Missile attack warning system. The history of the missile attack warning system. Part I
January 23, 1995, the city of Solnechnogorsk, the command post of the early warning system. The "ROCKET ATTACK" sign lit up on the system's monitoring console. The system recorded the launch of a Trident-class missile. An analysis of the trajectory showed that the missile, when activated at a height, can disable early warning early warning systems or can be aimed at the northern cities of the country. Ground based early warning systems confirmed the launch. All strategic forces were put on full alert. The bombers roll out onto the runway, the missiles are pointed and ready to launch. A nuclear briefcase is open on the table in front of the President of the country.
The Supreme Commander immediately contacted the Defense Minister. But the Minister of Defense, as a good military specialist, immediately determined that this could not be the beginning of the 3rd World War. If they decided to attack Us, they would start not with one rocket, but immediately with a hundred. Nothing can be done with one rocket.
Later it turned out that the system reacted to the launch of the Norwegian meteorological satellite, information about which was lost in the offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was the first case of using the Kazbek system, known as the nuclear suitcase.
The early warning system has been in use for about 30 years and has not had any failures. Many note that in 1985 the system also gave a signal of an attack, but then it itself admitted that the targets were false, so this cannot be considered a failure. The system is very complex and is still on combat duty.
History of creation
In 1961, the Americans tested a new Minuteman-1 intercontinental ballistic missile, which opened a new nuclear-missile stage of the Cold War. This missile had multiple warheads and camouflage systems.For a long time, the USSR created a missile defense system, which, as it turned out, was absolutely useless against new missiles. It was necessary to develop a new system to counter the impending threat. The Minister of Defense ordered that all prominent scientists be brought to one place where they could develop a new concept of protection against a nuclear strike.
After 4 weeks the document was ready. Initially, two options for the development of systems to counter the threat were considered:
1. Retaliatory tactics. The attack on the enemy was carried out after the hit of his missiles. This approach required a constant increase in the number of launchers and their strengthening. But this was a dead end development, as with each generation of missiles their accuracy increased, which required the construction of deeper and more secure bunkers and launch sites. Therefore, the choice was made on a different approach.
2. Reciprocal blow. This approach meant that the exit of missiles from the mines should be made during the flight of enemy missiles. Therefore, the country needed a missile launch detection system.
According to military experts, such a system should consist of several components:
1. Space. The task of which is to detect the launch of missiles and determine the country of the aggressor.
2. Ground. Formed along the perimeter of the country by ground-based radar stations. With their help, the threat of attack is finally confirmed.
space component.
Oko system
Chief developer of the Central Research Institute "Kometa".The system consists of 12 satellites in highly elliptical orbits.
At the same time, 2 satellites should observe the territory of a potential enemy.
The satellites have on board video and an infrared complex for detecting missile torches. The approval of the construction of such a system was due to chance. A satellite with an infrared detection complex was launched into low orbit. A rocket was to be launched from the cosmodrome, the launch of which was to be determined by the satellite. But the launch was postponed and the satellite designer was not informed about this. Having received data from orbit, the designer concluded that there had been a launch, which he reported to the management. He was laughed at. But the designer was confident in the equipment and went to the spaceport. He was confirmed that the rocket did not launch, but he also found out that a jet aircraft was warming up the engines at that moment on the runway near the cosmodrome. Having performed the necessary calculations, it was concluded that in a highly elliptical orbit, the height of which is 36,000 km. the satellite will perform its tasks, which was the start of the deployment of the Oko system.
In 1979, 4 satellites were launched into orbit. By 1982, 2 more and the system was put on alert.
Oko-1 system
The logical continuation of the Eye system. Chief developer of the Central Research Institute "Kometa".The satellites of this system were to be located in geostationary orbits. The deployment of the system began in 1991. From 1991 to 2008, 7 satellites were launched. In 1996, the system was put into service and put on combat duty.
CEN system
Unified space system. Testing began in 2009. How many satellites were launched into orbit is not known for certain. The system implies the integration into a single complex of the Oko, Oko-1 systems and new satellites.Current state of affairs
There are 3 satellites of the Oko system, 7 satellites of the Oko-1 system and approximately 2 satellites of the EKS system in orbit in working order.Ground component
About the complex "Daryal" has already been written. I'll tell you a little about other stations.Radar type "Volga"
The Volga radar is designed to detect ballistic missiles and space objects in flight at a distance of up to 5000 km, as well as to track, identify and measure the coordinates of targets, followed by the issuance of information on the state of the airspace to the Central Command and Computing Center of the early warning system.
Its construction began in 1981 in Belarus, when 180 American Pershing-2 missiles were based in Germany and Italy. After their withdrawal from Europe, the construction of the station was mothballed, as the construction of the Darial-type station in Latvia was coming to an end. But after it was blown up in 1995, it was decided to complete the construction of the Volga-type station in Belarus.
On December 15, 1999, factory tests of the Volga radar began, in 2002 it was accepted into the combat structure of the Space Forces, and in 2003 it was put on combat duty in the missile attack warning system.
Don-2n
One of the most complex, most highly protected facilities. The Don-2N multifunctional all-round radar is designed to detect ballistic targets at an altitude of up to 40,000 km, track them, determine coordinates and aim anti-missiles. The only working and efficient system PRO.
The Don-2N radar confirmed its high combat capabilities during the joint Russian-American Oderax experiment to track small space objects, when from the Shuttle spacecraft in 1994 in outer space metal balls with a diameter of 5.10 and 15 centimeters were thrown out. The US radars were able to track only 10 and 15 cm balls, and the five-centimeter one was only able to track the Don 2N radar at a range of 1500-2000 km. After detecting targets, the station accompanies them, automatically tunes out interference and selects false targets.
Radar type "Voronezh"
suprahorizontal radar station long-range detection of high factory readiness. Developed by the Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Communications. There is a station designed for the meter wavelength - "Voronezh-M", and for the decimeter - "Voronezh-DM". A feature of the facility is a significantly shorter deployment time at a new location and the possibility of relocating the station if necessary.
In 2006 deployed to Leningrad region, in 2009 took up combat duty.
In 2009 deployed in the Krasnodar Territory.
In the future, complexes should be deployed to replace the radar located outside the territory of Russia.
