Ours in the GDR: A group of Soviet troops in Germany. Withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany. History reference

For the uninitiated, it turned out to be, frankly, unexpected. The decision on my appointment was made by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and personally by Mikhail Gorbachev. Back in October 1990, I had a conversation with Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov. It was he who offered me in the spring of 1991 to head the Western Group of Forces. In Moscow, they noticed and, apparently, appreciated the successful withdrawal of the Southern Group of Forces, which I led.

But man proposes, but fate disposes... A month later I was urgently summoned to Moscow and ordered to take the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces. But that was only the beginning. At that time, the regular plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held in the capital. Suddenly there was a telephone call from the General Staff: "You are called general secretary!"

And how was the meeting with the first and last president USSR and the General Secretary of the Central Committee? Worried?

Not that word. After all, far from many, even considering the then democratization, had a chance to communicate with the leader of perestroika. The audience took place on the same day. During a break between sessions of the plenum of the Central Committee, Yazov and I approached Gorbachev. A little later, Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov joined us.

The General Secretary began with a question: "Have we already met?" I answered in the affirmative. In his recommendations, Gorbachev touched on the economic and political problems associated with the withdrawal of troops from Germany. He advised to establish ties with the local and federal leadership of the FRG and paid special attention to the sale of real estate owned by the USSR.

The press often mentioned fantastic figures for the value of Soviet property in Germany. How much was everything really valued?

In a conversation with me, Gorbachev suggested that our real estate was valued at 30 billion West German marks. A colossal number! However, there is nothing surprising in that. The group of troops was located in 777 military camps. They numbered 36290 buildings and structures. More than twenty-one thousand objects were built at the expense of the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, during the sale of all property Western group often there were conflicts, and sometimes deadlocks. Under a servile agreement between the USSR and the FRG, the implementation was entrusted to the German Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the current value of real estate owned by the USSR, at prices in 1990, was determined by a much smaller amount - about ten and a half billion marks. It is quite natural that the Germans were not interested in a profitable sale. Moscow, in the person of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, did not show the will of the state in this matter.

For the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Germans were ready to pay tens of billions of marks. But Gorbachev was content with a small amount.

According to interstate agreements dated December 16, 1992, all our real estate in the Western Group of Companies became the property of Germany. It was practically given to the Germans. This decision of some leaders of the Soviet Union and Russia is akin to a betrayal of interests own people, tens of thousands of homeless families of officers and ensigns. This conclusion was made even by some Western media.

God be with them, with the Western media. Russian newspapers and magazines wrote that the withdrawal of the WGW was like a rush. The Americans carried out the redeployment of only one division from Europe to the United States for five to seven years. Who is to blame for the fact that dozens of our formations and units ended up in an open field?

The top leadership of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's inner circle, who pursued an extremely short-sighted and irresponsible policy. Mikhail Sergeevich himself achieved world popularity, became the "best German" due to the fact that, for the sake of foreign policy dividends, he forgot about internal problems ah country. For the sake of the friendly smiles of a Western man in the street and the nickname "Gorby", he waved his hand at many things.

Boris Yeltsin continued his anti-army policy with no less cynicism. To please his friend, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, he reduced the already unthinkable period for the withdrawal of our troops by four months. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the military infrastructure of the Soviet Union was concentrated in the border areas - in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. So the Russian divisions and regiments had to be deployed in completely undeveloped places.

The same Americans withdrew their troops only after military camps were built for them in the States and appropriate living conditions were created. In 1992, the 7th Corps left Germany for their homeland, for the USA. The Yankees returned home without any problems, in good spirits, happy and contented.

During the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, Western intelligence allegedly successfully carried out an operation code-named "Giraffe", the purpose of which was to acquire ultra-modern weapons. Is it a bluff?

Yes and no. They most likely carried out the operation, but I would not be so categorical about success.

The group of Soviet troops in Germany, later renamed the Western Group of Forces, has always been a testing ground for the capabilities of the latest military equipment, the level of training of command personnel and personnel. The most modern samples of weapons and military equipment first came here.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan, conclusions on the characteristics of weapons and military equipment, the possibilities of their use in extreme conditions were made in the Armed Forces of the USSR mainly on the basis of exercises and maneuvers of formations and formations stationed in Germany.

In 1990-1994 in German media"Sensational" information regularly appeared that the Russians were selling weapons and ammunition left and right. One of the Germans pecked at this "duck", who offered our soldier two thousand marks for a Kalashnikov assault rifle. This "merchant" was caught red-handed. And there were more than fifty such attempts to buy weapons from our servicemen in 1992 alone. None of them succeeded. Therefore, once again I allow myself to doubt the success of Operation Giraffe. Accounting for ammunition, weapons and military equipment in the Western Group of Forces was properly organized.

Especially for skeptics, I will give the following argument. For almost half a century of existence of the GSVG-ZGV, only 68 units were wanted small arms. One hundred percent of weapons and military equipment were taken to Russia.

