Modern Russian elite. Political Elites of Modern Russia
6.1. On the concepts of the ruling and political elite
Politics, which is one of the spheres of the life of society, is carried out by people who have power resources or political capital. These people are called political class for whom politics becomes a profession. The political class is the ruling class, since it manages and disposes of the resources of power. It is heterogeneous due to differences in the possession of power, the nature of activities, methods of recruitment, etc. Its main difference lies in the institutionalization, which consists in the system of public positions occupied by its representatives. The formation of a political class is carried out in two ways: by appointment to public office (such representatives of the political class are called bureaucracy) and through elections to certain power structures.
In addition to the political class, politics can be influenced by individuals, groups that have either official powers or informal opportunities. T.I. Zaslavskaya calls such a set of individuals and groups ruling elite, to which she classifies politicians holding the highest government posts, the upper echelon of the bureaucracy, and the business elite. Since the most significant resource of the ruling elite is political capital, or power, which gives the legitimate right to manage the property and finances of the state, there is a direct or latent connection of all groups of the ruling elite with state structures.
O. Kryshtanovskaya gives such a definition elite: "This ruling group society, which is the upper stratum of the political class. The elite stands at the top of the state pyramid, controlling the main, strategic resources of power, making decisions at the national level. The elite not only rules society, but also governs the political class, and also creates such forms of state organization in which its positions are exclusive. The political class forms the elite and at the same time is the source of its replenishment. From her point of view, any elite is ruling, i.e. if the elite does not rule, then it is not the elite. The remaining members of the political class - professional managers who are not related to the ruling elite - constitute the political and administrative elite, whose role is to prepare general political decisions and organize their implementation in those structures of the state apparatus that they directly supervise.
Elite is a full-fledged social group that has complex structure. Various parts of a single ruling elite are called sub-elites which can be sectoral (political, economic), functional (administrators, ideologists, security officials), hierarchical (subelite layers), recruitment (appointees, elected). According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, "the elite cannot but be political." At the same time, it is possible to use this term to refer to a sub-elite group whose functions include the direct management of the political process.
In this context, one can characterize political elite as a relatively small stratum of people occupying leadership positions in public authorities, political parties, public organizations and influencing the development and implementation of policy in the country.
The political elite includes high-ranking professional politicians, endowed with power functions and powers, senior civil servants involved in the development and implementation of political programs, social development strategies. It can be divided into groups corresponding to the branches of government - legislative, executive, judicial, and also according to its location - federal and regional.
The authority of the elite is the most important condition for its stay in power and the preservation of power; the ruling elite must be legitimate. When the political or state community ceases to sanction the power of a given political elite, it loses the social basis of its existence and eventually loses power.
Political elites can come to power as a result of elections, having won the political struggle against other organized minorities, claiming the role of political control group. In this case, the interaction between the elite and the masses is legal and legitimate. However, the political elite can come to power in a revolutionary way or through a coup d'état. In such a situation, the new political elite seeks to gain the necessary legitimacy through informal recognition from the unorganized majority. In any case, the relationship of the elite with the masses is based on the principles of leadership and authoritative leadership, and not blind obedience. The legitimation of the political power of the elite distinguishes it from the oligarchy.
In countries with a legitimate existence of power, the content and boundaries of the functions performed by the political elite are determined by the constitution of the country. However, in real life there are frequent cases of discrepancies between constitutions and real power. This is possible in the event of a sharp change in the political situation, when the changes are not yet reflected in the constitution, as well as in the event of deviation from the norms of the constitution. For example, the Constitution of the USSR proclaimed that power at all levels belongs to the Soviets, but the real political picture did not confirm this.
6.2. Characteristics and functions of the ruling Russian elite
The elite is not uniform. Within the ruling elite there is a small cohesive group standing at the very top of the power pyramid. T. Zaslavskaya calls it the “upper (sub-elite) layer”, O. Kryshtanovskaya - “top elite”, L. Shevtsova - “super-elite”. This group, as a rule, consists of 20-30 people and is the most closed, close-knit and hard-to-reach for research.
To the most important characteristics of the elite researchers attribute cohesion, awareness of their group interests, a developed network of informal communications, the presence of esoteric norms of behavior and code language, hidden from outside observers and transparent to the initiated, the absence of a clear line separating official activity and private life.
For Russia, as for other post-communist states, there are common features that determine the peculiarity of the ruling elite: strengthening the role of the executive branch, increasing the importance of informal ties and procedures, accelerating the circulation of elites, exacerbating intra-elite rivalry and increasing mobility.
Under elite mobility understand the entry into the elite, the movement of personnel within the political system and the exit from the elite. Thus, mobility can be divided into upward, horizontal and downward mobility. Elite mobility in Russia has significant differences from the mobility of other social groups, which, according to O. Kryshtanovskaya, is due to a number of factors:
1. Higher competition between candidates for a position compared to other groups, which occurs at all levels of the political hierarchy.
2. Uncertainty of requirements for candidates who must meet conditions that are not announced anywhere.
3. Elite mobility is subject to much more regulation and planning than other professional mobility, since there is an institutionalized personnel reserve to replenish vacant positions.
4. Mobility of the elite is regulated not so much labor law how many intra-group norms.
5. Unlike all other professions, joining the elite is endowing the individual with primary political capital, which he can develop or leave unchanged.
Some researchers note changes in the type of organization of the power elite. So, O.V. Gaman-Golutvina distinguishes two types: bureaucratic and feudal (oligarchic). Bureaucratic is based on the delimitation of the functions of economic and political management, oligarchic is based on their merger. Historically, the basis of the Russian state was the universality of duties to the state, which implied the service principle of recruiting elites, which ensured the priority of the political elite over the economic one. As a result of the reforms carried out, the service principle began to be replaced by the oligarchic one. As a result, the model of elite formation was reproduced, which is characteristic of the feudal, and not modern West. One of the most characteristic features of today's ruling elite in Russia is the shadow merging of state power with business. This process covered all levels of state power. Place and connections in the political system have become the main factor in the multiplication of property, and property has become a powerful source of political influence.
For the maintenance of political functions big influence provides a political regime. T.I. Zaslavskaya considers the development, legitimization and implementation of a general strategy for reforming society to be the main functions of the elite in the transformation process. A.V.Malkoidentifies the following most significant functions of the political elite:
strategic - determination of a political program of action by generating new ideas that reflect the interests of society, developing a concept for reforming the country;
organizational- implementation of the developed course in practice, the implementation of political decisions in life;
integrative - strengthening the stability and unity of society, the stability of its political and economic systems, preventing and resolving conflict situations, ensuring consensus on fundamental principles the life of the state.
To these functions, one should also add communicative - effective representation, expression and reflection in political programs ah interests and needs of various social strata and population groups, which also involves the protection of social goals, ideals and values characteristic of society.
In order to effectively implement these functions, the elite must be characterized by such qualities as a modern mentality, a state type of thinking, readiness to protect national interests, etc.
6.3. Formation of the federal elite
In the political history of Russia XX - early XXI centuries The ruling elite has repeatedly undergone significant transformations. The first significant "revolutionary-political transformation" in the words of S.A. Granovsky took place in October 1917, when a party of professional revolutionaries came to power. The Bolsheviks monopolized power and established the dictatorship of the proletariat. After the death of V.I. Even under Lenin, a special ruling class - nomenclature(a list of leadership positions, appointments to which were approved by party bodies). However, it was Stalin who perfected the process of reproduction of the Soviet elite. The nomenklatura was built on a strictly hierarchical principle with a high degree of integration based on a common ideology, with a low level of competition and a low degree of conflict between intra-elite groups. In the mid 1980s. the processes of structural disintegration intensified in the ruling elite, which led to an intra-elite value and personnel conflict associated with a change in political course. By the end of the 1980s. the process of rapid formation of a counter-elite begins, which included leaders and activists of various democratic movements, representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia. At the same time, there is a change in the mechanism of elite recruitment. Instead of the nomenklatura principle, the democratic principle of election is being affirmed.
The German scientist E. Schneider, who studies the political system of modern Russia, believes that the new Russian political elite was formed in the bowels of the old Soviet system as a kind of counter-elite in various groups at the federal level. The beginning was laid on May 29, 1990, when B. Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, who also assumed the functions of the head of state. The second step followed after the election of B. Yeltsin as President of Russia on June 12, 1991. B. Yeltsin created his own administration, numbering 1.5 thousand people, and approaching in size the apparatus of the former Central Committee of the CPSU. The third step towards the formation of the central Russian political elite is the election of deputies to the State Duma and the Federation Council on December 12, 1993. The parliamentary elections of 1995 and the presidential elections of 1996 were summed up to the fourth stage. That is, E. Schneider connects the process of forming a new Russian political elite with the election process that has become characteristic of post-Soviet Russia.
An important factor that had far-reaching consequences for the ruling elite was the ban on the CPSU in 1991, which caused the liquidation of the traditional institutions of Soviet power, the liquidation of the institution of the nomenklatura, and the transfer of powers of the allied authorities to Russian ones.
Researchers distinguish between two stages in the formation of the post-Soviet elite: "Yeltsin's" and "Putin's". So, O. Kryshtanovskaya - the author of the book "Anatomy of the Russian Elite" - notes that during the nine years of his reign (1991-1999) B. Yeltsin could not integrate the supreme power. At the same time, no state structure has become dominant. In a power vacuum, informal groups and clans assumed state functions, competing with each other for the right to speak on behalf of the president. According to the scientist, “in the Yeltsin period there was a collapse of the supreme power. The diffusion of power has led not to a democratic separation of powers, but to managerial chaos.”
The "Putin" stage is characterized by the elimination of the causes that led to the destruction of the administrative vertical under B. Yeltsin. The new president returned to the federal center a significant amount of power over the regions, expanded the base of support for the center in the field and outlined ways to restore the functioning of the mechanisms of territorial administration, while not formally violating democratic principles. A controlled, orderly system of executive power was created. If under B. Yeltsin power was dispersed, moving from the center to the regions, then under V. Putin, power began to return to the center again, centrifugal tendencies gave way to centripetal ones.
The researchers note that the modern ruling elite of Russia differs from the Soviet one in many important qualities: genesis, recruitment models, socio-professional composition, internal organization, political mentality, the nature of relations with society, the level of reformatory potential.
The personal composition of the political elite is changing, but its job structure remains virtually unchanged. The political elite of Russia is represented by the president, prime minister, members of the government, deputies of the Federal Assembly, judges of the Constitutional, Supreme, Supreme arbitration courts, the office of the presidential administration, members of the Security Council, plenipotentiaries of the president in the federal districts, heads of power structures in the subjects of the federation, the highest diplomatic and military corps, some other government positions, the leadership of political parties and large public associations and other influential people.
Top political elite includes leading political leaders and those who hold high positions in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government (the immediate environment of the president, prime minister, speakers of parliament, heads of state authorities, leading political parties, factions in parliament) . Numerically, this is a rather limited circle of people who make the most significant political decisions for the whole society, concerning the fate of millions of people who are significant for the entire state. Belonging to the highest elite is determined by reputation (advisers, consultants to the president) or position in the power structure. According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, members of the Security Council, which in modern Russia is the prototype of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, should be attributed to the top leadership.
The size of the ruling elite is not constant. Thus, the nomenclature of the Central Committee of the CPSU (in 1981) included approximately 400 thousand people. The highest nomenclature (the nomenclature of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU) included approximately 900 people. The nomenclature of the secretariat of the Central Committee consisted of 14-16 thousand people. The accounting and control nomenclature (the nomenclature of departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU) included 250 thousand people. The rest was made up of the nomenklatura of the lower party committees. Thus, the political class in Soviet time was approximately 0.1% of total strength the population of the country.
In 2000, the size of the political class (the number of civil servants) tripled (while the country's population halved) and began to amount to 1,200,000 people. or 0.8% of the total population. The number of the ruling elite at the same time increased from 900 to 1060 people.
According to the same surveys, the main suppliers to the ruling elite in 1991 were the intelligentsia (53.5%) and business leaders (about 13%). During the transitional period of Yeltsin's rule (1991-1993), the role of workers, peasants, intellectuals, economic managers, employees of ministries and departments fell. The importance of others, on the contrary, increased: regional administrations, employees of security and law enforcement agencies, and, especially, businessmen.