Perimeter system
Known in America as "The Dead Hand". Weapon doomsday in Soviet.Only scattered facts are known about this system. Many believe that the existence of such a system is impossible, while others, on the contrary, argue that the system is still functioning and is on alert.
At its core, the Perimeter system is an alternative command system for all branches of the armed forces armed with nuclear warheads. It was created as a backup communication system, in case the key nodes of the Kazbek command system and the communication lines of the Strategic Missile Forces were destroyed. The whole system works without human intervention.How the system works:
The command posts of the system (CPS) monitor the readings of sensors that monitor a number of parameters, whether nuclear strike around the country. If so, the system was attempting to contact key command posts. If the connection could not be established, the system decides on the beginning of the "judgment day". Signal rockets are launched from several mines, which, flying over the country, transmit commands to launch ALL available nuclear charges: mine-based missiles, sea-based missiles, mobile-based missiles.
In addition to the main algorithm of the system, there is a countdown algorithm. When the system is put into this mode, the countdown starts. If by the end of the countdown there is no confirmation of resetting the regime, the "doomsday" begins.
The system is completely autonomous, that is, all stages of work are automated, even the stages of rocket launch.
System Facts:
1. Signal flares and automatic launch systems have been tested and passed successfully. In addition, the first experimental launch of the Satan rocket was carried out by this particular system.
2. It is reliably known about the existence of at least 4 autonomous KPS points disguised as conventional air defense system bunkers.
3. The system was put on alert in 1985.
Under the START-1 treaty, Russia was supposed to remove the system from combat duty. Although the contract has already expired, the state of the system is not known for certain. According to some reports, she was again put on combat duty in 2001.
Brief history of creation domestic system missile attack warnings
November 1976 in the history of the development of the missile attack warning system (SPRN) was marked by an event that experts know about, and even then not all of them. It was in this month, on the eve of the celebration of the Great October Revolution, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU A.P. Kirilenko, Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F. Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR V.G. Kulikov received the so-called "nuclear briefcases". In fact, these were wearable elements of the Crocus warning complex, which were duplicates of larger information elements located in the offices of the country's top leadership and some departments, as well as at the control points of the Supreme High Command and the commands of all branches of the country's Armed Forces.
The article, based on information from open sources, briefly outlines the history of the creation of a missile attack warning system, which, based on the processing of a huge amount of information from various means detection and allocation of the necessary data should issue a reliable signal "Missile attack" to the military-political leadership of the country.
Background and reasons for the creation of early warning systems
After the end of World War II (1939-1945) rapid development science and technology led to the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and spacecraft with their subsequent adoption. FROM military point In terms of vision, they had great capabilities to strike at enemy territory and conduct various types of reconnaissance from space. With all the acuteness, the question arose of providing them with effective counteraction. In the first 15-20 post-war years The explosive development of aviation and rocket and space technology has led to serious discussion by the military leadership of countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain of numerous projects of manned and automatic space attack weapons, aerospace and hypersonic bombers. However, over time, the understanding came that the implementation of such projects is associated whole complex problems.
First of these, the most understandable was the problem of combating ICBM warheads (by analogy with aircraft). However, for the timely interception of a missile (warhead) in the air (before the task was completed and the designated object was hit), it was necessary to detect it at a distance that ensured the timely setting of tasks for fire weapons. And this, in turn, required the availability of early warning means. To solve this problem in 1961, the general designer V.N. Chelomey proposed to create a satellite system for early detection. At that time, OKB-52, headed by him, was working on two space projects for military purposes - an IS anti-satellite system ("satellite fighter") and a controlled reconnaissance satellite (CS). The inability to deploy ground-based (ship and air) reconnaissance assets near US borders contributed to support for the proposal to deploy a space-based system. On December 30, 1961, a decree was issued on the creation of a space system early warning about the mass launch of ICBMs. OKB-52 was appointed the lead contractor for this project, and A.A. Design Bureau - 1 was appointed the contractor for the control complex. Raspletina.
Second, An even more difficult problem was the task of timely detection and possible destruction of military spacecraft, the first of which were reconnaissance satellites. However, to destroy the target satellite, it was necessary to detect it and determine the coordinates, put the interceptor satellite into orbit, bring it to the target at the required distance and undermine it warhead. The command-measuring complexes of the Main Directorate of Space Facilities (GUKOS) could not provide such accuracy of action against satellite targets. This problem was supposed to be solved by the OS system (satellite finder).
Third the problem was the need for the earliest possible detection of the fact of the launch of enemy missiles and which is fundamentally different from the problem of early detection of warheads within the framework of the anti-missile defense (ABM) system. Therefore, to solve these problems, early warning radar stations (RLS) are used in the missile attack warning system, combined into RO units, and in the missile defense system - early warning radars. Subsequently, units with over-the-horizon long-range (line-of-sight) radars, which provide target detection after it appears above the radio horizon, became the basis of the early warning system. In the United States, such radars are located at 3 posts deployed in the first half of the 1960s. in Alaska, Greenland and the UK as part of the BEAMUSE medium trajectory detection system. Due to geographical reasons in the USSR, it was decided to supplement the space-based system with several over-the-horizon radar stations (OZH radars), using the effect of reflection of a radio beam from the ionosphere and enveloping the earth's surface. This idea was formulated for the first time in the world in 1947 by N.I. Kabanov, and a pilot plant was built in Mytishchi to confirm it. The practical implementation of over-the-horizon location in the USSR is associated with the name of E.S. Shtyren who did not know about the discovery of Kabanov and at the end of 1950. made a proposal for the detection of aircraft at ranges of 1000-3000 km, in January 1961 submitted a report on the research "Duga". It recorded the results of calculations and experimental studies on the reflective surfaces of aircraft, missiles and the high-altitude wake of the latter, and also proposed a method for isolating a weak signal from a target against the background of powerful reflections from the earth's surface. The work was positively evaluated and with recommendations to confirm the theoretical results by practical experiments.
