Unique combat vehicle "Katyusha. Weapon of Victory: multiple launch rocket system "Katyusha"

The famous phrase: “I don’t know with what weapons the third world war will be fought, but the fourth with stones and sticks” belongs to Albert Einstein. Perhaps everyone understands what the great scientist meant.

The process of development and improvement of weapons, which goes hand in hand with the achievements of science and technology, ultimately leads to the mass destruction of people. What could be the result aphoristically explained by the father of the "theory of relativity". What is there to argue about...?

But here's the paradox. Understanding that any weapon is intended to destroy a person (the stupidity about lethal and non-lethal is not worth repeating), people respectfully preserve the memory of its individual types.

"Weapon of Victory": T-34 tank or Katyusha rocket launcher.

Who has not heard of the Mosin trilinear or the famous Maxim machine gun. Isn't the T-34 tank or the Katyusha rocket launcher deservedly the title of "Weapon of Victory". It's like that. And while the "doves of peace" are inferior to the "hawks", weapons will be produced.

How the weapon of Victory was created

Rocket projectiles, the principle of which is based on powder rockets, were tried to be used in many armies e back in the 19th century. Moreover, by the end of the century before last, they were even abandoned as ineffective. This was justified as follows:

• there was a danger of defeating one's own personnel in the event of an unauthorized explosion of such projectiles;
• large dispersion and insufficient shooting accuracy;
• a small flight range, practically no different from this indicator for cannon artillery.

The reason for the shortcomings was the use of low-quality rocket fuel. Black (smoky powder) did not fit, and there was no other. And for almost half a century they forgot about rockets. But as it turned out, not forever.

In the Soviet Union, work on the creation of new shells began in the early 20s. Engineers N. I. Tikhomirov and V. A. Artemyev headed this process.

by the end of the year, after numerous tests for aviation, 82 and 132 mm air-to-ground projectiles were created

They showed good test results. The flight range was 5 and 6 km, respectively. But a large dispersion nullified the effect of the shot.

As in other areas of the country's life, many engineers and designers - the authors of new types of weapons, experienced the "charms" of repression. Nevertheless, in 1937-38. rockets RS-82 and RS-132 were developed and put into service for bomber aircraft

At the same time, work was underway to create similar ammunition, but for artillery. The most successful option was the modified RS-132, which became known as the M-13.

After the next tests carried out on June 21, 1945, the new M-13 projectile was sent into mass production. Accordingly, they began to produce launchers BM-13 - the weapon of victory "Katyusha".

Military vehicle Katyusha BM-13 with a launcher

The first unit equipped with new systems that arrived at the front was a battery consisting of 7 launchers based on ZiS-6 trucks. The unit was commanded by Captain Flerov.

Katyusha fired her first salvo on July 16, 1941 at the railway junction of the Orsha station, where a large number of enemy troops were stationed. The effect was impressive. Explosions and flames destroyed everything. After delivering the first crushing blow, Katyusha became the main weapon of the Second World War.

The successful results of the use of rocket mortars (following the division of Captain Flerov, 7 more batteries were formed) contributed to an increase in the pace of production of new weapons.

By the autumn of 1941, the defense industry was able to deliver about 600 BM-13s to the front, which made it possible to form 45 divisions. Each contains three batteries with four launchers. These units were staffed with military equipment and personnel in the first place and at 100%.

Later, the reorganization of rocket artillery began, uniting individual divisions into regiments. The regiments were of four divisional composition (except for the three jets there was one anti-aircraft division). The regiment was armed with 36 Katyushas and 12 anti-aircraft guns (37 mm caliber).

The regiment was armed with 36 Katyushas and 12 anti-aircraft guns.

The staffing of each regiment had 1414 personnel. The regiments formed were immediately given the rank of guards and they were officially called regiments of guards mortars.

During the war, for the creators of rocket artillery, despite the results achieved, combat missions remained unchanged: to increase the firing range, increase the power of the missile warhead, and increase the accuracy and accuracy of firing.

To solve them, work was simultaneously carried out both to improve the rocket charge and to increase the combat capabilities of the rocket projectile as a whole. Along with the shells adopted before the war, the M-31 variant was developed and began to be mass-produced.

BM-13 at Studebaker

Characteristics of rockets

Options	M-13	M-8	M-31
Mass of the rocket engine body, kg	14	4,1	29
Case inner diameter, mm	123,5	73	128
Case wall thickness, mm	4	3,5	5
Nozzle throat diameter α kr, mm	37,5	19	45
Nozzle socket diameter α a, mm	75	43	76,5
The ratio α a / α kr	2	2,26	1,7
Pobedonostsev's criterion	170	100	160
Charge density, g / cm 3	1,15	1,0	1,0
Coefficient of mass perfection of the engine α	1,95	3,5	2,6
Engine intensity index β, kgf.s/kg	95	55	70

The Germans were terribly afraid of this deadly weapon of ours, calling it "Stalin's organs." Rockets were most often used to suppress the advancing enemy. Usually, after a missile strike, the infantry and tanks stopped moving forward and did not show activity on a given sector of the front for a long time.

Therefore, the rapid development of rocket artillery during the war does not need to be explained.

launchers and 12 million missiles were produced by the country's defense industry in the period from 1941-1945

The bulk of the installations were based first on ZiS-6 vehicles, and after Lend-Lease deliveries on American Studebaker vehicles. Other vehicles were also used: motorcycles, snowmobiles, armored boats, railway platforms and even certain types of tanks. But BM-13, "Katyusha" was the most effective installation.

The secret of the name of the rocket launcher BM-13 - "Katyusha"

The practice of assigning official and unofficial names to certain types of weapons has long been known. It exists in many countries of the world.

In the Red Army, some models of tanks bore the names of statesmen (KV - Kliment Voroshilov, IS - Joseph Stalin), aircraft were named after the names of their creators (La-Lavochkin, Pe-Petlyakov).

But to the factory abbreviations of artillery systems, taking into account their features, soldiers' fiction added proper names (For example, the M-30 howitzer was called "Mother").

There are several versions of why the Katyusha artillery mount received this particular name:

1. The name of the rocket launcher is associated with the popular song of M. Isakovsky and M. Blanter "Katyusha". The first volley of a jet battery was fired from a hill. So there was an association with a line from the song ...
2. On the body of the mortar flaunted the letter "K", denoting the plant. Comintern. It is possible that the first letter of the name was the reason for assigning it to the rocket launcher.
3. There is another version. In the battles at Khalkhin Gol, bomber aircraft used M-132 shells, the land counterpart of which was the ammunition for the Katyusha M-13. And these planes were sometimes called Katyushas.

In any case, the Katyusha became the most massive, famous and deserving the title of "weapon of Victory", a rocket launcher (and during the war it was not the only one).

Modifications of military equipment Katyusha

Even during the war years, German experts tried to get a description, characteristics, diagrams, technical subtleties associated with formidable Soviet weapons. One of the episodes of the war, associated with the increased secrecy surrounding the BM-13, was dedicated to the feature film "Special Forces".

As already noted, several modifications of rocket launchers were created during the war. Among them it is worth highlighting:

A feature of this installation is the presence of spiral guides. This innovation helped to improve the accuracy of the shot.

Military equipment Katyusha BM-13-SN (photo)

BM-8-48

Here the relationship between quantity and quality was tested. A less powerful M-8 projectile was used and at the same time the number of guides was increased to 48.

The figures show that a more powerful 310mm M-31 ammunition was used for this installation.

But, apparently, the developers of new options, trying to improve the BM-13, came to the banal conclusion that the best is the enemy of the good. The characteristics presented in the table emphasize the main advantage of the guards mortar - its simplicity.

The performance characteristics of the BM-13

Characteristiclauncher BM-13		Characteristicmissile M-13
Chassis	ZiS-6	Caliber (mm)	132
Number of guides	16	Stabilizer blade span (mm)	300
Guide length	5	Length (mm)	1465
Elevation angle (deg)	+4/+ 45	Weight, kg)
Angle of horizontal aiming (deg)	-10/+10	loaded ammunition	42,36
Length in stowed position (m)	6,7	curb head	21,3
Width (m)	2,3	bursting charge	4,9
Height in stowed position (m)	2,8	equipped jet engine	20,8
Weight without shells (kg)	7200	Projectile speed (m/s)
Engine power (hp)	73	when leaving the guide	70
Speed ​​(km/h)	50	maximum	355
Crew (people)	7	The length of the active section of the trajectory (m)	1125
Transition from traveling position. to combat (min)	2-3	Maximum firing range (m)	8470
Installation loading time (min)	5-10
Full salvo time - 7-10 minutes

Advantages and disadvantages

The simple device of Katyusha and its launcher is the main trump card in evaluating the BM-13 batteries. The artillery unit consists of eight five-meter I-beam guides, a frame, a swivel mechanism and starting electrical equipment.

In the course of technical improvements, a lifting mechanism and an aiming device appeared on the installation.

The crew consisted of 5-7 people.

The Katyusha rocket projectile consisted of two parts: a combat one, similar to a high-explosive fragmentation artillery round, and a rocket powder projectile.

Ammunition was also quite simple and inexpensive. In a word, along with the effectiveness of combat use, the simplicity and low cost of the system can be safely attributed to the advantages of the Katyusha.

For the sake of objectivity, it is necessary to point out the shortcomings of the BM-13:

• low accuracy and dispersion of projectiles during a salvo. With the advent of spiral guides, this problem was partially solved. By the way, in modern MLRS, these shortcomings are preserved to some extent;
• small, in comparison with barrel artillery, the range of combat use;
• strong smoke, appearing during the shooting, unmasked the combat position of the unit;
• the high-explosive fragmentation effect of a rocket projectile did not pose a particular danger to those in long-term shelters or in armored vehicles;
• the tactics of the BM-13 divisions provided for their rapid movement from one firing position to another. The increased center of gravity of cars often led to their turning over on the march.

Post-war history of the multiple launch rocket system

After the victory, the history of the creation of Katyusha continued. Installation improvement work salvo fire didn't stop. They continued even in peacetime. The main model was jet system BM-13-SN, the improvement and testing of which continued for several years with varying degrees of success.

Interestingly, the Katyusha multiple launch rocket system remained in demand until 1991 in almost unchanged form (only the chassis changed). The USSR sold MLRS to almost all socialist and some developing countries. Iran, China, Czechoslovakia and North Korea produced them.

If we abstract from complex technical innovations, then all post-war MLRS, known under the names: BM-24, BM-21 "Grad", 220 mm "Hurricane", "Smerch", can no doubt be considered their "pro-mother" famous all over the world " Katyusha."

In honor of Victory Day, we are talking about a real supercar from WWII

After the 82-mm air-to-air missiles RS-82 (1937) and the 132-mm air-to-ground missiles RS-132 (1938) were adopted by aviation, the Main Artillery Directorate set before the projectile developer - Reactive Research Institute - the task of creating a reactive field multiple launch rocket system based on RS-132 shells. An updated tactical and technical assignment was issued to the institute in June 1938.

In accordance with this task, by the summer of 1939, the institute developed a new 132-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile, which later received the official name M-13. Compared to the aircraft RS-132, this projectile had long range flight and a much more powerful warhead. The increase in flight range was achieved by increasing the amount of propellant, for this it was necessary to lengthen the rocket and head parts of the rocket projectile by 48 cm. The M-13 projectile had slightly better aerodynamic characteristics than the RS-132, which made it possible to obtain higher accuracy.

A self-propelled multiply charged launcher was also developed for the projectile. Its first version was created on the basis of the ZIS-5 truck and was designated MU-1 (mechanized installation, first sample). Conducted in the period from December 1938 to February 1939, field tests of the installation showed that it did not fully meet the requirements. Taking into account the test results, the Reactive Research Institute developed a new MU-2 launcher, which in September 1939 was accepted by the Main Artillery Directorate for field tests. Based on the results of field tests that ended in November 1939, the Institute was ordered five launchers for military testing. Another installation was ordered by the Artillery Directorate of the Navy for use in the coastal defense system.

On June 21, 1941, the installation was demonstrated to the leaders of the CPSU (6) and the Soviet government, and on the same day, just a few hours before the start of World War II, it was decided to urgently deploy the mass production of M-13 rockets and the launcher, which received the official name BM-13 (combat vehicle 13).

Now no one can say for sure under what circumstances the multiple launch rocket launcher received a female name, and even in a diminutive form - "Katyusha". One thing is known - at the front, far from all types of weapons received nicknames. Yes, and these names were often not at all flattering. For example, the Il-2 attack aircraft of early modifications, which saved the life of more than one infantryman and was the most welcome "guest" in any battle, received the nickname "humpback" among the soldiers for the cockpit that protruded above the fuselage. And the small I-16 fighter, which bore the brunt of the first air battles on its wings, was called the "donkey". True, there were also formidable nicknames - the heavy Su-152 self-propelled artillery mount, which was capable of knocking down a turret from the Tiger with one shot, was respectfully called the "St. one-story house, - "sledgehammer". In any case, the names were most often given harsh and strict. And then such unexpected tenderness, if not love ...

However, if you read the memoirs of veterans, especially those who, in their military profession, depended on the actions of mortars - infantrymen, tankers, signalmen, it becomes clear why the soldiers fell in love with these combat vehicles so much. In terms of its combat power, the Katyusha had no equal.

