Pistol at the temple. How the United States deployed nuclear weapons near the borders of Russia. Russia and the USA: what is hidden behind the threats of the use of nuclear weapons

TASS-DOSIER /Vladislav Sorokin/. On August 18, 2016, the European online publication Euractiv reported that the United States began to export nuclear weapons based in Turkey to Romania.

The US Department of Defense declined to comment, the Romanian Foreign Ministry categorically denied this information, and the Turkish side did not react to it.

Currently, US nuclear bombs are deployed on the territory of four EU countries - Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as Turkey.

Story

American nuclear weapons (NW) have been stationed in Europe since the mid-1950s. Its possible use in the form of aerial bombs and ammunition for artillery systems and short-range missiles (tactical nuclear weapons) was considered by the leadership of NATO and the United States as an asymmetric response in the event of a large-scale conflict with the countries of the Warsaw Pact, which had an advantage in conventional weapons. In 1954, the corresponding NATO Strategic Concept "Shield and Sword" was adopted.

As a result, tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in the member states of the alliance that were in the path of a likely Soviet offensive: Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. In Turkey, the southern flank of NATO was covered by medium-range missiles (their deployment provoked the Caribbean crisis of 1962), and the possible movement of the Soviet Army and its allies through the Balkans had to be deterred by nuclear forces located in Greece and Italy.

All these countries were given the opportunity to participate in the planning of the use of nuclear weapons, and their military personnel and aviation began to be involved in training in delivering nuclear strikes. The program was called Nuclear sharing - "joint nuclear missions of NATO member countries" (another translation is "sharing of nuclear responsibility").

According to experts, the largest number of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was reached by the beginning of the 1970s. In 1971, the number of charges deployed on the continent was about 7,300. In 1983, in response to the deployment of the Soviet Pioneer medium-range missile system, the United States began to deploy its Pershing-2 medium-range missiles and Tomahawk nuclear-powered cruise missiles. warheads in Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

Since the late 1980s the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was declining: by 1991, the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of medium and short-range missiles of 1987 was fulfilled. In 2000, according to the directive of US President Clinton, 480 US nuclear bombs remained in Europe and Turkey, while 300 of them were intended for use by the US Air Force, and 180 - for the Air Force of host countries. In 2001, the administration of George W. Bush began the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Great Britain and Greece, and in 2004 the arsenal in Germany was reduced (130 nuclear warheads were withdrawn from the Ramstein base).

Number of bombs and their placement

The United States "does not directly confirm or deny" the presence of its tactical nuclear weapons abroad, while official documents mention the storage of "special weapons" at safe facilities in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey.

To date, experts (including those from the Federation of American Scientists, FAS) estimate the number of US nuclear atomic bombs in Europe and Turkey at 150-200. These are B-61 type bombs with a total capacity of 18 megatons. They are located at six air bases: in Germany (Büchel, more than 20 pieces), Italy (Aviano and Gedi, 70-110 pieces), Belgium (Kleine Brogel, 10-20 pieces), the Netherlands (Volkel, 10-20 pieces) and Turkey (Incirlik, 50-90 pieces).

Bombs are in underground storages (more than 80 in total). For their delivery to targets, about 400 aircraft can be used: F-15E fighter-bombers, F-16 multi-role fighters and Tornado GR4 fighter-bombers from the US Air Force, Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. There are three levels of readiness of squadrons to perform combat missions in nuclear equipment (up to 35, 160 and 350 days). Since 2000, NATO has spent more than $80 million maintaining the bomb storage infrastructure at these bases.

Modernization

In September 2015, it became known that the United States would deploy its new bombs of the B61-12 type at the Büchel airbase in Germany. This modification is the first nuclear aerial bomb, which has guidance systems with increased hit accuracy, and its mass production will begin in 2020.

According to Aleksey Arbatov, head of the Center for International Security at the IMEMO RAS, the increased accuracy and variable power of the upgraded bombs may increase the likelihood that the NATO leadership will decide on a limited nuclear war.

Criticism

The deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in the region was accompanied by protests by the local population and pacifist organizations during the Cold War.

Now nuclear experts in the United States (in particular, Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the University of Monterey) are questioning the wisdom of keeping tactical nuclear weapons in Belgium - because of the threat of terrorism and non-compliance with security requirements - and in Turkey - because of the unstable political situation. after the attempted military coup on July 15, 2016

Russian officials have repeatedly said that the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Turkey is a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

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By 1998, at least $759 million had been given to the Marshall Islands in compensation for their exposure to US nuclear testing. In February 2006, more than $1.2 billion in compensation was paid to US citizens exposed to a nuclear hazard as a result of the US nuclear weapons program.

