Chapter IV Air reconnaissance. Aerial reconnaissance Highways and dirt roads

Depending on the scale and nature of the tasks to be solved, the purpose of the intelligence information received, aerial reconnaissance is divided into three kinds:

· strategic;

operational;

· tactical.

Strategic VR organized by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces or the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Strategic VR can be carried out by DA and VTA reconnaissance aircraft, space reconnaissance equipment.

Operational VR organized by the front command, carried out to the depth of front-line, air and sea operations by FA reconnaissance aircraft.

Tactical VR organized by the army command in the tactical depth of the enemy in the interests of formations of various branches of the armed forces.

For conducting tactical reconnaissance, FA reconnaissance aircraft, as well as tactical unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, are used.

Observation of the battlefield is organized by the army command and is carried out continuously and constantly.

In the interests of military operations aviation can be conducted:

Preliminary aerial reconnaissance (with insufficient data to make a decision to complete tasks),

additional reconnaissance (to clarify the position of objects, their air defense, radiation situation and weather on the route and in the combat area),

Control reconnaissance (during or after an air strike to determine its results).

Air reconnaissance methods:

1. visual observation;

2. aerial photography;

3. aerial reconnaissance with the help of electronic means.

1. Visual observation

· is currently the most versatile and trouble-free method of aerial reconnaissance available to all crews;

allows viewing large areas, and is indispensable in the search and additional reconnaissance of low-observable nuclear missiles, controls, air defense and other mobile objects;

Data can be transmitted by radio immediately after the detection of targets.

· decrease in the possibilities of visual observation: with an increase in the height and speed of the flight of a reconnaissance aircraft, with an increase in the degree of complexity of objects;

subjectivity of the received information.

2. Aerial photography

Although it is inferior to visual observation in the speed of obtaining information, it has certain advantages over it in objectivity and documentation, detail and reliability.

allows you to capture the most complex objects on film;

· makes it possible to obtain fairly complete data on the groupings of enemy troops, its defensive installations, large railway junctions, airfields, and positions of rocket launchers;

allows you to identify even the most minor changes in the objects of intelligence.

· the possibilities of aerial photography, as well as visual observation, depend on the weather and time of day.

Depending on the time and method of photographing, the position of the optical axis of the aerial camera (AFA), the method of exposure and photographic materials, the following types of aerial photography are distinguished:

· day and night;

planned, prospective and panoramic;

single, route and areal;

personnel and gap;

· black-and-white, color and spectrozonal.

Planned photography - such photography when the optical axis of the lens (AFA) at the time of shooting is perpendicular to the plane of the area being photographed

· Perspective photography - when the optical axis of the AFA lens is directed at an angle of 45 - 84 degrees. to the subject being photographed. Such pictures give the appearance of the object in the form in which the human eye is used to seeing them.

Perspective photography: complements planned; used to obtain data on the configuration of the terrain and objects, especially such as engineering structures; helps to reveal enemy camouflage measures; in the event of strong enemy opposition, it allows you to photograph the necessary objects without entering the air defense zone of the object.

· When taking panoramic photographs, the terrain is taken from the aircraft in front, behind, on the right, on the left.

· During a single photograph during a reconnaissance flight, one or more photographs of objects (targets) that are not interconnected are taken.

· Route aerial photography is carried out from one approach of the aircraft, during which a series of aerial photographs is made, mutually overlapping by approximately 30% in the direction of approach.

· Areal aerial photography - two-strip, or more, aerial photography, in which the routes of aerial photographs have a transverse overlap (up to 50%).

· On reconnaissance aircraft with a long range, up to 7 - 8 AFAs can be installed.

· Depending on the time of day and the nature of the illumination, day and night aerial photography is distinguished.

· Daytime aerial photography is used in daylight illumination of the object in the absence of clouds, fog, haze.

Night aerial photography is carried out under artificial lighting of the area. The opening and closing of the camera during night aerial photography is carried out automatically by the flash of a special electric lamp, powered by the discharge of high-power electric capacitors. For night photography, NAFA is used.

Spectrozonal aerial photography is performed on a special, most often 2-layer photographic material, on which terrain objects are depicted not in natural conditions, but in conditional colors that are sharply different from one another (for example, in purple and blue, red and green).

Such aerial photography is used when conducting aerial reconnaissance of camouflaged objects that are invisible during visual observation and photographing with ordinary photographic materials.

Spectrozonal images make it easier to interpret images

3. Electronic reconnaissance consists in obtaining information about the enemy using electronic means, it is divided into

radio intelligence,

radio engineering,

the radar,

radiothermal (thermal imaging),

thermal (infrared)

a laser,

television.

Intelligence Requirements

purposefulness (concentration of the main reconnaissance forces in the most important areas and in time of action);

activity (the persistent desire of each crew to complete a combat mission);

Timeliness (obtaining information on time, ensuring its effective use by troops);

Continuity (day, night under any conditions);

secrecy;

· credibility;

accuracy and clarity of information.

To meet the requirements for reconnaissance, it is planned to quickly process the results obtained on board and transfer information via communication channels to ground control points.

Aerial reconnaissance

Perhaps it should be considered logical that in the post-war period, in almost all cases when questions of military aviation were discussed, the main attention was paid to strategic bombers, aircraft carriers, jet fighters, rocket-propelled and unguided projectiles and anti-submarine warfare. Events such as the Korean War of 1953 and the floods in Holland and Great Britain showed the importance of helicopters. The question of transport aircraft came to the fore during the air resupply of Berlin and in the early tense days of the Korean War, when vital supplies had to be airlifted into the small patch of South Korea that was still in the hands of the United Nations troops. But in not a single significant work on the air force written after the end of the Second World War, one can find information about reconnaissance aircraft and reconnaissance operations, with the exception of isolated remarks.

It is difficult to understand why reconnaissance aviation began to play a secondary role in most air fleets between the two world wars, and why, despite the experience of the Second World War, no changes occurred in this matter. During the first two years of World War I, aircraft and airships were used primarily for surveillance. Their main task was to be the eyes of the army and navy: to detect guns and troop movements on land and enemy ships at sea. Naturally, with the advent of new methods of bombing and conducting air combat, the issues of conducting aerial reconnaissance began to be given correspondingly less attention. But every stage of the Second World War convinces us more and more that good or bad air patrols or reconnaissance must be the main factor in the air, land and sea situation.