From the memoirs of war veteran Vladimir Yakovlevich Ilyashenko: “Suddenly there was a rattle, a rumble behind us, and fiery arrows flew through us to the height ... At the height everything was covered with fire, smoke and dust. Amidst this chaos, fiery candles flared from separate explosions. when all this subsided and the command "Forward" was heard, we occupied the height, meeting almost no resistance, so cleanly "played the Katyushas" ... At the height, when we went up there, we saw that everything was plowed up. in which the Germans were almost gone. There were many corpses of enemy soldiers. The wounded fascists were bandaged by our nurses and, together with large quantity the survivors were sent to the rear. The faces of the Germans were frightened. They still did not understand what happened to them, and did not recover from the Katyusha volley.

The production of BM-13 installations was organized at the Voronezh plant. Comintern and at the Moscow plant "Compressor". One of the main enterprises for the production of rockets was the Moscow plant. Vladimir Ilyich.

During the war, the production of launchers was urgently deployed at several enterprises with different production capabilities, in connection with this, more or less significant changes were made to the design of the installation. Thus, up to ten varieties of the BM-13 launcher were used in the troops, which made it difficult to train personnel and adversely affected the operation of military equipment. For these reasons, a unified (normalized) BM-13N launcher was developed and put into service in April 1943, during the creation of which the designers critically analyzed all the parts and assemblies in order to increase the manufacturability of their production and reduce the cost, as a result of which all the nodes received independent indexes and became universal.

Compound

The composition of the BM-13 "Katyusha" includes the following weapons:

Combat vehicle (BM) MU-2 (MU-1);

Rockets.

Rocket M-13:

The M-13 projectile consists of a warhead and a powder jet engine. The head part in its design resembles an artillery high-explosive fragmentation projectile and is equipped with an explosive charge, which is detonated using a contact fuse and an additional detonator. The jet engine has a combustion chamber in which a powder propellant charge is placed in the form of cylindrical pieces with an axial channel. For ignition powder charge fireworks are used. The gases formed during the combustion of powder pellets flow through a nozzle, in front of which there is a diaphragm that prevents the pellets from being ejected through the nozzle. Stabilization of the projectile in flight is provided by a tail stabilizer with four feathers welded from stamped steel halves. (This method of stabilization provides lower accuracy compared to stabilization by rotation around the longitudinal axis, however, it allows you to get a longer range of the projectile. In addition, the use of a feathered stabilizer greatly simplifies the technology for the production of rockets).

The flight range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but at the same time there was a very significant dispersion. According to the firing tables of 1942, with a firing range of 3000 m, the lateral deviation was 51 m, and in range - 257 m.

In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, which received the designation M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of fire of the M-13-UK projectile, 12 tangentially located holes are made in the front centering thickening of the rocket part, through which, during the operation of the rocket engine, a part of the powder gases comes out, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the range of the projectile was somewhat reduced (up to 7.9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and to an increase in the density of fire by 3 times compared to the M-13 projectiles. The adoption of the M-13-UK projectile into service in April 1944 contributed to a sharp increase in the firing capabilities of rocket artillery.

Launcher MLRS "Katyusha":

A self-propelled multiply charged launcher was developed for the projectile. Its first version - MU-1 based on the ZIS-5 truck had 24 guides mounted on a special frame in a transverse position with respect to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle. Its design made it possible to launch rockets only perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle, and jets of hot gases damaged the elements of the installation and the body of the ZIS-5. Security was also not ensured when controlling fire from the driver's cab. The launcher swayed strongly, which worsened the accuracy of firing rockets. Loading the launcher from the front of the rails was inconvenient and time consuming. The ZIS-5 car had limited cross-country ability.

A more advanced MU-2 launcher based on a ZIS-6 off-road truck had 16 guides located along the axis of the vehicle. Each two guides were connected, forming a single structure, called "spark". A new unit was introduced into the design of the installation - a subframe. The subframe made it possible to assemble the entire artillery part of the launcher (as a single unit) on it, and not on the chassis, as it was before. Once assembled, the artillery unit was relatively easy to mount on the chassis of any brand of car with minimal modification of the latter. The created design made it possible to reduce the complexity, manufacturing time and cost of launchers. The weight of the artillery unit was reduced by 250 kg, the cost - by more than 20 percent. Both the combat and operational qualities of the installation were significantly increased. Due to the introduction of reservations for the gas tank, gas pipeline, side and rear walls of the driver's cab, the survivability of launchers in battle was increased. The firing sector was increased, the stability of the launcher in the stowed position was increased, improved lifting and turning mechanisms made it possible to increase the speed of aiming the installation at the target. Before launch, the MU-2 combat vehicle was jacked up similarly to the MU-1. The forces swinging the launcher, due to the location of the guides along the chassis of the car, were applied along its axis to two jacks located near the center of gravity, so the rocking became minimal. Loading in the installation was carried out from the breech, that is, from the rear end of the guides. It was more convenient and allowed to significantly speed up the operation. The MU-2 installation had swivel and lifting mechanisms the simplest design, a sight mount with a conventional artillery panorama and a large metal fuel tank mounted at the rear of the cockpit. The cockpit windows were covered with armored folding shields. Opposite the seat of the commander of the combat vehicle, on the front panel, a small rectangular box was mounted with a turntable, resembling a telephone dial, and a handle for turning the dial. This device was called the "fire control panel" (PUO). From it came a harness to a special battery and to each guide.

With one turn of the PUO handle, the electrical circuit was closed, the squib placed in front of the rocket chamber of the projectile was fired, the reactive charge was ignited and a shot was fired. The rate of fire was determined by the rate of rotation of the PUO handle. All 16 shells could be fired in 7-10 seconds. The time for transferring the MU-2 launcher from traveling to combat position was 2-3 minutes, the angle of vertical fire was in the range from 4 ° to 45 °, the angle of horizontal fire was 20 °.

The design of the launcher allowed it to move in a charged state at a fairly high speed (up to 40 km / h) and quickly deploy to a firing position, which contributed to sudden strikes against the enemy.

After the war, "Katyushas" began to be installed on pedestals - combat vehicles turned into monuments. Surely many have seen such monuments throughout the country. All of them are more or less similar to each other and almost do not correspond to those machines that fought in the Great Patriotic War. The fact is that these monuments almost always feature a rocket launcher based on the ZiS-6 car. Indeed, at the very beginning of the war, rocket launchers were installed on ZiSs, but as soon as American Studebaker trucks began to arrive in the USSR under Lend-Lease, they were turned into the most common base for Katyushas. ZiS, as well as Lend-Lease Chevrolets, were too weak to carry a heavy installation with missile guides off-road. It's not just a relatively low-power engine - the frames of these trucks could not withstand the weight of the installation. Actually, the Studebakers also tried not to overload with missiles - if it was necessary to go to a position from afar, then the missiles were loaded immediately before the salvo.

"Studebaker US 6x6", supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease. This car had an increased cross-country ability, provided by a powerful engine, three driven axles (6x6 wheel formula), a demultiplier, a winch for self-pulling, a high location of all parts and mechanisms that are sensitive to water. With the creation of this launcher, the development of the BM-13 serial combat vehicle was finally completed. In this form, she fought until the end of the war.

Installation M-30

Testing and operation

The first battery of field rocket artillery, sent to the front on the night of July 1-2, 1941, under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov, was armed with seven installations manufactured by the Reactive Research Institute. With its first salvo at 15:15 on July 14, 1941, the battery wiped out the Orsha railway junction, along with the German trains with troops and military equipment on it.

The exceptional effectiveness of the actions of the battery of Captain I. A. Flerov and the seven more such batteries formed after it contributed to the rapid increase in the pace of production of jet weapons. Already in the autumn of 1941, 45 divisions of three-battery composition with four launchers in the battery operated on the fronts. For their armament in 1941, 593 BM-13 installations were manufactured. As military equipment arrived from industry, the formation of rocket artillery regiments began, consisting of three divisions armed with BM-13 launchers and an anti-aircraft division. The regiment had 1414 personnel, 36 BM-13 launchers and 12 anti-aircraft 37-mm guns. The volley of the regiment was 576 shells of 132mm caliber. At the same time, the manpower and military equipment of the enemy were destroyed on an area of ​​over 100 hectares. Officially, the regiments were called Guards Mortar Artillery Regiments of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command.

Each projectile was approximately equal in power to a howitzer, but at the same time, the installation itself could almost simultaneously release, depending on the model and size of the ammunition, from eight to 32 missiles. Katyushas operated in divisions, regiments or brigades. At the same time, in each division, equipped, for example, with BM-13 installations, there were five such vehicles, each of which had 16 guides for launching 132-mm M-13 projectiles, each weighing 42 kilograms with a flight range of 8470 meters. Accordingly, only one division could fire 80 shells at the enemy. If the division was equipped with BM-8 installations with 32 82-mm shells, then one volley was already 160 missiles. What are 160 rockets that fall on a small village or a fortified height in a few seconds - imagine for yourself. But in many operations during the war, artillery preparation was carried out by regiments, and even brigades of "Katyusha", and this is more than a hundred vehicles, or more than three thousand shells in one volley. What is three thousand shells that plow trenches and fortifications in half a minute, probably no one can imagine ...

During offensives, the Soviet command tried to concentrate as much artillery as possible on the spearhead of the main attack. Super-massive artillery preparation, which preceded the breakthrough of the enemy front, was the trump card of the Red Army. Not a single army in that war could provide such fire. In 1945, during the offensive, the Soviet command pulled up to 230-260 cannon artillery guns per kilometer of the front. In addition to them, for every kilometer there were, on average, 15-20 rocket artillery combat vehicles, not counting stationary launchers - M-30 frames. Traditionally, Katyushas completed the artillery attack: rocket launchers fired a volley when the infantry was already on the attack. Often, after several volleys of Katyushas, ​​the infantrymen entered the deserted locality or into enemy positions without encountering any resistance.

Of course, such a raid could not destroy all enemy soldiers - Katyusha rockets could operate in fragmentation or high-explosive mode, depending on how the fuse was set up. When it was set to fragmentation, the rocket exploded immediately after it reached the ground, in the case of a "high-explosive" installation, the fuse worked with a slight delay, allowing the projectile to go deep into the ground or other obstacle. However, in both cases, if the enemy soldiers were in well-fortified trenches, then the losses from shelling were small. Therefore, Katyushas were also often used at the beginning of an artillery raid in order to prevent enemy soldiers from hiding in the trenches. It was thanks to the suddenness and power of one volley that the use of rocket launchers brought success.

In addition to ZiSs, Chevrolets and Studebakers, the most common among the Katyushas, ​​the Red Army used T-70 tanks as a chassis for rocket launchers, but they were quickly abandoned - the tank engine and its transmission turned out to be too weak to so that the installation could continuously run along the front line. At first, the missilemen did without a chassis at all - the M-30 launch frames were transported in the back of trucks, unloading them directly to the positions.

Already on the slope of the height, quite a bit before reaching the battalion, we unexpectedly came under a volley of our own "Katyusha" - a multi-barreled rocket mortar. It was terrible: large-caliber mines exploded around us for a minute, one after another. It didn’t take long for them to catch their breath and come to their senses. Now it seemed quite plausible newspaper reports about cases when German soldiers who had been under fire from Katyushas went crazy.

“If you involve an artillery barrel regiment, then the regiment commander will definitely say:“ I don’t have these data, I have to zero in the guns. "The shelter is usually given 15 - 20 seconds. During this time, the artillery barrel will fire one or two shells. And in 15-20 seconds I will fire 120 missiles in 15-20 seconds, which go all at once," says Alexander Filippovich Panuev, commander of the regiment of rocket launchers.

The only ones who did not like the Katyusha in the Red Army were the gunners. The fact is that mobile installations of rocket launchers usually advanced to positions immediately before the salvo and just as quickly tried to leave. At the same time, for obvious reasons, the Germans tried to destroy the Katyushas in the first place. Therefore, immediately after a salvo of rocket-propelled mortars, their positions, as a rule, began to be intensively processed by German artillery and aviation. And given that the positions of cannon artillery and rocket launchers were often located not far from each other, the raid covered the artillerymen who remained where the rocketmen fired from.

"We are choosing firing positions. We are told: "There is a firing position in such and such a place, you will be waiting for soldiers or beacons." We take a firing position at night. At this time, the Katyusha division approaches. If I had time, I would immediately remove from there their position. "Katyushas" fired a volley, at the cars and left. And the Germans raised nine "Junkers" to bomb the division, and the division hit the road. They were on the battery. There was a commotion! open place, hiding under gun carriages. They bombed, some in the right place, some in the wrong and left," says former artilleryman Ivan Trofimovich Salnitsky.

According to former Soviet missiles chiks who fought on the Katyushas, ​​most often the divisions operated within several tens of kilometers of the front, appearing where their support was needed. First, officers entered the positions, who made the corresponding calculations. These calculations, by the way, were quite complex - they took into account not only the distance to the target, the speed and direction of the wind, but even the air temperature, which influenced the trajectory of the missiles. After all the calculations were made, the machines advanced to the position, fired several volleys (most often no more than five) and urgently left for the rear. The delay in this case was indeed like death - the Germans immediately covered the place from which they fired rocket-propelled mortars with artillery fire.

