On behalf of the USSR, the CSCE signed the final act. The Helsinki Accords ended in Helsinki. End of the Vietnam War. "Nixon's Guam Doctrine". Paris Conference on Vietnam. Major Decisions

Magomedov Marad Sheikhmagomedovich,

Graduate of the Faculty of Law of the Southern Federal University (former Rostov State University)

August 1, 2010 marked the anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe dated 1 August 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Final Act of the CSCE or the CSCE Act). At a lecture dedicated to this anniversary at the University of Helsinki on April 20, 2009, President of the Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev proposed to develop a new European security treaty, which he called “Helsinki plus”: taking into account the cessation of ideological confrontation and the emergence of new subjects of international law”.

As is known, seven principles have found their consolidation in the UN Charter: conscientious fulfillment of obligations, sovereign equality of states, non-interference in internal affairs, refraining from the threat and use of force, peaceful resolution of international disputes, equality and self-determination of peoples, international cooperation. It is easy to see that the last two principles are not included in Art. 2 (“Principles”), and in Art. 1 ("Goals").

These principles reflected the obligations envisaged for the UN itself, and the obligations assumed by the states participating in it. However, as a result of further implementation, the basic principles began to be recognized as the fundamental principles of all international law. Such recognition was enshrined in the Declaration of Principles adopted by the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1970 international law relating to friendly relations and cooperation between states in accordance with the UN Charter (hereinafter referred to as the 1970 Declaration). The International Court of Justice in the Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua (1986) characterized the provisions of this Declaration as customary law.

The specificity of the basic principles of international law also lies in the fact that they, falling under Art. 103 of the UN Charter (on the primacy of obligations under the UN Charter over obligations under any other international treaty), at the same time differ from many other provisions of the UN Charter by the quality of a peremptory norm of general international law (the norm jus cogens).

The Final Act of the CSCE included in its text a Declaration of Principles by which "the participating States will guide their mutual relations." The Russian international legal doctrine indicates that this Declaration added three more to the previously existing seven basic principles of international law: the principle of the territorial integrity of states; the principle of inviolability of state borders; the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. In this regard, the question involuntarily arises as to whether the principles of the CSCE Final Act have all the characteristics just listed (given their updated normative content).

The practical significance of understanding the legal significance of the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE is also due to the fact that in the process of international communication, the highest officials of states geographically located in Europe or directly related to it, in their statements regarding the confirmation of the existence of any fact or right, often refer to those enshrined in Final Act of the CSCE principles. Accordingly, the legal assessment of such political statements encounters at least the following problems: (1) what is the quantitative composition of the basic principles of international law; and (2) what is the legal content of each of the main principles, since this question raises the issue of changes by the provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE of the norms defined in the Declaration of 1970. In this connection, a more general question is whether the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE are covered by the imperative principle pacta sunt service and, ultimately, whether the non-observance or improper observance of any principle from the CSCE Act entails the responsibility of states under international law.

The importance of providing answers to the questions just outlined is also dictated by the fact that it is the analysis of the previous experience in building a system of interstate communication that can be used as the basis for solving the urgent problem of bringing the existing regulatory superstructure, expressed primarily in the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE, in line with the needs international relations that developed at the end of the first decade of the XXI century in Europe. D. A. Medvedev noted that “one of the main principles of the new treaty on European security should be the rule on the indivisibility of the security space, regardless of existing alliances, it is necessary to include in the document the principles of arms control, measures to strengthen mutual trust and reasonable deterrence of military construction. In addition, within the framework of this treaty, each signatory state must refuse to deploy strategic offensive weapons outside national territories.

In connection with the above, we would like to state our vision of the problems of the topic indicated in the title of this article. However, we do not set ourselves the goal of legally evaluating other (except for the principles) provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE.

The legal significance of an international legal document is determined, first of all, by the possibility of referring to it as an act containing mandatory norms, the non-fulfillment or improper fulfillment of which entails responsibility under international law. The initiative put forward by the President of the Russian Federation to change the configuration of the normative regulation of international relations in Europe points to the conclusion of an international treaty. In this regard, it is first necessary to determine whether the Final Act of the CSCE is an international treaty.

Professor G. I. Tunkin noted that the coordination of the wills of states in the process of creating a norm of international law concerns both (1) the rule of conduct and (2) its recognition as a legal norm. When forming the norms of international law, the wills of the states regarding the rules of conduct are first coordinated. When creating treaty norms, this happens through negotiations, during discussions at international conferences, in international organizations, and ends with the adoption of the text as final. This ends the coordination of the wills of states regarding the content of the treaty norm of international law, but does not end the process of its formation. It is important to emphasize that agreement on the wills of states regarding the content of a treaty norm does not yet make it binding on states.

Not every agreement between states is an international treaty; this conclusion was specifically noted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations. Thus, it is necessary to study the will of the participating States of the CSCE Final Act regarding the recognition of its provisions as the norms of treaty international law.

As you know, the Helsinki process was political in nature, and most of the decisions taken within its framework were only the result of political compromises, which seemed to be a more flexible tool that allows finding acceptable formulations and formalizing agreed positions in the conditions of the level of relations between states that existed at that time. in Europe. The main objective of the Final Act of the CSCE was that with the help of this act all disputes between European states that remained after the Second World War would be finally settled, and, thereby, the inviolability of the European world would be confirmed.

Thus, we can conclude that it is impossible to talk about the explicit will of the states participating in the Helsinki process regarding the recognition of the nature of the norms of treaty international law behind the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE.

It can also be argued that the participating states of the Helsinki process quite deliberately tried not to give the CSCE Final Act the quality of an international treaty. Thus, it was specifically stated that the CSCE Act is not subject to registration in accordance with Art. 102 of the UN Charter. The legal consequence of this decision was the absence of the right for the participating states of the CSCE Final Act to refer to it as an international treaty in any of the UN bodies. However, it should be noted that the registration of an international legal act in accordance with Art. 102 of the UN Charter is not considered a constitutive feature of this act as an international treaty. Therefore, the decision of the participating States not to register the CSCE Final Act indirectly indicates that it lacks the quality of an international treaty.

The argument in favor of not recognizing the quality of an international treaty as an international treaty is seen in the absence of provisions defining the procedure for joining the CSCE Act, the procedure for secession from the participating states, and the mechanism of national legal implementation. In support of this thesis, let us point to the statement of the representative of the US State Department: “[p]olitical obligations are not regulated by international law, and there are no rules relating to their observance, modification or refusal.”

Professor A. Ya. Kapustin, in a textbook dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Russian Association of International Law, described the positions existing in the doctrine regarding the legal significance of the CSCE Final Act: MM.) as an international agreement, but, at the same time, not recognizing in it an international treaty within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. Such an approach made it possible to deny the legal nature of the obligations arising from it, recognizing only their moral or political significance. A close position was taken by supporters of recognizing the importance of the act of “soft law” behind the Helsinki Act. The opposite position was taken by some lawyers who proposed considering the Final Act of the CSCE ... as a treaty[a] suit generis. They were joined by those who, without denying the political nature of the obligations contained in the Final Act, emphasized the unique nature of this document, which, in their opinion, had an impact on European development many times greater than the significance of most legally binding treaties.