Our military echelons were heading home through the territory of neighboring states, recent allies under the Warsaw Pact. Were there any problems?

I don't want to indiscriminately blame entire peoples and label them, but the new "democratic" leaders of Poland and Czechoslovakia decided to improve their financial affairs at the expense of the troops withdrawn from Germany. The leadership of the Polish "Solidarity", for example, demanded to repair the bridges on which our echelons were supposed to move. The "lords" presented us with truly enslaving, clearly unfeasible demands for payment. The passage of each axle of a railway car through the country was estimated as much as four thousand West German marks. It was about tens of millions.

These conditions were unacceptable for us. Apparently, even then, recent colleagues in the Warsaw Pact were trying to earn indulgences, foreseeing the imminent expansion of NATO to the east.

Of course, we did not have such money to pay for transportation. The German side allocated only 1 billion marks to cover our transportation costs. There was only one way - by sea. But decide this the most difficult task without the consent of the authorities state power Germany was impossible.

To be honest, at first I had little faith in the reality of the idea of ​​transferring a huge group by sea. And there were objective reasons for that. Within two or three months, the entire withdrawal scheme and plan had to be revised, which in itself is quite problematic.

But the German side kept its promises and showed full political and financial support in sending our troops across the Baltic Sea.

Then, in your native Fatherland, you were not commemorated with a "quiet kind word" unless you were lazy. They were not accused of anything: use of official position, corruption, personal enrichment. Now it is clear that "puppeteers" were behind all this. Did you hurt someone?

Many! I think the time has not yet come when you can talk about everything in plain text. Although, there are no others, and those are far away.

First, it was necessary to distract Russian people from internal problems. Remember, there was not enough food, wages were not paid for months, plus rampant crime and all the "charms" of nascent capitalism.

The collapse of the Soviet Union buried the hopes of hundreds of millions of people for a stable and normal life. And here, the notorious piano in the bushes turned out to be very useful - the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany. A topical, so to speak, socio-political topic, when one could talk about the mediocrity of the command, about theft and corruption, about deserters and monster officers. At the same time, it was transparently hinted that all these loafers were sitting on the neck of the common people. In my opinion, an excellent valve for bleeding off excess pressure in the country.

Secondly, I did everything in my power to prevent unscrupulous businessmen from getting their hands on the withdrawal of troops. The Western group was surrounded by hundreds of different firms and firms, the owners of which were located in Moscow, Bonn and Berlin and occupied by no means the last positions. What we just did not offer. For example, to purchase food, coal, and other necessary material resources at astronomical prices.

In February 1991, we learned that we would not receive money from the 2.5 billion interest-free loan provided by Germany. I had to save on literally everything. Meanwhile, complaints about the objectionable and stubborn Burlakov were going to all instances. No one knows what it took to endure this pressure, except for me and the command of the Western Group of Forces. Naturally, I was not forgiven for such "willfulness". But I don't regret anything.

Many high-ranking military leaders at the end of their careers smoothly move to well-paid positions of consultants, advisers, heads of various firms and foundations. What is pensioner Burlakov doing today?

As befits a pensioner, I am raising children and grandchildren, but rather they are me. I do housework. I don’t get into politics and dubious commercial transactions.

On a voluntary basis, I lead the Union of Veterans of the Western Group of Forces - the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Anticipating malicious questions, I will say that we do not use customs privileges and, unlike some, did not flood the country with imported alcohol and cigarettes. We provide all possible legal and medical care veterans of military service and their families, we meet with the younger generation.

I look people straight in the eye. If someone considers similar work " warm place"- I will not dissuade. Time will judge.

Is it true that the Germans attempted unauthorized entry into our nuclear arsenals?

Yes, it was. In 1992, in Altengrabow, three officers of the Bundeswehr tried to penetrate the territory of the missile base. Ignoring the warning shouts of the sentry and even a shot in the air, one of them overcame the fence. Our soldier opened fire to kill. As a result, a German major was seriously wounded, and the violators were detained. The Minister of Defense of Germany then officially apologized to us for the actions of his subordinates.

They say that our Western partners were shocked when they finally found themselves in ... empty storage facilities for nuclear weapons? They were so hoping to get acquainted with their contents!

I will not brag, but they have not been able to calculate the time and place of the evacuation of nuclear weapons. Together with the special services, we planned and successfully implemented a multi-way combination. At the same time, purposeful disinformation was carried out and a number of distracting actions were carried out ...

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Western media have not tired of shouting about the so-called "Russian mafia". She did not cause problems to her compatriots in uniform?

In July 1992, the robbery of the century could have taken place. The publicity would be colossal, and the consequences would be unpredictable. On the way of transport with fifteen million German marks, Chechen criminal elements, already settled in Europe, ambushed. They calculated everything: traffic routes, departure time, security forces and much more. They did not take into account one thing - the professionalism of the Russian military and specialists from special detachment Criminal Police of Brandenburg. Thanks to coordinated and prompt actions, the robbery failed.