Gradually, parliamentary and governmental careers became two different ways of sewerage upwards, which was not typical for the Soviet elite, for which a parliamentary mandate was an appropriate attribute of nomenklatura status. Now there is a new professional group within the elite - elected officials.
In the absence of state support, weak social groups - workers, peasants - were almost completely ousted from the political field, the proportion of women and youth fell sharply, high percent participation in power which was previously artificially supported by the CPSU.
For parliamentarians, there remains a fairly high percentage of those who entered the elite back in Soviet times. In the State Duma of the first convocation (1993) there were 37.1% of such people, the third convocation (1999) - 32%; in the Federation Council in 1993 - 60.1%, in 2002 - 39.9%.
Researchers notice another feature: if in the early 1990s. the share of party and Komsomol functionaries fell, then their share among the deputies of both chambers grew to almost 40%. After 10 years of the post-Soviet period, involvement in the nomenclature has ceased to be a stain on a political career. A number of studies (S.A. Granovsky, E. Schneider) show that the foundation of the new Russian ruling elite is mainly made up of representatives of the second and third echelons of the old Soviet nomenklatura, transferring the special knowledge and experience that it needs to the new political elite.
As part of the new political elite in Russia, there have been significant changes in educational, age and professional plans.
Thus, the government and the elite in the regions have become almost ten years younger. At the same time, the parliament has aged a little, which is explained by its artificial rejuvenation during the Brezhnev period. The termination of quotas by age freed the highest legislative power of the country, both from Komsomol members and from quota young workers and collective farmers.
B. Yeltsin brought young scientists, brilliantly educated city politicians, economists, and lawyers closer to him. In his environment, the proportion of rural residents fell sharply. Despite the fact that the elite has always been one of the most educated groups in society, nevertheless, in the 1990s. there was a sharp jump in the educational qualification of the elite. Thus, well-known scientists and public figures are part of B. Yeltsin's inner circle. More than half of the presidential team of B.N. Yeltsin consisted of doctors of sciences. There was also a high percentage of those with a degree in the government and among party leaders.
The changes affected not only the level of education of the elite, but also the nature of education. The Brezhnev elite was technocratic. The vast majority of the leaders of the party and state in the 1980s. had an engineering, military or agricultural education. Under M. Gorbachev, the percentage of technocrats decreased, but not due to an increase in the number of humanitarians, but due to an increase in the proportion of party workers who received higher party education. And, finally, a sharp decrease in the proportion of people who received technical education (almost 1.5 times) occurred under B. Yeltsin. Moreover, this happens against the backdrop of the same educational system in Russia, where most universities still have a technical profile.
Under V. Putin, the proportion of people in uniform in the ruling elite increased significantly: every fourth representative of the elite became a military man (under B. Yeltsin, the share of the military in the elite was 11.2%, under V. Putin - 25.1%). This trend coincided with the expectations of society, since the reputation of the military as honest, responsible, politically unbiased professionals favorably distinguished them from other elite groups, whose image was associated with theft, corruption, and demagoguery. The massive involvement of the military in the civil service was also caused by the lack of a personnel reserve. The main distinguishing features of Putin's elite were the decline in the proportion of "intellectuals" with academic degrees (under B. Yeltsin - 52.5%, under V. Putin - 20.9%), the decrease in the already extremely low representation of women in the elite (from 2 .9% to 1.7%), the "provincialization" of the elite and a sharp increase in the number of military men, who began to be called "siloviki" (representatives of the armed forces, federal service security, border troops, the Ministry of the Interior, etc.).
The last wave of the ruling elite is also characterized by an increase in the share of countrymen of the head of state (from 13.2% under B. Yeltsin to 21.3% under V. Putin) and an increase in the share of businessmen (from 1.6% under B. Yeltsin to 11.3 % under V. Putin).
6.4. Regional political elite
On the regional level a new political elite was formed in different subjects at different times. This process was associated with the transition to an elective system for the formation of the regional elite. The heads of executive power in Moscow and Leningrad, as well as the president of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, were elected on June 12, 1991. After the failure of the putsch on August 21, 1991, the position of the head of the administration as the head of the executive power was introduced in the territories, regions and districts by a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The presidential decree of November 25, 1991 determined the procedure for appointing heads of administrations. By January 1992 new government established in almost all regions, regions and autonomous regions. True, it was only partially new. Half of the heads of administrations were appointed from among the former heads of executive or representative bodies, about a fifth consisted of employees of the Soviet apparatus for more than low level and only a third consisted of new appointees - directors of enterprises, employees of scientific institutions and other representatives of the non-political sphere.
In the autonomous republics, the head was the president, who was elected in popular elections, which contributed to the transformation of the Soviet model into a democratic one. By the end of 1994, most of the leaders of the autonomous republics were elected by popular vote.
In 1992-1993 there was a struggle between the president and the Supreme Council for influence on the formation of the heads of regional administrations. This struggle ended after the dissolution of the representative body of power with the adoption of a presidential decree “On the procedure for appointing and dismissing heads of administrations of territories, regions, autonomous districts, cities federal significance”, issued on October 7, 1993. The decree stated that the heads of administrations were appointed and dismissed by the President Russian Federation on the proposal of the government of the Russian Federation.
However, electoral trends were gaining momentum. Therefore, in a number of regions, as an exception, back in 1992-1993. the supreme power allowed the elections of heads of administrations. This process continued to develop and ended with the adoption of a presidential decree on September 17, 1995, which determined the term for the election of heads of administrations of the subjects of the federation appointed by the president - December 1996. Thus, the transition to the elective system of executive heads of the subjects of the federation was carried out. Last appointment Head of Administration took place in July 1997 in the Kemerovo region.
The formation of the regional elite was continued by the elections of people's representatives, which, after the dissolution of councils at all levels at the end of 1993, became full-fledged legislative bodies of power.
The elections were one of the most significant achievements of democracy in Russia, which led to profound changes in the entire political system. The consequences of such a transition were both positive and negative. On the one hand, a basis was created for the separation of powers, the formation civil society, creation of equal subjects of the federation. On the other hand, the election of the heads of subjects destabilized the political situation, allowing the governors to become independent from the center. There was a danger of a new wave of "parade of sovereignties", which could end in the collapse of the country. The federal government has practically no levers of influence on the regional elite.
In December 1995, the principle of formation of the Federation Council changed. In accordance with the new regulation, the upper house of the Russian parliament began to be formed by delegating two leaders of the subject of the federation - the heads of the executive and legislative branches. In the Federation Council, interregional associations began to form on territorial and economic principles which threatened the center with the loss of political and financial control.
To prevent negative trends, new president Vladimir Putin initiated political reforms in order to strengthen the vertical of power. In 2000, the procedure for forming the Federation Council changed: they began to delegate to the upper house of parliament one representative each from the executive and legislative authorities of the subject of the federation, but not the first persons, as was the case before. At the end of 2004 was adopted the federal law, which changed the procedure for electing the heads of the subjects of the federation: they began to be elected by the relevant legislative assemblies on the proposal of the president of the country. The last nationwide elections for the head of the administration were held in March 2005 in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
As a result, power federal center was restored, and the heads of regions became completely dependent on the president. The danger of the collapse of the country was overcome by abandoning the democratic procedure of popular elections.
An analysis of regional leaders indicates that the vast majority of governors fell into the elite long before they were appointed to the post of head of the region. So, according to the data given in the study by O. Kryshtanovskaya, in 2002 the average number of years in the elite of regional leaders before their appointment (election) as the head of the region was 15 years, and the average number of years in the post of head of a subject of the federation was 6 years.
The average age of a regional leader under L. Brezhnev was 59 years, under M. Gorbachev - 52 years, under B. Yeltsin - 49 years, under V. Putin - 54 years.
The weight of the Soviet nomenklatura still remains very high. In 2002, 65.9% of the heads of the subjects of the federation were previously members of the Soviet nomenclature (in 1992 - 78.2%, in 1997 - 72.7%).
As O. Kryshtanovskaya notes, “the paradox is that it was not elections, but appointments that brought new people to the top.”
Characterizing professional quality regional political elite, many researchers note its redistributive (rental) attitude to economic activity. At the same time, one should note such a trend as the promotion of an influential layer of intellectual, political, cultural, professional, highly educated leaders who form the core of the regional political elite. As S.A. Granovsky notes, “the nomenklatura sources of the current government, which are not easy to get rid of, are a brake on reforms that impede the true democratization of society, the transformation not only of the political, but also of all other spheres of our life. Russia has not yet formed an elite that would correspond to the new statehood that has already proved itself.
An important characteristic of the elite is its mentality. Practical orientations and their real implementation in the affairs of the regional political and administrative elites are reflected both in their own worldview and in the assessments of the population. Describing the mental features of the regional administrative and political elites, one should note their federalist thinking, the main parameters of which are the preservation of the integrity of the Russian Federation, the problems of equality of all subjects, the priority of federal laws over republican ones.
One can state a significant weakening of centro-paternalistic hopes among the regional political elite. In the minds of the elites, hopes for the possibilities of the center and own forces in the development of the economy and economic ties almost leveled. In many regions, the mood of "reliance on one's own strength" already prevails. Thus, ethno-federalist, economic-federalist and political-federalist factors turn out to be conjugated into one complex and are now acting in the same direction, contributing to the faster formation of the federalist paradigm of thinking.
On the other hand, as the most important characteristics of the political mentality of the ruling elite, many researchers emphasize its unscrupulousness and "servility". This leads to unconditional loyalty to the President, on the one hand, and a stable priority of clan interests over national interests, on the other.
6.5. Circulation and reproduction of the elite
Two waves of renewal of the upper layers can be distinguished. The first of these was connected with the invasion of the reformers. The second marked the arrival of the counter-reformers, whose actions should be regarded as the normal completion of the reform cycle. In classical images, it looks like this: “young lions” are being replaced by “old foxes”.
Models circulation and reproduction elite groups should be supplemented with a third element - the expansion of the elite composition. The increase in the elite ranks in the first half of the 1990s. happened more than twice. There has been a significant increase in the number of positions that are considered "elite". This is due to the growth in the number of new economic structures, whose leaders can be attributed to the new economic elite. But it is no less true and due to the growth of political and administrative structures.
The acceleration of the circulation of Russian elites is an obvious fact. It began during the reign of M. Gorbachev due to the promotion of numerous representatives of the so-called pre-nomenklatura groups from various public sectors (mainly former leaders middle level - heads of departments, divisions, services).
In the 1990s accelerated pace elite traffic(the movement of the elite - a term introduced into circulation by O. Kryshtanovskaya) required a change in approaches to working with personnel. Under B. Yeltsin, there were frequent resignations, reshuffles of high-ranking officials, whom he first brought closer to himself, then became disappointed and changed them to others. The rapidity of personnel replacements led to the destruction of the personnel reserve that helped maintain succession. There was a need to create some reservations for high-ranking officials who had fallen out of power. As a result, such structures as "state business" were created - commercial organizations, based on the resources of the state and having multiple privileges compared to private business, as well as foundations, associations, socio-political organizations, the leadership of which was taken by retirees. In recent years, deputy activity has been acting as a kind of reservation, which provides the necessary honor to all former officials.
With the widespread use of alternative elections, the ruling elite no longer had full control for the withdrawal of unwanted personalities from the elite. Officials who lost their positions in executive bodies could be elected to the federal or regional parliament, go into big business and influence the political situation with the help of economic resources, or create a political party and actively participate in political life.
If in Soviet times, resignation meant "political death", then in the post-Soviet period, returns to power began to occur. Thus, in the government elite in 1992, the share of return was 12.1%, for the government in 1999 - 8%.
Under V. Putin, the personnel situation begins to change gradually. The personnel reserve is being restored, public service, and loyalty to the regime becomes a guarantee of status stability. Administrative reform, launched in 2004 and designed to reduce the number of bureaucrats, only restructured departments and significantly increased the salaries of civil servants. In the 2000s increases not vertical, but horizontal mobility in the elite. So, former governors become members of the Federation Council, former ministers become deputies, former officials of the presidential administration go into state business.
As studies show, for most indicators, the nature of appointments and dismissals under V. Putin has undergone minor changes: the age of entry and exit, the average number of years in office, the proportion of people of retirement age among retirees are approximately the same as under the previous president. But the main thing is that the atmosphere has changed: the growing self-confidence of the political elite, the basis of which is the high level of public confidence in the president.
