US nuclear arsenal. US nuclear forces Number of bombs and their placement

25.11.2019

The development of American nuclear forces is determined by the US military policy, which is based on the concept of "possibility of opportunities." This concept proceeds from the fact that in the 21st century there will be many different threats and conflicts against the United States, uncertain in time, intensity and direction. Therefore, the United States will concentrate its attention in the military field on how to fight, and not on who and when will be the enemy. Accordingly, the US armed forces are faced with the task of having the power to not only withstand a wide range of military threats and military means that any potential adversary may have, but also guarantee the achievement of victory in any military conflicts. Proceeding from this goal, the United States is taking measures to maintain long-term combat readiness of its nuclear forces and improve them. The United States is the only nuclear power that has nuclear weapons on foreign soil.

Currently, two branches of the US armed forces have nuclear weapons - the Air Force (Air Force) and the Navy (Navy).

The Air Force is armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Minuteman-3 with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs), heavy bombers (TB) B-52N and B-2A with long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and free-range nuclear bombs. fall, as well as tactical aircraft F-15E and F-16C, -D with nuclear bombs.

The Navy is armed with Trident-2 submarines with Trident-2 D5 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) equipped with MIRVs and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

To equip these carriers in the US nuclear arsenal, there are nuclear munitions (NWs) produced in the 1970-1980s of the last century and updated (renewed) in the process of sorting in the late 1990s - early 2000s:

- four types of warheads of multiple warheads: for ICBMs - Mk-12A (with a W78 nuclear charge) and Mk-21 (with a W87 nuclear charge), for SLBMs - Mk-4 (with a W76 nuclear charge) and its upgraded version Mk-4A (with nuclear charge W76-1) and Mk-5 (with nuclear charge W88);
- two types of warheads of strategic air-launched cruise missiles - AGM-86B and AGM-129 with a nuclear charge W80-1 and one type of sea-based non-strategic cruise missiles "Tomahawk" with YaZ W80-0 (land-based cruise missiles BGM-109G were eliminated under the Treaty INF, their YAZ W84 are on conservation);
- two types of strategic air bombs - B61 (modifications -7, -11) and B83 (modifications -1, -0) and one type of tactical bombs - B61 (modifications -3, -4, -10).

The Mk-12 warheads with YaZ W62, which were in the active arsenal, were completely disposed of in mid-August 2010.

All of these nuclear warheads belong to the first and second generation, with the exception of the V61-11 aerial bomb, which some experts consider as third generation nuclear warheads due to its increased ability to penetrate the ground.

The modern US nuclear arsenal, according to the state of readiness for the use of nuclear warheads included in it, is divided into categories:

The first category is nuclear warheads installed on operationally deployed carriers (ballistic missiles and bombers or located at weapons storage facilities of air bases where bombers are based). Such nuclear warheads are called "operationally deployed".

The second category is nuclear warheads that are in the "operational storage" mode. They are kept ready for installation on carriers and, if necessary, can be installed (returned) on missiles and aircraft. According to American terminology, these nuclear warheads are classified as "operational reserve" and are intended for "operational additional deployment." In essence, they can be considered as "return potential".

The fourth category is reserve nuclear warheads put into the "long-term storage" mode. They are stored (mostly in military warehouses) assembled, but do not contain components with a limited service life - the tritium-containing assemblies and neutron generators have been removed from them. Therefore, the transfer of these nuclear warheads to the "active arsenal" is possible, but requires a significant investment of time. They are intended to replace nuclear warheads of an active arsenal (similar, of similar types) in the event that mass failures (defects) are suddenly found in them, this is a kind of "safety stock".

The US nuclear arsenal does not include decommissioned but not yet dismantled nuclear warheads (their storage and disposal is carried out at the Pantex plant), as well as components of dismantled nuclear warheads (primary nuclear initiators, elements of the second cascade of thermonuclear charges, etc.).

An analysis of openly published data on the types of nuclear warheads of nuclear warheads that are part of the modern US nuclear arsenal shows that nuclear weapons B61, B83, W80, W87 are classified by US specialists as binary thermonuclear charges (TN), nuclear weapons W76 - as binary charges with a gas (thermonuclear ) amplification (BF), and W88 as a binary standard thermonuclear charge (TS). At the same time, the nuclear weapons of aviation bombs and cruise missiles are classified as charges of variable power (V), and the nuclear weapons of ballistic missile warheads can be classified as a set of nuclear weapons of the same type with different yields (DV).

American scientific and technical sources give the following possible ways to change power:

- dosing of the deuterium-tritium mixture when it is supplied to the primary node;
- change in the release time (in relation to the time process of fissile material compression) and the duration of the neutron pulse from an external source (neutron generator);
- mechanical blocking of X-ray radiation from the primary node to the compartment of the secondary node (in fact, the exclusion of the secondary node from the process of a nuclear explosion).

The charges of all types of air bombs (B61, B83), cruise missiles (W80, W84) and some warheads (with charges W87, W76-1) use explosives that have low sensitivity and resistance to high temperatures. In nuclear weapons of other types (W76, W78 and W88), due to the need to ensure a small mass and dimensions of their nuclear weapons while maintaining a sufficiently high power, explosives continue to be used, which have a higher detonation velocity and explosion energy.