Russia and the US have a comparable number of nuclear warheads; together, these two countries possess over 90% of the world's nuclear warheads. As of 2019, the US has a list of 6,185 nuclear warheads; of these, 2,385 are retired and awaiting dismantling and +3,800 are part of the US arsenal. Of the stockpiles of warheads, the US declared in March 2019 START declaration, 1365 deployed on 656 ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.

The history of development

Manhattan Project

The United States first began developing nuclear weapons during World War II at the behest of President Franklin Roosevelt in 1939, out of fear that they were in a race with Nazi Germany to develop such weapons. After a slow start under the guidance, at the urging of British scientists and American administrators, the program was placed under the Office of Research and Development, and in 1942 it was officially transferred under the auspices of the United States Army and became known as the Manhattan Project, in the American, British and Canadian joint venture. Under the leadership of General Leslie Groves, over thirty different sites were built to research, manufacture and test components related to making bombs. These included the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, under the direction of physicist Robert Oppenheimer, the Hanford Plutonium Plant in Washington, and the Y-12 Homeland Security Complex in Tennessee.

By investing heavily in plutonium breeding in early nuclear reactors and in electromagnetic and gaseous enrichment processes to produce uranium-235, the United States was able to develop three usable weapons by mid-1945. Trinity's test was a plutonium implosion weapon design tested on 16 July 1945, with around 20 kilotons yield.

Faced with a planned invasion of the Japanese Islands scheduled to begin on November 1, 1945, and with Japan not giving up, President Harry S. Truman ordered atomic raids on Japan. On August 6, 1945, the US detonated a uranium cannon bomb design, Little Boy, over the Japanese city of Hiroshima with an energy of about 15 kilotons of TNT, killing about 70,000 people, among them 20,000 Japanese fighters and 20,000 Korean slave labor, and destroying about 50 000 buildings (including 2nd General Army and 5th Division Headquarters). Three days later, on August 9, the US attacked Nagasaki using a plutonium implosion bomb design, Fat Man, with the equivalent of an explosion of up to about 20 kilotons of TNT, destroying 60% of the city and killing about 35,000 people, among them 23,200–28,200 Japanese ordnance workers, 2000 Korean hijacked and 150 Japanese combat.

During the Cold War

Between 1945 and 1990, over 70,000 total warheads were developed, in over 65 different grades, ranging in yield from about 0.01 kt (such as the Davy Crockett wearable shell) to 25 megaton B41 bombs. Between 1940 and 1996, the US spent at least $9.3 trillion in modern terms to develop nuclear weapons. More than half was spent building delivery mechanisms for weapons. $583 billion in today's conditions has been spent on nuclear waste management and environmental restoration.

Throughout the Cold War, the US and the USSR were threatened with an all-out nuclear attack in the event of war, whether it was a conventional or nuclear confrontation. US nuclear doctrine called for Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which entailed a massive nuclear attack against strategic targets and core populations of the Soviet Union and its allies. The term "mutual assured destruction" was coined in 1962 by American strategist Donald Brennan. MAD was implemented by deploying nuclear weapons simultaneously on three different types of weapon platforms.

Post Cold War

A few notable US nuclear tests include:

• The Trinity test on July 16, 1945, was the world's first nuclear weapon test (yield about 20,000).
• The Operation Crossroads series, in July 1946, was the first post-war test series and one of the largest military operations in US history.
• Operation Greenhouse shots in May 1951 included the first enhanced fission weapon test ("Item") and a scientific test that proved the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon ("George").
• The Ivy Mike shot on November 1, 1952 was the first full test of the Teller-Ulam design "delivered" a hydrogen bomb, with a yield of 10 megatons. It was not a deployable weapon, however, with its full cryogenic equipment, it weighed around 82 tons.
• The Castle Bravo gunned down on March 1, 1954 was the first test of a deployable (solid fuel) thermonuclear weapon, and also (accidentally) the largest weapon ever tested by the United States (15 megatons). It was also the largest radiation accident in the United States in connection with nuclear testing. An unanticipated exit, and a change in the weather, as a result of the fallout spread eastward to the inhabited Rongelap and Rongerik atolls, which were soon evacuated. Many of the Marshall Islands have since suffered from birth defects and have received some compensation from the federal government. Japanese fishing boat fukurit-mara, also came into contact with precipitation, which led many of the crew to rise badly; one eventually died.
• The Argus I shot from Operation Argus, on 27 August 1958, was the first detonation of a nuclear weapon in outer space when a 1.7-kiloton warhead was detonated at an altitude of 200 kilometers (120 mi) over a series of high-altitude nuclear explosions.
• The frigate's firing from Operation Dominic I on May 6, 1962, was the only US test of an operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a live nuclear warhead (yield 600 kilotons), on Christmas Island. In general, missile systems were tested without live warheads and warheads were tested separately for safety reasons. In the early 1960s, however, technical questions were raised about how the systems would behave in combat (when they were "twinned", in military jargon), and this test was intended to allay those fears. However, the warhead had to be somewhat modified before use, and the missile was an SLBM (not an ICBM), so it did not solve all the problems on its own.
• The Sedan shot from Operation Styrax on 6 July 1962 (yielding 104 kilotons), was an attempt to show the possibility of using nuclear weapons for "civilian" and "peaceful" purposes, as part of Operation Plowshare. In this example, a 1,280 ft (390 m) diameter 320 ft (98 m) depth crater was created at the Nevada Test Site.

