List of artillery of the ussr of the second world war. Fighter-anti-tank artillery of the Red Army The birth of artillery special forces

The history and heroes of the elite type of troops born during the Great Patriotic War

The fighters of these units were envied and - at the same time - sympathized with. “The trunk is long, life is short”, “Double salary - triple death!”, “Farewell, Motherland!” - all these nicknames, hinting at high mortality, went to the soldiers and officers who fought in the anti-tank artillery (IPTA) of the Red Army.

The calculation of the anti-tank guns of senior sergeant A. Golovalov is firing at German tanks. In recent battles, the calculation destroyed 2 enemy tanks and 6 firing points (the battery of Senior Lieutenant A. Medvedev). The explosion on the right is the return shot of a German tank.

All this is true: the salaries increased one and a half to two times for the IPTA units on the staff, and the length of the barrels of many anti-tank guns, and the unusually high mortality among the artillerymen of these units, whose positions were often located near, or even in front of the infantry front ... But the truth and the fact that anti-tank artillery accounted for 70% of the destroyed German tanks; and the fact that among the artillerymen awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, one in four is a soldier or officer of anti-tank fighter units. In absolute terms, it looks like this: out of 1744 gunners - Heroes of the Soviet Union, whose biographies are presented in the lists of the Heroes of the Country project, 453 people fought in anti-tank units, the main and only task of which was direct fire at German tanks ...
Keep up with the tanks

In itself, the concept of anti-tank artillery as a separate type of this kind of troops appeared shortly before the Second World War. During the First World War, conventional field guns were quite successful in fighting slow-moving tanks, for which armor-piercing shells were quickly developed. In addition, until the beginning of the 1930s, tank reservations remained mainly bulletproof, and only with the approach of a new world war began to intensify. Accordingly, specific means of combating this type of weapon were also required, which became anti-tank artillery.

In the USSR, the first experience of creating special anti-tank guns came at the very beginning of the 1930s. In 1931, a 37 mm anti-tank gun appeared, which was a licensed copy of a German gun designed for the same purpose. A year later, a Soviet semi-automatic 45 mm cannon was installed on the carriage of this gun, and thus a 45 mm anti-tank gun of the 1932 model of the year - 19-K appeared. Five years later, it was modernized, resulting in a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model of the year - 53-K. It was she who became the most massive domestic anti-tank gun - the famous "forty-five".

Calculation of the M-42 anti-tank gun in battle. Photo: warphoto.ru

These guns were the main means of combating tanks in the Red Army in the prewar period. Since 1938, anti-tank batteries, platoons and divisions were armed with them, which until the autumn of 1940 were part of rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry battalions, regiments and divisions. For example, the anti-tank defense of the rifle battalion of the pre-war state was provided by a platoon of 45-millimeter guns - that is, two guns; rifle and motorized rifle regiments - a battery of "forty-five", that is, six guns. And as part of the rifle and motorized divisions, since 1938, a separate anti-tank division was provided - 18 guns of 45 mm caliber.

Soviet gunners are preparing to open fire with a 45-mm anti-tank gun. Karelian front.

But the way the fighting began to unfold in World War II, which began on September 1, 1939 with the German invasion of Poland, quickly showed that anti-tank defense at the divisional level could be insufficient. And then the idea came up to create anti-tank artillery brigades of the High Command Reserve. Each such brigade would be a formidable force: the regular armament of the 5,322 unit consisted of 48 76 mm guns, 24 107 mm guns, as well as 48 85 mm anti-aircraft guns and another 16 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. At the same time, there were no actual anti-tank guns in the staff of the brigades, however, non-specialized field guns, which received regular armor-piercing shells, more or less successfully coped with their tasks.

Alas, by the beginning of World War II, the country did not have time to complete the formation of anti-tank brigades of the RGC. But even unformed, these units, which came at the disposal of the army and front commands, made it possible to maneuver them much more efficiently than anti-tank units in the state of rifle divisions. And although the beginning of the war led to catastrophic losses throughout the Red Army, including in artillery units, due to this, the necessary experience was accumulated, which rather soon led to the emergence of specialized anti-tank units.

Birth of artillery special forces

It quickly became clear that regular divisional anti-tank weapons were not capable of seriously resisting the Wehrmacht’s tank spearheads, and the lack of anti-tank guns of the required caliber forced light field guns to be rolled out for direct fire. At the same time, their calculations, as a rule, did not have the necessary training, which means that they sometimes acted insufficiently efficiently even in favorable conditions for them. In addition, due to the evacuation of artillery factories and the massive losses of the first months of the war, the shortage of main guns in the Red Army became catastrophic, so they had to be disposed of much more carefully.

Soviet artillerymen roll 45-mm M-42 anti-tank guns, following in the ranks of the advancing infantry on the Central Front.

Under such conditions, the only right decision was the formation of special reserve anti-tank units, which could not only be put on the defensive along the front of divisions and armies, but could be maneuvered by them, throwing them into specific tank-dangerous areas. The experience of the first war months spoke about the same. And as a result, by January 1, 1942, the command of the active army and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had at its disposal one anti-tank artillery brigade operating on the Leningrad Front, 57 anti-tank artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery battalions. And they really were, that is, they actively participated in the battles. Suffice it to say that following the results of the battles of the autumn of 1941, five anti-tank regiments were awarded the title of "Guards", which had just been introduced in the Red Army.

Soviet gunners with a 45 mm anti-tank gun in December 1941. Photo: Museum of Engineering Troops and Artillery, St. Petersburg

Three months later, on April 3, 1942, a resolution of the State Defense Committee was issued, introducing the concept of a fighter brigade, the main task of which was to fight Wehrmacht tanks. True, its staff was forced to be much more modest than that of a similar pre-war unit. The command of such a brigade had three times fewer people at its disposal - 1795 fighters and commanders against 5322, 16 76-mm guns against 48 in the pre-war state, and four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns instead of sixteen. True, twelve 45-mm cannons and 144 anti-tank rifles appeared in the list of standard weapons (they were armed with two infantry battalions that were part of the brigade). In addition, in order to create new brigades, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered within a week to revise the lists of personnel of all military branches and "withdraw all junior and private personnel who previously served in artillery units." It was these fighters, having undergone a short retraining in the reserve artillery brigades, that formed the backbone of the anti-tank brigades. But they still had to be understaffed with fighters who did not have combat experience.

The crossing of the artillery crew and the 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K across the river. The crossing is carried out on a pontoon of landing boats A-3

By the beginning of June 1942, twelve newly formed fighter brigades were already operating in the Red Army, which, in addition to artillery units, also included a mortar battalion, an engineering mine battalion and a company of submachine gunners. And on June 8, a new GKO decree appeared, which reduced these brigades to four fighter divisions: the situation at the front required the creation of more powerful anti-tank fists capable of stopping German tank wedges. Less than a month later, in the midst of the summer offensive of the Germans, who were rapidly advancing to the Caucasus and the Volga, the famous order No. 0528 was issued “On renaming anti-tank artillery units and subunits into anti-tank artillery units and establishing advantages for the commanders and rank and file of these units.”

Pushkar elite

The appearance of the order was preceded by a great deal of preparatory work, concerning not only calculations, but also how many guns and what caliber new parts should have and what advantages their composition would enjoy. It was quite clear that the fighters and commanders of such units, who would have to risk their lives daily in the most dangerous areas of defense, needed a powerful not only material, but also a moral incentive. They did not assign the title of guards to the new units during the formation, as was done with the units of the Katyusha rocket launchers, but decided to leave the well-established word “fighter” and add “anti-tank” to it, emphasizing the special significance and purpose of the new units. For the same effect, as far as can be judged now, the introduction of a special sleeve insignia for all soldiers and officers of anti-tank artillery was calculated - a black rhombus with crossed golden trunks of stylized Shuvalov "unicorns".

All this was spelled out in the order in separate paragraphs. The same separate clauses prescribed special financial conditions for new units, as well as norms for the return of wounded soldiers and commanders to duty. So, the commanding staff of these units and subunits was set one and a half, and the junior and private - a double salary. For each destroyed tank, the crew of the gun was also entitled to a cash bonus: the commander and gunner - 500 rubles each, the rest of the calculation numbers - 200 rubles each. It is noteworthy that initially other amounts appeared in the text of the document: 1000 and 300 rubles, respectively, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin, who signed the order, personally reduced the prices. As for the norms for returning to duty, the entire commanding staff of the anti-tank destroyer units, up to the division commander, had to be kept on special account, and at the same time, the entire staff after treatment in hospitals had to be returned only to the indicated units. This did not guarantee that the soldier or officer would return to the very battalion or division in which he fought before being wounded, but he could not end up in any other units other than anti-tank destroyers.

The new order instantly turned the anti-tankers into the elite artillery of the Red Army. But this elitism was confirmed by a high price. The level of losses in anti-tank fighter units was noticeably higher than in other artillery units. It is no coincidence that anti-tank units became the only subspecies of artillery, where the same order No. 0528 introduced the position of deputy gunner: in battle, crews that rolled out their guns to unequipped positions in front of the defending infantry and fired direct fire often died earlier than their equipment.

From battalions to divisions

New artillery units quickly gained combat experience, which spread just as quickly: the number of anti-tank fighter units grew. On January 1, 1943, the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army consisted of two fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, two heavy anti-tank regiments, 168 anti-tank regiments and one anti-tank battalion.

Anti-tank artillery unit on the march.

And for the Battle of Kursk, Soviet anti-tank artillery received a new structure. Order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 0063 dated April 10, 1943 introduced in each army, primarily the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Southwestern and Southern fronts, at least one anti-tank regiment of the wartime army staff: six batteries of 76-mm guns, that is, a total of 24 guns.

By the same order, one anti-tank artillery brigade of 1215 people was organizationally introduced into the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-Western and Southern Fronts, which included an anti-tank regiment of 76-mm guns - a total of 10 batteries, or 40 guns, and a regiment of 45-millimeter guns, which was armed with 20 guns.

Guards artillerymen roll a 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937) into a prepared trench. Kursk direction.

The relatively calm time that separated the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad from the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge was used by the Red Army command to the fullest extent possible to complete, rearm and retrain the anti-tank fighter units. No one doubted that the coming battle would largely rely on the massive use of tanks, especially new German vehicles, and it was necessary to be prepared for this.

Soviet gunners at the 45 mm M-42 anti-tank gun. In the background is the T-34-85 tank.

History has shown that the anti-tank units had time to prepare. The battle on the Kursk Bulge was the main test of the artillery elite for strength - and they withstood it with honor. And the invaluable experience, for which, alas, the fighters and commanders of anti-tank units had to pay a very high price, was soon comprehended and used. It was after the Battle of Kursk that the legendary, but, unfortunately, already too weak for the armor of new German tanks, the "forty-five" began to be gradually removed from these units, replacing them with 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns, and where these guns were not enough, on the well-proven divisional 76-mm guns ZIS-3. By the way, it was the versatility of this gun, which showed itself well both as a divisional gun and as an anti-tank gun, along with the simplicity of design and manufacture, that allowed it to become the most massive artillery gun in the world in the entire history of artillery!

Masters of "firebags"

In ambush "forty-five", 45-mm anti-tank gun model 1937 (53-K).

The last major change in the structure and tactics of using anti-tank artillery was the complete reorganization of all fighter divisions and brigades into anti-tank artillery brigades. By January 1, 1944, there were as many as fifty such brigades in the anti-tank artillery, and in addition to them, there were 141 anti-tank artillery regiments. The main weapons of these units were the same 76-mm ZIS-3 guns, which the domestic industry produced at an incredible speed. In addition to them, the brigades and regiments were armed with 57-mm ZIS-2 and a number of "forty-fives" and 107 mm caliber guns.

Soviet artillerymen from the units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps fire at the enemy from a camouflaged position. In the foreground: 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937), in the background: 76-mm regimental gun (model 1927). Bryansk front.

By this time, the fundamental tactics of the combat use of anti-tank units were also fully developed. The system of anti-tank areas and anti-tank strongholds, developed and tested even before the Battle of Kursk, was rethought and finalized. The number of anti-tank guns in the troops became more than sufficient, experienced personnel were enough for their use, and the fight against Wehrmacht tanks was made as flexible and effective as possible. Now the Soviet anti-tank defense was built on the principle of "fire bags", arranged on the paths of movement of German tank units. Anti-tank guns were placed in groups of 6-8 guns (that is, two batteries each) at a distance of fifty meters from each other and were masked with all care. And they opened fire not when the first line of enemy tanks was in the zone of confident defeat, but only after virtually all attacking tanks entered it.

Unknown Soviet female soldiers from the anti-tank artillery unit (IPTA).

Such "fire bags", taking into account the characteristics of anti-tank artillery guns, were effective only at medium and short combat distances, which means that the risk for gunners increased many times over. It was necessary to show not only remarkable restraint, watching how German tanks were passing almost nearby, it was necessary to guess the moment when to open fire, and to fire it as quickly as the capabilities of technology and the strength of the calculations allowed. And at the same time, be ready to change position at any moment, as soon as it was under fire or the tanks went beyond the distance of confident defeat. And to do this in battle, as a rule, had to be literally on hand: most often they simply did not have time to adjust the horses or cars, and the process of loading and unloading the gun took too much time - much more than the conditions of the battle with the advancing tanks allowed.

