiming angle was “miserable” 3 °, but other howitzers had only a little more. Shells were also used smoke, lighting, gas, and shrapnel. Rate of fire - 5-6 rounds per minute. The recoil brake is hydraulic, the knurler is spring. Until the end of the war, more than 3,000 of these howitzers were manufactured, and they were supplied to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and in 1916 400 copies were sent to us in Russia. They fought in Gallipoli, the Balkans, Palestine and Mesopotamia. After the war, they changed the wheels and in this form they fought in France and were abandoned at Dunkirk, and then as training in Britain itself, they were in the service until the end of the war. They were part of the Finnish army during the Winter War. Moreover, they were used to equip the VT-42 self-propelled guns based on our captured BT-7 tanks. As part of the Red Army, they also fought back in 1941. In addition, British artillery boats were equipped with a gun of the same caliber, but, in general, it was never used anywhere else! A few years ago, one such howitzer stood on the second floor of the historical museum in Kazan, but whether it is there now, I personally do not know.

There is a saying: with whom you will behave, from that you will type. So Russia was led to an alliance with Britain, and from it both a 114-mm howitzer and ... a 127-mm cannon got to it! As you know, 127 mm is a “sea caliber”, the classic 5 inches, but on land it was only used in England! Well, here in Russia, allies of Britain during the First World War. In England, this gun was called the BL 60-Pounder Mark I, and was put into service in 1909 to replace the old gun of this caliber, which did not have recoil devices. The 127 mm cannon could fire 27.3 kg projectiles (shrapnel or high-explosive grenade) at a distance of 9.4 km. A total of 1773 guns of this type were produced during the war years.

Improved it gradually. First, they gave a new, aerodynamic shape to the shells and the firing range increased to 11.2 km. Then, in 1916, the barrel was lengthened on the Mk II modification, and it began to shoot up to 14.1 km. But the gun turned out to be heavy: the combat weight was 4.47 tons. In the British army, this gun was used until 1944. In the Red Army in 1936 there were only 18 of them, but, nevertheless, they were in service until 1942.

2.75 inch English mountain gun at the Hartlepool Museum

3.7-inch English mountain howitzer in the museum at Duxford

100-mm mountain howitzer firm "Skoda" from the museum in Lezann

104-mm gun M.15 from the museum in Vienna

127 mm gun at the National World War I Museum in Kansas City

114 mm English howitzer in the museum in Duxford

Self-propelled guns BT-42 in the BTT museum in the town of Parola, Finland

Scheme of the 114-mm howitzer device

High-explosive projectile of a 127-mm cannon in the section

Shrapnel projectile of a 2.75-mm cannon in the cut

At midnight on July 28, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum presented to Serbia in connection with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand expired. Since Serbia refused to fully satisfy him, Austria-Hungary considered itself entitled to begin fighting. On July 29, at 00:30, the Austro-Hungarian artillery located near Belgrade “spoke” (the Serbian capital was almost on the very border). The first shot was fired by the gun of the 1st battery of the 38th artillery regiment under the command of Captain Wödl. It was armed with 8-cm M 1905 field guns, which formed the basis of the Austro-Hungarian field artillery.

In the second half of the 19th century in all European states the doctrine of the field use of artillery provided for its use in the first line for direct support of the infantry - the guns fired direct fire at a distance of no more than 4–5 km. The key characteristic of field guns was considered to be the rate of fire - it was precisely over its improvement that the design idea worked. The main obstacle to increasing the rate of fire was the design of the carriages: the gun barrel was mounted on trunnions, being rigidly connected to the carriage in the longitudinal plane. When fired, the recoil force was perceived by the entire carriage, which inevitably knocked down the aiming, so the crew had to spend precious seconds of the battle restoring it. The designers of the French company Schneider managed to find a way out: in the 75-mm field gun of the 1897 model they developed, the barrel was movably installed in the cradle (on rollers), and the recoil devices (rollback brake and knurler) ensured its return to its original position.

