Withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany. History reference. Ours in the GDR: A group of Soviet troops in Germany
On February 15, 1989, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, according to the official version, became the last Soviet soldier to cross the border between the two countries along the Friendship Bridge. In fact, both Soviet military personnel who were captured by the dushmans and units of border guards who covered the withdrawal of troops and returned to the territory of the USSR only in the afternoon of February 15 remained on the territory of Afghanistan. The border troops of the KGB of the USSR carried out tasks to protect the Soviet-Afghan border individual divisions in Afghanistan until April 1989.
FEBRUARY 15, 1989
February night, ice armor
There are headlights on the rocks, machine guns in the loopholes.
The column leaves from under the fire.
We go to the border
let's go to the border!
Rumbles of water in the bed of a mountain river
And the darkness in the mountains sparkles with tracers
Today is the last push, guys!
The last push - and we are on the border.
Afghan! You are like a wound in the souls of soldiers.
I know that you will dream of us at night.
After all, there are obelisks along the roads
To the very border, to the very border.
There are no miracles in this war.
Not all boys are destined to return.
They watch us from heaven
They help us get to the border.
Let's go out and write to our mothers: “Now
No need to pray for us at night!”
God help us and we are without loss
We will reach the border, we will reach the border
"Frontier!" head watch reported
And dusty faces became brighter
And the commander said quietly on the air:
"Fighters! Will live! After all, we are on the border!”
Has this war ended?
And now nothing will happen to us
No wonder you kept the stash, foreman.
Come on, get it - we are already at the border!
WE HAVE PERFORMED OUR SOLDIER'S DUTY WITH HONOR
The population of the Afghan villages saw us off mostly friendly. In some settlements, people came out with flowers and waved affably after them. Not a single shot was fired during the march. In places of possible ambushes and in settlements, by agreement with tribal authorities, elders boarded our combat vehicles, who served as a kind of guarantor of the safety of our servicemen. We are not indebted to the people. They were given our well-settled towns with well-established infrastructure. Of particular value were artesian wells, which became sources of water supply for many villages.
Of course, for our soldiers, sergeants, ensigns and officers, returning to their homeland has become a real holiday. In freshly laundered uniforms, with hemmed collars, unfolded panels on which the names of the units were written, our soldiers looked spectacular when crossing the border. On the sides of the combat vehicles were inscriptions: "I'm back, mom!" Sanitary treatment points were deployed in all directions, everyone washed themselves with pleasure after the road, disinfected their uniforms, put them in order military equipment and weapons. The kitchens didn't smoke. Almost along the entire border, the soldiers' sense of smell teased the smell of delicious Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik pilaf. Both old and small border settlements met our soldiers. At the rallies dedicated to the exit from Afghanistan, the leaders of the republics, border regions, soldiers and officers-internationalists spoke. Parents came from many regions of the USSR to meet their sons. They sincerely thanked the officers for returning home their grown-up boys. After a plentiful lunch and dinner, the motorized maneuver groups adopted marching order and marched to previously prepared base areas along the state border with Afghanistan.
By this time, we had already all dived into the “perestroika”, hot spots appeared already inside the USSR, part of the motorized maneuvering and air assault groups were urgently transferred to other regions. Less and less forces and means remained to guard and defend the Afghan border, which had an extremely negative impact in the course of subsequent events already on the territory of Tajikistan. The mass media began to openly defame the causes and consequences of our stay in Afghanistan, extremely negatively influencing the moral and psychological state of the internationalist soldiers. I am still in correspondence with many of them. Many do not find their place in our bazaar market of profit and deceit, but the vast majority are sure that we have fulfilled our soldier's duty with honor and dignity.
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Meanwhile, for thousands of officers and members of their families, this hasty, more reminiscent of flight, outcome turned into a real tragedy. Domestic politicians, trying to please the West, and often just following the lead of "sworn friends", forgot about their army, in fact, left it to its fate. The last Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces, retired Colonel-General Matvey BURLAKOV, tells about how the Western Group of Forces was taken out and met, about the ups and downs of that strange period of time.
Matvey Prokofievich, having learned about the appointment to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces, did you realize that it was you who would bear the burden of withdrawing a military group of many thousands?
I began the withdrawal of our troops from Europe even before I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces - in the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Group. There were no special complaints against me in this regard, and the Minister of Defense of the USSR Yazov even decided to carry out, using the example of a group of troops subordinate to me workshops for the commands of the Western, Northern and Central groups. First Deputy Minister General of the Army Lushev was appointed to lead the classes in Hungary. For two days, we showed the procedure for preparing for the withdrawal, the process of collecting and loading equipment. Especially for this, a collection point. Everything went well. “I will report to the minister, and get ready, Matvey Prokofievich: you will most likely have to withdraw the Western Group as well. You have a good experience, ”Lushev said then. That was June 1989. And in October 1990, in Moscow, I was at the report of the minister. Yazov listened, was silent for a while: “You know, Matvey, in next year, most likely by May, the commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces will be dismissed. The age is still 65 years. Get ready to take the job." May means May.
