Determination of the type of projectile according to the sleeve of the times of the Second World War. Review of ammunition for small arms found on the sites of former battles in the European part of the USSR. How myths are created
Often we find shell casings from the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars in the ground. Almost all of them have some kind of their own difference. Today we will consider the marking of cartridge cases, which is located on the cartridge capsule, regardless of the brand and caliber of the weapon.
Consider some types and markings of the Austro-Hungarian types of cartridges of 1905-1916. For this type of cartridge case, the primer is divided into four parts with the help of dashes, the inscriptions are embossed. The left, respectively, and the right cell is the year of production, the upper month, and the designation of the plant in the lower part.
- In Fig. 1. - G. Roth, Vienna.
- Fig 2. - Bello and Celle, the city of Prague.
- Fig 3. - Wöllersdorf plant.
- Fig 4. - Hartenberg factory.
- Figure 5. - the same Hartenberg, but the Kellery Co. plant.
Later Hungarian 1930-40s, have some differences. Fig 6. - Chapelsky arsenal, year of issue from the bottom. Fig 7. - Budapest. Fig 8. - Veszprem military plant.
Germany, imperialist war.
The German marking of the shell casings of the imperialist war has two types with a clear division (Fig. 9) using dashes into four equal parts of the primer and with a conditional one (Fig. 10). The inscription is embossed; in the second version, the letters and numbers of the designation are directed towards the primer.
In the upper part, the marking S 67, in different versions: together, separately, through a dot, without numbers. The lower part is the month of production, on the left is the year, and on the right is the plant. In some cases, the year and plant are reversed, or the location of all divisions is reversed completely.
Fascist Germany.
Sleeves and their markings in Nazi Germany (Mauser type) have many options, because the cartridges were produced in almost all factories of the occupied countries of Western Europe: Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Italy.
Consider Figure 11-14, this case is made in Denmark. The capsule is divided into four parts: on the top is the letter P with numbers, on the bottom is the week, on the left side is the year, on the right is the letter S and a star (five-pointed or six-pointed). In figures 15-17 we see some more types of cartridges produced in Denmark.
In Figure 18 we see capsules, presumably of Czechoslovak and Polish production. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top - Z, at the bottom - the month of manufacture, on the left and right - the year. There is an option when “SMS” is written at the top, and the caliber is 7.92 at the bottom.
- In Fig. 19-23 German shells by G. Genshov and Co. in Durly;
- Figure 24. - RVS, Browning, caliber 7.65, Nuremberg;
- Figures 25 and 26 - DVM, Karlsruhe.
More options for Polish-made cartridges.
- Figure 27 - Skarzysko-Kamenna;
- Figure 28 and 29 - "Pochinsk", Warsaw.
The signs on the cartridges of the Mosin rifle are not depressed, but convex. Above is usually the letter of the manufacturer, below are the numbers of the year of manufacture.
- Figure 30 - Lugansk plant;
- Fig 31 - plant from Russia;
- Figure 32 - Tula plant.
Some more capsule options:
- Figure 33 - Tula plant;
- Figure 34 - Russian plant;
- Fig 35 - Moscow;
- Figure 36 - Russian-Belgian;
- Fig 37 - Riga;
- Fig 38 - Leningrad;
- Figure 39, 40, 41, 42 - different plants in Russia.
Universal shooting system of low ballistics for close combat of infantry units of the Red Army
The available information about the ampoule guns of the Red Army is extremely scarce and is mainly based on a couple of paragraphs from the memoirs of one of the defenders of Leningrad, a description of the design in the manual for the use of ampoule guns, as well as some conclusions and common conjectures of modern searchers-diggers. Meanwhile, in the museum of the capital's plant "Iskra" named after I.I. Kartukov for a long time lay like a dead weight in the amazing quality of the range of shooting front-line years. Text documents to it, obviously, are buried in the depths of the archive of the economy (or scientific and technical documentation) and are still waiting for their researchers. So when working on the publication, I had to generalize only known data and analyze references and images.