The solution proposed by the French was quickly adopted by Germany and Russia. In particular, three-inch (76.2 mm) rapid-fire field guns of the 1900 and 1902 models were adopted in Russia. Their creation, and most importantly, the rapid and massive introduction into the troops caused serious concern for the Austro-Hungarian military, since the main weapon of their field artillery - the 9-cm cannon M 1875/96 - was no match for the new artillery systems of a potential enemy. Since 1899, new samples were tested in Austria-Hungary - an 8 cm gun, a 10 cm light howitzer and a 15 cm heavy howitzer - however, they had an archaic design without recoil devices and were equipped with bronze barrels. If for howitzers the issue of rate of fire was not acute, then for a light field gun it was a key one. Therefore, the military rejected the 8-cm gun M 1899, demanding from the designers a new, faster-firing gun - "no worse than the Russians."

New wine in old wineskins

Since the new gun was required “for yesterday”, the specialists of the Vienna Arsenal took the path of least resistance: they took the barrel of the rejected M 1899 gun and equipped it with recoil devices, as well as a new horizontal wedge gate (instead of a piston one). The barrel remained bronze - thus, during the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian army was the only one in which the main field gun did not have a steel barrel. However, the quality of the material used - the so-called "Thiele bronze" - was very high. Suffice it to say that in early June 1915, the 4th battery of the 16th field artillery regiment used up almost 40,000 shells, but not a single barrel was damaged.

“Thiele Bronze”, also called “steel-bronze”, was used to make barrels using a special technology: punches of a diameter slightly larger than the barrel itself were sequentially driven through the drilled bore. As a result, precipitation and compaction of the metal occurred, and its inner layers became much stronger. Such a barrel did not allow the use of large charges of gunpowder (due to its lower strength compared to steel), but it did not corrode and break, and most importantly, it cost much less.

In fairness, we note that field guns with steel barrels were also developed in Austria-Hungary. In the years 1900-1904, the Skoda company created seven good examples of such guns, but they were all rejected. The reason for this was the negative attitude towards steel of the then inspector general of the Austro-Hungarian army, Alfred von Kropachek, who had his share in the patent for the Thiele bronze and received a substantial income from its production.

Design

The caliber of the field gun, which received the designation "8 cm Feldkanone M 1905" ("8 cm field gun M 1905"), was 76.5 mm (as usual, it was rounded in official Austrian designations). The forged barrel was 30 calibers long. The recoil devices consisted of a hydraulic recoil brake and a spring knurler. The recoil length was 1.26 m. With an initial projectile velocity of 500 m / s, the firing range reached 7 km - before the war this was considered quite sufficient, but the experience of the first battles showed the need to increase this indicator. As often happens, the soldier's ingenuity found a way out - they dug a recess under the frame in the position, due to which the elevation angle increased, and the firing range increased by a kilometer. In the normal position (with the frame on the ground), the vertical aiming angle ranged from -5 ° to + 23 °, horizontal - 4 ° to the right and left.

By the beginning of the First World War, the 8-cm gun M 1905 formed the basis of the artillery park of the Austro-Hungarian army
Source: passioncompassion1418.com

The gun ammunition included unitary shots with two types of shells. A shrapnel projectile was considered the main one, which weighed 6.68 kg and was equipped with 316 bullets weighing 9 g each and 16 bullets weighing 13 g each. It was supplemented by a grenade weighing 6.8 kg, equipped with an ammonal charge weighing 120 g. Thanks to unitary loading, the rate of fire was quite high - 7-10 rds / min. Aiming was carried out using a monoblock sight, which consisted of a level, goniometer and sight.

The gun had a single-beam L-shaped carriage typical of its time and was equipped with an armored shield 3.5 mm thick. The diameter of the wooden wheels was 1300 mm, the track width was 1610 mm. In the combat position, the gun weighed 1020 kg, in the stowed position (with a limber) - 1907 kg, with full equipment and crew - over 2.5 tons. The gun was towed by a six-horse team (another such team towed a charging box). Interestingly, the charging box was armored - in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian instructions, it was installed next to the gun and served as additional protection for the servants, which consisted of six people.

