As already mentioned, the rocket was a cantilever mid-wing with a fuselage about 6.5 m long (with an engine of 7.6 m) with a maximum diameter of 0.82 m. The first modifications of this projectile were made entirely of steel, but then the wing began to be made of wood. Various wing shapes of different spans were tested - trapezoidal, rectangular, "butterfly" type. A PuVRD As 014 was attached above the tail section of the fuselage. A warhead weighing 850 kg with fuses was installed in front of the fuselage (according to other sources, 830 kg. - Note. ed.), in the middle part - a fuel tank with a capacity of 600 l, two cylinders with compressed air, an electric accumulator, an autopilot and devices for controlling altitude and flight range, in the tail section - rudder drives. The takeoff speed of the projectile aircraft from the ground launcher was 280–320 km/h, the flight speed was from 565 to 645 km/h (for various modifications), the flight altitude was usually about 600 m. The autopilot worked as follows. A pair of gyroscopes controlled roll and pitch control, while a barometric device controlled flight altitude. A small propeller on the rocket's nose was connected to a counter that measured the distance the rocket traveled. As soon as the distance counter determined that the specified range had been reached, two squibs locked the control surfaces in such a position that the missile began to dive at the target.

Although the V-1 projectile had significantly worse combat characteristics compared to the V-2, the simplicity of its design and low cost (it cost about ten times less than the V-2 projectile) led to the fact that from June 1942 the development of the V-1 was provided "top priority".

By order of Hitler, a special commission was created, which was to decide what would be preferable to use the FZG 76 air force cruise missile or the A-4 army ballistic missile as a weapon for bombing British territory. According to preliminary estimates, the FZG 76 cruise missile was more vulnerable to interception, but much cheaper to manufacture and much easier to maintain. The A-4 ballistic missile was immune to interception, but expensive to manufacture and difficult to maintain. On May 26, 1943, a meeting of the above-mentioned commission was held in Peenemünde, which included the highest ranks of the command of the German army. The commission found that the V-1 and V-2 projectiles are approximately at the same stage of readiness, and decided to speed up the transfer of both types of weapons to mass production as much as possible and arrange their production in the largest possible quantities. It was recommended that both missiles be put into service jointly. Somewhat earlier, in April 1943, Colonel Max Wachtel was appointed commander of the experimental part of the Lehr und Erprobungskommando Wachtel cruise missiles. This team was deployed at the Peenemünde training ground and later became the main one for the formation of the 155th Anti-Aircraft Regiment (FR 155 W, where "W" meant the word Werfer - "launcher") to train personnel in launching V-1 cruise missiles.

In July 1943, the development of the V-1 was moving forward so successfully that the Air Force headquarters decided to put the V-1 into mass production. The start of the use of V-1 projectiles against England was scheduled for December 1943.

The development of the V-2 rocket was carried out in parallel with the development of the V-1. After a series of persistent attempts, Dornberger and Brown obtained a report from Hitler on July 7, 1943. They managed to convince him of the reality of the A-4 rocket, and its development was included in the list of "highest priority" for introduction into mass production. From that moment, direct preparations for rocket bombardments began.

In July 1943, the Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition organized a meeting of representatives of large firms (more than 250 people were present), at which a program was developed for the production of 300 long-range missiles at three factories every month. It was envisaged to increase this number by another 900 shells with the commissioning of the plant under construction in Nordhausen. In the future, it was planned to increase the release to 2000 shells per month.

However, the allies also did not sit idly by. Information about the German missile programs partially became the property of British intelligence, which provoked a raid by the Royal Air Force on the missile base at Peenemünde.

The British raid on August 17, 1943 on Peenemünde, as a result of which 735 people were killed, including engineer Thiel, one of the leading designers of the A-4, pushed back the deadlines for the implementation of the planned program. However, according to Dornberger, the material losses in Peenemünde were not great. Important facilities such as the wind tunnel, the measuring laboratory and the testing station were not damaged. The damage could be repaired within 4-6 weeks.

After the British raid on Peenemünde, the main headquarters in early September 1943 issued an order to transfer experimental A-4 launches from Peenemünde to the Heidelager training ground in Poland. This is how the new test site Blizna was created, located at the confluence of the San River with the Vistula River, in a triangle between these rivers.

Mass serial production of V-1 shells was organized in cooperation at a large number of factories that manufactured individual units. The final assembly of the V-1 was carried out at the Volkswagen plant in Fallersleben. The Fieseler firm produced prototypes of the projectile and a small prototype series of missiles for experimental research and training of personnel.

There was no agreement among senior leadership on how best to deploy the new missiles. Air Force anti-aircraft artillery commander Lieutenant General Walther von Axthhelm wanted to use large numbers of small positions that could be easily camouflaged. However, Field Marshal Erhard Milch was more inclined towards the construction of a small number of powerful bomb-proof bunkers. In this regard, on June 18, 1943, Goering held a meeting with Milch and Axthelm, at which he proposed a compromise solution: build 4 large missile silos and 96 small positions. In addition, it was supposed to launch the FZG 76 from bombers. The production of missiles was to begin in August with a production rate of 100 missiles per month, then gradually increased to 5 thousand copies monthly by May 1944. Hitler approved this plan on June 28, 1943, setting the Kirschkern program in motion.

It was supposed to start mass production in August 1943, so that by the start of combat use, scheduled for December 15, 1943, 5,000 missiles were already ready. However, the production of the Fi-103 started a month later at the Volkswagen plants in Fallersleben and the Fieseler firm in Kassel. On October 22, British bombers raided the Fieseler factory, damaging the Fi-103 assembly lines. To this was added a whole list of changes and new modifications in the project, after which, at the end of November, production was suspended until the problems were eliminated. Production began again only in March 1944, but soon after that, as a result of the Allied bombing of the plant in Fallersleben, the assembly lines at this enterprise were also damaged. Therefore, in July, production of the Fi-103 began at the Mittelwerke underground plant near Nordhausen, as it was the most protected from bomb attacks.

Unlike a conventional aircraft, the Fi-103 rocket was not completely assembled in factories. Instead, the main structural units (fuselage, engine, wing, warhead and other subsystems) were supplied to the Luftwaffe ammunition depots. Four warehouses were allocated to the FZG program, the most important of which were located in Mecklenburg and Dannenberg. In these warehouses, the final assembly of the projectile aircraft was carried out, after which it was installed on the TW-76 technological trolley. In this form, the missiles were delivered to field warehouses in France. Sensitive equipment such as an autopilot and a compass was already installed there, and rockets were delivered from field warehouses to launch positions.

When the Fi-103 finally reached the stage of mass production in March 1944, the production time for one rocket was reduced to 350 hours, of which 120 hours were spent on a complex autopilot. The cost of one copy of the rocket was about 5060 Reichsmarks, which was only 4% of the cost of a V-2 ballistic missile and approximately 2% of the cost of a twin-engine bomber.

At the end of September 1943, the mass production of the V-1 began. Around the same period, the Germans launched the construction of launch pads on the west coast of France. In the coastal strip from Calais to Cherbourg, 64 main and 32 reserve sites were built. On each of them, except for the launcher, sheltered premises were built for storing, repairing and testing shells. Not far from the launch sites, it was planned to build 8 storage facilities, each for 250 projectiles. The total number of workers employed in the construction was over 40 thousand people.

The construction of launch positions in France began in August 1943. In the initial phase, 96 positions were built along the English Channel from Dieppe to Calais. Each position included a launch platform, a non-magnetic pre-launch magnetic compass adjustment room, a control bunker, three missile storage depots, and several smaller fuel and spares storage buildings. When planning each position, the local landscape was taken into account in order to mask the positions. Rocket positions were usually located next to existing roads, which were either resurfaced or resurfaced to facilitate the use of the many vehicles serving the launch site. Often, rocket launchers were located near farms or residential buildings, which were used to house launch crews, and also helped to mask the position.

In September 1943, the first division of the 155th anti-aircraft regiment arrived in the construction area, designed to monitor the preparation of starting positions, and subsequently launch shells. Subsequently, the entire FR 155 W was transferred to France under the command of Colonel Wachtel. It structurally included four divisions, each with three batteries, service and supply divisions. The battery had three platoons, each with two launchers, a total of 18 launchers per division and 72 launchers for the entire regiment. Each launcher was serviced by approximately 50 people, part of the total numbered 6500 personnel. Due to the technical complexity of the new weapons, several dozen civilian specialists were attached to the 155th regiment.

To coordinate the bombing of London with Fi-103 and A-4 missiles, on December 1, the Wehrmacht created a "hybrid" unit - the 65th (LXV) Special Army Corps, staffed by army and Luftwaffe officers. Lieutenant General Erich Heinemann, former head of the artillery school, commanded the 65th Corps, Colonel Eugen Walter of the Luftwaffe was appointed chief of staff. After inspecting the positions, the corps headquarters were alarmed by the lack of planning and the unrealistic expectations of the high command. The high command insisted that rocket attacks on London begin in January 1944, ignoring the fact that the positions were not fully prepared, the training of personnel was not completed and the delivery of missiles had not yet begun.

Despite the secrecy of all preparations, the British received undercover information about the transfer of the 155th anti-aircraft regiment to France. After conducting aerial photographic reconnaissance of the entire northern part of France, the Allies began an intensive bombardment of the V-1 launch sites, during which most of them turned out to be unusable already at the beginning of 1944. The start of the combat use of the V-1 had to be postponed to a later date.

In March 1944, the Germans began building new "improved" launch sites that were better camouflaged and less vulnerable from the air. In May 1944, one of these sites was bombed by British Typhoon aircraft, but the bombing results were very low. By June 12, 1944, British intelligence became aware of the existence of 66 "improved" launch sites for the V-1. However, in the period from January 1 to June 12, 1944, the Allies bombarded the launch pads of the first sample, dropping more than 20 thousand tons of bombs on them. The "improved" launch pads for launching the V-1 remained intact.

In August 1943, General Dornberger drew up a draft, according to which all military units armed with V-2s were to be subordinated to him. Dornberger's proposal was approved by the army command, and he formed a headquarters in Schwedt on the Oder River. The headquarters consisted of three departments: operational, supply and engineering.

However, Himmler did not give up his intention to take control of the further development, production and use of rockets. In September 1943, at his insistence, a special committee for the production of the A-4 rocket, which was part of the Ministry of Armaments, was placed under the control of General of the SS Troops Kammler (head of the department for the production of weapons of the headquarters of the SS troops).