Changing the norms and rules of power interactions largely stems from the process elite reconversion(i.e. the transfer of capital from one form to another). The decisive element of this process was the "capitalization" of elite groups. It manifested itself primarily in two ways. First, part of the political elite converted its political influence into economic capital. Representatives of the political nomenklatura themselves entered the new business elite or patronized close relatives in the economic sphere. Secondly, "capitalization" touched the political elite itself - through the expansion of corruption. Corruption has always existed, but it is in modern Russia that it has become larger and more open than ever.
As a result, politics became associated with the most profitable business. On the one hand, large entrepreneurs seek state protection and try to obtain property and privileges from the state. On the other hand, politicians are no longer satisfied with the usual trappings of power and fame. Their status positions must be backed by receipts in private bank accounts. As a result, big businessmen become politically influential people, and politicians turn into very wealthy people.
The next process, which deserves special attention, is connected with the mutual relations of various elite groups. Two opposite tendencies usually collide here - fragmentation and consolidation of elites. The fragmentation hypothesis states that there is a process of pluralization of elites and the emergence of numerous pressure groups and interests.
Confrontation between the legislature, presidential structures and the government, federal and regional bodies government controlled, party groups of the left and right, political, military and economic elites, industry lobbies representing various economic complexes - all this contributes to the situation of power pluralism. This situation can be seen as a manifestation of the democratization of society, but more often it is seen as evidence of a power vacuum and a lack of effective governance.
The struggle for power between the "old" and "new" elites also leads to fragmentation. The goal of the first is to retain power, the second is to seize key positions in the state and oust their opponents from their posts.
Opposite assessments are expressed within the framework of the hypothesis of the consolidation of elites. It argues that the dividing lines between different elite groups are increasingly blurred, and power is concentrated in the hands of a limited number of subjects. Legislatures have no special power; federal bodies retained enough administrative and financial influence over the regions to determine policy at the regional level; the military elite is still loyal and subservient to political forces; "left" and "right" party groupsdrift towards the political "centre".
The confrontation between the political and economic elites should also not be exaggerated. On the contrary, the stage of transformation of the Russian elite is characterized by the integration of the political and economic elite. The reason for this rapprochement lies in mutual benefit: the economic elite is interested in the appropriate distribution of budget funds and federal investments, a certain personnel policy, making political decisions that are beneficial for themselves, and the political elite wants to benefit from the transformation of the economy.
Thus, despite the visible opposition, there is a consolidation of elite groups.
6.6. Political corporatism
in the Western political elitethe priority is social origin, which determines the starting opportunities, conditions and guidelines for primary and secondary socialization, in contrast to the Russian one, where this factor is replaced by a previous connection with the nomenklatura elite and commitment to a leader - leader. In other words, corporate origin.
American political scientist F. Schmitter considers corporatism“as one of the possible mechanisms that allow associations of interests to mediate between their members (individuals, families, firms, local communities, groups) and various counterparties (primarily state and government bodies).” Corporatism organically fits into the democratic legal order, as evidenced by the spread of this phenomenon in countries with developed democratic institutions, and with significant relapses in countries of unconsolidated democracy. It is especially negative in the political sphere.
Political corporatism means the dominance in the political system of a set of persons united to achieve, implement and maintain state power. The interaction of political corporations allows them to divide the power market, not allowing representatives of the general population to access it. There is a mechanism of “linking” and coordination of interests between corporations. Corporations can be built according to social-class, professional, family-countryman-mu and other characteristics, but they are always based on the unity of interests. Political system modern Russia is an example of interacting corporations.
Political corporations, in order to be effective, must have a certain degree of monopoly on the representation of interests. This is necessary from the point of view of influencing political decisions, since the state power, when forming the goals and objectives of its activities (especially in the transition period, when their leading groups are formed from a plurality of interests), inevitably takes into account only those groups interests and corporations that have the appropriate resources, i.e. able to mobilize and control large sections of the population. Thus, certain corporatist representations are formed, and the state becomes a “corporatist state”. The basis of his policy in this case is not the “public interest”, but the interest of that political corporation whose representatives in this moment are at the helm of state power or have the greatest influence on it.
The most powerful corporations in modern Russia are those that are based on the foundation of financial and industrial groups that have huge financial resources, control the most important enterprises and industries, gradually monopolize the media market and thereby are able to influence the decision-making process on government and parliamentary channels.
Feature of the corporatist system in Russialies in the fact that it is built on the basis of the interdependence of the most influential interest groups and the state and is of a contractual nature. So, for example, the former government of V. Chernomyrdin, patronizing the Gazprom corporation, received in return the opportunity to solve problems in social policy with its help. State power in Russia, motivated by the need to overcome the crisis, provided opportunities for such a monopolization of interests in exchange for political and financial support. Therefore, corporations should be considered as the main pillar of the political regime in Russia in the 1990s.
T.I. Zaslavskaya notes that “as a result of the “market” reform of the basic institutions, the state has dissolved into private political and financial corporations… There is a certain ruling clan behind each group of ministries, regions, and industrial complexes in Russia.”
As a result of the activities of political corporations, state power may become hostage to a group of political and economic monopolists and be subjected to targeted pressure from representatives of private interests, which can lead to the oligarchization of the political regime and increased social tension in the country.
In the 2000s a new corporatist structure has emerged, associated with belonging to the special services. In this structure, there is a corporate spirit of unity inherent in the security staff. President V. Putin's statement: "there are no former Chekists" - is a confirmation of the corporate spirit of the special services, which cements the power. In such an elite, solidarity prevails. According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, despite the fact that "the whole country is becoming an arena of operational work", ... "such a government is doubly stable, especially since it is held together by the ideology of patriotism, diluted, however, with liberal economic ideas."
The Russian scientist S.P. Peregudov, summing up F. Schmitter's thoughts on corporatism, singled out several main positions that could make corporatism "new", not undermining, but strengthening democracy and social world. “Firstly, it is the presence of independent interest groups independent of the state and their focus on interacting with it in order to strengthen social partnership and increase economic efficiency. Secondly, it is this or that degree of institutionalization of this interaction and the ability of the state to “impose” priorities dictated by national interests during the negotiation process. And, finally, thirdly, it is the observance by all parties of the obligations assumed and the corresponding system of control over their implementation. These principles, transferred to the political sphere, could prevent or weaken Negative consequences political corporatism.
6.7. Privileges as a Sign of the Political Elite
Privilege- these are legal benefits, first of all, for power structures and officials, which they need for the full implementation of their powers.
Privileges are one of the most important features of the political elite. exclusive rights and special features are closely related to the elite because it includes groups of people with natural talents, bright talents, special ideological, social and political qualities that determine the special role of people who perform the most important functions of managing society. The political elite, actively participating in the exercise of state power or in direct influence on it, expends a lot of energy, effort, and resources. In order to manage more effectively, the elite needs appropriate sources of replenishment of this energy. Therefore, the position of the elite is reinforced by its prestige, privileges, benefits, so it enjoys significant material and spiritual benefits.
Consequently, the formation of the political elite is stimulated by the fact that high status managerial activity is associated with the possibility of obtaining various kinds of material and moral privileges, advantages, honor, glory.
As R. Mills writes, the ruling elite “consists of people occupying such positions that give them the opportunity to rise above the environment of ordinary people and make decisions that have major consequences ... This is due to the fact that they command the most important hierarchical institutions and organizations of modern society ... They occupy strategic command posts in the social system, in which the effective means are concentrated, providing the power, wealth and fame that they use.
However, due to the limited resources of power (material and spiritual wealth, values), representatives of the elite, as a rule, do not give up privileges on a voluntary basis. In order to win this war, the elites are forced to rally and group. The very high position of the political elite in society determines the need for its cohesion, group interest in maintaining its privileged status. “For the elitist paradigm,” emphasizes G.K. Ashin, is characterized by the assertion that society cannot function normally without the elite, that it has the right to a privileged position, moreover, it must vigilantly protect its privileges from “encroachment” by the masses.
A.V.Malko notes another factor, which determines the close connection of the elite with privileges. It consists in the fact that this group of persons personifies power, which (due to the fact that it is associated with the distribution of values and resources) opens up wide opportunities for realizing the individual interests of the elite and its environment. Consequently, the struggle for privileges is largely a struggle for power, opportunities, resources, and influence.
After the February and October revolutions of 1917, there was a massive abolition of feudal unjust, in many respects already obsolete privileges, and a change of political elites took place. In addition, legal advantages, exclusive rights for the bodies and officials of the Soviet state began to be designated in the legislation to a greater extent through the concept of "benefits". The unfolding struggle against class and estate privileges, incompatible with the ideals of equality and justice, with the principles of socialist construction, led to the fact that the term "privilege" began to be perceived as purely reflecting illegal advantages. In this connection, he was practically deleted from the law-making circulation.
However, contrary to the Marxist teaching, in Soviet society from the very beginning there was a stratification of the population into classes occupying different positions in social structure and, accordingly, having different opportunities in the distribution of life's blessings. Inequality in this respect was not some sort of deviation from some correct norms prescribed by the classics of Marxism, but a manifestation of the objective laws of social life. By the end of the Brezhnev period, the class stratification of Soviet society reached a high level. A trend towards a decrease in the vertical dynamics of the population has become apparent; the possibilities of transition from one layer to the layers of a higher level were reduced. Representatives of the higher echelons of power rarely descended to the lower ones, as they had various privileges and opportunities to acquire the blessings of life due to their position in society.
Such privileges, received primarily by the nomenklatura, were not enshrined in the rule of law or were established in closed decisions. These advantages included the following: the distribution of housing, summer cottages, vouchers to sanatoriums and prestigious holiday homes, scarce goods, etc.
The new political elite, headed by B.N. Yeltsin, despite the fact that it came to power, including on the wave of the struggle against privileges, not only did not give up the existing privileges, but even increased them.
Privilege System, as S.V. Polenin, received, unfortunately, “widespread not only in the years of stagnation and deformation of socialism, but even more so in the current, democratic period. It's about about the benefits, with the help of which conditions of increased comfort of life are created for a selected circle of the “most responsible” persons, isolated on the basis of their belonging or proximity to those in power. In this case, benefits are not based on objective grounds and turn into ordinary privileges, the existence of which contradicts the idea of forming rule of law and undermines both the principle of equality of citizens and the principle of social justice, under the slogan of which they are usually established.
A significant part of the ruling modern Russian elite, not possessing high managerial and moral qualities, having received enormous privileges as a result of the nomenklatura privatization of a significant part of state property, was unable to adequately govern the country and was largely to blame for the crisis that swept society in the 1990s. .
In a truly democratic country, illegal and excessive privileges must be abolished.Must be incorporated by topic regulations, dedicated to benefits for senior officials, including the President of the Russian Federation, and then publish for general information and control over their observance. In addition, the question of careful control over the existing and emerging political elite (through the institution of elections, referendums, reports of deputies to voters, the media, public opinion polls, etc.) is increasingly being raised so that it does not turn into a closed ruling privileged caste, but worked for the benefit of society, the majority of Russian citizens.
A truly democratic political system can be considered that implements the rule of the people, whose influence on politics is decisive, while the influence of the elite is limited, limited by law, a political system in which the elite is controlled by the people. Therefore, if we cannot ignore the thesis that the presence of an elite is a real or potential threat to democracy, then the way out, the condition for the preservation of democracy, is in the constant control of the people over the elite, limiting the privileges of the elite only to those that are functionally necessary for exercise of its powers, maximum publicity, the possibility of unlimited criticism of the elite, the separation of powers and the relative autonomy of political, economic, cultural and other elites, the presence of opposition, the struggle and competition of elites, the arbiter of which (and not only during elections) the people come forward, in other words, everything that in its totality constitutes the modern democratic process.
It is important for Russia to shape public opinion in such a way that the political elite itself begins to limit itself to a number of privileges that, from a moral point of view, look clearly disproportionate against the backdrop of the poor majority of the population.
For the modern Russian state, the problem of becoming a qualified, highly professional political elite that the population could trust is becoming more and more acute. Such an elite needs to be created by Russian society, making significant efforts in order to use democratic and legal norms and mechanisms, including through legal and justified privileges, to carry out a kind of “selection” of new politicians who have state thinking and are able to take personal responsibility for change in the country.