But then chance intervened: an emergency occurs in the Western Group of Forces. The commander of one of the regiments, leaving his family and taking with him a secret rocket at that time, fled to the West. The Germans, of course, refused to extradite the defector to the Soviet side. A loud scandal erupted. The country's leadership makes decisions: to remove from their positions the commander-in-chief and a member of the military council of a group of troops. Thus, I took the ZGV instead of May in December. I was told about this at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow, giving only three days to hand over the affairs to the first deputy, say goodbye to the Hungarian leadership and subordinates. On December 14, 1990, I flew from Budapest to Berlin.
Was the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces more difficult than the previous withdrawal from Hungary?
Incomparably more difficult. Firstly, the Southern Group of Forces went out back in the days of the Soviet Union - they crossed the Hungarian border, and already at home, in their native Ukraine. Another thing is Germany, where the grouping was dozens of times larger, and in order to withdraw it, it was necessary to overcome several borders of sovereign states - Poland, Czechoslovakia, and since 1992 - also Belarus, Ukraine. Moreover, the attitude towards us was far from friendly. Poles and Czechs former brothers in the socialist camp, they decided to correct their shaky financial position. The leaderships of these countries put forward a number of conditions: to repair all routes, to build bridges, to lay, in fact, new bypass roads around cities. And for the passage of each axle of a railway car across the country, they demanded an astronomical amount - from 4.5 to 5 thousand marks!
Naturally, the group did not have such money, which means that there was only one way left - by sea. From the German ports of Rostock and Mukran to Kaliningrad, Vyborg and Klaipeda. In order to study the situation, the technical readiness for the withdrawal of troops by sea, I was on the coast with the main part of the headquarters for six months. Otherwise, it was impossible: after all, there were not enough warships, and no one knew how civilian cargo ships not intended for transporting equipment would behave. Then three ferries "Mukran - Klaipeda" were launched, each of which was loaded with a hundred pieces of equipment. The first six months were spent precisely on studying the possibility of withdrawing troops by sea, therefore, they entered the established schedule only in the second half of 1991.
Did the Germans really see off our soldiers and officers with tears in their eyes and bouquets of flowers? Or did the majority still grin maliciously at the back of the troops leaving Germany?
It was different. East Germans, especially those who served in the People's National Army of the GDR, were offended that we were leaving them. After the unification of Germany, the army of the GDR was simply disbanded. The generals and senior officers were fired, while all the rest who wished to stay were lowered in rank by two steps. But there really were rallies, flowers, tears, they saw us off well, kindly. The Western Germans were surprisingly calm and even about our departure.
There were, however, negative moments. Neo-Nazis threw a torch on one of the wagons of a train carrying ammunition passing under the bridge. The sentry, knowing full well that if the tarpaulin catches fire, then disaster cannot be avoided, climbs up. The guy managed to drop the torch and put out the flames, but he himself died.
Now, twenty years later, it is absolutely obvious that the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces in such a short time was an absolutely ill-conceived, I would even say adventurous operation. Did you, as commander-in-chief, somehow try to influence the situation?
A man in uniform cannot discuss orders, criticize the incumbent President - the Supreme Commander. And we prompted and advised him constantly. Personally, I kept telling both our and the German leadership that the rate of withdrawal should be equal to the rate of equipping the troops at home. A town was built in Russia - we are withdrawing a regiment, a division - we are liberating the German garrison. The formula is simple and not invented by us! This is how the French withdrew their troops. And in our country, elite units and formations were sent to an open field, everything was so ill-conceived.
The Germans, of course, wanted to push us out as soon as possible, and this can be understood. Another thing is incomprehensible: why the leaders of our country, neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin, who came to replace him, absolutely did not think about their own army. On the contrary, they were constantly rushing, urging. And Yeltsin, plus everything, reduced the already disastrous time for the withdrawal of the group by another four months.
If the ZGV had been given eight to ten years, then for sure everything would have turned out quite differently. During this time, it was possible to create infrastructure, equip training grounds, build housing for military personnel. Indeed, there were practically no military camps in post-Soviet Russia, all of them remained along the western borders of the former Union: in Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, and Moldova. The authorities turned out to be aloof from the problems of people in uniform, in fact, leaving them to the mercy of fate.
Take, for example, a tank division thrown under the village of Boguchary in the Voronezh region. The mud is impassable, the nearest railway line is 50 km off-road. No one even thought about how to drive the tanks to their destination through the black soil! When making such a wild decision, they were guided by other principles: at that time Voronezh region was afraid of Chechnya, located not so far away, and Boguchary on the southern outskirts was supposed to become a kind of barrier, an outpost. And they did not think at all about where to live for the officers and their families.
Matvey Prokofievich, don't you think that it was during these years that a time bomb was laid under the prestige of officer service?
The image of the officer corps and the prestige of military service as a whole have suffered, that's no doubt. And how many broken families! Judge for yourself: the officers left in trains with the soldiers, and the wives and children who had such an opportunity were sent to their parents, close relatives, and acquaintances. The forced separation sometimes lasted for several years: where to bring the family if you feed mosquitoes in the tent yourself, and there is no chance to change anything? Many never reunited. And this is also a tragedy, one of many.