Fourth the problem, also very complex, was the rapid growth in the number of objects in outer space. Satellite detection systems (OS), early detection systems (EO) and EO radars should work for "their" specific targets and not be fixed on others, which could be ensured only if there was a constant accounting of all space objects. There was a need to create a special space control service (KKP), which was supposed to create and maintain a catalog of space objects, which gave knowledge about potentially dangerous spacecraft and the emergence of new ones. Awareness of these and other problems of missile and space defense by the top leadership of the country led to the issuance of two Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of November 15, 1962: "On the creation of a detection and target designation system for the IP system, missile attack warning systems and an experimental complex for ultra-long-range detection of launches br, nuclear explosions and Aircraft Beyond the Horizon" and "On the Creation of the Domestic Service of the KKP".
Space echelon early warning system
The main initiator of the creation of an early detection system for enemy ICBMs using satellites in 1961 was General Designer V.N. Chelomey. At the end of 1962, an advance project was completed, according to which such a system included 20 satellites evenly spaced in one polar orbit at a height of 3600 km for round-the-clock surveillance of the United States. As conceived by the developers, satellites weighing 1400 kg with infrared sensors were supposed to detect launched rockets by the torch of the first stage engines. In addition to reconnaissance satellites, the system included launch vehicles of the UR-200 type, a relay satellite and a combat launch complex.
However, according to the calculations of some experts, instead of 20, 28 or more spacecraft (SC) were required for permanent observation. In addition, the time of operation of these spacecraft in orbit in that historical period did not exceed one month. Did not stand up to criticism and available as of the early 1960s. thermal direction-finding equipment, which does not provide a sufficient level of useful signal against the background of noise from the underlying surface and propagation medium, as well as insufficient knowledge of many issues (atmospheric characteristics, parameters of torches of Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, etc.). Similar studies were started only in 1963 at the Baikonur, Kura, and Balkhash test sites. The severity of the problem was such that during the preliminary design, the developers abandoned IR detection in favor of television facilities. After the removal in 1964, V.N. Chelomey from project management, KB-1 became the lead one, A.I. was appointed chief designer. Savin, and instead of the UR-200, the carrier was identified as Cyclone-2, developed by the Yangel Design Bureau.
In 1965, the US-K low-orbit system project with eighteen satellites in orbit was completed and initially approved by the Ministry of Defense. However, KB-1 specialists were increasingly inclined in favor of highly elliptical orbits. In this case, the satellite at apogee seems to hang for several hours over one region of the earth's surface, which makes it possible to reduce the number of spacecraft by several times.
The expediency of this was also confirmed by the experience of American specialists. Having spent time and money on the MIDAS low-orbit satellite system, the United States abandoned it and since 1971 began work on the deployment of the IMEUS system (IMEWS), which by 1975 had 3 satellites in geostationary orbit. It was believed that they would be enough to monitor launches from the territory of the USSR and control the ocean zone around the North American continent. Ultimately, based on US own calculations and experience, it was concluded that it was worthwhile placing satellites in geostationary orbit, despite the possible difficulties in using reconnaissance sensors from an altitude of about 40,000 km. In 1968, the design bureau of the Lavochkin plant, in cooperation with the Central Research Institute "Kometa", began developing a project for a high-orbit space monitoring system for rocket launches.
According to this project, the US-K high-orbit system was to include a spacecraft with a control and information receiving station (SUPI) and 4 spacecraft in elongated elliptical orbits with an apogee altitude of about 40,000 km and an inclination of 63 degrees. to the equator. With an orbital period of 12 hours, each satellite could observe for 6 hours, followed by charging batteries from solar batteries for 6 hours. For the rapid transmission of information to ground stations, a high-speed radio link was provided for the first time.
The first device for testing technology new system("Kosmos-520") was launched into orbit in September 1972. He and those following him were equipped with infrared and television detection devices. The third device in this series ("Cosmos-665") with television equipment on 12/24/1972 recorded the launch of the Minuteman BMR at night. Nevertheless, this did not become the basis for the final choice of the type of surveillance equipment. Over time, the tasks were repeatedly revised, and the ideology of the system evolved.
Initially, it was supposed to use an infrared telescope against the background of the earth's surface to detect launching rockets. However, due to the presence of significant interference, it was decided to place the satellites in orbit so that they were observing against the background of outer space. However, when the Sun hit the lens, it led to illumination of the field of view and failure of the equipment for some time. To neutralize the possible consequences in 1972, it was decided to place an additional satellite in geostationary orbit. However, the limited capabilities of solar batteries at that time ensured its performance for 6 hours, and the rest of the time the batteries were recharged.
As a result, it became necessary to double the set of satellites in elliptical orbits, and in the final form the system was to include 9 vehicles. As part of the work on this system, in 1976 Cosmos-862 was launched into orbit from the first in the USSR on-board computer on integrated circuits. In 1978, the space echelon of the early warning system consisted of 5 vehicles in highly elliptical orbits, but the development of the equipment for the control and reception station, as well as the equipment for processing it, was not completed. Due to possible delays and real threat existence of the program, it was decided to accept in January 1979 the US-K system with spacecraft equipped with heat direction finding sensors for trial joint operation by the forces of the Ministry of Defense and manufacturers with parallel testing of the system and bringing it to the staffing size of the spacecraft by the end of 1981.
The resource of the satellites of the first series did not exceed 3 months, in the subsequent - 3 years. It required significant costs to maintain the constellation of the required composition (the American apparatuses "Imeus-2" operated in orbit for 5-7 years). Therefore, for the entire period of development and operation of the US-K system and its further version US-KS, about 80 satellites have been in orbit. By the time the SPRN spacecraft constellation was brought to full strength, the cost of its creation and operation had increased three times compared to the planned one. Nevertheless, the system was gradually brought to the required level and on 04/05/1979 it became part of the missile attack warning army. In July of the same year, she recorded the launch of the carrier from the Kwajalein Atoll already in automatic operation. In 1980, 6 satellites were launched into elliptical orbits, and the system itself was associated with early warning systems. By 1982, the false alarm rate was obtained, which exceeded the normative indicators of the terms of reference, and on December 30 of this year, the space system with 6 satellites took up combat duty.
Space Control Center(CKKP) was an important element of the early warning system and, according to the project, had to perform two main tasks - to interact informationally with the means of the anti-satellite defense system and maintain the Main Catalog of space objects. Its commissioning was planned by gradually increasing the capacity, number and types of detection nodes involved and improving the algorithms for processing large flows of information about the space situation. The construction of its main elements near the town of Noginsk began in 1966, and already at the beginning of 1968, the Central Control Commission began to receive information from two Dniester cells of the OS-2 satellite detection system node in Gulshad. Since January 1967, the TsKKP became a separate military unit (03/05/1970 was transferred to the command of the missile defense and anti-aircraft defense forces).