At present, the US nuclear warhead uses a fairly large number of systems, instruments and devices of various types that ensure their safety and exclude unauthorized use during autonomous operation and as part of a carrier (complex) in the event of various kinds of emergencies that can occur with aircraft, underwater boats, ballistic and cruise missiles, air bombs equipped with nuclear warheads, as well as with autonomous nuclear warheads during their storage, maintenance and transportation.

These include mechanical safety and arming devices (MSAD), code blocking devices (PAL).

Since the early 1960s, several modifications of the PAL system have been developed and widely used in the United States, with the letters A, B, C, D, F, which have different functionality and design.

To enter codes in PAL installed inside the nuclear warhead, special electronic consoles are used. PAL cases have increased protection against mechanical impacts and are located in the nuclear warhead in such a way as to make it difficult to access them.

In some nuclear warheads, for example, with nuclear warheads W80, in addition to the KBU, a code switching system is installed, which allows arming and (or) switching the power of nuclear weapons on command from the aircraft in flight.

Aircraft monitoring and control systems (AMAC) are used in nuclear bombs, including equipment installed in the aircraft (with the exception of the B-1 bomber), capable of monitoring and controlling systems and components that ensure the safety, protection and detonation of nuclear warheads. With the help of AMAC systems, the command to fire the CCU (PAL), starting with the PAL B modification, can be given from the aircraft just before the bomb is dropped.

The US nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern nuclear arsenal, use systems that ensure their incapacitation (SWS) in the event of a threat of capture. The first versions of the SVS were devices that were capable of disabling individual internal nuclear warhead units on command from the outside or as a result of direct actions of persons from the personnel serving the nuclear warhead who had the appropriate authority and were located near the nuclear warhead at the moment when it became clear that the attackers (terrorists) may gain unauthorized access to it or seize it.

Subsequently, SHS were developed that automatically trigger when unauthorized actions are attempted with a nuclear warhead, primarily when they penetrate it or penetrate into a special “sensitive” container in which a nuclear warhead equipped with an SHS is located.

Specific implementations of SHS are known that allow for partial decommissioning of nuclear warheads by an outside command, partial decommissioning using explosive destruction, and a number of others.

To ensure the security and protection against unauthorized actions of the existing US nuclear arsenal, a number of measures are used to ensure detonation safety (Detonator Safing - DS), the use of heat-resistant shells pit (Fire Resistant Pit - FRP), low-sensitivity high-energy explosives (Insensitive High Explosive - IHE), providing increased nuclear explosion safety (Enhanced Nuclear Detonator Safety - ENDS), the use of command disable systems (Command Disable System - CDS), protection devices against unauthorized use (Permissive Action Link - PAL). Nevertheless, the overall level of safety and security of the nuclear arsenal from such actions, according to some American experts, does not yet fully correspond to modern technical capabilities. protection.

In the absence of nuclear tests, the most important task is to ensure control and develop measures to ensure the reliability and safety of nuclear warheads that have been in operation for a long time, which exceeds the originally specified warranty periods. In the United States, this problem is being solved with the help of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which has been operating since 1994. An integral part of this program is the Life Extension Program (LEP), in which nuclear components requiring replacement are reproduced in such a way as to correspond as closely as possible to the original technical characteristics and specifications, and non-nuclear components are upgraded and replace those nuclear warhead components whose warranty periods have expired.

NBP testing for signs of actual or suspected aging is performed by the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign (ESC), which is one of the five companies included in the Engineering Campaign. As part of this company, regular monitoring of nuclear warheads of the arsenal is carried out through a thorough annual examination of 11 nuclear warheads of each type in search of corrosion and other signs of aging. Of the eleven nuclear warheads of the same type selected from the arsenal to study their aging, one is completely dismantled for destructive testing, and the remaining 10 are subjected to non-destructive testing and returned to the arsenal. Using the data obtained as a result of regular monitoring with the help of the SSP program, problems with nuclear warheads are identified, which are eliminated within the framework of the LEP programs. At the same time, the main task is to “increase the duration of existence in the arsenal of nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components by at least 20 years with an ultimate goal of 30 years” in addition to the initial expected service life. These terms are determined based on the analysis of the results of theoretical and experimental studies on the reliability of complex technical systems and aging processes of materials and various types of components and devices, as well as generalization of data obtained in the process of implementing the SSP program for the main components of nuclear warheads by determining the so-called failure function, characterizing the entire set of defects that may arise during the operation of nuclear warheads.

Possible lifetimes of nuclear charges are determined primarily by the lifetimes of plutonium initiators (pits). In the United States, to address the issue of the possible life spans of previously produced pits that are stored or operated as part of nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern arsenal, a research methodology has been developed and is being used to assess the change in properties of Pu-239 over time, characterizing the process of its aging. The methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of data obtained during field tests and a study of the properties of Pu-239, which is part of the pits tested under the SSP program, as well as data obtained as a result of experiments on accelerated aging, and computer simulation of processes occurring during aging.

Based on the results of the studies, models of the plutonium aging process were developed, which allow us to assume that nuclear weapons remain operational for 45-60 years from the moment of production of the plutonium used in them.

The work carried out within the framework of the SSP allows the United States to keep the above types of nuclear warheads, developed more than 20 years ago, most of which were subsequently upgraded, in its nuclear arsenal for quite a long time, and to ensure a sufficiently high level of their reliability and safety without nuclear testing. .