The crew of Soviet artillerymen fires from a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model (53-K) at a German tank on a village street. The number of the calculation gives the loader a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile.

Heroes with a black diamond on the sleeve

Knowing all this, one is no longer surprised at the number of heroes among the fighters and commanders of anti-tank fighter units. Among them were real gunners-snipers. Such as, for example, the commander of the guns of the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Regiment of the Guard, Senior Sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov, who accounted for almost three dozen fascist tanks, and ten of them (including six "Tigers"!) He knocked out in one battle. For this he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Or, say, the gunner of the 493rd anti-tank artillery regiment, Sergeant Stepan Khoptyar. He fought from the very first days of the war, went with battles to the Volga, and then to the Oder, where in one battle he destroyed four German tanks, and in just a few January days of 1945 - nine tanks and several armored personnel carriers. The country appreciated this feat: in April, the victorious forty-fifth, Khoptyar was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard Senior Sergeant Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich Asfandiyarov (1918-1977) and Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard Sergeant Veniamin Mikhailovich Permyakov (1924-1990) are reading the letter. In the background, Soviet gunners at the 76-mm ZiS-3 divisional gun.

Z.L. Asfandiyarov on the front of the Great Patriotic War since September 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the liberation of Ukraine.
On January 25, 1944, in the battles for the village of Tsibulev (now the village of Monastyrishchensky district of the Cherkasy region), a gun under the command of Guards Senior Sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov was attacked by eight tanks and twelve armored personnel carriers with enemy infantry. Having let the enemy attacking column into direct range, the gun crew opened aimed sniper fire and burned all eight enemy tanks, of which four were Tiger-type tanks. The senior sergeant of the guard Asfandiyarov himself destroyed one officer and ten soldiers with fire from personal weapons. When the gun went out of action, the brave guardsman switched to the gun of the neighboring unit, the calculation of which went out of order and, having repelled a new massive enemy attack, destroyed two tanks of the Tiger type and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. In just one battle, the calculation of the guards of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov destroyed ten enemy tanks, of which six were of the Tiger type and over one hundred and fifty enemy soldiers and officers.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2386) was awarded to Asfandiyarov Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 1, 1944.

V.M. Permyakov was drafted into the Red Army in August 1942. At the artillery school he received the specialty of a gunner. From July 1943 at the front, he fought in the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Regiment as a gunner. He received his baptism of fire on the Kursk salient. In the first battle, he burned three German tanks, was wounded, but did not leave his combat post. For courage and steadfastness in battle, accuracy in defeating tanks, Sergeant Permyakov was awarded the Order of Lenin. He especially distinguished himself in the battles for the liberation of Ukraine in January 1944.
On January 25, 1944, in the area at the fork in the road near the villages of Ivakhny and Tsibulev, now the Monastyrishchensky district of the Cherkasy region, the calculation of the guards of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov, in which Sergeant Permyakov was the gunner, was among the first to meet the attack of enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers by infantry. Reflecting the first onslaught, Permyakov destroyed 8 tanks with accurate fire, of which four were tanks of the Tiger type. When the positions of the artillerymen approached the enemy landing, he entered into hand-to-hand combat. He was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield. Having beaten off the attack of machine gunners, he returned to the gun. When the gun failed, the guards switched to the gun of the neighboring unit, the calculation of which failed and, having repelled a new massive enemy attack, destroyed two more Tiger-type tanks and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. During a raid by enemy bombers, the gun was broken. Permyakov, wounded and shell-shocked, was sent to the rear unconscious. On July 1, 1944, Sergeant Veniamin Mikhailovich Permyakov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2385).

Lieutenant General Pavel Ivanovich Batov presents the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to the commander of an anti-tank gun, Sergeant Ivan Spitsyn. Mozyr direction.

Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin has been at the front since August 1942. He distinguished himself on October 15, 1943 when crossing the Dnieper. Direct fire, the calculation of Sergeant Spitsin destroyed three enemy machine guns. Having crossed to the bridgehead, the artillerymen fired at the enemy until a direct hit broke the gun. Artillerymen joined the infantry, during the battle they captured enemy positions along with cannons and began to destroy the enemy from his own guns.

On October 30, 1943, for the exemplary performance of the combat missions of the command on the front of the fight against the Nazi invaders and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, Sergeant Spitsin Ivan Yakovlevich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 1641).

But even against the background of these and hundreds of other heroes from among the soldiers and officers of anti-tank artillery, the feat of Vasily Petrov, the only one among them twice Hero of the Soviet Union, stands out. Drafted into the army in 1939, right on the eve of the war he graduated from the Sumy Artillery School, and met the Great Patriotic War as a lieutenant, platoon commander of the 92nd separate artillery battalion in Novograd-Volynsky in Ukraine.

Captain Vasily Petrov earned his first "Gold Star" of the Hero of the Soviet Union after crossing the Dnieper in September 1943. By that time, he was already deputy commander of the 1850th anti-tank artillery regiment, and on his chest he wore two orders of the Red Star and a medal "For Courage" - and three stripes for wounds. The decree on awarding Petrov the highest degree of distinction was signed on the 24th, and published on December 29, 1943. By that time, the thirty-year-old captain was already in the hospital, having lost both hands in one of the last battles. And if not for the legendary Order No. 0528, which ordered the return of the wounded to anti-tank units, the freshly baked Hero would hardly have got a chance to continue fighting. But Petrov, who was always distinguished by firmness and perseverance (sometimes dissatisfied subordinates and superiors said that he was stubborn), achieved his goal. And at the very end of 1944 he returned to his regiment, which by that time had already become known as the 248th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment.

With this regiment of the guard, Major Vasily Petrov reached the Oder, crossed it and distinguished himself by holding a bridgehead on the western bank, and then participating in the development of the offensive on Dresden. And this did not go unnoticed: by decree of June 27, 1945, for the spring exploits on the Oder, artillery major Vasily Petrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the second time. By this time, the regiment of the legendary major had already been disbanded, but Vasily Petrov himself remained in the ranks. And he remained in it until his death - and he died in 2003!

After the war, Vasily Petrov managed to graduate from Lviv State University and the Military Academy, received a PhD in military sciences, rose to the rank of lieutenant general of artillery, which he received in 1977, and served as deputy chief of missile forces and artillery of the Carpathian military district. As the grandson of one of General Petrov's colleagues recalls, from time to time, when going for a walk in the Carpathians, the middle-aged commander managed to literally drive his adjutants who could not keep up with him on the way up ...

Memory is stronger than time

The post-war fate of anti-tank artillery completely repeated the fate of all the Armed Forces of the USSR, which changed in accordance with the changing challenges of the time. Since September 1946, the personnel of anti-tank artillery units and subunits, as well as anti-tank rifle subunits, ceased to receive increased salaries. The right to a special sleeve insignia, which the anti-tankers were so proud of, remained ten years longer. But it also disappeared over time: the next order to introduce a new uniform for the Soviet army canceled this patch.

Gradually, the need for specialized anti-tank artillery units also disappeared. Cannons were replaced by anti-tank guided missiles, and units armed with these weapons appeared on the staff of motorized rifle units. In the mid-1970s, the word “fighter” disappeared from the name of anti-tank units, and twenty years later, the last two dozen anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades disappeared along with the Soviet army. But whatever the post-war history of Soviet anti-tank artillery, it will never cancel the courage and those feats with which the fighters and commanders of the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army glorified their kind of troops during the Great Patriotic War.

In the first months after the October Revolution, on the Don, in Siberia, in the Urals, in the North-West of Russia, centers of the White movement began to appear - centers of anti-Soviet struggle. In parallel, to counter them, the Red Guard detachments were created, and on January 15, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, headed by V.I. Lenin, adopted a decree on the creation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) - the Armed Forces of the Soviet state. A photocopy of this decree is placed in the exposition of the hall.

By the summer of 1918, Russia was engulfed in the flames of a fratricidal Civil War. On the main territory of the country, hostilities ceased by the end of 1920, and in the Far East, in Primorye, they continued until the autumn of 1923. With the outbreak of war, both the Whites and the Reds began to pay special attention to the creation of artillery units. The Red Army was in a more favorable position, since the main industrial regions of the country and a large number of artillery depots and arsenals of the internal military districts were under the control of the Bolsheviks. For this reason, the numerical superiority of its artillery over the artillery of the White armies was overwhelming.

The first section of the hall's exposition is devoted to the actions of Soviet artillery during the Civil War. The photographs depict one of the first artillery batteries of the Red Army, formed in Petrograd in the spring of 1918, and red artillery commanders - the first graduation of the Second Soviet Petrograd Artillery Courses, held in the autumn of 1918.

I. G. Drozdov. The first Red Army soldiers in 1918 1924.

Here you can also see the personal belongings of active participants in the Civil War - a revolver of the Nagant system, presented by Tula gunsmiths to the commander of the 25th Infantry Division V.I. .Furmanova, another revolver of the Nagant system of the outstanding Soviet artilleryman N.N. Voronov (later Chief Marshal of Artillery), as well as a dagger that belonged to the commander of one of the cavalry divisions of the Red Army G.I. Kotovsky.

The first Soviet order, the Order of the Red Banner, established by the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of the RSFSR of September 16, 1918, is also exhibited in the hall. Portraits of Soviet military leaders who were awarded four orders of the Red Banner during the Civil War are also presented here - V.K .Blucher, S.S. Vostretsov, J.F. Fabricius and I.F. Fedko.

There is a very interesting exhibit in the hall - a home-made 50-mm smoothbore gun, used by the Ural Red partisans in battles with the White Guards. The muzzle-loading cannon with a hammer-type percussion-capsule mechanism fired stone cannonballs or "shot" at a distance of up to 250 m.

In the Civil War in Russia, both on the side of the Whites and on the side of the Reds, troops and equipment of foreign states took part - England, France, the USA, Germany, Japan, Czechoslovakia, China, Latvia, etc. This is confirmed by the 18-pound exhibited in the hall. (85-mm) English field gun mod. 1903, captured by the Red Army in the battles against the Anglo-American invaders near Shenkursk in January 1919

During the war years, Soviet artillery went from separate guns and disparate Red Guard and partisan formations to an independent branch of the military. The combat skill of artillerymen grew stronger, new types of artillery arose. Thus, during the defense of the Kakhovka bridgehead in the summer of 1920, the system of modern anti-tank defense was born. In this operation, the artillery of one of the defense sectors was commanded by a former Kolchak officer, a talented artilleryman L.A. Govorov, later an active participant in the Great Patriotic War, Marshal of the Soviet Union. A photocopy of the layout of artillery during the defense of the Kakhovka bridgehead and a photograph of Govorov's paint committee are exhibited in the hall. There are also portraits of the first chief of artillery of the Red Army, Yu. Frunze.

After the end of the war in 1924-1928. in the USSR, a large-scale military reform was carried out, during which the size of the Red Army was significantly reduced. Particular attention was paid to the development of special branches of the armed forces, in particular artillery and armored forces. The exposition presents a photocopy of the law "On Compulsory Military Service" dated September 28, 1925, regulations and instructions of the Red Army of the 1920s, photographs showing the combat training of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, including artillerymen.

The experience of the world and civil wars showed the need to improve the quality of artillery weapons. Due to the devastation that prevailed after the war in industry, the lack of raw materials and qualified personnel, the initial tasks of the Soviet artillery were to put in order and subsequent modernization of the models already in service. In the hall there are authentic samples and photographs of artillery systems, ammunition and devices that were in service with domestic artillery in the 1920s. Samples of small arms of the Red Army of that period are also presented here.

However, it was clear to the country's leadership and military command that modernization alone would not solve the problems of improving weapons. Even during the Civil War, on December 17, 1918, the Commission for Special Artillery Experiments (KOSARTOP) was created in Petrograd, which was organizationally part of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). This commission, which existed until 1926, was entrusted with the tasks of carrying out research and experimental work in the field of artillery. Members of the commission developed promising projects for new guns, mortars, and ammunition. Photo portraits of the commission chairman V.M. Trofimov and its permanent members N.F. Drozdov, F.F. Lender, V.I. Rdultovsky and M.F. Rozenberg are presented in the exposition. Nearby are prototypes of artillery guns, created in the 2nd half of the 1920s - 37-mm gun M.F. Rozenberg, 45-mm gun A.A. Sokolov, 65-mm howitzer R.A. Durlyakhov and others

In 1926, due to a significant increase in the volume of artillery research, a number of design bureaus and research institutes were created on the basis of KOSARTOP, working on instructions from the GAU.

In 1927, the first regimental gun was put into service, which is a modernized and improved 76-mm short gun mod.