As mentioned above, on December 1, 1943, Hitler signed a directive according to which the use of all types of long-range missile weapons against England was assigned to the control of the 65th Army Corps, directly subordinate to the commander of the Western Front. Artillery Lieutenant General Heinemann was appointed corps commander, and Colonel Walter was appointed chief of staff. For the headquarters of the corps, the operational and supply officers were selected from the army, and the chief of staff and intelligence officers from the air force. The corps included the armed V-1 of the 155th anti-aircraft regiment, all units located in the west armed with the V-2, and units of ultra-long-range artillery. His headquarters was located in Saint-Germain, near the headquarters of the commander of the Western Front. During the first half of 1944, he was busy managing the construction of launch sites for the V-1. The total number of soldiers and officers who were part of the V-1 reached 10 thousand people.

Having familiarized himself with the state of affairs on the spot, the corps headquarters determined that the launch date for the V-1 in January 1944 was unrealistic. Only on May 20, 1944, he was able to convey that the V-1 projectiles were ready for combat use.

In the period before the V-2 missiles entered the combat units, the headquarters of the 65th Corps paid little attention to this type of weapon, especially since Dornberger's headquarters was engaged in it. But now everything has changed. On December 29, 1943, Major General of Artillery Metz was appointed to the corps for the operational management of the combat activities of units armed with V-2s. This appointment, in essence, removed General Dornberger from the leadership of the V-2 combat operations.

It must be said that the British command knew about the impending "act of retaliation." Anti-fascist scientist Dr. Kummerov handed over to the forces of the Anti-Hitler Coalition secret materials on the results of the work of German rocket scientists. Subsequently, associated with the Schulze-Boysen group, he was arrested along with his wife and died in the dungeons of the Gestapo. Fortunately, this repressive organization itself harmed the German missile program.

On March 15, 1944, V-2 chief designer von Braun and two other leading engineers were arrested by the Gestapo on charges of sabotage. Dornberger had to apply directly to Keitel and with great difficulty obtain their release and return to Peenemünde.

Meanwhile, British intelligence was bit by bit collecting information about the V-rockets. In April 1944, a group of Polish resistance fighters managed to photograph one of the missiles that was being tested on the banks of the Bug, disassemble it into parts, safely hide them, and then transfer it all to the Warsaw partisan center. Constant monitoring of the German launch sites was carried out on the territory of occupied France by the Marco Polo Resistance group.

By the beginning of June 1944, all four divisions of the 155th anti-aircraft regiment had already moved to France. Approximately 70 to 80 "improved" launch sites in the strip between Calais and the Seine River were ready for use. Most of them were aimed at London, a smaller number at Southampton. At night, German trains loaded with rocket weapons pulled to the areas of launch sites. By June 12, 873 V-1s with the required amount of fuel were already concentrated in the launch pad areas. On this day, 54 launch sites were put on alert.

According to the order, a salvo from all launchers was to be fired first so that the shells reached London at 2340 hours, after which the V-1 shells were to be launched at short intervals until 4 hours 45 minutes on June 13th.

The commander of the 155th regiment twice asked for a delay in the start of the bombardment, since not a single launch site could launch before 0330 hours on June 13th.

In the end result, in the early morning of June 13, 1944, the Germans fired only 10 V-1 launches. Five of them crashed immediately after launch, the fate of the sixth remained unknown, and the remaining four reached the south of England and exploded there. The projectile that crashed into Bethnal Green brought the first casualties: 6 people were killed and 9 injured. Thus, the widely conceived first missile attack, due to its technical unpreparedness, ended in complete failure. The moment of surprise was missed, a massive blow did not work.

After a 40-hour break, the Germans managed to start more intense rocket bombardments. On June 15, at 2230 hours, a small number of V-1 shells were fired, and then launches were carried out at short intervals until June 16. A total of 244 projectiles were fired at London and presumably 50 at Southampton. The launch was carried out from 55 launch pads. Of the total number of shells fired, 45 crashed immediately after launch. British air defense posts recorded that 144 shells reached the coast of England and 73 - London.

“This new form of attack,” wrote Churchill, “placed on the people of London a burden perhaps even heavier than the air raids of 1940 and 1941. The state of uncertainty and tension became more prolonged. Neither the onset of the day, nor the cloudiness brought consolation ... The blind force of this projectile inspired a feeling of helplessness in a person on earth.

The bombardment of England by aircraft-shells, begun by the Germans on June 13, lasted over 9 months, with varying intensity.

However, the British quickly learned to deal with the V-1, using fighters, anti-aircraft artillery and barrage balloons for this, since in terms of their aerodynamic and performance characteristics, this rocket was not much superior to the fighters available at that time in Britain. For five days, from June 16 to June 21, about 100 projectile aircraft per day flew to the English coast on average. Of these, up to 30% were destroyed by fighter aircraft and up to 10% by anti-aircraft artillery fire. Part of the shells exploded on air barrage balloons.

The intensity of unmanned bombardments was maintained in the future, despite the fact that the launch sites were bombarded by Anglo-American aircraft.

In the early days of the bombing, up to 40 V-1 shells reached London daily. But every day the number of shot down shells increased, and less and less reached London and other cities. The day of August 28 was the most revealing in this respect. Of the 97 projectiles that crossed the English Channel, 90 were destroyed, 4 reached London, and the rest 3 fell before reaching the capital of England.

By the beginning of September, the intensity of the German V-1 bombardment had decreased, as the Anglo-American troops had captured most of the areas where the starting positions were located. But part of the launchers by this time had already been moved to the southwestern part of Holland, and projectiles were brought there. In addition, He-111 bombers were adapted to launch the V-1 from the air, and the bombing continued, despite the fact that the British learned how to successfully fight the V-1. At the very end of 1944, on the night before Christmas, over 50 German He-111s again launched an attack with V-1 shells, but not on London, but on Manchester, where air defense was weaker. Of the 37 shells that crossed the coastline, only 18 reached Manchester. One of them exploded in the city, and the remaining 17 - within a radius of 15 km from the city. On March 29, 1945, the last V-1 shell fell on the territory of England. The following table shows the intensity of launching V-1 shells in the period from June 13, 1944 to March 29, 1945.

	13.06.1944–15.07.1944	16.07.1944–5.09.1944	16.09.1944–14.01.1945	3.03.1945–29.03.1945	Total
1. Number of V-1 rounds fired	4361	4656	1200	275	10 492
of them:
from launchers	4271	4346	-	275	8892
from aircraft	90	310	1200	-	1600
2. Number of V-1 shells reaching the London area	1270*	1070	66	13	2419

* An additional 25–30 shells reached Portsmouth and Southampton.

In total, for the period from June 13, 1944 to March 29, 1945, the Germans fired 10,492 V-1 shells in England, of which 8892 from ground launchers and 1600 from He-111 carrier aircraft.

The V-1 bombing of England, undertaken in 1944-1945, provided the first experience in the use of unmanned projectiles and the first experience in combating them. Within a short time, the British managed to rebuild their air defense system, use all the means at their disposal and significantly reduce the effectiveness of these weapons. Despite this, Britain suffered some damage. In London alone, there were over 6,000 dead and about 18,000 seriously wounded. 23,000 houses were destroyed and 100,000 damaged, tens of thousands of residents were left homeless. The area of ​​the City of London was particularly hard hit, where the largest number of V-1 rockets fell per unit area.

Comparison of the number of V-1 shells that fell in and around London and the number of casualties they caused shows that for each shell there were 10 killed and seriously wounded.

In addition to London, Portsmouth, Southampton, Manchester and other cities in England were bombed. In a later period, the Germans used the V-2 to bombard the cities of the countries they had previously occupied: Antwerp, Liège and Brussels. 8,696 shells were fired at Antwerp, of which 2,183 were shot down, and 3,141 at Liège.

At the time when V-1 shells were falling on the territory of England, the British government already had intelligence data that the Germans were intensively preparing new types of missiles for use. The information made it possible to judge the possibility of new bombardments with more effective weapons. Opinions were expressed that the Germans had large stocks of missiles. At the end of July 1944, the British government decided to evacuate, if necessary, about one million inhabitants from London.

At the end of August 1944, the British government hoped that the Anglo-American troops would clear the coastal areas of the Germans, which could be used as launching positions, and then London and the British Isles would be inaccessible to German missile weapons.

At the beginning of 1944, the German command developed a preliminary plan for shelling London and a number of other cities in England with V-2 rockets, starting in March. Launches were supposed to be carried out from 2 stationary launch pads and 45 field launch pads located on the Cotentin Peninsula. It was planned to deliver missiles through 7 main, 4 field and 6 intermediate warehouses.

Despite the developed plan for shelling the territory of Great Britain, the formation of the units intended for this by the end of March was far from being completed. The 836th V-2 battalion was more or less completed, and the 485th battalion could only be ready in 6-7 weeks. The launch of the V-2 during this period could only be carried out by the 953rd stationary division and the 500th separate battery, formed by the SS troops.

After the Allied landings in Normandy, the V-2 launch pads prepared in the Cherbourg area were lost. Therefore, the German command took special measures to speed up the construction of sites for shelling England from the area north of the Somme River. In August 1944, a preliminary plan was drawn up to attack London with V-2 rockets from Belgium.

The British made persistent efforts to get more accurate information about the intentions of the Germans, but for a long time their attempts were in vain.

The advance of the Anglo-American troops to the Seine in the last week of August 1944 endangered some starting positions. On August 29, Hitler approved a plan to bombard London and Paris with V-2 rockets from the area between Tournai and Ghent in Belgium. However, already in the following days, this zone turned out to be too close to the front line. The area from which the rocket bombardment was to be carried out was moved to the vicinity of Antwerp and Malin. By this time, the command of the 65th Corps was deprived of the right to lead the V-2 combat operations. Although nominally General Metz was listed as the commander of the V-2 units, in practice the leadership passed to General of the SS Troops Kammler. Himmler finally achieved his goal by appointing Kammler as special commissioner for the V-2, who concentrated in his hands the leadership of work on both types of rocket weapons - V-1 and V-2. At the end of August, there was an intensive preparation of new launch pads for V-2 rockets. The V-2 units were ordered to leave training areas and concentrate on combat positions by the end of August. Of these, two missile groups "Nord" and "South" were formed. The Nord group took up positions in the Kleve area. It consisted of the first and second batteries of the 485th division. The Süd group, as part of the second and third batteries of the 836th division, took up positions in the Venlo area and in the vicinity of Eiskirchen. Later, the 444th training and experimental battery was attached to it. On September 4, the transportation of the V-2 to the starting positions began.