The existing concept of "ampulomet" in relation to the combat system developed in the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War does not reveal all the possibilities and tactical advantages of this weapon. Moreover, all available information refers only, so to speak, to the late period of serial ampoule guns. In fact, this "pipe on the machine" was capable of throwing not only ampoules from a tin or bottle glass, but also more serious ammunition. And the creators of this simple and unpretentious weapon, the production of which was possible almost “on the knee”, no doubt deserve much more respect.
The simplest mortar
In the flamethrower system of weapons of the ground forces of the Red Army, the ampoule occupied an intermediate position between knapsack or easel flamethrowers, firing at short distances with a jet of liquid fire mixture, and field artillery (cannon and rocket), which occasionally used incendiary projectiles with solid incendiary mixtures such as military thermite at full range. brand 6. As conceived by the developers (and not the requirements of the customer), the ampoule gun was mainly (as in the document) intended to deal with tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles and fortified enemy firing points by firing at them with any ammunition of a suitable caliber.
Experienced 125-mm ampoule during factory testing in 1940
The opinion that the ampoule gun is a purely Leningrad invention is obviously based on the fact that this type of weapon was also produced in besieged Leningrad, and one of its samples is on display at the State Memorial Museum of the Defense and Siege of Leningrad. However, they developed ampoules (as, indeed, infantry flamethrowers) in the pre-war years in Moscow in the experimental design department of plant No. 145 named after SM. Kirov (chief designer of the plant - I.I. Kartukov), which is under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry of the USSR. The names of the designers of ampoule guns, unfortunately, are unknown to me.
Transportation of an experienced 125-mm ampoule in the summer when changing the firing position.
It is documented that the 125-mm ampoule gun with ammunition from ampoules passed field and military tests in 1941 and was adopted by the Red Army. The description of the design of the ampoule gun, given on the Internet, is borrowed from the manual and only in general terms corresponds to pre-war prototypes: “The ampoule gun consists of a barrel with a chamber, a bolt, a firing device, sights and a carriage with a fork.” In the version supplemented by us, the barrel of a serial ampoule launcher was a seamless steel pipe made of Mannesmann rolled products with an inner diameter of 127 mm, or rolled from 2 mm sheet iron, muffled in the breech. The barrel of a regular ampoule gun was freely supported by trunnions on the lugs in the fork of a wheeled (summer) or ski (winter) machine. There were no horizontal or vertical aiming mechanisms.
In an experienced 125-mm ampoule gun, a blank cartridge from a 12-gauge hunting rifle with a folder sleeve and a 15-gram weight of black powder was locked with a rifle-type bolt in the chamber. The firing mechanism was released by pressing the thumb of the left hand on the trigger lever (forward or down, there were different options), located near the handles, similar to those used on easel machine guns and welded to the ampoule breech.
125 mm ampoule in combat position.
In a serial ampoule gun, the firing mechanism was simplified due to the manufacture of many parts by stamping, and the trigger lever was moved under the thumb of the right hand. Moreover, in mass production, the handles were replaced with steel pipes bent like ram's horns, structurally combining them with a piston valve. That is, now for loading the shutter was turned with both handles all the way to the left and, relying on the tray, they pulled it towards themselves. The entire breech with handles along the slots in the tray moved to the rearmost position, completely removing the spent cartridge case of the 12-gauge cartridge.
The sights of the ampoule gun consisted of a front sight and a folding sight stand. The latter was designed to fire at four fixed distances (obviously from 50 to 100 m), indicated by holes. And the vertical slot between them made it possible to shoot at intermediate ranges.
The photographs show that on the experimental version of the ampoule gun, a roughly made wheeled machine welded from steel pipes and an angle profile was used. It would be more correct to consider it a laboratory stand. At the ampoule machine proposed for service, all parts were more carefully finished and supplied with all the attributes necessary for operation in the troops: handles, coulters, slats, brackets, etc. However, the wheels (rollers) on both experimental and serial samples were provided with monolithic wooden , upholstered with a metal strip along the generatrix and with a metal sleeve as a plain bearing in the axial hole.