And how many sensible, professional commanders we lost in those years! Even the young officers serving in the Western Group of Forces had a wealth of experience: after all, the troops in Germany did not engage in side activities that were not characteristic of the army, but devoted all their time to planned combat training. No annual "battles for the potato harvest", only the improvement of military skills! Arriving home, these people faced insurmountable difficulties of a domestic nature, and, accordingly, the service faded into the background, prospects and meaning were lost. 56,900 officers were withdrawn from Germany. Thousands of them - some immediately, others a few years later - left the Armed Forces.
Previously, it was believed that only the so-called "thieves" officers who won the "contest of dads" get to serve in the Western Group of Forces...
Of course, there were some, but I can confidently say that they did not make up the majority. You don’t have to go far for an example: I, a native of a working-class family, after graduating with honors from a school, were sent to Germany, where I served as a young officer from 1956 to 1963. Graduates with honors during distribution were then given the right to choose a place of service. And you know, these seven years have given me a lot as a commander, best school it was impossible to imagine.
The talk of the town was the sale of the property of the Western Group of Forces ...
According to an agreement between the heads of our states, the German Ministry of Finance was supposed to deal with the sale of real estate owned by the ZGV. Now think, why should the Ministry of Finance sell our barracks, when it is already clear to everyone that no one will take it with them anyway, and in the end they will get it for free? Therefore, there was actually no sale of real estate.
Under these conditions, I made a decision: to dismantle everything that was possible and take it to Russia. And these are thousands of various hangars, storages, boxes - in general, those structures that can be assembled in a new place. More than 37,000 concrete airfield slabs were removed from runways and parking lots alone! The Germans, of course, began to resent. And I tried to calmly explain: in the weapons room, the machine guns are in the pyramids, which we take along with the weapons, and the combat aircraft is based on the concrete parking lot of the airfield, and this, figuratively speaking, is its pyramid. Why should we leave our possessions when we leave? At home, these plates were very useful. Today, almost all the tanks withdrawn at one time from the Western Group of Forces, and this is neither more nor less than four thousand units of armored vehicles, are standing on these plates in the places where divisions are deployed.
And then…
- ... and then the “fourth estate” was lowered on me, or rather watchdogs from the journalistic workshop, which I deeply respect. He reacted painfully to all these attacks, blood, as they say, spoiled. When he came to Moscow, and this happened infrequently, he tried to speak on television, to tell the truth about the state of affairs in the Western Group of Forces. But lies poured from screens and newspaper pages every day! The people wanted fried facts, and they got them in huge quantities. Reading fables was also hard for my family, relatives, people who knew me well.
Tell us in more detail what kind of explosive compromising material was contained in the famous report of Yuri Boldyrev, which dealt with abuses in the Western Group of Forces? After all, as far as I know, his entire text was never made public.
But I don’t know who Boldyrev is, I have never met him personally. Yes, enough came from him at the end of 91 large group, fifteen people, led by his deputy Vyacheslav Vasyagin. The commission worked in the group of troops for almost a month. At the summing up, Vasyagin said: “After all the publications in the press, we came to you with bad intentions, and we leave with a good feeling. Everything is going well, and you will eliminate the minor shortcomings that exist on your own. ” The analysis by the head of the commission was carried out orally, no written conclusions were left to us. True, the entire meeting, including these words of Vasyagin, was recorded by my chief of staff on a dictaphone. This film, by the way, mysteriously disappeared after a month ...
And then it started from Moscow: remove, demote, imprison! The positive conclusion of the Vasyagin Commission after some 30 days turned into the famous, "revealing" report of Boldyrev. This lie was also needed in order to divert public opinion from blatant internal problems Russia. After all, it was the beginning of the 90s, a difficult time. And here, by the way, “the fattening, plundering the army generals and officers” came in handy! But think about it: after all, 36,095 people visited the Western Group of Forces with various checks at that time! Couldn't they all at once, as if by agreement, fail to notice gross violations bordering on crimes?
You once said that the time to name those who wanted to compromise you, to make you a whipping boy, has not yet come. Has it already arrived today?
Not yet. These people are still in power.
What can you say about the three-part film shot in 2001 by German filmmakers documentary"Red Star over Germany"?
I, along with several former commanders-in-chief, acted as a consultant on this project. The film is not bad, although the Germans still broke in places on the negative.
And how did the infamous August coup come back to haunt Wünsdorf, far from Moscow?
On the morning of the 19th (by the way, I was on another vacation then), the operational duty officer calls me: “Order of the Minister of Defense, at 6 o’clock all commanders should be watching TVs in their offices.” I, as befits a vacationer, go to the office in a tracksuit. I sit down, turn on the TV, watch the appeal of the State Emergency Committee. After that come the deputies. I then said that this does not concern us - no one will drive tanks from Berlin to Moscow, this is at least stupid. After an hour and a half of unsuccessful attempts to get through to the minister, I still heard Yazov's voice in the receiver: “Matvey, you are an experienced person, and you know what to do. Mind your own business". At that time, I had one thing to do - the withdrawal of troops.