During the offensive, the tactics of using Katyushas, ​​finally worked out by 1943 and used everywhere until the end of the war, were different. At the very beginning of the offensive, when it was necessary to break into the enemy's defense in depth, artillery (cannon and rocket) formed the so-called "barrage". At the beginning of the shelling, all howitzers (often even heavy self-propelled guns) and rocket launchers "processed" the first line of defense. Then the fire was transferred to the fortifications of the second line, and the infantry occupied the trenches and dugouts of the first. After that, the fire was transferred inland - to the third line, while the infantrymen, meanwhile, occupied the second. At the same time, the farther the infantry went, the less cannon artillery could support it - towed guns could not accompany it throughout the offensive. This task was assigned to self-propelled units and Katyusha. It was they who, along with the tanks, followed the infantry, supporting it with fire. According to those who participated in such offensives, after the "barrage" of the Katyushas, ​​the infantry walked along a scorched strip of land several kilometers wide, on which there were no traces of a carefully prepared defense.

It is difficult to imagine what it means to be hit by Katyushas. According to those who survived such attacks (both Germans and Soviet soldiers), it was one of the most terrible impressions of the entire war. The sound that the rockets made during the flight is described differently by everyone - grinding, howling, roaring. Be that as it may, in combination with subsequent explosions, during which for several seconds on an area of ​​​​several hectares the earth mixed with pieces of buildings, equipment, people, flew into the air, this gave a strong psychological effect. When the soldiers took up enemy positions, they were not met with fire, not because everyone was killed - just the rocket fire drove the survivors crazy.

The psychological component of any weapon cannot be underestimated. The German Ju-87 bomber was equipped with a siren that howled during a dive, also suppressing the psyche of those who were on the ground at that moment. And during the attacks of German tanks "Tiger" calculations anti-tank guns sometimes they left their positions in fear of the steel monsters. The Katyushas also had the same psychological effect. For this terrible howl, by the way, they received the nickname "Stalin's organs" from the Germans.

The barrelless system of field rocket artillery, which received the affectionate female name "Katyusha" in the Red Army, without exaggeration, became, probably, one of the most popular types of military equipment of the Second World War. In any case, neither our enemies nor our allies had anything of the kind.

Initially, barrelless rocket artillery systems in the Red Army were not intended for ground battles. They literally descended from heaven to earth.

The 82 mm caliber rocket was adopted by the Red Army Air Force back in 1933. They were installed on fighters designed by Polikarpov I-15, I-16 and I-153. In 1939, they underwent a baptism of fire during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, where they showed themselves well when firing at groups of enemy aircraft.

In the same year, employees of the Rocket Research Institute began work on a mobile ground launcher that could fire rockets at ground targets. At the same time, the caliber of rockets was increased to 132 mm.
In March 1941, they successfully conducted field tests of a new weapon system, and the decision to mass-produce combat vehicles with RS-132 rockets, called BM-13, was made the day before the start of the war - June 21, 1941.

How was it organized?

The BM-13 combat vehicle was a chassis of a three-axle ZIS-6 vehicle, on which a rotary truss was installed with a package of guides and a guidance mechanism. For aiming, a swivel and lifting mechanism and an artillery sight were provided. At the rear of the combat vehicle were two jacks, which ensured its greater stability when firing.
The launch of rockets was carried out by a handle electric coil connected to the battery and contacts on the rails. When the handle was turned, the contacts closed in turn, and in the next of the shells the starting squib was fired.
Undermining the explosive of the warhead of the projectile was carried out from two sides (the length of the detonator was only slightly less than the length of the cavity for explosives). And when two waves of detonation met, the gas pressure of the explosion at the meeting point increased sharply. As a result, the fragments of the body had a much greater acceleration, heated up to 600-800 ° C and had a good igniting effect. In addition to the hull, a part of the rocket chamber was also torn apart, heated from the gunpowder burning inside, this increased the fragmentation effect by 1.5-2 times compared to artillery shells of a similar caliber. That is why the legend arose that Katyusha rockets were equipped with a “thermite charge”. The "termite" charge, indeed, was tested in the weighty 1942 of the year in the besieged Leningrad, but it turned out to be redundant - after the volley of "Katyushas" and so everything was burning around. BUT joint application dozens of missiles at the same time also created the interference of explosive waves, which further enhanced the damaging effect.

Baptism of fire near Orsha

The first volley of a battery of Soviet rocket launchers (as they began to call for greater secrecy the new kind military equipment) as part of seven combat installations BM-13 produced in mid-July 1941. It happened near Orsha. An experienced battery under the command of Captain Flerov launched a fire attack on the Orsha railway station, where an accumulation of enemy military equipment and manpower was noticed.
At 15:15 on July 14, 1941, heavy fire was opened on enemy echelons. The entire station turned into a huge fiery cloud in the blink of an eye. On the same day, in his diary, the chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, wrote: “On July 14, near Orsha, the Russians used weapons unknown until that time. A fiery flurry of shells burned down the Orsha railway station, all trains with personnel and military equipment of the arrived military units. The metal melted, the earth burned.

The morale effect of the use of rocket-propelled mortars was overwhelming. The enemy lost more than an infantry battalion and a huge amount of military equipment and weapons at the Orsha station. And the battery of Captain Flerov dealt another blow on the same day - this time at an enemy crossing across the Orshitsa River.
The command of the Wehrmacht, having studied the information received from eyewitnesses to the use of new Russian weapons, was forced to issue a special instruction to its troops, which stated: “ There are reports from the front about the use by the Russians of a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds. Every appearance of these guns must be reported on the same day to the general, commander of the chemical troops, under the supreme command". A real hunt began for Captain Flerov's battery. In October 1941, she ended up in the Spas-Demensky "cauldron" and was ambushed. Out of 160 people, only 46 managed to get out. The battery commander himself died, having previously made sure that all the combat vehicles were blown up and would not fall into the hands of the enemy intact.

On land and sea...

In addition to the BM-13, in the Special Design Bureau of the Voronezh Plant named after. The Comintern, which produced these combat installations, developed new options for placing rockets. For example, given the extremely low cross-country ability of the ZIS-6 vehicle, an option was developed for installing rocket guides on the chassis of the STZ-5 NATI caterpillar tractor. In addition, an 82 mm caliber rocket was also used. For him, guides were developed and manufactured, which were later installed on the chassis of a ZIS-6 car (36 guides) and on the chassis of light tanks T-40 and T-60 (24 guides).

A 16-round mount for RS-132 shells and a 48-round mount for RS-82 shells for armored trains were developed. In the autumn of 1942, during the hostilities in the Caucasus, 8-round mountain pack launchers of RS-82 shells were manufactured for use in mountainous conditions.

Later, they were installed on the American Willis all-terrain vehicles, which arrived in the USSR under Lend-Lease.
Special launchers for 82 mm and 132 mm caliber rockets were made for their subsequent installation on warships — torpedo boats and armored boats.

The launchers themselves received the popular nickname "Katyusha", under which they entered the history of the Great Patriotic War. Why "Katyusha"? There are many versions of this. The most reliable - due to the fact that the first BM-13 had the letter "K" - as information that the product was produced at the plant. Comintern in Voronezh. By the way, the cruising boats of the Soviet navy, which had the letter index "K". In total, during the war, 36 launcher designs were developed and produced.

And the Wehrmacht soldiers nicknamed the BM-13 "Stalin's organs." Apparently, the roar of rockets reminded the Germans of the sounds of a church organ. From this "music" they were clearly uncomfortable.
And since the spring of 1942, guides with rockets began to be installed on British and American all-wheel drive chassis imported into the USSR under Lend-Lease. Nevertheless, the ZIS-6 turned out to be a vehicle with low cross-country ability and carrying capacity. The three-axle all-wheel drive American truck Studebakker US6 turned out to be the most suitable for installing rocket launchers. Combat vehicles began to be produced on its chassis. At the same time, they received the name BM-13N (“normalized”).

Throughout the Great Patriotic War Soviet industry produced more than ten thousand combat vehicles of rocket artillery.

Relatives of "Katyusha"

For all their merits, the high-explosive fragmentation rockets RS-82 and RS-132 had one drawback - large dispersion and low efficiency when exposed to enemy manpower located in field shelters and trenches. To correct this shortcoming, special 300 mm caliber rockets were made.
Among the people they received the nickname "Andryusha". They were launched from a launching machine (“frame”) made of wood. The launch was carried out using a sapper blasting machine.
For the first time, "andryushas" were used in Stalingrad. The new weapons were easy to make, but they took a long time to set up and aim at. In addition, the short range of M-30 rockets made them dangerous for their own calculations.

Therefore, in 1943, an improved rocket projectile began to enter the troops, which, with the same power, had a greater firing range. The M-31 projectile could hit manpower on an area of ​​2,000 square meters or form a funnel 2-2.5 m deep and 7-8 m in diameter. But the time to prepare a salvo with new projectiles was significant - one and a half to two hours.
Such shells were used in 1944-1945 during the assault on enemy fortifications and during street battles. One hit of an M-31 rocket projectile was enough to destroy an enemy bunker or firing point equipped in a residential building.

Fiery sword "god of war"

By May 1945, the rocket artillery units had about three thousand combat vehicles of various types and many “frames” with M-31 shells. Not a single Soviet offensive since Battle of Stalingrad, did not start without artillery preparation using Katyushas. Volleys of combat installations became the very “fiery sword” with which our infantry and tanks made their way through enemy fortified positions.
During the war, BM-13 installations were sometimes used for direct fire at enemy tanks and firing points. To do this, the rear wheels of the combat vehicle drove onto some kind of elevation so that its guides would take a horizontal position. Of course, the accuracy of such firing was rather low, but a direct hit by a 132-mm rocket projectile blew any enemy tank to pieces, a close explosion knocked over the enemy’s military equipment, and heavy hot fragments reliably disabled it.

After the war, Soviet designers of combat vehicles continued to work on the "Katyusha" and "Andryusha". Only now they began to be called not guards mortars, but volley fire systems. In the USSR, such powerful SZOs as Grad, Uragan and Smerch were designed and built. At the same time, the losses of the enemy, who fell under the volley of the Hurricanes or Tornadoes batteries, are comparable to the losses from the use of tactical nuclear weapons with a capacity of up to 20 kilotons, that is, with the explosion of an atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

Fighting vehicle BM-13 on the chassis of a three-axle vehicle

Projectile caliber - 132 mm.
Projectile weight - 42.5 kg.
The mass of the warhead is 21.3 kg.
The maximum speed of the projectile is 355 m/s.
The number of guides is 16.
The maximum firing range is 8470 m.
The loading time of the installation is 3-5 minutes.
The duration of a full salvo is 7-10 seconds.

Guards mortar BM-13 Katyusha

1. Launcher
2. Rockets
3. Car on which the unit was mounted

Guide package
Armored shields of the cabin
marching support
lifting frame
Launcher Battery
scope bracket
swing frame
Lifting handle

The launchers were mounted on the chassis of the ZIS-6, Ford-Marmont, Jimmy International, Austin vehicles and on the STZ-5 Nai tracked tractors. more"Katyusha" was mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebaker vehicles.

Projectile M-13

01. Fuse retaining ring
02. Fuse GVMZ
03. Checker detonator
04. Bursting charge
05. Head part
06. Igniter
07. Chamber bottom
08. Guide pin
09. Powder rocket charge
10. Missile part
11. Grate
12. Critical section of the nozzle
13. Nozzle
14. Stabilizer

Few survived

The effectiveness of the combat use of "Katyushas" in the course of an attack on a fortified enemy center can serve as an example of the defeat of the Tolkachev defensive center during our counteroffensive near Kursk in July 1943.
The village of Tolkachevo was turned by the Germans into a heavily fortified center of resistance with a large number of dugouts and bunkers in 5-12 runs, with a developed network of trenches and communications. The approaches to the village were heavily mined and covered with barbed wire.
A significant part of the bunkers was destroyed by volleys of rocket artillery, the trenches, together with the enemy infantry in them, were filled up, the fire system was completely suppressed. Of the entire garrison of the knot, which numbered 450-500 people, only 28 survived. The Tolkachev knot was taken by our units without any resistance.

Supreme Command Reserve

By decision of the Headquarters, in January 1945, the formation of twenty guards mortar regiments was begun - this is how the units that were armed with the BM-13 began to be called.
The Guards Mortar Regiment (Gv.MP) of the Artillery Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) in the state consisted of a command and three divisions of a three-battery composition. Each battery had four combat vehicles. Thus, a volley of only one battalion of 12 BM-13-16 PIP vehicles (Stavka directive No. 002490 prohibited the use of rocket artillery in an amount less than a battalion) could be compared in strength with a volley of 12 heavy howitzer regiments of the RVGK (48 howitzers of 152 mm caliber per regiment ) or 18 RVGK heavy howitzer brigades (32 152 mm howitzers per brigade).

Viktor Sergeev

"Katyusha" on the streets of Berlin.
Photo from the book "The Great Patriotic War"

The female name Katyusha entered the history of Russia and in world history as the name of one of the most terrible types of weapons of the Second World War. At the same time, none of the weapons was surrounded by such a veil of secrecy and disinformation.

PAGES OF HISTORY

No matter how much our fathers-commanders kept the Katyusha materiel secret, just a few weeks after the first combat use, it fell into the hands of the Germans and ceased to be a secret. But the history of the creation of "Katyusha" long years was kept "with seven seals" both because of ideological attitudes and because of the ambitions of the designers.