In the St. Petersburg, Volgograd and Arkhangelsk museums there are later versions of the factory-made ampoule gun on a simplified, lightweight, wheelless, non-folding machine with a support of two pipes, or without a machine at all. Tripods made of steel rods, wooden decks or oak crosses as gun carriages for ampoule guns were adapted already in wartime.
The manual mentions that the ammunition carried by the calculation of the ampoule gun was 10 ampoules and 12 expelling cartridges. On the machine of the pre-production version of the ampoule gun, the developers proposed to install two easily removable tin boxes with a capacity of eight ampoules each in the transport position. One of the fighters apparently carried two dozen rounds of ammunition in a standard hunting bandolier. In a combat position, boxes of ammunition were quickly removed and placed in a shelter.
On the barrel of the pre-production version of the ampoule gun, two welded swivels were provided for carrying it on a belt over the shoulder. Serial samples were devoid of any "architectural excesses", and the barrel was carried on the shoulder. Many note the presence of a metal divider grille inside the barrel, in its breech. This was not the case for the prototype. Obviously, the grate was needed to prevent the cardboard and felt wad of a blank cartridge from hitting the glass ampoule. In addition, it limited the movement of the ampoule into the breech until it stops, since the serial 125-mm ampoule had a chamber in this place. The factory data and characteristics of the 125 mm ampoule gun are somewhat different from those given in the descriptions and instructions for use.
Drawing of a serial 125-mm ampoule gun, proposed for mass production in 1940.
Rupture of a 125-mm ampoule filled with a self-igniting liquid KS in the target area.
Warehouse of finished products of the workshop for the production of ampoules at the plant No. 455 of the NKAP in 1942
Incendiary ampoules
As indicated in the documents, the main ammunition for ampoule guns was aviation tin ampoules АЖ-2 of 125 mm caliber, equipped with a self-igniting variety of condensed kerosene of the KS grade. The first tin spherical ampoules entered mass production in 1936. In the late 1930s. they were also improved at the OKO of the 145th plant (in the evacuation, this is the OKB-NKAL of plant No. 455). In factory documents, they were called aviation liquid ampoules АЖ-2. But still right
it would be more correct to call the ampoules tin ampoules, since the Red Army Air Force planned to gradually replace the AK-1 glass ampoules, which had been in service since the early 1930s, with them. like chemical munitions.
There were constant complaints about glass ampoules that they were, de, fragile, and if broken ahead of time, they could poison both the aircraft crew and ground personnel with their contents. Meanwhile, mutually exclusive requirements were imposed on the glass of ampoules - strength in handling and fragility in use. The first, of course, prevailed, and some of them, with a wall thickness of 10 mm, even when bombed from a height of 1000 m (depending on the density of the soil) gave a very large percentage of not crashed. Theoretically, their thin-walled tin counterparts could solve the problem. As tests later showed, the aviators' hopes for this were also not fully justified.
This feature probably also manifested itself when firing from an ampoule, especially along flat trajectories for a short range. Note that the recommended type of targets for the 125mm ampoule launcher also consists entirely of objects with strong walls. In the 1930s. aviation tin ampoules were made by stamping two hemispheres from thin brass 0.35 mm thick. Apparently, since 1937 (with the beginning of the austerity of non-ferrous metals in the production of ammunition), their transfer to tinplate with a thickness of 0.2-0.3 mm began.
The configuration of parts for the production of tin ampoules varied greatly. In 1936, at the 145th plant, the design of Ofitserov-Kokoreva was proposed for the manufacture of AZh-2 from four spherical segments with two options for rolling the edges of parts. In 1937, even AZh-2 consisted of a hemisphere with a filler neck and a second hemisphere of four spherical segments.
At the beginning of 1941, in connection with the expected transfer of the economy to a special period, technologies for the production of AZh-2 from black tin (thin rolled 0.5 mm pickled iron) were tested. From the middle of 1941, these technologies had to be used in full. Black tin during stamping was not as ductile as white or brass, and deep drawing of steel complicated production, therefore, with the outbreak of war, AZh-2 was allowed to be made from 3-4 parts (spherical segments or belts, as well as their various combinations with hemispheres).