The most striking example of the development and activity of reconnaissance aviation was shown by the German Air Force. In 1939, at the very beginning of the Second World War, 20 percent of the total, approximately 3,750 combat aircraft, were long-range and short-range reconnaissance aircraft, seaplanes and flying boats designed for aerial reconnaissance and patrol. This large percentage of reconnaissance aircraft continued until about 1943, when the deployment of fighter aircraft began on a large scale. In the entire history of military aviation, no other country has devoted such a large proportion of its aviation resources to aerial reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol missions. During the first nine or ten months of the war, German reconnaissance aircraft successfully completed their mission of obtaining information necessary for the effective and economical use of German air power. Seaplanes of the coast guard successfully carried out the tasks of monitoring the coasts of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea. Meteorological and general reconnaissance was carried out daily over the North Sea and Western Europe; these tasks were carried out by qualified crews of Heinkel twin-engine bombers assigned to each major aviation formation. During the campaign in Norway, they were assisted in these tasks by four-engine long-range flying boats and Focke-Wulf-200 aircraft. Aircraft "Henschel" performed important tasks of tactical reconnaissance in the interests of the ground forces operating in Poland, the Scandinavian countries, France and Flanders. They quickly reported accurate information about the movements of enemy troops, making it possible to quickly use dive bombers on the most advantageous targets. Almost every German tank division had a squadron of Henschel tactical reconnaissance aircraft, which performed the tasks of detecting tanks, as well as a flight of Fieseler aircraft, which provided communications in combat areas. Each unit of medium or dive bombers had a well-trained flight of reconnaissance aircraft, which performed special tasks of observation and aerial reconnaissance in the interests of its unit. Never before in the history of aviation has the air force had such first-class aerial reconnaissance, which would be able to ensure the use of a minimum number of bombers with maximum efficiency.

But by the summer of 1940, even this number of German reconnaissance units was not enough. In the Battle of England and during the fighting in the Atlantic, the German reconnaissance aircraft passed the first severe tests and showed the first signs indicating the weakness of the German air force in relation to aerial reconnaissance. During the Battle of England, it soon became clear that 300 Henschel aircraft, which had low speed, should be a good target for Spitfire and Hurricane fighters armed with eight machine guns and exceeding them in speed by almost 160 km / h, so that these machines had to be excluded from active operations, although they were partly used for patrols in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe coast of the Bay of Biscay. The remaining long-range reconnaissance aircraft Dornier, Heinkel and Junkers were also vulnerable to Hurricane and Spitfire fighters when they attempted to conduct reconnaissance missions over land. As a result, the Germans failed to conduct reconnaissance of many airfields and factories, which were important targets for Goering's bomber aircraft. German reconnaissance aircraft failed to obtain reliable information about the results of their raids on airfields, radar installations and factories. During the Battle of England, German naval reconnaissance aircraft also began to experience difficulties in the new Atlantic theatre. During operations against ships, mainly in the North Sea or in ports on the east coast of England, the German reconnaissance aircraft carried out the tasks of meteorological reconnaissance, aerial photographic reconnaissance and observation. When the air action spread further to the West and to the Bay of Biscay, the German reconnaissance aviation was not up to the task. From the end of 1940 it became more and more of a secondary role, and its operations became less effective. In the Mediterranean theater of operations, long-range reconnaissance in the interests of the German air force was often carried out by Italian aircraft. The position of German reconnaissance aircraft continued to deteriorate on all three main fronts, because the Germans knew that they had the means to carry out only the most minimal tasks. In the West, during the period from January 1941 to September 1944, the Germans could not conduct a single sortie on aerial photographs of London. In the decisive period before the Allied invasion of France, a lot of information could be obtained about the plans for the invasion by aerial reconnaissance of the ports of the south coast of England, but British patrol fighters drove off most of the German reconnaissance aircraft, and the aerial photographs they received were of poor quality and provided very little information. In the East, the situation was even worse, since after 1943 reconnaissance aviation units were often involved in bombing missions. Of course, the German troops operating against the Soviet Army received little information from aerial reconnaissance, which made it possible to judge the direction and strength of the strikes of the Soviet troops from the end of 1942. At that time, the air support of the Suez Canal zone and the central region of the Mediterranean Sea from the Germans and Italians was also insufficient. The position of the German reconnaissance aviation deteriorated at a time when it was especially necessary to strengthen the reconnaissance activities of the German Air Force. When the enemy is weak, the movements of his troops do not play a big role; but when it is strong, the value of aerial reconnaissance increases.

Air reconnaissance issues have not yet been adequately reflected in modern doctrines of air strategy and air power. Well-organized aerial reconnaissance (or information) is the "first line" of air defense and the first important condition for successful air operations. If guided missiles and bombers are used as means of attack, then first of all it is necessary to know where the enemy is, what his means and strength are. To ensure the protection of ships from attack by submarines, it is necessary to detect them in a timely manner. In order to evaluate the results of bombing during the war, it is necessary to have the latest information about the destruction caused, the dispersal of industry, restoration work and the construction of new factories. Aerial reconnaissance can completely change the outcome of military operations of ground forces. The German offensive in the Ardennes in the winter of 1944/45 began during the period of fog, as a result of which Allied air reconnaissance was not carried out. Hardly throughout the Pacific theater of operations - from Pearl Harbor to about. Okinawa - there were naval battles in which air reconnaissance would not play an important role.

Yet the value of aerial reconnaissance is always underestimated. During a war it is impossible to economically distribute forces and resources and use them to the maximum without knowledge of the situation. What Clausewitz wrote about the war a hundred years ago is still being studied and has not lost its force: "Many reports received in the war contradict one another; there are even more false reports, and most of them are not very reliable." It is difficult for a non-specialist to understand that the information available to the high command, which serves as the basis for decision-making, is often insufficient and incomplete. Troop commanders can lead combat operations for months without any information about how many planes, ships, tanks or submarines the enemy is producing. True, there are many sources of intelligence information: prisoners of war, documents captured from the enemy, agents and radio interception. But how to find out what information this or that prisoner of war has? Since it is possible to determine in advance which radiograms can be decrypted and what information they contain, it is not always possible to capture enemy documents containing important information. You can rarely rely on the fact that agents will deliver the necessary intelligence in the form required. Aerial photographic reconnaissance is the only source of reliable and up-to-date information of a military nature. Air reconnaissance activities can be planned and controlled. Almost always, aircraft performing aerial reconnaissance missions bring photographs that provide valuable information, since the objects, time and date of photographing are known. Even visual reconnaissance, despite the fact that its results are influenced by human errors, provides the ability to quickly obtain information that can satisfy operational requirements. Moreover, to know exactly the time and place of receipt of intelligence information is already half of being sure of its reliability.