Basic concepts: reproduction of the elite, the highest political elite, elite consolidation, corporatism, elite mobility, nomenclature, political corporatism, political elite, political class, ruling elite, privileges, regional elite, elite reconversion, subelite, federal elite, political elite functions, elite fragmentation, elite characteristics, elite circulation, elite, elite traffic.
Questions for self-control:
1. What is the main difference between the political class?
2. What is the ratio of the political class and the ruling elite?
3. What are the different parts of the single ruling elite called?
4. Define the political elite.
5. What are the most important characteristics of the elite.
6. Describe the mobility of the elite.
7. List the functions of the political elite.
8. What is the difference between the "Yeltsin" and "Putin" stages of the formation of the political elite?
9. Who belongs to the political elite in Russia?
10. What changes have taken place in the composition of the new Russian political elite?
11. What are the main features of the ruling elite formed under V. Putin?
12. Name the main stages in the formation of the modern regional elite in Russia.
13. What reforms did Vladimir Putin initiate in order to strengthen the power vertical?
14. Describe the regional political elite of Russia?
15. What is Elite Reconversion?
16. Explain the relationship between fragmentation and consolidation of the elite.
17. What is the essence of political corporatism?
18. What are the privileges of the elite?
19. What are the necessary conditions for the democratic exercise of the privilege of elite groups?
Literature:
Ashin G.K.Change of elites // Social sciences and modernity. 1995. No. 1.
Ashin G.K.Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological research. 1998. No. 1.
Gaman-Golutvina O.V. Bureaucracy or oligarchy? // Where does it go Russia?.. Power, society, personality. M., 2000.
Granovsky S.A.Applied Political Science: Textbook. M., 2004.
Zaslavskaya T.I.Modern Russian Society: The Social Mechanism of Transformation: Textbook. M., 2004.
Kretov B.I., Peregudov S.P. New Russian corporatism: democratic or bureaucratic? // Polis. 1997. No. 2. P.24.
Ashin G.K. Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological research. 1998. No. 1. P.11.
Polenina S.V. Law as a Means of Implementing the Tasks of Forming a Legal State // Theory of Law: New Ideas. M., 1993. Issue 3. P.16.
Ashin G.K. Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological research. 1998. No. 1. pp.13-14.
6.1. On the concepts of the ruling and political elite
Politics, which is one of the spheres of the life of society, is carried out by people who have power resources or political capital. These people are called political class for whom politics becomes a profession. The political class is the ruling class, since it manages and disposes of the resources of power. It is heterogeneous due to differences in the possession of power, the nature of activities, methods of recruitment, etc. Its main difference lies in the institutionalization, which consists in the system of public positions occupied by its representatives. The formation of a political class is carried out in two ways: by appointment to public office (such representatives of the political class are called bureaucracy) and through elections to certain power structures.
In addition to the political class, politics can be influenced by individuals, groups that have either official powers or informal opportunities. T.I. Zaslavskaya calls such a set of individuals and groups ruling elite, to which she classifies politicians holding the highest government posts, the upper echelon of the bureaucracy, and the business elite. Since the most significant resource of the ruling elite is political capital, or power, which gives the legitimate right to manage the property and finances of the state, there is a direct or latent connection of all groups of the ruling elite with state structures.
O. Kryshtanovskaya gives such a definition elite: “it is the ruling group of society, which is the upper stratum of the political class. The elite stands at the top of the state pyramid, controlling the main, strategic resources of power, making decisions at the national level. The elite not only rules society, but also governs the political class, and also creates such forms of state organization in which its positions are exclusive. The political class forms the elite and at the same time is the source of its replenishment. From her point of view, any elite is ruling, i.e. if the elite does not rule, then it is not the elite. The remaining members of the political class - professional managers who are not related to the ruling elite - constitute the political and administrative elite, whose role is to prepare general political decisions and organize their implementation in those structures of the state apparatus that they directly supervise.
The elite is a full-fledged social group with a complex structure. Various parts of a single ruling elite are called sub-elites which can be sectoral (political, economic), functional (administrators, ideologists, security officials), hierarchical (subelite layers), recruitment (appointees, elected). According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, "the elite cannot but be political." At the same time, it is possible to use this term to refer to a sub-elite group whose functions include the direct management of the political process.
In this context, one can characterize political elite as a relatively small stratum of people occupying leadership positions in government bodies, political parties, public organizations and influencing the development and implementation of policy in the country.
The political elite includes high-ranking professional politicians, endowed with power functions and powers, senior civil servants involved in the development and implementation of political programs, social development strategies. It can be divided into groups corresponding to the branches of government - legislative, executive, judicial, and also according to its location - federal and regional.
The authority of the elite is the most important condition for its stay in power and the preservation of power; the ruling elite must be legitimate. When the political or state community ceases to sanction the power of a given political elite, it loses the social basis of its existence and eventually loses power.
Political elites can come to power as a result of elections, having won the political struggle against other organized minorities, claiming the role of political control group. In this case, the interaction between the elite and the masses is legal and legitimate. However, the political elite can come to power in a revolutionary way or through a coup d'état. In such a situation, the new political elite seeks to gain the necessary legitimacy through informal recognition from the unorganized majority. In any case, the relationship of the elite with the masses is based on the principles of leadership and authoritative leadership, and not blind obedience. The legitimation of the political power of the elite distinguishes it from the oligarchy.
In countries with a legitimate existence of power, the content and boundaries of the functions performed by the political elite are determined by the constitution of the country. However, in real life there are frequent cases of discrepancies between constitutions and real power. This is possible in the event of a sharp change in the political situation, when the changes are not yet reflected in the constitution, as well as in the event of deviation from the norms of the constitution. For example, the Constitution of the USSR proclaimed that power at all levels belongs to the Soviets, but the real political picture did not confirm this.
6.2. Characteristics and functions of the ruling Russian elite
The elite is not uniform. Within the ruling elite there is a small cohesive group standing at the very top of the power pyramid. T. Zaslavskaya calls it the “upper (sub-elite) layer”, O. Kryshtanovskaya - “top elite”, L. Shevtsova - “super-elite”. This group, as a rule, consists of 20-30 people and is the most closed, close-knit and hard-to-reach for research.
To the most important characteristics of the elite researchers attribute cohesion, awareness of their group interests, a developed network of informal communications, the presence of esoteric norms of behavior and code language, hidden from outside observers and transparent to the initiates, the absence of a clear line separating official activity and private life.
For Russia, as for other post-communist states, there are common features that determine the peculiarity of the ruling elite: strengthening the role of the executive branch, increasing the importance of informal ties and procedures, accelerating the circulation of elites, exacerbating intra-elite rivalry and increasing mobility.
Under elite mobility understand the entry into the elite, the movement of personnel within the political system and the exit from the elite. Thus, mobility can be divided into upward, horizontal and downward mobility. Elite mobility in Russia has significant differences from the mobility of other social groups, which, according to O. Kryshtanovskaya, is due to a number of factors:
1. Higher competition between candidates for a position compared to other groups, which occurs at all levels of the political hierarchy.
2. Uncertainty of requirements for candidates who must meet conditions that are not announced anywhere.
3. Elite mobility is subject to much more regulation and planning than other professional mobility, since there is an institutionalized personnel reserve to replenish vacant positions.
4. The mobility of the elite is regulated not so much by labor legislation as by intra-group norms.
5. Unlike all other professions, joining the elite is endowing the individual with primary political capital, which he can develop or leave unchanged.
Some researchers note changes in the type of organization of the power elite. So, O.V. Gaman-Golutvina distinguishes two types: bureaucratic and feudal (oligarchic). Bureaucratic is based on the delimitation of the functions of economic and political management, oligarchic is based on their merger. Historically, the basis of the Russian state was the universality of duties to the state, which implied the service principle of recruiting elites, which ensured the priority of the political elite over the economic one. As a result of the reforms carried out, the service principle began to be replaced by the oligarchic one. As a result, the model of elite formation was reproduced, which is characteristic of the feudal, and not the modern West. One of the most characteristic features of today's ruling elite in Russia is the shadow merging of state power with business. This process covered all levels of state power. Place and connections in the political system have become the main factor in the multiplication of property, and property has become a powerful source of political influence.
The content of political functions is greatly influenced by the political regime. T.I. Zaslavskaya considers the development, legitimization and implementation of a general strategy for reforming society to be the main functions of the elite in the transformation process. A.V.Malkoidentifies the following most significant functions of the political elite:
strategic - determination of a political program of action by generating new ideas that reflect the interests of society, developing a concept for reforming the country;
organizational- implementation of the developed course in practice, the implementation of political decisions in life;
integrative - strengthening the stability and unity of society, the stability of its political and economic systems, preventing and resolving conflict situations, ensuring consensus on the fundamental principles of the life of the state.
To these functions, one should also add communicative - effective representation, expression and reflection in political programs of the interests and needs of various social strata and groups of the population, which also involves the protection of social goals, ideals and values characteristic of society.
In order to effectively implement these functions, the elite must be characterized by such qualities as a modern mentality, a state type of thinking, readiness to protect national interests, etc.
6.3. Formation of the federal elite
In the political history of Russia XX - early XXI centuries The ruling elite has repeatedly undergone significant transformations. The first significant "revolutionary-political transformation" in the words of S.A. Granovsky took place in October 1917, when a party of professional revolutionaries came to power. The Bolsheviks monopolized power and established the dictatorship of the proletariat. After the death of V.I. Even under Lenin, a special ruling class was created - nomenclature(a list of leadership positions, appointments to which were approved by party bodies). However, it was Stalin who perfected the process of reproduction of the Soviet elite. The nomenklatura was built on a strictly hierarchical principle with a high degree of integration based on a common ideology, with a low level of competition and a low degree of conflict between intra-elite groups. In the mid 1980s. the processes of structural disintegration intensified in the ruling elite, which led to an intra-elite value and personnel conflict associated with a change in political course. By the end of the 1980s. the process of rapid formation of a counter-elite begins, which included leaders and activists of various democratic movements, representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia. At the same time, there is a change in the mechanism of elite recruitment. Instead of the nomenklatura principle, the democratic principle of election is being affirmed.
The German scientist E. Schneider, who studies the political system of modern Russia, believes that the new Russian political elite was formed in the depths of the old Soviet system as a kind of counter-elite in various groups at the federal level. The beginning was laid on May 29, 1990, when B. Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, who also assumed the functions of the head of state. The second step followed after the election of B. Yeltsin as President of Russia on June 12, 1991. B. Yeltsin created his own administration, numbering 1.5 thousand people, and approaching in size the apparatus of the former Central Committee of the CPSU. The third step towards the formation of the central Russian political elite is the election of deputies to the State Duma and the Federation Council on December 12, 1993. The parliamentary elections of 1995 and the presidential elections of 1996 were summed up to the fourth stage. That is, E. Schneider connects the process of forming a new Russian political elite with the election process that has become characteristic of post-Soviet Russia.
An important factor that had far-reaching consequences for the ruling elite was the ban on the CPSU in 1991, which caused the liquidation of the traditional institutions of Soviet power, the liquidation of the institution of the nomenklatura, and the transfer of powers of the allied authorities to Russian ones.
Researchers distinguish between two stages in the formation of the post-Soviet elite: "Yeltsin's" and "Putin's". So, O. Kryshtanovskaya - the author of the book "Anatomy of the Russian Elite" - notes that during the nine years of his reign (1991-1999) B. Yeltsin could not integrate the supreme power. At the same time, no state structure has become dominant. In a power vacuum, informal groups and clans assumed state functions, competing with each other for the right to speak on behalf of the president. According to the scientist, “in the Yeltsin period there was a collapse of the supreme power. The diffusion of power has led not to a democratic separation of powers, but to managerial chaos.”
The "Putin" stage is characterized by the elimination of the causes that led to the destruction of the administrative vertical under B. Yeltsin. The new president returned to the federal center a significant amount of power over the regions, expanded the base of support for the center in the field and outlined ways to restore the functioning of the mechanisms of territorial administration, while not formally violating democratic principles. A controlled, orderly system of executive power was created. If under B. Yeltsin power was dispersed, moving from the center to the regions, then under V. Putin, power began to return to the center again, centrifugal tendencies gave way to centripetal ones.