At this time, the Allies entered Belgium and liberated Brussels. On September 5, 1944, Kammler ordered the Nord Group to take up positions in the Hague area and be on alert to start shelling London in the coming days. At the same time, the Süd group was ordered to prepare for attacks on targets in northern France and Belgium.

At 08:30 on September 6, the 444th training and experimental battery fired the first V-2 projectile, which exploded in Paris. However, the advance of the Allied forces forced the battery to leave its positions. She was transferred to the island of Walcheren to bombard England. Group "Nord" also prepared for the shelling of London.

The first two V-2 ballistic missiles in England exploded on September 8 at 18:40. The time between their breaks was 16 seconds. The first rocket killed 3 people and wounded 10, the second did not cause any harm. Over the next 10 days, 27 rockets fell on England, of which 16 were on London or in its zone. Presumably, from 6 to 8 missiles did not reach their targets.

Most of the launches were carried out by the first and second batteries of the 485th division from the Hague area, a smaller number - by the 444th battery from the island of Walcheren.

On September 17, 1944, the Allies began their further advance towards the Rhine. In this regard, the 485th division from the area of ​​The Hague was hastily relocated to the vicinity of Burgsteinfurt (northwest of Münster), and the 444th battery from the Walcheren island in Zwolle. Kammler with great haste moved with his headquarters to the vicinity of Münster. Due to the transfer of units, the shelling of England with V-2 shells was not carried out over the next 10 days.

During this period, Kammler ordered the 444th battery to relocate in the vicinity of Stavoren in Friesland. Projectile launches from this position began on 25 September. The fire was fired at the cities of Norwich and Ipswich. Between September 25 and October 12, the 444th battery fired 44 shells at these targets.

The delay in the Allied advance in the direction of Arnhem allowed Kammler to return part of the second battery of the 485th division to the south-west of Holland on September 30 and begin again bombarding London.

The loss of the V-2 supply system established in northern France forced Kammler and his staff to hastily organize a new improvised supply system. She had major flaws. Intermediate warehouses had very poor equipment for testing and repairing missiles. Sometimes rockets were delayed in separate warehouses, their mechanical and electrical equipment corroded, and they became unsuitable for launch. The organization of the supply of missiles to combat units had to be changed. According to the new system, V-2 rockets were sent directly from the factory to a transshipment point located near the designated starting position. From the transshipment point, the V-2 rockets were transported by special transport to the assembly and testing point, from where they were delivered to the starting position. This method ensured the launch of missiles in 3-4 days after they were sent from the factory.

Frequent change of starting positions by V-2 divisions, the loss of all pre-equipped warehouses in Northern France, the fragility of V-2 missiles that required special vehicles for transportation, the complete lack of both military and technical training from the commander of V-2 units, General of the SS Troops Kammler were significant reasons that the effectiveness of the bombing of England was very low.

An additional reason that influenced the effectiveness of the shelling of the UK with V-2 missiles was the quality of the products. The fact is that the Germans were forced to use the labor of concentration camp prisoners, who did not need the German victory in the war at all. Moreover, an international organization of the Resistance was created at the underground rocket weapons factory. In 1944, underground workers made an explosion in one of the tunnels, which for a long time disabled the most important section of the enterprise. A system of sabotage was also created under the slogans: “Who works more slowly, achieves peace faster”, “Team X (the so-called group of prisoners used in strictly secret work. - Note. ed.) is the work of nihts.” Sometimes it was possible to mount defective parts in the rocket mechanism. The Germans, of course, understood that prisoners could not be trusted, and tried to use them only for hard work. Nevertheless, forced laborers harmed their masters as best they could. However, rocket attacks on the United Kingdom continued.

In early October 1944, the intensity of the shelling of London was 2-3 rockets per day. By the end of October, the number of V-2s that fell in England increased significantly. The accuracy of the hit has also increased. Between October 26 and November 4, 44 rockets fell on the territory of England, of which 33 exploded in the London area.

In total, from September 8, 1944 to March 27, 1945, 1359 rockets were launched into the London area. Many of them, for various technical reasons, did not reach the goal. Only 517 rockets exploded in and around London.

The following table gives an idea of ​​the impact of V-2 missiles on individual regions and cities of England.

Cities and regions	September	October	November	December	January	February	March	Total
	1944				1945
London	16	32	82	47	114	114	112	517
Essex	6	25	40	65	71	90	81	378
Kent	1	6	16	4	11	14	12	64
hardworthshire	-	3	2	3	18	6	2	34
Norfolk	8	20	-	-	-	-	1	29
Suffolk	1	4	1	2	2	3	-	13
Surrey	-	1	-	-	2	3	2	8
Sussex	2	-	1	-	1	-	-	4
Bedfordshire	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	3
Buckinghamshire	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
Cambridgeshire	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Berkshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Total	34	91	144	121	220	232	212	1054

Separate V-2 explosions caused significant losses to the civilian population. So, on November 25, 160 people were killed by a single rocket explosion in London. England suffered the heaviest losses from V-2 missiles in November (more than 1,400 killed and wounded). The total number of victims from the V-2 was 2724 killed and 6467 seriously injured.

The British government was seriously concerned about this situation. The most tragic thing was that there were no means of combat with the new missile weapons.

As a countermeasure against the V-2 missiles, the British could only use the bombing of the German starting positions. However, it must be admitted that the results of such actions were very modest. Only the advance of the Anglo-American troops in France to the northeast and the capture of areas of starting positions saved the British from further rocket bombardments.

The last V-2 rocket in England was launched on March 27, 1945, after which the V-2 units stationed in the Hague area, together with the remnants of the Nord group units, were relocated to Germany. The bulk of the personnel of the "Nord" and "South" groups were later captured by the 9th US Army.

In conclusion, it should be said that the rocket bombing of England and other European countries undertaken by the Germans in the period 1944-1945 did not bring success to the German command. Using the V-1 and V-2, the Germans failed to change the military-political situation in their favor. The hype raised by the Nazis around the "secret" weapons in order to raise the spirit of the troops and the population of Germany in the face of heavy defeats by the Wehrmacht, did not achieve results.

The main objects of rocket bombing, as you know, were large cities. Long-range missile weapons were used not to defeat groups of troops, destroy industrial enterprises and other military facilities, but against the civilian population as a means of terrorism and blackmail. It is known that in response to the deterioration of diplomatic relations with Sweden, the German command planned to threaten the Swedes with a rocket bombardment of Stockholm, believing that such an event would have a very intimidating effect on them and force them to take positions more pleasing to Germany.

It is unlikely that the German command did not realize that the rocket weapons of that time, in qualitative and quantitative terms, were not yet ripe in order to play the role of a serious factor of strategic importance. However, a characteristic feature of the German leadership was extreme adventurism both in politics and in strategy. Therefore, she decided to use this weapon in the hope of achieving at least a psychological effect.

In conditions of significant interference with the work of industrial enterprises caused by intense bombing, in an environment of great haste, major technical miscalculations occurred in the design and preparation for mass production of V-1 and V-2 rockets. Frequent accidents of propulsion systems, large limits of probable deviations from aiming points, with the power of warheads that existed at that time, excluded the expediency of using these weapons against groupings of troops and individual enterprises of the military industry and generally made such systems ineffective. At the same time, the production of long-range missiles, especially the V-2, was costly. Winston Churchill noted on this occasion: “We were lucky that the Germans spent so much effort on the production of rocket shells instead of the production of bombers. Even our Mosquitos, which probably cost no more to produce than the V-2, dropped an average of 125 tons of bombs each during their existence, with a deviation of one mile from the target, while the V-2 dropped only one ton, and then with a deviation from the target by an average of 15 miles.

To this it must be added that the development of the V-1 and V-2 was carried out by various departments in the absence of a coordinating body. Often it was determined not by an expedient technical policy that takes into account the prospects for the development of rocket weapons, but by the personal relationships of the responsible leaders of work in the field of rocket science with Hitler and other Nazi leaders. The struggle between various departments, especially between army circles and Himmler's bodies for the leadership of rocket bombardments, had a negative effect on the production and use of the V-1 and V-2.

The share of long-range missile weapons in the armed struggle during the Second World War was insignificant. During the entire operation against London - the main object of the bombing - 2418 V-1 shells and 517 V-2 rockets exploded. The total weight of explosives (ammonal) in their combat charges did not exceed 3,000 tons. The total losses of the civilian population of England killed and wounded from the V-1 and V-2 reached 42,380 people, while these losses from aerial bombardment amounted to about 146 thousand people.

Organizing the operation of rocket bombing of England and other countries, the German command made many operational miscalculations. Suffice it to say that the bombing was not unexpected for the British, that is, the factor of surprise in the use of new means of combat was lost even during the preparation period. The bombing was not of the nature of massive strikes and was carried out in isolation from the actions of other branches of the armed forces, in particular aviation. Even between units armed with V-1 projectiles and units armed with V-2 ballistic missiles, there was no concerted action.

The unfortunate choice of areas for firing positions and logistics support for the V-1 and V-2 units had a very negative effect on the combat use of missile weapons. The deployment of the battle formations of these units on the Cotentin Peninsula and in North-Eastern France in the face of the immediate threat of an Allied invasion of Normandy was a major mistake of the German command. This led to the fact that with the landing of the allies in France, the German rocket units had to repeatedly change the areas of their starting positions, transferring them in a general northeast direction to the territory of Belgium, Holland and Northern Germany. In addition, the initial areas of the V-1 and V-2 launch sites were located at a great distance from the German centers for the production and supply of missiles, which created unnecessary difficulties in the transportation and logistics of missile units in the face of massive Allied air raids on German communications. This also made it difficult to keep secret the activities connected with the organization of the rocket bombardment.

The operational management of the preparation and especially the combat activities of missile units by their commander, Himmler's protege, SS General Kammler, and his headquarters was carried out very badly. All this could not but have a negative effect on the overall results of the use of long-range missiles.

Shortly after the start of the bombardment of England, the German command became personally convinced of the low effectiveness of its "secret" weapon and the aimlessness of its further use, which was not justified by either political or military considerations. However, seized with a passion for destruction, it continued to bombard England to the last opportunity. When the launch sites on the coast of France fell into the hands of the allies, Paris, Antwerp, Liege and Brussels were fired from new starting positions.

The calculations of the leaders of Nazi Germany that rocket bombardments would be able to undermine the morale of the population and enemy troops turned out to be completely untenable.

The use of V-1 and V-2 by the Germans did not in any way lead to a strategic change in the situation in favor of Nazi Germany. It did not and could not have an impact on the course of the armed struggle on the Western Front, and even more so on the general course of the Second World War, since during this period rocket weapons were still in their “infancy”.