It should be noted that some lawyers, emphasizing the unique nature of the CSCE Final Act, in fact, oppose such categories as the importance and effectiveness of any act and the quality of binding under international law. In this regard, a textbook example can be given when moral or religious norms turn out to be more effective regulators of social relations, however, it is generally recognized that this fact does not give them the quality of law. As it seems, within the framework of the position pointing to the uniqueness of the CSCE Final Act, its supporters should determine what is the impact of such uniqueness on the legal significance of the provisions of the CSCE Act.

The draft Commentary of the UN International Law Commission on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts contains the following thesis: “[r]commendations made by organs of an international organization or “non-binding” agreements, such as the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of 1 August 1975 may express obligations or norms which are not intended to be legally binding as such. Violation of such obligations or norms does not give rise to international legal responsibility.

Thus, it can be argued that on the example of the Final Act of the CSCE, we are dealing only with the agreement of wills regarding the rule of conduct. Since there is no agreement on the wills of states regarding the recognition of a rule of conduct as a legal norm, the CSCE Act cannot be considered an international treaty. However, in this regard, one should not, going to extremes, diminish or underestimate the element of agreement of wills regarding the rule of conduct, which makes it possible to say that the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE can acquire the status of customary legal norms.

The Russian legal literature notes that “... the principles (of the territorial integrity of states; inviolability of state borders and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (three principles) - MM.), fixed, it would seem, only for regional (European) application, however, with good reason can be considered and are considered the basic principles of international law. They have found their legal recognition and consolidation in thousands of international treaties of a universal and regional nature and in international practice states of all continents. Unfortunately, the content of this statement is not disclosed, so we can only offer our own vision of the mechanism within which the attribution of the status of the main principles of international law to the three principles is explained.

First of all, you should join the position of Prof. Yu. M. Kolosov, who will accurately notice that the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE are not called the basic principles of international law.

Guided by the thesis that there is nothing obvious in international law, but everything must be confirmed, it should be pointed out that the reference to “thousands” of international treaties of a universal and regional nature only means that the principles enshrined in such documents are binding only as treaty-legal for participating States and with the legal content as defined in the text of the relevant treaty. With regard to regional and bilateral treaties, it should be said that, unless specifically stated otherwise, they do not oblige participating states to apply these principles to states of other regions.

Probably, in the statement analyzed at this stage about the belonging of the three principles of the Final Act of the CSCE to the number of basic principles of international law, it is meant that they, by virtue of “recognition[s] and consolidation[s] in thousands of international treaties of a universal and regional nature and in international the practice of the states of all continents” acquired such a status and became obligatory under international law as universal customs.

First of all, we note that in the Asylum case (Colombia/Peru, 20.11.1950) the International Court of Justice stated that the party invoking the custom “must confirm that it has been established in such a way that it has become binding on the other party” (§ 276) .

In Art. 38(1)(b) of the Statute International Court of Justice The UN of 26.6.1945 international legal custom is defined as "a general practice recognized as a legal norm." In the decision in the Continental Shelf Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta, 3.6.1985), the International Court of Justice stated: “It is an axiom that elements of custom in international law must be sought, first of all, in practice and opinio juris states” (§ 27). In fact, this statement of the Court is consistent with the concept of prof. G. I. Tunkina on the harmonization of wills.

Let us assume that the very principles of the CSCE Final Act and the norms of international treaties, in which these principles are reflected, can constitute a practice indicating the agreement of wills regarding the rule of conduct. It is even possible that this practice meets the requirements of almost complete uniformity, breadth and representativeness, as such requirements have been defined by the International Court of Justice (for example, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 20.2.1969. § 74).

However, there are serious doubts about the ability of this practice to pass the test for compliance with the requirement of sufficient legal conviction ( opinio juris) states in that such principles and their normative content are customary in nature. In this regard, two approaches to assessing opinio juris developed by the International Court of Justice: (1) in some cases (for example, the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Canada/United States of America. 1984. § 91-93) this Court has concluded that there are opinio juris on the basis of existing state practice or previous court decisions; (2) a more "rigorous" approach, which consists in the need to search more evidence opinio juris (e.g., the Nicaragua case, 1986. § 14). In this article, we will adhere to the second approach, which will allow us to avoid the main drawback of the first, the methodology of which is modern conditions may be considered inadequate to prove the relevant fact.

not in favor opinio juris everything that we said earlier in connection with an attempt to identify the quality of an international treaty in the CSCE Final Act testifies to the recognition of the nature of customary legal norms behind the principles of the CSCE Final Act. To this must also be added the following.

When evaluating opinio juris Special attention should be paid to the fact that currently 56 states are members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), i.e. in the 35 years that have elapsed since the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE, the number of members of the organization has increased by 21. This happened due to the accession of Albania and Andorra, the collapse of Czechoslovakia. Later, starting in 1992, 18 new members appeared as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the SFRY.

The view that the principles of the CSCE Final Act apply to these states in exactly the same way as to the original participants in the Act seems superficial. In fact, the analysis of the provisions of the CSCE Act itself tells a somewhat different story. Thus, its participants established that they "consider as inviolable all the borders of each other, as well as the borders of all states in Europe." The interpretation of this provision calls into question what the original participants "consider as inviolable" the borders of the newly formed states in Europe. Similarly, the fact that the new entrants “see as inviolable” their (i.e. new) boundaries is called into question. The reference to the fact that the original and new states never challenged the inviolability of the borders of the newly formed states in an appropriate form cannot be used as direct evidence, since this variant of behavior could be caused not only by a legal conviction in an existing obligation, but also by the fact of awareness of the existence of a right ( on a claim) that simply was not realized (for a variety of reasons).

It seems that in international law there are no rules on succession in relation to an act of a recommendatory nature, which also causes certain difficulties in identifying opinio juris newly formed states.

Most of the principles of the CSCE Final Act contain references to their applicability only in relations between participating States. Thus, even the provisions of the CSCE Act itself do not oblige (at least even morally) states to adhere to a given variant of behavior in relation to non-participating states (or non-European states in the case of the principle of inviolability of state borders). Accordingly, from what has just been said it is impossible to derive a legal conviction of the universality of these principles.

It is doubtful what can be deduced opinio juris some states from the fact of their accession to the CSCE/OSCE. In fact, even if it is recognized that accession entails the assumption of obligations, then their very nature allows us to speak of the acceptance by new participants of only political obligations.

Proving the customary legal status of the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE can be carried out in two ways: through the recognition that these principles belong to universal or regional customs. Apparently, it is difficult to recognize the status of universal customary legal norms behind the three principles of the Final Act of the CSCE.

For objective reasons, the requirements for the formation of a regional custom are not so high, therefore, it is probably advisable to consider the three principles as regional customs that have established themselves within Europe. However, even if one takes this path, one cannot ignore the above arguments about the absence of a precisely established opinio juris. In addition, in theory and practice, the existence of regional and local customs is called into question. Although in some of its decisions (for example, the Right of Passage over Indian Territory case, Portugal v. India, 11/26/1957. § 39-43) the International Court of Justice referred to such usages, it appears that in the cases under consideration the Court, in fact, applied the provisions on a unilateral act as a source of obligations or the doctrine of estoppel.