The regular ammunition of the 8-cm field gun consisted of 656 shells: 33 shells (24 shrapnel and 9 grenades) were in the limber; 93 - in the charging box; 360 - in the ammunition column and 170 - in the artillery park. According to this indicator, the Austro-Hungarian army was at the level of other European armed forces(although, for example, in the Russian army, the regular three-inch ammunition consisted of 1000 shells per barrel).

Modifications

In 1908, a modification of the field gun was created, adapted for use in mountain conditions. The gun, which received the designation M 1905/08 (the abbreviated M 5/8 was more often used), could be disassembled into five parts - a shield with an axle, a barrel, a cradle, a carriage and wheels. The mass of these units was too large to be transported in horse packs, but they could be transported on special sledges, delivering the gun to hard-to-reach mountain positions.

In 1909, using the artillery part of the M 1905 cannon, a gun for fortress artillery was created, adapted for mounting on a casemate gun carriage. The gun received the designation "8 cm M 5 Minimalschartenkanone", which can literally be translated as "the gun for the minimum size of the embrasure". applied and short designation- M 5/9.

Service and combat use

The fine-tuning of the M 1905 gun dragged on for several years - the designers for a long time could not achieve the normal operation of the recoil devices and the shutter. Only in 1907 did the production of a serial batch begin, and in the fall next year The first cannons of the new model were delivered to the units of the 7th and 13th artillery brigades. In addition to the Vienna Arsenal, the production of field guns was established by the Skoda company (although bronze barrels were supplied from Vienna). Quite quickly, it was possible to re-equip all 14 artillery brigades of the regular army (each brigade united the artillery of one army corps), but later the pace of deliveries slowed down, and by the beginning of the First World War, most of the artillery units of the Landwehr and Honvedsheg (Austrian and Hungarian reserve formations) were still in service "antique" 9 cm guns M 1875/96.

By the beginning of the war, field guns were in service with the following units:

forty-two field artillery regiments (one per infantry division; initially they had five six-gun batteries, and after the start of the war, an additional sixth battery was created in each regiment);
nine divisions of horse artillery (one per cavalry division; three four-gun batteries in each division);
reserve units - eight landwehr field artillery divisions (two six-gun batteries each), as well as eight field artillery regiments and one horse artillery division of the Honvedsheg.

As in the era Napoleonic Wars, at the beginning of World War I, Austro-Hungarian artillerymen tried to fire direct fire from open firing positions
Source: landships.info

During the First World War, 8-cm field guns were widely used by the Austro-Hungarian army on all fronts. Combat use revealed some shortcomings - and not so much the gun itself, but the concept of its use. The Austro-Hungarian army did not draw proper conclusions from the experience of the Russo-Japanese and Balkan wars. In 1914, the Austro-Hungarian batteries of field guns, as in the 19th century, were trained to fire only direct fire from open firing positions. At the same time, by the beginning of the war, Russian artillery already had a proven tactic of firing from closed positions. The Imperial-Royal field artillery had to learn, as they say, "on the go." There were also complaints about the damaging properties of shrapnel - its nine-gram bullets often could not cause any serious injury. personnel enemy and were completely powerless even against weak shelters.

AT initial period During the war, field gun regiments sometimes achieved impressive results, firing from open positions as a kind of "long-range machine guns." However, more often they had to endure defeats - as, for example, on August 28, 1914, when the 17th field artillery regiment was completely defeated in the battle of Komarov, losing 25 guns and 500 people.

Not being a specialized mountain gun, the M 5/8 gun was widely used in mountainous areas.
Source: landships.info

Taking into account the lessons of the first battles, the Austro-Hungarian command "shifted the focus" from cannons to howitzers capable of firing on hinged trajectories from closed positions. At the beginning of the First World War, guns accounted for approximately 60% of field artillery (1734 guns out of 2842), but later this proportion changed significantly not in favor of guns. In 1916, compared with 1914, the number of batteries of field guns decreased by 31 - from 269 to 238. At the same time, 141 new batteries of field howitzers were formed. In 1917, the situation with guns changed slightly in the direction of increasing their number - the Austrians formed 20 new batteries. At the same time, 119 new howitzer batteries were formed in the same year (!). In 1918, the Austro-Hungarian artillery underwent a major reorganization: instead of homogeneous regiments, mixed regiments appeared in it (each with three batteries of 10-cm light howitzers and two batteries of 8-cm field guns). By the end of the war, the Austro-Hungarian army had 291 batteries of 8 cm field guns.