The researchers note that the modern ruling elite of Russia differs from the Soviet one in many important qualities: genesis, recruitment models, socio-professional composition, internal organization, political mentality, the nature of relations with society, the level of reformatory potential.
The personal composition of the political elite is changing, but its job structure remains virtually unchanged. The political elite of Russia is represented by the president, prime minister, members of the government, deputies of the Federal Assembly, judges of the Constitutional, Supreme, Supreme Arbitration Courts, the office of the presidential administration, members of the Security Council, plenipotentiaries of the president in federal districts, heads of power structures in the subjects of the federation, the highest diplomatic and the military corps, some other government positions, the leadership of political parties and large public associations, and other influential people.
Top political elite includes leading political leaders and those who hold high positions in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government (the immediate environment of the president, prime minister, speakers of parliament, heads of state authorities, leading political parties, factions in parliament) . Numerically, this is a rather limited circle of people who make the most significant political decisions for the whole society, concerning the fate of millions of people who are significant for the entire state. Belonging to the highest elite is determined by reputation (advisers, consultants to the president) or position in the power structure. According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, members of the Security Council, which in modern Russia is the prototype of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, should be attributed to the top leadership.
The size of the ruling elite is not constant. Thus, the nomenclature of the Central Committee of the CPSU (in 1981) included approximately 400 thousand people. The highest nomenclature (the nomenclature of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU) included approximately 900 people. The nomenclature of the secretariat of the Central Committee consisted of 14-16 thousand people. The accounting and control nomenclature (the nomenclature of departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU) included 250 thousand people. The rest was made up of the nomenklatura of the lower party committees. Thus, the political class in Soviet times was approximately 0.1% of the total population of the country.
In 2000, the size of the political class (the number of civil servants) tripled (while the country's population halved) and began to amount to 1,200,000 people. or 0.8% of the total population. The number of the ruling elite at the same time increased from 900 to 1060 people.
According to the same surveys, the main suppliers to the ruling elite in 1991 were the intelligentsia (53.5%) and business leaders (about 13%). During the transitional period of Yeltsin's rule (1991-1993), the role of workers, peasants, intellectuals, economic managers, employees of ministries and departments fell. The importance of others, on the contrary, increased: regional administrations, employees of security and law enforcement agencies, and, especially, businessmen.
Gradually, parliamentary and governmental careers became two different ways of sewerage upwards, which was not typical for the Soviet elite, for which a parliamentary mandate was an appropriate attribute of nomenklatura status. Now there is a new professional group within the elite - elected officials.
In the absence of state support, weak social groups - workers, peasants - were almost completely ousted from the political field, the share of women and youth, whose high percentage of participation in power was previously artificially supported by the CPSU, fell sharply.
For parliamentarians, there remains a fairly high percentage of those who entered the elite back in Soviet times. In the State Duma of the first convocation (1993) there were 37.1% of such people, the third convocation (1999) - 32%; in the Federation Council in 1993 - 60.1%, in 2002 - 39.9%.
Researchers notice another feature: if in the early 1990s. the share of party and Komsomol functionaries fell, then their share among the deputies of both chambers grew to almost 40%. After 10 years of the post-Soviet period, involvement in the nomenclature has ceased to be a stain on a political career. A number of studies (S.A. Granovsky, E. Schneider) show that the foundation of the new Russian ruling elite is mainly made up of representatives of the second and third echelons of the old Soviet nomenklatura, transferring the special knowledge and experience that it needs to the new political elite.
As part of the new political elite in Russia, there have been significant changes in educational, age and professional plans.
Thus, the government and the elite in the regions have become almost ten years younger. At the same time, the parliament has aged a little, which is explained by its artificial rejuvenation during the Brezhnev period. The termination of quotas by age freed the highest legislative power of the country, both from Komsomol members and from quota young workers and collective farmers.
B. Yeltsin brought young scientists, brilliantly educated city politicians, economists, and lawyers closer to him. In his environment, the proportion of rural residents fell sharply. Despite the fact that the elite has always been one of the most educated groups in society, nevertheless, in the 1990s. there was a sharp jump in the educational qualification of the elite. Thus, well-known scientists and public figures are part of B. Yeltsin's inner circle. More than half of the presidential team of B.N. Yeltsin consisted of doctors of sciences. There was also a high percentage of those with a degree in the government and among party leaders.
The changes affected not only the level of education of the elite, but also the nature of education. The Brezhnev elite was technocratic. The vast majority of the leaders of the party and state in the 1980s. had an engineering, military or agricultural education. Under M. Gorbachev, the percentage of technocrats decreased, but not due to an increase in the number of humanitarians, but due to an increase in the proportion of party workers who received higher party education. And, finally, a sharp decrease in the proportion of people who received technical education (almost 1.5 times) occurred under B. Yeltsin. Moreover, this is happening against the backdrop of the same educational system in Russia, where the majority of universities still have a technical profile.
Under V. Putin, the proportion of people in uniform in the ruling elite increased significantly: every fourth representative of the elite became a military man (under B. Yeltsin, the share of the military in the elite was 11.2%, under V. Putin - 25.1%). This trend coincided with the expectations of society, since the reputation of the military as honest, responsible, politically unbiased professionals favorably distinguished them from other elite groups, whose image was associated with theft, corruption, and demagoguery. The massive involvement of the military in the civil service was also caused by the lack of a personnel reserve. The main distinguishing features of Putin's elite were the decline in the proportion of "intellectuals" with academic degrees (under B. Yeltsin - 52.5%, under V. Putin - 20.9%), the decrease in the already extremely low representation of women in the elite (from 2 .9% to 1.7%), the "provincialization" of the elite and a sharp increase in the number of military men, who began to be called "siloviki" (representatives of the armed forces, the federal security service, border troops, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc.).
The last wave of the ruling elite is also characterized by an increase in the share of countrymen of the head of state (from 13.2% under B. Yeltsin to 21.3% under V. Putin) and an increase in the share of businessmen (from 1.6% under B. Yeltsin to 11.3 % under V. Putin).
6.4. Regional political elite
At the regional level, a new political elite was formed in different subjects at different times. This process was associated with the transition to an elective system for the formation of the regional elite. The heads of executive power in Moscow and Leningrad, as well as the president of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, were elected on June 12, 1991. After the failure of the putsch on August 21, 1991, the position of the head of the administration as the head of the executive power was introduced in the territories, regions and districts by a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The presidential decree of November 25, 1991 determined the procedure for appointing heads of administrations. By January 1992, the new government was established in almost all territories, regions and autonomous regions. True, it was only partially new. Half of the heads of administrations were appointed from among the former heads of executive or representative bodies, about a fifth consisted of employees of the lower level of the Soviet apparatus, and only a third consisted of new appointees - directors of enterprises, employees of scientific institutions and other representatives of the non-political sphere.
In the autonomous republics, the head was the president, who was elected in popular elections, which contributed to the transformation of the Soviet model into a democratic one. By the end of 1994, most of the leaders of the autonomous republics were elected by popular vote.
In 1992-1993 there was a struggle between the president and the Supreme Council for influence on the formation of the heads of regional administrations. This struggle ended after the dissolution of the representative body of power with the adoption of a presidential decree "On the procedure for appointing and dismissing heads of administrations of territories, regions, autonomous districts, cities of federal significance", issued on October 7, 1993. The decree stated that heads of administrations were appointed and dismissed from office. positions as the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation.
However, electoral trends were gaining momentum. Therefore, in a number of regions, as an exception, back in 1992-1993. the supreme power allowed the elections of heads of administrations. This process continued to develop and ended with the adoption of a presidential decree on September 17, 1995, which determined the term for the election of heads of administrations of the subjects of the federation appointed by the president - December 1996. Thus, the transition to the elective system of executive heads of the subjects of the federation was carried out. The last appointment of the head of the administration took place in July 1997 in the Kemerovo region.
The formation of the regional elite was continued by the elections of people's representatives, which, after the dissolution of councils at all levels at the end of 1993, became full-fledged legislative bodies of power.
The elections were one of the most significant achievements of democracy in Russia, which led to profound changes in the entire political system. The consequences of such a transition were both positive and negative. On the one hand, a basis was created for the separation of powers, the formation of civil society, and the creation of equal subjects of the federation. On the other hand, the election of the heads of subjects destabilized the political situation, allowing the governors to become independent from the center. There was a danger of a new wave of "parade of sovereignties", which could end in the collapse of the country. The federal government has practically no levers of influence on the regional elite.
In December 1995, the principle of formation of the Federation Council changed. In accordance with the new regulation, the upper house of the Russian parliament began to be formed by delegating two leaders of the subject of the federation - the heads of the executive and legislative branches. In the Federation Council, interregional associations began to form on territorial and economic principles, which threatened the center with the loss of political and financial control.
To prevent negative trends, the new President Vladimir Putin initiated political reforms in order to strengthen the power vertical. In 2000, the procedure for forming the Federation Council changed: they began to delegate to the upper house of parliament one representative each from the executive and legislative authorities of the subject of the federation, but not the first persons, as was the case before. At the end of 2004, a federal law was adopted that changed the procedure for electing the heads of subjects of the federation: they began to be elected by the relevant legislative assemblies on the proposal of the president of the country. The last nationwide elections for the head of the administration were held in March 2005 in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
As a result, the power of the federal center was restored, and the heads of the regions became completely dependent on the president. The danger of the collapse of the country was overcome by abandoning the democratic procedure of popular elections.
An analysis of regional leaders indicates that the vast majority of governors fell into the elite long before they were appointed to the post of head of the region. So, according to the data given in the study by O. Kryshtanovskaya, in 2002 the average number of years in the elite of regional leaders before their appointment (election) as the head of the region was 15 years, and the average number of years in the post of head of a subject of the federation was 6 years.
The average age of a regional leader under L. Brezhnev was 59 years, under M. Gorbachev - 52 years, under B. Yeltsin - 49 years, under V. Putin - 54 years.
The weight of the Soviet nomenklatura still remains very high. In 2002, 65.9% of the heads of the subjects of the federation were previously members of the Soviet nomenclature (in 1992 - 78.2%, in 1997 - 72.7%).
As O. Kryshtanovskaya notes, “the paradox is that it was not elections, but appointments that brought new people to the top.”
Describing professional qualities regional political elite, many researchers note its redistributive (rental) relation to economic activity. At the same time, one should note such a trend as the promotion of an influential layer of intellectual, political, cultural, professional, highly educated leaders who form the core of the regional political elite. As S.A. Granovsky notes, “the nomenklatura sources of the current government, which are not easy to get rid of, are a brake on reforms that impede the true democratization of society, the transformation not only of the political, but also of all other spheres of our life. Russia has not yet formed an elite that would correspond to the new statehood that has already proved itself.
An important characteristic of the elite is its mentality. Practical orientations and their real implementation in the affairs of the regional political and administrative elites are reflected both in their own worldview and in the assessments of the population. Describing the mental features of the regional administrative and political elites, one should note their federalist thinking, the main parameters of which are the preservation of the integrity of the Russian Federation, the problems of equality of all subjects, the priority of federal laws over republican ones.
One can state a significant weakening of centro-paternalistic hopes among the regional political elite. In the minds of the elites, hopes for the possibilities of the center and their own forces in the development of the economy and economic ties were almost leveled. In many regions, the mood of "reliance on one's own strength" already prevails. Thus, ethno-federalist, economic-federalist and political-federalist factors turn out to be conjugated into one complex and are now acting in the same direction, contributing to the faster formation of the federalist paradigm of thinking.
On the other hand, as the most important characteristics of the political mentality of the ruling elite, many researchers emphasize its unscrupulousness and "servility". This leads to unconditional loyalty to the President, on the one hand, and a stable priority of clan interests over national interests, on the other.
6.5. Circulation and reproduction of the elite
Two waves of renewal of the upper layers can be distinguished. The first of these was connected with the invasion of the reformers. The second marked the arrival of the counter-reformers, whose actions should be regarded as the normal completion of the reform cycle. In classical images, it looks like this: “young lions” are being replaced by “old foxes”.
Models circulation and reproduction elite groups should be supplemented with a third element - the expansion of the elite composition. The increase in the elite ranks in the first half of the 1990s. happened more than twice. There has been a significant increase in the number of positions that are considered "elite". This is due to the growth in the number of new economic structures, whose leaders can be attributed to the new economic elite. But it is no less true and due to the growth of political and administrative structures.