But this did not stop the mafia. The ZGV safe was a painfully tasty morsel. The gang was sent reinforcements from Chechnya. High-class "specialists" in robbery and robbery have come to Germany. In January 1993, the criminals repeated the robbery attempt. But the command and counterintelligence received on time necessary information... On the territory of the former GDR, by the way, at that time more than a dozen ethnic bandit groups operated. We realized that it is simply impossible to foresee everything. And the money was delivered by plane.

Alas, today experts' forecasts that with the collapse of the Soviet Union organized crime will rush to Western Europe have been confirmed.

Ten years since the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces is more of a sad date than a happy holiday. Who were we in Europe - occupiers, as some people sometimes say, or liberators?

For 49 years of our troops being in Germany, we have never frightened anyone, but we have not been afraid of anyone either. Being the most powerful grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces, the GSVG-ZGV faithfully carried out its historic mission to ensure peace and stability in Europe. It is not yet known how it will turn out post-war device peace, if there were no Soviet troops in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

One of the military journalists, touching on this topic, aptly remarked:
In the ZGV were all for selection
And the orders of the fathers were honored sacredly,
If we were still there
It is not known where NATO would be!

I think there is a lot of truth in these words. Russian soldiers and the officers who served in the Western Group of Forces deserve only the respect and gratitude of their descendants. I am sure that after a short time, Mrs. History will put everything in its place and reward everyone according to their deserts.

The capitulation of Nazi Germany came at 01:01 on May 9, 1945 Moscow time or at 23:01 on May 8 CET. Three weeks later, on May 29, a Directive was issued to rename the Soviet front into the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. The Soviet army, which reached Berlin with heavy losses in the last months of the war, remained in East Germany for the next almost half a century. The final withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany took place on August 31, 1994.

My father was one of the Soviet conscripts sent to serve in Germany (1978-1980, Bad Freienwalde, East Germany). In this post I will show some photos from the time of his service and tell general facts about Soviet troops in Germany.

Potsdam

At first, the unit was called GSOVG - Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany (1945-1954). The head of the GSOVG was at the same time the head of the Soviet military administration in Germany (SVAG) - that is, he had full power in the territory of Germany occupied by the Soviet Union. The first Commander-in-Chief of the GSOVG was Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. After the formation of the GDR on October 7, 1949, the head of the GSOVG carried out control functions in the new state for several more years as chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany.

Potsdam

The headquarters of the Soviet troops in Germany since 1946 was located in Wünsdorf - where the High Command was based during Nazi Germany ground forces Wehrmacht. Due to the special nature of the town, the territory of Wünsdorf was closed to ordinary citizens of the GDR. Along with 2,700 German residents, 50-60 thousand Soviet military personnel and members of their families lived in the city.

Bad Freienwalde

About half a million Soviet citizens lived permanently in East Germany. GSVG - a group of Soviet troops in Germany (1954-1989) - had own factories, Russian schools, sanatoriums, shops, houses of officers and other infrastructure. For crimes stipulated by the criminal legislation of the USSR, Soviet citizens were tried according to Soviet legislation in special institutions. I have already written about one Soviet pre-trial detention center in Potsdam.

Chernyakhovsk (former Insterburg), educational part(my father is on the right)

The GSVG was a kind of state within a state. Its main task was to protect the western borders of the USSR from possible threats. In the context of the Cold War, the GSVG was the advanced unit of the Soviet army, so it was equipped with the most modern equipment and weapons (including nuclear). In the event of a military conflict with NATO member countries, the group of troops had to stay on the border line until full mobilization armed forces USSR and its allies.

Potsdam

The group owned 777 military camps throughout the German Democratic Republic- more than 36,000 buildings were on the balance sheet. 21,000 objects were built with the money of the USSR. However, in many cases, barracks and other premises that once belonged to the Wehrmacht were also used to house Soviet troops.

Potsdam

Conscript soldiers received monetary allowances in GDR stamps, so service in the GSVG was considered prestigious. My dad remembers how he used the saved money to buy last days his stay in Germany before being sent home. Among the purchases were, for example, jeans that were rare at that time. In total, eight and a half million citizens of the USSR have served in the Group for the entire time of its existence.

Bad Freienwalde

In 1989, the Group was renamed again - from now on it was called the Western Group of Forces (ZGV). After the unification of the FRG and the GDR, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany became inevitable. Due to the scale and complexity of the operation, the withdrawal of troops continued until August 31, 1994. A huge amount of equipment and weapons was taken out. More than half a million people returned to the territory of the Soviet Union that had collapsed at that time. A farewell parade in honor of the withdrawal of Russian troops took place in Treptow Park in Berlin with the participation of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Potsdam

February 15, 1989 at 1000 local time, the last Soviet soldier crossed the border separating the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on a bridge over the Amu Darya River near the small Uzbek city of Termez. This soldier was Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who closed the last column of the 40th Army, thus symbolizing completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan after many years of bloody war.