The first question is why rocket artillery was applied only in 1941? After all, powder rockets were used by the Chinese a thousand years ago. In the first half of the 19th century, rockets were widely used in European armies (rockets by V. Kongrev, A. Zasyadko, K. Konstantinov and others). Alas, the combat use of missiles was limited by their huge dispersion. At first, long poles made of wood or iron - “tails” were used to stabilize them. But such missiles were effective only for hitting area targets. So, for example, in 1854, the Anglo-French from rowing barges fired rockets at Odessa, and the Russians in the 50-70s of the XIX century - the Central Asian cities.

But with the introduction of rifled guns, powder rockets become an anachronism, and between 1860-1880 they are removed from service with all European armies (in Austria - in 1866, in England - in 1885, in Russia - in 1879). In 1914, only signal rockets remained in the armies and navies of all countries. Nevertheless, Russian inventors constantly turned to the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) with projects for combat missiles. So, in September 1905, the Artillery Committee rejected the high-explosive rocket project. The warhead of this rocket was stuffed with pyroxylin, and not black, but smokeless powder was used as fuel. Moreover, the good fellows from the State Agrarian University did not even try to work out an interesting project, but swept it away from the threshold. It is curious that the designer was Hieromonk Kirik.

It was not until World War I that interest in rockets revived. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, slow-burning gunpowder was created, which made it possible to dramatically increase the flight speed and firing range. Accordingly, with an increase in flight speed, it became possible to effectively use wing stabilizers and improve the accuracy of fire.

The second reason: the need to create powerful weapons for airplanes of the First World War - "flying whatnots".

And, finally, the most important reason - the rocket was best suited as a means of delivering chemical weapons.

CHEMICAL PROJECT

As early as June 15, 1936, the head of the chemical department of the Red Army, corps engineer Y. Fishman, was presented with a report from the director of the RNII, military engineer 1st rank I. Kleimenov and the head of the 1st department, military engineer 2nd rank K. Glukharev on preliminary tests of 132 / 82-mm short-range rocket-chemical mines . This munition supplemented the 250/132 mm short-range chemical mine, the tests of which were completed by May 1936. Thus, “RNII has completed all the preliminary development of the issue of creating a powerful short-range chemical attack weapon, and is expecting from you a general conclusion on testing and an indication of the need for further work in this direction. For its part, the RNII considers it necessary now to issue an experimental-gross order for the manufacture of RHM-250 (300 pieces) and RHM-132 (300 pieces) in order to conduct field and military tests. The five pieces of RHM-250 remaining from the preliminary tests, of which three at the Central Chemical Test Site (Prichernavskaya station) and three RHM-132 can be used for additional tests according to your instructions.

According to the RNII report on the main activity for 1936 on topic No. 1, samples of 132-mm and 250-mm chemical rockets with a warhead capacity of 6 and 30 liters of OM were manufactured and tested. Tests carried out in the presence of the head of the VOKHIMU of the Red Army gave satisfactory results and received a positive assessment. But VOKHIMA did nothing to introduce these shells into the Red Army and gave the RNII new tasks for shells with a longer range.

For the first time, the Katyusha prototype (BM-13) was mentioned on January 3, 1939, in a letter from People's Commissar of the Defense Industry Mikhail Kaganovich to his brother, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lazar Kaganovich: basically passed factory tests by shooting at the Sofrinsky control and test artillery range and is currently undergoing field tests at the Central Military Chemical Range in Prichernavskaya.

Note that the customers of the future Katyusha are military chemists. The work was also financed through the Chemical Department and, finally, the warheads of the missiles are exclusively chemical.

132-mm RHS-132 chemical projectiles were fire tested at the Pavlograd artillery range on August 1, 1938. The fire was fired by single shells and series of 6 and 12 shells. The duration of firing a series of full ammunition did not exceed 4 seconds. During this time, the target area reached 156 liters of RH, which, in terms of an artillery caliber of 152 mm, was equivalent to 63 artillery shells when firing in a salvo of 21 three-gun batteries or 1.3 artillery regiments, provided that the fire was fired with unstable RH. The tests focused on the fact that the metal consumption per 156 liters of RH when firing rocket projectiles was 550 kg, while when firing chemical 152-mm projectiles, the weight of the metal was 2370 kg, that is, 4.3 times more.

The test report stated: “The automotive mechanized rocket launcher for chemical attack during the test showed significant advantages over artillery systems. A system capable of firing both single fire and a series of 24 shots within 3 seconds is installed on a three-ton machine. The speed of movement is normal for a truck. Transfer from marching to combat position takes 3-4 minutes. Firing - from the driver's cab or from cover.

The warhead of one RHS (reactive-chemical projectile. - “NVO”) holds 8 liters of OM, and in artillery shells of a similar caliber - only 2 liters. To create a dead zone on an area of ​​12 hectares, one volley from three trucks is enough, which replaces 150 howitzers or 3 artillery regiments. At a distance of 6 km, the area of ​​​​contamination of OM with one volley is 6-8 hectares.

I note that the Germans also prepared their multiple rocket launchers exclusively for chemical warfare. So, in the late 1930s, the German engineer Nebel designed a 15-cm rocket projectile and a six-barreled tubular installation, which the Germans called a six-barreled mortar. Mortar tests began in 1937. The system received the name "15-cm smoke mortar type" D ". In 1941, it was renamed 15 cm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer), i.e. 15 cm smoke mortar mod. 41. Naturally, their main purpose was not to set up smoke screens, but to fire rockets filled with poisonous substances. Interestingly, the Soviet soldiers called 15 cm Nb.W 41 "Vanyusha", by analogy with the M-13, called "Katyusha".

The first launch of the Katyusha prototype (designed by Tikhomirov and Artemyev) took place in the USSR on March 3, 1928. The range of the 22.7-kg rocket was 1300 m, and the Van Deren mortar was used as a launcher.

The caliber of our rockets of the period of the Great Patriotic War - 82 mm and 132 mm - was determined by nothing more than the diameter of the powder cartridges of the engine. Seven 24-mm powder cartridges, tightly packed into the combustion chamber, give a diameter of 72 mm, the thickness of the chamber walls is 5 mm, hence the diameter (caliber) of the rocket is 82 mm. Seven thicker (40 mm) checkers in the same way give a caliber of 132 mm.

The most important issue in the design of rockets was the method of stabilization. Soviet designers preferred feathered rockets and adhered to this principle until the end of the war.

In the 1930s, rockets with an annular stabilizer that did not exceed the dimensions of the projectile were tested. Such shells could be fired from tubular guides. But tests have shown that it is impossible to achieve stable flight with the help of an annular stabilizer. Then they fired 82-mm rockets with a four-bladed tail span of 200, 180, 160, 140 and 120 mm. The results were quite definite - with a decrease in the scope of the plumage, flight stability and accuracy decreased. The plumage with a span of more than 200 mm shifted the center of gravity of the projectile back, which also worsened the stability of the flight. Lightening the plumage by reducing the thickness of the stabilizer blades caused strong vibrations of the blades until they were destroyed.

Grooved guides were adopted as launchers for feathered missiles. Experiments have shown that the longer they are, the higher the accuracy of the shells. The length of 5 m for the RS-132 became the maximum due to restrictions on railway dimensions.

I note that the Germans stabilized their rockets until 1942 exclusively by rotation. Turbojet rockets were also tested in the USSR, but they did not go into mass production. As it often happens with us, the reason for the failures during the tests was explained not by the wretchedness of the execution, but by the irrationality of the concept.

FIRST volleys

Whether we like it or not, for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Germans used multiple launch rocket systems on June 22, 1941 near Brest. “And then the arrows showed 03.15, the command “Fire!” sounded, and the devilish dance began. The earth shook. The nine batteries of the 4th Special Purpose Mortar Regiment also contributed to the infernal symphony. In half an hour, 2880 shells whistled over the Bug and hit the city and fortress on the eastern bank of the river. Heavy 600-mm mortars and 210-mm guns of the 98th Artillery Regiment unleashed their volleys on the fortifications of the citadel and hit point targets - positions Soviet artillery. It seemed that there would be no stone left unturned from the fortress.”

This is how the historian Paul Karel described the first use of 15 cm rocket-propelled mortars. In addition, the Germans in 1941 used heavy 28 cm high-explosive and 32 cm incendiary turbojet shells. The shells were over-caliber and had one powder engine (the diameter of the engine part was 140 mm).

A 28-cm high-explosive mine, with a direct hit on a stone house, completely destroyed it. The mine successfully destroyed field-type shelters. Living targets within a radius of several tens of meters were hit by a blast wave. Fragments of the mine flew at a distance of up to 800 m. The head part contained 50 kg of liquid TNT or ammatol brand 40/60. It is curious that both 28-cm and 32-cm German mines (rockets) were transported and launched from the simplest wooden closure such as a box.

The first use of Katyushas took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two salvos from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station. The appearance of "Katyusha" was a complete surprise for the leadership of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht. On August 14, the High Command of the German Ground Forces notified its troops: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barreled flamethrower gun ... The shot is fired by electricity. During the shot, smoke is generated ... If such cannons are captured, report immediately. Two weeks later, a directive appeared entitled "Russian gun throwing rocket-like projectiles." It said: “...Troops report on the use by the Russians of a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds ... Every appearance of these guns must be reported to the general, commander of the chemical troops at the high command, on the same day.

Where the name "Katyusha" came from is not known for certain. The version of Pyotr Hook is curious: “Both at the front, and then, after the war, when I got acquainted with the archives, talked with veterans, read their speeches in the press, I met a variety of explanations of how formidable weapon got a girl's name. Some believed that the beginning was laid by the letter "K", which was put by the Voronezh Comintern on their products. There was a legend among the troops that the guards mortars were named after a dashing partisan girl who destroyed many Nazis.

When soldiers and commanders asked the representative of the GAU to name the “genuine” name of the combat installation at the firing range, he advised: “Call the installation as an ordinary artillery piece. It's important to maintain secrecy."

Soon, a younger brother named Luka showed up at Katyusha. In May 1942, a group of officers of the Main Armaments Directorate developed the M-30 projectile, in which a powerful over-caliber warhead made in the shape of an ellipsoid with a maximum diameter of 300 mm was attached to the rocket engine from the M-13.

After successful ground tests, on June 8, 1942, the State Defense Committee (GKO) issued a decree on the adoption of the M-30 and the start of its mass production. In Stalin's times, all important problems were solved quickly, and by July 10, 1942, the first 20 M-30 Guards mortar divisions were created. Each of them had a three-battery composition, the battery consisted of 32 four-charged single-tier launchers. The divisional salvo, respectively, was 384 shells.

The first combat use of the M-30 took place in the 61st Army of the Western Front near the city of Belev. On the afternoon of June 5, two regimental volleys hit the German positions in Annino and Upper Doltsy with a thunderous roar. Both villages were wiped off the face of the earth, after which the infantry occupied them without loss.

The power of the Luka shells (M-30 and its modifications M-31) made a great impression both on the enemy and on our soldiers. There were many different assumptions and inventions about the Luka at the front. One of the legends was that it was as if the warhead of the rocket was stuffed with some kind of special, especially powerful, explosive, capable of burning everything in the area of ​​​​the gap. In fact, conventional explosives were used in the warheads. The exceptional effect of the Luka shells was achieved through volley fire. With the simultaneous or almost simultaneous explosion of a whole group of projectiles, the law of addition of impulses from shock waves came into force.

M-30 shells had high-explosive, chemical and incendiary warheads. However, a high-explosive warhead was mainly used. Behind characteristic shape The head of the M-30, the front-line soldiers called him "Luka Mudishchev" (the hero of Barkov's poem of the same name). Naturally, this nickname, in contrast to the replicated "Katyusha", the official press preferred not to mention. The Luka, like the German 28 cm and 30 cm shells, was launched from a wooden corking box in which it was delivered from the factory. Four, and later eight of these boxes were placed on a special frame, resulting in a simple launcher.

Needless to say, after the war, the journalistic and writer fraternity commemorated Katyusha out of place and out of place, but chose to forget her much more formidable brother Luka. In the 1970s and 1980s, at the first mention of Luka, veterans asked me with surprise: “How do you know? You didn't fight."

ANTI-TANK MYTH

"Katyusha" was a first-class weapon. As often happens, the father commanders wished it to become a universal weapon, including an anti-tank weapon.

An order is an order, and victorious reports rushed to the headquarters. If you believe the secret publication "Field Rocket Artillery in the Great Patriotic War" (Moscow, 1955), then on the Kursk Bulge in two days in three episodes "Katyushas" destroyed 95 enemy tanks! If it's true, then it should be disbanded anti-tank artillery and replace it with multiple rocket launchers.

In some ways, the huge numbers of wrecked tanks were influenced by the fact that for each wrecked tank, the crew of the combat vehicle received 2,000 rubles, of which 500 rubles. - commander, 500 rubles. - to the gunner, the rest - to the rest.