A summary table of each American operational series can be found in the United States Nuclear Test Series.

delivery systems

From the left are the Peacekeeper, Minuteman III and Minuteman I

The original Little Boy and Fat Man weapons, developed by the United States during the Manhattan Project, were relatively large (Fat Man had a diameter of 5 feet (1.5 m)) and heavy (about 5 tons each) and required specially modified bomber aircraft to adapt for their bombing missions against Japan. Each modified bomber could only carry one such weapon, and only within a limited range. After these initial weapons were developed, a significant amount of money and research was carried out towards the goal of standardizing nuclear warheads so that they do not require highly specialized experts to assemble them before use, as is the case with special wartime devices, and miniaturizations. warheads for use in systems with variable over delivery.

With the help of brains acquired from Operation Paperclip at the tail end of the European theater of World War II, the United States was able to embark on an ambitious program in rocket science. One of the first products of this was the development of missiles capable of holding nuclear warheads. The MGR-1 Honest John was the first such weapon, developed in 1953 as a surface-to-surface missile with a radius of no more than 15 miles (24 km). Due to their limited range, their potential use was severely limited (they could not, for example, threaten Moscow with an immediate strike).

B-36 Peacekeeper in flight

The development of long-range bombers, such as the B-29 Superfortress during World War II, was continued during the Cold War period. In 1946, the Convair B-36 Peacemaker became the first purpose-built nuclear bomber; it served in the US Air Force until 1959. The Boeing B-52 Stratofortress was unable by the mid-1950s to carry a wide arsenal of nuclear bombs, each with different capabilities and potential use cases. Beginning in 1946, the US based its initial deterrence of force at the Strategic Air Command which, in the late 1950s, maintained a number of nuclear-armed bombers in the skies at all times, ready to be ordered to attack the USSR when needed. This system was, however, extremely expensive, both in terms of natural and human resources, and also raised the possibility of an accidental nuclear war.

During the 1950s and 1960s, computerized early warning systems developed, such as defense support programs were developed to detect incoming Soviet attacks and coordinate response strategies. During this same period, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems were developed that could deliver a nuclear weapon over vast distances, allowing the US to deploy nuclear forces capable of hitting the Soviet Union in the American Midwest. Shorter-range weapons, including small tactical weapons, were sent to Europe as well, including nuclear artillery and a man-portable dedicated nuclear bomb. The development of submarine-launched ballistic missile systems allowed covert nuclear submarines to covertly launch missiles at long-range targets as well, making it nearly impossible for the Soviet Union to successfully launch a first strike attack against the United States without receiving a lethal response.

Improvements in warhead miniaturization in the 1970s and 1980s allowed for the development of MIRV missiles that could carry warheads, each of which could be individually targeted. The question of whether these missiles should be based on constantly rotating railroad tracks (to avoid being easily targeted against Soviet missiles) or based in heavily fortified bunkers (to possibly withstand Soviet attacks) was a major political controversy in the 1980s. (in the end, the bunker deployment method was chosen). The MIRV system allowed the US to render Soviet missile defense systems economically unfeasible, as each offensive missile required three to ten defensive missiles to counter.

Additional changes to the weapons supply included missile cruise systems, which allowed the aircraft to fire long-range, low-flying nuclear missile warheads towards the target from a relatively comfortable distance.

Existing US delivery systems make virtually any part of the earth's surface within reach of its nuclear arsenal. Although its land-based missile systems have a maximum range of 10,000 kilometers (6,200 miles) (less than worldwide), its force-based submarines extend their reach from the coastline 12,000 kilometers (7,500 miles) inland. In addition, in-flight refueling of long-range bombers and the use of aircraft carriers expands the possible range almost indefinitely.

Management and control

If the United States is actually under attack by a nuclear capable adversary, the President can only order nuclear strikes as a member of the two-man National Command Authority, the other member being the Secretary of Defense. Their joint decision is to be passed on to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will direct the National Military Command Center to issue Action Emergency messages to nuclear-capable forces.