As soon as hostilities in Europe ended, the United States was the first in the world to test an atomic bomb. This happened on July 16, 1945. However, the beginning of the United States nuclear program was laid much earlier.

The US nuclear weapons development program started in October 1941 - the Americans feared that Nazi Germany would receive a superweapon earlier and be able to launch a preemptive strike. This program went down in history as the Manhattan Project. The project was led by the American physicist Robert Oppenheimer, who was constantly under surveillance because he actively sympathized with the left movement. However, the latter fact did not prevent him from taking part in the development of deadly weapons - the physicist was very worried about the events in Europe.

The researchers developed the Fat Man bomb, which worked on the basis of the decay of plutonium-239 and had an implosive detonation scheme. In addition, Oppenheimer commissioned a separate group to develop a bomb of simple design, which was supposed to work only on uranium-235 and was called "Baby". On August 6, 1945, the Americans dropped it on the Japanese city of Hiroshima.

It was decided to detonate the implosion-type plutonium bomb first, the explosion of which is directed inwards. In fact, it was an analogue of the "Fat Man", which did not have an outer shell.

Due to the top secrecy of development, it was decided to conduct tests in the south of New Mexico at a test site located about 100 km from Alamogordo.

The atomic bomb "Trinity" two days before the test was installed on a steel tower, at various distances from which were located seismographs, cameras, instruments that record the level of radiation and pressure.

The first nuclear explosion in the history of mankind took place on July 16, 1945 at 5.30 local time, and the explosion power was 15-20 thousand tons of explosives in TNT equivalent. At the same time, the light from the explosion was visible at a distance of 290 km from the test site, and the sound propagated over a distance of about 160 km.

“My first impression was the feeling of a very bright light flooding everything around, and when I turned around, I saw a picture of a fireball now familiar to many ... Soon, literally 50 seconds after the explosion, a shock wave reached us. I was surprised by her comparative weakness. In fact, the shock wave was not so weak. It's just that the flash of light was so strong and so unexpected that the reaction to it reduced our susceptibility for a while, ”Leslie Groves, military director of the Manhattan Project.

In addition, in the center of the explosion in a circle with a radius of 370 m, all vegetation was destroyed and a crater appeared, and the metal and concrete structures located there completely evaporated. The cloud formed during the explosion rose to a height of 12.5 km - while traces of radioactive contamination were observed even at a distance of 160 km from the test site, and the contamination zone was about 50 km.

“We knew the world would never be the same again. A few people laughed, a few people cried. Most were silent. I remembered a line from the holy book of Hinduism, the Bhagavad Gita - Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he must do his duty, and to impress him, he assumes his many-armed form and says: "I am Death, the great destroyer of the worlds." I believe that we all, one way or another, thought about something like that, ”- remembered later the "father" of the bomb Oppenheimer.

The American president told Joseph Stalin about the successful bomb tests already on July 17, when the Potsdam Conference started in Berlin, which allowed the United States to conduct a dialogue with the USSR from a position of strength. But the successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb took place only after four years, on August 29, 1949.

Russia United Kingdom France China Other
India Israel (undeclared) Pakistan North Korea Former
South Africa Belarus Kazakhstan Ukraine

By 1998, at least $759 million had been given to the Marshall Islands in compensation for their exposure to US nuclear testing. In February 2006, more than $1.2 billion in compensation was paid to US citizens exposed to a nuclear hazard as a result of the US nuclear weapons program.

Russia and the US have a comparable number of nuclear warheads; together, these two countries possess over 90% of the world's nuclear warheads. As of 2019, the US has a list of 6,185 nuclear warheads; of these, 2,385 are retired and awaiting dismantling and +3,800 are part of the US arsenal. Of the stockpile of warheads, the US declared in March 2019 START declaration, 1,365 deployed on 656 ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.

History of development

Manhattan Project

The United States first began developing nuclear weapons during World War II at the behest of President Franklin Roosevelt in 1939, out of fear that they were in a race with Nazi Germany to develop such weapons. After a slow start under the guidance, at the urging of British scientists and American administrators, the program was placed under the Office of Research and Development, and in 1942 it was officially transferred under the auspices of the United States Army and became known as the Manhattan Project, in the American, British and Canadian joint venture. Under the direction of General Leslie Groves, over thirty different sites were built to research, manufacture and test components related to making bombs. These included the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, under the direction of physicist Robert Oppenheimer, the Hanford Plutonium Plant in Washington, and the Y-12 Homeland Security Complex in Tennessee.

By investing heavily in plutonium breeding in early nuclear reactors and in electromagnetic and gaseous enrichment processes to produce uranium-235, the United States was able to develop three usable weapons by mid-1945. Trinity's test was a plutonium implosion weapon design tested on 16 July 1945, with around 20 kilotons yield.

Faced with a planned invasion of the Japanese Islands scheduled to begin on November 1, 1945, and with Japan not giving up, President Harry S. Truman ordered atomic raids on Japan. On August 6, 1945, the US detonated a uranium cannon bomb design, Little Boy, over the Japanese city of Hiroshima with an energy of about 15 kilotons of TNT, killing about 70,000 people, among them 20,000 Japanese fighters and 20,000 Korean slave labor, and destroying about 50 000 buildings (including 2nd General Army and 5th Division Headquarters). Three days later, on August 9, the US attacked Nagasaki using a plutonium implosion bomb design, Fat Man, with the equivalent of an explosion of up to about 20 kilotons of TNT, destroying 60% of the city and killing about 35,000 people, among them 23,200–28,200 Japanese ordnance workers, 2000 Korean hijacked and 150 Japanese combat.