When discussing the topic of this work, one cannot but touch upon the possible position of the Russian Federation on the nature of the obligations arising from the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE. So, as it seems, nothing prevents Russia from considering them binding under international law. However, in this regard, it is necessary to consider the likely legal consequences of such a position.

It can be argued that the RF statement regarding the legal significance of the principles of the CSCE Final Act is a unilateral act. Although Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not refer to unilateral acts of subjects of international law, the practice of states itself shows that such acts can be a source of obligations under international law. This thesis is also confirmed in judicial practice. Thus, the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Tests case (New Zealand v. France, 12/20/1974) pointed out that “a statement [to do something] ... entails an obligation (according to international law - MM.) follow this course of action” (§ 267-271).

Without denying that such a unilateral act is an indicator opinio juris Russian Federation in favor of the formation of a customary legal norm, it must be stated that before the formation of a norm of this nature, the Russian Federation will not be able to refer to the applicability of the principles of the CSCE Act in international law to its relations with states that consider these principles only as recommendations. On the contrary, such states may indicate that the Russian Federation has unilaterally assumed obligations under the Final Act of the CSCE.

Apparently, within the framework of this situation, it is necessary to take into account the following point: if the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE contain norms that reflect the course foreign policy Russian Federation, it is necessary to look for other sources of these norms, which are mandatory for all relevant states; if it is not possible to find binding norms, then it is necessary to seek their inclusion in a new international treaty.

In conclusion, we would like to point out that nothing in this article should be considered as intended to diminish the significance of the principles of the CSCE Final Act. The research done here is necessary for a proper understanding of the legal significance of these principles, as well as for understanding and taking into account for the future when developing Helsinki Plus certain shortcomings in the implementation of the CSCE Act.

As we have established, the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE cannot, on their own, be regarded as either treaty or customary law. However, in general, the significance of the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE can be expressed as follows:

    their appearance indicated that states on a certain historical stage proved able to cooperate with each other in order to ensure peace and security in Europe;

    these principles marked a new approach of states to the solution of security issues in Europe;

    although it is worth recognizing the lack of binding quality of these principles under international law, it should be noted that they do not simply recommend a certain rule of conduct, they recognize the legality of the corresponding actions or inactions that could be considered illegal in the absence of these principles;

    these principles outlined the features of the general course of the further progressive movement of interstate communication on issues of security and cooperation in Europe. It should be noted that this communication took place and is now taking place with the participation of four permanent members of the UN Security Council, which inevitably increases the role of such a process;

    provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE may be included in the process of formation of international legal custom, forming part of state practice and/or opinio juris, the other part must be formed by acts binding on international law;

    the entire experience of implementing the CSCE Final Act can be taken into account when concluding a new Helsinki Plus Treaty.

Although many representatives of the Russian international legal doctrine emphasize the political nature of the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE, nevertheless Russian science adheres to the position that there are ten basic principles of international law. It seems to us that such a position is quite suitable in educational purposes, however, cannot be considered impeccable when proving the relevant fact in the framework of the legal process. However, we do not exclude the possibility of taking into account the position of Russian international scientists in accordance with Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice that "...the doctrines of the most qualified publicists of the various nations as an aid to the determination of legal rules" may be applied.

International Acts Not Constituting Agreements // American Journal of International Law. 1994 No. 1. P. 518.

Kapustin A. Ya. European law // International law / otv. ed. V. I. Kuznetsov, B. R. Tuzmukhamedov, 2nd ed. - M., 2007. S. 914.

Ivanenko V. S., Kuznetsov V.I. Principles of international law // International law / otv. ed. V. I. Kuznetsov, B. R. Tuzmukhamedov, 2nd ed. - M., 2007. S. 193.

Cm.: Kolosov Yu. M. Principles of international law // International law / otv. ed. Yu. M. Kolosov, E. S. Krivchikova. - 2nd ed. - M., 2005. S. 64.

In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was held in Helsinki. As a result of the meeting, the OSCE (Eng. OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) was created - the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the world's largest regional organization dealing with security issues. The OSCE currently brings together 57 countries located in North America, Europe and Central Asia. The former name was the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" was convened on the initiative of the USSR and the socialist states of Europe as a permanent international forum of representatives of 33 European countries, as well as the United States and Canada, to develop measures to reduce military confrontation and strengthen security in Europe.

The meeting was held in three stages: July 3-7, 1973 - Helsinki - a meeting of foreign ministers, September 18, 1973 - July 21, 1975 - Geneva - making proposals, amendments and agreeing on the text of the Final Act, July 30 - August 1 In 1975, in the capital of Finland, Helsinki, the heads of 35 states signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the so-called Helsinki Accords).

The development of the agreements reached was consolidated at the meetings of the participating states. So, in 1992, the Helsinki meeting was held at highest level. The document “The Challenge of the Times of Change” was adopted, which marked the beginning of the transformation of the CSCE from a forum of predominantly political dialogue between the participating states into a trans-regional organization aimed at maintaining military-political stability and developing cooperation “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”. The CSCE received wide powers and opportunities to take practical measures to prevent and resolve local and regional conflicts.

Two years later, in 1994, the Budapest Summit took place. A decision was made to rename the CSCE from January 1, 1995 to the OSCE - the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. A political declaration “Towards a true partnership in a new era” was adopted, an agreement to start developing a model of common and comprehensive security for Europe in the 21st century, military-political agreements (“Code of Conduct Concerning Military-Political Aspects of Security”, “Principles Governing Nonproliferation " and etc.).


The organization aims to prevent conflicts in the region, resolve crisis situations, and eliminate the consequences of conflicts.

The main means of ensuring security and solving the main tasks of the organization:

« The first basket, or the political-military dimension:

arms proliferation control;

Diplomatic efforts to prevent conflicts;

Construction measures trusting relationship and security.

"Second basket", or economic and environmental dimension: economic and environmental security.

"Third basket", or the human dimension: the protection of human rights;

Development of democratic institutions;

Election monitoring.

Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki final act(eng. Helsinki Final Act), the Helsinki Accords (eng. Helsinki Accords) or the Declaration of Helsinki (eng. Helsinki Declaration) is a key document related to the activities of the OSCE. Signed by the heads of 35 states in the capital of Finland, Helsinki, July 30 - August 1, 1975.

Interstate agreements grouped into several sections:

In the international legal field: consolidation of the political and territorial results of the Second World War, outlining the principles of relations between the participating states, including the principle of inviolability of borders; territorial integrity of states; non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign states;

In the politico-military field: coordination of confidence-building measures in the military field (prior notification of military exercises and major troop movements, presence of observers at military exercises); peaceful settlement of disputes;

In the economic field: coordination of the main areas of cooperation in the field of economy, science and technology and environmental protection;

In the humanitarian field: harmonization of commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of movement, contacts, information, culture and education, the right to work, the right to education and health care.

The text of the Final Act included five sections: security issues, economics and scientific and technical exchange, problems of the Mediterranean, humanitarian concerns, further steps to develop cooperation after the signing of the Final Act. But the division of the “Helsinki Accords” has become established in the literature not according to sections of the document, but according to the profiles of the agreements themselves.