Having crossed the invisible line - the state border, the army commander stopped and, turning towards Afghanistan, quietly but clearly uttered a few phrases that do not fit on paper, and then told reporters: “There was not a single soldier of the 40th Army left behind me” . Thus ended the Afghan war, which began and lasted more than 9 years. A war that claimed the lives of over 14,000 and maimed over 53,000 Soviet citizens and over a million Afghans.

On February 7, 1980, a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, where the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was considered. The Soviet leadership spoke negatively at the meeting regarding the withdrawal of troops.
In particular, D. F. Ustinov said: “I think it will take a year, or even a year and a half, until the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and before that we cannot even think about withdrawing troops, otherwise we can get into a lot of trouble.” L. I. Brezhnev: “I think that we even need to slightly increase the contingent of troops in Afghanistan.” A. A. Gromyko: “After some time, the troops will certainly be withdrawn from Afghanistan. It seems to me that we should think about what contractual obligations to establish between the parties after it happens that it will be possible to withdraw troops. We need to ensure the complete security of Afghanistan.”

At the end of February 1980, again at the initiative of L. I. Brezhnev, the issue of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan was being worked out. It was believed that by overthrowing H. Amin and securing the new Afghan government of B. Karmal, they had fulfilled their task.
But Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov and, possibly, A. A. Gromyko opposed the withdrawal of troops, so they did not do it. Probably, the decision was influenced by a sharp aggravation of the situation in Kabul at the end of February: the Soviet embassy was fired upon, several of our citizens were killed. Then the government forces barely managed to disperse the crowds of thousands of fanatics.

In May 1981, the USSR Ambassador to the DRA, F. A. Tabeev, at a meeting of military advisers, stated the official point of view on the prospects for the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan: “It was assumed that in short time, not more than a year, using the army as a deterrent force, without getting involved in hostilities, we will create conditions for the establishment and strengthening of a new leadership and the development of a new stage of the revolution. And then, while the world public opinion will not have time to react negatively, we will withdraw the troops. But a year has passed and it turned out that the leadership of Afghanistan does not have its own military support to protect the country. Therefore, now, for the next two years, the task has been set to create an Afghan army, combat-ready, devoted to the government.”

At the beginning of 1982, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, his deputy D. Cordoves and others joined in the active participation in the settlement of the Afghan problem. 12 rounds of negotiations were organized, 41 discussions with the participation of Soviet, Afghan, American and Pakistani diplomats. As a result, a package of documents on the withdrawal of troops was prepared.
In Moscow, immediately after Yu. V. Andropov came to power, these proposals were answered positively.
On May 19, 1982, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and the DRA to set a deadline for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Yu. V. Andropov was ready to present an eight-month program for the withdrawal of troops. But during that period, the confrontation between the USSR and the USA intensified. Yu. V. Andropov passed away. D. Cardoves sent his project to Moscow and Washington, but received no response.

After K. U. Chernenko came to power, the negotiation process on Afghanistan was suspended, although the military raised the question of the withdrawal of troops more and more insistently.

The process of negotiations resumed only in 1985 after the election of M. S. Gorbachev General Secretary Central Committee of the CPSU. In October 1985, the Politburo was given the task of speeding up the decision on the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. At the same time, the Afghan authorities were informed of our firm intention to withdraw our troops. B. Karmal commented on this decision: “If you leave now, next time you will have to bring in a million soldiers.”

In February 1986, at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, MS Gorbachev announced that a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops had been worked out and would be implemented immediately after the political settlement. In May 1986, instead of B. Karmal, Najibullah (Najib) was elected to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA. B. Karmal went to "rest and treatment" in the USSR.
At a meeting of the Politburo on November 13, 1986, a large-scale task was set: within two years to carry out the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan (withdraw half of the troops in 1987, and the remaining 50% in 1988).

On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Geneva, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a series of documents designed to put an end to the bloodshed. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors of the implementation of the agreements, in accordance with which the USSR undertook to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within a nine-month period starting from May 15, 1988. During the first three months, it was planned to withdraw half of all troops.
Pakistan and the US had to stop all interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The schedule for the withdrawal of troops on April 7, 1988 was signed by the Minister of Defense, Marshal D.T. Yazov. By this time, their number in Afghanistan was 100.3 thousand people. The withdrawal was planned to be carried out in parallel through two border points - Termez (Uzbekistan) and Kushka (Turkmenistan).

Carrying out the planned withdrawal of troops, the USSR continued to provide Afghanistan with significant military aid. Training of Afghan specialists was carried out at an accelerated pace, stockpiles of materiel were created in key areas and at outposts. The 40th Army continued to take part in the battles with the Mujahideen, attacking the bases of the militants with R-300 missiles and aircraft from the territory of the Soviet Union.