During the Cold War

Between 1945 and 1990, over 70,000 total warheads were developed, in over 65 different grades, ranging in yield from about 0.01 kt (such as the Davy Crockett wearable shell) to 25 megaton B41 bombs. Between 1940 and 1996, the US spent at least $9.3 trillion in modern terms to develop nuclear weapons. More than half was spent building delivery mechanisms for weapons. $583 billion in today's conditions has been spent on nuclear waste management and environmental restoration.

Throughout the Cold War, the US and the USSR were threatened with an all-out nuclear attack in the event of war, whether it was a conventional or nuclear confrontation. US nuclear doctrine called for Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which entailed a massive nuclear attack against strategic targets and core populations of the Soviet Union and its allies. The term "mutual assured destruction" was coined in 1962 by American strategist Donald Brennan. MAD was implemented by deploying nuclear weapons simultaneously on three different types of weapon platforms.

Post Cold War

A few notable US nuclear tests include:

The Trinity test on July 16, 1945, was the world's first nuclear weapon test (yield about 20,000).
The Operation Crossroads series, in July 1946, was the first post-war test series and one of the largest military operations in US history.
Operation Greenhouse shots in May 1951 included the first enhanced fission weapon test ("Item") and a scientific test that proved the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon ("George").
The Ivy Mike shot on November 1, 1952 was the first full test of the Teller-Ulam design "delivered" a hydrogen bomb, with a yield of 10 megatons. It was not a deployable weapon, however, with its full cryogenic equipment, it weighed around 82 tons.
The Castle Bravo gunned down on March 1, 1954 was the first test of a deployable (solid fuel) thermonuclear weapon, and also (accidentally) the largest weapon ever tested by the United States (15 megatons). It was also the largest radiation accident in the United States in connection with nuclear testing. An unforeseen exit, and a change in the weather, as a result of the fallout spread eastward to the inhabited Rongelap and Rongerik atolls, which were soon evacuated. Many of the Marshall Islands have since suffered from birth defects and have received some compensation from the federal government. Japanese fishing boat fukurit-mara, also came into contact with precipitation, which led many of the crew to rise badly; one eventually died.
The Argus I shot from Operation Argus, on 27 August 1958, was the first detonation of a nuclear weapon in outer space when a 1.7-kiloton warhead was detonated at an altitude of 200 kilometers (120 mi) over a series of high-altitude nuclear explosions.
The frigate's firing from Operation Dominic I on May 6, 1962, was the only US test of an operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a live nuclear warhead (yield 600 kilotons), on Christmas Island. In general, missile systems were tested without live warheads and warheads were tested separately for safety reasons. In the early 1960s, however, technical questions were raised about how the systems would behave in combat (when they were "twinned", in military jargon), and this test was intended to allay those fears. However, the warhead had to be somewhat modified before use, and the missile was an SLBM (not an ICBM), so it did not solve all the problems on its own.
The Sedan shot from Operation Styrax on 6 July 1962 (yielding 104 kilotons), was an attempt to show the possibility of using nuclear weapons for "civilian" and "peaceful" purposes, as part of Operation Plowshare. In this example, a 1,280 ft (390 m) diameter 320 ft (98 m) depth crater was created at the Nevada Test Site.

A summary table of each American operational series can be found in the United States Nuclear Test Series.

delivery systems

From the left are the Peacekeeper, Minuteman III and Minuteman I

The original Little Boy and Fat Man weapons, developed by the United States during the Manhattan Project, were relatively large (Fat Man had a diameter of 5 feet (1.5 m)) and heavy (about 5 tons each) and required specially modified bomber aircraft to adapt for their bombing missions against Japan. Each modified bomber could only carry one such weapon, and only within a limited range. After these initial weapons were developed, a significant amount of money and research was carried out towards the goal of standardizing nuclear warheads so that they do not require highly specialized experts to assemble them before use, as is the case with special wartime devices, and miniaturizations. warheads for use in systems with variable over delivery.

With the help of brains acquired from Operation Paperclip at the tail end of the European theater of World War II, the United States was able to embark on an ambitious program in rocket science. One of the first products of this was the development of missiles capable of holding nuclear warheads. The MGR-1 Honest John was the first such weapon, developed in 1953 as a surface-to-surface missile with a radius of no more than 15 miles (24 km). Due to their limited range, their potential use was severely limited (they could not, for example, threaten Moscow with an immediate strike).

B-36 Peacekeeper in flight

The development of long-range bombers, such as the B-29 Superfortress during World War II, was continued during the Cold War period. In 1946, the Convair B-36 Peacemaker became the first purpose-built nuclear bomber; it served in the US Air Force until 1959. The Boeing B-52 Stratofortress was unable by the mid-1950s to carry a wide arsenal of nuclear bombs, each with different capabilities and potential use cases. Beginning in 1946, the US based its initial deterrence of force at the Strategic Air Command which, in the late 1950s, maintained a number of nuclear-armed bombers in the skies at all times, ready to be ordered to attack the USSR when needed. This system was, however, extremely expensive, both in terms of natural and human resources, and also raised the possibility of an accidental nuclear war.