According to this principle, the provisions of the Final Act are grouped into three blocks (“three baskets”):

1) political agreements;

2) agreements on economic, scientific and technical issues;

3) decisions of a humanitarian nature.

This volume contains the texts of the agreements of the first and third "baskets", around which there was a sharp political struggle in subsequent years.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which began in Helsinki on July 3, 1973 and continued in Geneva from September 18, 1973 to July 21, 1975, was completed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975 by the High Representatives of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Holy See, United Kingdom, United States of America, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Turkey, Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden and Yugoslavia…

The High Representatives of the participating States solemnly adopted the following.

Questions related to security in Europe

The participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have adopted the following:

a) Declaration of principles which will guide the participating States in their mutual relations, The participating States declare their determination to respect and apply to each of them with all other participating States, regardless of their political, economic and social systems, as well as their size, geographic location and level economic development, the following principles, which are all of paramount importance and by which they will guide their mutual relations:

I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty

The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and identity, as well as all the rights inherent in and covered by their sovereignty, which include, in particular, the right of each State to legal equality, to territorial integrity, to liberty and political independence. They will also respect each other's right to freely choose and develop their political, social, economic and cultural systems, as well as the right to establish their own laws and administrative regulations.

Under international law, all participating States have equal rights and responsibilities. They will respect each other's right to determine and exercise as they please their relations with other states in accordance with international law and in the spirit of this Declaration. They believe that their borders can be changed, in accordance with international law, peacefully and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including the right to be or not to be a party to union treaties; they also have the right to neutrality.

II. Non-use of force or threat of force

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as in their international relations in general, from the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with this Declaration. No considerations may be used to justify recourse to the threat or use of force in violation of this principle.

Accordingly, participating States will refrain from any action constituting a threat of force or the direct or indirect use of force against another participating State.

Likewise, they will refrain from all manifestations of force for the purpose of compelling another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. Likewise, they will also refrain in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.

No such use of force or threat of force will be used as a means of settling disputes or matters that may give rise to disputes between them.

III. Inviolability of borders

The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers, as well as the frontiers of all states in Europe, and will therefore refrain now and in the future from any encroachment on those frontiers.

They will accordingly also refrain from any demand or action aimed at the seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.

IV. Territorial integrity of states

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.

Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or unity of any participating State and, in particular, from any such action constituting the use of force or threat by force.

The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of the use of force in violation of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No occupation or acquisition of this kind will be recognized as legal.

v. Peaceful settlement of disputes

The participating States will settle disputes between them by peaceful means in such a way as not to endanger international peace and security and justice.

They will strive in good faith and in a spirit of cooperation to arrive at a just solution based on international law in a short time.

To this end, they will use such means as negotiation, examination, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, litigation or other peaceful means of their own choice, including any settlement procedure agreed before disputes to which they would have been parties arose.

In the event that the parties to a dispute fail to reach a resolution of the dispute by one of the aforementioned peaceful means, they will continue to seek mutually agreed means of a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

The participating States that are parties to a dispute between them, as well as other participating States, will refrain from any action that may aggravate the situation to such an extent as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and thereby make an amicable settlement of the dispute more difficult.

VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs

The participating States will refrain from any interference, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs within the internal competence of another participating State, regardless of their relationship.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.

They will likewise refrain in all circumstances from any other act of military or political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interests the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty, and thus to secure for themselves advantages of any kind. .

Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from providing direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities or subversive or other activities aimed at the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.

VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will encourage and promote the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms, all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential to his free and full development.

Within this framework, the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess, alone or in community with others, a religion or belief, acting in accordance with the dictates of one's own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory there are national minorities will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will grant them full opportunity actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will thus protect their legitimate interests in this area.

The participating States recognize the universal importance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for peace, justice and well-being, necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation between them, as between all states.

They will at all times respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavor, jointly and individually, including cooperating with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of individuals to know their rights and obligations in this area and to act in accordance with them.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, participating States will act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations as set out in international declarations and agreements in this field, including but not limited to the International Covenants on Human Rights, if they are bound by them.

VIII. Equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny

The participating States will respect equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny, acting at all times in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and relevant norms of international law, including those relating to the territorial integrity of states.

Based on the principle of equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny, all peoples always have the right, in conditions of complete freedom, to determine, when and how they wish, their internal and external political status without outside interference and to exercise their own political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal importance of respect for and effective exercise of equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny for the development of friendly relations between them, as well as between all states; they also recall the importance of excluding any form of violation of this principle.

IX. Cooperation between states

The participating states will develop their cooperation with each other, as with all states, in all fields in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. In developing their cooperation, the participating States will attach particular importance to the areas as defined by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with each of them contributing in full equality.

They will strive, developing their cooperation as equals, to promote mutual understanding and trust, friendly and good neighborly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice. They will likewise strive, by developing their cooperation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the realization of their aspirations, using, in particular, the benefits arising from increasing mutual acquaintance and from progress and achievements in the economic, scientific, technical, social, cultural and humanitarian areas. They will take steps to promote conditions conducive to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interests of all in reducing differences in the levels of economic development and, in particular, the interests of developing countries throughout the world.

They confirm that governments, institutions, organizations and individuals can play an appropriate and positive role in helping to achieve these goals of their cooperation. They will strive, by expanding their cooperation as defined above, to develop closer relations among themselves on a better and more solid basis for the benefit of the peoples.

x. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law

The participating States will fulfill in good faith their obligations under international law, both those obligations arising from generally recognized principles and norms of international law, and those obligations arising from treaties or other agreements consistent with international law to which they are parties.

In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to establish their own laws and regulations, they will be consistent with their legal obligations under international law; they will, moreover, give due consideration to and implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The participating States reaffirm that, in the event that the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations conflict with their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter shall prevail in accordance with Article 103 of the UN Charter.

All the principles set forth above are of paramount importance, and therefore they will apply equally and unreservedly in interpreting each of them with regard to the others.

The participating States express their determination to fully respect and apply these principles, as set out in this Declaration, in all aspects to their mutual relations and co-operation in order to secure to each participating State the benefits deriving from the respect and application of these principles for everyone.

The participating States, having due regard to the principles set forth above and, in particular, the first sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law", note that this Declaration does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the relevant treaties and other agreements and arrangements. .

The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will contribute to the development of normal and friendly relations and to the progress of cooperation between them in all fields. They also express their conviction that respect for these principles will contribute to the development of political contacts between them, which, in turn, will contribute to a better mutual understanding of their positions and views.

The participating States declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other States in the spirit of the principles set forth in this Declaration.

Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields

1. Contacts between people.

The participating States express their intention to proceed now with the following:

Contacts and regular meetings based on family ties With a view to facilitating the further development of contacts based on family ties, the participating States will consider favorably requests for travel with a view to allowing persons to enter or leave their territories on a temporary and, if so desired, regular basis to meet with members of their families .

Applications for temporary travel to meet family members will be considered regardless of the country of departure or entry; the existing procedures for issuing travel documents and visas will be applied in this spirit. Processing and issuance of such documents and visas will be carried out within a reasonable time; in cases of urgent need - such as serious illness, death - on an extraordinary basis. They will take such steps as may be necessary to ensure an acceptable level of fees for the issuance of official travel documents and visas.