The closer the deadline for the start of the second stage of the withdrawal of troops approached, the more worried the Afghan leadership showed. In September 1988, the President of Afghanistan, Najibullah, in a conversation with Generals V. I. Varennikov, head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, and B. V. Gromov,
commander of the 40th Army, made an attempt to detain Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The military command unambiguously spoke out against this proposal. However, this position of the Afghans found understanding among some leaders of the USSR. Under their pressure, the schedule for the withdrawal of troops was changed. The second stage of the withdrawal of troops from Kabul was supposed to begin in November 1988, and in accordance with the new directive of the Ministry of Defense, it began only on January 15, 1989.

But this was not the end of the matter. In January 1989, President Najibullah, during meetings in Kabul with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR E. A. Shevardnadze and
KGB Chairman V. A. Kryuchkov persistently asked to leave volunteers from the 40th Army in the amount of 12 thousand people in Afghanistan for protection international airport in Kabul and the Kabul-Hairatan Strategic Highway.
E. A. Shevardnadze instructed to prepare proposals to the Politburo Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Afghanistan.
General V. I. Varennikov transmitted his negative answer, despite the fact that it was proposed to establish monetary payments to volunteers - officers at 5 thousand rubles, and soldiers at 1 thousand rubles a month. At the same time, the military emphasized that if the decision is nevertheless made, then it is necessary to leave the grouping of at least 30 thousand people.
Before the final decision was made, V. I. Varennikov gave the order to suspend the withdrawal of troops, since otherwise the objects left behind would have to be recaptured with battles and losses.
The pause lasted 10 days, until January 27, 1989. And yet common sense prevailed. At a meeting of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan, it was decided not to leave the troops, but to ensure their complete withdrawal on time.

On February 4, 1989, the last unit of the 40th Army left Kabul. In the capital, in addition to the Soviet embassy, ​​only small security forces remained, the leadership of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the office of the chief military adviser, who already flew to their homeland on February 14.

February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of a limited contingent (OKSVA), Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

Until now, there is a discussion about the reasons that prompted the USSR to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and the expediency of this step. The only thing that needs no comment is the terrible price our country has paid. About a million Soviet soldiers and officers went through the Afghan war, which claimed the lives of almost 15 thousand Soviet citizens and made tens of thousands disabled, in addition, countless Afghan rebels and civilians died.

Winners or losers?

Disputes do not subside about the status in which the Soviet military contingent left Afghanistan in 1989 - as a winner or a defeated one. However, no one calls the Soviet troops the winners in the Afghan war, opinions are divided on whether the USSR lost or did not lose this war. According to one point of view, the Soviet troops cannot be considered defeated: firstly, they have never officially been given the task of complete military victory over the enemy and control over the main territory of the country. The task was to relatively stabilize the situation, help strengthen the Afghan government and prevent possible external intervention. With these tasks, according to the supporters of this position, the Soviet troops coped, moreover, without suffering a single significant defeat.

Opponents say that in fact the task of complete military victory and control over the Afghan territory was, but it could not be fulfilled - the tactics of guerrilla warfare were used, in which the final victory is almost unattainable, and the main part of the territory was always controlled by the Mujahideen. In addition, it was not possible to stabilize the position of the socialist Afghan government, which, as a result, three years after the withdrawal of troops, was overthrown. At the same time, no one disputes that significant military losses and economic costs played a large role in the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It was estimated that during the war, the USSR annually spent 3.8 billion US dollars on Afghanistan (3 billion on the military campaign itself). The official losses of the Soviet troops are 14427 people killed, more than 53 thousand wounded, more than 300 prisoners and missing. At the same time, there is an opinion that the real death toll is 26 thousand - the official reports did not take into account the wounded, who died after being transported to the territory of the USSR.

Nevertheless, despite all the complexity, inconsistency and political assessment of these events, it should be noted that the Soviet military personnel, military advisers and specialists who were in the DRA were faithful to their military duty to the end and fulfilled it with dignity. Eternal glory heroes!

About 25 years ago, without a single shot, East Germany either ceased to exist. The group of Soviet troops in Germany (GSVG) located in the GDR was prepared for any situation, even taking into account the enemy’s nuclear attack. But the USSR lost cold war", which led to the humiliating withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany.

post-war period

Approximately one month after the victory of the USSR over Germany in World War II, the high command of the USSR decided to create a contingent of occupation troops in Germany, the commander of which was the hero of the war, Marshal Georgy Zhukov. This happened on July 9, 1945. The number of Soviet soldiers stationed at first was 1.5 million.