Ironically, August 19th is my birthday. In the evening we celebrated a little in the family circle, with colleagues. A little later, Chief of Staff Kuznetsov calls: “Comrade Commander-in-Chief, the Prime Minister of Brandenburg, Mr. Manfred Stolbert, wants to meet with you.” I put on my uniform and went to my office. It turned out that Stolbert arrived on behalf of the President of Germany himself, in order to find out how a group of troops would behave in the light of the current situation? My answer that no adjustments would be made to the withdrawal schedule reassured him.
On August 25, when I safely returned from vacation, the commission of the group of troops, headed by the chief of staff, worked according to plan in the formations of the 2nd Panzer Army. And I flew to the coast, to control the process of the withdrawal of troops by sea. No sooner had he arrived in Mukran than the Chief of the General Staff got in touch: “Matvey Prokofievich, urgently return to Wünsdorf. The Germans are panicking: Burlakov is raising the 2nd Panzer Army, he is almost going to attack Germany. At least play preference, but don’t get out of control! The situation was such that journalists, police, and special services were on duty almost around the clock near each of our military camps. And I, as commander in chief, was the number one figure for spies of all stripes.
Thanks for the candid conversation!
Interviewed by Roman SHKURLATOV
| PRIVATE BUSSINESS BURLAKOV Matvey Prokopevich Born on August 19, 1935 in Ulan-Ude. In 1957 he graduated from Omsk military school them. M. V. Frunze. In 1968, after graduating from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze was appointed deputy commander of the regiment. Since 1969 - regiment commander, since 1973 - division commander. In 1977, after graduating from the Military Academy General Staff appointed commander of an army corps. Since 1979 - Army Commander, since 1983 - Chief of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District. Since 1988 - Commander of the Southern Group of Forces. Since December 1990 - Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces. Since 1994 - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Reserved since 1995. The president public association"Union of Veterans of the Western Group of Forces / GSVG". |
- Matvey Prokopyevich, before moving on to the main topic of the conversation, perhaps remember how your appointment as commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces took place?
For the uninitiated, it turned out to be, frankly, unexpected. The decision on my appointment was made by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and personally by Mikhail Gorbachev. Back in October 1990, I had a conversation with Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov. It was he who offered me in the spring of 1991 to head the Western Group of Forces. In Moscow, they noticed and, apparently, appreciated the successful withdrawal of the Southern Group of Forces, which I led.
But man proposes, but fate disposes... A month later I was urgently summoned to Moscow and ordered to take the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces. But that was only the beginning. At that time, the regular plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held in the capital. Suddenly there was a telephone call from the General Staff: "The General Secretary is calling you!"
And how was the meeting with the first and last president of the USSR and the general secretary of the Central Committee? Worried?
Not that word. After all, far from many, even considering the then democratization, had a chance to communicate with the leader of perestroika. The audience took place on the same day. During a break between sessions of the plenum of the Central Committee, Yazov and I approached Gorbachev. A little later, Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov joined us.
The General Secretary began with a question: "Have we already met?" I answered in the affirmative. In his recommendations, Gorbachev touched on the economic and political problems associated with the withdrawal of troops from Germany. He advised to establish ties with the local and federal leadership of the FRG and paid special attention to the sale of real estate owned by the USSR.
The press often mentioned fantastic figures for the value of Soviet property in Germany. How much was everything really valued?
In a conversation with me, Gorbachev suggested that our real estate was valued at 30 billion West German marks. A colossal number! However, there is nothing surprising in that. The group of troops was located in 777 military camps. They numbered 36290 buildings and structures. More than twenty-one thousand objects were built at the expense of the Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, during the sale of all the property of the Western Group, conflicts and sometimes deadlocks often arose. Under a servile agreement between the USSR and the FRG, the implementation was entrusted to the German Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the current value of real estate, which is the property of the USSR, at prices in 1990 was determined by a much smaller amount - about ten and a half billion marks. It is quite natural that the Germans were not interested in a profitable sale. Moscow, in the person of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, did not show the will of the state in this matter.
For the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Germans were ready to pay tens of billions of marks. But Gorbachev was content with a small amount.
According to interstate agreements dated December 16, 1992, all our real estate in the Western Group of Companies became the property of Germany. It was practically given to the Germans. This decision of some leaders of the Soviet Union and Russia is akin to a betrayal of interests own people, tens of thousands of homeless families of officers and ensigns. This conclusion was made even by some Western media.
God be with them, with the Western media. Russian newspapers and magazines wrote that the withdrawal of the WGW was like a rush. The Americans carried out the redeployment of only one division from Europe to the United States for five to seven years. Who is to blame for the fact that dozens of our formations and units ended up in an open field?
The top leadership of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's inner circle, who pursued an extremely short-sighted and irresponsible policy. Mikhail Sergeevich himself achieved world popularity, became the "best German" due to the fact that, for the sake of foreign policy dividends, he forgot about the country's internal problems. For the sake of the friendly smiles of a Western man in the street and the nickname "Gorby", he waved his hand at many things.