In Soviet military circles, the words "tactical (military) intelligence" (reconnaissance) and "strategic intelligence" (intelligence) are synonymous. Yet the USSR never attached as much importance to tactical intelligence as the Germans did in the period between the two world wars. The Soviet air force has always had (and still has) reconnaissance aviation regiments of 30-40 aircraft, but they were never enough to meet the needs of the army in reconnaissance information. Has anyone ever heard of the existence of an air reconnaissance command in the air forces of the Western powers, equal in position to the bomber and fighter air commands and the coastal aviation command of the British air forces? Position, dignity and popularity are as important in military life as they are in civilian life. It is rare to hear that a pilot or navigator of a reconnaissance aircraft has become a national hero. At the time of the announcement of the Bruneval raid, few had heard of the valuable low-level perspective aerial photographs taken by Air Major Hill. Reconnaissance information obtained from aerial photographs served as the initial data for the raid on Bruneval. Subsequently, he took many aerial photographs of radar stations during flights that required skill, courage and enterprise; but, as was the case with many other reconnaissance pilots who delivered valuable information both during the first and second world wars, his feat was soon forgotten. Apparently, fighter and bomber pilots are considered the aristocrats of the air and the monopoly bearers of the Victoria Cross and the Order of Honor of Congress. This opinion is erroneous, since every pilot or navigator of a reconnaissance aircraft must be a first-class specialist in order to cope with his tasks. With modern radio and radar equipment on bombers and fighters, an average crew can often achieve good results. It is indicative that in the British Air Force the navigator wears only half a wing on his uniform and rarely rises to the rank of colonel. Those who fly know how often the navigator is the most important and authoritative member of the aircraft crew. And yet, did at least one navigator, a participant in the First World War, become an air general or an air marshal during the second world war?

A modern air force must consider organizing aerial reconnaissance on an entirely new basis. At the start of World War II, only the German Air Force was able to provide intelligence for bombing operations. In the US Air Force! the lenses of many aerial cameras met only the requirements of cartographic aerial photography in peacetime. In many cases, their size was insufficient to obtain aerial photographs at the scale necessary for detailed interpretation. There were very few trained codebreakers and reconnaissance pilots.

During the Second World War, aerial reconnaissance of all kinds was widely developed, but the war did not give the main strategic lesson that the conduct of multi-purpose air operations of a large scale required the conduct of multi-purpose aerial reconnaissance of an appropriate scale. In modern warfare, the tasks of aerial reconnaissance are very diverse. Coastal aviation conducts reconnaissance on sea lanes, meteorological reconnaissance is carried out over land and sea, radar reconnaissance is carried out in order to detect enemy radar stations, and strategic aviation reconnaissance is carried out in order to determine the results of bombing and obtain reconnaissance data on targets. In addition, there is tactical reconnaissance, which includes the adjustment of artillery fire, the identification of camouflaged objects and targets, and the observation of the movement of enemy troops along highways and railways. During the Second World War, reconnaissance activities for the solution of each of the above tasks hardly lasted several months. During the first two years of the war, there was no aerial survey of the factories of Japan's growing aviation industry in the Pacific theater. The British conducted insufficient meteorological reconnaissance over German territory. Captured combat logs revealed that what the Allies thought were bad weather days in important cities like Berlin and Leipzig were actually clear, sunny days. Winston Churchill wrote of the British air raids on Berlin that began in November 1943: "We had to wait until March 1944 to obtain sufficiently clear aerial photographs to evaluate the results of the bombing. This was partly due to poor meteorological conditions, as well as insufficient number of reconnaissance aircraft "Mosquito" American aircraft, which carried out raids on oil refineries in Romania in 1943 and subsequently did not have aerial reconnaissance data both during the planning period of operations and during the evaluation of the results of the bombing.Effective air patrols in coastal zones and good radio communications could have thwarted a Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor.The German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, during their breakthrough across the English Channel, were accidentally detected from a Spitfire aircraft performing a combat air patrol mission, and not by reconnaissance aircraft Many examples can be given when, at the decisive stages of the Second World War, the organization of aerial reconnaissance was poorly organized.

The tactical lessons of World War II are well learned. It is now clear that reconnaissance aircraft must be the best and their crews the most qualified. Bombers and fighters intended for reconnaissance should be stripped of weapons and replaced with additional fuel tanks in order to increase their range and flight speed. All the best aircraft of the Second World War period: Mosquito, Mustang, Lightning, LaG and Messerschmitt jets were used for aerial reconnaissance. In the post-war period, aircraft such as the Canberra, a twin-engine jet aircraft of the design Tupolev, Saber and other jet fighters, as well as B-36 and B-52 strategic bombers have all been specially adapted for aerial reconnaissance missions.There may also be a version of a heavy bomber, from which, when approaching enemy territory, a supersonic fighter will be launched - Reconnaissance It is quite clear that in aerial photography, accurate keeping of the course, altitude and speed of flight is of great importance - which can be done by only a few pilots; the choice of the flight route and the exact keeping of the time spent above the target are also important. At present, they are widely used cameras with lenses having focal lengths from 150 up to more than 1500 mm; they provide a large photographic area with a large overlap that allows detailed interpretation of aerial photographs taken from altitudes above 9000 m. All modern air forces use machines that provide fast and efficient interpretation. As soon as the plane lands, the 16- or 35-mm film is quickly delivered to the local mobile interpretation center, where the first stage of processing is carried out within several hours: development, washing, drying, printing and initial interpretation. Using these images, you can quickly estimate the damage caused by the bombing, or calculate the approximate number of vehicles, trains and troops on the move. In order to make maximum use of the aerial photographs obtained after the first processing for operational purposes, it is necessary to have a good file of intelligence information and military maps of the latest editions. In itself, information about the number of ships in the port, aircraft at the airfield or trains at the marshalling yard is of dubious value. It is necessary to know for what purpose certain funds are concentrated. This position can be illustrated by one example from the Second World War. At an airfield in central Norway, photographic reconnaissance discovered a large number of four-engine bombers designed to fight ships. This indicated that the Germans were preparing an attack on ships located off the coast of Scotland or Ireland. The ships were in turmoil. It was decided to take them to a safe place or take other measures. In fact, it turned out that the concentration of a large number of aircraft at one airfield was caused by bad weather around air bases in southwestern France and southwestern Norway, as well as due to the lack of spare parts at bases in central Norway, which caused the failure of several aircraft. It is very often not taken into account that the aircraft photographed at the airfield may turn out to be out of order. A lot of information can be gleaned from each image, but in order to accept this information as facts, it must be supplemented with other data.