Despite great success in the field of creating means of delivering warheads to targets, the Germans did not have explosives of great power at that time. This, along with the low accuracy of the hit, reduced the effectiveness of the first ever combat use of V-1 and V-2 missiles to a minimum. Only the further improvement of rocket weapons in the post-war period, combined with the use of nuclear warheads, made rocket weapons a factor of decisive strategic importance.

The absence of nuclear warheads from the Nazis saved another country of the Anti-Hitler coalition - the United States of America - from "retaliation" strikes. But work on missiles capable of reaching the territory of the United States has been carried out by German specialists since the end of 1941.

Even at the beginning of the war in Peenemünde, work began on the possibility of launching missile strikes on the United States. However, the A-4 rocket, due to its limited range, was not suitable for this purpose. Therefore, in order to increase the flight range, it was proposed to create a cruise missile with a longer range on the basis of the A-4 missile. But the estimated range of the cruise missile modification, which received the designation A-4B, was 500-600 km, which was also not enough to reach the United States. Therefore, in 1943, a method was developed for launching rockets from floating launch containers.

Such a container with a missile placed in it was supposed to be delivered to a given area in tow behind a submarine. During towing, the container was in a submerged position, and before launching the rocket, it was transferred to a vertical position (like a float) by pumping ballast water. It was assumed that the XXI class submarine would be able to simultaneously tow three containers with missiles. However, with the strengthening of air defense and the US Navy, the German command had to abandon such an idea, nevertheless, until the end of the war, one launch container was built at the shipyard in Elblag.

Then the designers of von Braun began to develop a two-stage rocket under the designation A-9 / A-10, which was supposed to be launched from Europe. The first stage was the A-10 launch vehicle with a height of 20 m, a diameter of 4.1 m and a launch weight of 69 tons. The LRE of the original A-10 version had 6 combustion chambers, similar to the combustion chamber of the A-4 rocket, working on one jet nozzle. Then this option was replaced by another - with one large combustion chamber.

The A-9 cruise missile was envisaged as the second stage. Its length was 14.2 m, diameter 1.7 m, total weight 16.3 tons. It was supposed to place about a ton of explosive in the bow. In the middle part, it was originally planned to install a swept wing, later, based on the results of blowing in wind tunnels, it was replaced by a delta wing. At that time, only a pilot could provide the necessary guidance accuracy with a flight range of about 5 thousand km, so the A-9 was manned. Behind the compartment with the warhead in the bow of the rocket, it was planned to install a pressurized cockpit. To achieve the estimated range, the maximum height of the flight path exceeded 80 km, that is, the rocket had to go into outer space. At the same time, the pilot who controls the rocket could formally be considered an astronaut. It is necessary to remind the reader that almost twenty years later, for such suborbital flights on the Mercury spacecraft (without going into orbit), the Americans Sheppard and Grissom received the title of astronauts. The scenario for the flight of the A-9 / A-10 rocket was supposed to look like this. After the launch of the rocket and the separation of the first stage of the A-10, the second stage of the A-9 with a working rocket engine continued to fly with an increase in altitude and speed. After running out of fuel, the rocket switched to planning mode, and the pilot took control. He was supposed to carry out a further flight using radio signals from submarines for navigation. Having brought the car to the target and stabilizing its trajectory, the pilot had to eject. Theoretically, it was assumed that the pilot who descended on a parachute would be picked up by German submarines or he would be captured by the Americans. Experts also estimated the real chances of a pilot to land or splash down alive as 1:100. The first flight of the A-9/A-10 system was planned for 1946.

In 1943, the development of the A-9 / A-10 project was in full swing, but the events that took place soon forced the German leadership to change plans. The fact is that back in 1942, Allied intelligence became interested in top-secret German facilities in the Peenemünde area. An operation was developed, the purpose of which was a massive bombardment of the power plant, the plant for the production of liquid oxygen, assembly buildings, etc. To lull the Germans' vigilance, Allied reconnaissance aircraft made regular flights along the coast from Kiel to Rostock for several months before the scheduled operation. German air defense systems were categorically ordered not to open fire on reconnaissance aircraft and not to raise fighter-interceptors in order to avoid unmasking objects in Peenemünde. And late in the evening of August 17, 1943, the allied armada, consisting of almost 600 long-range bombers, flew out on a mission. The Germans took this operation as an intention to bomb Berlin, for this reason, Berlin's air defense was put on full alert. However, unexpectedly for the Germans, the allied armada over the island of Rügen changed course: instead of turning south towards Berlin, the bombers turned southeast. That night, more than 1,500 tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped on Peenemünde, and the missile center suffered enormous damage. During the bombing, more than 700 people were killed, among whom were many specialists, including the chief designer of engines for the A-4 and Wasserfall rockets, Dr. Thiel, and the chief engineer, Walter.

Immediately after the raid on Peenemünde, measures were taken to speed up the construction of the huge underground Mittelwerk plant in the limestone mountains of the Harz near Nordhausen. This plant was intended for the mass production of aircraft turbojet engines and rockets V1 and V2. For work at this plant, the Germans used 30 thousand prisoners placed in the Dora concentration camp specially built for this purpose. A test site for missiles was urgently equipped in Poland. Only the design office and testing laboratories remained in Peenemünde.

Under these conditions, it was ordered to freeze work on the A-9 / A-10, and concentrate all efforts on the serial production of the A-4 ballistic missile.

In June 1944, on the orders of Hitler, work was resumed under the code name Projekt Amerika. To speed up the work, we decided to take the A-4V cruise missile as a basis, and develop it in unmanned and manned versions. On the A-4B manned cruise missile, it was supposed to install an aircraft landing gear, as well as an additional turbojet or ramjet engine in the lower stabilizer, the pilot was located in a pressurized cabin in the nose of the rocket.

By the end of 1944, the Germans managed to build only prototypes of the unmanned version of the A-4V rocket. Tests of the first prototype took place on December 27, 1944. The launch ended in an accident due to a missile control system that failed at an altitude of about 500 m. Only the third launch of an unmanned rocket was successfully completed, which actually took place on January 24, 1945. The rocket reached a speed of 1200 m / s and an altitude of 80 km, but after switching to the planning mode, its wing broke, and the rocket fell into the sea.

The Germans failed to implement the planned projects of the A-4B and A-9 manned cruise missiles before the end of the war, all the work remained at the stage of sketch drawings. As for the training of pilots for missile flights, indeed, since 1943, as part of the 5th squadron of the 200th bomber squadron, a group of suicide pilots was trained to fly projectiles and cruise missiles. However, not a single case of the combat use of German aircraft with suicide pilots was recorded until the end of the war.

On May 5, 1945, the Peenemünde test center was captured by Soviet troops, but the entire scientific and technical staff of the Rocket Center managed to evacuate to Bavaria in April. Wernher von Braun took refuge in an alpine ski resort, where, after the German surrender was announced, he surrendered to the Americans. He, like thousands of other major Nazi scientists and engineers, was transported to the United States as part of the secret Operation Paperclip. There he continued to work on the Pentagon's missile theme, being under the close supervision of the special services. In 1951, under the leadership of von Braun, the Redstone and Atlas ballistic missiles were developed, which could carry nuclear charges.

Deployment of rocket units of Nazi Germany for the bombing of England

"Killer Planes"

This chapter of the book is devoted to German mass-produced manned vehicles designed to destroy ground targets. Contrary to the recently widespread opinion about the numerous effective projects of German designers, only two developments “reached” the real application, and the rest remained experimental.

Despite their design simplicity and low cost, V-1 (Fi-103) projectiles were not very accurate when hitting relatively small targets. And sometimes it was simply necessary to destroy bridges, command posts, ships and other targets. However, it takes time to create effective guidance systems, and the scientists of the Nazi state did not have it. Therefore, the idea was put forward to replace the expensive human guidance mechanism. Despite the fact that the practical chances of a pilot leaving the cockpit of a projectile with a parachute (according to the instructions) at a high dive speed and landing safely (or splashing down) were estimated by many German experts as one in a hundred, and the use of suicide pilots is contrary to the Christian attitude towards death, it was decided to develop a combat manned version of the V-1. Proponents of such ideas were authoritative people in the Third Reich: the famous test pilot Hanna Reitsch and Germany's "saboteur No. 1" SS Hauptsturmführer Otto Skorzeny.

In the fall of 1943, Luftwaffe officer Hauptmann Heinrich Lange led a small group of volunteer pilots to practice the technique of using "non-standard" attacks on enemy ground and surface targets, including attacks using manned projectiles. In October 1943, X. Lange met with the famous test pilot Hanna Reitsch and Dr. Benzinger, head of the German Institute for Aviation Medicine. They developed specific proposals for the use of manned projectiles, which were then discussed with E. Milch, G. Goering's deputy. Hanna Reitsch was instructed to present the final version of the proposals personally to A. Hitler, which was done on February 28, 1944. The result of the consideration of these proposals was the order to deploy work on the study of various "non-standard" methods of attack on the basis of the 200th bomber squadron KG 200 (Kampfgeschwader 200).

As part of KG 200, a special experimental squadron 5./KG 200 was created, the commander of which was appointed X. Lyange. Unofficially, the squadron had the name "Leonidas Staffel" (Leonidasstaffel) after the ancient hero Thermopylae of the Spartan king Leonidas, who, together with his detachment of 300 people, detained the many thousands of troops of the Persian king Xerxes before the main forces approached, which clearly indicated her appointment. The flight crew of 5./KG 200 consisted of 90 people: 60 people from the Luftwaffe and 30 from the SS team of O. Skorzeny. The leadership of all work related to the formation of groups of suicide pilots and their development of attack methods was entrusted to the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, General Korten. Aviation firms were instructed to develop manned aircraft for these purposes.

Despite the fact that several designs of a manned projectile with a jet engine were manufactured, the Reichenberg projectile, structurally similar to the V-1 unmanned rocket, was brought to mass production. In total, four variants of such an aircraft were developed:

Fi-103A1 "Reichenberg I" - unpowered two-seat aircraft;

Fi-103A1 "Reichenberg II" - a two-seat aircraft with an engine;

Fi-103A1 "Reichenberg III" - single-seat powered aircraft;

Fi-103A1 "Reichenberg IV" - combat modification.

The first three modifications were intended for testing and training of flight personnel, the fourth for combat use. Reichenberg was towed in the air by a Henschel Hs-126 aircraft, all the rest were launched in the air from a Heinkel He-111N22 bomber.