Alas, due to the huge dispersion, shooting at tanks is ineffective. Here I am picking up the most boring brochure "Tables of firing rockets M-13" of the 1942 edition. It follows from it that at a firing range of 3000 m, the range deviation was 257 m, and the side deviation was 51 m. For shorter distances, the range deviation was not given at all, since the dispersion of shells could not be calculated. It is not difficult to imagine the probability of a rocket hitting a tank at such a distance. If, theoretically, we imagine that the combat vehicle somehow managed to shoot at the tank at close range, then even here the muzzle velocity of the 132-mm projectile was only 70 m / s, which is clearly not enough to penetrate the armor of the Tiger or Panther.

It is not without reason that the year of publication of the shooting tables is specified here. According to the TS-13 firing tables of the same M-13 rocket, the average range deviation in 1944 is 105 m, and in 1957 - 135 m, and the side deviation is 200 and 300 m, respectively. Obviously, the 1957 table is more accurate, in which the dispersion increased by almost 1.5 times, so that in the tables of 1944 there are errors in the calculations or, most likely, deliberate falsification to raise fighting spirit personnel.

There is no doubt that if an M-13 projectile hits a medium or light tank, it will be disabled. The frontal armor of the "Tiger" is not able to penetrate the M-13 projectile. But in order to be guaranteed to hit a single tank from a distance of the same 3 thousand meters, it is necessary to fire from 300 to 900 M-13 shells due to their huge dispersion, while at shorter distances an even larger number of missiles will be required.

And here is another example, told by veteran Dmitry Loza. During the Uman-Botoshansk offensive on March 15, 1944, two Shermans from the 45th mechanized brigade of the 5th mechanized corps got stuck in the mud. The troops jumped off the tanks and retreated. German soldiers surrounded the stuck tanks, “smeared the viewing slots with mud, covered the aiming holes in the turret with black earth, completely blinding the crew. They knocked on hatches, tried to open them with rifle bayonets. And everyone bawled: “Rus, kaput! Give up! But then two combat vehicles BM-13 left. "Katyusha" front wheels quickly descended into the ditch and fired a volley of direct fire. Bright fiery arrows hissed and whistled into the hollow. A moment later, blinding flames danced around. When the smoke from the rocket explosions dissipated, the tanks stood unharmed at first glance, only the hulls and turrets were covered with thick soot...

Having corrected the damage to the tracks, having thrown out the burnt tarpaulins, the Emcha went to Mogilev-Podolsky. So, thirty-two 132-mm M-13 shells were fired at two Shermans point-blank, and their tarpaulin was only burned.

WAR STATISTICS

The first M-13 firing mounts had the BM-13-16 index and were mounted on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle. The 82 mm BM-8-36 launcher was also mounted on the same chassis. There were only a few hundred ZIS-6 vehicles, and at the beginning of 1942 their production was stopped.

The launchers of the M-8 and M-13 missiles in 1941-1942 were mounted on anything. So, six M-8 guide shells were installed on machines from the Maxim machine gun, 12 M-8 guides - on a motorcycle, sled and snowmobile (M-8 and M-13), T-40 and T-60 tanks, armored railway platforms (BM-8-48, BM-8-72, BM-13-16), river and sea boats, etc. But basically, launchers in 1942-1944 were mounted on cars received under Lend-Lease: Austin, Dodge, Ford Marmont, Bedford, etc. During the 5 years of the war, out of 3374 chassis used for combat vehicles, the ZIS-6 accounted for 372 (11%), the Studebaker - 1845 (54.7%), the remaining 17 types of chassis (except for the Willis with mountain launchers) - 1157 (34.3%). Finally, it was decided to standardize combat vehicles based on the Studebaker car. In April 1943, such a system was put into service under the symbol BM-13N (normalized). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for the M-13 was adopted on the BM-31-12 Studebaker chassis.

But in the post-war years, the Studebakers were ordered to be forgotten, although combat vehicles on its chassis were in service until the early 1960s. In secret instructions, the Studebaker was referred to as a "cross-country vehicle." Mutant Katyushas mounted on the ZIS-5 chassis or post-war vehicles, which stubbornly pass off as genuine military relics, ascended on numerous pedestals, but the original BM-13-16 on the ZIS-6 chassis was preserved only in the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg.

As already mentioned, back in 1941 the Germans captured several launchers and hundreds of 132-mm M-13 and 82-mm M-8 shells. The Wehrmacht command believed that their turbojet shells and tubular launchers with revolver-type guides were better than Soviet wing-stabilized shells. But the SS took up the M-8 and M-13 and ordered the Skoda company to copy them.

In 1942, on the basis of the 82-mm Soviet M-8 projectile, 8 cm R.Sprgr rockets were created in Zbroevka. In fact, it was a new projectile, and not a copy of the M-8, although outwardly the German projectile was very similar to the M-8.

Unlike the Soviet projectile, the stabilizer feathers were placed obliquely at an angle of 1.5 degrees to the longitudinal axis. Due to this, the projectile rotated in flight. The rotation speed was many times less than that of a turbojet projectile, and did not play any role in projectile stabilization, but it eliminated the thrust eccentricity of a single-nozzle rocket engine. But the eccentricity, that is, the displacement of the engine thrust vector due to the uneven burning of gunpowder in checkers, was the main reason for the low accuracy of Soviet missiles of the M-8 and M-13 types.

On the basis of the Soviet M-13, the Skoda company created a whole range of 15-cm missiles with oblique wings for the SS and Luftwaffe, but they were produced in small batches. Our troops captured several samples of German 8-cm shells, and our designers made their own samples based on them. Missiles M-13 and M-31 with oblique plumage were adopted by the Red Army in 1944, they were assigned special ballistic indices - TS-46 and TS-47.

The apotheosis of the combat use of the Katyusha and Luka was the assault on Berlin. In total, more than 44 thousand guns and mortars, as well as 1,785 M-30 and M-31 launchers, 1,620 rocket artillery combat vehicles (219 divisions) were involved in the Berlin operation. In the battles for Berlin, rocket artillery units used the rich experience they had gained in the battles for Poznan, which consisted in direct fire with single projectiles M-31, M-20 and even M-13.

At first glance, this method of firing may seem primitive, but its results turned out to be very significant. Firing with single rockets during battles in such big city, like Berlin, has found the widest application.

To conduct such fire in the guards mortar units, assault groups of approximately the following composition were created: an officer - group commander, an electrical engineer, 25 sergeants and soldiers for the M-31 assault group and 8–10 for the M-13 assault group.

The intensity of the battles and the fire missions performed by rocket artillery in the battles for Berlin can be judged by the number of rockets used up in these battles. In the offensive zone of the 3rd shock army, the following were used up: M-13 shells - 6270; shells M-31 - 3674; shells M-20 - 600; shells M-8 - 1878.

Of this amount, rocket artillery assault groups used up: M-8 shells - 1638; shells M-13 - 3353; shells M-20 - 191; shells M-31 - 479.

These groups in Berlin destroyed 120 buildings that were strong centers of enemy resistance, destroyed three 75-mm guns, suppressed dozens of firing points, and killed over 1,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

So, our glorious "Katyusha" and her unfairly offended brother "Luka" became a weapon of victory in the full sense of the word!

Weapon of Victory - "Katyusha"

The first combat use of Katyushas is now quite well known: on July 14, 1941, three volleys were fired at the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. This town with a population of only 9 thousand people is located on the Vitebsk Upland, on the Malaya Berezina River, 68 km from Smolensk, at the very border of Russia and Belarus. On that day, the Germans captured Rudnya, and a large amount of military equipment accumulated on the market square of the town.

At that moment, on the high steep western bank of the Malaya Berezina, the battery of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov appeared. From a western direction unexpected for the enemy, she hit the market square. As soon as the sound of the last volley ceased, one of the gunners named Kashirin loudly sang the song “Katyusha”, popular in those years, written in 1938 by Matvey Blanter to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. Two days later, on July 16, at 15:15, Flerov's battery struck at the Orsha station, and an hour and a half later, at the German crossing over Orshitsa.

On that day, signal sergeant Andrey Sapronov was seconded to Flerov's battery, who provided communication between the battery and the command. As soon as the sergeant heard about how Katyusha went to the high, steep bank, he immediately remembered how rocket launchers had just entered the same high and steep bank, and, reporting to the headquarters of the 217th separate communications battalion The 144th Infantry Division of the 20th Army about Flerov completing a combat mission, the signalman Sapronov said:

"Katyusha sang perfectly."

In the photo: Commander of the first experimental Katyusha battery Captain Flerov. Killed October 7, 1941. But about who was the first to use the Katyusha against tanks, the opinions of historians differ - too often in the initial period of the war, the situation forced them to make such desperate decisions.

The systematic use of the BM-13 to destroy tanks is associated with the name of the commander of the 14th separate guards mortar division, Lieutenant Commander Moskvin. This unit, assembled from military sailors, was originally called the 200th OAS division and was armed with 130 mm stationary naval guns. Both guns and artillerymen performed well in the fight against tanks, but on October 9, 1941, by written order of the commander of the 32nd Army, Major General Vishnevsky, the 200th artillery division, having blown up stationary guns and ammunition for them, withdrew to the east, but October 12 fell into the Vyazemsky cauldron.

Having left the encirclement on October 26, the division was sent for reorganization, during which it would be re-equipped with Katyushas. The division was headed by the former commander of one of his batteries, senior lieutenant Moskvin, who was immediately awarded the rank of lieutenant commander. The 14th separate guards mortar division was included in the 1st Moscow separate detachment of sailors, which took part in the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow. At the end of May - beginning of June 1942, during a period of relative calm, Moskvin summed up the experience of fighting enemy armored vehicles and found new way its destruction. He was supported by the GMCH inspector, Colonel Alexei Ivanovich Nesterenko. Arranged test firing. To give the guides a minimum elevation angle, the Katyushas drove their front wheels into the dug recesses, and the shells, leaving parallel to the ground, smashed the plywood models of the tanks. So what if you break plywood? skeptics doubted. - You still can't beat real tanks!

In the photo: shortly before death. There was some truth in these doubts, because the warhead of the M-13 shells was high-explosive fragmentation, and not armor-piercing. However, it turned out that when their fragments hit the engine part or gas tanks, a fire breaks out, the caterpillars are interrupted, the towers are jammed, and sometimes they are torn off the shoulder. The explosion of a 4.95-kilogram charge, even behind the armor, incapacitates the crew due to severe shell shock.

On July 22, 1942, in a battle north of Novocherkassk, the Moskvin division, which by that time had been transferred to the Southern Front and included in the 3rd Rifle Corps, destroyed 11 tanks with two volleys of direct fire - 1.1 per installation, while a good result for the anti-tank division out of 18 guns, it was considered the defeat of two or three enemy tanks.

Often, the mortar guards were the only force capable of providing organized resistance to the enemy. This forced the front commander R.Ya. Malinovsky, on July 25, 1942, on the basis of such units, the Mobile Mechanized Group (PMG) headed by the commander of the MCH A.I. Nesterenko. It included three regiments and a BM-13 division, the 176th rifle division planted on vehicles, a combined tank battalion, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery battalions There were no such divisions either before or after that.

At the end of July, near the village of Mechetinskaya, the PMG collided with the main forces of the 1st German Panzer Army, Colonel General Ewald Kleist. Intelligence reported that a column of tanks and motorized infantry was moving, - Moskvin reported. - We chose a position near the road so that the batteries could fire at the same time. Motorcyclists appeared, followed by cars and tanks. The column was covered with battery volleys to the full depth, the wrecked and smoking cars stopped, tanks flew at them like blind men and caught fire themselves. The advance of the enemy along this road was suspended.

Several such strikes forced the Germans to change tactics. They left reserves of fuel and ammunition in the rear and moved in small groups: in front of 15-20 tanks, followed by trucks with infantry. This slowed down the pace of the offensive, but created the threat of outflanking our PMG. In response to this threat, ours created their own small groups, each of which included a Katyusha division, a motorized rifle company, and anti-aircraft and anti-tank batteries. One of these groups - the group of Captain Puzik, created on the basis of the 269th division of the 49th gmp, using the Moskvin method, destroyed 15 enemy tanks and 35 vehicles in two days of fighting near Peschanokopskaya and Belaya Glina.

The advance of enemy tanks and motorized infantry was suspended. The regiments of the 176th Infantry Division took up defensive positions along the ridge of the hills at the turn of Belaya Glina and Razvilnoye. The front has temporarily stabilized.

observation method invented Captain-Lieutenant Moskvin. Not a single frontal attack by enemy tanks, and even more so by motorized infantry against the volley fire of guards mortar units, reached the goal. Only flanking detours and strikes forced the mobile group to withdraw to other lines. Therefore, German tanks and motorized infantry began to accumulate in the folds of the terrain, provoked a volley of BM-13s with a false attack, and while they were reloading, which took five to six minutes, they made a throw. If the division did not respond to a false attack or fired with one installation, the Germans did not leave shelters, waiting for the Katyushas to use up ammunition. In response, Lieutenant Commander Moskvin applied his own method of adjusting fire. Climbing to the top of the guide trusses, Moskvin observed the area from this height.

The correction method proposed by Moskvin was recommended to other units, and soon the schedule for the German offensive in the Caucasus was disrupted. A few more days of fighting - and the word "tank" could be removed from the name of the 1st Panzer Army. The losses of the mortar guards were minimal.

At first, the guardsmen fired on tanks from the slopes of the hills facing the enemy, but when our troops retreated to the Salsky steppes during the Battle of the Caucasus, the hills ended, and on the plain, the Katyusha could not fire direct fire, but dig a corresponding hole under fire approaching enemy tanks was not always possible.