At the second and third stages of interpretation of aerial photographs, a more thorough study of them is carried out. The use of a stereoscope increases the accuracy of interpretation. The vague shadows on the hills and in the valleys become clear. Viewing aerial photographs through a stereoscope helps identify parked aircraft, camouflaged bridges and buildings by detecting differences in the height of an object compared to surrounding objects. The stereoscope allows you to see the relief of an object by its shadow, which is often the last key to recognizing objects when deciphering. By studying the details of aerial photographs, a large amount of reconnaissance data can be obtained, for example, comparative data on the development of a network of radar stations and anti-aircraft artillery firing positions, information on the construction and expansion of airfields with a significant lengthening of runways. With the help of data obtained by aerial photographic reconnaissance, the preparation of the Axis countries for the failed airborne landing on the island was revealed. Malta with about. Sicily, where airfields and runways were specially built for this purpose. It was with the help of aerial photographic reconnaissance that it was discovered that the Germans were developing new weapons in Peenemünde, which in the future could play a decisive role in the war. The role of aerial reconnaissance of strategic targets cannot be overestimated. Accurate and reliable basic intelligence data can be obtained from other intelligence sources. But only aerial reconnaissance can provide reliable information about the best flight route to the target, taking into account the air defense in the area, enemy camouflage and important target areas that have recently undergone reconstruction or restoration.

However, one important issue of aerial reconnaissance is often misunderstood. At the present time, it is still argued that, using aerial photographs, it is possible to determine how long a particular object has been disabled. During the Second World War, based on aerial photographs, the following conclusions were made: "It is assumed that the production capacity of the facility has decreased by 50 percent for a period of two to three months." No one can calculate the percentage of destruction based on aerial photographs with such accuracy. The pace of restoration work depends on many factors: the morale of the population, the sequence of work, the supply of electricity, the availability of labor and raw materials. In 1944, the assessment of the destruction of the German aircraft industry, based on aerial photographs, was optimistic because the enemy dispersed industrial enterprises and used production facilities in unknown factories. Estimation of the destruction of Japanese aircraft factories in 1944-1945 was often pessimistic, as the pace of reconstruction in Japan was slow, and the reassessment of the destruction of German factories in 1944 is probably only too well remembered.

One of the sad lessons of the air war in Korea is that the experience of conducting aerial reconnaissance during the second world war was confused. First, there was a great shortage of qualified codebreakers. The work of deciphering aerial photographs requires a lot of preparation and skill. Many good codebreakers lost their skills while working in civilian institutions. In 1950, the US Air Force had only two air reconnaissance squadrons in Japan and Korea, one of which was engaged in mapping. The second squadron could not be used effectively, as it suffered greatly from a lack of materiel and personnel. When these squadrons began their missions, the tactical lessons of the forties had already been forgotten. They received too many impracticable requests for large-scale aerial photographs, which had to be taken from low altitudes and at high speed. There were various bodies which, despite limited resources, used aerial reconnaissance facilities to meet their own needs; it happened that on the same day, at the request of various organizations, reconnaissance flights were made twice along the same route. Worst of all, there were no decryption specialists. But these difficulties of the initial period were soon overcome. By the beginning of 1952, mobile photo labs were organized, equipped with vans, trailers with power plants and water tanks. There were vans for printing pictures and developing photographic films, workshops for the repair of photographic equipment, a film library - that is, everything necessary for processing aerial photographs in the field. The number of equipment, personnel and aircraft gradually increased. Applications for aerial reconnaissance were coordinated in the US Air Force Intelligence Directorate in the Far East, and the actions of the United Nations troops in Korea became more economical and expedient.

Of the lessons of aerial reconnaissance during the Second World War, one lesson, perhaps, remained unlearned - this is the inadmissibility of underestimating the use of seaplanes and flying boats. During the war, American Catalina flying boats, British Sunderland, Soviet MPs, and German Heinkel and Dornier seaplanes and flying boats carried out coastal and meteorological reconnaissance, carried out anti-submarine patrols, and performed other tasks in the interests of naval forces. forces. But after the war, seaplanes and flying boats fell out of fashion in the air forces of the Western powers, although a few such squadrons remained in the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the Communists in Korea had a small bomber force; if the few airfields that the United Nations air force had at the initial period of the Korean War had been attacked even lightly from the air, their aircraft would have had to operate from air bases in Japan, forfeiting great advantages. In many cases, only seaplanes and flying boats, dispersed at anchorages in case of air attack, can provide important information about enemy movements and changing meteorological conditions. The Germans valued flying boats and seaplanes in 1940 during the campaign in Norway, when there were few airfields at their disposal and meteorological and other information was necessary for the rapid success of the campaign. Undoubtedly, conditions similar to those in the Pacific theater may occur in the future, in which flying boats will play an important role. Flying boats are a convenient and economical means of passenger transportation on civil airlines; they are capable of carrying a large payload and can be quickly adapted for military purposes. Flying boats are more valuable than many people think.

The need for global weather forecasts is now greater than ever before, but the role of aerial reconnaissance in this regard is difficult to define. Should it become necessary to move air squadrons across large areas of water at speeds in excess of 1,100 km/h, as was the case in early 1954, the meteorological service must provide a worldwide weather forecast. At present, thousands of ground and sea meteorological stations have been established in all countries, delivering basic weather data. There are countless previously collected data on meteorological conditions and climate that can help establish the relationship between current local meteorological data and possible long-term weather trends. Electronic equipment is increasingly being used to predict the weather. VHF radios are used to warn of an approaching storm that poses a danger to aircraft flight. With the help of radar stations determine the nature of the winds in the upper atmosphere. It would be impractical to employ a large number of weather reconnaissance aircraft when these aircraft are needed for more important missions. It would be more expedient to increase the number of terrestrial mobile meteorological stations and ships for reconnaissance of weather at sea, improve meteorological instruments and ensure reliable communication with central bodies that summarize information on the state of the weather.