The president can order a nuclear launch using his or her nuclear briefcase (nicknamed nuclear football), or one can use command centers such as the White House Situation Room. The command will be carried out by a nuclear and missile operations officer (a missile combat crew member, also called a "missileer") at the Missile Launch Control Center. The two-man rule applies to launching rockets, meaning that two employees must turn the keys at the same time (far enough apart that it can't be done by one person).

In general, these institutions served to coordinate scientific research and create websites. Typically, they had their sites with the help of contractors, however, both private and public (for example, Union Carbide, a private company, ran Oak Ridge National Laboratory for decades, while the University of California, a public educational institution, ran Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore Laboratories since their inception, and will also co-manage Los Alamos with the private company Bechtel as their next contract). Funding was received both through these agencies directly, but also from additional external agencies such as the Department of Defense. Each branch of the military also maintains its own nuclear-related research facilities (usually related to delivery systems).

production complex Arms

This table is not exhaustive, as numerous sites throughout the United States have contributed to its nuclear weapons program. It includes the main sites associated with the US weapons program (past and present), their main site features, and their current state of operation. Not on the list are the numerous bases and facilities where nuclear weapons have been deployed. In addition to placing weapons on its own soil, during the Cold War, the United States also stationed nuclear weapons in 27 foreign countries and territories, including Okinawa (which was under US control until 1971), Japan (during the occupation immediately after World War II), Greenland, Germany, Taiwan, and French Morocco then independent Morocco.

Name of the site	Location	function	Status
National Laboratory at Los Alamos	Los Alamos, New Mexico	Research, Design, Pit Manufacturing	active
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	Livermore, California	Research and Development	active
Sandia National Laboratories	Livermore, California; Albuquerque, New Mexico	Research and Development	active
Site Hanford	Richland, Washington	Production material (plutonium)	Not active in rehabilitation
Oak Ridge National Laboratory	Oak Ridge, Tennessee	Material production (uranium-235, leaked fuel), research	Active to some extent
Y-12 National Security Complex	Oak Ridge, Tennessee	Component fabrication, strategic management stocks, uranium storage	active
Nevada Test Site	Near Las Vegas, Nevada	Nuclear testing and nuclear waste disposal	Active; no tests since 1992, currently engaged in waste disposal
Yucca Mountain	Nevada Test Site	Waste management (primarily power reactor)	Pending
Waste separation pilot plant	East of Carlsbad, New Mexico	Radioactive waste from the production of nuclear weapons	active
Pacific polygons	Marshall Islands	Nuclear tests	Inactive, last tested in 1962
Rocky Flats Factory	Near Denver, Colorado	Fabrication Components	Not active in rehabilitation
pantex	Amarillo, Texas	Weapon assembly, disassembly, storage pit	active, esp. disassembly
Fernald Site	Near Cincinnati, Ohio	Production material (uranium-238)	Not active in rehabilitation
Paducah plant	Paducah, Kentucky	Material production (uranium-235)	Active (commercial use)
portsmouth factory	Near Portsmouth, Ohio	Production material (uranium-235)	Active (centrifuge), but not for weapons production
Kansas City Plant	Kansas City, Missouri	Production component	active
Mound plant	Miamisburg, Ohio	Research, component manufacturing, tritium purification	Not active in rehabilitation
Pinellas plant	Largo, Florida	Production of electrical components	Active, but not for weapons production
Savannah River Site	Aiken Row, South Carolina	Production material (plutonium, tritium)	Active (limited mode), in rehabilitation

proliferation

Early in the development of its nuclear weapons, the United States relied in part on sharing information with both Britain and Canada, codified in the Quebec Agreement of 1943. The three parties agreed not to share nuclear weapons information with other countries without the consent of the others, an early attempt at non-proliferation. Since the development of the first nuclear weapons during World War II, however, there has been much debate within the political circles and public life of the United States about whether or not the country should attempt to maintain a monopoly on nuclear technology, or whether it should pursue an information exchange program with other countries. (especially its former ally and likely competitor, the Soviet Union), or submit control of their weapons to some international organization (such as the UN) that will use them to try and keep world peace. Although the fear of a nuclear arms race spurred many politicians and scientists to advocate some degree of international control or sharing of nuclear weapons and information, many politicians and military personnel believed it was best in the short term to maintain high standards of nuclear secrecy and prevent a Soviet bomb as long as possible ( and they do not believe that the USSR actually represents international control in good faith).