A way out of this situation was found on August 3 in the battle, which was accepted by the battery of senior lieutenant Koifman from the 271st division of captain Kashkin. She took up firing positions south of the farm. Soon, the observers noticed that tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy approached the village of Nikolaevskaya. The combat vehicles were aimed at the target, which was well observed and was in the reachable zone. A few minutes later, groups of tanks began to leave the village and descend into the hollow. Obviously, the Germans decided to covertly approach the battery and attack it. This evasive maneuver was first noticed by the guards, Private Levin. The battery commander ordered the flank installation to be deployed towards the tanks. However, the tanks had already entered the dead zone, and even with the smallest angle of inclination of the RS-132 guide trusses, they would have flown over them. And then, to reduce the aiming angle, Lieutenant Alexei Bartenyev ordered the driver Fomin to drive his front wheels into the trench trench.

When the nearest tank was about two hundred meters away, the guardsmen Arzhanov, Kuznetsov, Suprunov and Khilich opened fire with direct fire. Sixteen shells exploded. The tanks were shrouded in smoke. Two of them stopped, the rest quickly turned around and high speed went to the beam. There were no new attacks. The 19-year-old lieutenant Barteniev, who invented this method of firing, died in the same battle, but since then the mortar guards began to use infantry trenches to make the guides position parallel to the ground.

In early August, the movement of Army Group A slowed down, which created a threat to the right flank of Army Group B, marching on Stalingrad. Therefore, in Berlin, the 40th Panzer Corps of Group B was redirected to the Caucasus, which was supposed to break into Stalingrad from the south. He turned to the Kuban, made a raid on the Rural steppes (bypassing the SMG coverage area) and ended up on the outskirts of Armavir and Stavropol.

Because of this, the commander of the North Caucasian Front, Budyonny, was forced to split the PMG in two: one part of it was thrown into the Armavir-Stavropol direction, the other covered Krasnodar and Maykop. For the battles near Maykop (but not for victories in the steppes), Moskvin was awarded the Order of Lenin. A year later, he will be mortally wounded near the village of Krymskaya. Now this is the same Krymsk, which suffered from the recent flood.

Already after the death of Moskvin, under the impression of his experience in fighting enemy tanks with the help of Katyushas, ​​the cumulative shells RSB-8 and RSB-13 were created. Such shells took the armor of any of the then tanks. However, they rarely fell into the regiments of Katyushas - at the base they were supplied with rocket launchers of Il-2 attack aircraft.

THE LEGENDARY KATYUSHA IS 75!

June 30, 2016 marks the 75th anniversary of the creation of a design bureau for the production of the legendary Katyushas by the decision of the State Defense Committee at the Kompressor plant in Moscow. This rocket launcher with its powerful volleys terrified the enemy and decided the outcome of many battles of the Great Patriotic War, including the battle for Moscow in October-December 1941. At that time, the BM-13 combat vehicles went to the defensive lines directly from the Moscow factory shops.

Multiple launch rocket systems fought on different fronts, from Stalingrad to Berlin. At the same time, the Katyusha is a weapon with a distinctly Moscow “pedigree”, rooted in pre-revolutionary times. Back in 1915, a graduate of the Faculty of Chemistry of Moscow University, engineer and inventor Nikolai Tikhomirov patented a "self-propelled mine of reactive action", i.e. projectile, applicable in water and in the air. The conclusion on the security certificate was signed by the famous N.E. Zhukovsky, at that time the chairman of the department of inventions of the Moscow military-industrial committee.

While the examinations were going on, the October Revolution happened. The new government, however, recognized the great defense significance of Tikhomirov's rocket. To develop self-propelled mines in Moscow in 1921, the Gas Dynamics Laboratory was created, which Tikhomirov headed: for the first six years it worked in the capital, then moved to Leningrad and was located, by the way, in one of the ravelins of the Peter and Paul Fortress.

Nikolai Tikhomirov died in 1931 and was buried in Moscow on Vagankovsky cemetery. An interesting fact: in his other, “civilian” life, Nikolai Ivanovich designed equipment for sugar refineries, distilleries and oil mills.

The next stage of work on the future Katyusha also took place in the capital. On September 21, 1933, the Jet Research Institute was established in Moscow. Friedrich Zander stood at the origins of the institute, and S.P. was the deputy director. Korolev. RNII maintained a close relationship with K.E. Tsiolkovsky. As you can see, almost all the pioneers of Russian rocket technology of the twentieth century were the fathers of the guards mortar.

One of the prominent names on this list is Vladimir Barmin. At the time when his work on a new jet weapon began, the future academician and professor was a little over 30 years old. Shortly before the war, he was appointed chief designer.

Who could have foreseen in 1940 that this young refrigeration engineer would become one of the creators of the world-famous weapons of World War II?

On June 30, 1941, Vladimir Barmin retrained as rocketmen. On this day, a special design bureau was created at the plant, which became the main "think tank" for the production of Katyushas. Recall: work on the rocket launcher went on throughout the pre-war years and ended literally on the eve of the Nazi invasion. The People's Commissariat of Defense was looking forward to this miracle weapon, but not everything went smoothly.

In 1939, the first samples of aviation rockets were successfully used during the battles at Khalkhin Gol. In March 1941, successful field tests of the BM-13 installations (with a high-explosive fragmentation projectile M-13 of 132 mm caliber) were carried out, and already on June 21, just a few hours before the war, a decree was signed on their mass production. Already on the eighth day of the war, the production of Katyushas for the front began at the Kompressor.

On July 14, 1941, the first Separate Experimental Battery of Field Rocket Artillery of the Red Army was formed, led by Captain Ivan Flerov, armed with seven combat mounts. On July 14, 1941, the battery fired a salvo at the railway junction of the city of Orsha captured by the Nazi troops. Soon she successfully fought in battles near Rudnya, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl and Spas-Demensk.

In early October 1941, while moving to the front line from the rear, Flerov's battery was ambushed by the enemy near the village of Bogatyr (Smolensk region). Having shot all the ammunition and blowing up the combat vehicles, most of the fighters and their commander Ivan Flerov died.

219 Katyusha divisions participated in the battles for Berlin. Since the autumn of 1941, these units were given the title of Guards during the formation. Since the battle for Moscow, not a single major offensive operation of the Red Army has been complete without the fire support of the Katyushas. The first batches of them were completely manufactured at the capital's enterprises in those days when the enemy stood at the walls of the city. According to production veterans and historians, it was a real labor feat.

When the war began, it was the Compressor specialists who were instructed to arrange the production of Katyushas as soon as possible. It was previously planned that these combat vehicles would be produced by the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern, however, the difficult situation on the fronts forced them to make adjustments to this plan.

At the front, "Katyusha" represented a significant fighting force and was able to single-handedly predetermine the outcome of an entire battle. 16 conventional heavy guns from the times of the Great Patriotic War could fire 16 high-powered projectiles in 2-3 minutes. In addition, it takes a lot of time to move such a number of conventional guns from one firing position to another. "Katyusha", mounted on a truck, it takes a few minutes. So the uniqueness of the installations was in their high firepower and mobility. The noise effect also played a certain psychological role: it was not for nothing that the Germans, because of the strongest rumble that accompanied the volleys of the Katyusha, called it the “Stalinist organ”.

The work was complicated by the fact that in the autumn of 1941 many Moscow enterprises were being evacuated. Part of the workshops and the "Compressor" itself was relocated to the Urals. But all the capacities for the production of Katyushas remained in the capital. There was a shortage of skilled workers (they went to the front and the militia), equipment, and materials.

Many Moscow enterprises in those days worked in close cooperation with the Compressor, producing everything necessary for the Katyushas. Machine-building plant them. Vladimir Ilyich made rocket shells. Carriage Repair Plant. Voitovich and the Krasnaya Presnya plant manufactured parts for launchers. Precise movements were supplied by the 1st watch factory.

All of Moscow united in a difficult hour to create a unique weapon capable of bringing Victory closer. And the role of "Katyusha" in the defense of the capital is not forgotten by the descendants of the winners: several museums in Moscow and on the territory of the "Compressor" plant have monuments to the legendary Guards mortar. And many of its creators were awarded high state awards during the war.

The history of the creation of "Katyusha"

The list of contract work carried out by the Jet Research Institute (RNII) for the Armored Directorate (ABTU), the final settlement of which was to be carried out in the first quarter of 1936, mentions contract No. 251618s dated January 26, 1935 - a prototype rocket launcher on the BT tank -5 with 10 missiles. Thus, it can be considered proven that the idea of ​​creating a mechanized multiply charged installation in the third decade of the 20th century did not appear at the end of the 30s, as previously stated, but at least at the end of the first half of this period. Confirmation of the fact of using vehicles for firing rockets in general was also found in the book "Rockets, Their Design and Application", authored by G.E. Langemak and V.P. Glushko, released in 1935. At the end of this book, in particular, the following is written: "The main area of ​​​​application of powder rockets is the armament of light combat vehicles, like airplanes, small ships, vehicles of various types, and finally escort artillery."

In 1938, employees of Research Institute No. 3, by order of the Artillery Directorate, carried out work on object No. 138 - a gun for firing 132 mm chemical projectiles. It was required to make non-rapid machines (such as a pipe). Under an agreement with the Artillery Directorate, it was necessary to design and manufacture an installation with a pedestal and a lifting and turning mechanism. One machine was made, which was later recognized as not meeting the requirements. At the same time, Research Institute No. 3 developed a mechanized salvo rocket launcher mounted on a modified chassis of a ZIS-5 truck with an ammunition load of 24 rounds. According to other data from the archives of the State Research Center of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Center of Keldysh” (former Research Institute No. 3), “2 mechanized installations were made on vehicles. They passed factory shooting tests at the Sofrinsky Artfield and partial field tests at the Ts.V.Kh.P. R.K.K.A. with positive results." On the basis of factory tests, it could be argued that the flight range of the RCS (depending on the specific gravity of the HE) at a firing angle of 40 degrees is 6000 - 7000m, Vd = (1/100)X and Wb = (1/70)X, the useful volume of the OV in the projectile - 6.5 l, metal consumption per 1 liter of RH - 3.4 kg / l, the dispersion radius of RH when the projectile breaks on the ground is 15-20 l, the maximum time required to fire the entire ammunition load of the vehicle in 24 shells is 3-4 sec.

The mechanized rocket launcher was designed to provide a chemical raid with rocket chemical projectiles /SOV and NOV/ 132 mm with a capacity of 7 liters. The installation made it possible to fire at the squares both with single shots and in a volley of 2 - 3 - 6 - 12 and 24 shots. “The installations, combined into batteries of 4-6 vehicles, are a very mobile and powerful means of chemical attack at a distance of up to 7 kilometers.”

The installation and a 132 mm chemical rocket projectile for 7 liters of poisonous substance successfully passed field and state tests; its adoption was planned for service in 1939. The table of practical accuracy of rocket-chemical projectiles indicated the data of a mechanized vehicle installation for a surprise attack by firing chemical, high-explosive fragmentation, incendiary, lighting, and other rocket projectiles. I-th option without a pickup device - the number of shells in one volley - 24, total weight one volley of poisonous substances - 168 kg, 6 vehicle installations replace one hundred and twenty howitzers of 152 mm caliber, the vehicle reload speed is 5-10 minutes. 24 shots, the number of service personnel - 20-30 people. on 6 cars. In artillery systems - 3 Artillery regiments. II-version with control device. Data not specified.

From December 8, 1938 to February 4, 1939, unguided rockets of 132 mm caliber and automatic installations were tested. However, the installation was submitted for testing unfinished and did not withstand them: a large number of failures were found during the descent of rockets due to the imperfection of the corresponding units of the installation; the process of loading the launcher was inconvenient and time consuming; the swivel and lifting mechanisms did not provide easy and smooth operation, and the sights did not provide the required pointing accuracy. In addition, the ZIS-5 truck had limited cross-country ability. (See the gallery Testing an automobile rocket launcher on the ZIS-5 chassis, designed by NII-3, drawing No. 199910 for launching 132 mm rockets. (Testing time: from 12/8/38 to 02/4/39).

The letter of award for the successful testing in 1939 of a mechanized installation for a chemical attack (outgoing NII No. 3, number 733s dated May 25, 1939 from the director of NII No. 3 Slonimer addressed to the People's Commissar of Munitions comrade Sergeev I.P.) indicates the following participants of the work: Kostikov A.G. - Deputy technical director parts, installation initiator; Gvai I.I. - lead designer; Popov A. A. - design engineer; Isachenkov - assembly mechanic; Pobedonostsev Yu. - prof. advising object; Luzhin V. - engineer; Schwartz L.E. - engineer .

In 1938, the Institute designed the construction of a special chemical motorized team for salvo firing of 72 shots.

In a letter dated February 14, 1939, to Comrade Matveev (V.P.K. of the Defense Committee under the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) signed by the Director of Research Institute No. 3 Slonimer and Deputy. Director of Research Institute No. 3, military engineer of the 1st rank Kostikov says: “For ground troops, the experience of a chemical mechanized installation should be used for:

• the use of rocket high-explosive fragmentation shells in order to create massive fire on the squares;
• use of incendiary, lighting and propaganda projectiles;
• development of a 203mm caliber chemical projectile and a mechanized installation providing double the chemical power and firing range compared to the existing one.