They confirm that the submission of a request relating to contacts based on family ties will not result in a change in the rights and obligations of the person submitting the request or members of his family.

- Family reunion

The participating States will consider in a positive and humane spirit the requests of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family, giving particular attention to applications of an urgent nature, such as applications from the sick or the elderly. They will deal with these requests as quickly as possible.

They will, if necessary, reduce the fees charged in connection with these requests to ensure that they are kept at a moderate level.

Unsatisfied requests for family reunification can be resubmitted at the appropriate level and will be considered after a short period of time by the authorities of the respective country of residence or host country; in such circumstances fees will only be charged if the request is granted.

Persons whose requests for family reunification are granted may bring with them or send items of household and personal use; to this end, the participating States will use all the possibilities contained in the existing rules.

Until members of the same family are reunited, meetings and contacts between them can be carried out in accordance with the order for contacts based on family ties.

The participating States will support the efforts of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies dealing with family reunification.

They confirm that the filing of a request for family reunification will not result in a change in the rights and obligations of the person who submitted the request or members of his family.

The host participating State will take due care of the employment of persons from other participating States who come to that State for permanent residence within the framework of family reunification with its citizens, ensure that they are provided with equal educational opportunities as their own citizens, medical care and social security.

- Marriages between citizens of different states

The participating States will examine favorably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations requests for exit and entry permits of persons who decide to marry a citizen of another participating State.

The processing and issuance of documents required for the above purposes and for marriage will be carried out in accordance with the provisions adopted in relation to family reunification.

When considering requests from married spouses from different participating States to enable them and the minor children of their marriage to transfer their habitual residence to the State in which one of them has its habitual residence, the participating States will also apply the provisions adopted with regard to family reunification.

- Travel for personal or professional reasons

The participating States intend to promote greater opportunities for their citizens to travel for personal or professional reasons, and to this end they intend, in particular:

Gradually simplify and flexibly apply the procedure for exit and entry;

Facilitate the movement of citizens from other participating States on their territory with due regard to security requirements.

They will seek to progressively lower, where appropriate, fees for visas and official travel documents.

They intend to study, if necessary, means of improving bilateral consular practices, including legal and consular assistance, including, as appropriate, the conclusion of multilateral or bilateral consular conventions or other appropriate agreements and arrangements.

They confirm that religious denominations, institutions and organizations operating within the constitutional framework of the participating States and their representatives may, in the area of ​​their activity, carry out contacts and meetings between them and exchange information.

- Improving conditions for tourism on an individual or collective basis

The participating States consider that tourism contributes to a more complete knowledge of the life, culture and history of other countries, to the growth of mutual understanding between peoples, to the improvement of contacts and the wider use of leisure. They intend to contribute to the development of tourism on an individual or collective basis.

- Meetings between youth

The participating States intend to promote the development of contacts and exchanges between young people.

2. Information

The participating States express their intention, in particular:

a) Improving the dissemination, access and exchange of information

- oral information

Facilitate the dissemination of oral information by encouraging lectures and lecture tours by prominent figures and experts from other participating States, as well as exchanges of views such as round tables, seminars, symposiums, summer courses, congresses and bilateral and multilateral meetings.

- Printed information

To contribute to the improvement of the distribution in their territories of newspapers and printed publications, periodicals and non-periodicals, from other participating States ...

Film, radio and television information

Contribute to the improvement of the dissemination of film, radio and television information.

For these purposes:

They will encourage the expansion of the display and transmission of more varied information, recorded on tape, from other participating States, illustrating various aspects of life in their countries, and obtained on the basis of such agreements or arrangements as may be necessary between the organizations and firms directly concerned;

They will facilitate the importation by competent organizations and firms of audiovisual material recorded on tape from other participating States.

The participating States note the expansion of the dissemination of radio information and express the hope that this process will continue, so that it meets the interests of mutual understanding between peoples and the goals determined by this Conference.

b) Cooperation in the field of information

Encourage cooperation in the field of information on the basis of short- or long-term agreements or arrangements.

In particular:

They will promote broader cooperation between the mass media, including between telegraph agencies, publishing houses and publishing organizations;

They will promote cooperation between broadcasters and television organizations, both public and private, national and international, in particular through the exchange of direct or recorded radio and television programs, the joint production and distribution of such programs;

They will encourage meetings and contacts both between journalistic organizations and between journalists of the participating States;

They will welcome the possibility of reaching agreements between periodicals, including newspapers, of the participating States on the exchange of articles and their publication;

They will encourage the exchange of technical information, as well as the organization of joint research and meetings of experts to exchange experience and opinions in the field of press, radio and television.

c) Improving working conditions for journalists

The participating States, seeking to improve the conditions under which journalists from one of the participating States exercise their professional activity in another State Party, mean

In particular:

Facilitate, on a reciprocal basis, procedures for arranging travel for journalists from participating States in the country in which they carry out their professional activities, and progressively provide greater opportunities for such travel, subject to rules related to the presence of areas closed for security reasons;

Increase opportunities for personal communication between journalists of the participating States and their sources of information, including organizations and official institutions.

Helmut Schmidt - Federal Chancellor of the German Democratic Republic.

Erich Honecker - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany of the United States of America.

Gerald Ford - President of the United States of America of the Republic of Austria.

Bruno Kreisky - Federal Chancellor.

Kingdoms of Belgium: Leo Tindemans - Prime Minister.

People's Republic of Bulgaria: Todor Zhivkov - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Canada: Pierre Elliot - Trudeau Prime Minister.

Republic of Cyprus: His Beatitude Archbishop Makarios III - President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Denmark: Anker Jorgensen - Prime Minister.

Spain: Carlos Arias Navarro - Head of Government.

Republic of Finland: Urho Kekkonen - President of the Republic.

French Republic: Valerie Giscard d'Estaing - President of the Republic.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Harold Wilson - First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Hellenic Republic: People's Republic of Hungary: Konstantinos Karamanlis -Prime Minister.

Hungarian People's Republic: Janos Kadar - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, member of the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Ireland: Liam Cosgrave - Prime Minister.

Iceland: Geir Hutlgrimsson - Prime Minister.

Italian Republic: Aldo Moro - President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic and as Acting President of the Council of the European Communities.

Principality of Liechtenstein: Walter Kieber - Head of Government.

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: Gaston Thorne - Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Republic of Malta: Dominic Mintoff - Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Principalities of Monaco: André Saint-Mle - Minister of State, President of the Council of Government, representing His Serene Highness the Prince of Monaco.

Norway: Trygve Bratteli - Prime Minister.

Kingdom of the Netherlands: Joop M. Den Oyl - Prime Minister.

Polish People's Republic: Edward Gierek - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party.

Portugal: Francisco Costa Gomes - President of the Republic.

Socialist Republic of Romania: Nicolae Ceausescu - President of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

San Marino: Gian Luigi Berti - Secretary of State for Foreign and Political Affairs.

Holy See: Agostino Casaroli - Secretary of the Council of state affairs Church, Special Delegate of His Holiness Pope Paul VI.

Sweden: Olof Palme - Prime Minister.