Boris Yeltsin continued his anti-army policy with no less cynicism. To please his friend, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, he reduced the already unthinkable period for the withdrawal of our troops by four months. Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of the military infrastructure of the Soviet Union was concentrated in the border areas - in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. So the Russian divisions and regiments had to be deployed in completely undeveloped places.
The same Americans withdrew their troops only after military camps were built for them in the States and appropriate living conditions were created. In 1992, the 7th Corps left Germany for their homeland, for the USA. The Yankees returned home without any problems, in good spirits, happy and contented.
During the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, Western intelligence allegedly successfully carried out an operation code-named "Giraffe", the purpose of which was to acquire ultra-modern weapons. Is it a bluff?
Yes and no. They most likely carried out the operation, but I would not be so categorical about success.
The group of Soviet troops in Germany, later renamed the Western Group of Forces, has always been a testing ground for the capabilities of the latest military equipment, the level of training of command personnel and personnel. The most modern samples of weapons and military equipment first came here.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan, conclusions on the characteristics of weapons and military equipment, the possibilities of their use in extreme conditions were made in the Armed Forces of the USSR mainly on the basis of exercises and maneuvers of formations and formations stationed in Germany.
In 1990-1994 in German media"Sensational" information regularly appeared that the Russians were selling weapons and ammunition left and right. One of the Germans pecked at this "duck", who offered our soldier two thousand marks for a Kalashnikov assault rifle. This "merchant" was caught red-handed. And there were more than fifty such attempts to buy weapons from our servicemen in 1992 alone. None of them succeeded. Therefore, once again I allow myself to doubt the success of Operation Giraffe. Accounting for ammunition, weapons and military equipment in the Western Group of Forces was properly organized.
Especially for skeptics, I will give the following argument. For almost half a century of existence of the GSVG-ZGV, only 68 small arms were wanted. One hundred percent of weapons and military equipment were taken to Russia.
Our military echelons were heading home through the territory of neighboring states, recent allies under the Warsaw Pact. Were there any problems?
I don't want to indiscriminately blame entire peoples and label them, but the new "democratic" leaders of Poland and Czechoslovakia decided to improve their financial affairs at the expense of the troops withdrawn from Germany. The leadership of the Polish "Solidarity", for example, demanded to repair the bridges on which our echelons were supposed to move. The "lords" presented us with truly enslaving, clearly unfeasible demands for payment. The passage of each axle of a railway car through the country was estimated as much as four thousand West German marks. It was about tens of millions.
These conditions were unacceptable for us. Apparently, even then, recent colleagues in the Warsaw Pact tried to earn indulgences, foreseeing the imminent expansion of NATO to the east.
Of course, we did not have such money to pay for transportation. The German side allocated only 1 billion marks to cover our transportation costs. There was only one way - by sea. But decide this the most difficult task without the consent of the German state authorities was impossible.
To be honest, at first I had little faith in the reality of the idea of transferring a huge group by sea. And there were objective reasons for that. Within two or three months, the entire withdrawal scheme and plan had to be revised, which in itself is quite problematic.
But the German side kept its promises and showed full political and financial support in sending our troops across the Baltic Sea.
Then in your native Fatherland you were not commemorated "quiet kind word"unless he was lazy. They were not accused of anything: using his official position, corruption, personal enrichment. Now it is clear that the "puppeteers" were behind all this. Did you greatly interfere with someone?
Many! I think the time has not yet come when you can talk about everything in plain text. Although, there are no others, and those are far away.
First, it was necessary to distract Russian people from internal problems. Remember, there was not enough food, wages were not paid for months, plus rampant crime and all the "charms" of emerging capitalism.
The collapse of the Soviet Union buried the hopes of hundreds of millions of people for a stable and normal life. And here, the notorious piano in the bushes turned out to be very useful - conclusion Russian troops from Germany. A topical, so to speak, socio-political topic, when one could talk about the mediocrity of the command, about theft and corruption, about deserters and monster officers. At the same time, it was transparently hinted that all these loafers were sitting on the neck of the common people. In my opinion, an excellent valve for bleeding off excess pressure in the country.
Secondly, I did everything in my power to prevent unscrupulous businessmen from getting their hands on the withdrawal of troops. The Western group was surrounded by hundreds of different firms and firms, the owners of which were located in Moscow, Bonn and Berlin and occupied by no means the last positions. What we just did not offer. For example, to purchase food, coal, and other necessary material resources at astronomical prices.
In February 1991, we learned that we would not receive money from the 2.5 billion interest-free loan provided by Germany. I had to save on literally everything. Meanwhile, complaints about the objectionable and stubborn Burlakov were going to all instances. No one knows what it took to endure this pressure, except for me and the command of the Western Group of Forces. Naturally, I was not forgiven for such "willfulness". But I don't regret anything.
Many high-ranking military leaders at the end of their careers smoothly move to well-paid positions of consultants, advisers, heads of various firms and foundations. What is pensioner Burlakov doing today?
As befits a pensioner, I am raising children and grandchildren, but rather they are me. I do housework. I don’t get into politics and dubious commercial transactions.