1913-1925, and in 1929 the first domestic battalion 45-mm was put into service. howitzer (cannon) arr. 1929 designs by F. F. Lender with sliding beds to increase the flexibility of the fire. There are also modernized guns of the First World War: 76-mm. rapid-fire cannon mod. 1902-1930, 122 mm howitzer mod. 1910-1930, 152 mm howitzer mod. 1910-1930 and 107 mm gun mod. 1910-1930 As a result of the modernization, the firing range was significantly increased (by almost 50% for cannons, by 30% for howitzers), the mobility of guns increased as a result of the transition from wooden wheels to metal ones with tires filled with sponge rubber, which also made it possible to successfully transfer guns from horse traction to mechanical.

In the 20s. in the USSR, active work was carried out to create new models of manual automatic weapons. There was a remarkable school of Soviet gunsmiths, whose outstanding representatives were V.G. Fedorov, V.A. Degtyarev, F.V. Tokarev, G.S. Shpagin, S.G. Simonov.
Personal belongings, awards, samples of weapons created by them are exhibited in special cabinets. Particularly interesting are the samples adopted by the Red Army in the late 1920s. machine guns designed by V.A. Degtyarev - aviation (coaxial DA-2 mod. 1928 and PV-1), infantry mod. 1927 (DP-27), tank mod. 1929 (DT-29). Two cabinets are occupied by a collection of the first samples of automatic weapons, created in 1921-1927. V. G. Fedorov, V. A. Degtyarev, G. S. Shpagin. Here are the automatic rifles of F.V. Tokarev arr. 1932 and S.G. Simonov arr. 1931 and 1936, submachine guns designed by F.V. Tokarev, S.G. Simonov, S.A. Korovin.

During the years of the first five-year plan (1929-1932), in connection with the development of aviation, new models of anti-aircraft artillery guns, rangefinders, as well as artillery anti-aircraft fire control devices (PUAZO) were created, which develop installations for firing at air targets and transfer them to guns.

The hall exhibits a 76-mm anti-aircraft gun mod. 1931 and ammunition for it. Next to the gun are PUAZO-1 and PUAZO-2, a rangefinder, a synchronous communication cable, a commander's tablet mod. 1927, sound detector and anti-aircraft searchlight station.

A separate section of the exposition is dedicated to the origin and development of a completely new type of artillery weapons - dynamo-reactive cannons, proposed in 1923 by the designer L.V. Kurchevsky. When fired from them, part of the powder gases rushed through the nozzle in the direction opposite to the movement of the projectile. There was a reactive force equal to the pressure force of powder gases on the bottom of the projectile. This achieved practical recoillessness of the gun barrel. In the early 30s. The ground forces, aviation and navy were armed with dynamo-reactive guns of various types. Among the material exhibits are a 37-mm anti-tank gun of the Kurchevsky RK, a 76-mm BOD battalion gun, a 76-mm DRP-4 dynamo-active gun and a 76-mm aircraft gun of the Kurchevsky APC-4. For merits in the creation of new types of artillery weapons, L.V. Kurchevsky, among the first Soviet citizens, was awarded the Order of the Red Star (No. 116). But, to the greatest regret for Russian science and the armed forces, in 1937 the designer was repressed and in 1939 he died in prison, and the army was left without effective weapons.

The period from 1933 to 1940 was marked by a new qualitative stage in the development of domestic artillery. The modernized guns of the old types no longer met modern requirements, so the main task facing the Soviet designers was to create a new material part of the artillery. On March 22, 1934, the Council of Labor and Defense of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution "On the system of artillery weapons of the Red Army for the second five-year plan." This system provided for the re-equipment of the Red Army during the second five-year plan (1933-1937) with new models of modern artillery equipment. Particular attention was paid to the development of anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery, the improvement of old and the development of new types of ammunition, the standardization and unification of weapons.

From the middle of 1932, the 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1932. However, despite the high ballistic data, it had a number of drawbacks, in particular, it lacked suspension. Therefore, as a result of the modernization, a new gun was created, called the 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937. A new semi-automatic shutter was created for it, a push-button trigger was introduced at the flywheel of the lifting mechanism, which increased the rate of fire and accuracy of fire, as well as suspension, which increased the mobility of the gun. In addition, the gun had a sprung limber for 50 shells, the wheels of which were of the same type as the wheels of the gun. The new cannon, along with its limber and samples of ammunition, can be seen on display.

To replace the mountain artillery in service with the 76-mm mountain gun mod. 1909 by the design bureau of the plant. M.V. Frunze created a new 76-mm mountain gun mod. 1938. It was light and silent on the move, had good maneuverability on mountain roads and was not inferior to foreign models in terms of its combat qualities. In the display case you can see a disassembled model of this gun and drawings showing the method of transporting the gun in packs.

By 1936, under the leadership of the chief designer V. G. Grabin, the first domestic divisional 76-mm cannon mod. 1936 (F-22). Not a single node of it was borrowed from other systems. The rate of fire of the gun was increased to 20 rounds per minute, and the firing range to 14 km, although the complexity of the device and the large mass reduced its combat capabilities. In connection with this, the design bureau of V. G. Grabin quickly developed and put into service a 76-mm cannon mod. 1939 (USV), which was lighter, more compact and eliminated the shortcomings of its predecessor, the F-22.

A separate part of the exposition is devoted to the development of domestic mortar weapons. Its development was mainly carried out by a design team led by B.I. Shavyrin. In the 2nd half of the 30s. a whole family of mortars was created. Samples of all of them are presented in the exhibition. So, for example, a 50-mm company mortar arr. 1938 was notable for its simplicity of design, high accuracy and good fragmentation action, and the small mass of the mortar and the ability to carry it in one pack made it a very maneuverable weapon. In the course of the modernization, the mass of the mortar decreased by 2 kg, it became easier to manufacture, the dead space was reduced by 100 m. The new mortar was called the “50-mm company mortar mod. 1940".

In 1937, an 82-mm mortar was created, which was distinguished by high ballistic data, had a base plate of a more rational design and had a relatively high practical rate of fire - 15 rounds per minute. A powerful and highly maneuverable escort weapon for mountain infantry units was the 107-mm mountain pack mortar mod. 1938. It could be dismantled into several parts and transported in nine horse packs. On the merits of the 120-mm regimental mortar arr. 1938 speaks eloquently of the fact that its design in 1943 was copied by the Germans. All domestic mortars were distinguished by their small size, long firing range, mobility, rate of fire, and were successfully used during the Great Patriotic War. Samples of ammunition for them are also shown next to the mortars. Behind the complex showing the creation of mortars in our country, there are showcases with fuses and remote tubes for artillery ammunition, rockets and feathered mines.

To replace the 122-mm howitzer mod.
1909/30, which in terms of its tactical and technical data was already inferior to the corresponding models of foreign armies, a team led by F.F. Petrov created a howitzer of the same caliber - a 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 (M-30). The sliding frames of its carriage made it possible to significantly increase the angles of horizontal and vertical shelling, which in turn dramatically increased the ability to maneuver fire. Suspension significantly increased the maneuverability of the howitzer. She was in service until the 1980s.

The best use of artillery in combat was facilitated by the successes achieved in such a branch of artillery science as the internal and external ballistics of artillery firing. Scientific research of artillery scientists D.A.Venttsel, P.V.Gelvikh, I.I.Grave, V.D.Grendal, N.F.Drozdov, V.G.Dyakonov, D.E.Kozlovsky, V.V. Mechnikova, Ya.M. Shapiro made it possible by the autumn of 1939 to create new firing tables, firing rules for military and anti-aircraft artillery, to revise the instructions for fire training and firing course, as well as other manuals.

The showcases display portraits of prominent Soviet artillery designers V.G. Grabin, F.F. Petrov, I.I. Ivanov, M.Ya. Krupchatnikov, who were awarded the high title of Hero of Socialist Labor for their work.

Along with the creation of new guns, Soviet designers also developed new ammunition for them. The activities of the most prominent Soviet specialists in this field D. N. Vishnevsky, A. A. Gartz, M. F. Vasiliev are reflected in documents, photographs, and printed works. Next to them are samples of the shells they created, remote tubes, fuses.

A lot of work in these years was carried out by gunsmiths. In 1938, a 12.7-mm machine gun of the Degtyarev-Shpagin system (DShK) was created and entered service on a Kolesnikov universal machine gun, which makes it possible to fire at both ground and air targets. This machine gun is on display. Next to him is a 7.62-mm machine gun of the system of V. A. Degtyarev arr. 1939 (DS-39). Here are samples of automatic weapons designed by G. S. Shpagin, V. A. Degtyarev, B. G. Shpitalny, I. A. Komaritsky, M. E. Berezin and S. V. Vladimirov, created in the 2nd half of 1930- x years.

Particular attention was paid to the creation of weapons for aviation.
In 1936, Soviet designers developed an ultra-high-speed machine gun - ShKAS, capable of firing 1800 rounds per minute. In 1939, the super-ShKAS entered service, the rate of fire of which reached 3600 rounds per minute. This machine gun is exhibited next to the universal machine gun of the Berezin (UB) system, which was one of the main types of aviation weapons during the Great Patriotic War. Nearby is a large-caliber aircraft machine gun of designers
B. G. Shpitalny and S. V. Vladimirov (ShVAK). The hall also houses a twin anti-aircraft mount for machine guns of the system of B. G. Shpitalny and I. A. Komaritsky (ShKAS) and a 20-mm aircraft gun of the Shpitalny-Vladimirov system on a tripod machine for firing at air targets.

A major contribution to the development of automatic weapons was the creation of submachine guns by V. A. Degtyarev and G. S. Shpagin. PPD and PPSh are presented in the showcase.

In September 1935, personal military ranks were introduced in the Red Army. One of the showcases contains portraits of the first five Marshals of the Soviet Union - K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny, M.N. Tukhachevsky, V.K. Blucher, A.I. Egorov.

In the second half of the 1930s. Significant changes have taken place in the development of military educational institutions - their number has increased, curricula have changed, military schools have been renamed military schools. Materials dedicated to artillery schools are presented in the exposition.

However, during the same period, a wave of political repressions hit the Red Army. About 40 thousand commanders and political workers, including M. N. Tukhachevsky, V. K. Blyukher, A. I. Egorov, were repressed, many were shot. The death of many experienced commanders and weapons designers seriously undermined the combat capability of the Armed Forces.

Military equipment created by Soviet designers showed high fighting qualities in battles with Japanese militarists, who suddenly invaded the territory of Soviet Primorye near Lake Khasan on July 29, 1938. On the stands dedicated to these events, battle diagrams are shown. Japanese troops in the Khasan area managed to capture the dominant heights - Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya. On August 6, the offensive of the Soviet troops was scheduled, the ultimate goal of which was to dislodge the Japanese from Soviet soil. By the end of August 7, units of the 40th division of the Red Army, smashing the Japanese, reached the eastern slopes of the Zaozernaya hill. In these battles, the commander of a platoon of 45-mm guns of the 118th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division, Lieutenant I. R. Lazarev, acted heroically. When, attacking the eastern slopes of the height, the Red Army men lay down under heavy fire, the artillerymen of Lieutenant Lazarev, moving in infantry combat formations, opened fire on the enemy with direct fire. At one of the guns, Lazarev personally acted as a gunner and, despite heavy Japanese fire and a wound, continued to fire. Three enemy guns were destroyed, and machine gun fire was suppressed. On August 9, the enemy was driven back beyond the territory of the state border, and two days later hostilities were stopped. Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain I. R. Lazarev, died in a battle with the Nazi invaders in the autumn of 1941. One of the showcases displays his winter helmet, as well as the Gold Star medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union and the Order of Lenin.

During the operation carried out by the Soviet-Mongolian troops under the command of commander G.K. Zhukov in July-August 1939, the 6th Japanese army was crushed in the area
R. Khalkhin Gol. From the fire of Soviet artillery, the Japanese suffered huge losses. In a showcase dedicated to the battle on the river. Khalkhin Gol, a photograph and awards of the commander of the artillery battalion, captain A.S. Rybkin. In battles with the Japanese, with skillful actions and well-aimed fire, he repeatedly thwarted enemy infantry attacks, suppressed several artillery batteries, and distinguished himself during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses. For bravery and courage shown in battles with the Japanese on the Khalkhin-Gol River, A.S. Rybkin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on November 17, 1939.

The painting by the artist M. Avilov “Eleven Border Guards on the Zaozernaya Hill” is dedicated to the events in the Far East. Here you can also see two captured cannons and small arms captured from the Japanese.

The increased role of aviation dictated the need for a sharp improvement in the quality of anti-aircraft artillery. The 76-mm anti-aircraft guns that were in service no longer fully met the increased requirements, therefore, in 1939, an 85-mm high-power anti-aircraft gun mod. 1939, which, if necessary, could be used to combat ground targets and strengthen anti-tank defenses. To combat aircraft operating at low altitudes, small-caliber automatic anti-aircraft guns were created. In 1939 and 1940 37- and 25-mm automatic guns were adopted. They had a high rate of fire and were a powerful means of combating not only enemy aircraft, but also ground targets - tanks, armored vehicles, etc. Along with these guns, ammunition for them is also on display in the hall. During the Great Patriotic War, these guns were an effective means of combating German attack aircraft and dive bombers.