Since the beginning of 1969, the functions of control of outer space, which had previously been assigned to the 45th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, were officially transferred to the Central Control Commission. In the same year, state tests of the first stage of the Central Control Commission took place as part of a computing complex based on one computer, a data transmission line and one operator's workplace. Taking into account radar posts and points optical surveillance(PON), who worked as part of the Central Control Commission, its capabilities at this stage made it possible to process about 4000 radar and about 200 optical measurements daily and maintain a catalog of 500 space objects.
In 1973, the second stage of development of the TsKKP began, during which it was supposed to put into operation a computer complex with a capacity of about 2 million operations per second, as well as its integration with the Dnestr-M PRN radar and the Danube-3 missile defense radar. At this stage, on February 15, 1975, the Central Control Commission took up combat duty. In terms of its capabilities, the Center was already able to process up to 30 thousand measurements per day, with a capacity of the main catalog of up to 1800 objects. Along with the main task, the CKKP provided the solution of other tasks. In particular, it was used to support the flights of domestic spacecraft in the conditions of a rapid increase in "space debris" in near-Earth orbits, of which at that time there were already more than 3000 fragments with dimensions of 10 cm or more.
Subsequently, the TsKKP was re-equipped with the new Elbrus computer, which significantly expanded the range of tasks it solved. In addition to the indicated sources of information, he became able to receive and process information from the Window electro-optical complex and the Krona radio-optical complex. Its capabilities and structure changed, which was due to a change in the structure of the outer space control system, as well as the involvement of the Center to perform tasks of general civilian purpose.
Ground echelon early warning system
The first developments of satellite detection systems (OS) and missile attack warning (RO) as constituent parts rocket and space defense (RKO) in the Soviet Union began in the 50s. after the advent of satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the same period, the Radio Engineering Institute (RTI) of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the leadership of A.L. Mints began the development of the first domestic radar "Dnestr" (estimated detection range up to 3250 km), which was intended to detect attacking ICBMs and space objects. After completion of field tests prototype this radar in July 1962, it was decided (11/15/1962) to create 4 similar radars on the Kola Peninsula (Olenegorsk), in Latvia (Skrunda), near Irkutsk (Mishelevka) and in Kazakhstan (Balkhash). The location of the radar in this way made it possible to control potentially dangerous directions and track ICBM launches from the Atlantic, from the Norwegian and North Seas and the territory North America in the northwest direction, as well as from the west coast of the United States and from the Indian and Pacific Oceans in the southeast direction. Under construction since the late 1960s. along the perimeter of the state border of the USSR, the first early warning stations "Dnestr" and "Dnepr" were to create a continuous radar barrier with a length of more than 5000 km.
At the same time, a command post was created in the Moscow region, connected by communication lines with the Baikonur cosmodrome, where at that time an anti-space defense complex was being built, an important element of which was a maneuvering spacecraft developed by OKB-52 and launched into orbit from Baikonur on November 1, 1963. After the transfer of work on this topic to the Design Bureau of the Lavochkin Plant, their first apparatus under the official name "Cosmos-185" was launched on 10/27/1967 by the "Cyclone-2A" rocket designed by Yangel. As early as November 1, 1968, the Cosmos-252 satellite approached the Cosmos-248 satellite to the estimated distance and carried out the first successful space interception. In August 1970, an interception of a space target was obtained during the operation of the full complement of the standard means of the IS complex, and in December 1972 its state tests were completed. In February 1972, a government decree assigned the development of the IS-M complex with an expanded interception zone (for the IS system, this zone was orbits with an altitude of 120 to 1000 km). In November 1978, it was put into service, and the Central Research Institute "Kometa" began to develop IS-MU to intercept maneuvering targets.
To control the interceptor satellite, a command and measurement complex (KIP, KB-1) was developed, which consisted of a radio engineering complex (RTC) and the main command and computer center (GKVTs). There were two opinions regarding the construction of the RTC, which was due to the difficulty of determining the trajectory of the spacecraft, which circled the Earth in 55 minutes in the radio silence mode in low orbit. At the same time, the satellite was in the visibility zone of any ground-based radar for only 10 minutes, which was not enough to obtain data of the required accuracy, and there might not have been time for spacecraft notches on subsequent orbits.
According to one of the opinions, it was possible to accurately determine the parameters of the trajectory of the spacecraft target on the first orbit by obtaining information from a large number OS nodes on the territory of the USSR. However, this involved a very large amount of construction and installation work and related costs. Therefore, the method was used when five antennas were located crosswise at one point (one in the center and four on the sides at a distance of 1 km from the central one). The resulting Doppler interferometer ensured the achievement of the required accuracy at a much lower cost.
In the course of work on the creation of early warning systems, it was found that the same radar facilities can provide the determination of satellite trajectories and over-the-horizon detection of enemy ICBMs. As a result, it was decided to return to the version of the TsSO-P meter-range radar, previously proposed by A.L. Mints. At the same time (December 1961), autonomous tests of this radar were carried out at Balkhash, which confirmed the possibility of its use as a base station for building an OS system.
The basis for the start of work on the creation of a long-range warning radar (DO) in 1954 was a special decision of the Government of the USSR on the development of proposals for the creation of an anti-missile defense (ABM) in Moscow. Its most important elements were considered to be DO radars, which, at a distance of several thousand kilometers, were supposed to detect enemy missiles, warheads and high precision determine their coordinates. In 1956, the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On missile defense" A.L. Mints was appointed one of the chief designers of the DO radar and in the same year, studies began in Kazakhstan on the reflective parameters of the BR warheads launched from the Kapustin Yar test site.
The OS system was based on two nodes separated by 2000 km, creating a radar field through which the bulk of satellites flying over the territory of the USSR should pass. The leading node OS-1 in the Irkutsk region solved the tasks of detecting and determining the coordinates of satellites with subsequent transmission of information to the command and measurement point (CIP, Noginsk region), designed to recognize objects, determine the degree of their danger and solve the problem of interception.