On a voluntary basis, I lead the Union of Veterans of the Western Group of Forces - the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Anticipating malicious questions, I will say that we do not use customs privileges and, unlike some, have not flooded the country with imported alcohol and cigarettes. We provide all possible legal and medical care veterans of military service and their families, we meet with the younger generation.
I look people straight in the eye. If someone considers such work a "warm place" - I will not dissuade. Time will judge.
Is it true that the Germans attempted unauthorized entry into our nuclear arsenals?
Yes, it was. In 1992, in Altengrabow, three officers of the Bundeswehr tried to penetrate the territory of the missile base. Ignoring the warning shouts of the sentry and even a shot in the air, one of them overcame the fence. Our soldier opened fire to kill. As a result, a German major was seriously wounded, and the violators were detained. The Minister of Defense of Germany then officially apologized to us for the actions of his subordinates.
They say that our Western partners were shocked when they finally found themselves in ... empty storage facilities for nuclear weapons? They were so hoping to get acquainted with their contents!
I will not brag, but they have not been able to calculate the time and place of the evacuation of nuclear weapons. Together with the special services, we planned and successfully implemented a multi-way combination. At the same time, purposeful disinformation was carried out and a number of distracting actions were carried out ...
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Western media have not tired of shouting about the so-called "Russian mafia". She did not cause problems to her compatriots in uniform?
In July 1992, the robbery of the century could have taken place. The publicity would be colossal, and the consequences would be unpredictable. On the way of transport with fifteen million German marks, Chechen criminal elements, already settled in Europe, ambushed. They calculated everything: traffic routes, departure time, security forces and much more. They did not take into account one thing - the professionalism of the Russian military and specialists from special detachment Criminal Police of Brandenburg. Thanks to coordinated and prompt actions, the robbery failed.
But this did not stop the mafia. The ZGV safe was a painfully tasty morsel. The gang was sent reinforcements from Chechnya. High-class "specialists" in robbery and robbery have come to Germany. In January 1993, the criminals repeated the robbery attempt. But the command and counterintelligence received on time necessary information... On the territory of the former GDR, by the way, at that time more than a dozen ethnic bandit groups operated. We realized that it is simply impossible to foresee everything. And the money was delivered by plane.
Alas, today experts' predictions that with the collapse of the Soviet Union organized crime will rush to Western Europe have been confirmed.
Ten years since the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces is more of a sad date than fun party. Who were we in Europe - occupiers, as some people sometimes say, or liberators?
For 49 years of our troops being in Germany, we have never frightened anyone, but we have not been afraid of anyone either. Being the most powerful grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces, the GSVG-ZGV honestly carried out its historic mission to ensure peace and stability in Europe. It is not yet known how it will turn out post-war device peace, if there were no Soviet troops in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.
One of the military journalists, touching on this topic, aptly remarked:
In the ZGV were all for selection
And the orders of the fathers were honored sacredly,
If we were still there
It is not known where NATO would be!
I think there is a lot of truth in these words. Russian soldiers and officers who served in the Western Group of Forces deserve only the respect and gratitude of their descendants. I am sure that after a short time, Mrs. History will put everything in its place and reward everyone according to their deserts.
The capitulation of Nazi Germany came at 01:01 on May 9, 1945 Moscow time or at 23:01 on May 8 CET. Three weeks later, on May 29, a Directive was issued to rename the Soviet front into the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. The Soviet army, with heavy losses, reached recent months war to Berlin, remained in East Germany for the next half century. The final withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany took place on August 31, 1994.
My father was one of Soviet soldiers conscripts sent to serve in Germany (1978-1980, Bad Freienwalde, GDR). In this post I will show some photos from the time of his service and tell general facts about Soviet troops in Germany.
Potsdam
At first, the unit was called GSOVG - Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany (1945-1954). The head of the GSOVG was at the same time the head of the Soviet military administration in Germany (SVAG) - that is, he had full power in the territory of Germany occupied by the Soviet Union. The first Commander-in-Chief of the GSOVG was Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. After the formation of the GDR on October 7, 1949, the head of the GSOVG carried out control functions in the new state for several more years as chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany.
Potsdam
The headquarters of the Soviet troops in Germany since 1946 was located in Wünsdorf - where the High Command was based during Nazi Germany ground forces Wehrmacht. Due to the special nature of the town, the territory of Wünsdorf was closed to ordinary citizens of the GDR. Along with 2,700 German residents, 50-60 thousand Soviet military personnel and members of their families lived in the city.
Bad Freienwalde
About half a million Soviet citizens lived permanently in East Germany. GSVG - a group of Soviet troops in Germany (1954-1989) - had own factories, Russian schools, sanatoriums, shops, houses of officers and other infrastructure. For crimes stipulated by the criminal legislation of the USSR, Soviet citizens were tried according to Soviet legislation in special institutions. I have already written about one Soviet pre-trial detention center in Potsdam.
Chernyakhovsk (former Insterburg), educational unit (my father is on the right)
The GSVG was a kind of state within a state. Its main task was to protect the western borders of the USSR from possible threats. In the context cold war GSVG was the advanced unit Soviet army, so she was equipped with the most modern technology and weapons (including nuclear). In the event of a military conflict with NATO member countries, a group of troops had to stay on the border line until the armed forces of the USSR and its allies were fully mobilized.