Since this path was chosen, the United States, in the early days, was essentially in favor of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, although primarily for self-preservation reasons. A few years after the USSR detonated its first weapon in 1949, though, the US under President Dwight Eisenhower is seeking to encourage nuclear information exchange programs related to civilian nuclear power and nuclear physics in general. The Atoms for Peace program, begun in 1953, was also partly political: the US was better prepared to commit various scarce resources, such as enriched uranium, to these peace efforts and to ask for a similar contribution from the Soviet Union, which had far fewer resources along those lines. ; Thus, the program had a strategic rationale, and, as it turned out later, internal memos. This overall goal of promoting the civilian use of nuclear energy in other countries, as well as preventing the proliferation of weapons, has been cited by many critics as controversial and resulted in loose standards over a number of decades, allowing a number of other countries, such as China and India, to profit from dual-use technology (purchased from nations other than the US).

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Agency's Defense Threat Reduction program was established after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to assist former Soviet bloc countries in inventorying and destroying their sites for the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the means by which they are delivered (silo ICBMs, long-range bombers, etc.). More than $4.4 billion was spent in this area to prevent the targeted or accidental distribution of weapons from the former Soviet arsenal.

The development of American nuclear forces is determined by the US military policy, which is based on the concept of "possibility of opportunities." This concept proceeds from the fact that in the 21st century there will be many different threats and conflicts against the United States, uncertain in time, intensity and direction. Therefore, the United States will concentrate its attention in the military field on how to fight, and not on who and when will be the enemy. Accordingly, the US armed forces are faced with the task of having the power to not only withstand a wide range of military threats and military means that any potential adversary may have, but also guarantee the achievement of victory in any military conflicts. Proceeding from this goal, the United States is taking measures to maintain long-term combat readiness of its nuclear forces and improve them. The United States is the only nuclear power that has nuclear weapons on foreign soil.

Currently, two branches of the US armed forces have nuclear weapons - the Air Force (Air Force) and the Navy (Navy).

The Air Force is armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Minuteman-3 with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs), heavy bombers (TB) B-52N and B-2A with long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and free-range nuclear bombs. fall, as well as tactical aircraft F-15E and F-16C, -D with nuclear bombs.

The Navy is armed with Trident-2 submarines with Trident-2 D5 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) ​​equipped with MIRVs and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

To equip these carriers in the US nuclear arsenal, there are nuclear munitions (NWs) produced in the 1970-1980s of the last century and updated (renewed) in the process of sorting in the late 1990s - early 2000s:

- four types of warheads of multiple reentry vehicles: for ICBMs - Mk-12A (with W78 nuclear charge) and Mk-21 (with W87 nuclear charge), for SLBMs - Mk-4 (with W76 nuclear charge) and its upgraded version Mk-4A (with nuclear charge W76-1) and Mk-5 (with nuclear charge W88);
- two types of warheads of strategic air-launched cruise missiles - AGM-86B and AGM-129 with a nuclear charge W80-1 and one type of sea-based non-strategic cruise missiles "Tomahawk" with YaZ W80-0 (land-based cruise missiles BGM-109G were eliminated under the Treaty INF, their YAZ W84 are on conservation);
- two types of strategic air bombs - B61 (modifications -7, -11) and B83 (modifications -1, -0) and one type of tactical bombs - B61 (modifications -3, -4, -10).

The Mk-12 warheads with YaZ W62, which were in the active arsenal, were completely disposed of in mid-August 2010.

All of these nuclear warheads belong to the first and second generation, with the exception of the V61-11 aerial bomb, which some experts consider as third generation nuclear warheads due to its increased ability to penetrate the ground.

The modern US nuclear arsenal, according to the state of readiness for the use of nuclear warheads included in it, is divided into categories:

The first category is nuclear warheads installed on operationally deployed carriers (ballistic missiles and bombers or located at weapons storage facilities of air bases where bombers are based). Such nuclear warheads are called "operationally deployed".

The second category is nuclear warheads that are in the "operational storage" mode. They are kept ready for installation on carriers and, if necessary, can be installed (returned) on missiles and aircraft. According to American terminology, these nuclear warheads are classified as "operational reserve" and are intended for "operational additional deployment." In essence, they can be considered as "return potential".

The fourth category is reserve nuclear warheads put into the "long-term storage" mode. They are stored (mainly in military warehouses) assembled, but do not contain components with a limited service life - the tritium-containing assemblies and neutron generators have been removed from them. Therefore, the transfer of these nuclear warheads to the "active arsenal" is possible, but requires a significant investment of time. They are intended to replace nuclear warheads of an active arsenal (similar, of similar types) in the event that mass failures (defects) are suddenly found in them, this is a kind of "safety stock".