During the First World War, 8-cm field guns were also used as anti-aircraft guns. To do this, the guns were placed on various kinds of improvised installations, which provided a large elevation angle and circular fire. The first case of using the M 1905 cannon for firing at air targets was noted in November 1915, when it was used to protect an observation balloon near Belgrade from enemy fighters.

Later, on the basis of the M 5/8 gun, a full-fledged anti-aircraft gun was created, which was a field gun barrel superimposed on a pedestal installation developed by the Skoda plant. The gun received the designation "8 cm Luftfahrzeugabwehr-Kanone M5 / 8 M.P." (The abbreviation "M.P." meant "Mittelpivotlafette" - "carriage with a central pin"). In a combat position, such an anti-aircraft gun weighed 2470 kg and had circular horizontal fire, and the vertical aiming angle ranged from -10 ° to + 80 °. The effective range of fire against air targets reached 3600 m.

In the workshop for the manufacture of heavy shells. Illustration from the book "The Great War in Images and Pictures". Issue 9. - M., 1916

The unforeseen intensity of the battles and, as a result, the huge consumption of artillery shells, coupled with the rate of fire of field artillery, already two or three months after the start of the war, led to the first crisis in the supply of artillery ammunition. Already in November 1914, the troops of the Russian active army began to receive official insistent demands to limit the consumption of shells, and five months after that, this circumstance was of paramount importance for the fighting in the Carpathians. Orders for the troops of the Southwestern Front ordered to open fire only when the enemy approached at minimum distances.

THE SITUATION IS IMPROVING

By the spring of 1916 (the period of the Brusilov offensive), the situation had changed for the better. So, during the breakthrough of the enemy’s fortified zone near Sopanova, one of the batteries of the Russian strike group fired over 3,000 shells in two battles (May 22-23). Russian batteries have long lost the habit of such, although, in essence, an insignificant scale of ammunition consumption. But already on May 25, in the course of the development of hostilities to seize the neighboring sector, artillery was again limited in the consumption of ammunition. Thereby artillery group, consisting of two light and one mountain batteries, was obliged to conduct ineffective methodical artillery preparation. The result was heavy casualties in the advancing units of the 35th Infantry Division.

Nevertheless, the situation gradually improved in the second half of 1916 and in 1917 became satisfactory. When breaking through the enemy front during the June offensive of the Southwestern Front of 1917, the Russian army was able to carry out continuous three-day artillery preparation, and with guns of almost all calibers (up to 11-inch inclusive). With regard to howitzer artillery, the lack of shells was cured at an even slower pace, which affected the actions of the small Russian heavy artillery and light howitzer batteries. While the Germans were constantly firing heavy artillery, the Russian heavy artillery only opened fire immediately before the operation. Even light howitzers opened fire only in accordance with the permission of the command (which also indicated the number of shells determined for this).

A qualitative disadvantage in supplying Russian artillery with ammunition is the insufficient range of 3-inch shrapnel, equipped mainly with a 22-second remote tube, while German shrapnel had a range of up to 7 km, having a double-action remote tube. At the end of 1915, this shortcoming was neutralized by the receipt by Russian gunners of batches of remote tubes of other types - 28-, 34- and 36-second with ranges up to 8 km. But shooting at moving targets was still carried out with shrapnel only up to 5.2 km. Note that the range of fire of the 75-mm French shrapnel was almost identical to the Russian one.

GRENADES WERE IN DEMAND

The other main type of projectile, the so-called high-explosive grenades equipped with TNT, first appeared in Russian artillery in 1914. Field batteries entered the war with 1520 shrapnels and 176 grenades in sets, that is, a ratio of 9 to 1. After the batteries switched from 8 to 6 guns in October 1914, the ratio changed in favor of grenades and became 1096 and 176, that is, 6 to 1. With the transition from mobile warfare to positional warfare, the demand for grenades increased significantly, and already from the end of 1915, the presence of an equal number of grenades and shrapnels in artillery kits was provided.