The probability of detecting a satellite already on the first orbit met the specified requirements, however, the accuracy of determining the characteristics of its trajectory, taking into account the possible range of the interceptor's homing head, did not exceed 0.5. To increase it, a two-turn method was used, in which the "satellite fighter" started after the first passage of the target over OS-1, which specified the coordinates of the IS, and the OS-2 node (Gulshad) specified the coordinates of the target's orbit. These data were sent to the instrumentation, which processed them and transmitted them in the form of commands to the interceptor for additional maneuvering and entering the IS into the range of its GOS for the purpose of subsequent homing and destruction of the enemy spacecraft. In this case, the probability of hitting the target reached 0.9-0.95.
Thus, the OS-1 and OS-2 nodes should have stations of the TsSO-P polygon type. Taking into account known characteristics For this radar, each of the nodes of the OS system was supposed to consist of eight sector stations, the integrated coverage area of which was a fan of 160 degrees. In the course of further work, a new (intermediate) radar cell based on two radars appeared as part of the OS node "Dniester" , united by a common computer and equipment for display, control and technological support.
Construction at the OS-1 and OS-2 nodes began in the spring of 1964, and in the same year, tests of the Dnestr radar model, assembled on the basis of the TsSO-P range, were completed at Balkhash. The first tested radar cell with the Dnestr radar was cell No. 4 in Gulshad, and in 1968 3 more cells in Gulshad and 2 in Irkutsk were put into service. The first stage of the space control system (SKKP) consisting of 8 cells with the Dnestr radar and 2 command posts at the OS-1 and OS-2 nodes in Irkutsk and Gulshad, was put into service and put on combat duty in 1971. This made it possible to create a continuous radar barrier 4000 km long with a detection height of 200-1500 km in that zone of outer space where passed most of the potential enemy spacecraft.
But already in 1966, an improved version of this station "Dnestr-M" was developed. Compared with the prototype, its energy was increased by 5 times, the range resolution was improved by 16 times, which also increased to 6000 km, and the use of semiconductor equipment, in addition to the transmitter, significantly improved reliability and performance characteristics. Therefore, all the following cells of the OS system were equipped with radar "Dniester-M" , and those previously adopted were modernized to its level. At the same time, the detection altitude of satellites increased to 2500 km. In 1972, the fifth cells with the Dnestr-M radar were put into service at both nodes, and all the means (OS-1, OS-2, TsKKP) were combined into a single information system within a separate space reconnaissance division.
To be continued.
History of creation
The development and adoption of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the late 1950s led to the need to create means for detecting launches of such missiles in order to exclude the possibility of a surprise attack.
The construction of the first early warning radars was carried out in 1963-1969. These were two Dnestr-M radars located in Olenegorsk (Kola Peninsula) and Skrunda (Latvia). In August, the system was put into service. It was designed to detect ballistic missiles launched from US territory or from the Norwegian and North Seas. The main task of the system at this stage was to provide information about the missile attack to the missile defense system deployed around Moscow.
In 1967-1968, simultaneously with the construction of radar stations in Olenegorsk and Skrunda, the construction of four Dnepr-type radar stations (a modernized version of the Dnestr-M radar station) began. For construction, nodes were chosen in Balkhash-9 (Kazakhstan), Mishelevka (near Irkutsk), Sevastopol. Another one was built at the site in Skrunda, in addition to the Dnestr-M radar already operating there. These stations were supposed to provide a wider sector of the warning system, expanding it to the North Atlantic, the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.
At the beginning of 1971, on the basis of the command post for early detection in Solnechnogorsk, a command post for a missile attack warning system was created. On February 15, 1971, by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, a separate anti-missile surveillance division took up combat duty.
In the early 70s of the last century, new types of threats appeared - ballistic missiles with multiple and actively maneuvering warheads, as well as strategic cruise missiles that use passive (false targets, radar traps) and active (jamming) countermeasures. Their detection was also hampered by the introduction of radar visibility reduction systems (Stealth technology). To meet the new conditions in 1971-72, a project was developed for a new early warning radar of the Daryal type. In 1984, a station of this type was handed over to the state commission and put on combat duty in the city of Pechora, Komi Republic. A similar station was built in 1987 in Gabala, Azerbaijan.
Space echelon early warning system
In accordance with the project of the missile attack warning system, in addition to over-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars, it was supposed to include a space echelon. It made it possible to significantly expand its capabilities due to the ability to detect ballistic missiles almost immediately after launch.
The lead developer of the space echelon of the warning system was the Central Research Institute "Kometa", and the design bureau was responsible for the development of spacecraft. Lavochkin.
By 1979, a space system for early detection of ICBM launches from four spacecraft (SC) US-K (Oko system) was deployed in highly elliptical orbits. To receive, process information and control the system's spacecraft in Serpukhov-15 (70 km from Moscow), an early warning control center was built. After conducting flight design tests, the first generation US-K system was put into service in. It was intended to monitor the continental missile-prone areas of the United States. To reduce the illumination by the background radiation of the Earth, reflections of sunlight from clouds and glare, the satellites observed not vertically down, but at an angle. To do this, the apogees of the highly elliptical orbit were located over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. An additional advantage of this configuration was the ability to observe the US ICBM base areas on both daily turns, while maintaining direct radio communication with the command post near Moscow, or with the Far East. This configuration provided conditions for observation of approximately 6 hours per day for one satellite. To ensure round-the-clock surveillance, it was necessary to have at least four spacecraft in orbit at the same time. In reality, to ensure the reliability and reliability of observations, the constellation had to include nine satellites. This made it possible to have the necessary reserve in case of premature failure of the satellites. In addition, the observation was carried out simultaneously by two or three spacecraft, which reduced the probability of issuing a false signal from the illumination of the recording equipment by direct or reflected sunlight from clouds. This 9 - satellite configuration was first created in 1987 .
To ensure the solution of the problems of detecting BR launches and bringing commands combat control The Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) was supposed to create a Unified Space System (UNS) on the basis of the US-K and US-KMO systems.