Swiss Confederation: Pierre Graber - President of the Confederation, Head of the Federal Political Department.

Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: Gustav Husak - General Secretary of the Central Committee Communist Party Czechoslovakia, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Republic of Turkey: Suleiman Demirel - Prime Minister.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L.I. Brezhnev - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Josip Broz Tito - President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has become a kind of highest point period in the history of international relations, which was called "Detente" or simply "Detente". The act, concluded by 35 states, established the principles of a peaceful and humane international order in Europe. However, in practice, some of the provisions of the Act were not respected, and in 1979 "Detente" was replaced by a new round of "Cold War".

In the 60s. the international situation has changed dramatically. Both superpowers faced great difficulties that forced them to move from the Cold War to the establishment of more peaceful relations, to the policy of international detente (abbreviated as "Detente").
The positions of the USSR were weakened by a split in the international communist movement related to the Sino-Soviet conflict.
The situation was even more difficult capitalist countries. The US is bogged down in a war in Indochina. In 1968, a wave of mass popular uprisings swept through the countries of the West. In 1969, the economic crisis began, and in 1971 - the crisis of the monetary system.
In the mid 70s. an approximate parity of strategic nuclear forces between the USSR and the USA. Further arms race became meaningless.
In conditions of international instability, confrontation between the superpowers was increasingly dangerous for them. Both sides began to look for opportunities for rapprochement. To begin with, the powers that possessed nuclear weapons agreed to limit their proliferation. It should not freely pass into the hands of other states. July 1, 1968 non-proliferation treaty nuclear weapons was signed. The countries of the "atomic club" (that is, the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and China that possessed atomic and nuclear weapons) pledged not to transfer to other countries technologies that could be used to create atomic weapons. Most countries in the world have pledged not to proliferate nuclear weapons.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the first sign that the USSR and the USA were ready to agree on limiting the "arms race". The period of "détente", a pause in the "Cold War" began.
The USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 somewhat delayed the start of the "détente" process, but already in November 1969 negotiations began between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic (i.e., nuclear) arms (SALT). At the same time, several agreements were prepared and signed to limit the "arms race", for example, an agreement on the prohibition of the placement of nuclear weapons on the bottom of the seas and oceans, on measures to reduce the threat nuclear war.
Taking advantage of the conflict between the PRC and the USSR, the United States normalized its relations with China. In February 1972 President Nixon came to China. The long-standing confrontation between the US and China ended, while hostile relations between the USSR and China persisted.
On May 22, 1972, Nixon arrived in Moscow and met with General Secretary Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev. During the visit, which lasted until May 30, several important documents were signed. In the statement "On the foundations of relations between the two countries," the parties renounced the use of force and acknowledged that they did not seek to destroy each other. This meant the actual rejection of the idea of ​​the communist movement to eliminate capitalism and the desire of Western politicians to eliminate the socialist system. The leaders of the two countries agreed to freeze strategic weapons at the levels at which they were in 1972 (SALT-1 agreement). The USSR and the USA pledged not to create systems missile defense(ABM), because the emergence of protection against nuclear weapons on one side increases the temptation to use nuclear missiles against the other. The superpowers have decided to use space only for peaceful purposes. These agreements were a decisive step towards a world that would not be threatened by destruction in nuclear fire. But Nixon and Brezhnev did not stop there. In June 1973, during Brezhnev's return visit to the United States, the two leaders agreed to start negotiations on the SALT II treaty, which was supposed to bring the arms levels of both countries to equality. After Nixon's resignation from the US presidency in 1974, President D. Ford continued his policy.
"Detente" concerned relations not only between the USSR and the USA. The political climate in Europe has also changed. Back in 1966, the Social Democrat W. Brandt, who headed the FRG Foreign Ministry, proclaimed the "Ostpolitik" aimed at normalizing relations between the "two Germanys". On September 3, 1971, an agreement was signed between the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France, which settled international disputes over West Berlin.
In July 1973, at the initiative of the superpowers, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began, which was supposed to resolve all the international problems that arose during the Cold War in Europe. The meeting was attended by representatives of almost all European countries as well as the USA and Canada.
On August 1, 1975, the heads of these states, having gathered in Helsinki, solemnly signed the Final Act of the conference. It was a moment of the triumph of the policy of peace, peaceful and good neighborly coexistence of countries with different social order.
The act affected a wide range international problems, including trade, industrial cooperation, cooperation in science and technology, environmental protection, cultural and interpersonal relationships.
The states that signed the Act pledged to "respect each other's sovereign equality and originality" ... "the right of each other freely to choose and develop their political, social, economic and cultural systems, as well as the right to establish their own laws and administrative rules."
An important provision, which remains relevant today, said: “Borders can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including the right to be or not to be a party to union treaties; they also have the right to neutrality”…
Participating States pledged to refrain in international relations "from the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with this Declaration."
“The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers, as well as the frontiers of all states in Europe, and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from any encroachment on these frontiers.
They will accordingly also refrain from any demand or action aimed at the seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.”
Chapter VII was specifically devoted to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, participating States will act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
There was a contradiction between the principles of non-interference in each other's internal affairs and guarantees of civil rights - after all, in order to guarantee rights, it was necessary to intervene in the affairs of countries that violate them.
In those countries where civil rights were violated, they continued to be trampled further, and attempts by other states to criticize internal politics governments violating human rights were declared interference in internal affairs. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was created to oversee compliance with the Helsinki Agreement. In some countries of Eastern Europe, including the USSR, public Helsinki groups arose that exposed violations of the agreement in the field of human rights on the territory of the socialist countries. Members of these groups were persecuted by the authorities, and in the early 80s. most of them were destroyed.
During the "Detente" period, ties between the "two worlds" noticeably expanded. Their symbols were the hockey matches of the USSR and Canada in 1972, space program"Soyuz-Apollo", when in 1975 there was a docking of the Soviet and American spacecraft. The final act was intended to ensure the expansion of cultural cooperation between countries and people.
The act became the apogee of "Detente", after which relations between the USSR and the USA began to gradually deteriorate.
After the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-1) in 1972, negotiations continued on their more stringent limitations. However, in 1977-1978. the negotiation process has gradually stalled. The American administration of D. Carter criticized human rights violations in the USSR. The slowdown in the Soviet-American talks was intensified both by different approaches to the rate of arms reduction and by conflicts in the Third World.
As a result, time was lost, and it was only possible to agree on a new SALT treaty at the end of Carter's presidency, which made it difficult to ratify the agreement under the new President R. Reagan.
The SALT-2 Treaty, signed during the meeting between Brezhnev and Carter in Vienna on June 18, 1979, consolidated the existing parity of strategic arms. This treaty was the last major foreign policy success not only of the Carter administration, but also of the Brezhnev administration. However, SALT-2 was not ratified by the US Congress, and the US administration until 1986 fulfilled its conditions “voluntarily” (it was concluded until 1985).
The SALT-2 treaty limited the number of nuclear weapons of all types to 2400. Several other restrictions were introduced, as well as a strict control mechanism.
An important shortcoming of SALT-2 was the lack of geographical regulation of the distribution of nuclear weapons. By maintaining the overall balance of nuclear weapons, the superpowers could gain advantages in regions that were important to them. First of all, it concerned Europe. The unprecedented concentration of armaments here was a constant source of military danger.
In 1979, in connection with disputes about the deployment in Europe nuclear missiles the average range of two blocks, and also due to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, Soviet-American relations worsened again, and "Detente" ended.


