Combat railway missile system. Special purpose train Strategic missile train

In Russia, a new nuclear weapon is being prepared for the final stage of testing - the combat railway missile system (BZHRK) "Barguzin", created on the basis of its predecessor, the BZHRK "Molodets" (SS-24 Scalpel), which was on combat duty from 1987 to 2005 and It was withdrawn from service by agreement with the United States in 1993. What forced Russia to return to the creation of these weapons again? When the Americans once again confirmed the deployment of their missile defense facilities in Europe in 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin rather harshly formulated Russia's response to this. He officially stated that the creation of an American missile defense system actually "nullifies our nuclear missile potential", and announced that our answer would be "the development of strike nuclear missile systems." One of these complexes was the Barguzin BZHRK, which the US military especially did not like , causing them serious concern, since its adoption makes the presence of US missile defense as such practically useless. The predecessor of "Bargruzin" "Well done" Until 2005, the BZHRK was already in service with the Strategic Missile Forces. Its lead developer in the USSR was Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (Ukraine). The only missile manufacturer is Pavlogradsky mechanical plant. Tests of the BZHRK with the RT-23UTTH Molodets missile (according to NATO classification - SS-24 Scalpel) in the railway version began in February 1985 and ended by 1987. The BZHRK looked like ordinary trains made of refrigerated, mail and luggage and even passenger cars. Inside each train there were three launchers with Molodets solid-propellant missiles, as well as the entire system for their support with a command post and combat crews. The first BZHRK was put on combat duty in 1987 in Kostroma. In 1988, five regiments were already deployed (a total of 15 launchers), and by 1991, three missile divisions: near Kostroma, Perm and Krasnoyarsk, each consisted of four missile regiments (a total of 12 BZHRK trains). Each train consisted of several cars . One car is a command post, the other three - with an opening roof - launchers with missiles. Moreover, it was possible to launch rockets both from the planned parking lots and from any point on the route. To do this, the train stopped, a contact suspension of electrical wires was removed with a special device, the launch container was placed in a vertical position, and the rocket started.
The complexes stood at a distance of about four kilometers from each other in stationary shelters. Within a radius of 1500 kilometers from their bases, together with the railway workers, work was carried out to strengthen the track: heavier rails were laid, wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete, embankments were littered with denser gravel. force only for professionals (launch modules with a rocket had eight wheelsets, the remaining supply cars - four each). During the day, the train could cover about 1200 kilometers. The time of his combat patrol was 21 days (thanks to the reserves on board, he could work autonomously for up to 28 days). The BZHRK was attached great importance, even the officers who served on these trains had higher ranks than their counterparts in similar positions in the mine complexes.
Soviet BZHRK– shock to Washington Rocketeers tell either a legend, or a true story that the Americans themselves allegedly pushed our designers to create the BZHRK. They say that once our intelligence received information that in the United States they are working on the creation of a railway complex that can move through underground tunnels and, if necessary, appear from under the ground at certain points in order to launch a strategic missile unexpectedly for the enemy. Photographs were even attached to the intelligence report this train. Apparently, these data made a strong impression on the Soviet leadership, since it was immediately decided to create something similar. But our engineers approached this issue more creatively. They decided: why drive trains underground? You can put them on conventional railways, disguised as freight trains. It will be easier, cheaper and more efficient. Later, however, it turned out that the Americans had special studies, which showed that in their conditions the BZHRK would not be effective enough. They simply slipped us misinformation in order to once again shake up the Soviet budget, forcing us, as it seemed to them then, to useless expenses, and the photo was taken from a small full-scale layout.
But by the time all this became clear, it was already too late for Soviet engineers to work back. They, and not only in the drawings, have already created a new nuclear weapon with an individual-guided missile, a range of ten thousand kilometers with ten warheads with a capacity of 0.43 Mt and a serious set of means to overcome missile defense. In Washington, this news caused a real shock. Still would! How do you determine which of the "freight trains" to destroy in the event of a nuclear strike? If you shoot at all at once, no nuclear warheads will be enough. Therefore, in order to track the movement of these trains, which easily escaped the field of view of tracking systems, the Americans had to keep a constellation of 18 spy satellites almost constantly over Russia, which cost them very dearly. Especially when you consider that the US intelligence services have never been able to identify the BZHRK on the patrol route. Therefore, as soon as the political situation allowed in the early 90s, the US immediately tried to get rid of this headache. At first, they obtained from the Russian authorities that the BZHRK would not ride around the country, but would be laid up. This allowed them to constantly keep over Russia instead of 16-18 spy satellites, only three or four. And then they persuaded our politicians to finally destroy the BZHRK. Those officially agreed under the pretext of supposedly "the expiration of the warranty period for their operation."