The US nuclear arsenal does not include decommissioned but not yet dismantled nuclear warheads (their storage and disposal is carried out at the Pantex plant), as well as components of dismantled nuclear warheads (primary nuclear initiators, elements of the second cascade of thermonuclear charges, etc.).

An analysis of openly published data on the types of nuclear warheads of nuclear warheads that are part of the modern US nuclear arsenal shows that nuclear weapons B61, B83, W80, W87 are classified by US specialists as binary thermonuclear charges (TN), nuclear weapons W76 - as binary charges with a gas (thermonuclear ) amplification (BF), and W88 as a binary standard thermonuclear charge (TS). At the same time, the nuclear weapons of aviation bombs and cruise missiles are classified as charges of variable power (V), and the nuclear weapons of ballistic missile warheads can be classified as a set of nuclear weapons of the same type with different yields (DV).

American scientific and technical sources give the following possible ways to change power:

- dosing of the deuterium-tritium mixture when it is supplied to the primary unit;
- change in the release time (in relation to the time process of compression of fissile material) and the duration of the neutron pulse from an external source (neutron generator);
– mechanical blocking of X-ray radiation from the primary node into the compartment of the secondary node (in fact, the exclusion of the secondary node from the process of a nuclear explosion).

The charges of all types of air bombs (B61, B83), cruise missiles (W80, W84) and some warheads (with charges W87, W76-1) use explosives that have low sensitivity and resistance to high temperatures. In nuclear weapons of other types (W76, W78 and W88), due to the need to ensure a small mass and dimensions of their nuclear weapons while maintaining a sufficiently high power, explosives continue to be used, which have a higher detonation velocity and explosion energy.

At present, the US nuclear warhead uses a fairly large number of systems, instruments and devices of various types that ensure their safety and exclude unauthorized use during autonomous operation and as part of a carrier (complex) in the event of various kinds of emergencies that can occur with aircraft, underwater boats, ballistic and cruise missiles, air bombs equipped with nuclear warheads, as well as with autonomous nuclear warheads during their storage, maintenance and transportation.

These include mechanical safety and arming devices (MSAD), code blocking devices (PAL).

Since the early 1960s, several modifications of the PAL system have been developed and widely used in the United States, with the letters A, B, C, D, F, which have different functionality and design.

To enter codes in PAL installed inside the nuclear warhead, special electronic consoles are used. PAL cases have increased protection against mechanical impacts and are located in the nuclear warhead in such a way as to make it difficult to access them.

In some nuclear warheads, for example, with nuclear warheads W80, in addition to the KBU, a code switching system is installed, which allows arming and (or) switching the power of nuclear weapons on command from the aircraft in flight.

Aircraft monitoring and control systems (AMAC) are used in nuclear bombs, including equipment installed in the aircraft (with the exception of the B-1 bomber), capable of monitoring and controlling systems and components that ensure the safety, protection and detonation of nuclear warheads. With the help of AMAC systems, the command to fire the CCU (PAL), starting with the PAL B modification, can be given from the aircraft just before the bomb is dropped.

The US nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern nuclear arsenal, use systems that ensure their incapacitation (SWS) in the event of a threat of capture. The first versions of the SVS were devices that were capable of disabling individual internal nuclear warhead units on command from the outside or as a result of direct actions of persons from the personnel serving the nuclear warhead who had the appropriate authority and were located near the nuclear warhead at the moment when it became clear that the attackers (terrorists) may gain unauthorized access to it or seize it.

Subsequently, SHS were developed that automatically trigger when unauthorized actions are attempted with a nuclear warhead, primarily when they penetrate it or penetrate into a special “sensitive” container in which a nuclear warhead equipped with an SHS is located.

Specific implementations of SHS are known that allow for partial decommissioning of nuclear warheads by an outside command, partial decommissioning using explosive destruction, and a number of others.

To ensure the security and protection against unauthorized actions of the existing US nuclear arsenal, a number of measures are used to ensure detonation safety (Detonator Safing - DS), the use of heat-resistant shells pit (Fire Resistant Pit - FRP), low-sensitivity high-energy explosives (Insensitive High Explosive - IHE), providing increased nuclear explosion safety (Enhanced Nuclear Detonator Safety - ENDS), the use of command disable systems (Command Disable System - CDS), protection devices from unauthorized use (Permissive Action Link - PAL). Nevertheless, the overall level of safety and security of the nuclear arsenal from such actions, according to some American experts, does not yet fully correspond to modern technical capabilities. protection.

In the absence of nuclear tests, the most important task is to ensure control and develop measures to ensure the reliability and safety of nuclear warheads that have been in operation for a long time, which exceeds the originally specified warranty periods. In the United States, this problem is being solved with the help of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which has been operating since 1994. An integral part of this program is the Life Extension Program (LEP), in which nuclear components requiring replacement are reproduced in such a way as to correspond as closely as possible to the original technical characteristics and specifications, and non-nuclear components are upgraded and replace those nuclear warhead components whose warranty periods have expired.