Potsdam
The group owned 777 military camps throughout the German Democratic Republic- more than 36,000 buildings were on the balance sheet. 21,000 objects were built with the money of the USSR. However, in many cases, barracks and other premises that once belonged to the Wehrmacht were also used to house Soviet troops.
Potsdam
Conscript soldiers received monetary allowances in GDR stamps, so service in the GSVG was considered prestigious. My dad remembers how he used the saved money to buy last days his stay in Germany before being sent home. Among the purchases were, for example, jeans that were rare at that time. In total, eight and a half million citizens of the USSR have served in the Group for the entire time of its existence.
Bad Freienwalde
In 1989, the Group was renamed again - from now on it was called the Western Group of Forces (ZGV). After the unification of the FRG and the GDR, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany became inevitable. Due to the scale and complexity of the operation, the withdrawal of troops continued until August 31, 1994. A huge amount of equipment and weapons was taken out. More than half a million people returned to the territory of the Soviet Union that had collapsed at that time. A farewell parade in honor of the withdrawal of Russian troops took place in Treptow Park in Berlin with the participation of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.
Potsdam
February 15, 1989 at 1000 local time, the last Soviet soldier crossed the border separating the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on a bridge over the Amu Darya River near the small Uzbek city of Termez. This soldier was Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who closed the last column of the 40th Army, thus symbolizing completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan after many years of bloody war.
Having crossed the invisible line - the state border, the army commander stopped and, turning towards Afghanistan, quietly but clearly uttered a few phrases that do not fit on paper, and then told reporters: “There was not a single soldier of the 40th Army left behind me” . Thus ended the Afghan war, which began and lasted more than 9 years. A war that claimed the lives of over 14,000 and maimed over 53,000 Soviet citizens and over a million Afghans.
On February 7, 1980, a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, where the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was considered. The Soviet leadership spoke negatively at the meeting regarding the withdrawal of troops.
In particular, D. F. Ustinov said: “I think it will take a year, or even a year and a half, until the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and before that we cannot even think about withdrawing troops, otherwise we can get into a lot of trouble.” L. I. Brezhnev: “I think that we even need to slightly increase the contingent of troops in Afghanistan.” A. A. Gromyko: “After some time, the troops will certainly be withdrawn from Afghanistan. It seems to me that we should think about what contractual obligations to establish between the parties after it happens that it will be possible to withdraw troops. We need to ensure the complete security of Afghanistan.”
At the end of February 1980, again at the initiative of L. I. Brezhnev, the issue of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan was being worked out. It was believed that by overthrowing H. Amin and securing the new Afghan government of B. Karmal, they had fulfilled their task.
But Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov and, possibly, A. A. Gromyko opposed the withdrawal of troops, so they did not do it. Probably, the decision was influenced by a sharp aggravation of the situation in Kabul at the end of February: the Soviet embassy was fired upon, several of our citizens were killed. Then the government forces barely managed to disperse the crowds of thousands of fanatics.
In May 1981, the USSR Ambassador to the DRA, F. A. Tabeev, at a meeting of military advisers, stated the official point of view on the prospects for the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan: “It was assumed that in short time, no more than a year, using the army as a deterrent force, without getting involved in fighting Let us create conditions for the establishment and strengthening of a new leadership and the development of a new stage of the revolution. And then, until world public opinion has time to react negatively, we will withdraw the troops. But a year has passed and it turned out that the leadership of Afghanistan does not have its own military support to protect the country. Therefore, now, for the next two years, the task has been set to create an Afghan army, combat-ready, devoted to the government.”
At the beginning of 1982 to active participation UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, his deputy D. Cordoves and others joined in the settlement of the Afghan problem. 12 rounds of negotiations were organized, 41 discussions with the participation of Soviet, Afghan, American and Pakistani diplomats. As a result, a package of documents on the withdrawal of troops was prepared.
In Moscow, immediately after Yu. V. Andropov came to power, these proposals were answered positively.
On May 19, 1982, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and the DRA to set a deadline for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Yu. V. Andropov was ready to present an eight-month program for the withdrawal of troops. But during that period, the confrontation between the USSR and the USA intensified. Yu. V. Andropov passed away. D. Cardoves sent his project to Moscow and Washington, but received no response.
After K. U. Chernenko came to power, the negotiation process on Afghanistan was suspended, although the military raised the question of the withdrawal of troops more and more insistently.
The process of negotiations resumed only in 1985 after the election of MS Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In October 1985, the Politburo was given the task of speeding up the decision on the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. At the same time, the Afghan authorities were informed of our firm intention to withdraw our troops. B. Karmal commented on this decision: “If you leave now, next time you will have to bring in a million soldiers.”
In February 1986, at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, MS Gorbachev announced that a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops had been worked out and would be implemented immediately after the political settlement. In May 1986, instead of B. Karmal, Secretary General The Central Committee of the PDPA was elected Najibullah (Najib). B. Karmal went to "rest and treatment" in the USSR.