How the "Scalpels" were cut The last combat personnel was sent for remelting in 2005. Eyewitnesses said that when the wheels of cars rattled on the rails in the twilight of the night and the nuclear “ghost train” with the Scalpel missiles set off on its last journey, even the strongest men could not stand it: tears rolled down from the eyes of both gray-haired designers and rocket officers . They said goodbye to unique weapons, in many combat characteristics superior to everything that was available and was even planned to be adopted in the near future. Everyone understood that this unique weapon in the mid-1990s, it became a hostage to political agreements between the country's leadership and Washington. And unselfish ones. Apparently, therefore, each new stage in the destruction of the BZHRK strangely coincided with the next tranche of the International Monetary Fund loan. The refusal of the BZHRK had a number of objective reasons. In particular, when Moscow and Kyiv "fled" in 1991, it immediately hurt Russia's nuclear power. Almost all of our nuclear missiles during the Soviet era were made in Ukraine under the guidance of Academicians Yangel and Utkin. Of the 20 types then in service, 12 were designed in Dnepropetrovsk, at the Yuzhnoye design bureau, and produced there, at the Yuzhmash plant. BZHRK was also made in Ukrainian Pavlograd.
But every time it became more and more difficult to negotiate with the developers from Nezalezhnaya to extend their service life or upgrade. As a result of all these circumstances, our generals had to report with a sour face to the country's leadership that “in accordance with the planned reduction in the Strategic Missile Forces, another BZHRK was removed from combat duty.” But what to do: the politicians promised - the military are forced to fulfill. At the same time, they perfectly understood: if we cut and remove missiles from combat duty due to old age at the same pace as in the late 90s, then in just five years, instead of the existing 150 Voevods, we will not have any of these heavy missiles. And then no light Topols will make the weather any more - and at that time there were only about 40 of them. For the American missile defense system, this is nothing. For this reason, as soon as Yeltsin vacated the Kremlin office, a number of people from the country's military leadership, at the request of the rocket men, began to prove to the new president the need to create nuclear complex, similar to the BZHRK. And when it became finally clear that the US was not going to abandon plans to create its own missile defense system under any circumstances, work on the creation of this complex really began. And now, in the very near future, the States will again receive their former headache, now in the form of a new generation BZHRK called "Barguzin". Moreover, as the rocket scientists say, these will be ultra-modern missiles, in which all the shortcomings that the Scalpel has have been eliminated.
"Barguzin"– main trump card against US missile defense The main drawback noted by the opponents of the BZHRK is the accelerated wear and tear of the railway tracks along which it traveled. They often had to be repaired, about which the military and the railway workers had eternal disputes. The reason for this was heavy rockets - weighing 105 tons. They did not fit in one car - they had to be placed in two, reinforcing wheel sets on them. Today, when the issues of profit and commerce have come to the fore, Russian Railways is probably not ready, as it was before, to infringe on its interests for the sake of national defense, and also bear the cost of repairing the canvas in the event that a decision is made that BZHRK should again run on their roads. It is the commercial reason, according to some experts, that today could become an obstacle to the final decision to adopt them. However, now this problem has been removed. The fact is that there will no longer be heavy missiles in the new BZHRK. The complexes are armed with lighter RS-24 missiles, which are used in the Yars complexes, and therefore the weight of the wagon turns out to be comparable to the usual one, which makes it possible to achieve perfect camouflage of the combat personnel. True, the RS-24s have only four warheads, and there were dozen. But here it must be borne in mind that the Barguzin itself is carrying not three missiles, as it was before, but already twice as many. This, of course, is all the same - 24 against 30. But we should not forget that the Yars are practically the most modern development and the probability of overcoming missile defense is much higher than that of their predecessors. The navigation system has also been updated: now you do not need to set the coordinates of targets in advance, everything can be changed quickly.
Such a mobile complex can cover up to 1,000 kilometers per day, cruising along any railway lines in the country, indistinguishable from a regular train with refrigerated cars. The time of "autonomy" is a month. There is no doubt that the new BZHRK grouping will become a much more effective response to the US missile defense system than even the deployment of our Iskander tactical missiles near the borders of Europe, which are so feared in the West. There is also no doubt that the idea of ​​​​a BZHRK is for the Americans clearly will not like it (although theoretically their creation will not violate the latest Russian-American agreements). BZHRK at one time formed the basis of a retaliatory strike grouping in the Strategic Missile Forces, since they had increased survivability and with a high probability could survive after the first strike was delivered by the enemy. The United States was no less afraid of him than the legendary "Satan", since the BZHRK was a real factor in inevitable retribution. Until 2020, five regiments of the BZHRK "Barguzin" are planned to be put into service - these are 120 warheads, respectively. Apparently, the BZHRK will become the strongest argument, in fact, our main trump card in the dispute with the Americans regarding the advisability of deploying a global missile defense system.