There are also fire control devices for anti-aircraft artillery (PUAZO-3), a commander's anti-aircraft tube, a stereoscopic rangefinder of a 4-meter base and a meter-long anti-aircraft rangefinder on display. The stand contains illustrative material that was used in training in firing from anti-aircraft artillery guns. Of interest are the first samples of radar stations - RUS-2 and P-2M.

The events related to the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 were also reflected in the hall. The stand shows a diagram of military operations. The main obstacle for the advancing units of the Red Army was a fortified strip of permanent structures, the so-called "Mannerheim Line", the flanks of which rested on Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland and therefore could not be bypassed. The "Mannerheim Line" was a dense chain of pillboxes, pillboxes and dugouts, reinforced with anti-tank ditches, gouges, barbed wire and skillfully adapted to the terrain. How formidable the Finnish defense was can be judged by the fragments of the Finnish reinforced concrete fortifications and the granite anti-tank gouge presented in the hall. In addition, one of the photographs shows a section of the front edge of the Finnish fortified zone in 1939. In such a situation, artillery acquired particular importance. With her fire, she destroyed the discovered enemy firing points, thereby clearing the way for infantry and tanks. The exposition presents Soviet concrete-piercing shells of various calibers and a 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 No. 2243. Under enemy fire, the commander of the 45-mm anti-tank gun I. E. Egorov rolled out the gun into the open area and, firing armor-piercing shells at the embrasures of the pillbox, suppressed it, and after the gun was disabled, took together with the calculation, participation in the attack of the infantry. For the courage shown in battle, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The events of this war are dedicated to the paintings by artists M. Avilov “The pillbox fell silent forever” and A. Blinkov “The capture of Vyborg by Soviet troops on March 12, 1940”. The flag of the 27th Infantry Regiment, hoisted on March 13, 1940 over Vyborg, is exhibited in the hall. A separate display case shows captured enemy small arms.

In addition to samples of artillery equipment, the exposition presents military uniforms of the 1920-1930s. Uniforms, tunics and headdresses of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army can be seen in glass cases located along the central gallery of the hall.

The anti-tank artillery of the Red Army was subdivided into military and RGK. Military anti-tank artillery was first introduced into the rifle troops in the early 30s of the last century as a "separate anti-tank battery" as part of a rifle division. Due to the lack of materiel, the batteries were completely introduced into the rifle units in the year 1936. In 1938 1941, a separate anti-tank division was introduced into the structure of a rifle division.The composition of anti-tank artillery units and units in various divisions of the Red Army as of June 11, 1441 is given in Table No. 11 (data as of June 11, 1941; batteries of regimental artillery, batteries of divisional 76-mm cannons of artillery regiments, separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions of divisions).
Studying the experience of the combat use of the armored forces of the Wehrmacht in 1939-1940, Soviet military experts came to the conclusion that the attacks of enemy tanks could only be countered by massing anti-tank weapons. As an experimental organizational form of this massing, a separate cannon artillery regiment of the RGK was chosen, armed with 76-mm F-11 cannons and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. In total, four such regiments were formed in KOVO and ZapOVO. These were the first anti-tank artillery units of the RGK. But the brigade was defined as the result of the activities of the regiments as a new structure of the military unit of anti-tank defense.
On October 14, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR turned to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with proposals for holding NEW organizational measures in the Red Army in the first half of 1941. In particular, it was proposed:

To form 20 machine-gun and artillery motorized brigades with powerful cannon and machine-gun armament, designed to fight and counter enemy tank and mechanized troops. The deployment of E brigades should have:
a). L VO - 5 brigades.
b). PribOVO - 4 brigades.
in). ZapOVO - 3 brigades.
G). KOVO - 5 brigades,
e). ZabNO - 1 brigade.
with). DVF - 2 brigades ... ".
It was proposed to use three artillery regiments of the fortified areas of the KOVO and OdVO, as well as all four separate artillery regiments armed with 76-mm cannons and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, created temporarily to reinforce the troops of the KOVO and ZapOVO, to form brigades.
Permission to form was received, and on November 4, 1940, by the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, the formation of 20 machine-gun and artillery motorized brigades began as part of the Armored Forces of the Red Army with the deadline for staffing the brigades with personnel and training materiel on January 1, 1941. The receipt of materiel and equipment was to take place gradually as it came from industry. Soon, the phrase "machine-gun and artillery" was canceled, and the brigades began to be called "motorized", confusing some publications on the history of the pre-war Red Army, where they were called "motorized rifles". brigades were formed according to wartime staffs No. 05 / 100-05 / 112 (Scheme 1).

In total, the brigade was supposed to have: 6199 people, 17 T-26 tanks, 19 armored vehicles, machine guns: D11 - 56, easel - 156, large-caliber anti-aircraft guns - 48. Mortars: 50 mm -90.82 mm - 28, 107 mm - 1 2. guns: 45 mm anti-tank - 30.76 mm F-22 - 42.37 mm automatic anti-aircraft guns - 12, 76 mm or 85 mm anti-aircraft guns - 36, tractors - 82. motor vehicles - 545.

The 4th (KOVO) and 5th (ZapOVO) cannon artillery regiments were turned to the formation of brigades. 48th reserve artillery regiment of the OdVO, 191st rifle regiment of the Grodekovsky UR of the Far Eastern Front. Motorized brigades were formed in the following military districts (fronts): LVO - 1. 4.7, 10th; PribOVO - 2,% 8, 11th, ZapOVO - 3, 9, 13, 14th, KOVO - 6, 15, 18, 20, 22nd, OdVO -12th and on the Far Eastern Front - 16th and 23rd -I.
Considering the structure of a motorized brigade, one can notice the main drawback - 76 and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were not quite suitable for anti-tank defense purposes due to their weight and size characteristics and the absence of an armor shield. In addition, the divisions armed with these guns did not have artillery anti-aircraft fire control devices (PUAZO) and rangefinders, which did not allow them to be used for air defense purposes.

As was often the case in the Russian Armed Forces, without having time to complete and train, in February-March 1941, all brigades were disbanded, equipment and personnel were not used for new formations - rifle divisions of 6,000 men and motorized divisions of mechanized corps. For example, in the LVO, on the basis of the 4th brigade, by July 1, 1941, the 237th rifle division was formed, from the 10th brigade - the 177th rifle division, in the OdVO on the basis of the 12th brigade -218th motorized division 18- mechanized corps. in PribOVO on the basis of the 11th brigade - the 188th rifle division.

At the beginning of 1911, the head of the GAU of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Kulik, informed the leadership of the Red Army intelligence data that the German army was rapidly re-equipping its troops with tanks with armor of increased thickness, in the fight against which all our 45-mm caliber artillery would be ineffective. The intelligence received most likely referred to captured French B-1 bis tanks. having armor 60 mm thick. Just in the spring of 19-11, a small number of these vehicles were re-equipped with flamethrowers and, with the k-2 index, entered service with individual tank battalions of the Wehrmacht.

Be that as it may, the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense took this information quite seriously. As a result, just before the war, the production of 45 mm anti-tank and 76-mm divisional guns was stopped, and instead of them, preparations were hastily made for the release of 107-mm guns.

In addition, on April 23, 1911, by the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the SNKSSSR No. 1112-459ss "On new formations as part of the Red Army", it was planned to form ten anti-tank artillery brigades of the RUK by June 1, 1941, consisting of:
- Brigade management:
- 2 artillery regiments:
- Headquarters battery;
- Minno sapper battalion;
- Motor transport battalion.

According to the state, the brigade had 5322 people, 48 76-mm cannons of the 1936 model (F-22), 48 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, 24 107-mm M-6O cannons, 16 - 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. 12 heavy machine guns, 93 DT light machine guns. 584 trucks.
123 special vehicles, 11 cars and 165 tractors (Scheme 2).

Brigades were formed in Kiev (1. 2, 3.4 and 5th). Western (6. 7.8th) and Baltic (9th and 10th) Special Military Districts. All brigades were created at the ball formed in February - April 1941 of the rifle divisions of the 6,000-strong staff N * 4/120. The brigade directorates were formed from the headquarters of the chiefs of artillery of divisions, the rest of the units and subunits from howitzer and light artillery regiments of integral anti-aircraft artillery divisions, separate communications battalions, separate engineer battalions, automobile divisions transport companies. The personnel missing to the states came from other parts of the KOVO. ZanOVO and PriboVO. The brigades equipped with vehicles and tractors were supposed to be stuffed in the second half of 1941.

For example, in the ZapOVO all brigades were formed on the basis of three rifle divisions that arrived in the district in the first half of May 1941 from the Moscow (22-4th and 231st rifle divisions) and Siberian (201st rifle divisions) military districts.

Commanders and chiefs of artillery of rifle and mechanized corps or divisions were promoted to the positions of brigade commanders. For example, the chief of artillery of the 2nd mechanized corps of the OdVO, Major General of Artillery K. Moskalenko, was appointed commander of the 1st anti-tank artillery brigade, and Colonel M. Nedelin, chief of artillery of the 160th rifle division of the Moscow Military District, was appointed commander of the 1st brigade. Interestingly, both of these brigade commanders later became the first and second Commanders-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces.

It was believed that an anti-tank artillery brigade was capable of creating a density of 20-25 anti-tank guns per 1 km of front on a front 5-6 km wide and repulsing an attack by one or two enemy tank divisions in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces.
Apparently, the presence of ten anti-tank defense brigades seemed insufficient, therefore, in order to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the troops, by the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army of May 16, 1941, 50 tank regiments and several separate reconnaissance battalions of the newly formed mechanized corps before they received tanks by July 1, 1941 should have been armed with 76- mm p 45 mm cannons and DT machine guns based on: for a tank regiment 18 45-MM and 24 76-MM cannons and 14 machine guns, for a reconnaissance battalion 18 45-mm cannons.

Checking the implementation of the directives of the ICS) of the USSR, carried out by the General Staff of the Red Army at the beginning of June 1911, showed that the staffing of brigades with personnel, vehicles and other property of the GVOM was carried out slowly. On June 11, 1941, the brigades had from 30 to 78% of the regular number of guns. So. in the 6th Iptabr of the RGK there were only about 11% of the number of cars assigned to it by the state and there were no tractors at all. Due to the lack of traction equipment, the 11th Iptabr RGK could only use 3 divisions from 11. In the 636th artillery regiment of the 9th Iptabr RGK, there were only 15 tractors and vehicles for 68 guns.

The very first battles with Wehrmacht tank formations revealed a new mental illness of the Red Army soldiers - a disease called "tank fear". Numerous stories of retreating soldiers about the power and abundance of German tanks, capable of quickly, suddenly, making coverage - “pincers * and encirclement - * boilers *, made an indelible impression on those leading to the front.

In the last decade, the Headquarters of the High Command decided to form separate anti-tank artillery regiments of the RGK according to state No. 04/133 (wartime) with a total number of 1551 people without a school of junior command personnel, divisions of 107-mm guns and air defense. From June 30, 1941, according to the directives of the General Staff of the Red Army, the formation of such regiments began in Orlovsky (753rd Ap readiness deadline for the morning of July 7. 761st Ap readiness date for July 7, 7b5th Ap. Ready date for August 15) and Kharkiv ("64th ap. readiness deadline for August 15) military districts. Difficulties with staffing the material part led to the fact that in order to accelerate the formation of directives of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 71 / org and 72 / org of July 18, 1911, all four The regiments were reorganized according to a paid calculation as part of five 4-gun battalions of 85-mm anti-aircraft guns.They received the name "artillery regiments of anti-aircraft defense."

Air defense units with 76- and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were thrown into the formation of anti-tank artillery regiments. So, the 509th anti-aircraft artillery regiment (commander - Major V.A. Gerasimov) met the beginning of the war as part of the 4th air defense division in the city of Lvov. Batteries of the regiment on the outskirts of the city destroyed at least 11 enemy aircraft. After numerous battles, on July 7, 1941, the regiment concentrated in the Ignatopol camps near Korosten. where on July 8 it was reorganized into the 509th anti-tank artillery regiment (since 1942 - the 3rd guards artillery regiment of the PTO).

By GOKO Decree No. 172ss of July 16, 1941 "On the Mozhaisk Line of Defense", the commander of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General P. Artemyev, was allowed to withdraw 200 85-mm cannons from Moscow's air defense and form 10 lightweight artillery (anti-tank) regiments (five batteries each) in each regiment).The deadline for the readiness of these regiments (Nos. 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876. 877, 878.879, 880) was set to a minimum - July 18-20.