In 1939, the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 developed two versions of experimental installations on a modified chassis of a ZIS-6 truck for launching 24 and 16 unguided rockets of 132 mm caliber. Installation of the II sample differed from the installation of the I sample in the longitudinal arrangement of the guides.

The ammunition load of the mechanized installation /on the ZIS-6/ for launching chemical and high-explosive fragmentation shells of 132mm caliber /MU-132/ was 16 rocket shells. The firing system provided for the possibility of firing both single shells and a salvo of the entire ammunition load. The time required to produce a volley of 16 missiles is 3.5 - 6 seconds. The time required to reload ammunition is 2 minutes by a team of 3 people. The weight of the structure with a full ammunition load of 2350 kg was 80% of the calculated load of the vehicle.

Field tests of these installations were carried out from September 28 to November 9, 1939 on the territory of the Artillery Research Experimental Range (ANIOP, Leningrad) (see photos taken at ANIOP). The results of field tests showed that the installation of the 1st sample, due to technical imperfections, cannot be admitted to military tests. Installation of the II sample, which also had a number of serious shortcomings, according to the conclusion of the members of the commission, could be admitted to military tests after making significant constructive changes. Tests showed that when firing, the installation of the II sample sways and the knockdown of the elevation angle reaches 15 ″ 30 ′, which increases the dispersion of shells, when loading the lower row of guides, the projectile fuse can hit the truss structure. Since the end of 1939, the main attention has been focused on improving the layout and design of the II sample installation and eliminating the shortcomings identified during field tests. In this regard, it is necessary to note the characteristic directions in which the work was carried out. On the one hand, this is a further development of the installation of the II sample in order to eliminate its shortcomings, on the other hand, the creation of more perfect installation, different from the installation of sample II. In the tactical and technical assignment for the development of a more advanced installation (“modernized installation for the RS” in the terminology of the documents of those years), signed by Yu.P. Pobedonostsev on December 7, 1940, it was envisaged: to carry out structural improvements to the lifting and turning device, to increase the angle of horizontal guidance, to make simplifications sighting device. It was also envisaged to increase the length of the guides to 6000 mm instead of the existing 5000 mm, as well as the possibility of firing unguided rockets of 132 mm and 180 mm caliber. At a meeting at the technical department of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, it was decided to increase the length of the guides even up to 7000 mm. The deadline for the delivery of the drawings was scheduled for October 1941. Nevertheless, in order to conduct various kinds of tests in the workshops of Research Institute No. 3 in 1940 - 1941, several (in addition to the existing) modernized installations for the RS were manufactured. Total number different sources indicate different things: in some - six, in others - seven. In the data of the archive of Research Institute No. 3, as of January 10, 1941, there are data on 7 pieces. (from the document on the readiness of object 224 (topic 24 of the overplan, an experimental series of automatic installations for firing RS-132 mm (in the amount of seven pieces. See UANA GAU letter No. 668059) Based on the available documents, the source states that there were eight installations, but in different time. On February 28, 1941 there were six of them.

The thematic plan of research and development work for 1940 of the Research Institute No. 3 NKB provided for the transfer to the customer - the AU of the Red Army - six automatic installations for the RS-132mm. The report on the implementation of pilot orders in production for the month of November 1940 at Research Institute No. 3 of the National Design Bureau indicates that with a delivery batch to the customer of six installations, by November 1940, the OTK received 5 units, and the military representative - 4 units.

In December 1939, Research Institute No. 3 was tasked with short period time to develop a powerful rocket projectile and a rocket launcher to carry out the tasks of destroying long-term enemy defenses on the Mannerheim Line. The result of the work of the Institute team was a feathered rocket projectile with a range of 2-3 km with a powerful high-explosive warhead with a ton of explosive and a four-guide installation on a T-34 tank or on a sleigh towed by tractors or tanks. In January 1940, the installation and rockets were sent to the combat area, but soon it was decided to conduct field tests before using them in combat. The installation with shells was sent to the Leningrad scientific and test artillery range. Soon the war with Finland ended. The need for powerful high-explosive shells dropped. Further installation and projectile work was discontinued.

Department 2n Research Institute No. 3 in 1940 was asked to perform work on the following objects:

• Object 213 - An electrified installation on a VMS for firing lighting and signaling. R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (Note: for the first time, an electric drive for a rocket artillery combat vehicle was used in the design of the BM-21 combat vehicle of the M-21 Field Rocket System).
• Object 214 - Installation on a 2-axle trailer with 16 guides, length l = 6mt. for R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (alteration and adaptation of object 204)
• Object 215 - Electrified installation on the ZIS-6 with a portable supply of R.S. and with a wide range of aiming angles.
• Object 216 - Trailer-mounted PC charging box
• Object 217 - Installation on a 2-axle trailer for firing long-range missiles
• Object 218 - Anti-aircraft moving installation for 12 pcs. R.S. caliber 140 mm with electric drive
• Object 219 - Fixed anti-aircraft installation for 50-80 R.S. caliber 140 mm.
• Object 220 - Command installation on a ZIS-6 vehicle with an electric current generator, aiming and firing control panel
• Object 221 - Universal installation on a 2-axle trailer for possible polygon firing of RS calibers from 82 to 165 mm.
• Object 222 - Mechanized installation for escorting tanks
• Object 223 - Introduction to the industry of mass production of mechanized installations.

In a letter, acting Director of Research Institute No. 3 Kostikov A.G. on the possibility of representation in K.V.Sh. under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR data for the award of the Comrade Stalin Prize, based on the results of work in the period from 1935 to 1940, the following participants in the work are indicated:

• rocket launcher for a sudden, powerful artillery and chemical attack on the enemy with the help of rocket shells - Authors according to the application certificate of the GB PRI No. 3338 9.II.40g (author's certificate No. 3338 of February 19, 1940) Kostikov Andrey Grigorievich, Gvai Ivan Isidorovich, Aborenkov Vasily Vasilievich.
• tactical and technical justification of the scheme and design of the auto-installation - designers: Pavlenko Alexey Petrovich and Galkovsky Vladimir Nikolaevich.
• testing rocket high-explosive fragmentation chemical shells of caliber 132 mm. - Shvarts Leonid Emilievich, Artemiev Vladimir Andreevich, Shitov Dmitry Alexandrovich.

The basis for submitting Comrade Stalin for the Prize was also the Decision of the Technical Council of the Research Institute No. 3 of the National Design Bureau dated December 26, 1940.

№1923

scheme 1, scheme 2

galleries

On April 25, 1941, tactical and technical requirements No. 1923 were approved for the modernization of a mechanized installation for firing rockets.

On June 21, 1941, the installation was demonstrated to the leaders of the CPSU (6) and the Soviet government, and on the same day, just a few hours before the start of World War II, a decision was made to urgently expand the production of M-13 rockets and M-13 installations (see Fig. scheme 1, scheme 2). The production of M-13 installations was organized at the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and at the Moscow plant "Compressor". One of the main enterprises for the production of rockets was the Moscow plant. Vladimir Ilyich.

During the war, the production of component installations and shells and the transition from serial production to mass production required the creation of a broad structure of cooperation on the territory of the country (Moscow, Leningrad, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), Nizhny Tagil, Krasnoyarsk, Kolpino, Murom, Kolomna and, possibly, , other). It required the organization of a separate military acceptance of guards mortar units. For more information about the production of shells and their elements during the war years, see our gallery website (further on the links below).

According to various sources, in late July - early August, the formation of Guards mortar units began (see:). In the first months of the war, the Germans already had data on new Soviet weapons (see:).

In September-October 1941, on the instructions of the Main Directorate of Armament of the Guards Mortar Units, the M-13 installation was developed on the chassis of the STZ-5 NATI tractor modified for mounting. The development was entrusted to the Voronezh plant. Comintern and SKB at the Moscow plant "Compressor". SKB performed the development more efficiently, and prototypes were manufactured and tested in a short time. As a result, the installation was put into service and put into mass production.

In the December days of 1941, the Special Design Bureau, on the instructions of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, developed, in particular, a 16-charger installation on an armored railway platform for the defense of the city of Moscow. The installation was a throwing installation of the M-13 serial installation on a modified chassis of a ZIS-6 truck with a modified base. (for more details on other works of this period and the period of the war as a whole, see: and).

At a technical meeting in the SKB on April 21, 1942, it was decided to develop a normalized installation, known as the M-13N (after the war BM-13N). The aim of the development was to create the most advanced installation, the design of which would take into account all the changes made earlier to various modifications of the M-13 installation and the creation of such a throwing installation that could be manufactured and assembled on a stand and assembled and assembled on a chassis cars of any brand without major revision of technical documentation, as was the case before. The goal was achieved by dismembering the M-13 installation into separate units. Each node was considered as an independent product with an index assigned to it, after which it could be used as a borrowed product in any installation.

During the development of components and parts for the normalized BM-13N combat installation, the following were obtained:

• increase in the area of ​​fire by 20%
• reduction of efforts on the handles of guidance mechanisms by one and a half to two times;
• doubling the vertical aiming speed;
• increasing the survivability of the combat installation due to the reservation of the rear wall of the cabin; gas tank and gas pipeline;
• increasing the stability of the installation in the stowed position by introducing a support bracket to disperse the load on the side members of the vehicle;
• increase in the operational reliability of the unit (simplification of the support beam, rear axle, etc.;
• a significant reduction in the amount of welding work, machining, the exclusion of bending truss rods;
• reduction in the weight of the installation by 250 kg, despite the introduction of armor on the rear wall of the cab and gas tank;
• reduction of production time for the manufacture of the installation by assembling the artillery part separately from the chassis of the vehicle and mounting the installation on the chassis of the vehicle using mounting clamps, which made it possible to eliminate drilling holes in the spars;
• reduction by several times of the idle time of the chassis of vehicles that arrived at the plant for installation of the installation;
• reduction in the number of fastener sizes from 206 to 96, as well as the number of parts: in the swing frame - from 56 to 29, in the truss from 43 to 29, in the support frame - from 15 to 4, etc. The use of normalized components and products in the design of the installation made it possible to apply a high-performance flow method for the assembly and installation of the installation.

The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebaker series truck (see photo) with a 6 × 6 wheel arrangement, which was supplied under Lend-Lease. The normalized M-13N installation was adopted by the Red Army in 1943. The installation became the main model used until the end of the Great Patriotic War. Other types of modified truck chassis of foreign brands were also used.

At the end of 1942, V.V. Aborenkov suggested adding two additional pins to the M-13 projectile in order to launch it from dual guides. For this purpose, a prototype was made, which was a serial M-13 installation, in which the swinging part (guides and truss) was replaced. The guide consisted of two steel strips placed on edge, in each of them a groove was cut for the drive pin. Each pair of strips was fastened opposite each other with grooves in a vertical plane. The field tests carried out did not give the expected improvement in the accuracy of fire and the work was stopped.

At the beginning of 1943, SKB specialists carried out work on the creation of installations with a normalized throwing installation of the M-13 installation on the modified chassis of Chevrolet and ZIS-6 trucks. During January - May 1943, a prototype was made on a modified Chevrolet truck chassis and field tests were carried out. The installations were adopted by the Red Army. However, due to the presence of a sufficient number of chassis of these brands, they did not go into mass production.

In 1944, Special Design Bureau specialists developed the M-13 installation on the armored chassis of the ZIS-6 car modified for the installation of a throwing installation for launching M-13 shells. For this purpose, the normalized “beam” guides of the M-13N installation were shortened to 2.5 meters and assembled into a package on two spars. The truss was made shortened from pipes in the form of a pyramidal frame, turned upside down, served mainly as a support for attaching the screw of the lifting mechanism. The elevation angle of the guide package was changed from the cab using handwheels and a cardan shaft for the vertical guidance mechanism. A prototype was made. However, due to the weight of the armor, the front axle and springs of the ZIS-6 vehicle were overloaded, as a result of which further installation work was stopped.

In late 1943 - early 1944, SKB specialists and rocket developers were asked to improve the accuracy of fire of 132 mm caliber shells. To give rotational motion, the designers introduced tangential holes into the design of the projectile along the diameter of the head working belt. The same solution was used in the design of the regular M-31 projectile, and was proposed for the M-8 projectile. As a result of this, the accuracy indicator increased, but there was a decrease in the indicator in terms of flight range. Compared to the standard M-13 projectile, whose flight range was 8470 m, the range of the new projectile, which received the M-13UK index, was 7900 m. Despite this, the projectile was adopted by the Red Army.

In the same period, specialists from NII-1 (Lead Designer Bessonov V.G.) developed and then tested the M-13DD projectile. The projectile had the best accuracy in terms of accuracy, but they could not be fired from standard M-13 installations, since the projectile had a rotational motion and, when launched from ordinary standard guides, destroyed them, tearing off the linings from them. To a lesser extent, this also took place during the launch of M-13UK projectiles. The M-13DD projectile was adopted by the Red Army at the end of the war. Mass production of the projectile was not organized.