New combat railway missile system " Barguzin» is preparing for the final stage of testing. After their successful completion, the BZHRK will enter the Russian Army and take up combat duty. It will be practically impossible for a potential enemy to detect such a train with a rocket in the wide Russian expanses. At its core - great experience developments of similar complexes and the latest technological solutions.

The news about the successful test of the BZHRK "Barguzin" hastened to be made public. The original source was the transfer site Andrew Karaulova"The moment of truth", and there was no confirmation, although the news was distributed on many sites. Interfax then contacted Ministry defense through their channels, and it turned out that although the tests are scheduled for current year until there were no launches. However, there are still two months left until the end of the year.

“It is necessary to confirm the feasibility of a “mortar” launch of the product and its subsequent withdrawal away from the rocket train, in which people and technological equipment are located, on the new product, after which the ICBM main engine will be launched.”

Although the journalists hurried a little, the development is in full swing, so you can discuss Barguzin now.

It is worth briefly recalling its predecessor - BZHRK 15P961 " Well done»:

A good video, but at the end - a juggling: the complexes, it turns out, " served for about 20 years and at the end of the warranty period they were disbanded". The adoption of the first missile regiment with RT-23UTTKh - October 1987, and why didn't they produce new trains, but waited for the end of the guarantee? Yes, and after the guarantee, it was possible to carry out preventive maintenance / modernization, as was done with missiles.

Alas, out of 12 rocket trains, two were converted into museum exhibits (located in Technical Museum"AvtoVAZ" and in the museum of railway equipment at the Varshavsky railway station Petersburg), and the rest were destroyed, despite Russia's withdrawal from the treaty START-2 in 2002.

Didn't like it very much Washington"Well done" (according to NATO classification - "Scalpel"): strategic missiles with nuclear warheads ride on the railroad, and try to find it. And if you find it, then try to prevent the launch. In 1991, they set up an experiment: not far from Molodets, they piled up a bunch of anti-tank mines that had once been taken out of Germany, about 20 meters high and blew up. The power of the explosion was about a kiloton, resulting in a funnel with a diameter of 80 meters and a depth of 10 meters - and immediately after the explosion, the rocket was launched in a regular manner.

However, it is incorrect to reduce the reasons only to the desire to please Washington. Yes, the hard-to-track BZHRKs made them want to destroy them “by contractual means” - even then, specialists in the United States themselves understood the problems with modern ICBMs, and indeed with military developments in general. Let's say, an analogue of "Well done" Pentagon never managed to develop (projects "Peacekeeper Rail Garrison" and "Midgetman"), while the Chinese are slowly getting something.