The problem of ensuring European security is one of the key problems of our time. Historical experience shows that Europe has always played and today plays an important role in the development of international relations throughout the world. In this regard, the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, enshrined in the Final Act, signed on August 1, 1975 in Helsinki by the leaders of 33 European countries, as well as the United States and Canada, and its consistent implementation are of historical importance.

Outbreaks of the "cold war" between East and West alternated with periods of detente and warming. The longest detente came in the 1970s. During these years, the USSR and the USA concluded a number of important arms limitation treaties. The crowning achievement of détente was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Representatives of the United States, Canada and all European states, except Albania, have been conferring for two years.

At the end of the 60s. international relationships in Europe were also characterized by the search for ways to ease tensions. The power policy in the conditions of military-strategic parity turned out to be unpromising. The idea of ​​negotiations began to make its way in the governments of the West, and the search for ways to security through cooperation and confidence building in Europe emerged.
The initiative to convene a meeting of European states to discuss measures to ensure collective security in Europe belonged to the USSR and other socialist countries. But these proposals were largely propagandistic in nature.

First stage : On July 3, 1973, the foreign ministers of 35 states gathered in Helsinki for the first stage of the meeting. They approved the rules of procedure for the all-European meeting, its agenda and tasks for the working bodies, outlined the general approach of their governments to the tasks of the meeting, and began an exchange of views on the substance of the proposals made. The foreign ministers of the socialist countries concentrated on questions of security in Europe, emphasizing the need to work out the principles of relations between all participants in the conference. First of all, this concerned the inviolability of borders and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Representatives of the West placed special emphasis on the issues of the "third basket", seeking "freedom of movement of people and ideas in Europe."

Second phase The pan-European meeting began in Geneva on September 18, 1973 and continued until July 21, 1975. Hard work went on for almost two years: the points of the draft Final Act of the Conference were agreed upon. Coordinating the positions of 35 different states - socialist and capitalist, large and small, neutral and military blocs - was in itself not an easy task. And then there was the fundamental difference in the approaches of the East and West. The representatives of the socialist countries insisted on the speedy elaboration of political principles for the mutual relations of the CSCE participants, while the Western countries sought tangible concessions on issues of humanitarian cooperation.

It was also difficult to resolve the issue of confidence-building measures. Prior notification of major military exercises on the territory of the participating states was provided for, but those states whose territory extended beyond Europe (the USSR and Turkey) had to allocate a certain border zone for the implementation of these measures.

Third stage. The meeting of the top leaders of 35 states on July 30 - August 1, 1975 in Helsinki was the third stage of the pan-European conference. In their speeches, they summed up the results of the work done, gave overall ratings major international problems, outlined the prospects for European cooperation. On August 1, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed. The text of this document in six languages ​​was compiled into a green-bound volume - hence its unofficial name "Green Book". The final document of the CSCE reflected agreements on a wide range of European problems. The OSCE participating States agreed to meet regularly on the full range of issues reflected in the Final Act, including humanitarian issues on human rights and freedoms.

Helsinki Final Act.

First section.

The first part of the Helsinki Final Act dealt with issues relating to to security in Europe: contribute to the improvement of relations between States and to the provision of conditions in which their peoples can live in conditions of genuine and lasting peace to make détente both continuous and increasingly viable and comprehensive; refrain from any use of armed force inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; take effective measures which, by their scope and nature, are steps towards the eventual achievement of general and complete disarmament; promote by all means the creation of an atmosphere of trust and respect among peoples; make efforts to resolve any disputes that arise; cooperate in the interests of humanity, etc.

It also included the Declaration of Principles, which the participating States undertook to be guided in their relations - ten European commandments »:

1. Sovereign equality respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty. The totality of these rights includes the right of every state to legal equality, territorial integrity, freedom and political independence, the right to choose and develop their political, social, economic and cultural systems.

2. Non-use of force or threat of force. The meeting participants agreed not to use force as a means of settling disputes, and no considerations can justify resorting to the threat or use of force.

3. Inviolability of borders. The states participating in the meeting declared that they considered the borders of all states in Europe as inviolable, and pledged to refrain from any encroachment on these borders. (The desire of the West to preserve the possibility of peacefully changing borders led to the appearance in the first principle of a provision according to which the borders of the states participating in the conference could “change, in accordance with international law, peacefully and by agreement.”)

4.Territorial integrity of states. Its recognition meant the rejection of any action against the territorial integrity, political independence or unity of any participating state.

5.Amicable settlement of disputes provided for the resolution of disputes through such means as negotiation, examination, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, litigation.

6.Non-intervention in internal affairs imposed a ban on any interference - direct or indirect, individual or collective.

7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, was recognized as an essential factor for peace, justice and well-being.

8. Equality and the right of peoples to control their own destiny meant the right of all peoples to determine their internal and external political status in conditions of complete freedom.

9.Cooperation between states should develop on the basis of full equality and promote mutual understanding and trust among peoples, strengthening peace and security. 10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law meant obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and norms of international law and treaties and agreements corresponding to this law.

The same part of the Final Act also included a document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security. Member States committed to provide advance notification of major military exercises. At the same time, “major military exercises” were understood as the exercises of the ground forces total strength more than 25,000 people or exercises involving a significant number of amphibious or airborne troops. The rule of mandatory notification of major military exercises applied to the territory of all European states. If the territory of a participating State extended beyond Europe, then it extended to a zone 250 km from the border with any other participant in the meeting. In addition, confidence-building measures included the exchange of observers for military exercises and advance notification of major troop movements, all on a voluntary basis. The agreed measures were designed to eliminate the causes of tension and contribute to strengthening peace and security in Europe.

Second section.

The second part of the Helsinki Final Act dealt with cooperation in the field of economy, science, technology and the environment. The participating States undertook to promote the development of trade in the broadest possible multilateral plan, to reduce or gradually eliminate all kinds of obstacles to its development. The "beneficial effect on the development of trade that can result from the application of most favored nation treatment" was recognized. The participating States expressed their readiness to encourage the development of industrial cooperation between competent organizations, enterprises and firms various countries; promote the adoption of measures to create favorable conditions for industrial cooperation. Among the projects of common interest, the following areas were identified: the exchange of electricity in Europe, the search for new sources of energy, the development of road networks and the improvement of transport.

The final act provided for the elimination of difficulties for further development scientific and technical cooperation. It outlined promising areas for such cooperation: agriculture, energy, rational use resources, transportation technology, physics, chemistry, meteorology and hydrology, oceanography, seismological research, space research, medicine and healthcare, etc.; its forms and methods: exchange of books and other scientific and technical publications, visits and other contacts and connections between scientists and specialists, holding international and national conferences, etc.

The Helsinki Accords also focused on expanding international cooperation to protect the environment in the following areas: air pollution, rational use of fresh water, protection of the marine environment and land, improvement of the state of the environment in populated areas, basic research and assessment of changes in environment and others. The following forms and methods of achieving the set goals were envisaged: the exchange of scientific and technical information, the organization of conferences.