At the beginning of 2012, the planned deployment of VZG radar stations of high factory readiness (VZG radar) "Voronezh" is being carried out in order to form a closed radar field for warning of a missile attack at a new technological level with significantly improved characteristics and capabilities. At the moment, new VZG radars have been deployed in Lekhtusi (one meter), Armavir (two decimeter), Svetlogorsk (decimeter). Ahead of schedule, the construction of a complex of dual meter-range VZG radars in the Irkutsk region is underway - the first segment of the southeast direction has been put on experimental combat duty, the complex with the second antenna sheet for viewing the east direction is planned to be put on OBD in 2013.
Work on the creation of a unified space system (UNS) is entering the finish line.
Russian early warning stations on the territory of Ukraine
Unlike Russian-leased and Russian-operated early warning radar stations located in Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, Ukrainian radar stations are not only owned by Ukraine, but also maintained by the Ukrainian military. On the basis of an interstate agreement, information from these radars, which monitor outer space over the Central and Southern Europe, as well as the Mediterranean, enters the central command post of the early warning system in Solnechnogorsk, subordinate to the Russian space forces. For this, Ukraine annually received $1.2 million.
In February, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry demanded that Russia increase the payment, but Moscow refused, recalling that the 1992 agreement was for 15 years. Then, in September 2005, Ukraine began the process of transferring the radar to the NSAU, meaning the renewal of the agreement in connection with a change in the status of the radar. Russia cannot prevent American specialists from accessing the radar. At the same time, Russia would have to rapidly deploy new Voronezh-DM radars on its territory, which it did by putting nodes on duty near Armavir in Krasnodar and Svetlogorsk in Kaliningrad.
In March, Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoly Gritsenko said that Ukraine would not lease two missile warning stations in Mukachevo and Sevastopol to the United States.
In June 2006, Director General of the National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU) Yuri Alekseev announced that Ukraine and Russia had agreed to increase in 2006 the service fee for the Russian side of the radar stations in Sevastopol and Mukachevo "one and a half times."
Currently, Russia has abandoned the use of stations in Sevastopol and Mukachevo. The leadership of Ukraine has decided to dismantle both stations within the next 3-4 years. The military units serving the stations have already been disbanded.
see also
- Over-the-horizon radar
Notes
Links
- History and current state of the Russian missile attack warning system
- The history of the creation of a missile attack warning system, arms-expo.ru
| Soviet and Russian radar stations | |
|---|---|
| Radar of the Radio Engineering Troops | "RUS-1" "RUS-2" "P-3" P-8 Volga "P-10 Volga-A" P-14 P-18 Terek P-20 P-30 P-35 Drainage P-37 P-40 P-70 Lena-M "Resonance-N(E)" "Ring" "Casta" "5N59.19ZH6.35D6 / 36D6""Casta-2E" "Gamma-C1E" "Gamma-DE" "Defense-14""5N87" "Desna-M" "Enemy-GE" |
| radio altimeters | "PRV-9" "PRV-10" "PRV-11" "PRV-13" « |
MISSILE WARNING SYSTEM (USA)
THE SYSTEM OF MISSILE ATTACK WARNING (USA)
31.03.2016
In the north of Norway, by 2020, a new American radar station will be put into operation, designed to track ballistic missiles and space objects. This was reported by the Norwegian television and radio company NRK, citing a source in the intelligence services.
As the newspaper writes, construction work will begin no later than the summer of 2017 with an eye to commissioning the station within three years. This follows from the report of the head military intelligence Norway Lieutenant General Morten Haga Lunde.
The new station will operate at the Varde site in conjunction with the existing Globus II station (AN/FPS-129 Have Stare) launched in 2001.
official task radar complex in Varda is space debris tracking. However, Russian and Western experts unequivocally point out that this object, located close to the projection of the likely trajectories of missiles launched from the European regions of Russia (including bases Northern Fleet), is one of the key links in the American system of warning about a possible nuclear missile strike.
Lenta.ru
15.04.2016
The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) has published a computer image of the Globus radar in the city of Varde.
This is the first officially authorized image of radars aimed at Russia, NRK notes.
“The military released this illustration of the new radar station in Varda. What she will actually do, it is better to ask American sources, ”the caption under the picture says.
The Globus system is a joint project of the US Air Force Space Command and the Norwegian Intelligence Service. The deployment of the system should be completed by 2020 at a cost of NOK 1 billion (about 107.5 million euros), according to NRK.
The Norwegian side said that with the help of the new radar it will collect scientific information, observe space objects and monitor the observance of national interests. At the same time, in a press release, the Norwegian Armed Forces do not talk about why the project is beneficial to American partners.
NRK found documents from the American side that suggest a completely different version.
According to the papers, Globus is closely associated with the American radar station in Florida, and both stations are subordinate to the 1st Space Control Squadron in Colorado. The squadron, in turn, is subordinate to the 21st Space Wing, which is engaged in the prevention of nuclear attacks against the United States and space threats.
Thus, the main purpose of the radar should be reconnaissance.
RIA News
08.07.2016
Raytheon and the US Navy are working to install the first AMDR (Air and Missile Defense Radar) on the coast of Kauai in Hawaii, Military Parity reports.
According to the developers, the first low-power activation of the radar has been completed, there is permission to bring the radar to full power to track satellites in orbit, which will be carried out by the end of summer. The radar, designated SPY-6(V), is designed to replace the SPY-1D air defense/missile defense radars on destroyers of the class Arleigh Burke starting with the DDG-127, which are being built under the upgraded Flight III program at the General Dynamics Bath Iron Works shipyard.
It is noted that the radar has scalable equipment (scalable sensor) - large ships can get equipment with advanced capabilities, ships of smaller displacement can be equipped with fewer modules. By September 2017, the tests should be fully completed, after which a decision will be made to start production of the first batch.
"The Kauai station is not a prototype, but rather a full scale production version that could go into production today," the company says. The first operational radar for the destroyer DDG-127 is planned to be delivered in 2019.
Military Parity
FROM The state of the satellite component of the missile attack warning system (EWS) does not inspire optimism. However, a few days ago, a message flashed in the news: the early warning system is in order and the country is protected from attack from any direction. But what does the word "protected" mean if Russia does not have a global missile defense system? There is only an outdated missile defense system in Moscow, which will not be able to fend off a massive attack, although with a certain probability it will save the capital from one or two warheads (warheads). However, what mad nation would dare to strike with such forces? The United States today also does not have a reliable missile defense system, although technologically they are capable of shooting down warheads somewhere over Arctic Canada (figuratively speaking, this is more difficult than hitting a bullet with a bullet) .