But the point is also that the 15Zh61 missiles used by Molodets were produced at the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant (PO Yuzhmash), which, after being destroyed the USSR stayed in the area Ukraine, where it is still degrading. It is clear that relying on the reliability of Ukrainian suppliers would be extremely naive and Maidan.

Relying on the reliability of Ukrainian suppliers of high-tech products is extremely naive.

In addition, the Molodets had its drawbacks - for example, it was still noticeable, because due to the weight of the missiles, the train was pulled by three diesel locomotives at once, and the cars with launchers had additional axles, so it was difficult to confuse it with a conventional refrigerated train. Outdated, of course, and navigation equipment.

Therefore, it was decided not to try to restore the Molodets project, but to immediately develop a modern version - Barguzin.

It was reported that according to the plan in 2016, there was only the creation of documentation, but, as you already know, testing of the launch system will begin soon. Everything is logical: the specifics were worked out even on Molodets: a mechanism for diverting electrical wires, a mortar take-off, and redirecting the rocket exhaust to the side at launch.

At the same time, the new rocket train becomes unrecognizable: it uses rockets RS-24 "Yars". Although they have only 4 warheads, and there were a dozen of them on the 15Zh61, the Barguzin itself carries not three missiles, but twice as many. Of course, it still turns out 24 against 30.

However, we must not forget that Yarsy is a more modern development, and the likelihood of overcoming PRO much higher. At the same time, the weight of the rockets is almost half as much, and the weight of the car is comparable to the usual one. Therefore, the camouflage is perfect from the outside, and the train itself can pull a double locomotive. The navigation system has also been updated: it is no longer necessary to set the coordinates of targets in advance, everything can be quickly changed.

Such a mobile complex can cover up to 1000 km per day, running along any railway lines in the country, indistinguishable from a regular train with refrigerated cars up to “X hour”. Time of "autonomy" - a month.

Why did the United States insist so much on the destruction of the "Molodtsev" and now they are very unhappy with the "Barguzin"? It's all about the concept of war: if Russia always plays on defense (although, of course, we must not forget that in some cases, defense can also be a preventive nuclear strike), then military doctrine The USA is always attacking. And if the Pentagon is getting worse and worse with nuclear weapons, and its use will not be approved by other significant countries, not to mention a retaliatory nuclear attack, then the concept of "Fast Global Impact"(Prompt Global Strike, PGS) provides for a massive global strike by non-nuclear forces.

US military doctrine is always attacking.

“Disarmament” is taking place: non-nuclear, but powerful explosions known military and civilian targets are destroyed, after which the result differs from the use nuclear weapons except for the absence of radioactivity. Let us emphasize the global nature of such an attack - industrial centers will also be destroyed, and not just military facilities. A good example from the past: the bombings Dresden USA and UK. They had no military meaning, the function is purely awesome (as well as the use atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki subsequently).

And against such an attacking strategy, “rocket trains” are a very good “antidote”, since they cannot be destroyed with an accurate strike, and in response to aggression, the “Yarsy” will take off - and, accordingly, will fly in. Until 2020, 5 regiments of the BZHRK "Barguzin" should be put into service - this is, respectively, 120 warheads.

However, it should be noted that, of course, the BZHRK here is not some kind of miracle weapon: if Washington suddenly collectively goes crazy and sanctions such a volley at Russia, then its mass character will be obvious - and, accordingly, in response, you can immediately launch missiles with nuclear warheads, and not just from trains. Those. we get a total nuclear war, in which it is somehow strange to start with non-nuclear charges, the probability of destroying the enemy for the United States is less when its own is guaranteed. Therefore, a “quick global strike” against Russia still does not work, but can be applied to a smaller country. What if in such countries they also learn how to make rocket trains? Russia sets a bad example, no life for the aggressor.

Type of strategic missile systems of mobile railway basing. It is a specially created train, in the cars of which strategic missiles (mainly of the intercontinental class), as well as command posts, technological and technical systems, means of protection, personnel ensuring the operation of the complex and its life support system.