Third section.

The third section of the Final Act contained provisions on cooperation in humanitarian and other fields. They envisaged cooperation in expanding contacts between people and the exchange of information, in the field of culture and education. At the same time, the participating states expressed their desire to contribute to the strengthening of peace and mutual understanding between peoples and the spiritual enrichment of the human person. It was also determined that cooperation in the humanitarian and other fields should be carried out on the basis of the basic principles of relations between states. At the same time, the meeting participants made specific commitments with regard to people-to-people contacts: to facilitate family reunification and marriages between citizens of different states, to encourage various personal contacts and youth exchanges.

The final act included a number of measures to improve the exchange of information. These included expanding the distribution of newspapers and other foreign print publications, as well as film, radio and television information; improving working conditions for foreign journalists. The CSCE participating States expressed their intention to develop cooperation and exchanges in the field of culture and education.

Significance of the Helsinki Final Act.

The Helsinki Final Act was not an international treaty and did not require ratification by parliamentary institutions. In form, it was rather a solemn political declaration signed at the highest level. Reading the magnificent language of the Helsinki Final Act, people thought that peace in Europe was now assured. But that's just how it seemed.

Over the past quarter century, almost all provisions of the act have been violated. The whole problem was that all the principles of relations between states had the same force and had to be implemented in a complex, but immediately after the completion of the CSCE, differences in the interpretation of the principles recorded in the act were revealed. The USSR and its allies attached particular importance to the provisions that consolidated the established territorial and political structure of Europe (the inviolability of borders), and the obligation not to interfere in the affairs of other countries. The West emphasized respect for human rights and the equality of peoples. At the same time, one cannot deny the great significance of the Act both for history and for drawing lessons for the future. Helsinki showed the possibility of successful cooperation if the parties are willing to reach an agreement.

The Helsinki Final Act was an outstanding international political document of the 20th century, continuing the tradition of the UN Charter, adopted in 1945, at the end of the Second World War. He concretized and further developed the principles of the UN Charter in relation to the conditions prevailing on the European continent, adding to the 7 principles enshrined in the UN Charter and the UN Declaration on Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation of States of 1970, three more principles (the principle of inviolability of borders, territorial integrity and respect for human rights).

These 10 principles are now recognized by the global community as fundamental principles international law. The Helsinki Final Act, which laid the foundations for a future European regional organization for security and cooperation, is not a legal document, unlike the UN Charter, but rather it can be attributed to the so-called "soft law".

Events after the signing of the Act(for reference)

The act assumed the continuity of the process of meetings and negotiations within the framework of the All-European, or Helsinki process. In accordance with this agreement, a new meeting of 33 European states, the USA and Canada was held in Belgrade in October 1977-March 1978. By this time, however, the international situation had become much more complicated. The United States and other NATO countries took the path of exacerbating relations with the USSR and its allies, using the ongoing violations of human rights in the USSR. Therefore, the Belgrade meeting practically did not give anything new. Although it was still possible to achieve the adoption of a joint document, it did not take a step forward from the Final Act of 1975. Nevertheless, the participants in the Belgrade meeting agreed on a new meeting in Madrid. And despite the turn to confrontation and a new outbreak of the Cold War, this meeting still took place.

It continued intermittently for three years (November 1980-September 1983). Central to its work was the issue of confidence-, security- and disarmament-building measures in Europe in order to halt further confrontation. But the US and some of its NATO allies resisted making constructive decisions. The position of the USSR also remained very rigid. After a lengthy heated discussion, a document was nevertheless adopted in which the meeting participants expressed their determination to make detente a more viable and continuous process, to seek solutions to unresolved issues by peaceful means. An important result of the Madrid meeting was also the agreement on the convening and determination of the objectives of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe.

In January 1984, this conference began its work in Stockholm. It lasted more than two and a half years - until September 1986. All its 35 participants committed themselves, recorded in the final document of the conference, to respect and put into practice the principles of non-use of force or threat of force. The 10 points of the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference were also reaffirmed and concrete measures were outlined to strengthen security in Europe. The conference participants, for example, agreed on advance notice of certain types military activities, on the mutual invitation of observers, as well as on the exchange of information on plans for military exercises and maneuvers. The Stockholm meeting was milestone on the way to stabilizing the political situation in Europe.

The next meeting was held in Vienna, where on January 19, 1989, the foreign ministers of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada signed the Final Document of the Vienna session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Thus, the 27-month work of the Conference participants was completed, during which measures were agreed upon that could advance the pan-European process far in all spheres of relations - economic, political, military, humanitarian, cultural.

Of great importance for establishing an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding were the negotiations that began in March 1989 in Vienna as part of the Helsinki process between 23 member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO on conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The task of the participants in these negotiations was to move the fruitless negotiations in Geneva that had lasted for years, establish stability and security in Europe, reduce the size of the armed forces and conventional weapons, and achieve a strengthening of an atmosphere of confidence.

The Vienna talks were successfully completed, the text of the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe was agreed upon, providing for a large-scale reduction in the armaments of the Warsaw Pact and NATO from the Atlantic to the Urals. To sign this and a number of other documents on the construction of a new Europe in Paris on November 19-21, 1990, for the first time in 15 years after Helsinki, a meeting of the heads of state and government of 32 European countries, the USA and Canada was held. This document provided for the reduction of the military machine of the Warsaw Pact and NATO to an agreed parity level. Accordingly, a major reduction in the level of conventional weapons of the USSR was envisaged.

This event opened a new page in the pan-European process, marked the end of the hostile confrontation in Europe. The final document of the meeting - the Charter of Paris for a New Europe - reaffirmed the loyalty of the participating states of the Conference to the 10 principles of the Final Act adopted in Helsinki, outlined a constructive program of international cooperation, expressed their commitment to democracy based on human rights and ensuring prosperity with the guarantee of economic freedom and social justice, and recognized equal security for all countries.

The fundamental document on security and cooperation in Europe is the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975 by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada.

The Helsinki Final Act consolidated the political and territorial results of the Second World War and approved ten principles (the Helsinki Decalogue) of relations between states: sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; non-use of force or threat of force; inviolability of borders; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equality and the right of peoples to control their own destiny; cooperation between states; fulfillment of international legal obligations.

The Helsinki Final Act formed the basis for the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and long time fixed key principles world security. But a lot has changed over the years, and now Western countries call for revision of the document. A number of Western politicians recent times began to talk about the inability of the organization to resist modern challenges. Russia does not intend to abandon the Helsinki Act, but proposes to modernize it in accordance with modern realities.

In 2013, a draft concept of a new agreement was proposed, which was called "Helsinki + 40". However, from the very beginning, the participants could not agree on the main components of the document. Thus, Russia opposed the revision basic principles of the Helsinki Act and insists only on their updating. The Russian Foreign Ministry stresses the need to preserve the OSCE.

In December 2014, diplomats agreed to continue the Helsinki+40 process. A special expert body was created, which was called the "Group of Wise Men". Its work should contribute to a constructive dialogue on security issues, as well as the restoration of confidence in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions and the strengthening of OSCE commitments.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources

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