NBP testing for signs of actual or suspected aging is performed by the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign (ESC), which is one of the five companies included in the Engineering Campaign. As part of this company, regular monitoring of nuclear warheads of the arsenal is carried out through a thorough annual examination of 11 nuclear warheads of each type in search of corrosion and other signs of aging. Of the eleven nuclear warheads of the same type selected from the arsenal to study their aging, one is completely dismantled for destructive testing, and the remaining 10 are subjected to non-destructive testing and returned to the arsenal. Using the data obtained as a result of regular monitoring with the help of the SSP program, problems with nuclear warheads are identified, which are eliminated within the framework of the LEP programs. At the same time, the main task is to “increase the duration of existence in the arsenal of nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components by at least 20 years with an ultimate goal of 30 years” in addition to the initial expected service life. These terms are determined based on the analysis of the results of theoretical and experimental studies on the reliability of complex technical systems and aging processes of materials and various types of components and devices, as well as generalization of data obtained in the process of implementing the SSP program for the main components of nuclear warheads by determining the so-called failure function, characterizing the entire set of defects that may arise during the operation of nuclear warheads.

Possible lifetimes of nuclear charges are determined primarily by the lifetimes of plutonium initiators (pits). In the United States, to address the issue of the possible life spans of previously produced pits that are stored or operated as part of nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern arsenal, a research methodology has been developed and is being used to assess the change in properties of Pu-239 over time, characterizing the process of its aging. The methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of data obtained during field tests and a study of the properties of Pu-239, which is part of the pits tested under the SSP program, as well as data obtained as a result of experiments on accelerated aging, and computer simulation of processes occurring during aging.

Based on the results of the studies, models of the plutonium aging process were developed, which allow us to assume that nuclear weapons remain operational for 45-60 years from the moment of production of the plutonium used in them.

The work carried out within the framework of the SSP allows the United States to keep the above types of nuclear warheads, developed more than 20 years ago, most of which were subsequently upgraded, in its nuclear arsenal for quite a long time, and to ensure a sufficiently high level of their reliability and safety without nuclear testing. .

The secret system of the Cold War era, which in the event of a nuclear attack was supposed to automatically launch Soviet missiles in response and was known as the "Dead Hand", is now returning, writes The National Interest. However, now Russia is openly talking about this system, which has become even more deadly, and this gives every reason for concern in the West, the article emphasizes.

Russian "nuclear apocalypse weapon" The Cold War era is back and it could herald a dangerous new nuclear race, warns Michael Peck in The National Interest. If the United States proceeds to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe, Russia may adopt the doctrine of a pre-emptive nuclear strike, the author explains. Today, this is openly discussed in public, so the West has every reason to be concerned, the article notes.

Russia knows how to design and build weapons that "inspires terror": for example, nuclear-powered cruise missiles or unmanned submarines with 100 megaton warheads, writes The National Interest. But "the most terrible", according to the author, was the Cold War system, which in the event of a nuclear attack was supposed to automatically launch rockets in response without human intervention. Now this automated Russian system, known as the "Perimeter" or "Dead Hand", is back in service, and it has become "even more deadly", emphasized in the article.

This is due to the decision of President Donald Trump to announce the US withdrawal from the 1987 INF Treaty, which eliminated the huge arsenals of American and Russian intermediate and shorter-range missiles, the author explains. Trump's claims that Russia "violates" this treaty, developing and adopting new "forbidden" missiles, infuriates Moscow, which seriously fears that America will again begin deploying nuclear missiles in Europe, the article says. After all, if American missiles are deployed, for example, in Germany or Poland, then they are capable of reaching Russian territory, even if they do not belong to the extended range category. While Russia can strike at the continental United States only with the help of intercontinental ballistic missiles due to its geographical position, notes The National Interest.

General Viktor Yesin, who in the 1990s commanded Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, confirmed in a recent interview that the legendary Perimeter system still exists. According to him, if the United States begins to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe and thereby reduce the flight time to the Russian borders to two or three minutes, then Moscow will, in response, consider switching to the doctrine of a preemptive nuclear strike. " The Perimeter system is functioning, it has even been improved. But when it works, we will have few funds left - we will be able to launch only those missiles that survive the first strike of the aggressor., - The National Interest quotes excerpts from Esin's interview.

Although it is not entirely clear what the Russian general meant when he said that the system "functioning" and "improved" noted in the article. According to reports, Perimeter is launching modified UR-100 ICBMs, which transmit the command to launch nuclear-armed conventional ICBMs hidden in mines.