During the 1950s and 1960s, computerized early warning systems developed, such as defense support programs were developed to detect incoming Soviet attacks and coordinate response strategies. During this same period, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems were developed that could deliver a nuclear weapon over vast distances, allowing the US to deploy nuclear forces capable of hitting the Soviet Union in the American Midwest. Shorter-range weapons, including small tactical weapons, were sent to Europe as well, including nuclear artillery and a man-portable dedicated nuclear bomb. The development of submarine-launched ballistic missile systems allowed covert nuclear submarines to covertly launch missiles at long-range targets as well, making it nearly impossible for the Soviet Union to successfully launch a first strike attack against the United States without receiving a lethal response.

Improvements in warhead miniaturization in the 1970s and 1980s allowed for the development of MIRV missiles that could carry warheads, each of which could be individually targeted. The question of whether these missiles should be based on constantly rotating railroad tracks (to avoid being easily targeted against Soviet missiles) or based in heavily fortified bunkers (to possibly withstand Soviet attacks) was a major political controversy in the 1980s. (in the end, the bunker deployment method was chosen). The MIRV system allowed the US to render Soviet missile defense systems economically unfeasible, as each offensive missile required three to ten defensive missiles to counter.

Additional changes to the weapons supply included missile cruise systems, which allowed the aircraft to fire long-range, low-flying nuclear missile warheads towards the target from a relatively comfortable distance.

Existing US delivery systems make virtually any part of the earth's surface within reach of its nuclear arsenal. Although its land-based missile systems have a maximum range of 10,000 kilometers (6,200 miles) (less than worldwide), its force-based submarines extend their reach from the coastline 12,000 kilometers (7,500 miles) inland. In addition, in-flight refueling of long-range bombers and the use of aircraft carriers expands the possible range almost indefinitely.

Management and control

If the United States is actually under attack by a nuclear capable adversary, the President can only order nuclear strikes as a member of the two-man National Command Authority, the other member being the Secretary of Defense. Their joint decision is to be passed on to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will direct the National Military Command Center to issue Action Emergency messages to nuclear-capable forces.

The president can order a nuclear launch using his or her nuclear briefcase (nicknamed nuclear football), or one can use command centers such as the White House Situation Room. The command will be carried out by a nuclear and missile operations officer (a member of the missile combat crew, also called a "missileer") at the Missile Launch Control Center. The two-man rule applies to launching rockets, meaning that two employees must turn the keys at the same time (far enough apart that it can't be done by one person).

In general, these institutions served to coordinate scientific research and create websites. Typically, they had their sites with the help of contractors, however, both private and public (for example, Union Carbide, a private company, ran Oak Ridge National Laboratory for decades, while the University of California, a public educational institution, ran Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore Laboratories since their inception, and will also co-manage Los Alamos with the private company Bechtel as their next contract). Funding was received both through these agencies directly, but also from additional external agencies such as the Department of Defense. Each branch of the military also maintains its own nuclear-related research facilities (usually related to delivery systems).

production complex Arms

This table is not exhaustive, as numerous sites throughout the United States have contributed to its nuclear weapons program. It includes the main sites associated with the US weapons program (past and present), their main site features, and their current state of operation. Not on the list are the numerous bases and facilities where nuclear weapons have been deployed. In addition to placing weapons on its own soil, during the Cold War, the United States also stationed nuclear weapons in 27 foreign countries and territories, including Okinawa (which was under US control until 1971), Japan (during the occupation immediately after World War II), Greenland, Germany, Taiwan, and French Morocco then independent Morocco.

Name of the site	Location	function	Status
National Laboratory at Los Alamos	Los Alamos, New Mexico	Research, Design, Pit Manufacturing	active
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	Livermore, California	Research and development	active
Sandia National Laboratories	Livermore, California; Albuquerque, New Mexico	Research and development	active
Site Hanford	Richland, Washington	Production material (plutonium)	Not active in rehabilitation
Oak Ridge National Laboratory	Oak Ridge, Tennessee	Material production (uranium-235, leaked fuel), research	Active to some extent
Y-12 National Security Complex	Oak Ridge, Tennessee	Component fabrication, strategic management stocks, uranium storage	active
Nevada Test Site	Near Las Vegas, Nevada	Nuclear testing and nuclear waste disposal	Active; no tests since 1992, currently engaged in waste disposal
Yucca Mountain	Nevada Test Site	Waste management (primarily power reactor)	Pending
Waste separation pilot plant	East of Carlsbad, New Mexico	Radioactive waste from the production of nuclear weapons	active
Pacific polygons	Marshall Islands	Nuclear tests	Inactive, last tested in 1962
Rocky Flats Factory	Near Denver, Colorado	Fabrication Components	Not active in rehabilitation
pantex	Amarillo, Texas	Weapon assembly, disassembly, storage pit	active, esp. disassembly
Fernald Site	Near Cincinnati, Ohio	Production material (uranium-238)	Not active in rehabilitation
Paducah plant	Paducah, Kentucky	Material production (uranium-235)	Active (commercial use)
portsmouth factory	Near Portsmouth, Ohio	Production material (uranium-235)	Active (centrifuge), but not for weapons production
Kansas City Plant	Kansas City, Missouri	Production component	active
Mound plant	Miamisburg, Ohio	Research, component manufacturing, tritium purification	Not active in rehabilitation
Pinellas plant	Largo, Florida	Production of electrical components	Active, but not for weapons production
Savannah River Site	Aiken Row, South Carolina	Production material (plutonium, tritium)	Active (limited mode), in rehabilitation