Of course, there is still a need to use a certain number of aircraft for meteorological reconnaissance, especially with the increasing range of all types of aircraft, when bombers during the flight to the target may encounter a variety of meteorological conditions. It is difficult to foresee the full range of operational requirements in the field of meteorological reconnaissance, as well as in the field of military reconnaissance. As the ability to use expensive nuclear weapons for close air support grows, tactical military intelligence becomes more and more important. Nuclear weapons should not be allowed to be spent on secondary purposes. In the era of atomic projectiles and tactical atomic bombs, which can be used from fighter-bombers, timely and reliable information is extremely important. Expensive tactical guided missiles also cannot be used against small targets. If ground forces operate in Africa, South America, Asia and the Middle East, where many areas have not yet been mapped, then the need for aerial photography will be significant. This is evidenced by the experience of military operations in Malaya. The available maps of Malaya proved useless for military purposes. It was necessary to draw up new military maps, for which it was necessary to make aerial photographs of an area of ​​​​more than 10 thousand square meters. km. Much of this work has been done with helicopters. These machines also proved to be extremely valuable for aerial reconnaissance during the Korean War. But the territories of Korea and Malaya cannot be compared, for example, with the vast expanses of Asia, where there are also no modern large-scale military maps and the compilation of which will require colossal efforts of aerial reconnaissance. It is safe to say that any conflict in the future, during which aerial reconnaissance will be required, will almost certainly cover the whole world. The number of reconnaissance aircraft will be very limited. What can be done in a relatively calm peacetime environment in order to prepare for war as much as possible, with limited resources? The first and most important condition is the conduct of general training of the personnel of the armed forces in visual observation. Part of the time spent on physical training and lectures on current issues is useful for studying meteorology, camouflage, aerial observation techniques, geography, terrain features - that is, all issues that develop theoretical and practical skills in the personnel of all branches of the armed forces for conducting reconnaissance. Measures such as showing all personnel special documentaries and post-flight practical checks to see if they were awarded a special observer badge, which entitles them to pay bonuses, will raise the overall level of reconnaissance training. All bomber fighter and transport units of the Air Force must have more pilots specially trained for reconnaissance missions. If the initial training of observers is organized on a large scale in the armed forces, then it will not be difficult to create reconnaissance detachments in combat aviation units and equip them with personnel. In addition, conditions must be created for more flexible switching of aircraft to aerial reconnaissance. Why not, for example, use an entire aviation wing of bombers and fighters to survey an entire area and thus obtain visual reconnaissance data on this area. But all too often only two or three aircraft are allocated for aerial reconnaissance. Just as a good boxer saves his signature punch until he knows his opponent's strengths and weaknesses, successful offensive operations in the air require detailed knowledge of the enemy's territory, and it is often advisable to delay the start of operations until necessary. information will not be received. Saving manpower and resources for aerial reconnaissance only leads to a waste of resources in bombardment.

If the vast areas covered by modern warfare necessitate aerial reconnaissance on a large scale, then they also require special attention to communications and centralized control. In the USA, Great Britain and the USSR, central intelligence directorates have been created, but they mainly carry out the tasks of strategic intelligence. It is necessary to organize a unified intelligence service of the armed forces, which would include a unit of photo decoders who process all intelligence materials coming through all channels: this department should include both military and civilian specialists. Of course, in this department there should be specialized units: technical, scientific, industrial, etc., but these units should be general, without any preference for one of the branches of the armed forces. Intelligence information is of value to all branches of the armed forces: intelligence on the state of the weather, on radar stations, enemy ships, and almost everything else is rarely of interest to any one branch of the armed forces.

Similarly, reconnaissance air units and additionally created reconnaissance observer detachments should also serve all armed forces, and not just air forces. Aerial reconnaissance, as well as strategic bombing, must be carried out in accordance with state military policy, determined by the ministries of defense and the joint chiefs of staff. The control of Soviet long-range bomber aviation during the Second World War was carried out by the State Defense Committee, and reconnaissance aviation units were dispersed, being at the disposal of the commanders of the ground army and navy. The Anglo-American strategic bomber force was temporarily under the control of the joint chiefs of staff, but it never won the air reconnaissance, which was often the eyes of the strategic bomber force and the evaluator of the results of its actions, to itself. Of course, at the present time tendencies are intensifying towards the unification of the branches of the armed forces. Joint intelligence directorates and joint committees have already been organized, and many staff documents are being jointly developed. The time has already come for the abolition of the various uniforms of individual branches of the armed forces and for the development of detailed plans for the closest integration of the army, navy and air forces in all units, where possible. However, this is a large independent issue, which is dealt with in more detail in Chapter IX. Chapter 3. Reconnaissance Reconnaissance in the mountains is more difficult than on the flat terrain. Mountainous rugged terrain, the presence of mountain spurs and ridges, gorges and valleys between them contribute to the secrecy of enemy movements and the location of his units. In addition, folds

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Conducting aerial reconnaissance in Operation Desert Storm