The mission in Germany of the Soviet troops, whose main headquarters was in the city of Potsdam, neighboring Berlin, was to ensure the management of the German occupation zone, as well as the restoration of a peaceful life for citizens in it. At the same time, the command of the USSR did not believe that these troops would long time be in Germany. In addition, the policy of the USSR in the post-war period was focused on the unification of Germany, since after the destruction of the ruling fascist party in this country, the communists and socialists became the main political forces. Thus, the Soviet Union viewed Germany as a potential strong ally in the center of Europe.

The GSVG was established on March 26, 1954, this date is considered the end of the occupation of Germany by Soviet troops. Between 1957 and 1958, about 70,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed on the territory of the GDR.

This group of troops was created to ensure the implementation of the decisions taken at the Potsdam Conference, as well as to ensure the security of the western border. Further, on September 20, 1955, the GDR signed an agreement with the USSR and became one of the countries of the Warsaw Pact. In 1957, a new pact was signed between and the GDR, according to which the number and location of Soviet troops in Germany were established. According to this agreement, Soviet troops did not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the GDR.

In 1963, the GSVG had about 386,000 soldiers, of which 46,000 belonged to the air force. The armament of the GSVG included:

• 7500 tanks;
• 100 tactical missiles;
• 484 self-propelled military installations;
• 146 bombers;
• 101 reconnaissance aircraft;
• 80 helicopters.

In 1968, German Soviet troops took part in the suppression of the uprising in Prague. In the late 70s and early 80s, the Soviet military contingent in Germany was reduced. Thus, 1,000 tanks and other military vehicles and about 20,000 soldiers were withdrawn from the territory of the GDR. During perestroika in the USSR, the GSVG had a defensive character in accordance with its structure and armament. In 1989, the number of armored Soviet technology on the territory of the GDR was significantly reduced.

In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev (general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee) was at the head of the USSR. In 1989, he decided on the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany. The military power of the GSVG was greatly weakened, since 8 battalions of soldiers and 4 tank divisions were immediately disbanded. It should be noted that the number of GSVG has been constantly decreasing since the year of their formation in the GDR, however, a major withdrawal of troops began in 1989. Therefore, answering the question of when the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany began, it should be called 1989.

On September 2, 1990, the foreign ministers of the FRG, Great Britain, the GDR, the USA, the USSR and France signed an agreement concerning the fate of Germany, which in practice meant that the borders of the FRG would expand, absorbing the GDR completely.

It is interesting to note that the United States did not plan to withdraw its troops from the territory of the FRG, while the USSR agreed to carry out a complete withdrawal of Soviet and Russian troops from East Germany before 1994. this name replaced the previous GSVG) at the time of withdrawal included:

• 546,200 soldiers;
• 115,000 units of military equipment;
• 667,000 tons of ammunition;
• 36,290 buildings and structures in 777 military camps.

The withdrawal of such a huge number of troops meant for the USSR a shameful retreat to nowhere.

Troop withdrawal

In 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the withdrawal from Germany of 4 divisions of armored vehicles attacking the air force, as well as short-range nuclear missiles. Starting from that date, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany became the most full-scale transfer of military forces in the history of mankind. Despite the enormous difficulties in transferring such a quantity of military and military equipment from the GDR to the USSR, the withdrawal deadlines were not violated, and the plan was completed by August 1994. The German government pledged to allocate DM 15 million to cover the costs required by the withdrawal of troops.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany was carried out mainly by sea, in particular, through the ports of the German city of Rostock and the island of Rügen, as well as railroad tracks through Poland.

Problems during the withdrawal of troops

One of the main problems during the years of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany was the issue of housing. It was originally planned to withdraw troops as housing was built for them at home. However, according to the last commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces, Matvey Burlakov, "the country's government did not think about its own army." Moreover, the president of Russia at that time, Boris Yeltsin, in order to meet the requirements of the Western authorities, spoke in favor of reducing the withdrawal period by 4 months.

Of the promised 15 million marks for the construction of housing for soldiers, Germany paid only 8 million. As a result, only 45,000 houses were built for Soviet soldiers in Ukraine and Belarus. More than 170,000 Soviet officers and 160,000 soldiers were left homeless.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany was also a personal disaster for many thousands of soldiers. Their wives and children were sent to their parents' houses, many soldiers remained to live in tents and tents. Most of the families were never able to reunite again.

Another important question was to compensate the USSR for the property they left in Germany. The total value of this property at that time was estimated at $28 billion. Only $385 million was paid to Russia as compensation.

Most of Soviet military units were disbanded after their withdrawal from Germany. Many Germans sympathized with the Soviet soldiers, because they understood that there was not even housing for them in their homeland. The famous historian Werner Borchert said that Soviet soldiers were friends for many Germans.

Many East Germans were in good relations With Soviet soldiers, since they had been in German territory for several decades. During the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the German people saw off the soldiers with rallies and flowers.