There is only one defense against a nuclear attack on Russia: the threat of retaliation. A grim strategy of assured, mutual destruction, born in the era of the Great Confrontation. The state of our nuclear forces is described in the article. In the process of “getting up from their knees”, they suffered significantly, but, apparently, they are still capable of destroying the United States. The problem is, will we have time to respond if America decides to launch a disarming strike? During such an attack, it should be noted that millions of people will die from radioactive fallout, even if only nuclear infrastructure facilities are chosen as targets.
The missile, launched from the United States, will reach its target in Russia in 27-30 minutes. The ability to strike back before the silos are disabled and missile submarines are destroyed at piers or sunk by hunter submarines at sea depends critically on how quickly and reliably the fact of a nuclear attack on Russia can be established. It is highly desirable to detect missile launches in order to have the maximum margin of time. And this can only be done with the help of the early warning satellite constellation.
According to data from various sources, against 16 American early warning satellites, Russia today has only 2! The article below talks about three satellites, but one of them, apparently, has already stopped working.
http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1827540.html. It remains to rely only on ground-based early warning radars. Consequently, for most of the day, the early warning system does not see the territory of the United States and almost the entire water area of the World Ocean. This means that in the event of a nuclear attack, Russia would have less than 15 minutes to assess the situation and make a decision. This is too little!Question: How did we get to this point? What did the government do in the "fat 2000s", swimming in petrodollars? Preparing for the Olympics in Sochi? Now the Defense Ministry is cheerfully reporting on plans to restore the early warning satellite constellation. Let's hope they make it.
Dmitry Zotiev
The author of the following article is Fedor Chemerev, published on the website
http://gazeta.eot.su/article/kosmicheskiy-eshelon-sprn.The last spacecraft Russian system missile attack warning (SPRN) was launched on March 30, 2012. Shortly before this, the circumstances of its creation were discussed at the forum of the Novosti Kosmonavtiki magazine. The result of the discussion was the words of one of its participants:
“Regarding this car, I would ask you not to flatter yourself, and not to mock” . Bitter as it may seem, but these words can be fully applied to the entire space industry and, undoubtedly, to the space echelon of early warning systems. And this is extremely worrisome.By the mid-2000s, the first signs of another round of space militarization appeared. In February 2004, the report was approved Air force USA Air Force Transformation Flight Plan-2004". Later, the main provisions of the report were reflected in the development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, known as the "Unified Perspective 2010", which was further developed in the document "Unified Perspective 2020". It is stated that main principle construction of the American military - "all-encompassing dominance." The US Army must be ready to conduct large-scale military operations, including in space, with the most decisive goals.
An important place in the plans for the development of technical means related to military space is given to the space echelon of early warning systems of a new generation.
From the early 1970s to the present, the United States has been in service with the IMEWS (Integrated Missile Early Warning Satellite) system with spacecraft (SC) in geostationary orbits (GSO). The task of the system is, together with ground-based radars, to detect launches of Soviet and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at the launch site.
Currently over the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Oceans and the European zone host nine IMEWS satellites, whose field of view covers the entire band along the equator. All of them are equipped with infrared radiation receivers, with the help of which missile launches are detected. The last satellite of this constellation was launched in December 2007.
The more modern SBIRS ("Space-Based Infrared System") is designed to replace the IMEWS system. This is an integrated system, which includes four geostationary satellites (GEO), two vehicles in highly elliptical orbits (HEO) and ground points for collecting and processing data and constellation control. As part of this system, it is planned to have up to 24 low-orbit Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites. All SBIRS spacecraft are equipped with infrared radiation receivers.
STSS low orbit satellites are designed to detect strategic, tactical and operational-tactical missiles and support military formations and individual divisions. Their task is to escort a rocket detected by high-orbit satellites SBIRS or IMEWS. The objects of detection and further tracking may be warheads and other missile fragments after they have been separated. In the future, STSS satellites will be equipped with laser radars to measure the range and determine the target state vector.
As of March 2013, the combined SBIRS-STSS constellation is represented by seven satellites: GEO-1 (USA-230, 2011), GEO-2 (USA-241, 2013), HEO-1 (USA-184, 2006), HEO- 2 (USA-200, 2008), STSS-ATRR (USA-205, 2009), STSS Demo 1 (USA-208, 2009) and STSS Demo 2 (USA-209, 2009).
What is the situation with the Russian SPRN space group? According to the Internet resource "Strategic nuclear weapons Russia”, as part of our early warning system, as of November 2013, two satellites of the 74D6 type were operating in highly elliptical orbits (HEO) - Kosmos-2422 and Kosmos-2446 (US-KS system) and one in geostationary orbit - Kosmos-2479 (type 71X6, US-KMO system). it latest satellites, made in NPO them. Lavochkin. Since the beginning of the 1990s, funding for work on the US-KS system has practically ceased, and by 1995, on the US-KMO system as well. The assembly of vehicles to maintain the orbital group was made from parts and assemblies left over from the Soviet era. To date, these backlogs have been exhausted.
Total - sixteen against three! Such is the quantitative ratio of the forces of the United States and Russia in the space segment of early warning systems. What about quality? What can we oppose to "all-encompassing domination"?
It is believed that a new word in the fate of the space echelon of the early warning system of Russia should be said by the project of the Unified Space System (UNS). The lead developer of the system is JSC “Corporation “Kometa”. This enterprise specializes in the creation of command posts, global information and control systems for various purposes, the development, production and operation of hardware and software for ground and aerospace control, monitoring and telecommunications systems.
Kometa has been the lead developer of the US-K, US-KS (Oko), US-KMO (Oko-1) systems since Soviet times. The lead developer of spacecraft for these systems was NPO im. Lavochkin. The All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Television (VNIIT) developed on-board television-type detection equipment, and the State Optical Institute. Vavilov (GOI) - equipment of a heat direction finding type.