"Reichenberg" differed from the unmanned Fi-103 only by installing the cockpit in front of the engine air intake (instead of the compartment with compressed air cylinders) and the presence of ailerons on the wing. The cockpit was equipped with a pilot's seat, a dashboard with a sight, an altimeter, an artificial horizon, a speed indicator and a clock. In addition, a gyrocompass and an electric battery with a converter were located in the cockpit. The aircraft was controlled using a conventional handle and pedals. The cockpit canopy opened to the right, the windshield was armored.

The first prototypes of the Reichenberg did not have a pilot rescue system. On serial machines, it was supposed to install the simplest emergency escape system, similar to the system used on the DB P.F projectile or on the Henschel Hs-132 jet attack aircraft. When exposed to the ejection lever, the bottom hatch lock opened, releasing it, after which the pilot fell out of the cockpit along with the parachute.

The Reichenberg prototype was manufactured at the Henschel plant in Berlin-Schoenefeld. Flight tests of the machine began in Rechlin in September 1944. The pilot during the first flight received serious back injuries due to the high speed of landing on the ventral ski. During the second flight, the lantern was torn off, and again the pilot was seriously injured during the landing. After finalizing the design of the machine, the tests continued, several flights were performed by Willy Fidler, a test pilot of the Fieseler company. Hanna Reitsch, who tested the third experimental machine, completed the first flight successfully, despite the damage received by the machine during uncoupling from the carrier aircraft. However, the second flight of the same machine, due to the loss of sand ballast, which was located in the fuselage instead of a warhead, ended in an accident: the plane crashed, but the famous pilot remained alive.

Soon a two-seat training model was built without the Reichenberg-I engine, and in November a two-seat apparatus with the Reichenberg-II engine was built. During the second test flight of the Reichenberg III on November 5, 1944, the tip of the left wing broke off due to strong vibration from the engine, but test pilot Heinz Kensche managed to leave the cramped cockpit and descend by parachute. This accident demonstrated the enormous difficulty of leaving the vehicle in flight, even for a highly trained test pilot.

At the end of 1944, the training of instructors began to train flight crews to fly the Reichenberg IV, and production facilities were prepared near Dannenburg to convert the Fi-103 into manned Reichenbergs. As already mentioned, the Reichenbergs were intended for the Leonidas Staffel of the KG 200 squadron. Of the trained volunteer pilots, approximately 35 people were trained until the end of February 1945, but then the training was suspended due to lack of fuel. During a test flight in Rechlin on March 5, test pilot Kenshe's luck turned away - he died after the skin was torn off the wing of the Reichenberg during a dive.

This catastrophe broke the patience of the commander of KG 200, Lieutenant Colonel Baumbach, who was an opponent of the Reichenberg program. Baumbach turned to Minister of Armaments and War Industry Albert Speer for help. On March 15, Speer and Baumbach visited Hitler, and Speer was able to convince the Führer that suicide was not in the tradition of the German military. In the end, Hitler agreed with these arguments, and on the same day Baumbach ordered the disbandment of the suicide pilot squadron. By that time, more than 200 Reichenberg projectiles were already in the Luftwaffe warehouses in Dannenberg and Pulverhof, but not one of them was ever used in combat.

The plant in Dannenberg was visited several times by Japanese officers in order to get acquainted with the process of building the Reichenberg. German technological assistance was provided in the development of the Japanese analogue of the Reichenberg, the Kawanishi Baika kamikaze aircraft, which was also not lucky enough to take part in the hostilities.

The Fi-103R projectile ("Reichenberg-IV") had the following characteristics: crew - 1 person, power plant - 1 As 014 PuVRD with a thrust of 300 kgf, wingspan - 5.7 m, aircraft length - 8.0 m, take-off weight - 2250 kg, warhead weight - 830 kg, maximum speed - 800 km / h, flight range (when dropped from a height of 2500 m) - 330 km, flight duration - 32 min.

Another idea to be implemented to improve the accuracy of hitting objects was the development of composite projectiles - the so-called "Mistels".

Back in the pre-war years in the UK, aircraft designer Robert Mayo proposed a scheme for a composite mail aircraft for transatlantic flights. The composite aircraft was a system of two seaplanes mounted one on top of the other. A prototype of such an aircraft was assembled by order of the Ministry of Aviation. A slightly modified four-engined S.21 seaplane, named "Maya", was the lower carrier aircraft. A four-engine seaplane S.20 "Mercury" was installed on top. The first separation flight took place on February 6, 1938. After a large number of test flights, on July 21, 1938, Mercury made a non-stop flight to Montreal (team) lasting 20 hours and 20 minutes, covering a distance of 4715 km, carrying 272 kg of mail on board. October 6 "Mercury" made a record non-stop flight to South Africa (9652 km). The outbreak of war interrupted the operation of the composite aircraft - in May 1941 it was destroyed during a German air raid.

In the Soviet Union, work with composite projectiles was carried out at the end of the 30s. A TB-3 bomber with 3.5 tons of explosives was used as a projectile aircraft, a KR-6 control aircraft was mounted on the back of the TB-3. The range of this hitch was about 1200 km.

The Soviet aircraft designer V. S. Vakhmistrov (the author of the famous project "Link") in 1944 developed a project for a composite projectile aircraft, the basis of which was a glider with a control aircraft mounted on its back. The glider was made according to the scheme with a two-beam tail unit, with a bomb weighing 1000 kg located in each beam. The control plane ensured the delivery of the airframe to the target area. The takeoff of the hitch was carried out using a resettable starting cart. Having delivered the glider to a given area, the aircraft carried out aiming and unhooked it. After uncoupling from the aircraft, the glider was to fly towards the target using a gyroscopic autopilot. However, the project was not implemented.

In 1941, Germany, using the experience of the USSR and England, also began the development of composite projectile aircraft. After initial scrutiny, the RLM technical department rejected the idea on the grounds that there was no practical application for it. However, already in 1942, on the instructions of the Ministry, the DFS Gliding Institute began studying the features of the linkage flight from the glider and the control aircraft installed on its back. Initially, the experiments were carried out with the DFS 230 airframe, and the K-135, Fw-56 and Bf-109E devices were used as control aircraft. As a result, they decided to start flight tests of an experimental bunch of a projectile aircraft, into which the Junkers Ju-88A bomber was converted, and a control aircraft, which was used as a Messerschmitt Bf-109F fighter. After the end of the tests, a program code-named "Beethoven" was adopted. As part of this program, in July 1943, the RLM issued the Junkers company with the task of preparing 15 copies of the Mistel-1 combat system (mistel - “dung cart”). This system consisted of a Ju-88A bomber and a Bf-109F fighter and was named Mistel-1.

In the spring of 1944, as part of the 4th group of the KG 101 (IV / KG 101) bomber squadron, a special squadron was formed, which began to receive the Misteli-1. Ju-88A4s without a warhead were used to train flight crews, almost all equipment was removed from the cockpit, such training vehicles were designated Mistel S1. Fighting vehicles were equipped as follows. The nose of the Ju-88A4 was easily detached using quick-release bolts and replaced with a warhead with a shaped charge weighing 3800 kg. The fighter was mounted on top of two front rigid struts and one rear spring-loaded strut. Two options for the combat use of the bundle were envisaged. According to the first option, takeoff and flight to the target was carried out only with the engines of the lower machine running. The engines of the upper machine were started when approaching the target, after which the pilot transferred the bunch into a gentle dive and unhooked. The in-flight undocking mechanism was as follows. The pilot of the control aircraft released the rear pillar, which, leaning back along the fuselage of the bomber, pressed the limit switch, which opened the locks of the main pillars. The freed bomber dived on the target, and the control aircraft went to the base. The second option provided for the joint operation of the engines of both aircraft until the moment of undocking, while the engine of the upper aircraft was fed with fuel from the carrier. On the night of June 24, 1944, the Mistelei 1 squadron from IV / KG 101 attacked the Allied ships in France for the first time at the mouth of the Seine River.

Other variants of the Mistele were also developed. For example, Mistel-2 was a combination of Ju-88G1 with Fw-190A6 or Fw-190F8. In 1944, 75 Ju-88G1 bombers that were under repair were converted into Misteli-2. The first sample took off in November of the same year, it was planned to deliver 125 copies.

Mistel-3 was a modernization of Mistel-2, in which an additional landing gear was installed under the fuselage of the lower aircraft, which was dropped after takeoff. The strengthening of the landing gear was caused by several Mistelei-2 accidents due to strut failures during takeoff from poorly prepared airfields.

In October 1944, the 4th group of the KG 101 bomber squadron was transferred to the II / KG 200, it was armed with 60 Mistels. In December, it was supposed to carry out a massive attack on the British naval base in Scapa Flow, but due to bad weather conditions, the attack did not take place. Then the German command redirected the Mistels to use them as part of Operation Eisenhammer (Iron Hammer), which was scheduled for March next year. The essence of the operation, the technical part of which was developed by Professor Steinmann of the RLM back in 1943, was the one-time bombing of power plants located in the European part of the Soviet Union in order to paralyze the defense industry. For these strikes, special aviation mines "Sommerballon" ("Summer balloon") were developed, which were supposed to be dropped into the reservoirs of power plants. While remaining afloat, the mine was supposed to be delivered by the flow of water to hydroelectric turbines or water intake systems to cool thermal turbines and disable them. About 100 Mistels were required to complete Operation Iron Hammer. According to the scenario of the planned operation, the Mistels were supposed to take off from airfields in East Prussia, but in March these airfields were captured by the advancing Soviet troops. In connection with the change in the situation, II / KG 200 received an order to redirect their Mistels to attack bridges on the Oder, Neisse and Vistula rivers. Since April, the KG 30 bomber squadron, partially re-equipped on the Misteli, has been connected to these hostilities. According to Soviet data, on April 16, 1945, after the start of the Berlin strategic offensive operation, 16 Mistel twin aircraft tried to destroy the Oder crossings in order to stop the advance of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on the capital of the Reich, but failed.

A variant of the Mistel-3 was developed, which was intended for reusable use as an ultra-long fighter. At the same time, the lower aircraft was piloted by its crew, a radar was located in the forward fuselage, and an MG-131 machine gun was installed in the rear of the cockpit, two drop fuel tanks with a capacity of 900 l each were suspended to achieve maximum range.

"Mistel-4" was a bunch of Ju-88G7 and Ta-152H fighter. Until the end of the war, about 250 copies were built, up to 50 copies were captured by the Allied forces in the Mercerburg area.