Completion of the withdrawal of troops

The Russian ground forces left German soil on June 25, 1994. Withdrawal celebrations were held on June 11, 1994 in the city of Wünsdorf and in Treptow Park on August 31, 1994. The last date is considered the official date when the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany was completed. The festive ceremony in Treptow Park was attended by (German chancellor) and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Matvey Burlakov - Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces left Germany by plane on September 1, 1994.

On the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria and its consequences.
....Here it would be very appropriate to mention one more act of Khrushchev, which is already little known today. Nikita Sergeevich himself said this about this: “But I have the conviction that it is no longer possible to confine ourselves to talking and pulling on this issue, that the abnormality should be eliminated by urgently signing a peace treaty with Austria, withdrawing our troops from there. Thus, untie your hands in order to loudly conduct propaganda against the US military bases, which scattered their troops across different continents and countries and conducted an aggressive, gendarmerie policy towards countries that were in their sphere of influence, keeping military bases on their territory. In order to speak in a loud voice, to organize the public of the whole world to fight against such orders, we ourselves had to withdraw our troops from foreign territories. The first question arose about Austria. It will be about how Khrushchev, without any need, unexpectedly withdrew our troops from Austria. As you can see, the pretext was far-fetched: the Soviet Union needed to withdraw its troops from Austria so that it would be easier to launch propaganda against the presence of American bases in many parts of the world. Here, they say, we do not have military bases on foreign territory, which means that the Americans should also withdraw their military bases.
More than half a century has passed, it's time to take stock. How many American bases were liquidated by the Americans after our criticism? None. So the reasons for Khrushchev's actions are completely different - the systematic, gradual surrender of the geopolitical positions of Russia - the USSR. What is Austria from a geopolitical point of view? At that moment it was a country with a population of about 7 million people and with a very important location in Central Europe. It borders on Germany, Switzerland, Italy and other countries. In 1938, as a result of the Anschluss, Austria was annexed to the Third Reich and became its eastern land Ostmark. Tens of thousands of Austrian soldiers fought on the German Eastern Front against the Soviet Union and committed atrocities on our territory no less than the Germans. In the spring of 1945, more than 26 thousand people died during the battles for the liberation of Austria. Soviet soldiers. But this was not the entire payment for the right of Russia - the USSR to have military bases and for its presence in the very center of Europe. In the Austrian

1 Khrushchev N. S. Time. People. Power: Memoirs. In 4 books. - M.: Moscow news, 1999.Kn. 4.C. 281.
the ashes of more than 60 thousand Soviet prisoners of war and forcibly driven away civilians who died in concentration camps on the territory of Austria rest on earth.
After the surrender, the territory of Austria within the borders of 1938 was divided among the four victorious powers into occupation zones, just like the territory of Germany. At first, only the Soviet troops that liberated it were in Vienna, but at the Potsdam Conference, the allies agreed on the division of the capital of Austria into four occupation zones. All laws adopted by the Austrian parliament, before they were officially published by the federal government, had to receive approval from the Allied Commission created by the victorious countries. This situation continued for ten years. And suddenly, in March 1955, at the direction of N. S. Khrushchev, an Austrian government delegation was unexpectedly invited to Moscow to prepare a state treaty, which was supposed to restore the independence and full sovereignty of Austria. The USSR did not gain anything from this step, but already on May 15, 1955, this document was signed in Vienna and entered into force on July 27, 1955. According to the agreements reached, the troops of all victorious countries had to leave Austria within only 90 days. On October 19, 1955, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria was completed1.
Per beautiful words about the withdrawal of "all troops" the essence was hidden: it was incomparably more important for the Soviet Union to remain in the center of Europe than for anyone else. It was our army that came to Europe, chasing the Nazis from our homeland, and created a barrier against new aggression in the form of a bloc of socialist states. Being in Austria, we had a powerful lever of influence on European politics. And most importantly, giving up your positions in any game is a sign of weakness or

1 “In total, the Soviet troops stationed in Austria are staffed by 38,803 military personnel and 2,671 workers and employees” (G.K. Zhukov’s note to the Central Committee of the CPSU on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria dated June 6, 1955, AP RF.F. 3. Inv. 64. D. 21. Ll. 11–14).
nonsense. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria, carried out in 1955 at the direction of N. S. Khrushchev, caused great damage to the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union and significantly changed the balance of power in Central Europe not in favor of our country. The Austro-Hungarian border that became transparent allowed the former fascists of Miklós Horthy to return to Hungary, who now began working for the US and British intelligence services. The result was an armed rebellion in Hungary in the fall of 1956, to suppress which the USSR had to use troops1. Pay attention to the dates: in 1955 we left Austria, and in 1956 we were almost "left" from Hungary its head