At the same time, SKB specialists began research design studies and experimental work to improve the accuracy of firing of M-13 and M-8 rockets by developing guides. It was based on new principle launching rockets and ensuring their strength is sufficient for firing M-13DD and M-20 projectiles. Since giving rotation to feathered rocket unguided projectiles in the initial segment of their flight trajectory improved accuracy, the idea was born to give rotation to projectiles on guides without drilling tangential holes in the projectiles, which consume part of the engine power to rotate them and thereby reduce their flight range. This idea led to the creation of spiral guides. The design of the spiral guide has taken the form of a trunk formed by four spiral rods, of which three are smooth steel pipes , and the fourth, leading one, is made of a steel square with selected grooves forming an H-shaped section profile. The bars were welded to the legs of the annular clips. In the breech there was a lock to hold the projectile in the guide and electrical contacts. A special equipment was created for bending guide rods in a spiral, having different angles of twisting along their length and welding guide shafts. Initially, the installation had 12 guides rigidly connected into four cassettes (three guides per cassette). Prototypes of the 12-charger M-13-SN were developed and manufactured. However, sea trials showed that the chassis of the car was overloaded, and it was decided to remove two guides from the upper cassettes from the installation. The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebeker off-road truck. It consisted of a set of rails, a truss, a swing frame, a subframe, a sight, vertical and horizontal guidance mechanisms, and electrical equipment. In addition to cassettes with guides and farms, all other nodes were unified with the corresponding nodes of the normalized M-13N combat installation. With the help of the M-13-SN installation, it was possible to launch M-13, M-13UK, M-20 and M-13DD shells of 132 mm caliber. Significantly better results were obtained in terms of accuracy of fire: with M-13 shells - 3.2 times, M-13UK - 1.1 times, M-20 - 3.3 times, M-13DD - 1.47 times) . With the improvement in the accuracy of firing with M-13 rocket projectiles, the flight range did not decrease, as was the case when firing M-13UK shells from M-13 installations that had beam-type guides. There was no need to manufacture M-13UK shells, complicated by drilling in the engine case. The M-13-CH installation was simpler, less laborious and cheaper to manufacture. A number of labor-intensive machine work has disappeared: gouging long guides, drilling a large number of rivet holes, riveting linings to guides, turning, calibrating, manufacturing and threading spars and nuts for them, complex machining of locks and lock boxes, etc. Prototypes were manufactured at the Moscow plant "Kompressor" (No. 733) and were subjected to ground and sea trials, which ended with good results. After the end of the war, the M-13-SN installation in 1945 passed military tests with good results. Due to the fact that the modernization of the M-13 type shells was coming, the installation was not put into service. After the 1946 series, on the basis of the order of the NKOM No. 27 dated 10/24/1946, the installation was discontinued. However, in 1950 a Brief Guide to the BM-13-SN Combat Vehicle was issued.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, one of the directions for the development of rocket artillery was the use of throwing installations developed during the war for mounting on modified types of domestic-made chassis. Several options were created based on the installation of the M-13N on the modified truck chassis ZIS-151 (see photo), ZIL-151 (see photo), ZIL-157 (see photo), ZIL-131 (see photo) .

Installations of the M-13 type were exported to different countries after the war. One of them was China (see photo from the military parade on the occasion of the National Day of 1956, held in Beijing (Beijing) .

In 1959, when working on a projectile for the future M-21 Field Rocket System, the developers were interested in the issue of technical documentation for the production of the ROFS M-13. This is what was written in a letter to the Deputy Director for Research at NII-147 (now the Federal State Unitary Enterprise GNPP Splav (Tula), signed by the chief engineer of Plant No. 63 of the SSNH Toporov (State Plant No. 63 of the Sverdlovsk Economic Council, 22.VII.1959 No. 1959c): “In response to your request for No. 3265 dated 3 / UII-59. about sending technical documentation for the production of ROFS M-13, I inform you that at present the plant does not produce this product, but the classification has been removed from the technical documentation.

The plant has outdated tracing papers of the technological process of machining the product. The plant has no other documentation.

Due to the workload of the photocopier, the album of technical processes will be blue-printed and sent to you no earlier than in a month.

Compound:

Main cast:

• Installations M-13 (combat vehicles M-13, BM-13) (see. gallery images M-13).
• Main rockets M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1.

• Ammunition transport vehicles (transport vehicles).

The M-13 projectile (see diagram) consisted of two main parts: the warhead and the reactive part (jet powder engine). The warhead consisted of a body with a fuse point, the bottom of the warhead and an explosive charge with an additional detonator. The jet powder engine of the projectile consisted of a chamber, a cover-nozzle that closes to seal the powder charge with two cardboard plates, a grate, a powder charge, an igniter and a stabilizer. On the outer part of both ends of the chamber there were two centering thickenings with guide pins screwed into them. The guide pins held the projectile on the guide of the combat vehicle until the shot and directed its movement along the guide. A powder charge of nitroglycerin gunpowder was placed in the chamber, consisting of seven identical cylindrical single-channel checkers. In the nozzle part of the chamber, the checkers rested on the grate. To ignite the powder charge, an igniter made of smoky gunpowder is inserted into the upper part of the chamber. Gunpowder was placed in a special case. Stabilization of the M-13 projectile in flight was carried out using the tail unit.

The flight range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but at the same time there was a very significant dispersion. In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, which received the designation M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of fire of the M-13-UK projectile, 12 tangentially located holes are made in the front centering thickening of the rocket part (see photo 1, photo 2), through which, during the operation of the rocket engine, part of the powder gases escape, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the range of the projectile was somewhat reduced (up to 7.9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and to an increase in the density of fire by 3 times compared to the M-13 projectiles. In addition, the diameter of the critical section of the nozzle of the M-13-UK projectile is somewhat smaller than that of the M-13 projectile. The M-13-UK projectile was adopted by the Red Army in April 1944. The M-13UK-1 projectile with improved accuracy was equipped with flat stabilizers made of steel sheet.

Tactical and technical characteristics:

Characteristic	M-13	BM-13N	BM-13NM	BM-13NMM
Chassis	ZIS-6	ZIS-151,ZIL-151	ZIL-157	ZIL-131
Number of guides	8	8	8	8
Elevation angle, hail: - minimal - maximum	+7 +45	8±1 +45	8±1 +45	8±1 +45
Angle of horizontal fire, degrees: - to the right of the chassis - to the left of the chassis	10 10	10 10	10 10	10 10
Handle force, kg: - lifting mechanism - swivel mechanism	8-10 8-10	up to 13 up to 8	up to 13 up to 8	up to 13 up to 8
Dimensions in the stowed position, mm: - length - width - height	6700 2300 2800	7200 2300 2900	7200 2330 3000	7200 2500 3200
Weight, kg: - guide package - artillery unit - installations in combat position - installation in the stowed position (without calculation)	815 2200 6200 —	815 2350 7890 7210	815 2350 7770 7090	815 2350 9030 8350
	2-3
	5-10
Full salvo time, s	7-10

The main performance data of the combat vehicle BM-13 (at Studebaker) 1946
Number of guides	16
Applied projectile	M-13, M-13-UK and 8 M-20 rounds
Guide length, m	5
Guide type	rectilinear
Minimum elevation angle, °	+7
Maximum elevation angle, °	+45
Angle of horizontal guidance, °	20
	8
Also, on the rotary mechanism, kg	10
Overall dimensions, kg:
length	6780
height	2880
width	2270
Weight of a set of guides, kg	790
Weight of artillery piece without shells and without chassis, kg	2250
The weight of the combat vehicle without shells, without calculation, with a full refueling of gasoline, snow chains, tools and spare parts. wheel, kg	5940
Weight of a set of shells, kg
M13 and M13-UK	680 (16 rounds)
M20	480 (8 rounds)
The weight of the combat vehicle with the calculation of 5 people. (2 in the cockpit, 2 on the rear fenders and 1 on the gas tank) with a full gas station, tools, snow chains, a spare wheel and M-13 shells, kg	6770
Axle loads from the weight of the combat vehicle with the calculation of 5 people, full refueling with spare parts and accessories and M-13 shells, kg:
to the front	1890
to the back	4880

Basic data of combat vehicles BM-13
Characteristic	BM-13N on a modified truck chassis ZIL-151	BM-13 on a modified truck chassis ZIL-151	BM-13N on a modified truck chassis of the Studebaker series	BM-13 on a modified truck chassis of the Studebaker series
Number of guides*	16	16	16	16
Guide length, m	5	5	5	5
The greatest elevation angle, hail	45	45	45	45
The smallest elevation angle, hail	8±1°	4±30 ‘	7	7
Angle of horizontal aiming, hail	±10	±10	±10	±10
Effort on the handle of the lifting mechanism, kg	up to 12	up to 13	to 10	8-10
Force on the handle of the rotary mechanism, kg	up to 8	up to 8	8-10	8-10
Guide package weight, kg	815	815	815	815
Artillery unit weight, kg	2350	2350	2200	2200
The weight of the combat vehicle in the stowed position (without people), kg	7210	7210	5520	5520
The weight of the combat vehicle in combat position with shells, kg	7890	7890	6200	6200
Length in the stowed position, m	7,2	7,2	6,7	6,7
Width in the stowed position, m	2,3	2,3	2,3	2,3
Height in the stowed position, m	2,9	3,0	2,8	2,8
Transfer time from traveling to combat position, min	2-3	2-3	2-3	2-3
Time required to load a combat vehicle, min	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10
Time required to produce a volley, sec	7-10	7-10	7-10	7-10
Combat vehicle index	52-U-9416	8U34	52-U-9411	52-TR-492B

NURS M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1
Ballistic index	TS-13
head type	high-explosive fragmentation
Fuse type	GVMZ-1
Caliber, mm	132
Full projectile length, mm	1465
Span of stabilizer blades, mm	300
Weight, kg: - finally equipped projectile - equipped warhead - bursting charge of the warhead - powder rocket charge - equipped jet engine	42.36 21.3 4.9 7.05-7.13 20.1
Projectile weight coefficient, kg/dm3	18.48
Head part filling ratio, %	23
The strength of the current required to ignite the squib, A	2.5-3
	0.7
Average reactive force, kgf	2000
Projectile exit speed from the guide, m/s	70
	125
Maximum projectile speed, m/s	355
Tabular maximum range of the projectile, m	8195
Deviation at maximum range, m: - by range - lateral	135 300
Powder charge burning time, s	0.7
Average reactive force, kg	2000 (1900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Muzzle velocity of the projectile, m/s	70
The length of the active section of the trajectory, m	125 (120 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Maximum projectile speed, m/s	335 (for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
The greatest range of the projectile, m	8470 (7900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)

According to the English catalog Jane's Armor and Artillery 1995-1996, section Egypt, in the mid-90s of the XX century due to the impossibility of obtaining, in particular, shells for combat vehicles of the M-13 type, the Arab Organization for Industrialization (Arab Organization for Industrialization) engaged in the production of 132 mm caliber rockets. An analysis of the data presented below allows us to conclude that we are talking about a projectile of the M-13UK type.

The Arab Organization for Industrialization included Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, with most of the production facilities located in Egypt and with the main funding from the Gulf countries. Following the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in mid-1979, the other three members of the Persian Gulf withdrew their funds intended for the Arab Organization for Industrialization from circulation, and at that time (data from Jane's Armor and Artillery catalog 1982-1983) Egypt received other assistance in projects.

Characteristics of the 132 mm Sakr rocket (RS type M-13UK)
Caliber, mm	132
Length, mm
full shell	1500
head part	483
rocket engine	1000
Weight, kg:
starting	42
head part	21
fuse	0,5
rocket engine	21
fuel (charge)	7
Maximum plumage span, mm	305
head type	high-explosive fragmentation (with 4.8 kg of explosive)
Fuse type	inertial cocked, contact
Type of fuel (charge)	dibasic
Maximum range (at elevation angle 45º), m	8000
Maximum projectile speed, m/s	340
Fuel (charge) burning time, s	0,5
Projectile speed when meeting with an obstacle, m/s	235-320
Minimum fuse cocking speed, m/s	300
Distance from the combat vehicle for cocking the fuse, m	100-200
Number of oblique holes in the rocket engine housing, pcs	12

Testing and operation

The first battery of field rocket artillery, sent to the front on the night of July 1-2, 1941 under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov, was armed with seven installations made in the workshops of Research Institute No. The battery wiped out the Orsha railway junction from the face of the earth, along with the German echelons with troops and military equipment on it.

The exceptional effectiveness of the actions of the battery of Captain I. A. Flerov and the seven more such batteries formed after it contributed to the rapid increase in the pace of production of jet weapons. Already in the autumn of 1941, 45 divisions of three-battery composition with four launchers in the battery operated on the fronts. For their armament in 1941, 593 M-13 installations were manufactured. As military equipment arrived from industry, the formation of rocket artillery regiments began, consisting of three divisions armed with M-13 launchers and an anti-aircraft division. The regiment had 1414 personnel, 36 M-13 launchers and 12 anti-aircraft 37-mm guns. The volley of the regiment was 576 shells of 132mm caliber. At the same time, the manpower and military equipment of the enemy were destroyed on an area of ​​over 100 hectares. Officially, the regiments were called Guards Mortar Artillery Regiments of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. Unofficially, rocket artillery installations were called "Katyusha". According to the memoirs of Evgeny Mikhailovich Martynov (Tula), former child during the war years, in Tula at first they were called infernal machines. From ourselves, we note that multi-charged machines were also called infernal machines in the 19th century.

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