proliferation

Early in the development of its nuclear weapons, the United States relied in part on sharing information with both Britain and Canada, codified in the Quebec Agreement of 1943. The three parties agreed not to share nuclear weapons information with other countries without the consent of the others, an early attempt at non-proliferation. Since the development of the first nuclear weapons during World War II, however, there has been much debate within the political circles and public life of the United States about whether or not the country should attempt to maintain a monopoly on nuclear technology, or whether it should pursue an information exchange program with other countries. (especially its former ally and likely competitor, the Soviet Union), or submit control of their weapons to some international organization (such as the UN) that will use them to try and keep world peace. Although the fear of a nuclear arms race spurred many politicians and scientists to advocate some degree of international control or sharing of nuclear weapons and information, many politicians and military personnel believed it was best in the short term to maintain high standards of nuclear secrecy and prevent a Soviet bomb as long as possible ( and they do not believe that the USSR actually represents international control in good faith).

Since this path was chosen, the United States, in the early days, was essentially in favor of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, although primarily for self-preservation reasons. A few years after the USSR detonated its first weapon in 1949, though, the US under President Dwight Eisenhower is seeking to encourage nuclear information exchange programs related to civilian nuclear power and nuclear physics in general. The Atoms for Peace program, begun in 1953, was also partly political: the US was better prepared to commit various scarce resources, such as enriched uranium, to these peace efforts and to ask for a similar contribution from the Soviet Union, which had far fewer resources along those lines. ; Thus, the program had a strategic rationale, and, as it turned out later, internal memos. This overall goal of promoting the civilian use of nuclear energy in other countries, as well as preventing the proliferation of weapons, has been cited by many critics as controversial and resulted in loose standards over a number of decades, allowing a number of other countries, such as China and India, to profit from dual-use technology (purchased from nations other than the US).

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Agency's Defense Threat Reduction program was established after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to assist former Soviet bloc countries in inventorying and destroying their sites for the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the means by which they are delivered (silo ICBMs, long-range bombers, etc.). More than $4.4 billion was spent in this area to prevent the targeted or accidental distribution of weapons from the former Soviet arsenal.

Every year, the systems installed here more and more resemble museum exhibits. At the top, more and more international treaties are being concluded, according to which these wells are closed one by one. But every day, the next crews of the US Air Force descend into concrete dungeons in anticipation of something that absolutely should not happen ...

Another day of service The next watch carries suitcases with secret documents, fastened with steel cables to overalls. People will descend into the bunker on a 24-hour watch, taking control of ballistic missiles hidden under the grasslands of Montana. If the fateful order comes, these young Air Force officers will not hesitate to unleash their apocalyptic weapons.

Joe Pappalardo

An inconspicuous ranch about fifteen meters from a bumpy two-lane road southeast of Great Falls, Montana. A primitive one-story building, a chain link fence, a garage set in the outskirts and a basketball backboard right above the driveway.

However, if you look closely, you can notice some funny details - a red-and-white lattice tower of a microwave radio tower rises above the buildings, here is a helicopter landing pad on the front lawn, plus another UHF cone antenna sticking out of the lawn like a white fungus. You might think that some university agricultural laboratory or, say, a weather station has settled here - only a red banner on the fence confuses, notifying that anyone who tries to arbitrarily enter the territory will be met with fire to kill.

Inside the building, the security service scrupulously examines each incoming. The slightest suspicion - and guards with M4 carbines and handcuffs will immediately appear in the room. The massive entrance door moves vertically upwards - so even winter snow drifts will not block it.

After the checkpoint, the interior becomes the same as in a regular barracks. In the center there is something like a wardroom - a TV, sofas with armchairs and several long tables for common meals. Further from the hall exits to the cabins with bunk beds. Standard government-issued posters about stupid talkers and ubiquitous spies are hung on the walls.

The Malmstrom Air Force Missile Base controls 15 launchers and 150 silos. Its entire economy is spread over a territory of 35,000 km 2. The control bunkers were buried so deep and spaced so far apart to survive a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union and preserve the possibility of a nuclear retaliatory strike. To disable such a system, the warheads must hit each launch position without missing.

One of the armored doors in the living area leads to a small side room. Here sits the flight security controller (FSC), a non-commissioned officer, the commander of the security of the launcher. A three-meter chest next to it is packed with M4 and M9 carbines. There is another door in this arsenal, which neither the dispatcher nor the guards should enter in any case, unless an emergency situation requires it. Behind this door is an elevator that goes six floors underground without stopping.

In a calm voice, FSC announces the ciphers for calling the elevator over the phone. The elevator will not rise until all passengers have left it and the front door in the security room is locked. The steel elevator door is opened by hand in much the same way as the blinds are rolled up, which in small shops protect windows and doors at night. Behind it is a small cabin with metal walls.