The acceleration of the circulation of Russian elites is an obvious fact. It began during the reign of M. Gorbachev due to the promotion of numerous representatives of the so-called pre-nomenklatura groups from various public sectors (mostly former middle managers - heads of departments, subdivisions, services).
In the 1990s accelerated pace elite traffic(the movement of the elite - a term introduced into circulation by O. Kryshtanovskaya) required a change in approaches to working with personnel. Under B. Yeltsin, there were frequent resignations, reshuffles of high-ranking officials, whom he first brought closer to himself, then became disappointed and changed them to others. The rapidity of personnel replacements led to the destruction of the personnel reserve that helped maintain succession. There was a need to create some reservations for high-ranking officials who had fallen out of power. As a result, structures such as "state business" were created - commercial organizations based on state resources and having multiple privileges compared to private business, as well as foundations, associations, socio-political organizations, led by retirees. In recent years, deputy activity has been acting as a kind of reservation, which provides the necessary honor to all former officials.
With the widespread use of alternative elections, the ruling elite no longer had complete control over the removal of unwanted individuals from the elite. Officials who lost their positions in executive bodies could be elected to the federal or regional parliament, go into big business and influence the political situation with the help of economic resources, or create a political party and actively participate in political life.
If in Soviet times, resignation meant "political death", then in the post-Soviet period, returns to power began to occur. Thus, in the government elite in 1992, the share of return was 12.1%, for the government in 1999 - 8%.
Under V. Putin, the personnel situation begins to change gradually. The personnel reserve is being restored, the civil service is being strengthened, and loyalty to the regime becomes a guarantee of status stability. The administrative reform, launched in 2004 and designed to reduce the number of bureaucrats, only restructured departments and significantly increased the salaries of civil servants. In the 2000s increases not vertical, but horizontal mobility in the elite. So, former governors become members of the Federation Council, former ministers become deputies, former officials of the presidential administration go into state business.
As studies show, for most indicators, the nature of appointments and dismissals under V. Putin has undergone minor changes: the age of entry and exit, the average number of years in office, the proportion of people of retirement age among retirees are approximately the same as under the previous president. But the main thing is that the atmosphere has changed: the growing self-confidence of the political elite, the basis of which is the high level of public confidence in the president.
Changing the norms and rules of power interactions largely stems from the process elite reconversion(i.e. the transfer of capital from one form to another). The decisive element of this process was the "capitalization" of elite groups. It manifested itself primarily in two ways. First, part of the political elite converted its political influence into economic capital. Representatives of the political nomenklatura themselves entered the new business elite or patronized close relatives in the economic sphere. Secondly, "capitalization" touched the political elite itself - through the expansion of corruption. Corruption has always existed, but it is in modern Russia that it has become larger and more open than ever.
As a result, politics has become associated with the most profitable business. On the one hand, large entrepreneurs seek state protection and try to obtain property and privileges from the state. On the other hand, politicians are no longer satisfied with the usual trappings of power and fame. Their status positions must be backed by receipts in private bank accounts. As a result, big businessmen become politically influential people, and politicians turn into very wealthy people.
The next process, which deserves special attention, is connected with the mutual relations of various elite groups. Two opposite tendencies usually collide here - fragmentation and consolidation of elites. The fragmentation hypothesis states that there is a process of pluralization of elites and the emergence of numerous pressure groups and interests.
The confrontation between the legislature, presidential structures and the government, federal and regional government bodies, party groups of the left and right, political, military and economic elites, industry lobbies representing various economic complexes - all this contributes to the situation of power pluralism. This situation can be seen as a manifestation of the democratization of society, but more often it is seen as evidence of a power vacuum and a lack of effective governance.
The struggle for power between the "old" and "new" elites also leads to fragmentation. The goal of the first is to retain power, the second is to seize key positions in the state and oust their opponents from their posts.
Opposite assessments are expressed within the framework of the hypothesis of the consolidation of elites. It argues that the dividing lines between different elite groups are increasingly blurred, and power is concentrated in the hands of a limited number of subjects. Legislatures have no special power; federal bodies retained enough administrative and financial influence over the regions to determine policy at the regional level; the military elite is still loyal and subservient to political forces; "left" and "right" party groupsdrift towards the political "centre".
The confrontation between the political and economic elites should also not be exaggerated. On the contrary, the stage of transformation of the Russian elite is characterized by the integration of the political and economic elite. The reason for this rapprochement lies in mutual benefit: the economic elite is interested in the appropriate distribution of budget funds and federal investments, a certain personnel policy, making political decisions that are beneficial for themselves, and the political elite wants to benefit from the transformation of the economy.
Thus, despite the visible opposition, there is a consolidation of elite groups.
6.6. Political corporatism
in the Western political elitethe priority is social origin, which determines the starting opportunities, conditions and guidelines for primary and secondary socialization, in contrast to the Russian one, where this factor is replaced by a previous connection with the nomenklatura elite and commitment to a leader - leader. In other words, corporate origin.
American political scientist F. Schmitter considers corporatism“as one of the possible mechanisms that allow associations of interests to mediate between their members (individuals, families, firms, local communities, groups) and various counterparties (primarily state and government bodies).” Corporatism organically fits into the democratic legal order, as evidenced by the spread of this phenomenon in countries with developed democratic institutions, and with significant relapses in countries of unconsolidated democracy. It is especially negative in the political sphere.
Political corporatism means the dominance in the political system of a set of persons united to achieve, implement and maintain state power. The interaction of political corporations allows them to divide the power market, not allowing representatives of the general population to access it. There is a mechanism of “linking” and coordination of interests between corporations. Corporations can be built according to social-class, professional, family-countryman-mu and other characteristics, but they are always based on the unity of interests. The political system of modern Russia is an example of interacting corporations.
Political corporations, in order to be effective, must have a certain degree of monopoly on the representation of interests. This is necessary from the point of view of influencing political decisions, since the state power, when forming the goals and objectives of its activities (especially in the transition period, when their leading groups are formed from a plurality of interests), inevitably takes into account only those groups interests and corporations that have the appropriate resources, i.e. able to mobilize and control large sections of the population. Thus, certain corporatist representations are formed, and the state becomes a “corporatist state”. The basis of his policy in this case is not the “public interest”, but the interest of the political corporation whose representatives are currently at the helm of state power or have the greatest influence on it.
The most powerful corporations in modern Russia are those that are based on the foundation of financial and industrial groups that have huge financial resources, control the most important enterprises and industries, gradually monopolize the media market and thereby are able to influence the decision-making process on government and parliamentary channels.
Feature of the corporatist system in Russialies in the fact that it is built on the basis of the interdependence of the most influential interest groups and the state and is of a contractual nature. So, for example, the former government of V. Chernomyrdin, patronizing the Gazprom corporation, received in return the opportunity to solve problems in social policy with its help. State power in Russia, motivated by the need to overcome the crisis, provided opportunities for such a monopolization of interests in exchange for political and financial support. Therefore, corporations should be considered as the main pillar of the political regime in Russia in the 1990s.
T.I. Zaslavskaya notes that “as a result of the “market” reform of the basic institutions, the state has dissolved into private political and financial corporations… There is a certain ruling clan behind each group of ministries, regions, and industrial complexes in Russia.”
As a result of the activities of political corporations, state power may become hostage to a group of political and economic monopolists and be subjected to targeted pressure from representatives of private interests, which can lead to the oligarchization of the political regime and increased social tension in the country.
In the 2000s a new corporatist structure has emerged, associated with belonging to the special services. In this structure, there is a corporate spirit of unity inherent in the security staff. President V. Putin's statement: "there are no former Chekists" - is a confirmation of the corporate spirit of the special services, which cements the power. In such an elite, solidarity prevails. According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, despite the fact that "the whole country is becoming an arena of operational work", ... "such a government is doubly stable, especially since it is held together by the ideology of patriotism, diluted, however, with liberal economic ideas."
The Russian scientist S.P. Peregudov, summing up F. Schmitter's thoughts on corporatism, singled out several main positions that could make corporatism "new", not undermining, but strengthening democracy and social peace. “Firstly, it is the presence of independent interest groups independent of the state and their focus on interacting with it in order to strengthen social partnership and increase economic efficiency. Secondly, it is this or that degree of institutionalization of this interaction and the ability of the state to “impose” priorities dictated by national interests during the negotiation process. And, finally, thirdly, it is the observance by all parties of the obligations assumed and the corresponding system of control over their implementation. These principles, transferred to the political sphere, could prevent or mitigate the negative consequences of political corporatism.
6.7. Privileges as a Sign of the Political Elite
Privilege- these are legal benefits, first of all, for power structures and officials, which they need for the full implementation of their powers.
Privileges are one of the most important features of the political elite. Exclusive rights and special opportunities are closely related to the elite because it includes groups of people with natural talents, bright talents, special ideological, social and political qualities that determine the special role of people who perform the most important functions of managing society. The political elite, actively participating in the exercise of state power or in direct influence on it, expends a lot of energy, effort, and resources. In order to manage more effectively, the elite needs appropriate sources of replenishment of this energy. Therefore, the position of the elite is reinforced by its prestige, privileges, benefits, so it enjoys significant material and spiritual benefits.
Consequently, the formation of the political elite is stimulated by the fact that the high status of managerial activity is associated with the possibility of obtaining various kinds of material and moral privileges, advantages, honor, and glory.
As R. Mills writes, the ruling elite “consists of people occupying such positions that give them the opportunity to rise above the environment of ordinary people and make decisions that have major consequences ... This is due to the fact that they command the most important hierarchical institutions and organizations of modern society ... They occupy strategic command posts in the social system, in which the effective means are concentrated, providing the power, wealth and fame that they use.
However, due to the limited resources of power (material and spiritual wealth, values), representatives of the elite, as a rule, do not give up privileges on a voluntary basis. In order to win this war, the elites are forced to rally and group. The very high position of the political elite in society determines the need for its cohesion, group interest in maintaining its privileged status. “For the elitist paradigm,” emphasizes G.K. Ashin, is characterized by the assertion that society cannot function normally without the elite, that it has the right to a privileged position, moreover, it must vigilantly protect its privileges from “encroachment” by the masses.
A.V.Malko notes another factor, which determines the close connection of the elite with privileges. It consists in the fact that this group of persons personifies power, which (due to the fact that it is associated with the distribution of values and resources) opens up wide opportunities for realizing the individual interests of the elite and its environment. Consequently, the struggle for privileges is largely a struggle for power, opportunities, resources, and influence.
After the February and October revolutions of 1917, there was a massive abolition of feudal unjust, in many respects already obsolete privileges, and a change of political elites took place. In addition, legal advantages, exclusive rights for the bodies and officials of the Soviet state began to be designated in the legislation to a greater extent through the concept of "benefits". The unfolding struggle against class and estate privileges, incompatible with the ideals of equality and justice, with the principles of socialist construction, led to the fact that the term "privilege" began to be perceived as purely reflecting illegal advantages. In this connection, he was practically deleted from the law-making circulation.
However, contrary to the Marxist teaching, in Soviet society from the very beginning there was a stratification of the population into classes occupying different positions in the social structure and, accordingly, having different opportunities in the distribution of life's blessings. Inequality in this regard was not some kind of deviation from certain correct norms prescribed by the classics of Marxism, but a manifestation of the objective laws of social life. By the end of the Brezhnev period, the class stratification of Soviet society reached a high level. A trend towards a decrease in the vertical dynamics of the population has become apparent; the possibilities of transition from one layer to the layers of a higher level were reduced. Representatives of the higher echelons of power rarely descended to the lower ones, as they had various privileges and opportunities to acquire the blessings of life due to their position in society.
Such privileges, received primarily by the nomenklatura, were not enshrined in the rule of law or were established in closed decisions. These advantages included the following: the distribution of housing, summer cottages, vouchers to sanatoriums and prestigious holiday homes, scarce goods, etc.
The new political elite, headed by B.N. Yeltsin, despite the fact that it came to power, including on the wave of the struggle against privileges, not only did not give up the existing privileges, but even increased them.