Colonel V. Palagin,
Captain A. Kaishauri

One of the key places in ensuring the preparation and conduct of the air offensive campaign and the air-ground operation of the multinational forces (MNF) against Iraq (January 17 - February 28, 1991) was occupied by aerial reconnaissance. At the stage of strategic deployment and preparation of the armed forces of the United States and its allies for combat operations, the main efforts were focused on monitoring the progress of the operational deployment of the armed forces of Iraq, collecting and processing data on military installations in the territories of Iraq and Kuwait in order to plan missile and bomb strikes and electronic suppression, as well as ensuring the implementation of measures to control the naval blockade in the Persian Gulf. With the outbreak of hostilities, reconnaissance tasks were redirected to assess the results of missile and bomb strikes, identify new targets for destruction, primarily mobile operational-tactical missiles (OTR)<Скад>, tracking the movements of Iraqi troops and aircraft, control of airspace, primarily with the aim of detecting launches of Iraqi missiles.
In solving these problems, along with space forces and means (satellites: KN-11 optical-electronic reconnaissance, radar -<Лакросс>, radio and radio engineering -<Феррет>, <Шале>, <Аквакейд>) was attended by reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force Strategic Aviation Command (since 1992 - Combat Aviation Command), early warning radar (AWACS) and control aircraft, including carrier-based aircraft, as well as tactical air reconnaissance equipment.
By the beginning of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, the MNF command created a reconnaissance aviation group consisting of 41 AWACS aircraft (17 E-ZA<Сентри>AWACS and 24 E-2C systems<Хокай>), two E-8A and about 180 reconnaissance aircraft (six RC-135, one U-2C, nine TR-1A and approximately 150RF-4C,<Мираж-F.lCR>, RF-14A<Томкэт>, rice. one,<Торнадо-GR.lA>in the tactical reconnaissance variant, fig. 2, and others).
Strategic reconnaissance aircraft RC-135, U-2C and TR-1A carried out round-the-clock radar, radio and electronic reconnaissance along the line of contact in order to identify military installations and groupings of enemy troops, determine the results of air and missile strikes, and additional reconnaissance of electronic means of command and control and weapons, an advance opening of the Iraqi side's preparations for a surprise air strike. The intensity of aerial reconnaissance during this period was 10-12 sorties per day, and during combat operations - up to 200 (10-15 percent of their total number). Complexes of airborne reconnaissance equipment of strategic reconnaissance aircraft made it possible to:
- photograph military facilities and positions of troops at a distance of up to 60 km from RC-135 aircraft, up to 150 km - from U-2C (with a resolution of 0.2 -10m) and up to 40 km in the infrared wavelength range (with a resolution of 5- 10 m);
- shoot objects with television equipment (with a resolution of 0.2-0.5 m);
- to carry out radar survey of objects at a distance of up to 150 km (with a resolution of 3 - 4.5 m);
- conduct radio and electronic intelligence in the HF range within a radius of up to 1000 km, and in the VHF range - up to 450 km of ground-based RES and up to 1000 km of aviation RES in flight.
The command of the MNF paid considerable attention to solving the problems of searching for and detecting mobile objects of the Iraqi armed forces, which required the allocation of a large detachment of reconnaissance aviation forces. For this, a promising system of aerial radar reconnaissance and target designation was used for the first time.<Джистарс>(an air squadron of two E-8A aircraft, created on the basis of the Boeing 707, and six AN / TSQ-132 ground mobile data receiving and processing points). Ground stations were deployed as part of the main and forward command posts of the ground forces, headquarters of the 7th Army Corps and 18th Airborne Forces, the headquarters of the Air Force grouping (9th Airborne Forces), as well as under the commander of the US Marine Corps contingent.
Two prototypes of the E-8A made 54 sorties. System<Джистарс>made it possible to solve the following tasks: track single and group mobile targets, primarily armored formations of the Iraqi troops; provide recognition of tracked and wheeled vehicles; detect low-flying helicopters and rotating antennas of air defense radars; determine the characteristics of objects and issue target designations on them.
As conceived by the American command, the main purpose of this system was to reconnoiter targets for hitting them with ATACMS missiles (firing range of more than 120 km). In addition, it has been successfully used to guide tactical aircraft (F-15, F-16 and F-111) to ground targets, significantly increasing their combat capabilities. Thanks to the issuance of target designations at night, it was possible to carry out round-the-clock impact on the enemy.
For example, only on February 13, during 11 hours of flight time, the E-8A aircraft detected 225 combat vehicles, most of which were attacked by tactical fighters. E-8A and TR-1 radar reconnaissance aircraft, along with artificial Earth satellites of the type<Лакросс>provided reconnaissance of enemy territory in conditions of dense clouds, sandstorms, as well as heavy smoke caused by fires at oil industry enterprises.
Tracking of Iraqi mobile OTP installations on the E-8A aircraft of the system<Джистарс>carried out a radar with a selection of moving targets, the data of which was transmitted to a TR-1A aircraft equipped with an ASARS radar with a synthetic aperture having a higher resolution. This radar provided the detection of the alleged positions of the OTR from high altitudes, and the aircraft were outside the zone of operation of the Iraqi air defense. It is believed that the TR-1A, which received the designation U-2R in 1993, will continue to operate in conjunction with the production E-8C aircraft, which are expected to enter service in 1996. The U-2R aircraft provided not only visual, but also electronic reconnaissance, which made it possible to observe areas masked from the system<Джистарс>.
In addition to the E-8A aircraft, the following were involved in conducting aerial reconnaissance of the OTP and controlling the delivery of air strikes against them:
- RF-4C aircraft<Фантом>, which are equipped with perspective cameras, infrared stations and side-looking radars, as well as a Saudi Arabian Air Force RF-5E with IR and photo reconnaissance equipment;
- carrier-based aircraft RF-14<Томкэт>equipped with hanging containers with cameras and IR stations;
- all-weather reconnaissance aircraft<Торнадр-GR.lA>RAF with three airborne IR stations.
Reconnaissance tasks to detect OTP turned out to be the most difficult for Allied aviation. During the first two weeks, up to 30 per cent. the total number of sorties by Allied aircraft. However, it was not possible to destroy all mobile complexes, despite the fact that for almost an hour before launch they were in an open area in a stationary position. A small number of complexes were discovered at the initial stage of preparation for launch, which made it possible to direct strike aircraft at them. Part of the sorties fell on false targets, which diverted significant forces of reconnaissance and strike aircraft.
In the course of hostilities against Iraq, in the interests of the ground forces and marines, new reconnaissance systems based on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the type<Пионер>-. The complex included 14 - 16 UAVs, as well as ground control and data reception equipment, located on two vehicles of the type<Хаммер>. In total, six units were deployed: 3 were intended for the Marine Corps, one for the 7th Army Corps and one each for battleships.<Висконсин>and<Миссури>. Each of them was armed with up to five UAVs, which could be controlled within a radius of up to 185 km from the main ground station, and up to 74 km from a portable auxiliary one. During the operation<Буря в пустыне>total flight time of UAV type<Пионер>amounted to 1011 hours. These devices, equipped with television cameras or thermal imaging stations of the forward view, performed flights both in the daytime and at night.
In the interests of the Navy, the devices were used to search for mines and target designation of naval artillery. In addition, they carried out reconnaissance flights on behalf of the naval special forces airborne units (SEAL) and were involved in the search for coastal launch sites for Iraqi anti-ship missiles.<Силкворм>.
In the ground forces, the UAV was tasked with reconnaissance of routes for flights of attack helicopters AN-64<Апач>. Before taking off for a combat mission, the pilots conducted a reconnaissance of the area with a selection of potential targets from the images that came from the aircraft flying over a given area. In total, during the fighting in Iraq, the United States lost 12 UAVs: two were shot down, five were damaged by anti-aircraft fire, and five were due to equipment failures or operator errors.
In addition to those indicated, UAVs of the FQM-151A type were used in the Persian Gulf<Пойнтер>. Five complexes, each of which included four vehicles and two ground stations, were deployed in the areas of deployment of the Marine Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division. Lightweight devices in aluminum cases with a total weight of 23 kg, carried in knapsacks, were assembled in the field. The UAV has a range of 4.8 km, is designed to work in the air for 1 hour. Its flight altitude is 150 - 300 m.<Пойнтер>, intended for reconnaissance and observation at low altitude, decreased due to the unfavorable conditions of the desert area, devoid of landmarks. Currently, the possibility of equipping these UAVs with a global satellite navigation system (GPS) receiver and a LORAL night vision device is being studied.
Assessing the results of the air and air-ground operations of the CAPE in the Persian Gulf, foreign experts note that the successful solution of the tasks set was largely facilitated by comprehensive intelligence support. Thanks to this, it was possible to achieve a fairly high level of awareness about the groupings of troops and command and control systems, weapons and military equipment of Iraq, their tactical and technical characteristics, vulnerabilities, combat capabilities and features of use in this theater. Careful and lengthy (more than five months) reconnaissance of the territories of Iraq and Kuwait allowed the MNF command to clearly plan and conduct military operations.
Aerial reconnaissance promptly provided the US and MNF command with detailed topographic and geodetic and topographic data with accurate reference of important military-political, economic and military facilities, the location of armed forces, command and communications centers, communications, engineering fortifications. On the basis of the information received, the selection and calculation of the optimal routes for reaching targets (objects) were made, the outfits of the forces, the required number and composition of weapons were determined. In order to increase the effectiveness of the use of high-precision weapons, in some cases it was necessary to clarify intelligence data on the key components of targets.
At the same time, the war in the Persian Gulf revealed a number of shortcomings in the organization and conduct of intelligence of the MNF. Experts believe that, despite the use of all available air and space assets, US intelligence services have not been able to uncover the locations of all Iraqi OTPs and establish their exact number, although it was known that they were based in only two areas in a relatively small area. Delays were repeatedly noted in the processing and provision of operational information to the relevant combat command and control authorities. The pace of aviation combat operations often outstripped the speed of the flow of data coming from aviation and space means of optoelectronic reconnaissance.
The intelligence report prepared by the Committee on the Armed Services of the House of Representatives of the US Congress indicated, in particular, that its most serious shortcoming was inaccuracies in assessing the damage inflicted on the enemy. Thus, the number of Iraqi tanks destroyed by aircraft was significantly (by 100 - 134 percent) exaggerated. The commander-in-chief of the MNF, General Schwarzkopf, decided to conduct an air-ground offensive operation based on these assessments, and later stated:<Военные разведчики просто не знают, как вести подсчет ущерба, нанесенного боевой технике противника. Во время шестинедельной воздушной войны методика подсчета неоднократно изменялась в попытках повысить достоверность, однако анализ, проведенный по окончании боевых действий, показывает, что цифры оказались все же на удивление завышенными>.
The US Air Force command, having analyzed the shortcomings in conducting aerial reconnaissance during combat operations in the Persian Gulf zone, plans to take specific measures to increase the level of reliability and efficiency of reporting intelligence, to provide them comprehensively and in a timely manner to their troops, and above all air attack forces.