In NPO them. Lavochkin always insisted on the concept laid down in the US-K system. It provided for the presence of only four satellites in highly elliptical orbits (HEO), located so that the observation areas of individual devices in the aggregate would cover all missile-hazardous regions (ROR). In addition, each satellite must observe from the upper part of the orbit for 6 hours. The movement of the satellites was synchronized in such a way that at any time any point of the ROP was under observation, and the satellites also insured each other. For this purpose, a device was created with a three-axis orientation system and with the ability to control along all three axes. Its delivery into orbit could be carried out by a light Molniya-M rocket, which is three times cheaper than launching it into the GEO using a heavy Proton-K rocket. Brilliant technical solution! Didn't it serve as a prototype for the HEO satellites of the new American system SBIRS?
However, due to problems with the detection equipment (they were eliminated only in 1984), the US-K had to be abandoned - in favor of the US-KS system with eight satellites on the HEO and one insurer on the GSO. The obvious shortcomings of the US-KS, in fact, a temporary system, caused distrust on the part of a number of Kometa specialists in the very idea of using highly elliptical spacecraft. Moreover, they were not used in the American IMEWS.
Perhaps these disagreements played a role in the fact that the longtime partner of "Kometa" - NPO im. Lavochkin - outside the CEN project. But there is another explanation as well. Comet needed partners with money. And those who, by the time the tender for the development of spacecraft was held, already had sources of funding other than state ones, could have them. At NPO them. Lavochkin was not there. And they were, for example, at the GKNPTs them. Khrunichev - from commercial launches - until the supply of Protons runs out. RSC Energia also had good prospects - a participant international projects with orbital stations "Mir" and "ISS".
And could it be otherwise in the conditions of very modest funding for protracted space programs? Gazprom probably proceeded from the same logic by ordering Energia satellites of the Yamal series. And, thus, financed the development of a new direction for Energia - unmanned spacecraft of a modern type. And this intellectual and technological backlog is no less valuable than Gazprom's finances.
One way or another, today it is Energia that is the lead developer of the EKS spacecraft. The spacecraft, apparently, is being built on the basis of the Yamal universal non-hermetic platform that meets the requirements of modularity, in which the control, power supply, and thermal control systems are concentrated. The platform has been comprehensively worked out - the Yamals have been operating for more than 9 years.
According to experts, Gazeta.Ru writes, the EKS will be able to detect launches not only of ICBMs, but of ballistic missiles submarines, but also operational-tactical and tactical missiles, as well as service the system military communications. Energia has the resources necessary to create a spacecraft. But how long will it take?
Unfortunately, media reports that mention CEN are not encouraging yet. Until recently, Energia had problems with the military. In November 2011, Kommersant.ru reported that the subject of proceedings in the Moscow Arbitration Court was the failure to complete work on the EKS. And this is after their transfer from June 2008 to May 2010!
From the publication in Krasnaya Zvezda dated February 3, 2014, it follows that the construction of the assembly and test building for the EKS spacecraft (run by Spetsstroy of Russia) is unlikely to be completed before the end of the year. The report of Interfax.ru (September 3, 2013) that the head of one of the departments of Spetsstroy, Alexander Belov, was charged with embezzlement is alarming. large sum as part of the implementation of the GLONASS program. The leadership of Roskosmos is being reshuffled, and there is talk of reorganizing the rocket and space industry.
It is reported that three-quarters of the electronics in Russian spacecraft are imported. Can't there be dangerous "special bookmarks" in it? In addition, at any time, the manufacturer of a microcircuit or processor can stop producing them - and our hardware developers and programmers will find themselves in a very difficult situation.
All this contributes little to productive, rhythmic work. And time goes by. Will the creators of the CEN at least have time to begin the first flight design tests before the last Lavochka satellites “fall in”?
The situation is reminiscent of the beginning of 1999. By that time, the orbital constellation had also “melted away”. However, then the other segments of the early warning system did not inspire optimism. Now the situation is better, the hopes of the military leadership are connected with over-the-horizon radar stations - work on their construction and putting on experimental combat duty is going according to plan.
But it is important to understand that the absence of a space-based early warning system, which means the presence of "holes" in the warning system, can devalue the entire Russian nuclear missile shield - our deterrent weapon. In addition, the unreliability of Russia's early warning system is a powerful argument for the information-psychological war against us.
After the incident with the Korean Boeing-747, shot down Soviet fighter in September 1983, the USSR was accused of exceeding the required level of defense and almost of cannibalism. “Burned with milk”, in May 1987, the air defense forces allowed the sports plane of 18-year-old Mathias Rust to land on Red Square. And they became the subject of ridicule from the "world community" and some compatriots. As a result, the command structure of the Armed Forces of the USSR has undergone significant changes. And then there was August 1991...
By the beginning of 1995, the orbital constellation of the early warning system of Russia consisted of 11 satellites. And still, a mistake occurred - when on January 25, 1995, the Norwegian-American, as they later said, research four-stage Black Brant XII rocket was launched, the Russian early warning system qualified it as a nuclear missile attack. It came to the "nuclear briefcase". The world has gone through some unpleasant hours.
Three years later, on March 15 and 16, 1998, the Washington Post published two articles by D. Hoffman under the unifying title "Shattered Shield" ("Leaky Shield") - about the degradation of the Russian early warning system.
A year later, the Rossiyskiye Vesti newspaper launched a discussion about Russian missile defense. During the discussion, T. Postol, an expert from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said: “There are many Russian military installations that can be hit from Alaska, and these objects will be destroyed, and the Russian military will not even know that there was a missile attack ... The situation is very risky, because it can initiate a decision by Russia to immediately retaliate, which will be based on unreliable information.”
So, step by step, the dominant opinion in Russian expert circles was the lack of confidence that Russia would be able to repulse the aggressor in time and reliably. Isn't that why the discussion about Russian missile defense was started?
Now our relations with the US have not improved at all. In this situation, gaps in the space echelon of early warning systems may become another reason for putting pressure on Russian elites(they say that the statements of the Russian authorities about the power of the nuclear missile shield are a bluff, Russia will not be able to prevent a missile attack). And if the opinion that our shield is rusted and good for nothing really prevails in the elite and society, then the situation may worsen catastrophically.
There is another year, maybe two. I would like to believe that the creators of the early warning system will have time. In these minutes, only three "Lavochkin" satellites protect the borders of the Fatherland. We wish them success in their difficult service. And to all the creators of early warning systems, especially those in whose hands the fate of spacecraft is in their hands - responsibility to the country and people they are called upon to protect.
Fedor Chemerev