Scheme of various options for the Mistel system (from top to bottom): A - Mistel S1 (combination of Ji-88A4 and Bf-109F4); B - Mistel S2 (combination of Ju-88G1 and Fw-190A8); B - Mistel S3s (combination of Ju-88G10 and Fw-190A8)

Notes:

Dornberger W. V-2. London, 1954, pp. 37–38.

Dornberger W. Op. cit., pp. 66, 69.

Norman Macmillan. Royal Air Force in the World War. Vol. IV, p. 176.

Dornberger W. Op. cit., p. 112.

All of the planned 8 storage facilities could not be built before the end of the war (See B. Collier. The Defense of the United Kingdom. London, 1957, p. 361.).

Churchill W. The Second World War, vol. VI, p. 35.

According to W. Collier. Op. cit., p.523.

"Army", April, 1956, p. 23.

Collier b. Op. cit., p.257.

One of the documents of the operational leadership of the OKW (No. 8803/45 ss of January 5, 1945) stated in this connection: that the danger of Sweden entering the war against Germany increased considerably during 1944, especially since the replacement of General Ternel by General Jung. This situation makes it possible to put forward again the proposal previously made by the Quartermaster's Department. This proposal consists of building a small number of launch sites for V-1 projectiles and V-2 rockets directed against Stockholm. It can be assumed that such an event would have a very intimidating effect on Sweden. The Swedes face the danger of formidable countermeasures from Germany ... We can count on the fact that the very fact of the construction of launch sites will become known in Sweden in the shortest possible time.

Churchill W. Op. cit., p. 48.

Collier W. Op. cit., p. 528.

FAA rocket: a fundamentally new type of weapon designed in Nazi Germany. A push in industrial development and science. This rocket was the first to go into outer space, and space exploration began with it.

In this article, you will learn about the history of this type of weapon, its purpose and effectiveness. We will tell you how this mega-weapon of the Third Reich was arranged, and what hopes the command of Nazi Germany had placed on it.

History of the FAA rocket

The development of liquid fuel ballistic missiles originates in Germany, in 1926. People who were fond of designing rockets and studying other planets founded the "Space Flight Society". Soon a young man named Wernher Von Braun, the future creator of the FAA rockets, joined it.

Solid fuel rockets as a type of weapon were used in the bloody First World War - these are Le Prier rockets that were installed on aircraft and were intended to destroy German observation balloons.

But Germany, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, could not develop missiles of this type. However, the documents of the Versailles Peace do not describe a ban on the design of rockets with an engine that uses not solid, but liquid fuel. It was this loophole that the German command decided to take advantage of.

In 1929, the German government gave the military-industrial complex the task of finding the possibility of using liquid-fuel rockets as weapons, and already in 1932 the first tests of rocket prototypes took place.

By that time, the Space Flight Society, namely Wernher von Braun, had created a working experimental prototype, presented to Colonel Walter Dornberger. Despite the fact that the possibilities of using the prototype were extremely small, he became interested in the colonel, and he suggested that the young designer work under the command of the military.

Von Braun, like the vast majority of his colleagues in society, accepted this proposal, and in December 1934 a prototype of the A-2 rocket was presented, which ran on liquid oxygen and ethanol.

Despite the instability of this type of fuel and the availability of options for better fuel mixtures, the choice was made on ethanol, as a cheap and mass product.

V-2 missile in launch position. In addition to standard ground-based missiles, missiles were developed that could be placed on ships of the Navy and on heavy bombers.

The A-2 was successfully tested, and soon the Von Braun team began to create the A-3 and A-4 rockets, which became the prototypes for the V-1 and V-2.

The final creation of the A-4 - a rocket, which later became the basis for the development of the FAA 2, was completed in 1941.

FAA 2 launches were carried out until December 1942, however, after that they were discontinued for economic reasons.

The principle of operation of the rocket

V-1 is the first cruise missile to enter serial production. Launched from the ground using a special launcher. Having started, the rocket flew on a sustainer engine. If the fuel supply in the engine compartment was completely consumed, the sustainer engine was turned off, and the rocket dived towards the target.

FAA 2 had a slightly different principle of operation. The fact is that FAU 2 was the world's first rocket that flew at an altitude of 188 kilometers, almost went into outer space. After launch, the rocket went to flight altitude, and at these echelons it passed most of the way. After reaching the desired coordinates, the FAA 2 headed to the ground and hit its target.

It was controlled by the FAA system of specialized devices.

Advantages and disadvantages of such missiles

FAU 2 became the superweapon of the Third Reich. The main advantage was that these missiles were ahead of their time, and the opponents of Nazi Germany did not have effective means of destroying such a class of weapons.

In any army, the most expensive resource is military personnel with complex specialties. Pilots are like that. And every sortie to bombard a target in enemy territory is an inevitable risk of losing the pilot and his car.

In the case of the FAA family, this risk was reduced to zero. After all, the ammunition is still disposable, not requiring regular repair, maintenance and crew maintenance. In addition, new weapons were much more difficult to detect and subsequently intercept.

It is impossible to exclude such an important point as the psychological factor. The use of a new superweapon of the Third Reich against the British - the FAA missiles.

Despite the fact that rockets were really ahead of their time, they, like any, even the most modern weapons, were not without flaws.

For example, FAA 1 had one major drawback. The fact is that she did not move on the main engine for the entire flight. This created quite significant problems for the use of this type of weapon.

The main use of the FAA rockets was against the British, and they soon deployed a huge number of radars, observation posts and other missile defense systems to detect them.

After the FAA 1 was discovered, a squadron of fighters was raised to intercept it or air defense systems were activated.

The pilots of the Royal Air Force used a rather interesting trick: they flew up to the rocket and pushed it to the side with their wing or “blowed” it to the side with the air flow of their propeller.

In the second case, the FAA could be shot down by air defense systems, like a conventional aircraft.

FAA 2 had a flaw from which two more followed. This weapon was very expensive, and the effectiveness and accuracy of the FAA 2 control systems used was rather low.

In this photo you can see the compartments of the FAU 1 rocket and make sure of its simplicity of structure. German engineers have managed to create a cheap and effective enough weapon to fight the enemy at a great distance.

Therefore, it was simply not profitable to destroy targets with missiles of this type, their production was comparable in cost to the production of all armored vehicles of the Third Reich in 1940.

The design of the rockets FAU 1 and FAU 2

V 1 was very simple in design and cheap to manufacture. The fuselage was cigar-shaped, made by welding from ordinary steel sheets.

FAA design 1:
1. Compass. 2. Lower detonator. 3. Detonator. 4. Warhead. 5. Wing. 6. Fuel tanks. 7. Cylinders with compressed air. 8. The counter of passed kilometers. 9. Fuel supply regulator. 10. Gyro autopilot

In the middle of the body were wings. Behind the wings, on a special stand, was a pulsating jet engine. The design of the engine is also simple. It consisted of a nozzle and a combustion chamber, the nozzle had a smaller diameter than the chamber. The main advantages of this engine were the simplicity of design and low price.

To launch, an initial speed of around 240 kilometers per hour was required. For this, specialized launch catapults and boosters were used.

The electronic “stuffing” of the FAA 1 is three gyroscopes and an altitude sensor. One - the main and two additional gyroscopes provided excellent stabilization in flight.

The steering gear was controlled using high pressure air. The flight range was measured using the simplest mechanical counter, equipped with blades that rotated with the help of an oncoming air flow. After reaching the required number of kilometers on the counter, the steering device introduced the missile at the peak, and the missile hit the target.

FAA 2 had a more complex design. The shape of the rocket body remained the same spindle-shaped. 4 stabilizers were added at the base of the hull.

FAU 2 was equipped with a liquid fuel engine. Ethyl alcohol was used as a fuel, and liquid oxygen was used as an oxidizing element.

The entire body of the rocket was divided into four compartments: instrument, combat, fuel and tail.

The missile warhead contained ammotol, the fuse was a contact fuse.

In the central part there was a fuel compartment, and below it an engine and two turbopumps were installed. Below the combat compartment was the control compartment, which housed the flight control equipment.

Specifications

Since the characteristics of FAA 1 and FAA 2 were somewhat different from each other, we will present them separately.

Technical characteristics of the rocket FAA 1

• The maximum flight speed is from 550 to 660 kilometers in particular;
• Maximum flight range: 240 kilometers;
• Practical ceiling: 2700 meters;
• Curb weight: 2160 kilograms;
• Warhead weight: 830 kilograms;
• Accuracy of hit (KVO), in kilometers: 0.9;
• Rocket length: 8.325 meters;
• Wingspan: 5.37 meters.

Technical characteristics of the rocket FAA 2

• Starting weight of the rocket: 12800 kilograms;
• Carrying fuel weight: 8760 kilograms;
• Warhead weight: 980 kilograms;
• Length: 14.3 meters;
• Largest diameter: 1.65 meters;
• Span of stabilizers: 3.52 meters;
• Maximum speed: 1560 meters per second;
• The greatest flight range: 260-320 kilometers;
• Maximum flight altitude: 188 kilometers;
• Number of engines: 1;
• Thrust: 25,400 kilograms per second;
• Specific thrust: 100 kilograms per second;
• Full thrust: 27,250 kilograms per second.

The use of the FAA rocket

The first use of the FAA 1 took place in 1943. Over a hundred launch positions were built in France. In the summer of 1944, the Germans launched their first attack on the English capital.

After the first successful strike, the FAA 1 bombardment of the English capital was carried out almost every day. In two weeks of bombing, almost two and a half thousand people became their victims.

During World War II, the Germans produced more than 30,000 FAAs. 10 thousand were launched towards the British coast, but only 3200 shells reached its territory, and only 2500 fell on London.

The FAA 2 missiles were stored in special underground hangars. In 1943, the missile center in Peenemünde was bombed, production was transferred to underground and secret factories.

The low accuracy of missile strikes is due to the fact that the missile control system was imperfect. In addition, after two weeks of bombing, the British managed to create a huge number of defensive systems. These included detection systems, specialized squadrons covering the British skies, and anti-aircraft batteries. Therefore, not all missiles reached their target.

About 25% of the rockets failed during launch. A quarter were destroyed by the RAF, about fifteen percent were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, and a fifth of them did not reach the target and fell into the sea.

After the Allies landed in Normandy in 1944, the Germans launched several rocket attacks on Belgian and French territory.

Londoners nicknamed the FAA 1 buss bomb (buzzing bomb). This was due to the characteristic sound that the FAU 1 engine produced during operation.

The results of the bombing with such an expensive type of weapon did not suit the German command. Hardly a third of the missiles successfully reached their target. But the funds for the production of these missiles took a fabulous amount, so they decided to curtail the program. The FAA 1, which was in service at that moment, was much more efficient and cheaper.