It will take us less than a minute to descend 22 meters underground, but there, at the bottom of the hole, a completely different world will open before us. The elevator door is built into the smoothly curved black wall of the circular hall. Along the wall, breaking its monotony, thick columns of shock absorbers are installed, which should absorb the shock wave if a nuclear warhead explodes somewhere nearby.

Outside the walls of the hall, something rumbled and clanged exactly as the lifting gates of an old castle should clang, after which a massive hatch smoothly leaned outward, 26-year-old Air Force Captain Chad Dieterle is holding on to the metal handle. A good meter and a half thick, this shockproof plug is screen-printed with the letters INDIA. Dieterle, Commander of the Launch Control Center (LCC) India, is now halfway through the 24-hour watch, and this launch position itself was organized here at Malmstrom Air Force Base, back when the parents of this brave Air Force captain went to school.

The mines and the launch control panel, located at a depth of 22 m underground, are guarded around the clock. "Rocket monkeys", as they call themselves, train in a training silo - the same as real rockets are in. They replace the cables leading to the gyroscopes and on-board computers. These computers are hidden in bulky boxes that protect electronics from radiation.

LCC India is connected by cables to fifty other mines scattered in a 10-kilometer radius. Each silo contains one 18-meter Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

The Air Force command refuses to report the number of warheads on each missile, but it is known that there are no more than three. Each of the heads can destroy all life within a radius of ten kilometers.

Having received the appropriate order, Dieterle and his henchmen in half an hour can send these weapons to any part of the globe. Hiding in silence underground, he turns an inconspicuous ranch, lost in the expanses of Montana, into one of the most strategically important points on the planet.

Small but effective

The US nuclear arsenal—about 2,200 strategic warheads that can be delivered by 94 bombers, 14 submarines, and 450 ballistic missiles—is still the backbone of the entire national security system. Barack Obama never tires of declaring his desire for a world completely free of nuclear weapons, but this does not contradict the fact that his administration in relation to nuclear policy unequivocally postulates: “As long as there are stocks of nuclear weapons in the world, the United States will maintain its nuclear forces in state of full and effective combat readiness.

Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of nuclear warheads in the world has dropped drastically. True, now states such as China, Iran or North Korea are deploying their own nuclear programs and designing their own long-range ballistic missiles. Therefore, despite high-flown rhetoric and even sincere good intentions, America should not yet part with its nuclear weapons, as well as with aircraft, submarines and missiles that could deliver them to the target.

The missile component of the American nuclear triad has been in existence for 50 years, but year after year it finds itself at the center of tense discussions between Moscow and Washington. Last year, the Obama administration signed a new START III treaty with Russia on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms. As a result, the nuclear arsenals of these two countries must be limited to less than 1,550 strategic warheads within a seven-year period. Of the 450 active US missiles, only 30 will remain. In order not to lose the support of the "hawks" and simply skeptical senators, the White House has proposed adding $ 85 billion to modernize the remaining nuclear forces over the next ten years (this amount must be approved at the next meeting of Congress). “I will vote to ratify this treaty … because our president is clearly determined to make sure that the remaining weapons are really effective,” Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander said.

Mine of intercontinental ballistic missile. These mines hide their terrible nature behind a completely inconspicuous appearance. Some trucker will pass by on the highway and not even look back. He will never know that these 30-meter-deep mines hide nuclear weapons, maintained in a state of continuous alert.

Nuclear missile umbrella

So why does the Strategic Missile Force, a symbol of the end of the Cold War, remain at the center of defensive strategy, politics, and diplomacy of the 21st century? If we take three types of delivery vehicles (aircraft, submarines and ballistic missiles), then of them, intercontinental ballistic missiles remain the means of the most prompt reaction to aggression from the enemy, and indeed the most operational weapon that allows a preemptive strike. Submarines are good because they are almost invisible, nuclear bombers are capable of delivering precision pinpoint strikes, but only intercontinental missiles are always ready to deliver an irresistible nuclear strike anywhere in the world, and they can do it in a matter of minutes.

The American nuclear missile umbrella is now deployed over the whole world. “As representatives of the Air Force, we are convinced that America is obliged to keep at gunpoint and under threat any enemy object, wherever it may be, no matter how serious the defense covers it, no matter how deep it is hidden,” he said. Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, who just stepped down in January as head of the Global Strike Command, the agency that controls nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles.

The launch positions of strategic missiles represent a major achievement in engineering terms. All these mines were built in the early 1960s, and since then they have been in full combat readiness 99% of the time. More interestingly, the Pentagon built these launch sites for only a few decades. When the MinutemanIII missiles are retired, all silos and launchers at Malmstrom Base will be mothballed and buried for a period of 70 years.

So, the Air Force controls the most powerful weapons in the world, and the equipment to control these weapons was created in the space age, and not at all in the 21st century of information technology. Nevertheless, these old launch systems do their job much better than one might think. “Building a system that will stand the test of time and still perform brilliantly,” says Klotz, “is a true triumph of engineering genius. These guys in the 1960s thought through everything to the smallest detail, generously laying in a few redundant levels of reliability.

Thousands of dedicated officers at three air force bases - Malmstrom, base them. F.E. Warren in Wyoming and Mino in North Dakota spare no effort to keep the silo launchers in constant combat readiness.