1 These were not peaceful demonstrators, but armed fighters who fought in World War II just 11 years ago. Reprisals against communists and members of the Hungarian special services. Actual lynchings on the streets of Budapest. The scope of the "peaceful demonstrations" in Hungary in 1956 and their scenario will be understandable in comparison with the events in Syria. Demonstrations also began there, and then out of nowhere the "demonstrators" appeared sniper rifles, grenade launchers and machine guns.
Some units of the regular army of Hungary went over to the side of the rebels. The scope of the battles in which Russian soldiers defended its geopolitical interests and gave their lives will emphasize the following fact: “...Thousands (the exact number is unknown to this day) of Soviet soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 26 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union Yuza, 14 of them - posthumously. By a separate but open Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 1, 1956, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (four times) was awarded to Marshal Zhukov. During 12 days of active hostilities, our army lost as a result of the actions of "peaceful and unarmed demonstrators": 705 people, including 22 - missing; 26 tanks, 3 self-propelled guns, 10 armored personnel carriers, 4 Katyushas, ​​38 vehicles, 9 anti-aircraft guns (76 mm and 85 mm), four 85 mm D-44 divisional cannons, nine 122 mm howitzers (see photo). : Smolyannikov S. Hungary 1956. The bloody autumn of Budapest, on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the events that received the official name "Liquidation of the Hungarian rebellion" //).
2 But Austria-Hungary until 1918 was called a common country of several peoples in the center of Europe.
idiot (traitor) Khrushchev - you need to put pressure on all fronts1. That is why under Stalin, who did not do stupid things in foreign policy, there were no uprisings anywhere. Surrendering Hungary at that time also meant receiving similar speeches by “driven to despair” agents of the CIA and MI-6, former Nazis who received promises and money, as well as people simply deceived by propaganda in all other countries that entered the zone of influence of the USSR. Don't forget: the colossal war ended just a little over ten years ago, everyone who fought against Russia was alive and full of strength...
And one more important fact. Our army did not leave Austria, but almost ran away from there. The three-month period for the withdrawal of troops was not determined by any circumstances, there was nowhere to rush, moreover, there was no need to withdraw troops.

1 It is necessary to understand that geopolitical competitors always use ANY reason to rock the situation. And the death of Stalin, his demonization by Khrushchev, insulting the memory of the leader - this is also a REASON for pumping up tensions within the USSR. Only not against, but for Stalin. A good example is the unrest and unrest that happened in the same 1956 in Tbilisi. Stalin died on March 5, 1953, and on February 25, 1956, at the morning meeting, N. S. Khrushchev delivered a closed report "On the cult of personality and its consequences." You can easily find this report on the Internet and you can see for yourself how false it is. Pay attention: the report is SECRET and CLOSED. And in a week in the capital of Georgia, the demonstrators will know its contents and be indignant. At first, people took to the streets without seeing any mention of the anniversary of Stalin's death in the newspapers. Spontaneous mourning events began. Then, from March 6, indignation will begin to be pumped up with Khrushchev's lies, which were voiced in the report. Stalin is a Georgian, Khrushchev's slander touches the pride of the Georgians. The result was demonstrations in the capital of Georgia with portraits of Stalin and a demand that March 9, the day of Stalin's funeral, be given the status of a day of mourning. And then provocateurs in the crowd, whipping up passions, seizing transport and trying to seize the House of Communications and newspaper editorial offices. First, warning volleys of troops, then aimed fire, which stopped the onslaught. At least one person with a gun was detained in the crowd. According to official data, a total of 21 people were killed, and another 54 were injured of varying severity. Let me remind you: under Stalin there was not a single similar story.
So the withdrawal of troops to the detriment of the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union, and also accelerated, was not invented by Gorbachev (Afghanistan) and not Yeltsin (Germany), but by Khrushchev.
And finally, for all those who like to call on Russia to repent. There are no emotions in geopolitics and there is no place for evaluations based on them. Only one thing is valued here - strength. The word "gratitude" in geopolitics is simply absent. The most seemingly moral actions in the field of geopolitics will not lead to anything good if they are one-sided surrender of positions. Here is one example of how Austria later thanked its liberators, who gave it the opportunity in 1955 to restore independence and full sovereignty. 24 years after the withdrawal of our troops, in 1979 Researcher At one of the exhibitions in Vienna, Sergei Androsov accidentally saw an elegant bronze statue of "Flying Mercury" at the State Hermitage Museum. She was abducted by German troops from Pavlovsky Park near St. Petersburg during the Great Patriotic War and is the only bronze copy in the world famous sculpture Mercury, the god of trade and patron of the arts, the work of the outstanding Italian Renaissance master Giovanni Bologna1. The USSR announced the find and asked for the statue to be returned. The "grateful" Austrian side, under various pretexts, did not want to return it. Negotiations about the obvious fact have been going on for 25 (!) years. Finally, only on May 5, 2005, on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 50th anniversary of the restoration of the independence and sovereignty of Austria, its ambassador to Moscow, Martin Vukovich, at a ceremony at the State Museum fine arts named after A. S. Pushkin gave Russia the sculpture "Flying Mercury".

It was an excerpt from the book by N. Starikov "Geopolitics: How it's done"