Privilege System, as S.V. Polenin, received, unfortunately, “widespread not only in the years of stagnation and deformation of socialism, but even more so in the current, democratic period. We are talking about benefits, with the help of which conditions of increased comfort of life are created for a selected circle of the “most responsible” persons, isolated on the basis of their belonging or proximity to those in power. In this case, benefits are not based on objective grounds and turn into ordinary privileges, the existence of which contradicts the idea of forming a state of law and undermines both the principle of equal rights for citizens and the principle of social justice, under the slogan of which they are usually established.
A significant part of the ruling modern Russian elite, not possessing high managerial and moral qualities, having received enormous privileges as a result of the nomenklatura privatization of a significant part of state property, was unable to adequately govern the country and was largely to blame for the crisis that swept society in the 1990s. .
In a truly democratic country, illegal and excessive privileges must be abolished.It is necessary to incorporate by thematic principle the regulations on benefits for senior officials, including the President of the Russian Federation, and then publish for general information and control over their observance. In addition, the question of careful control over the existing and emerging political elite (through the institution of elections, referendums, reports of deputies to voters, the media, public opinion polls, etc.) is increasingly being raised so that it does not turn into a closed ruling privileged caste, but worked for the benefit of society, the majority of Russian citizens.
A truly democratic political system can be considered that implements the rule of the people, whose influence on politics is decisive, while the influence of the elite is limited, limited by law, a political system in which the elite is controlled by the people. Therefore, if we cannot ignore the thesis that the presence of an elite is a real or potential threat to democracy, then the way out, the condition for the preservation of democracy, is in the constant control of the people over the elite, limiting the privileges of the elite only to those that are functionally necessary for exercise of its powers, maximum publicity, the possibility of unlimited criticism of the elite, the separation of powers and the relative autonomy of political, economic, cultural and other elites, the presence of opposition, the struggle and competition of elites, the arbiter of which (and not only during elections) the people come forward, in other words, everything that in its totality constitutes the modern democratic process.
It is important for Russia to shape public opinion in such a way that the political elite itself begins to limit itself to a number of privileges that, from a moral point of view, look clearly disproportionate against the backdrop of the poor majority of the population.
For the modern Russian state, the problem of becoming a qualified, highly professional political elite that the population could trust is becoming more and more acute. Such an elite needs to be created by Russian society, making significant efforts in order to use democratic and legal norms and mechanisms, including through legal and justified privileges, to carry out a kind of “selection” of new politicians who have state thinking and are able to take personal responsibility for change in the country.
Basic concepts: reproduction of the elite, the highest political elite, elite consolidation, corporatism, elite mobility, nomenclature, political corporatism, political elite, political class, ruling elite, privileges, regional elite, elite reconversion, subelite, federal elite, political elite functions, elite fragmentation, elite characteristics, elite circulation, elite, elite traffic.
Questions for self-control:
1. What is the main difference between the political class?
2. What is the ratio of the political class and the ruling elite?
3. What are the different parts of the single ruling elite called?
4. Define the political elite.
5. What are the most important characteristics of the elite.
6. Describe the mobility of the elite.
7. List the functions of the political elite.
8. What is the difference between the "Yeltsin" and "Putin" stages of the formation of the political elite?
9. Who belongs to the political elite in Russia?
10. What changes have taken place in the composition of the new Russian political elite?
11. What are the main features of the ruling elite formed under V. Putin?
12. Name the main stages in the formation of the modern regional elite in Russia.
13. What reforms did Vladimir Putin initiate in order to strengthen the power vertical?
14. Describe the regional political elite of Russia?
15. What is Elite Reconversion?
16. Explain the relationship between fragmentation and consolidation of the elite.
17. What is the essence of political corporatism?
18. What are the privileges of the elite?
19. What are the necessary conditions for the democratic exercise of the privilege of elite groups?
Literature:
Ashin G.K.Change of elites // Social sciences and modernity. 1995. No. 1.
Ashin G.K.Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological research. 1998. No. 1.
Gaman-Golutvina O.V. Bureaucracy or oligarchy? // Where is Russia going?.. Power, society, personality. M., 2000.
Granovsky S.A.Applied Political Science: Textbook. M., 2004.
Zaslavskaya T.I.Modern Russian Society: The Social Mechanism of Transformation: Textbook. M., 2004.
Kretov B.I., Peregudov S.P. New Russian corporatism: democratic or bureaucratic? // Polis. 1997. No. 2. P.24.
Ashin G.K. Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological research. 1998. No. 1. P.11.
Polenina S.V. Law as a Means of Implementing the Tasks of Forming a Legal State // Theory of Law: New Ideas. M., 1993. Issue 3. P.16.
Ashin G.K. Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological research. 1998. No. 1. pp.13-14.
1. Introduction………………………………………………………...2
2. Political elite ………………………………………………3
3. The structure of the political elite………………………………….4
4. Functions of the political elite………………………………...5
5. Types of political elites………………………………………....7
6. The political elite of modern Russia
Prerequisites for the emergence and process of formation ...... 8
7. O. Kryshtanovskaya BacktotheUSSR.
The new Russian elite………………...11
8. The structure of the political elite of modern Russia…….....17
9. Features of the political regime in modern Russia ..21
11.List of Sources………………………...................................................24
Introduction
The word "elite" in translation from French means "the best", "choice", "favorites". In everyday language it has two meanings. The first of them reflects the possession of some intensely, clearly and maximally expressed features, the highest on a particular scale of measurements. In this sense, the term "elite" is used in such phrases as "elite grain", "elite horses", "sports elite", "elite troops", "thieves' elite", etc.
In the second sense, the word "elite" refers to the best, the most valuable group for society, standing above the masses and called upon, by virtue of possessing special qualities, to manage them. This understanding of the word reflected the reality of a slave-owning and feudal society, the elite of which was the aristocracy. (The term "aristos" itself means "the best", respectively, the aristocracy - "the power of the best".)
In political science, the term "elite" is used only in the first, ethically neutral sense. Defined in the most general form, this concept characterizes the bearers of the most pronounced political and managerial qualities and functions.
The outstanding Italian sociologist and political scientist Mosca (1858-1941) tried to prove the inevitable division of any society into two unequal social position and the role of the group. In 1896, in The Foundations of Political Science, he wrote: “In all societies, from the most moderately developed and barely civilized to the enlightened and powerful, there are two classes of persons: the class of rulers and the class of those who are ruled. The first, always relatively small, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys its inherent advantages, while the second, more numerous, is controlled and regulated by the first and supplies the material means of support necessary for the viability of the political organism.
Gaetano Mosca (April 1, 1858, Palermo, Italy - November 8, 1941, Rome, Italy) was an Italian lawyer and sociologist. Along with Pareto, he is known as the creator of the theory of elites. Mosca analyzed the problem of the formation of the political elite and its specific qualities. He believed that the most important criterion for entering it is the ability to manage other people, i.e. organizational ability, as well as material, moral and intellectual superiority that distinguishes the elite from the rest of society. Although, on the whole, this stratum is the most capable of governing, however, not all of its representatives are inherent in the best, higher qualities in relation to the rest of the population.
The purpose of this work is to try to systematize and briefly present the material on the topic: The modern political elite of Russia. To solve this problem, it is planned, citing the most authoritative political scientists, to talk in detail about the concept of "Political elite", its functions and types of political elites. To give material on the topic "The modern political elite of Russia", the prerequisites for its emergence, its structure, functions, features. Try to draw your own conclusion about possible ways and directions of its development.
Political elite
Politics, which is one of the spheres of the life of society, is carried out by people who have power resources or political capital. These people are called political class for whom politics becomes a profession. The political class is the ruling class, since it manages and disposes of the resources of power. It is heterogeneous due to differences in the possession of power, the nature of activities, methods of recruitment, etc. Its main difference lies in the institutionalization, which consists in the system of public positions occupied by its representatives. The formation of a political class is carried out in two ways: by appointment to public office (such representatives of the political class are called bureaucracy) and through elections to certain power structures.
In addition to the political class, politics can be influenced by individuals, groups that have either official powers or informal opportunities. T.I. Zaslavskaya calls such a set of individuals and groups ruling elite, to which she classifies politicians holding the highest government posts, the upper echelon of the bureaucracy, and the business elite. Since the most significant resource of the ruling elite is political capital, or power, which gives the legitimate right to manage the property and finances of the state, there is a direct or latent connection of all groups of the ruling elite with state structures.
O. Kryshtanovskaya gives such a definition elite: “it is the ruling group of society, which is the upper stratum of the political class. The elite stands at the top of the state pyramid, controlling the main, strategic resources of power, making decisions at the national level. The elite not only rules society, but also governs the political class, and also creates such forms of state organization in which its positions are exclusive. The political class forms the elite and at the same time is the source of its replenishment. From her point of view, any elite is ruling, i.e. if the elite does not rule, then it is not the elite. The remaining members of the political class - professional managers who are not related to the ruling elite - constitute the political and administrative elite, whose role is to prepare general political decisions and organize their implementation in those structures of the state apparatus that they directly supervise.
The elite is a full-fledged social group with a complex structure. Various parts of a single ruling elite are called sub-elites which can be sectoral (political, economic), functional (administrators, ideologists, security officials), hierarchical (subelite layers), recruitment (appointees, elected). According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, "the elite cannot but be political." At the same time, it is possible to use this term to refer to a sub-elite group whose functions include the direct management of the political process.
In this context, one can characterize political elite as a relatively small stratum of people occupying leading positions in state authorities, political parties, public organizations and influencing the development and implementation of policy in the country.
The political elite includes high-ranking professional politicians, endowed with power functions and powers, senior civil servants involved in the development and implementation of political programs, social development strategies. It can be divided into groups corresponding to the branches of government - legislative, executive, judicial, as well as by its location - federal and regional.
The authority of the elite is the most important condition for its stay in power and the preservation of power; the ruling elite must be legitimate. When the political or state community ceases to sanction the power of a given political elite, it loses the social basis of its existence and eventually loses power.
Political elites can come to power through elections by winning the political struggle against other organized minorities claiming to be the political control group. In this case, the interaction between the elite and the masses is legal and legitimate. However, the political elite can come to power in a revolutionary way or through a coup d'état. In such a situation, the new political elite seeks to gain the necessary legitimacy through informal recognition from the unorganized majority. In any case, the relationship of the elite with the masses is built on the principles of leadership and authoritative leadership, and not blind obedience. The legitimation of the political power of the elite distinguishes it from the oligarchy.
In countries with a legitimate existence of power, the content and boundaries of the functions performed by the political elite are determined by the constitution of the country. However, in real life there are frequent cases of discrepancies between constitutions and real power. This is possible in the event of a sharp change in the political situation, when the changes are not yet reflected in the constitution, as well as in the event of deviation from the norms of the constitution. For example, the Constitution of the USSR proclaimed that power at all levels belongs to the Soviets, but the real political picture did not confirm this.
The structure of the political elite
The structure of the elite stratum, which performs the functions of power and control in the state and society, is extremely complex. To understand the mechanism of state policy formation, it is no longer enough to use only the categories of the elite and the counter-elite. Many scientists point to the presence in the ruling circles of society of economic, administrative, military, intellectual (scientific, technical, ideological), political segments. Each of them builds their own relations with the masses, determines the place and role in decision-making, the degree and nature of influence on power.
The well-known Polish political scientist W. Milanowski proposed to consider the structure of elite circles depending on the performance by their internal groupings of specific functions in the sphere of political management of society.
Modern sociology divides the elite into three groups that intersect. political elite- this is primarily the ruling elite in society and that part of the opposition layer that makes claims to power functions. The field of action of the political elite is the struggle for power.
Business Elite- this is also an elite, but not always claiming power. Although in this area there is economic power that forces people to act in a certain direction without resorting to the open use of political resources. This is the attraction of the economic elite, one of the motives for its activities.
And finally intellectual elite. Perhaps, at this stage, it would be better if we separate the concepts of the intellectual elite and the cultural elite. In terms of their activity - politics, economics, culture - such groups of a subjective nature act here, which, under the proposed conditions, with the participation of the masses in the transformation of society, construct this society in a certain way and ensure the balance of social relations and their reproduction. We can give the following definition of the intellectual elite: this is the part of society that produces rationality in all other areas of activity.