In the general complex of measures aimed at preparing the armed forces for new aggressive wars, the army commands of the main capitalist states give a large place to the organization of tactical aerial reconnaissance in the theater of operations, on the results of which, in their opinion, the success of military operations of the troops will largely depend. Aerial reconnaissance is conducted in the interests of all branches of the armed forces. In particular, it is designed to provide the Air Force command with the necessary data to solve the tasks of gaining air superiority, isolating the combat area and providing close air support to the ground forces.

The efforts of tactical air reconnaissance in gaining air superiority are to be directed primarily to identifying the airfield network, especially airfields and dispersal sites, as well as positions of missiles and command posts.

When isolating a combat area, the main objects of aerial reconnaissance include reserves in areas of concentration and on the march, highway junctions and railway stations, bridges, crossings, command posts and communication centers of formations and associations, warehouses and supply bases.

According to foreign military experts, especially great stress will be required from the crews of reconnaissance aircraft when providing close air support to ground forces, since ground combat operations will be characterized by transience and be conducted over large spaces under any meteorological conditions. In this case, aviation must first of all identify the positions of troops, areas of their concentration, tactical missile launchers, command posts and radio control facilities located in the combat formations of troops.

The main task of aerial reconnaissance in the theater, as noted by foreign military experts, is the timely detection of the location of nuclear weapons carriers and nuclear ammunition depots.

It is believed that the data obtained by aerial reconnaissance must be reliable and fully reflect the rapidly changing situation on the battlefield. Therefore, not only specially equipped, but also all combat aircraft are used for its maintenance.

Tactical reconnaissance forces carry a large load of opening objects in the tactical depth of the enemy. For example, in the last years of the aggressive war in Vietnam, out of the total number of sorties made by American aircraft for the purpose of reconnaissance of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 97% were tactical reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4C, RF-101 and others), 1%. - for unmanned aircraft and 2% - for strategic aircraft (U-2, ). The reconnaissance crews had to not only find the object, identify it and set the coordinates, but also determine how and from what directions it is safer and more convenient to approach it.

Depending on the tasks and in whose interests aerial reconnaissance is conducted, its depth will be different. The foreign press reported that the depth of tactical reconnaissance for a field army is 300-100 km, for an army corps - 100 km, and for a division - 40 km.

To conduct tactical air reconnaissance, the US and French Air Forces also have reconnaissance aviation wings (squadrons), consisting of two or three aviation squadrons of 15-18 aircraft, and in other countries - reconnaissance squadrons. The US Air Force has formed a squadron of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and jammers launched from the DC-130 mother aircraft. Reconnaissance aviation squadrons can independently solve the tasks of aerial reconnaissance in the theater.

Organization of air reconnaissance control in the theater

The management of reconnaissance aviation in the theater of operations in the US Air Force is carried out through the tactical aviation control system, the main bodies of which are the tactical aviation control center, which is part of the command post of the air force commander in the theater, and the close air support center created at the combat operations control center of the army corps or field army. Air reconnaissance operations are carried out on the basis of planned or urgent requests.