David Hoffman, the author of the book dedicated to the Perimeter, who called this system the Dead Hand, describes the mechanism of its action as follows: “In the event of a possible nuclear attack, the political leadership had to give “consent to access”. The officers on duty in this case should have descended into the "balls" (underground bunkers) deep underground. If permission was given in time, if the system received seismic confirmation of nuclear explosions on the ground, and if communication with the center was lost, the bunkers on duty were to launch command rockets. They would take off, relaying the order to the ballistic missiles. And they would have fulfilled the mission of retribution.

Periodically came to light "implicit signs" the fact that the Perimeter system still exists, the article says. “This points to the strangeness of the Soviet government, which kept the existence of the Perimeter a secret even from the American enemy, whom this system was supposed to deter and intimidate,”- notes the author. In his opinion, the main principle of the "Dead Hand" is initially based on fear: “On the fear of an American first strike that will decapitate the Russian leadership before it gives the order to strike back. And also on the fear that some Russian leader will get cold feet and will not give this order.”

But the fact that today in Russia they began to discuss the "Perimeter" openly also gives the West "every reason for concern" concludes The National Interest.

US nuclear weapons
Story
Beginning of the nuclear program	October 21, 1939
First test	July 16, 1945
First thermonuclear explosion	November 1, 1952
September 23, 1992	Last test
The most powerful explosion	15 megatons (March 1, 1954)
Total tests	1054 explosions
Maximum warheads	66500 warheads (1967)
Current number of warheads	1350 on 652 deployed carriers.
Max. delivery distance	13,000 km/8100 miles (ICBM) 12,000 km/7,500 miles (SLBM)
Member of the NPT	Yes (since 1968, one of 5 parties allowed to possess nuclear weapons)

Since 1945, the US has produced 66,500 atomic bombs and nuclear warheads. This assessment was made by Hans Christensen, director of the nuclear information program at the Federation of American Scientists, and his colleague from the Natural Resources Defense Council, Robert Norris, in the Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists in 2009.

In two government laboratories - in Los Alamos and Livermore them. Lawrence - since 1945, a total of about 100 different types of nuclear charges and their modifications have been created.

Story

The very first atomic bombs, which entered service in the late 40s of the last century, weighed about 9 tons and could only be delivered to potential targets by heavy bombers.

By the early 1950s, more compact bombs with a lower weight and diameter were developed in the United States, which made it possible to equip US front-line aircraft with them. A little later, nuclear charges for ballistic missiles, artillery shells and mines entered service with the Ground Forces. The Air Force received warheads for surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. A number of warheads have been created for the Navy and Marine Corps. Naval sabotage units - SEALs received light nuclear mines for special missions.

carriers

The composition of US nuclear weapons carriers and their jurisdiction have changed since the appearance of the first atomic bombs in service with the US Army Aviation. At different times, the Army (intermediate-range ballistic missiles, nuclear artillery and nuclear infantry munitions), the Navy (missile carriers and nuclear submarines carrying cruise and ballistic missiles), the Air Force had their own nuclear arsenal and means of its delivery. forces (intercontinental ballistic missiles of ground, mine and bunker-based, bottom-based, combat railway missile systems, air-launched cruise missiles, guided and unguided aircraft missiles, strategic bombers and missile-carrying aircraft). As of the beginning of 1983, offensive weapons in the US nuclear arsenal were represented by 54 Titan-2 ICBMs, 450 Minuteman-2 ICBMs, 550 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, 100 Peekeper ICBMs, about 350 Stratofortress strategic bombers " and 40 APRK with various types of SLBMs on board.

The Air Force's Air Force Global Strike Command manages ground and air delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. Maritime delivery vehicles are operated by the Fleet Forces Command (Navy Kings Bay - 16th Submarine Squadron) and the Pacific Fleet (Naval Kitsap - 17th Submarine Squadron). Collectively, they report to Strategic Command.

Megatonnage

Since 1945, the total yield of nuclear warheads has increased many times and peaked by 1960 - it amounted to over 20 thousand megatons, which is approximately equivalent to the yield of 1.36 million bombs dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945.
The largest number of warheads was in 1967 - about 32 thousand. Subsequently, the Pentagon's arsenal was reduced by almost 30% over the next 20 years.
At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the US had 22,217 warheads.

Production

Production of new warheads ceased in 1991 although now [ when?] [ ] it is planned to resume. The military continues to modify the existing types of charges [ when?] [ ] .

The US Department of Energy is responsible for the entire production cycle - from the production of fissile weapons materials to the development and production of ammunition and their disposal.

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