The name "Combat railway missile system" is also used as a proper name for the Soviet missile system 15P961 "Molodets" (RT-23 UTTKh), the only BZHRK brought to the stage of adoption and serial production. 15P961 "Molodets" was on combat duty in the Strategic Missile Forces of the Armed Forces of the USSR and Russia in the period from 1987 to 1994 in the amount of 12 units. Then (by 2007) all the complexes were dismantled and destroyed, with the exception of two transferred to museums.

On the railways of the USSR and Russia, it had the symbol “train number zero”.

The first studies on the use of a train as a carrier of strategic missiles appeared in the 1960s. Work in this direction was carried out both in the USSR and in the USA.

Story

IN THE USA

The idea of ​​rail-based ballistic missiles was first considered in detail in the United States in the early 1960s. The advent of the Minuteman solid-propellant ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), which did not need pre-launch refueling, was resistant (unlike early liquid-fuel rockets) to vibration and shaking in motion, made it possible for the first time to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles from a moving platform. It was assumed that trains with missiles would be regularly redeployed between pre-calculated positions - since ICBMs of that time needed exact definition coordinates of the launch site for the operation of their inertial navigation system - and, thus, will be practically invulnerable to a Soviet missile attack.

In the summer of 1960, as part of a theoretical study, the operation " Big Star”(Eng. Big Star), in which prototypes of future railway launch complexes moved along US railroads. The purpose of the exercises was to test the mobility of the complexes, the possibility of their dispersal along the railways in use. As a result of the operation in 1961, a project was prepared and a prototype of a railway train was assembled, which could carry five Minuteman missiles on specially reinforced platforms.

It was assumed that the first mobile Minutemen would enter service in the summer of 1962. The US Air Force expected to deploy 30 trains carrying a total of 150 missiles. However, the cost of the project was too high. Mine launch complexes for the Minutemen were considered more effective solution- cheap (in comparison with the mine installations of the previous Atlas and Titan liquid ICBMs) and protected from existing Soviet ICBMs, which at that time had extremely low accuracy. In the summer of 1961 the project was closed; the created prototypes of launch trains were used as transporters for the delivery of Minutemen from factories to mine deployment bases.

In 1986, the idea of ​​a railroad deployment was adopted for the new American LGM-118A "Peacekeeper" heavy ICBM, also known as the MX. When designing this heavy ICBM, much attention was paid precisely to its ability to survive the sudden Soviet missile attack directed against the nuclear forces of the US Armed Forces. Many different proposals for basing the MX were considered, but in the end it was decided to deploy 50 MX missiles in conventional silos from Minuteman ICBMs, and another 50 on special trains.

Each such train - designated as the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison - would have to carry two heavy ICBMs with 10 individually targetable warheads each. Thus, it was supposed to deploy 25 trains, which, dispersed over the US rail network and constantly changing position, would be practically invulnerable to a Soviet attack.

In 1990, the prototype train was tested, but by this time the Cold War had already ended, and in 1991 the entire program was curtailed. In our time, the US Air Force has no plans to develop new similar railway systems or new heavy ICBMs.

In the USSR/Russia

The order "On the creation of a mobile combat railway missile system (BZHRK) with the RT-23 missile" was signed on January 13, 1969. The Yuzhnoye design bureau was appointed as the main developer. The leading designers of the BZHRK were academicians brothers Vladimir and Alexei Utkin.

V. F. Utkin, a specialist in solid fuel topics, created a launch vehicle. A.F. Utkin created the launch complex, as well as cars for the rocket-carrying train. As conceived by the creators, the BZHRK was supposed to form the basis of a retaliatory strike grouping, since it had increased survivability and, with a high probability, could survive after the enemy struck the first blow. The only place in the USSR for the production of missiles for the BZHRK is the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant (PO Yuzhmash).