Intellectual Elite Groups:
First group- intellectuals who comprehend and explain social, political, economic problems, events and processes taking place in society. This group includes scientists, journalists, politicians and other professionals.
second group are made up of scientists who, with their research and development, contribute to the scientific and technological progress of the country, maintaining the world prestige of Russia, especially in the field of innovative technologies. They make a real contribution to the development of industry and the economy of the country.
AT third group includes professionals with a high level of competence, experience and practical thinking, the ability to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty, rapid change. These are engineers, managers of various levels and profiles, civil, military scale, enterprises, cities, provinces, etc. And it is on their intellectual level that the success of various kinds of initiatives in local areas and in certain areas of the social economic life of our country depends.
To fourth group I attribute the leaders of the education system, teachers, who themselves constitute the intellectual potential of the country and cultivate the intellectual potential of the next generation. Through their activities, they not only transmit relevant knowledge, but also look for ways of thinking that meet modern requirements.
Reasons for the decline in the intellectual potential of Russia: the financial insecurity of science and, as a result, the migration of scientists; non-optimal combination of pedagogical and scientific activities by scientists; archaic or inefficient organization of science in a variety of positions and directions; lack of a strategic approach to the priority of scientific and technical problems and directions. And, finally, the most important reason is the decline in the prestige of intellectuals. There are also internal personal and psychological reasons: dissatisfaction with one's professional social position, insecurity, etc.
The population consists of two layers: the lower layer, not involved in the elite; the upper stratum is the elite, divided into ruling and non-ruling. Social division is based on the irremediable uneven distribution of wealth. The struggle for the redistribution of wealth and power, even when the masses participate in it, only leads to the replacement of one ruling minority by another.
The elite of society is a social stratum that has such a position in society and such qualities that allow it to manage society, or to have a significant impact on the process of managing it, to influence (positively or negatively) on value orientations and behavioral stereotypes in society and, ultimately, more actively, more effectively than all other strata of society, participate in shaping trends in the development of society, while having much more sovereignty than other groups in shaping their own position.
We focus on the political elite.
First, this includes the ruling elite, which performs state functions in the legislative and executive authorities at various levels.
Secondly, the political elite also includes leaders of political parties and movements, public organizations that are not directly involved in the performance of state duties, but have a significant impact on political decision-making.
Thirdly, the political elite undoubtedly includes the leaders of the mass media, big businessmen and bankers, well-known scientists in the field of social sciences.
Fourth, it is not easy to define the boundaries of the elite as a whole and its individual groups. The same individuals can be simultaneously assigned to different elites, for example, businessmen involved in economic and state activities, or only economic ones, but influencing the political decisions of the top state leadership.
The following main functional groups can be distinguished in the ruling elite: the government, the parliament, and the regional business elite.
The elite is a complex formation; individual groups of the elite (elites) may be in more or less acute and even antagonistic conflicts. The main sources of such conflicts are: competition for status, for admission to power, contradictions and conflicts of non-elite social groups whose interests are represented by one or another group of the elite (this or that elite).
There are two types of intra-elite connections: dominance (dominance) and coordination (coordination), which can operate simultaneously.
Stages of development of the political elite in Russia
1917 -early 20s. The coming to power of professional revolutionaries - the Leninist guard and the replacement of the institutions of state power by party instances, i.e. establishment of monopoly power of the Communist Party.
Early 20s-late 30s. The transformation of the ruling elite into the ruling class of Soviet society. The development of the institution of "nomenklatura" - a hierarchy of positions, the appointment of which requires coordination with party authorities. Replacement of professional revolutionaries by the party nomenklatura.
Early 40s-mid 80s. The preservation of the homogeneity of the political elite, its gradual (starting from the mid-60s) its degeneration, the aging of the nomenklatura, the slowdown in the rotation of the elite, which accompanied the "stagnation" of the economy by the beginning of the 80s.
The beginning of perestroika-1990 Renewal of the allied political elite by replacing the nomenklatura appointment with a legitimate election procedure. The rise of the role of the republics of the USSR in the political process, in other words, the fall of the role of the center and the rise of the outskirts. The departure of the Communist Party to the periphery of political life.
1990-now
Thus, the modern political elite of Russia began to take shape in the early 1990s. There are 2 stages in the formation of the post-Soviet elite: "Yeltsin" and "Putin"
Consider the "Yeltsin" stage.
The beginning was laid on May 29, 1990, when B. Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, who also assumed the functions of the head of state.
Features of the evolution of the political elite of the "Putin" period
Putin became the winner of the candidate competition during Operation Successor for two reasons: undoubted loyalty to the President of the Russian Federation (which was evidenced by Putin's position as head of the FSB) and determination to protect former patron A. Sobchak, who was accused of corruption. These qualities were critically important in Yeltsin's perception, since ensuring security and inviolability (personal and immediate environment) after his resignation due to the imperfect heritage of the past era was a decisive selection criterion.
With the entry into office of a new energetic president, despite the expectations of the general population, there were no quick and cardinal changes in the top ruling elites.
During the initial period of Vladimir Putin's first reign, the top political elite seemed to remain the same. But in the political depths, a struggle gradually began between the Yeltsin elite and the new one, which entered sociological and journalistic use as "St. Petersburg".
The president's desire to deprivatize state power was inevitably accompanied by a curtailment of the power of those whose powers under Yeltsin had grown at the expense of the powers of the federal political elite. These are economic and regional elites. A significant reduction in the influence of these two categories of elites has become Putin's strategic line in the field of domestic policy. If the regional elites practically without a fight accepted the new rules of the game, then, as expected, the desire to subdue big business was accompanied by a sharp struggle. The vicissitudes of relations between business and government (reflected, in particular, in the confrontation between the "siloviki" and "liberals") not only became the main intrigue of "Putin's" presidency, but appeared as a new stage in the development of the central collision of post-Soviet politics - the confrontation between the bureaucracy and the oligarchy.
The history of the state's relations with big business under Putin includes two stages.
Under Putin, the military and civilian bureaucracy has become the main source of replenishment of the elite.
There was a massive influx of Putin's colleagues from the KGB and the St. Petersburg mayor's office into the federal political elite. It is these circumstances that determined the most noticeable trend in the renewal of the political elite under Putin - the increase in the number of former and current employees of the military and special departments.
The main distinguishing features of Putin's elite were the decline in the proportion of "intellectuals" with academic degrees (under B. Yeltsin - 52.5%, under V. Putin - 20.9%), the decrease in the already extremely low representation of women in the elite (from 2 9% to 1.7%), the "provincialization" of the elite and a sharp increase in the number of the military, who began to be called "siloviki".
Thus, the military and businessmen became the most significant social categories of the elite under Putin. And if during the first term the key posts of the head of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation and the head of the Government of the Russian Federation were occupied by Yeltsin's cadres, then the team of Putin's second term almost entirely consists of his nominees.
The "Putin" stage is characterized by the elimination of the causes that led to the destruction of the administrative vertical under B. Yeltsin. The new president returned to the federal center a significant amount of power over the regions, expanded the base of support for the center in the field and outlined ways to restore the functioning of the mechanisms of territorial administration, while not formally violating democratic principles. A controlled, orderly system of executive power was created. If under B. Yeltsin power was dispersed, moving from the center to the regions, then under V. Putin, power began to return to the center again, centrifugal tendencies gave way to centripetal ones.
Hence, D. Medvedev's coming to power took place in a "palace" situation, with a complete absence of elite competition. And the new president has to deal with representatives of the political and economic elite, who are guided not by the new head of state, but by the powerful prime minister and lead the state apparatus, which is dominated by people loyal to Putin, including Medvedev himself.
In this vein, of particular interest is Medvedev's project to form a personnel reserve - a list of 1,000 people who will be taken into account in the future when distributing posts at the top of the state apparatus. Obviously, this step pursues not only the official goal of renewing and rejuvenating the country's ruling elite. More importantly, with the help of this list, Medvedev will be able to promote people who will personally owe their ascent to him.
It is also obvious that V. Putin, having refused the third term, destroyed the consensus of the elites and created the prerequisites for a "civil war of the elites."
Thus, over the six years of perestroika, the structure of power in the USSR has undergone significant changes.
Features of the modern Russian elite
One of important features ruling elite is the social composition and its dynamics.
A significant difference between the elite of Putin's call is the rejuvenation of the ruling stratum, and the average age of the top leadership is higher than the representatives of the regional elite.
One of the characteristic manifestations of such ties among the modern political elite is clannishness and fraternity.
Let us dwell on some features of the clan system inherent in the Russian political elite.
Clanism gives rise to localism, i.e. the desire to observe only their narrow interests (to the detriment of the common cause). The other side of the clan system is the lack of purposeful state activity of power structures, the impossibility of implementing promising programs, because with the departure of officials, their team also changes. The government as a set of independent players is not capable of generating a predictable economic policy - it needs to be updated. Of particular interest is the entrepreneurial stratum, which not only begins to enter the Russian political elite, but also influences the behavior of the elite and the alignment of political forces.
Many members of the elite are directly involved in questionable or illegal activities. According to the director of the FBI, in today's Russia, criminal activity is especially different in the field of financial speculation, manipulation of the banking system, and illegal fraudulent transactions with state property.
many members of the ruling political elite responsible for making economic and political decisions are directly involved in illegal business.
The ideological fragmentation of our political elite, the inability, and possibly the lack of a common desire for consolidation, is one of its main features.
However, despite the aforementioned “divorce” of the various current factions of the former nomenklatura, they still remain connected, not only by common origin, personal relations, but also institutionally.
One thing is certain - the current Russian elite is characterized to a greater extent than the Soviet one by such qualities as greed, a tendency to corruption (noted by 44% of respondents), irresponsibility, a tendency to put their interests above the interests of the people (41%), cosmopolitanism, susceptibility to external influence, contempt for the interests of their country and their people (39%). The Russians believe that the Soviet elite was characterized by patriotism, concern for the fate of the country (according to the majority of respondents - 57%), responsibility to the country, the people (39%), diligence, efficiency (34%). The Russian and Soviet elites are united by the tendency to transfer power by inheritance, only to “their” people or even children (43%), closeness from society, caste, the desire to resolve all issues in a narrow circle, without advice from the people (41%). The fact that neither one nor the other is characterized by democracy, proximity to the people is indicated by 33% of the respondents; the presence of openness to new people, readiness to attract talented and distinguished professionals to the government of the country is noted by 31% of the respondents.
The Soviet elite seems to be more professional in public opinion, the current Russian elite is more enterprising. Nevertheless, it was the Soviet party and Komsomol nomenklatura (together with the bureaucracy of the Boris Yeltsin presidency, as well as crime) that served as the main base for recruiting the modern Russian elite, according to 24 to 37% of respondents. The inner circle of President V. Putin (24%) is referred to the number of the main "forges of personnel" of the elite. One-fifth of the respondents (20%) in the number of groups on the basis of which the elite is formed, includes the heads of former state-owned enterprises. Almost the same number (18 and 17%) in the composition of the elites see people from law enforcement agencies and children of high-ranking and wealthy parents. The scientific and creative intelligentsia, according to Russians, is the last in the list of social groups from which the Russian elite comes (6%).
Well, the development of society, sciences, relations between people gives rise to new concepts and, consequently, new terms. It is quite natural to deal with them, to find the meaning and reasons for their appearance. It is not only necessary to use them to hide, disguise the vices of modern society, to ignore the forces that inexorable history calls for to take control of this society into their own hands. It was in order to divert people's consciousness from this need that it was necessary to give a new life to the long-known concept of "elite".
The political technologists of the post-Soviet bottling had to change the terminology, come up with abstruse formulations with a claim to scientificity, in order to look like innovators in the field of social transformations.
Dealing with the apologists of the current elite is a useful and necessary matter. After all, they are increasingly trying to set the tone in the life of Russian society.
And here we should note another very significant feature of the problem of elitism in our time.
In the era of globalization, it outgrows the role and affairs of individual, even the most influential individuals or groups, and becomes a characteristic feature of the activities of large international or regional organizations that set the tone and influence the activities in the field of politics and economics of large groups of countries, which, moreover, is not only open, but in some cases also hidden.
It often brings more tangible results to their leaders than officially recognized organizations. Their creators and leaders (which is typical for the United States) use their elitism in an effort to rule the whole world. That is why the modern national and international elite require especially careful study, which is what the authors are striving for.