The command remembered the FAA 2 in December 43. After that, funding for the work was restored in full.

In 1944, on September 8, London was hit by a new FAA 2 rocket, which, unlike its predecessor, did not emit any buzz when approaching the target. And that is why the British did not understand what kind of weapon was used for this bombardment. In addition, all the missile defense systems put into operation were unable to detect an object flying at an altitude of 100 kilometers. And interceptor aircraft could not rise to such a height.

Unfortunately for the Nazi command, the FAU 2 also did not become a highly effective weapon against the enemies of the Reich. The missile had low accuracy, hardly half of the missiles hit a circle with a radius of ten kilometers. Almost two thousand rockets detonated during the launch or some time after it. The cost of the FAA 2 was also quite high.

Some German military leaders, in particular, Albert Speer, the German Defense Minister, in his memoirs expressed disappointment with the fact that Germany was spending fabulous amounts of money on such an ineffective project. He believed that instead of spending money on strikes against the allies, it was necessary to create an effective anti-aircraft missile to protect German cities from British and Soviet air raids.

After the end of World War II, FAA 2 became the base for the creation of ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union and the United States.

Perhaps someone has additional information on the FAA missiles?

If you have any questions - leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them.

In 1942, the course of the Second World War began to change, and not in favor of Nazi Germany. Heavy defeats dispelled the impression created by the brilliant victories of the Reich in the initial campaigns. Naturally, German propaganda continued to assure the townsfolk that victory would be achieved. But, which is significant, a special role in achieving future victory was assigned not to the genius of the Fuhrer or the courage of the soldiers. The triumph was to provide a "wonder weapon".

The "wunderwaffe" also includes the "weapon of retaliation" - cruise and ballistic missiles, which were supposed to strike at Britain, replacing aircraft.

Cruise missile "V-1"

The first "weapon of retaliation" was the Fi 103 projectile, which had been developed since the summer of 1942. This unmanned, straight-wing monoplane was powered by a simple and inexpensive pulse jet engine mounted above the fuselage. The V-1 autopilot kept the rocket on a given course and altitude using gyroscopes and a magnetic compass.

The range of the "V-1" was set by a mechanical counter, which was twisted to zero by an aerodynamic spinner on the nose of the projectile. When the counter went to zero, the "drone" went into a peak.

The V-1 warhead contained up to a ton of ammotol.

A rocket was launched from a steam catapult about 50 meters long. Such a launcher was not very mobile and was easily detected by air reconnaissance.

Ballistic missile "V-2"

The family, created since the late 30s under the leadership of Wernher von Braun, bore the index "A" - "Aggregat". The most famous of them - A-4, despite the digital designation, was the fifth in a series of projects, and first took off in the spring of 1942.

The device housing "V-2" included four compartments. The warhead was equipped with ammotol, the mass of the charge reached 830 kg. In the control compartment was a gyroscopic guidance system. The central, and largest, compartment was occupied by tanks with fuel and oxidizer. An aqueous solution of ethyl alcohol served as fuel, and liquefied oxygen acted as an oxidizing agent. Finally, the tail of the rocket was occupied by a liquid rocket engine.

Initially, the V-2 missiles were supposed to be launched from protected bunkers, but the air superiority won by the Allied aircraft did not even allow the construction of fortified positions to be completed. As a result, rocket men "worked" from mobile field positions.

To prepare such a launch pad, it was enough to find a flat piece of terrain and install a launch pad on it.

Application

The first major formation of missile troops - the 65th Army Corps - was formed at the end of 1943. It included a regiment that was supposed to launch the V-1, but for the sake of conspiracy it was called the "anti-aircraft artillery." A week after the landing of troops in Normandy, "retaliatory strikes" began against Britain.

As the Wehrmacht retreated from France, positions from which it was possible to strike at London were lost, and "drones" began to be used to bombard strategically important ports in Belgium. The shells turned out to be extremely unreliable - up to a quarter of the launched V-1s fell immediately after the start. Just as great was the percentage of rockets whose engines went out of order in flight.

The V-1s that flew to Britain collided with balloons, were shot down by fighters and destroyed by anti-aircraft fire.

To continue the bombing of London and reduce the risk of meeting with V-1 interceptors, they tried to launch He.111H-22 from the aircraft. Studies have shown that during such attacks, up to 40% of the V-1 was lost, and almost a third of the carrier aircraft was destroyed.

"V-2" came into action only in the autumn of 1944. Although the warhead of the new weapon was no more powerful, and the accuracy of the hits left much to be desired, the psychological impact of the use of the V-2 was incomparable. The ballistic missile was not detected by radar, and its interception by fighters was also impossible.

For some time it was believed that the V-2 was guided by the radar - this led to work on the creation of jammers.

They ceased in December 1944. It was supposed to create an artillery barrier on the intended flight path. But a good means of countering the V-2 turned out to be false reports sent by British intelligence. They reported that German missiles consistently missed London, going into flight.

The missilemen corrected the guidance, and the V-2 began to hit the sparsely populated suburbs. Intelligence, of course, began to report accurate hits and great destruction. V-2 launches on London (designated as a priority target by Hitler personally) and on Antwerp continued until the spring of 1945.

During the battle for Remagen, an attempt was made to use the V-2 as a tactical weapon. The Fuhrer ordered with their help to destroy the railway bridge over the Rhine captured by the Americans. None of the fired missiles hit the bridge, and one deviated from the target by 60 kilometers.

Specifications

Let us give the basic data of both samples of the German "weapon of retaliation".

It is easy to see, without even going into details, that the V-2, delivering even a smaller explosive charge, was far superior in total mass to a primitive projectile. It can be said that if the Reich could still afford the production of large batches of V-1s, then the assembly of V-2s was not easy for the economy.

At the end of the war, the Americans copied the V-1 and adopted it under the name JB-2. The American rocket compares favorably with the V-1 in being guided by radio commands and launched using compact powder boosters.

The use of V-missiles in itself can be considered successful. Even taking into account the number of V-1s that failed or were destroyed by air defense systems, they justified the costs of their production. But the V-2, although they seem to be a more effective weapon due to the impossibility of interception and the high percentage of successful launches, were much more expensive.

And the production of ballistic missiles also drew on valuable resources. For example, in order to provide fuel for one V-2, it was necessary to process about 30 tons of potatoes into alcohol. And this at a time when the shortage of food was becoming palpable.

The low accuracy of the missiles made them suitable only for use as a weapon of terror, for shelling large cities.

There was no need to even talk about any pinpoint strikes on strategically important objects. Massive bombardments would have been more effective - but Germany had nothing to carry them out. And most importantly, the time when Britain could be forced to withdraw from the war, by 1944, was gone forever.

During the period when the Wehrmacht was being expelled from France, strikes on residential areas could rather arouse a desire to quickly finish off the enemy. But after the war, the victorious countries took full advantage of German developments in the field of rocket weapons.

Video

The successful launch of the world's first ballistic missile is largely associated with the personality of its designer, Wernher von Braun. In fact, it is he (along with) who is the founder of modern rocket science. In fact, it was with his achievements that the space age began.

Born into a privileged aristocratic family, Wernher von Braun was fascinated by the idea of ​​space flight from a young age and purposefully studied physics and mathematics in order to later design rockets. In 1930, at the age of 18, he entered the Berlin Institute of Technology (now the Technical University of Berlin), where he joined the group "Verein für Raumschiffahrt" ("VfR", "Space Travel Society"). There, in particular, he took part in the testing of a liquid-fuel rocket engine. Then Braun also studied at the Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin and at the ETH Zurich.

In the early 1930s, Brown attended a presentation given by Auguste Piccard, who at the time was a pioneer in stratosphere flight. After Picard's speech, a young student approached him and declared:

"You know, I plan to fly to the moon someday." Picard is said to have responded with words of encouragement.

Von Braun was greatly influenced by the rocket theorist Hermann Oberth, whom the rocket scientist called: "the first who, thinking about the possibility of creating spaceships, picked up a slide rule and presented mathematically sound ideas and designs."

On July 25, 1934, at the age of 22, Wernher von Braun received his Ph.D. This was only the first, open part of his work. The full dissertation was called "Constructive, theoretical and experimental approaches to the problem of creating a rocket on liquid fuel." It was classified at the request of the army and was not published until 1960.

By the end of 1934, the von Braun group successfully tested the theory in practice by launching two rockets at altitudes of 2.2 km and 3.5 km, respectively.

Since 1933, civilian experiments in rocket science have been banned in Germany. Rockets were only allowed to be built by the military. A couple of years later, a huge rocket center was built for their needs in the vicinity of the village of Peenemünde. There, 25-year-old Brown was appointed technical manager and chief designer of the A-4 rocket ("V-2").

9 tons of alcohol - and into space

Taking into account the already existing theoretical and practical developments of Wernher von Braun, the world's first ballistic missile was created in a fantastically short time - in just 21 months. On October 3, 1943, her first successful launch was carried out. It was the world's first guided combat ballistic missile. In its design, German designers have made great progress in the creation of liquid rocket engines, missile control systems in flight and guidance.

The 14-meter rocket had a classic spindle shape with four cross-shaped air stabilizers and was single-stage. The launch weight reached 12.8 tons, of which the design itself with the engine weighed three tons, about a ton - the warhead. The remaining almost nine tons accounted for fuel, mainly of ethyl origin. "V-2" consisted of more than 30 thousand individual parts, and the length of the wires of its electrical equipment exceeded 35 km.

The engine could run for 60-70 seconds, accelerating the rocket to a speed several times greater than the speed of sound - 1700 m/s (6120 km/h). The acceleration of the rocket at the start was 0.9 g, and before the cutoff of the fuel supply - 5 g. In a series of experiments on vertical flight that followed in 1944, the same engine was able to throw a rocket to a height of 188 kilometers - the first man-made object was in space.

The speed of sound was gained in the first 25 seconds of flight. The range of the missile reached 320 km, the height of the trajectory - 100 km. Moreover, at the time the fuel supply was cut off, the horizontal range from the starting point was only 20 km, and the height was 25 km (then the rocket flew by inertia). The head fairing of the rocket during the flight heated up to 600 degrees Celsius.

The accuracy of the missile hitting the target (circular probable deviation, a key characteristic for combat ballistic missiles) was 0.5-1 km (0.002-0.003 from the range) according to the project. But in reality, the efficiency was much less: 10-20 km (0.03-0.06 of the range).