“The task that the Soviet government set before us was striking in its enormity. In domestic and world practice, no one has ever faced so many problems. We had to place an intercontinental ballistic missile in a railway car, and a rocket with a launcher weighs more than 150 tons. How can this be done? nuclear warhead how to ensure absolute safety on the way, because we were given the design speed of the train up to 120 km/h. Will the bridges withstand, will the track not collapse, and the start itself, how to transfer the load to the railway track during the launch of the rocket, will the train stand on the rails during the start, how to raise the rocket to a vertical position as quickly as possible after the train stops?
- V. F. Utkin, General Designer of Yuzhnoye Design Bureau

Flight tests of 15Zh61 missiles of the RT-23 UTTKh complex took place in 1985-1987. at the Plesetsk cosmodrome (NIIP-53), a total of 32 launches were carried out. 18 exits of the BZHRK were made along the country's railways (more than 400 thousand kilometers were covered). The tests were carried out in various climatic zones countries (from tundra to deserts).

Each composition of the BZHRK took missile regiment. More than 70 military personnel, including several dozen officers, were on the train, which was on combat duty. In the cabs of the locomotives, in the places of the drivers and their assistants, there were only military officers - officers and ensigns.

The first missile regiment with RT-23UTTKh went on combat duty in October 1987, and by the middle of 1988 five regiments were deployed (15 launchers in total, 4 in the Kostroma region and 1 in the Perm region). The trains were located at a distance of about four kilometers from each other in stationary structures, and when they took up combat duty, the trains dispersed.

By 1991, three missile divisions were deployed, armed with BZHRK with RT-23UTTKh ICBMs:

10th Guards Rocket Division Kostroma region;
-52nd Missile Division stationed in Zvezdny ZATO (Perm Territory);
-36th Missile Division, ZATO Kedrovy (Krasnoyarsk Territory).
Each of the divisions had a command and four missile regiments (a total of 12 BZHRK trains, three launchers each). Within a radius of 1500 km from the bases of the BZHRK, joint measures were taken with the Ministry of Railways to replace the worn-out railway track: heavier rails were laid, wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete, and embankments were strengthened with denser gravel.

Since 1991, after a meeting between the leaders of the USSR (Gorbachev) and Great Britain (Thatcher), restrictions were imposed on the patrol routes of the BZHRK, they were on combat duty at a permanent deployment point, without leaving the country's railway network. In February - March 1994, one of the BZHRK of the Kostroma division carried out a trip to the country's railway network (the BZHRK reached at least Syzran).

According to the START-2 treaty (1993), Russia was to decommission all RT-23UTTKh missiles by 2003. At the time of decommissioning, Russia had three rds (Kostroma, Perm and Krasnoyarsk), a total of 12 trains with 36 launchers. For the disposal of "rocket trains" at the Bryansk repair plant of the Strategic Missile Forces, a special "cutting" line was assembled. Despite Russia's withdrawal from the START-2 treaty in 2002, during 2003-2007, all trains and launchers were disposed of (destroyed), except for two demilitarized and installed as exhibits in the museum of railway equipment at the Varshavsky railway station in St. Petersburg and in AvtoVAZ Technical Museum.

In early May 2005, as the Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, officially announced, the BZHRK was removed from combat duty in the Strategic Missile Forces. The commander said that in exchange for the BZHRK, from 2006, the Topol-M ground mobile missile system would begin to enter the troops.

On September 5, 2009, Deputy Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Vladimir Gagarin, said that the Strategic Missile Forces did not rule out the possibility of resuming the use of combat railway missile systems.

In December 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Karakaev, announced a possible revival in Russian army BZHRK complexes.

On April 23, 2013, Deputy Defense Minister Yu. Borisov announced the resumption of development work by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (developer of the Bulava, Topol and Yars missiles) to create a new generation of railway missile systems.

In December 2013, information appeared in the press about the revival of BZHRK complexes in Russia on a new technological base as a response to the US Global Instant Strike program. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT) at the beginning of 2014 will complete work on the preliminary design of the BZHRK. New complex The BZHRK, armed with an ICBM with a multiple reentry vehicle designed on the basis of the Yars, will be disguised as a standard refrigerated car, the length of which is 24 meters with a missile length of 22.5 meters.