At a meeting of the Politburo on November 13, 1986, a large-scale task was set: within two years to carry out the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan (withdraw half of the troops in 1987, and the remaining 50% in 1988).
On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Geneva, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a series of documents designed to put an end to the bloodshed. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors of the implementation of the agreements, in accordance with which the USSR undertook to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within a nine-month period starting from May 15, 1988. During the first three months, it was planned to withdraw half of all troops.
Pakistan and the US had to stop all interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The schedule for the withdrawal of troops on April 7, 1988 was signed by the Minister of Defense, Marshal D.T. Yazov. By this time, their number in Afghanistan was 100.3 thousand people. The withdrawal was planned to be carried out in parallel through two border points - Termez (Uzbekistan) and Kushka (Turkmenistan).
Carrying out the planned withdrawal of troops, the USSR continued to provide Afghanistan with significant military aid. Training of Afghan specialists was carried out at an accelerated pace, stockpiles of materiel were created in key areas and at outposts. The 40th Army continued to take part in the battles with the Mujahideen, attacking the bases of the militants with R-300 missiles and aircraft from the territory of the Soviet Union.
The closer the deadline for the start of the second stage of the withdrawal of troops approached, the more worried the Afghan leadership showed. In September 1988, the President of Afghanistan, Najibullah, in a conversation with Generals V. I. Varennikov, head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, and B. V. Gromov,
commander of the 40th Army, made an attempt to detain Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The military command unambiguously spoke out against this proposal. However, this position of the Afghans found understanding among some leaders of the USSR. Under their pressure, the schedule for the withdrawal of troops was changed. The second stage of the withdrawal of troops from Kabul was supposed to begin in November 1988, and in accordance with the new directive of the Ministry of Defense, it began only on January 15, 1989.
But this was not the end of the matter. In January 1989, President Najibullah, during meetings in Kabul with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR E. A. Shevardnadze and
KGB Chairman V. A. Kryuchkov persistently asked to leave volunteers from the 40th Army in the amount of 12 thousand people in Afghanistan to protect the international airport in Kabul and the strategic Kabul-Khairatan highway.
E. A. Shevardnadze instructed to prepare proposals to the Politburo Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Afghanistan.
General V. I. Varennikov transmitted his negative answer, despite the fact that it was proposed to establish monetary payments to volunteers - officers at 5 thousand rubles, and soldiers at 1 thousand rubles a month. At the same time, the military emphasized that if the decision is nevertheless made, then it is necessary to leave the grouping of at least 30 thousand people.
Before the final decision was made, V. I. Varennikov gave the order to suspend the withdrawal of troops, since otherwise the objects left behind would have to be recaptured with battles and losses.
The pause lasted 10 days, until January 27, 1989. And yet common sense prevailed. At a meeting of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan, it was decided not to leave the troops, but to ensure their complete withdrawal on time.
On February 4, 1989, the last unit of the 40th Army left Kabul. In addition to the Soviet embassy, only small security forces remained in the capital, the leadership of the Task Force of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the office of the chief military adviser, who already flew to their homeland on February 14.
February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of a limited contingent (OKSVA), Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. 
Until now, there is a discussion about the reasons that prompted the USSR to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and the expediency of this step. The only thing that needs no comment is the terrible price our country has paid. About a million Soviet soldiers and officers went through the Afghan war, which claimed the lives of almost 15 thousand Soviet citizens and made tens of thousands disabled, in addition, countless Afghan rebels and civilians died.
Winners or losers?
Disputes do not subside about the status in which the Soviet military contingent left Afghanistan in 1989 - as a winner or a defeated one. However, no one calls the Soviet troops the winners in the Afghan war, opinions are divided on whether the USSR lost or did not lose this war. According to one point of view, the Soviet troops cannot be considered defeated: firstly, they have never officially been given the task of complete military victory over the enemy and control over the main territory of the country. The task was to relatively stabilize the situation, help strengthen the Afghan government and prevent possible external intervention. With these tasks, according to the supporters of this position, the Soviet troops coped, moreover, without suffering a single significant defeat.
Opponents say that in fact the task of complete military victory and control over the Afghan territory was, but it could not be fulfilled - the tactics of guerrilla warfare were used, in which final victory almost unattainable, and the main part of the territory has always been controlled by the Mujahideen. In addition, it was not possible to stabilize the position of the socialist Afghan government, which, as a result, three years after the withdrawal of troops, was overthrown. At the same time, no one disputes that significant military losses and economic costs played a large role in the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It was estimated that during the war, the USSR annually spent 3.8 billion US dollars on Afghanistan (3 billion on the military campaign itself). The official losses of the Soviet troops are 14427 people killed, more than 53 thousand wounded, more than 300 prisoners and missing. At the same time, there is an opinion that the real death toll is 26 thousand - the official reports did not take into account the wounded, who died after being transported to the territory of the USSR.
Nevertheless, despite all the complexity, inconsistency and political assessment of these events, it should be noted that the Soviet military personnel, military advisers and specialists who were in the DRA were faithful to their military duty to the end and fulfilled it with dignity. Eternal glory to the heroes!