Decree of the GOKO No. 735ss of October 5, 1941 “On the formation of 24 anti-tank regiments. armed with 85 mm and 37 mm anti-aircraft guns - to strengthen the anti-tank defense of the army of the Western Front, it was ordered to form 4 anti-tank artillery regiments at the expense of the 1st air defense corps, which covered the capital from the air. Each regiment consisted of 8 - 85 mm and 8 - 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, the readiness date was set on October 6. In addition, according to the same decree, 20 more NTO artillery regiments of the same composition were formed in the Moscow Military District, but with the possibility of replacing 37-mm anti-aircraft guns with 45-mm anti-tank ones. The readiness date for the first six regiments was set on the 8th. the next four on the 10th and the remaining ten by October 15th.
On the Leningrad Direction, on July 5, 1941, the 2nd Air Defense Corps allocated 100 anti-aircraft guns with the best crews to reinforce and support ground forces and sent them to anti-tank defense. By order of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front on August 11, 115. 189. 194 and 351 anti-aircraft artillery regiments additionally formed four anti-tank divisions and sent them to anti-tank defense in the Southern fortified area.

All further formations of anti-tank regiments were carried out in 4 or 6-battery composition. The number of batteries in a regiment was determined mainly by the availability of materiel at the time of formation, as well as by the desire to experimentally find out the most advantageous form of regiment organization. It was believed that a regiment of this composition was maneuverable, easily controlled, it was easier to complete it with materiel and personnel due to its small number.

In total, in 1941, according to some data, 72 were rationed and sent to the front, according to others, at least 90 artillery regiments of the NTO. In addition, in the Leningrad Military District in July 1941, the 14th anti-tank artillery brigade of two field strength was formed, which also took part in hostilities on the Northern (later Leningrad) Front.

The experience of the first battles showed. that the anti-tank brigades of the RGK are a powerful means of fighting tanks. At the same time, they also revealed shortcomings - the difficulty of managing units and subunits, the cumbersomeness of the organizational structure. Numerous command and control units (brigade - regiment - division - battery) did not allow to quickly and timely bring information to the performers, process it in a short time, making a timely decision. The maneuverable nature of the slaughterhouses gave rise to rapid changes in the situation and the balance of forces and means in certain sectors of the front. The success of repulsing enemy tank attacks largely depended on the continuous control of units and subunits of brigades from speed
their maneuver to threatened areas and the timely opening of fire.

The brigade organization of anti-tank artillery made it difficult to meet these requirements. Regiments of anti-tank brigades, as a rule, acted separately and often at a considerable distance from one another, which not only made it difficult for the brigade commander to manage them, but sometimes completely excluded him. At the same time, it was very difficult for the regimental commander to control the actions of six divisions. The brigades, having taken the first blows of German tanks, disappeared in the crucible of battles of the first year of the war: the 1st - in September as part of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front, the 2nd - in August as part of the 12th Army of the Southern Front, 3rd - in August as part of the 6th Army of the Southern Front, 1st - in November as part of the 18th Army of the Southern Front 5th - in October as part of the 40th Army of the Southwestern Front, 6, 7 and 8th - in June-July as part of the Western Front. The 9th - in September as part of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front and the 10th in October as part of the North-Western Front.

In military anti-tank artillery, due to the large losses of 45-mm guns, blocking four times the income from industry, as well as the formation of a significant number of new rifle and cavalry divisions, it was decided to reduce the number of 45-mm guns in rifle divisions. On July 29, 19-11, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR approved the new state of rifle division No. 04/600 (wartime), to which newly formed divisions and divisions recovering after battles were transferred. Therefore, the payment was completely excluded - a platoon of 45-mm guns of a rifle battalion and a separate artillery battalion of 45-mm guns of a rifle division. In total, 18 45-mm guns remained in the rifle division instead of 54 in the pre-war state. In the cavalry, in July 1941, a new staff of light cavalry division No. 07/3 (wartime) was introduced, according to which the number of cavalry regiments was reduced to three, and 45 mm guns in each regiment to two. Thus, the cavalry division had only 6 45-mm guns instead of 16 according to the pre-war state. According to such states, 81 cavalry divisions were formed in 1911.

To some extent, the decrease in the number of anti-tank guns was offset by the start of production in October and the arrival of Simonov and Degtyarev anti-tank rifles to the front in November. However, at first, the design of anti-tank rifles went with big problems. Things got to the point that on August 10, 1941, by decree of GOKO No. 453ss at the Tula Arms Plant, a German 7.92-mm anti-tank rifle was launched into series, and by decree of GOKO No. 661ss of September 11, an anti-tank cartridge of caliber 7.92- was adopted by the Red Army. mm.

The staff of a separate rifle brigade No. 04/730 (wartime) dated October 15, 1941, it included a separate anti-tank division of three batteries (12-57th anti-tank guns of the 1941 model (ZIS-2)). On December 6, 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR approved the next staff of rifle division No. 04/750 (wartime), in which a company of anti-tank rifles (27 anti-tank rifles), a battery of 45-mm guns (6 guns), as well as the division was restored a separate anti-tank division (12 - 57-mm guns. 8 anti-tank rifles. In total, according to the new staff, the division had 12 - 57-mm, 18 -45-mm guns and 89 anti-tank guns.
On January 1, 1942, in the active army and in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, there were: one artillery brigade. 57 artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery battalions. They were on the following fronts:
- Leningradsky - 14 ABR VET, 1.2. 3.4. 5, 6.7, b90ap PTO;
- Volkhovsky - 884 ap VET;
- North-West - 171.698, 759 ap PTO);
- Kalininsky - 873 app. 213 AADN VET;
- Western - 289. 296, 304, 316. 483. 509. 533, 540. 551. 593. 600. 610. 6-I, 694, 703, 766. 768.863.
- Bryansk - 569.1002 ap PTO;
- Southwest - 338.582, 591, 595, 651.738.760. 76-1 ap PTO,
- Southern - 186.521.530.558.665.727.754. 756 ap PTO:
- 7th Separate Army - 514 anti-tank guns; The reserve of the Supreme High Command rate is 702.765 an IITO.

More than 30 anti-tank regiments were lost in the first year of the war. The previous numbers of the disbanded or reorganized artillery regiments of the PTO are known - 18. 24, 39.79,117.121.197.367.395.421.452.453,455. 525, 559. 598. 603, 689, 696, 697. 699. 700, 704, 753. 758, 761, 872, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880. 885th and regiment of Major Bogdanov Leningradsky front.

For skillful combat operations, by order of the NCO of the USSR No. 4 of January 8, 1942, five artillery regiments of the NTO of the Western and one regiment of the South-Western Fronts were transformed into guards; 289, 296, 509, 760, 304, 871 respectively in the 1. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6th Guards.

The release of the required number of 76-mm F-22USV guns made it possible to replace them in anti-tank artillery units with 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. By GOKO Decree No. GOKO-1530SS of April 3, 1942 - On the replacement and withdrawal of 85 mm anti-aircraft guns from the anti-tank regiments of the fronts * during April 1942, 272 guns were withdrawn from the composition of the fronts:
- Western - 98,
- Kalininsky-20,
- Northwestern - 6,
- Volkhovsky - 10.
- Crimean - 8,
- South-80.
- Southwest-42.
- 7th Separate Army - 8.

All these guns were transferred to the Moscow Air Defense Corps, and in return, the same number of USV guns will be received from industry in April. A little later, the new resolution of the GOKO No. 1541 of April 5, 1942 “On strengthening the air defense of the mountains. Moscow had to transfer another 100 85-mm anti-aircraft guns in April, and another 80 guns in May 1942, at the expense of anti-tank artillery regiments of the fronts, to strengthen the air defense of the capital.

On April 3, 1942, the formation of 20 artillery regiments of the RGK (20 76-mm F-22USV guns each) began with a deadline for readiness by April 25 (10 regiments) and by May 10, 1942.
By GOKO Decree No. GOKO-1607ss of April 16, 1942 "On the organization, staffing and armament of a fighter brigade," new anti-tank formations of a combined arms type began to be formed - separate fighter brigades (onbr). According to the approved organization, the brig yes included:
a). Brigade management (with a communications platoon and a motorcycle platoon);
b). Two anti-tank battalions (72 1GGR each);
in). Anti-tank artillery regiment (four batteries of 76-mm ZIS-3 cannons (The People's Commissariat of Defense in the draft resolution proposed F-22USV guns, but I.V. Stalin's hand and red pencil in the text of the Decree -USV- was corrected to * ZIS-3 * -
Note. authors), three batteries of 45 mm guns, one battery of 37 mm anti-aircraft guns):
G). Separate engineering-mine battalion;
e). Separate tank battalion (21 T-34 tanks, 11 T-60 or T-70 tanks);
e). A separate company of submachine gunners (100 people);
g). Separate mortar division (8 -82-mm and 4 - 120-mm mortars).

In total, the fighter brigade had 1~9S people. 453 submachine guns, 10 light machine guns. 144 anti-tank rifles. 4 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. 12-45mm anti-tank guns, 16-76mm ZIS-3 guns, 8-82mm and 4 120mm mortars, 33 tanks, 193 vehicles and 22 motorcycles.

The decree ordered the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR to form "25 fighter brigades with a deadline - the first five by May 5. ten by May 20 and ten by June 28, 1942. In the Red Army, separate fighter brigades were kept according to states No. 0 4/270 - 04/276 (wartime).

The next decree No. GOKO-1901 ss of June 8, 1942 introduced a new organization of anti-tank formations. The twelve formed fighter brigades were combined into four fighter divisions (id) of three brigades each. The division was formed:
- in the Moscow military district - 1st and 2nd; in the Volga Military District - 3rd;
- in the Ural military district - 4th. Fighter divisions were supposed
use: 1st - on the South-Western, 2nd - on the Bryansk, 3rd - on the Western and 4th - on the Kalinin fronts.

_______________________________________________________________________________________
Data source: quote from the magazine "Front illustration for 2003-5" "Anti-tank artillery of the Red Army"

Soviet anti-tank artillery played a crucial role in the Great Patriotic War; it accounted for about 70% of all destroyed German artillery. Anti-tank warriors, fighting "to the last", often at the cost of their own lives repulsed the attacks of the Panzerwaffe.

The structure and materiel of anti-tank subunits were continuously improved in the course of hostilities. Until the autumn of 1940, anti-tank guns were part of rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry battalions, regiments and divisions. Anti-tank batteries, platoons and divisions were thus embedded in the organizational structure of the formations, being an integral part of them. The rifle battalion of the rifle regiment of the pre-war state had a platoon of 45-mm guns (two guns). The rifle regiment and motorized rifle regiment had a battery of 45-mm cannons (six guns). In the first case, horses were the means of traction, in the second case, Komsomolets specialized caterpillar armored tractors. The rifle division and the motorized division included a separate anti-tank division of eighteen 45-mm guns. For the first time, an anti-tank division was introduced into the state of a Soviet rifle division in 1938.
However, maneuvering with anti-tank guns was possible at that time only within a division, and not on a corps or army scale. The command had very limited opportunities to strengthen anti-tank defense in tank-prone areas.

Shortly before the war, the formation of anti-tank artillery brigades of the RGK began. According to the state, each brigade was supposed to have forty-eight 76-mm guns, forty-eight 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four 107-mm guns, sixteen 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The staff strength of the brigade was 5322 people. By the beginning of the war, the formation of brigades had not been completed. Organizational difficulties and the general unfavorable course of hostilities did not allow the first anti-tank brigades to fully realize their potential. However, already in the first battles, the brigades demonstrated the broad capabilities of an independent anti-tank formation.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the anti-tank capabilities of the Soviet troops were severely tested. Firstly, most often rifle divisions had to fight, occupying a front of defense that exceeded the statutory standards. Secondly, the Soviet troops had to face the German "tank wedge" tactics. It consisted in the fact that the tank regiment of the Wehrmacht tank division struck at a very narrow defense sector. At the same time, the density of attacking tanks was 50–60 vehicles per kilometer of front. Such a number of tanks on a narrow sector of the front inevitably saturated the anti-tank defense.

The heavy loss of anti-tank guns at the beginning of the war led to a decrease in the number of anti-tank guns in a rifle division. The July 1941 state rifle division had only eighteen 45 mm anti-tank guns instead of fifty-four in the pre-war state. In July, a platoon of 45-mm guns from a rifle battalion and a separate anti-tank battalion were completely excluded. The latter was restored to the state of the rifle division in December 1941. The shortage of anti-tank guns was to some extent made up for by the recently adopted anti-tank guns. In December 1941, an anti-tank rifle platoon was introduced at the regimental level in a rifle division. In total, the state division had 89 anti-tank rifles.

In the field of organizing artillery, the general trend at the end of 1941 was to increase the number of independent anti-tank units. On January 1, 1942, the active army and the reserve of the Headquarters of the High Command had: one artillery brigade (on the Leningrad front), 57 anti-tank artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery battalions. Following the results of the autumn battles, five artillery regiments of the PTO received the title of guards. Two of them received a guard for the battles near Volokolamsk - they supported the 316th Infantry Division of I.V. Panfilov.
1942 was a period of increasing the number and consolidation of independent anti-tank units. April 3, 1942 was followed by a decision of the State Defense Committee on the formation of a fighter brigade. According to the state, the brigade had 1795 people, twelve 45-mm guns, sixteen 76-mm guns, four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 144 anti-tank guns. By the next decree of June 8, 1942, the twelve formed fighter brigades were merged into fighter divisions, each with three brigades.