The main, most justified types of grenades were TNT, Schneiderite and melinite. Of the most reliable fuses, one can note the fuse of the 3 GT, 4 GT and 6 GT brands, the French fuses with delay (black) and without delay (white), as well as the Schneider fuse.

The destruction of various defensive structures that did not require significant penetration of the projectile into the depths of the target, as well as the destruction of wire obstacles, was most successfully carried out by Moscow-made melinite grenades with a French fuse without a moderator. This grenade was the best. Next came a Schneiderite grenade with a Schneider fuse, and in third place - a TNT grenade and a bomb with fuses of types 3 GT, 4 GT and 6 GT.

At the same time, the action of melinite grenades when firing at wire obstacles did not justify the hopes of the infantry - bursting from a ricochet (at short distances) in the air, they cut through the wire obstacles with fragments and not so much cleared as confusing them, making it difficult for people to pass. Practice has shown that the most rational type of ammunition for destroying barriers was a high-explosive impact projectile that destroyed stakes and, accordingly, wire. The Moscow-made melinite grenade with a moderator was an excellent tool for destroying living targets at short distances (no more than 2.5-3 km). Its shrapnel effect, combined with the morale effect, gave excellent results when firing at live targets and was effective tool in order to raise enemy fighters lying down under shrapnel fire.

For firing at any (not only short) distances, due to the lack of remote double-action tubes, artillery could not use grenades to the full extent to destroy living targets. At the end of 1916 and in 1917, small batches of grenades with a 28-second remote tube began to be received at the front - they began to be used for firing at air targets. In France, this problem was solved only by 1918 - with the adoption of a new long-range blasting grenade with a range of fire up to 7500 m. “Ultra-sensitive fuses” were also adopted for grenades. In Germany, attention was paid to increasing the range of remote fire from the very beginning of the war, as a result of which the range of fire of the 77-mm gun increased to 7100 m already in 1915 (compared to 5500 m in 1914). A powerful blasting bomb of the 150-mm Krupp heavy howitzer had a similar range of fire (up to 8 km).

PLANTS WORKED FOR WEAR

The quantitative shortage of shells, which immediately manifested itself in France, was quickly replenished due to the high productivity of its industry - this made it possible already from 1915 to carry out military operations associated with a huge consumption of ammunition. So, in the first months of the war, French factories produced 20 thousand shells per day, and at the end of the war the daily output exceeded 250 thousand. From the spring of 1917, the French could afford to conduct artillery preparations on great depth, as well as open powerful barrage fire.

The overall picture of the combat supply of the Russian army artillery shells looked like this.

By the beginning of the war, the active army had 6.5 million 3-inch shells and about 600 thousand shells for medium-caliber guns.

In 1915, the artillery received 11 million 3-inch and about 1 million 250 thousand other shells.

In 1916, 3-inch guns received about 27.5 million shells, and 4- and 6-inch guns - about 5.5 million shells. This year the army received 56,000 shells for heavy artillery (only 25% of them were created by the efforts of domestic industry).

And in 1917, Russia was coping with the difficulties of meeting the needs of its army in terms of light and medium-caliber shells, gradually freeing itself from foreign dependence. More than 14 million shells of the first type are supplied this year (of which about 23% are from abroad), and over 4 million for medium-caliber guns (with the same percentage of foreign procurement). In relation to the shells to the guns of the TAON corps (heavy artillery special purpose) the amount of ammunition ordered from outside was 3.5 times higher than the productivity of the domestic industry. In 1917, the army received about 110,000 shells for 8-12-inch guns.

The production of remote tubes was carried out in Russia, while fuses, especially of a safe type, were mainly ordered abroad.

Thus, the combat needs of the Russian army in artillery ammunition small and medium caliber were gradually satisfied, and the shell shortage of late 1914 and 1915 was eliminated, but the shortage of large caliber shells, although not so acute, was felt until the end of Russia's participation in the First World War.