The new model of the BZHRK will be called "Barguzin".

Advantages and disadvantages

The official reasons for the removal of the BZHRK from service were called outdated design, the high cost of recreating the production of complexes in Russia and the preference for mobile units based on tractors.

BZHRK also had the following disadvantages:

The impossibility of complete camouflage of the train due to the unusual configuration (in particular, three diesel locomotives), which made it possible to determine the location of the complex using modern means satellite intelligence. Long time the Americans could not detect the complex with satellites, and there were cases when even experienced railway workers from 50 meters could not distinguish the composition covered with a simple camouflage net.

Lower security of the complex (unlike, for example, mines), which can be overturned or destroyed by a nuclear explosion in the vicinity. To assess the impact of an air shock wave of a nuclear explosion, a large-scale experiment "Shift" was planned for the second half of 1990 - an imitation of a close nuclear explosion by detonating 1000 tons of TNT (several railway echelons of TM-57 anti-tank mines (100 thousand units) taken out from the warehouses of the Central Group of Forces in East Germany laid out in the form truncated pyramid 20 meters high). The “Shift” experiment was carried out at 53 NIIP MO (Plesetsk) on February 27, 1991, when a funnel with a diameter of 80 and a depth of 10 m was formed as a result of the explosion, the level of acoustic pressure in the habitable compartments of the BZHRK reached pain threshold- 150 dB, and the BZHRK launcher was removed from readiness, however, after carrying out the modes to bring it to the required degree of readiness, the launcher was able to conduct a “dry launch” (imitation of a launch using an electric rocket model). That is, the command post, launcher and rocket equipment remained operational.

Depreciation of the railway tracks along which such a heavy complex moved.

Supporters of the operation of the BZHRK, including the engineer of the launch team at the first tests of the BZHRK, the head of the group of military representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the Yuzhmash Production Association, Sergey Ganusov, note the unique combat characteristics products that confidently overcame zones missile defense. The breeding platform, as confirmed by flight tests, delivered warheads solid or total weight of 4 tons at a distance of 11 thousand km. One product containing 10 warheads with a yield of about 500 kilotons was enough to hit an entire European state. The press also noted the high mobility of trains capable of moving along the country's railway network (which made it possible to quickly change the location of the starting position over 1000 kilometers per day), in contrast to tractors operating in a relatively small radius around the base (tens of kilometers).

Calculations carried out by American specialists, in relation to the railway version of the MX ICBM basing for the US railway network, show that with a dispersal of 25 trains (twice large quantity than Russia had in service) on railway sections with a total length of 120,000 km (which is much more than the length of the main track of Russian railways), the probability of hitting a train is only 10% when 150 ICBMs of the Voevoda type are used for an attack.

A huge resonance in the professional environment was caused by the news about the freezing of the project of the combat railway missile system (BZHRK) "Barguzin", better known as a nuclear train. Information about this, citing an “informed representative of the military-industrial complex,” was distributed by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the official publication of the Russian government.

At the time of preparation of the material, the Ministry of Defense did not comment on the situation. Given the reputation of the WG, it is safe to say that the development of the Barguzin has indeed been suspended. However, it is not clear why they decided to talk about it so delicately at the top, refraining from publicly explaining the reasons, which, probably, there is no point in hiding.

“The topic of creating a new generation of rocket trains is closed, at least for the short term,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta reported. At the same time, it is indicated that “if it is urgently needed, our rocket train will be quickly brought to working condition and put on rails.” The reasons for the suspension of the project "Barguzin" understood the "Russian Planet".

Forced disposal

For the first time, the Ministry of Defense announced the progress of work on the creation of a new strategic BZHRK in April 2013. On December 24, 2014, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov emphasized that the adoption of a railway missile system in the Russian Federation does not contradict the provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-3).

The development of "Barguzin" began at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT), presumably in 2011-2012. In 2014, a sketch was prepared, and in 2015, development work (R&D) started. In December 2015, the commander Rocket troops Strategic Purpose (RVSN) Colonel General Sergei Karakaev spoke about the current "development of working design documentation for the units and systems of the complex."