A milestone for the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army was the order of the NPO of the USSR No. 0528 signed by I. V. Stalin, according to which: the status of anti-tank units was raised, a double salary was set for personnel, a cash bonus was established for each tank that was destroyed, all command and personnel destroyer-anti-tank artillery units were placed on a special account and were to be used only in these units.

The distinctive sign of the anti-tankers was a sleeve insignia in the form of a black rhombus with a red border with crossed gun barrels. The rise in the status of anti-tankers was accompanied by the formation in the summer of 1942 of new anti-tank regiments. Thirty light (twenty 76-mm guns each) and twenty anti-tank artillery regiments (twenty 45-mm guns each) were formed.
The regiments were formed in a short time and immediately thrown into battle on the threatened sectors of the front.

In September 1942, ten more anti-tank regiments with twenty 45-mm guns were formed. Also in September 1942, an additional battery of four 76-mm guns was introduced to the most distinguished regiments. In November 1942, part of the anti-tank regiments was merged into fighter divisions. By January 1, 1943, the Red Army anti-tank artillery included 2 fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, 2 heavy anti-tank regiments, 168 anti-tank regiments, 1 anti-tank battalion.

The improved anti-tank defense system of the Red Army received the name Pakfront from the Germans. RAK is the German abbreviation for anti-tank gun - Panzerabwehrkannone. Instead of a linear arrangement of guns along the defended front, at the beginning of the war they were united in groups under a single command. This made it possible to concentrate the fire of several guns on one target. Anti-tank areas were the basis of anti-tank defense. Each anti-tank area consisted of separate anti-tank strongholds (PTOPs) in fire communication with each other. "To be in fire communication with each other" - means the possibility of firing by neighboring anti-tank guns on the same target. The PTOP was saturated with all types of fire weapons. The basis of the anti-tank fire system was 45-mm guns, 76-mm regimental guns, partially cannon batteries of divisional artillery and anti-tank artillery units.

The finest hour of anti-tank artillery was the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. At that time, 76-mm divisional guns were the main means of anti-tank units and formations. "Forty-five" accounted for about a third of the total number of anti-tank guns on the Kursk Bulge. A long pause in combat operations at the front made it possible to improve the condition of units and formations due to the receipt of equipment from industry and the additional manning of anti-tank regiments.

The last stage in the evolution of the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army was the enlargement of its units and the appearance of self-propelled guns in the anti-tank artillery. By the beginning of 1944, all fighter divisions and separate fighter brigades of the combined arms type were reorganized into anti-tank brigades. On January 1, 1944, the anti-tank artillery included 50 anti-tank brigades and 141 anti-tank regiments. By order of the NPO No. 0032 of August 2, 1944, one SU-85 regiment (21 self-propelled guns) was introduced into the fifteen anti-tank brigades. In reality, only eight brigades received self-propelled guns.

Particular attention was paid to the training of personnel of anti-tank brigades, purposeful combat training of artillerymen was organized to fight new German tanks and assault guns. Special instructions appeared in the anti-tank units: "Memo to the gunner - destroyer of enemy tanks" or "Memo on the fight against Tiger tanks." And in the armies, special rear ranges were equipped, where artillerymen trained in firing at mock-up tanks, including moving ones.

Simultaneously with the increase in the skill of artillerymen, tactics were improved. With the quantitative saturation of the troops with anti-tank weapons, the "fire bag" method began to be used more and more often. The guns were placed in "anti-tank nests" of 6-8 guns within a radius of 50-60 meters and were well camouflaged. The nests were located on the ground to achieve long-range flanking with the possibility of concentrating fire. Passing the tanks moving in the first echelon, the fire opened suddenly, to the flank, at medium and short distances.

In the offensive, anti-tank guns were quickly pulled up after the advancing units in order to support them with fire if necessary.

Anti-tank artillery in our country began in August 1930, when, within the framework of military-technical cooperation with Germany, a secret agreement was signed, according to which the Germans pledged to help the USSR organize the gross production of 6 artillery systems. To implement the agreement in Germany, a front company "BYuTAST" was created (limited liability company "Bureau for technical work and studies").

Among other weapons proposed by the USSR was a 37 mm anti-tank gun. The development of this weapon, bypassing the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, was completed at Rheinmetall Borsig in 1928. The first samples of the gun, which received the name Tak 28 (Tankabwehrkanone, i.e., anti-tank gun - the word Panzer came into use later) were tested in 1930, and from 1932 deliveries to the troops began. The Tak 28 gun had a 45-caliber barrel with a horizontal wedge breech, which provided a fairly high rate of fire - up to 20 rounds per minute. The carriage with sliding tubular beds provided a large horizontal pickup angle - 60 °, but at the same time the undercarriage with wooden wheels was designed only for horse traction.

In the early 1930s, this gun pierced the armor of any tank, and was perhaps the best in its class, far ahead of developments in other countries.

After modernization, having received wheels with pneumatic tires that can be towed by a car, an improved carriage and an improved sight, it was put into service under the designation 3.7 cm Pak 35/36 (Panzerabwehrkanone 35/36).
Remaining until 1942 the main anti-tank gun of the Wehrmacht.

The German gun was put into production at the plant near Moscow. Kalinin (No. 8), where she received the factory index 1-K. The enterprise mastered the production of a new weapon with great difficulty, the guns were made semi-handicraft, with manual fitting of parts. In 1931, the plant presented 255 guns to the customer, but did not hand over any due to poor build quality. In 1932, 404 guns were delivered, and in 1933, another 105.

Despite the problems with the quality of the guns produced, the 1-K was a fairly perfect anti-tank gun for the 1930s. Its ballistics made it possible to hit all the tanks of that time, at a distance of 300 m, an armor-piercing projectile normally pierced 30-mm armor. The gun was very compact, its light weight allowed the crew to easily move it around the battlefield. The disadvantages of the gun, which led to its rapid removal from production, were the weak fragmentation effect of the 37-mm projectile and the lack of suspension. In addition, the guns produced were notable for their low build quality. The adoption of this gun was considered as a temporary measure, since the leadership of the Red Army wanted to have a more versatile gun that combined the functions of an anti-tank and battalion gun, and 1-K was poorly suited for this role due to its small caliber and weak fragmentation projectile.

1-K was the first specialized anti-tank gun of the Red Army and played a big role in the development of this type. Very soon, it began to be replaced by a 45-mm anti-tank gun, becoming almost invisible against its background. In the late 30s, 1-K began to be withdrawn from the troops and transferred to storage, remaining in operation only as training ones.

At the beginning of the war, all the guns available in the warehouses were thrown into battle, since in 1941 there was a shortage of artillery to equip a large number of newly formed formations and make up for huge losses.

Of course, by 1941, the armor penetration characteristics of the 37-mm 1-K anti-tank gun could no longer be considered satisfactory, it could only confidently hit light tanks and armored personnel carriers. Against medium tanks, this gun could only be effective when firing into the side from close (less than 300 m) distances. Moreover, Soviet armor-piercing shells were significantly inferior in armor penetration to German ones of a similar caliber. On the other hand, this gun could use captured 37 mm ammunition, in which case its armor penetration increased significantly, exceeding even the similar characteristics of a 45 mm gun.

It was not possible to establish any details of the combat use of these guns; probably, almost all of them were lost in 1941.

The very great historical significance of the 1-K is that it became the ancestor of a series of the most numerous Soviet 45-mm anti-tank guns and Soviet anti-tank artillery in general.

During the "liberation campaign" in western Ukraine, several hundred Polish 37-mm anti-tank guns and a significant amount of ammunition were captured.

Initially, they were sent to warehouses, and at the end of 1941 they were transferred to the troops, because due to the heavy losses of the first months of the war, there was a large shortage of artillery, especially anti-tank artillery. In 1941, the GAU issued a "Brief Description, Operating Instructions" for this gun.

The 37 mm anti-tank gun developed by Bofors was a very successful weapon capable of successfully fighting armored vehicles protected by bulletproof armor.

The gun had a fairly high muzzle velocity and rate of fire, small dimensions and weight (which made it easier to camouflage the gun on the ground and roll it on the battlefield with crew forces), and was also adapted for rapid transportation by mechanical traction. Compared to the German 37 mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun, the Polish gun had better armor penetration, which is explained by the higher muzzle velocity of the projectile.

In the second half of the 1930s, there was a tendency to increase the thickness of tank armor, in addition, the Soviet military wanted to get an anti-tank gun capable of providing fire support to infantry. This required an increase in caliber.
A new 45 mm anti-tank gun was created by imposing a 45 mm barrel on the carriage of a 37 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1931. The carriage was also improved - wheel suspension was introduced. The semi-automatic shutter basically repeated the 1-K scheme and allowed 15-20 rds / min.

The 45-mm projectile had a mass of 1.43 kg and was more than 2 times heavier than the 37-mm one. At a distance of 500 m, an armor-piercing projectile pierced 43-mm armor normally. At the time of adoption, the 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 pierced the armor of any tank that existed then.
A fragmentation 45-mm grenade, when burst, gave about 100 fragments, retaining lethal force when expanding along the front by 15 m and to a depth of 5-7 m. When fired, grapeshot bullets form a striking sector along the front for up to 60 m and in depth up to 400 m .
Thus, the 45 mm anti-tank gun had good anti-personnel capabilities.

From 1937 to 1943, 37354 guns were produced. Shortly before the start of the war, the 45-mm gun was discontinued, as our military leadership believed that the new German tanks would have a frontal armor thickness impenetrable for these guns. Shortly after the start of the war, the gun was put back into production.

The 45-mm guns of the 1937 model of the year relied on the state of the anti-tank platoons of the rifle battalions of the Red Army (2 guns) and the anti-tank divisions of the rifle divisions (12 guns). They were also in service with separate anti-tank regiments, which included 4-5 four-gun batteries.

For its time, in terms of armor penetration, the "forty-five" was quite adequate. Nevertheless, the insufficient penetration of the 50-mm frontal armor of the Pz Kpfw III Ausf H and Pz Kpfw IV Ausf F1 tanks is beyond doubt. Often this was due to the low quality of armor-piercing shells. Many batches of shells had a technological marriage. If the heat treatment regime was violated in production, the shells turned out to be excessively hard and as a result split against the tank's armor, but in August 1941 the problem was solved - technical changes were made to the production process (localizers were introduced).

To improve armor penetration, a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile with a tungsten core was adopted, which pierced 66 mm armor at a distance of 500 m along the normal, and 88 mm armor when fired at a dagger fire distance of 100 m.

With the advent of sub-caliber shells, the later modifications of the Pz Kpfw IV tanks became "too tough" for the "forty-five". The thickness of the frontal armor, which did not exceed 80 mm.

At first, new shells were on special account and were issued individually. For the unjustified consumption of sub-caliber shells, the gun commander and gunner could be court martialed.

In the hands of experienced and tactically skilled commanders and trained crews, the 45-mm anti-tank gun posed a serious threat to enemy armored vehicles. Its positive qualities were high mobility and ease of disguise. However, for better destruction of armored targets, a more powerful gun was urgently needed, which was the 45-mm cannon mod. 1942 M-42, developed and put into service in 1942.

The 45 mm M-42 anti-tank gun was obtained by upgrading the 45 mm gun of the 1937 model at factory No. 172 in Motovilikha. The modernization consisted in lengthening the barrel (from 46 to 68 calibers), strengthening the propellant charge (the mass of gunpowder in the sleeve increased from 360 to 390 grams) and a number of technological measures to simplify mass production. The armor thickness of the shield cover has been increased from 4.5 mm to 7 mm to better protect the crew from armor-piercing rifle bullets.

As a result of the modernization, the muzzle velocity of the projectile increased by almost 15% - from 760 to 870 m/s. At a distance of 500 meters along the normal, an armor-piercing projectile pierced -61mm, and a sub-caliber projectile pierced -81mm armor. According to the memoirs of anti-tank veterans, the M-42 had very high firing accuracy and relatively low recoil when fired. This made it possible to fire at a high rate of fire without correcting the pickup.

Serial production of 45-mm guns mod. 1942 was launched in January 1943 and was carried out only at plant number 172. In the most stressful periods, the plant produced 700 of these guns monthly. In total, in 1943-1945, 10,843 mod. 1942. Their production continued after the war. New guns, as they were produced, were used to re-equip anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades, which had 45-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1937.

As it soon became clear, the armor penetration of the M-42 to fight German heavy tanks with powerful anti-shell armor Pz. Kpfw. V "Panther" and Pz. Kpfw. VI "Tiger" was not enough. More successful was the firing of sub-caliber shells on the sides, stern and undercarriage. Nevertheless, thanks to the well-established mass production, mobility, ease of camouflage and low cost, the gun remained in service until the very end of the war.

In the late 30s, the issue of creating anti-tank guns capable of hitting tanks with anti-shell armor became acute. Calculations showed the futility of the 45-mm caliber in terms of a sharp increase in armor penetration. Various research organizations considered calibers 55 and 60 mm, but in the end it was decided to stop at 57 mm. Guns of this caliber were used in the tsarist army and (guns of Nordenfeld and Hotchkiss). A new projectile was developed for this caliber - a standard cartridge case from a 76-mm divisional cannon was adopted as its cartridge case with the neck of the cartridge case re-compressed to a caliber of 57 mm.