The Minuteman III was retired in the 1970s with a retirement date set for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the series' lifespan by another decade. In response to this demand, the leadership of the Air Force drew up a schedule for the reorganization of the existing missile bases. A tangible fraction of those billions of dollars that were recently promised by the White House should go towards this.

Norm is perfection

Let's return to the India Launch Control Center, hidden under an inconspicuous ranch. Little has changed inside since the Kennedy administration. Of course, teletype paper printers have given way to digital screens, and upstairs servers provide the underground crew with Internet access, and even live television when the situation is calm. However, the electronics here - hefty blocks inserted into wide metal racks and studded with many shining lights and illuminated buttons - resemble the scenery from the first versions of the Star Trek television series. Something really literally asks for an antique shop. Dieterle, with an embarrassed smile, pulls out of the console a nine-inch floppy disk - an element of the ancient, but still well-functioning Strategic Automatic Command and Control System.

Thousands of officers at US Air Force bases keep silo launchers on alert. Since 2000, the Pentagon has spent more than $7 billion to modernize this branch of the military. All work was aimed at ensuring that the Minuteman III model safely reached the retirement date, which was set for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the service life of this series for another ten years.

The missiles themselves and the equipment installed at ground level can still be somehow upgraded, but with underground mines and the launch centers themselves, everything is much more complicated. But time does not spare them. It is very difficult to fight corrosion. Any movement of the ground can break the underground communication lines.

The India Launch Control Center is one of 15 centers where missilemen from Malmstrom Air Force Base are on duty. “Take an ordinary house that is already 40 years old,” says Colonel Jeff Frankhouser, commander of the base maintenance team, “and bury it underground. And then think about how you will repair everything there. That's the same situation with us."

This missile base includes 150 nuclear ballistic missiles scattered across 35,000 km2 of launch sites in the mountains, hills and plains of Montana. Due to the large distance between the mines, the USSR could not disable all launch positions and command posts with one massive missile strike, which guaranteed America the possibility of a retaliatory strike.

This elegant doctrine of mutual deterrence implied the mandatory existence of a developed infrastructure. In particular, all these mines and command posts are interconnected by hundreds of thousands of kilometers of underground cables. The fist-thick harnesses are woven from hundreds of insulated copper wires and laid in sheaths that are pressurized. If the air pressure in the pipe drops, the maintenance team concludes that a crack has formed somewhere in the containment.

The communication system that spreads across the surrounding expanse is a matter of constant concern for the personnel of the Malmstrom base. Every day, hundreds of people - 30 teams at the control panels, 135 maintenance workers and 206 security fighters - go to work, keeping this whole economy in order. Some command posts are three hours away from the base. Heroes offended by fate, who are called Farsiders at the base, yearn in them. Jeeps, trucks and bulky self-propelled units dart around the surrounding roads every day to extract missiles from underground, and the total length of the roads at this base is 40,000 km, 6,000 of which are primers improved with gravel.

The mines were built on small plots purchased from the previous owners. You can freely wander along the fence, but you just have to go behind it, and the security service can open fire to kill.

The slogan reigns here: “Our norm is perfection,” and in order to ensure that no one ever forgets about this tough principle, a whole army of controllers looks after the staff. Any mistake may result in suspension from duty until the violator retakes the qualification exam. Such captious control applies to all services of the missile base.

The cook will receive a strict reprimand from the officer for using expired sauce for the salad or not cleaning the hood over the stove in time. And rightly so - food poisoning can undermine the combat readiness of a launch platoon with the same success as an enemy commando team would. Caution to the point of paranoia is a basic principle for all who serve on this base. “At first glance, it may seem that we are playing it safe,” says Colonel Mohammed Khan (until the very end of 2010 he served at the Malmstrom base as commander of the 341st Missile Battalion), “but look at this matter seriously, here we have real nuclear warheads ".

Weekdays of the bunker

To launch a nuclear ballistic missile, one turn of the key is not enough. If an appropriate command arrives at the India launch center, Dieterle and his deputy, Captain Ted Jivler, must verify the encryption sent from the White House with the cipher stored in the center's steel safes.

Then each of them will take their own triangular switch, fixing their eyes on the electronic clock ticking between the blocks of electronic equipment. At a given moment, they must turn the switches from the "ready" position to the "start" position. At the same moment, two rocket men on the other launcher will turn their switches - and only after that the ballistic missile will break free.

Each mine is suitable for only one launch. In the very first seconds, electronic components, ladders, communication cables, safety sensors and sump pumps will burn out or melt in it. Above the hills of Montana, a ring of smoke will rise, ridiculously exactly repeating the outlines of a mine vent. Relying on a column of reactive gases, the rocket will break out into outer space in a matter of minutes. Another half an hour, and the warheads would begin to fall on their targets.

The striking power of the weapons entrusted to these rocket men, and the entire measure of responsibility entrusted to them, is clearly emphasized by the harsh situation in the bunker. In the far corner is a simple mattress, fenced off with a black curtain so that the light does not hit the eyes. “It’s not a great pleasure to wake up in this nook,” says Dieterle.

And it's time for us to return to the world that rocket scientists call "real". Dieterle pulls on the handle of the black shockproof plug until it begins to rotate smoothly. He gives us a reserved smile as we leave, and the door slams shut behind us with a heavy thud. We are going up, and there, below, Dieterle remains and the same as him, in tense eternal expectation.