When falling, the speed of the rocket was 450-1100 m / s. Detonation did not occur immediately upon impact with the surface - the rocket had time to go a little deeper into the ground. The explosion left a funnel with a diameter of 25-30 m and a depth of 15 m.

***One rocket - a hundred factories***

In July 1943, the 31-year-old Wernher von Braun was awarded the title of professor, which was quite an exceptional phenomenon for Germany at that time.

Why did the young Werner manage to attract the attention of Wehrmacht officers back in 1932 and soon become the head of one of the country's largest projects? Wernher von Braun was distinguished by fundamental theoretical training and the ability of a born organizer.

German rocket science patriarch Hermann Oberth said he was superior to Wernher von Braun as a mathematician, physicist and inventor, but was certainly a child compared to von Braun the manager.

The baron himself noted exactly what a leader who replaces the founder of the Oberth type should possess: the ability to organize and finance gigantic and most complex works. According to the researchers of von Braun's biography, such a coincidence of time, place, circumstances and a person who managed to take advantage of all this to the maximum extent rarely happens in history.

Von Braun immediately involved in the creation of the world's first ballistic missile the potential of the most qualified design engineers, technologists and workers. As a result, as experts note, he succeeded in the main thing - to build and optimize a system for creating complex technical systems.

The cooperation of specialized co-executing organizations, which was then adopted almost everywhere under the leadership from a single center, made it possible to put the process of creating ballistic missiles on a serious industrial basis, attract the best specialists and work on a wide front.

Von Braun created not only the world's first ballistic missile with outstanding characteristics for those times, but also an entire branch of German industry, while making fantastic breakthroughs in technology.

This thesis, in particular, is well illustrated by a well-known historical fact: when in the USSR in 1947 they started copying the V-2, it turned out that the Germans used 86 different steel grades in the production of their rocket.

The industry of the Soviet Union was able to replace only 32 grades with steels of similar properties. For non-ferrous metals, the situation was even worse - only 21 analogues were selected for 59 grades. Even greater problems turned out to be in the group of non-metals: rubbers, gaskets, plastics, seals, insulation. Problems when copying the V-2 arose literally with every material, with every technological operation, including welding.

As a result, the USSR in those years had to create a new industry.

***Useless weapon?***

According to the Soviet and Russian design scientist, one of the closest associates of S.P. Korolev Boris Chertok, the activities of Wernher von Braun to a large extent contributed to the defeat of Germany in World War II.

The V-2 (about 6 thousand of them were built in total) diverted huge resources from the production of weapons and military equipment, so necessary at the front. Even the German nuclear project suffered, since the gas-jet rudders of the V-2 rocket required very scarce graphite. Tens of thousands of highly skilled engineers and workers were employed in the production of rockets. Enormous funds were spent on the creation of the appropriate infrastructure.

At the same time, from September 8, 1944 to February 1945, about 4200 V-2s were fired towards England. More than two thousand of them did not reach the goal, and those who flew killed 2,700 people.

In other words, one and a half rockets were spent per dead Englishman. Thus, despite the exorbitant efforts and costs, the V-2 did not become a weapon of retaliation.

Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments of the late war period, also admitted the error in his memoirs. In his opinion, it would be more effective to focus on the mass production of another brainchild of von Braun - the Wasserfall anti-aircraft missiles. They were much cheaper to manufacture and could have shielded German industry and urban populations from massive Allied air raids.

The missile did not demonstrate high performance characteristics during combat use. She delivered only 1 ton of explosives to the target with a square probable deviation of 20-25 km. Such indicators cannot be considered satisfactory.

But, oddly enough, it was the V-2 that opened up new horizons for mankind, and almost all the rocket programs of the world, including Israeli and Chinese, came out of the school of Wernher von Braun. Documentation and infrastructure were studied in detail by Soviet specialists, many Peenemünde employees were captured and helped in the development of the first Soviet missiles.

Von Braun himself was captured by American intelligence and taken to the United States, where a few years later he became the head of the space program and an absentee competitor of Sergei Korolev.

According to biographers, Wernher von Braun, the founder of world rocket science, is one of the most purposeful people in the history of mankind. During the Second World War, he said about the German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel: “We have before us a very experienced and brave enemy and, I must admit, despite this devastating war, a great commander.” The same can be said about Wernher von Braun.

The reason for writing this article was the huge attention to the small engine, which appeared recently in the range of Parkflyer. But few people thought that this engine has more than 150 years of history:

Many believe that the pulse jet engine (PUVRD) appeared in Germany during the Second World War, and was used on V-1 (V-1) projectiles, but this is not entirely true. Of course, the German cruise missile became the only mass-produced aircraft with a PuVRD, but the engine itself was invented 80 (!) years earlier and not at all in Germany.
Patents for a pulsating jet engine were obtained (independently of each other) in the 60s of the 19th century by Charles de Louvrier (France) and Nikolai Afanasyevich Teleshov (Russia).

A pulsating jet engine (Eng. Pulse jet), as its name implies, operates in a pulsation mode, its thrust does not develop continuously, like a ramjet (ramjet engine) or turbojet engine (turbojet engine), but in the form of a series of pulses .

Air, passing through the confuser part, increases its speed, as a result of which the pressure in this area drops. Under the action of reduced pressure, fuel begins to be sucked from tube 8, which is then picked up by an air stream and dispersed by it into smaller particles. The resulting mixture, passing through the diffuser part of the head, is somewhat compressed due to a decrease in the speed of movement and, in the final mixed form, enters the combustion chamber through the inlets of the valve grill.
Initially, the fuel-air mixture that filled the volume of the combustion chamber is ignited with a candle, in extreme cases, with the help of an open flame brought to the edge of the exhaust pipe. When the engine enters the operating mode, the fuel-air mixture again entering the combustion chamber is ignited not from an external source, but from hot gases. Thus, a candle is needed only at the stage of starting the engine, as a catalyst.
The gases formed during the combustion of the fuel-air mixture rise sharply, and the plate valves of the lattice close, and the gases rush into the open part of the combustion chamber towards the exhaust pipe. Thus, in the engine pipe, during its operation, the gas column oscillates: during the period of increased pressure in the combustion chamber, gases move towards the outlet, during the period of reduced pressure - towards the combustion chamber. And the more intense the fluctuations of the gas column in the working tube, the more thrust the engine develops in one cycle.

The PUVRD has the following main elements: input section a - in, ending with a valve grill, consisting of a disk 6 and valves 7 ; combustion chamber 2 , plot c - d; jet nozzle 3 , plot d - d, exhaust pipe 4 , plot e - e.
The inlet channel of the head has a confuser a - b and diffuser b - c plots. A fuel pipe is installed at the beginning of the diffuser section. 8 with adjusting needle 5 .

And let's go back to history. German designers, who had been conducting a wide search for alternatives to piston engines even on the eve of World War II, did not ignore this invention, which remained unclaimed for a long time. The most famous aircraft, as I said, was the German V-1 projectile.

The chief designer of the V-1, Robert Lusser, chose the PUVRD for it mainly because of the simplicity of design and, as a result, low labor costs for manufacturing, which was justified in the mass production of disposable projectiles mass-produced in less than a year (from June 1944 to March 1945 ) in quantities over 10,000 units.

In addition to unmanned cruise missiles, in Germany, a manned version of the V-4 (V-4) projectile was also developed. As planned by the engineers, the pilot had to point his disposable pepelats at the target, leave the cockpit and escape using a parachute.

True, whether a person is able to leave the cockpit at a speed of 800 km / h, and even having an engine air intake behind his head, was modestly silent.

The study and creation of PuVRD was carried out not only in Nazi Germany. In 1944, for review, England delivered crumpled pieces of V-1 to the USSR. We, in turn, "blinded from what was", creating at the same time an almost new engine PuVRD D-3, iiii .....
..... and hoisted it on the Pe-2:

But not with the aim of creating the first domestic jet bomber, but for testing the engine itself, which was then used to produce Soviet 10-X cruise missiles:

But the use of pulsating engines in Soviet aviation is not limited to this. In 1946, the idea was realized to equip the fighter with PuVRD-shki:

Yes. Everything is simple. On the La-9 fighter, two pulsating engines were installed under the wing. Of course, in practice, everything turned out to be somewhat more complicated: they changed the fuel supply system on the plane, removed the armored back, and two NS-23 guns, strengthening the airframe design. The increase in speed was 70 km / h. Test pilot I.M. Dziuba noted strong vibrations and noise when the PuVRD was turned on. The suspension of the PuVRD worsened the maneuvering and takeoff and landing characteristics of the aircraft. Starting the engines was unreliable, the flight duration was sharply reduced, and operation became more complicated. The work carried out was beneficial only in the development of ramjet engines intended for installation on cruise missiles.
Of course, these aircraft did not take part in the battles, but they were quite actively used at air parades, where they invariably made a strong impression on the public with their roar. According to eyewitnesses, from three to nine cars with PuVRD participated in different parades.
The culmination of the PuVRD tests was the flight of nine La-9RDs in the summer of 1947 at an air parade in Tushino. The planes were piloted by test pilots of the GK NII VVS V.I. Alekseenko. A.G. Kubyshkin. L.M. Kuvshinov, A.P. Manucharov. V.G.Masich. G.A. Sedov, P.M. Stefanovsky, A.G. Terentiev and V.P. Trofimov.

I must say that the Americans, too, did not lag behind in this direction. They were well aware that jet aircraft, even at the stage of infancy, were already superior to their piston counterparts. But there are a lot of piston aircraft. What to do with them?! .... And in 1946, two Ford PJ-31-1 engines were suspended under the wings of one of the most advanced fighters of its time, the Mustang P-51D.

However, the result was, frankly, not very good. With the PUVRD turned on, the speed of the aircraft increased noticeably, but they consumed the fuel, oh-hoo, so it was not possible to fly at good speed for a long time, and when turned off, the jet engines turned the fighter into a sluggish fighter. After suffering for a whole year, the Americans, nevertheless, came to the conclusion that it would not be possible to get a cheap fighter capable of at least somehow competing with the newfangled jets.

As a result, they forgot about the PuVRD .....
But not for long! This type of engine performed well as an aircraft model! Why not?! It is cheap to manufacture and maintain, has a simple device and a minimum of settings, does not require expensive fuel, and in general - it is not necessary to buy it - you can build it yourself with a minimum of resources.

This is the smallest PUVRD in the world. Created in 1952
Well, you must admit, who has not dreamed of a jet plane with a hamster pilot and rockets?!))))
Now your dream has become a reality! Yes, and it is not necessary to buy an engine - you can build it:

P.S. This article is based on materials published on the Internet ...
The end.