In 1940, a design team led by Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin began to design a new anti-tank gun that meets the tactical and technical requirements of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). The main feature of the new gun was the use of a long barrel with a length of 73 calibers. The gun at a distance of 1000 m pierced armor 90 mm thick with an armor-piercing projectile

A prototype gun was made in October 1940 and passed factory tests. And in March 1941, the gun was put into service under the official name "57-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941" In total, from June to December 1941, about 250 guns were handed over.

57-mm guns from experimental batches took part in the fighting. Some of them were mounted on the Komsomolets light tracked tractor - this was the first Soviet anti-tank self-propelled gun, which, due to the imperfection of the chassis, was not very successful.

The new anti-tank gun easily pierced the armor of all the then existing German tanks. However, due to the position of the GAU, the release of the gun was stopped, and the entire production reserve and equipment were mothballed.

In 1943, with the appearance of heavy tanks among the Germans, the production of guns was restored. The gun of the 1943 model had a number of differences from the guns of the 1941 issue, aimed primarily at improving the manufacturability of the gun. However, the restoration of serial production was difficult - there were technological problems with the manufacture of barrels. Mass production of guns under the name "57-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1943" ZIS-2 was organized by October - November 1943, after the commissioning of new production facilities, provided with equipment supplied under Lend-Lease.

Since the resumption of production, until the end of the war, more than 9,000 guns entered the troops.

With the restoration of production of the ZIS-2 in 1943, the guns entered the anti-tank artillery regiments (iptap), 20 guns per regiment.

From December 1944, the ZIS-2 was introduced into the states of the guards rifle divisions - into the regimental anti-tank batteries and into the anti-tank battalion (12 guns). In June 1945, ordinary rifle divisions were transferred to a similar state.

The capabilities of the ZIS-2 made it possible at typical combat distances to confidently hit the 80-mm frontal armor of the most common German medium tanks Pz.IV and StuG III assault self-propelled guns, as well as the side armor of the Pz.VI Tiger tank; at distances of less than 500 m, the Tiger's frontal armor was also hit.
In terms of the cost and manufacturability of production, combat and service performance, the ZIS-2 became the best Soviet anti-tank gun of the war.

According to materials:
http://knowledgegrid.ru/2e9354f401817ff6.html
Shirokorad A. B. The Genius of Soviet Artillery: The Triumph and Tragedy of V. Grabin.
A. Ivanov. Artillery of the USSR in the Second World War.

Active work on the creation of self-propelled artillery installations began in the USSR in the early 30s of the 20th century, although their design had been carried out since 1920. in the developed "System of artillery weapons of the Red Army for the second five-year plan 1933 - 1938. The new weapon system, approved by the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR on January 11, 1934, determined the widespread development and introduction of self-propelled artillery into the troops, and mass production of self-propelled guns was planned to begin as early as 1935.

The main work on the creation of self-propelled guns was carried out at factories No. 174 named after. Voroshilov and No. 185 im. Kirov under the guidance of talented designers P. Syachintov and S. Ginzburg. But despite the fact that in 1934 - 1937. a large number of prototypes of self-propelled guns for various purposes were manufactured, they practically did not enter service. And after P. Syachintov was repressed at the end of 1936, work on the creation of self-propelled artillery was almost completely curtailed. Nevertheless, before June 1941, the Red Army received a number of self-propelled artillery installations for various purposes.

The first to enter the army were the SU-1-12 (or SU-12), developed at the Kirov plant in Leningrad. They were a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927, installed on GAZ-ALA or Moreland trucks (the latter were purchased in the early 30s in the USA for the needs of the Red Army). The gun had an armor shield and an armor plate on the rear of the cockpit. In total, in 1934 - 1935. The Kirov Plant manufactured 99 of these vehicles, which entered the artillery battalions of some mechanized brigades. SU-1-12s were used in the battles near Lake Khasan in 1938, on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 and during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. The experience of their operation has shown that they have poor terrain and low survivability on the battlefield. By June 1941, most of the SU-1-12s were badly worn out and in need of repair.

In 1935, the reconnaissance battalions of the Red Army began to receive the Kurchevsky self-propelled gun (SPK) - a 76-mm recoilless (according to the terminology of that time - dynamo-reactive) gun on the GAZ-TK chassis (a three-axle version of the GAZ-A passenger car). The 76-mm recoilless gun was developed by the inventor Kurchevsky among a large range of guns of a similar design with a caliber from 37 to 305 mm. Despite the fact that some Kurchevsky guns were produced in large quantities - up to several thousand pieces - they had a lot of design flaws. After Kurchevsky was repressed in 1937, all work on dynamo-reactive guns was curtailed. Until 1937, 23 SPKs were transferred to the Red Army. Two such installations participated in the Soviet-Finnish war, where they were lost. By June 1941, the troops had about 20 SPKs, most of which were out of order.

The only serial pre-war self-propelled artillery installation on a tank chassis was the SU-5. It was developed in 1934 - 1935. at the plant number 185 named after. Kirov as part of the so-called "small triplex" program. The latter was a single base created on the chassis of the T-26 tank, with three different artillery systems (76-mm cannon mod. 1902/30, 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 and 152-mm mortar mod. 1931). After the manufacture and testing of three self-propelled guns, which received the designations SU-5-1, SU-5-2 and SU-5-3, respectively, the SU-5-2 (with a 122-mm howitzer) was adopted by the Red Army. In 1935, an initial batch of 24 SU-5-2s was made, which entered service with the tank units of the Red Army. The SU-5 was used in the fighting near Lake Khasan in 1938 and during the Polish campaign in September 1939. They turned out to be quite effective vehicles, but had a small portable ammunition load. By June 1941, all 30 SU-5s were in the army, but most of them (with the exception of those in the Far East) were lost in the first weeks of the war.

In addition to the SU-5, the armored units of the Red Army had another vehicle that can be classified as self-propelled artillery on a tank base. We are talking about the tank BT-7A (artillery), developed at the Kharkov plant number 183 named after. Comintern in 1934, the BT-7A was intended for artillery support of line tanks on the battlefield, combating fire weapons and enemy fortifications. It differed from the BT-7 line tank by installing a larger turret with a 76-mm KT-27 gun. In total in 1935 - 1937. Red Army units received 155 BT-7A. These vehicles were used in the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 and during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. During these conflicts, the BT-7A, but according to the reviews of the command of the tank units, proved to be from the best side as an effective means of supporting tanks and infantry on the battlefield. As of June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 117 BT-7A tanks.

In addition to self-propelled guns, by the beginning of the war, the Red Army also had self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. First of all, these are 76-mm anti-aircraft guns 3K, mounted on YaG-K trucks) manufactured by the Yaroslavl Automobile Plant. In 1933 - 1934 troops received 61 such installations, which by the beginning of the war were part of the units of the Moscow military district. In addition, there were about 2,000 anti-aircraft machine gun mounts (ZPU) - quadruple Maxim machine guns installed in the back of a GAZ-AAA car.

Thus, by June 1941, the Red Army had about 2,300 self-propelled artillery mounts for various purposes. Moreover, most of them were vehicles with weapons installed on them without any armor protection. In addition, it should be borne in mind that ordinary civilian trucks were used as a base for them, which had very low traffic on country roads, not to mention rough terrain. Therefore, these vehicles could not be used to directly support troops on the battlefield. There were only 145 full-fledged self-propelled guns on a tank chassis (28 SU-5 and 117 BT-7A). In the very first weeks of the war (June - July 1941), most of them were lost.

During the very first battles of the Great Patriotic War, the question arose of the need to develop an anti-tank self-propelled artillery installation as soon as possible, capable of quickly changing positions and fighting German tank units, which were significantly superior in mobility to units of the Red Army. On July 15, 1941, at plant No. 92 in Gorky, the ZIS-30 self-propelled gun was urgently developed, which was a 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun mounted on the chassis of the Komsomolets armored tractor. Due to the lack of tractors, the production of which was discontinued in August, it was necessary to search for and withdraw Komsomol members from military units, repair them, and only after that install guns on them. As a result of this, the production of the ZIS-30 began in mid-September and ended on October 15th. During this time, the Red Army received 101 installations. They entered service with anti-tank batteries of motorized rifle battalions of tank brigades and were used only in battles near Moscow as part of the Western, Bryansk and right wing of the Southwestern Fronts.

Due to heavy losses in tanks in the summer of 1941, the leadership of the Red Army adopted a resolution "On shielding light tanks and armoring tractors." Among other measures, the production of armored tractors under the KhTZ-16 index was prescribed at the Kharkov Tractor Plant. The KhTZ-16 project was developed at the Scientific Automotive and Tractor Institute (NATI) in July. KhTZ-16 was a slightly modernized chassis of the STZ-3 agricultural tractor with an armored hull made of 15 mm armor mounted on it. The armament of the tractor consisted of a 45-mm tank gun mod. 1932, installed in the front hull plate and had limited firing angles. Thus. KhTZ-16 was an anti-tank self-propelled gun, although in the documents of that time it was referred to as an "armored tractor". The volume of production of KhTZ-16 was planned to be quite large - when Kharkov was handed over in October 1941, KhTZ had 803 chassis ready for armor. But due to problems with the supply of armor plates, the plant produced from 50 to 60 (according to various sources) KhTZ-16, which were used in the battles of the autumn - winter of 1941, and some, judging by the photographs, "survived" until the spring of 1942 .

In the summer - autumn of 1941, work on the creation of self-propelled guns was actively carried out at the enterprises of Leningrad, primarily at the Izhora, Kirov, Voroshilov and Kirov factories. So, in August, 15 self-propelled guns were manufactured with the installation of a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 on the chassis of the T-26 tank with the turret removed. The gun was mounted behind the shield and had a circular fire. These vehicles, which were documented as T-26-SAUs, entered service with tank brigades of the Leningrad Front and operated quite successfully until 1944.

On the basis of the T-26, anti-aircraft installations were also made. For example, in early September, the 124th Tank Brigade received "two T-26 tanks with 37-mm anti-aircraft guns mounted on them." These vehicles operated as part of the brigade until the summer of 1943.

In July-August, the Izhora plant manufactured several dozen ZIS-5 armored trucks (the cabin and sides of the loading platform were completely protected by armor). From the car, which mainly entered service with the divisions of the Leningrad People's Militia Army (LANO), they were armed with a machine gun in the front of the cab and a 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1932, which rolled into the body and could fire forward in the direction of travel. It was supposed to use these "brontasaurs" primarily to fight from ambushes with German tanks. Judging by the photographs, some vehicles were still used by the troops during the lifting of the blockade of Leningrad in the winter of 1944.

In addition, the Kirov plant manufactured several self-propelled guns of the SU-1-12 type with the installation of a 76-mm regimental gun behind a shield on the chassis of ZIS-5 trucks.

All self-propelled guns created in the first months of the war had a large number of design flaws due to the fact that they were created in a hurry using the tools and materials at hand. Naturally, it was out of the question to talk about the mass production of machines created in such conditions.

On March 3, 1942, the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry signed an order to create a special bureau for self-propelled artillery. The special bureau was supposed to develop in the shortest possible time a single chassis for self-propelled guns using the units of the T-60 tank and cars. Based on the chassis, it was supposed to create a 76-mm assault self-propelled support gun and a 37-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun.

On April 14-15, 1942, a plenum of the Artillery Committee of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) was held with the participation of representatives from the troops, industry and the People's Commissariat for Armaments (NKV) of the USSR, at which issues of creating self-propelled artillery were discussed. In its decision, the plenum recommended the creation of infantry support self-propelled guns with a 76-mm ZIS-3 cannon and a 122-mm M-30 howitzer, as well as self-propelled guns with a 152-mm ML-20 howitzer cannon to fight fortifications and with a 37-mm anti-aircraft gun to combat air targets.

The decision of the plenum of the GAU Artillery Committee was approved by the State Defense Committee and in June 1942 the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry (NKTP), together with the NKV, developed a "self-propelled artillery system for arming the Red Army." At the same time, the NKV led the development and manufacture of the artillery part of the self-propelled guns, and the NKTP was engaged in the design of the chassis. The general coordination of work on the ACS was carried out by the NKTP special bureau, headed by the talented designer S. Ginzburg.

In the summer of 1942, the first samples of self-propelled guns were tested. It was a 37-mm anti-aircraft and 76-mm assault self-propelled guns of plant No. 37 NKTP. Both vehicles were made on a single chassis, which was created using the units of the T-60 and T-70 tanks. The tests of the machines ended successfully, and in June 1942 the GKO ordered the preparation of mass production of self-propelled guns after the identified shortcomings were eliminated. However, the beginning of the German offensive on Stalingrad required an urgent increase in the production of tanks and work on the creation of self-propelled guns was curtailed.

In addition, at the plant number 592 NKN (in Mytishchi near Moscow), the design of self-propelled guns of the 122-mm M-30 howitzer was carried out on the chassis of the captured German StuG III installation. The prototype, which received the designation self-propelled assault howitzer "Artsturm" or SG-122A, was put to the test only in September.