In the tactical aviation control center there are officers who plan the action and organize the flights of reconnaissance aircraft. Here, on the basis of approved applications, detailed planning of reconnaissance aviation sorties for the next day takes place according to planned applications that come from ground forces battalions through intelligence officers of divisions, corps and field armies. Each subsequent supervisor can approve or cancel the application. According to foreign press reports, in the Vietnam War, planned requests were implemented 4 hours or more after they were received. They accounted for 3/4 of all applications.

The air intelligence officers in the close air support center are busy summarizing urgent requests. The latter, without the consent of higher authorities, are transmitted over tactical aviation control radio networks by Air Force communications officers who are in tactical aviation control teams, or advanced aviation gunners. Having considered the application, the close air support center reports this to the tactical aviation control center, and then calls reconnaissance aircraft through the command post of aviation units and subunits. According to the experience of military operations in Southeast Asia, urgent requests were fulfilled after 2-2.5 hours when aircraft took off from airfields and after 15 minutes. when a scout is called from a duty position in the zone.

According to the foreign press, the following aircraft can conduct reconnaissance: single ones, which are part of strike groups, specially covered from the air. The first, as a rule, are sent to areas with weak air defense. They photograph the area from medium and high altitudes. The latter are intended for shooting objects after bombing them. Reconnaissance aircraft, specially covered from the air, aim at objects with strong air defense.

Aircraft crews on routes are guided through control and warning centers, observation and warning posts, as well as through advanced aviation gunners. The pilots are given information about the air defense system of the object, attacks by enemy fighters, weather changes, the location of the drop point for the footage, the actions of their aircraft in the reconnaissance area, etc.

Preparation for air reconnaissance in the theater

Preparation for conducting aerial reconnaissance in a squadron begins with the receipt of an order from the command post of the aviation wing. On its basis, the squadron commander gives appropriate instructions to the operational officer and the photographic reconnaissance officer.

The operational officer, who controls the calculation of the required fuel supply and the time of transmission of reconnaissance reports, determines the order of following to the target, routes and time to reach the target, the conditions of radio exchange responsible for communication by flight stages, if necessary, indicates the methods of interaction between reconnaissance aircraft and cover fighters.

Assigned crews to complete the mission begin to prepare a flight plan. The route to the reconnaissance object is chosen taking into account the covert access to it and bypassing areas covered by air defense systems. It is applied to the map, on which control landmarks are clearly visible. If necessary, the plan indicates the area for in-flight refueling of aircraft on the way back. If the reconnaissance aircraft must go on a mission together with the strike group, then the place, time and height of their meeting is recorded. When reconnaissance of objects with a strong air defense system, the plan reflects the issues of interaction with the cover group.

The photo reconnaissance officer, together with specialists in electronic equipment, in accordance with the task and the weather, selects the type of AFA, the amount of film, filters and shooting intervals.

During the pre-flight preparation, which can last up to 1.5 hours, the crews are instructed. The squadron commander clarifies the task and explains it. The reconnaissance officer acquaints the crews with the credentials of the targets (if they were not studied by them during preliminary training), then informs the pilots about the enemy’s air defense systems on the route and in the target area, recommends tactics for overcoming them, names especially noticeable visual landmarks and explains the camouflage of objects enemy. He also brings to the attention of the crews (in case they find themselves on enemy territory for any reason) the possible attitude of the population towards them, how to avoid capture and how to act during rescue.

The photographic reconnaissance officer instructs the crews on the procedure for using the AFA, indicating the number of photographs that can be taken by each device, and reference points for photographing.

The radio intelligence officer from the maintenance squadron recalls the modes of operation of the equipment, the moments of its switching on and off, the features of identifying radiation sources on the on-board indicators.

The meteorological officer acquaints the crew with the weather forecast along the route and in the target area.

Crews who previously flew to a given area are specially invited to the briefing.

At the end of the briefing, the crews clarify the flight routes to and from the targets, the time of flight of reference points and the approach to targets, alternate routes in case of weather changes or unexpectedly strong opposition from enemy air defense forces.

After completing the task, the aircraft is met by the duty team, which removes the film cassettes and delivers them to the photo lab. Here, the still wet film is viewed by codebreakers for a preliminary assessment and preparation of an urgent report. In addition, the crew commander submits a report on the results of visual observation. When the specified objects are detected on the film, it is sent to the photo-reconnaissance technical squadron of the reconnaissance aviation wing. If no objects are found, then the issue of a re-flight is decided. In the photo-reconnaissance technical squadron, the film is deciphered more carefully.

Foreign experts believe that the time spent on deciphering the tape is still large. Therefore, abroad they seek to learn information about the enemy from the aircraft. The value of such information lies in its timeliness and reliability, since the aircraft crew can transmit it within 3-5 minutes after the object is detected. All authorities interested in receiving them can simultaneously receive data on the target. In the Vietnam War, as the foreign press reported, the American command received by radio from reconnaissance aircraft more than two-thirds of the data on moving objects.

Rice. 1. Reconnaissance aircraft RF-4C 2

The capabilities of reconnaissance aircraft in surveying the terrain are determined by the eye by the tactical and technical characteristics of the onboard equipment.

Judging by reports in the foreign press, the main tactical reconnaissance aircraft in the air forces of the main capitalist countries is the RF-4C Phantom 2 (Fig. 1). The crew is two people. It is equipped with modern reconnaissance equipment. Its capabilities when surveying terrain from a height of 100 m are shown in fig. 2. As the altitude increases, the area covered by photography increases.

Rice. Fig. 2. Strips of terrain captured by the reconnaissance equipment of the RF-4C aircraft during its flight at an altitude of 100 m: 1, 2 and 3 - AFA of forward, perspective and planned surveys; 4, 5 - IR and laser equipment; 6 - side-looking radar, which takes pictures of the terrain on both sides of the aircraft; 7 - range of electronic intelligence equipment

Television reconnaissance equipment is not installed on Phantom aircraft. This is due to its weak noise immunity. However, it is used on unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. It was reported that it is planned to be used in conjunction with infrared surveillance equipment.

Thus, as can be judged from the data published in the foreign press, tactical aerial reconnaissance in the theater of operations in the armed forces of NATO countries is of paramount importance. It is organized taking into account the use of all combat aircraft and the fastest transfer of data about the enemy to commanders.