In November 2016, at the Plesetsk cosmodrome, throw tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile for the new BZHRK were successfully completed. The tests consisted in the fact that the weight model of the future rocket was "thrown" out of the car with the help of a powder accumulator. Deployment nuclear train was planned for the period between 2018-2020.

"Barguzin" is a deep modernization of the Soviet analogue of the RT-23 UTTH "Molodets" (SS-24 Scalpel - according to NATO classification). The first missile regiment took up combat duty on October 20, 1987 in Kostroma. According to the Ministry of Defense, the main advantage of the Soviet BZHRK was the ability to disperse. Unnoticed by reconnaissance means, the complex could change its location.

“BZHRK was structurally a train of two or three diesel locomotives and special (in appearance refrigerated and passenger) cars, which housed transport and launch containers (TPK) with intercontinental ballistic missiles, launch control points, technological and technical systems, security equipment , personnel and life support systems, ”explains the Ministry of Defense.

"Molodets" was put into service during the end cold war. By 1994, Russia had 12 BZHRK with three missiles each. Three missile divisions were deployed in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Kostroma and Perm regions.

In 1993, Moscow and Washington signed the START II Treaty, according to which our country undertook to decommission nuclear trains. In 2002, in response to the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russia denounced START II. However, she decided to dispose of "Molodtsov". Only two trains remained intact: one complex adorns the Varshavsky railway station in St. Petersburg, and the second - the AvtoVAZ Technical Museum in Togliatti.

Unsuccessful attempt

The reasons for the decommissioning of Molodtsov largely echo the situation around the Barguzin project. The operating experience of the BZHRK revealed a number of shortcomings that are critical in peacetime. It's about high cost and unresolved technical problems.

The Ministry of Defense assumed that the train with nuclear filling will be able to move throughout the railway network of the USSR. No doubt this would be a gigantic advantage. It was for this purpose that a new delivery system was created. atomic weapons. However, the nuclear train turned out to be too heavy, and the usual railway track could not withstand it. Only one rocket weighed over 100 tons, and there were three of them on each BZHRK.

It is known that within a radius of 1.5 thousand kilometers from the places of deployment of Molodtsov, the railway track was strengthened. Wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete, ordinary rails with heavy ones, and the embankment was made of denser gravel. It is obvious that the relocation of all railway lines to the needs of the BZHRK is a senseless process from a military and economic point of view, which will require gigantic costs and an incredible amount of time.

Thus, MIT was faced with the task of developing a lighter and more maneuverable nuclear train. It follows from the comments of experts that the ICBM for the Barguzin was created on the basis of the RS-24 Yars and was supposed to weigh less than 50 tons. Only in this case, the operation of the BZHRK would be justified. It is possible that MIT could have had difficulties with the creation of a lightweight rocket or the train itself.

Similar problems could arise due to the fact that "Molodets" was fully developed and assembled in the Ukrainian SSR. The developer of the RT-23 UTTH is the famous Dnipropetrovsk design bureau Yuzhnoye, and production was established in Pavlograd, located nearby.

The version of an unsuccessful attempt to create an endowed ICBM was indirectly confirmed on July 3, 2017 by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. In particular, he stated that the industry is ready to produce a BZHRK and a 100-ton heavy ballistic missile if such a decision is made and nuclear trains are included in the State Arms Program (SAP) for 2018-2025.

In March 2017, the Zvezda TV channel claimed that the BZHRK was "preparing for the final stage of testing." And during 2017, the federal media repeatedly reported that the Barguzin should be included in the State Armaments Program for 2018-2027. However, the inclusion of a nuclear train with a 100-ton missile in the GPV, as mentioned above, simply does not make sense.

According to Rossiyskaya Gazeta, at the end current year prototype"Barguzin" went "to a long sludge on sidings." Nevertheless, it is not worth burying a unique project. main reason failures - the lack of a lightweight version of the ICBM. Work in this direction probably required an increase in time and funding. The project is frozen, which means that Russia can always return to it if the situation so requires.

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