On October 19, 1942, the GKO, by its Decree No. 2429ss, decided to prepare for the mass production of assault and anti-aircraft self-propelled guns of 37 - 122-mm caliber. Plant No. 38 im. Kuibyshev (Kirov) and GAZ them. Molotov (Gorky), a 122-mm self-propelled howitzer was developed by Uralmashzavod and plant No. 592 NKV. The design deadlines were set quite strict - by December 1, it was required to report to the State Defense Committee on the results of testing new models of self-propelled guns.

And in November, the first prototypes of assault and anti-aircraft self-propelled guns went to the test. These were SU-11 (anti-aircraft) and SU-12 (assault) of plant No. 38, as well as GAZ-71 (assault) and GAZ-72 (anti-aircraft) of the Gorky Automobile Plant. When creating them, an already proven layout scheme was used, proposed back in the summer of 1942 by the special bureau of the self-propelled guns PKTP - two twin parallel engines in front of the vehicle and a fighting compartment in the stern. The armament of the vehicles consisted of a 76-mm ZIS-3 divisional gun (assault self-propelled guns) and a 37-mm 31K gun (anti-aircraft self-propelled guns).

On November 19, the commission that conducted the tests drew up a conclusion on testing samples of the ACS of plant No. 38 and GAZ. In it, the GAZ-71 and GAZ-72 were characterized as vehicles that did not meet the requirements for them, and it was recommended that factory No. 38 self-propelled guns be adopted.

At the same time, self-propelled samples of the 122-mm M-30 howitzer were tested: U-35 of Uralmashzavod, created on the chassis of the T-34 tank and SG-122 of factory No. 592 NKV, developed on the basis of the captured Pz.Kpfw tank. III (the last sample was an improved version of ST-122A).

On December 9, 1942, tests of the SU-11, SU-12, SG-122 and U-35 began at the Gorohovets training ground. As a result, the government commission that conducted the tests recommended that the SU-76 (SU-12) and SU-122 (U-35) self-propelled guns be adopted by the troops. The SU-11 did not pass the tests due to the poor layout of the fighting compartment of the unfinished sight installation and the shortcomings of a number of other mechanisms. The SG-122 was abandoned because of its trophy base (at that time the number of captured tanks was still not large enough).

Even before the completion of testing of prototypes of self-propelled guns, by the GKO decree of November 25, 1942, the Directorate of mechanical traction and self-propelled artillery was created in the system of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army. The duties of the new department included control over the production, supply and repair of self-propelled artillery installations. On December 2, 1942, the State Defense Committee decides to expand the production of self-propelled artillery mounts SU-12 and SU-122 for the Red Army.

At the end of December 1942, the People's Commissar of Defense, by directives No. 112467ss and 11210ss, demanded the formation of 30 self-propelled artillery regiments of the Reserve Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, armed with new types of installations. Already by January 1, 1943, the first batch of 25 SU-76s and the same number of SU-122s was sent to the newly formed training center for self-propelled artillery.

But already on January 19, in connection with the operation to break the blockade of Leningrad, the first two formed self-propelled artillery regiments (1433rd and 1434th), by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, were sent to the Volkhov Front. In March, two new self-propelled artillery regiments were sent to the Western Front - the 1485th and 1487th.

Already the first experience of the combat use of self-propelled artillery showed that it is capable of providing significant artillery fire support to the advancing infantry and tank units. The memorandum of the Chief of Staff of the Red Army Artillery to GKO member V. Molotov dated April 6, 1943 stated: “Experience has shown that self-propelled guns are needed, since no other type of artillery has given such an effect in continuous accompaniment of infantry and tank attacks and interaction with them in close combat. The material damage inflicted on the enemy by self-propelled guns and the results of the battle compensate for the losses..

At the same time, the results of the first combat use of self-propelled guns revealed major flaws in their design. For example, in the SU-122 there were frequent breakdowns of the stopper for mounting the gun in the stowed position and the lifting mechanism. In addition, the poor layout of the fighting compartment of the self-propelled gun was very tiring for the calculation of the gun during operation, and insufficient visibility made it difficult for the vehicle to operate during the battle. But most of the shortcomings of the SU-122 were eliminated fairly quickly. The situation with the SU-76 was much more complicated.

During the very first battles, most of the SU-76s failed due to breakdowns in gearboxes and main shafts. It was not possible to solve the matter by simply strengthening the design of the shafts and gears of the gearboxes - such self-propelled guns failed just as often.

It soon became clear that the cause of the accidents was the parallel installation of two twin engines running on a common shaft. Such a scheme led to the occurrence of resonant torsional vibrations on the shaft and its rapid breakdown, since the maximum value of the resonant frequency fell on the most loaded engine operation mode (this corresponded to the movement of the ACS in second gear through snow and mud). It became clear that the elimination of this design defect takes time. Therefore, on March 21, 1943, the production of the SU-12 was suspended.

To compensate for the decrease in the production of SU-76, which the front urgently needed, on February 3, factory No. 37 was ordered to produce 200 self-propelled guns based on the captured Pz.Kpfw tank. III. By that time, according to the trophy services, after the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, about 300 German tanks and self-propelled guns were delivered to repair enterprises. Using the experience of work on the SG-122, plant No. 37 quickly developed, tested and put into production the SU-76I ("foreign") self-propelled gun, created on the basis of the Pz.Kpfw sneaker. III and armed with a 76-mm F-34 cannon, adapted for installation in self-propelled guns. In total, until December 1945, the Red Army received 201 SU-76Is. after which their release was discontinued.

Meanwhile, Plant No. 38 hastily worked to eliminate the shortcomings of the SU-76 (SU-12). In April, the SU-12M machine was created. differed from the SU-12 by the presence of additional elastic couplings between the motors, gearboxes and final drives. These measures made it possible to drastically reduce the accident rate of the SU-76, and since May they have been sent to enter the troops.

Technical difficulties in eliminating design flaws in the chassis and insufficient study of the issues of technical operation of self-propelled artillery installations caused the GKO decree of April 24, 1943, in which issues of factory acceptance of self-propelled guns. the formation of self-propelled artillery units were transferred from the GAU KA to the jurisdiction of the Commander of the Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Red Army. All further work on the creation of new and improvement of existing models of self-propelled guns was carried out through the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA).

In May 1913, Plant No. 38 manufactured a modernized sample of a self-propelled artillery mount under the SU-15 index. In it, the layout of the engine compartment was made according to the type of the T-70 tank: the engines were in series one after the other, and the crankshafts were interconnected. The self-propelled gun had only one gearbox, and the roof over the fighting compartment was dismantled to improve the working conditions of the crew (on the SU-12, there were cases when crews died due to poor ventilation of the fighting compartment). Tests of the unit, which received the army designation SU-76M, showed a completely fatal operation of the transmission, and from June 1943 the machine was put into serial production. In the fall of 1943, GAZ and Plant No. 40 (created on the basis of Plant No. 592 NKV) joined the production of the SU-76M. The production of this machine was carried out until November 1945.

By GKO Decree No. 2692 of January 4, 1943, Plant No. 100 NKTP (Chelyabinsk) and Plant No. 172 NKV (Molotov) were ordered to design and manufacture a prototype self-propelled artillery mount based on the KB-1C gun with 152-mm gun-howitzer ML-20. Despite a number of difficulties, the task was completed on time, and by February 7, tests of a prototype that received the factory index KB-14 were completed at the Chebarkul training ground. By a resolution of the State Defense Committee of February 14, the KB-14 installation under the index SU-152 was adopted by the Red Army and put into serial production. The first SU-152 regiments took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943.

To combat the new German guns "Tiger", captured in early 1943 near Leningrad, the GKO, by decree No. 3289 of May 5, 1943, ordered the NKTP and the NKV to produce a prototype of a medium self-propelled artillery mount with an 85-mm gun based on the T tank -34, intended for the direct escort of medium tanks in their combat formations.

The development of the new self-propelled guns was entrusted to Uralmashzavod, and the guns for it were assigned to the design bureau of plant No. 9 and the Central Artillery Design Bureau (TsAKB). In early August 1943, two samples of installations were tested at the Gorohovets artillery range - with an 85-mm D-5S gun from plant No. 9 and S-18 TsAKB. The D-5S gun turned out to be more successful, and by GKO Decree No. 3892 of August 7, 1943, the new machine was adopted by the Red Army under the symbol SU-85. In the same month, serial production of the SU-85 began, and the production of the SU-122 was discontinued.

In connection with the adoption by the Red Army of the new heavy tank IS in the fall of 1943 and the decommissioning of the KB-1C, plant No. 100 developed a 152-mm self-propelled artillery mount based on the new heavy tank, which was put into service under the symbol ISU- 152 and since November it has been put into serial production, with the simultaneous termination of the production of the SU-152.

Some design changes were made to the design of the ISU-152, based on the results of the experience of combat use of self-propelled artillery mounts SU-152.

Due to the fact that the program for the production of self-propelled artillery installations ISU-152 was not provided with the necessary number of 152-mm howitzer-guns ML-20S, in 1944, in parallel with the ISU-152, the production of ISU-122 installations armed with a 122-mm cannon was carried out A-19. Subsequently, the A-19 gun was replaced by a 122-mm D-25S gun mod. 1943 (similar to the one installed on the IS-2 gun) and the installation received the name ISU-122S.

In connection with the armament of the T-34 tank in the fall of 1943 with an 85-mm gun and the need to strengthen the armament of medium self-propelled artillery installations, the GKO, by decree No. artillery mount SU-85.

Plant No. 9, on its own initiative, got involved in this work and, ahead of schedule, designed, tested and presented to Uralmashzavod a 100-mm D-10S gun for installation in a self-propelled gun. On February 15, 1944, Uralmashzavod manufactured two prototypes of the SU-100 installation, one of which was armed with a D-10S gun designed by plant No. 9, and the second with a 100-mm S-34 gun developed by TsAKB. After carrying out factory tests of samples by shooting and mileage, on March 9, the plant presented self-propelled units to the state commission for field tests. On them, the best results were shown by a self-propelled artillery mount with a D-10S cannon designed by factory No. 9, which in July 1944 was adopted by the Red Army under the symbol SU-100. However, due to problems with the organization of the serial production of D-10S guns, the production of the SU-100 began only in September 1944. Until that time, Uralmashzavod produced the SU-85M, which differed from the SU-85 in the use of a new design armored hull (with a commander's cupola and more thick armor) developed for the SU-100.

It should be said that according to the experience of summer battles, which showed that not all serial self-propelled artillery installations of the Red Army can successfully fight new German tanks and heavy self-propelled guns. GKO in December 1943 proposed to the GBTU KA and NKV to design, manufacture and by April 1944 submit for testing self-propelled artillery mounts with high-power guns of the following types:
- with an 85-mm cannon with an initial projectile velocity of 1050 m / s;
- with a 122-mm gun with an initial projectile velocity of 1000 m/s;
- with a 130-mm gun with an initial projectile velocity of 900 m / s;
- with a 152-mm cannon with an initial projectile velocity of 880 m / s.

All of these guns, except for the 85 mm cannon, were supposed to penetrate armor up to 200 mm at ranges of 1500 - 2000 m. Tests of these installations took place in the summer of 1944 - in the spring of 1945, however, not a single silt of these guns was put into service.

Along with self-propelled guns of domestic production, American units supplied to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program were actively used in the Red Army.

At the end of 1943, the T-18 self-propelled artillery mounts began to arrive first (and in Soviet documents they are referred to as SU-57). The T-48 was a 57 mm cannon mounted on an M3 half-tracked armored personnel carrier. The order for the manufacture of these machines was given by Great Britain, but due to the weakness of weapons, some of the machines were transferred to the Soviet Union. The SU-57 was not popular in the Red Army: the vehicle had large overall dimensions, weak armor protection and armament. However, with proper use, these self-propelled guns could act quite effectively.

In 1944, the Red Army received two anti-aircraft self-propelled guns: self-propelled guns M15 and M17. The first was a combined installation of a 37 mm M1A2 automatic cannon and two 12.7 mm Browning M2 machine guns on an M3 half-track armored personnel carrier. The M17 differed from the M15 in its base (M5 armored personnel carrier) and armament - it had four 12.7 mm Browning M2 machine guns. M15 and M17 were the only self-propelled anti-aircraft guns that were in service with the Red Army during the war. They proved to be an effective means of protecting tank formations on the march from air attack, and were also successfully used for fighting in cities, firing at the upper floors of buildings.

In 1944, a small batch of M10 Wolverine ("Wolverine") anti-tank self-propelled guns, created on the basis of the American M4A2 medium tank, arrived from the USA. The armament of the M10 consisted of a 76 mm M7 cannon mounted in a circular rotation turret open at the top. During the fighting, the M10 proved to be a powerful anti-tank weapon. They could successfully deal with heavy German tanks.

Captured German self-propelled guns were also used in the Red Army. However, their number was small and hardly exceeded 80 units. The most commonly used assault guns were StuG III, which were called “artillery assaults” in our army.