Below: experimental ampoules АЖ-2 with additional fuses. Photo 1942
Soldering the seams of black tin products in the presence of special fluxes then also turned out to be quite an expensive pleasure, and academician E.O. Paton introduced into the production of ammunition only a year later. Therefore, in 1941, the parts of the AZh-2 hulls began to be connected by rolling the edges and sinking the seam flush with the contour of the sphere. By the way, before the birth of ampoules, the filling necks of metal ampoules were soldered on the outside (for use in aviation, this was not so important), but since 1940, the necks began to be fixed inside. This made it possible to avoid the diversity of ammunition for use in aviation and ground forces.
The filling of ampoules AZH-2KS, the so-called "Russian napalm" - condensed kerosene KS - was developed in 1938 by A.P. Ionov in one of the capital's research institutes with the assistance of chemists V.V. Zemskova, L.F. Shevelkin and A.V. Yasnitskaya. In 1939, he completed the development of a technology for the industrial production of powdered thickener OP-2. How the incendiary mixture acquired the properties of instantly self-igniting in air remains unknown. I'm not sure that the trivial addition of granules of white phosphorus to a thick incendiary mixture based on petroleum products here would guarantee their self-ignition. In general, be that as it may, already in the spring of 1941, at factory and field tests, the 125-mm ampoule gun AZH-2KS worked normally without fuses and intermediate igniters.
According to the original plan, the AZh-2s were designed to infect the terrain with persistent poisonous substances from aircraft, as well as to destroy manpower with persistent and unstable poisonous substances, later (when used with liquid fire mixtures) - to set fire to and smoke tanks, ships and firing points. Meanwhile, the use of military chemicals in ampoules against the enemy was not ruled out by using them from ampoules. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the incendiary purpose of the ammunition was supplemented by the smoking out of manpower from field fortifications.
In 1943, in order to guarantee the operation of the AZh-2SOV or AZh-2NOV during bombing from any height and at any carrier speed, the ampoule developers supplemented their designs with fuses made of thermosetting plastic (resistant to the acid base of toxic substances). As conceived by the developers, such modified ammunition already affected manpower as fragmentation-chemical ones.
Ampoule fuses UVUD (universal impact fuse) belonged to the category of all-round, i.e. worked even when the ampoules fell sideways. Structurally, they were similar to those used on ADS aircraft smoke bombs, but it was no longer possible to shoot such ampoules from ampoule guns: from overloads, a non-safety type fuse could work right in the barrel. During the war period and for incendiary ampoules, the Air Force sometimes used cases with fuses or with plugs instead.
In 1943-1944. AZh-2SOV or NOV ampoules, intended for long-term storage in the curb condition, have been tested. To do this, their bodies were coated inside with bakelite resin. Thus, the resistance of the metal case to mechanical stress increased even more, and fuses were installed on such ammunition without fail.
Today, in the places of past battles, "diggers" can already come across in a conditioned form only ampoules AK-1 or AU-125 (AK-2 or AU-260 - an extremely rare exotic) made of glass. Thin-walled tin ampoules are almost all decayed. Do not try to defuse glass ampoules if you can see that there is liquid inside. White or yellowish cloudy - this is the CS, which by no means lost its properties for self-ignition in air, even after 60 years. Transparent or translucent with yellow large crystals of sediment - this is SOV or NOV. In glass containers, their combat properties can also be preserved for a very long time.
Ampoules in battle
On the eve of the war, units of knapsack flamethrowers (flamethrower teams) were organizationally part of rifle regiments. However, due to the difficulties of using it in defense (extremely short range of flamethrowing and unmasking signs of the ROKS-2 backpack flamethrower), they were disbanded. Instead, in November 1941, teams and companies were created, armed with ampoules and rifle mortars for throwing metal and glass ampoules and Molotov cocktails at tanks and other targets. But, according to the official version, the ampoule guns also had significant drawbacks, and at the end of 1942 they were removed from service.
At the same time, there was no mention of the abandonment of rifle-bottle mortars. Probably, for some reason they did not have the shortcomings of ampoules. Moreover, in other divisions of the rifle regiments of the Red Army, it was proposed to throw bottles with KS at tanks exclusively by hand. The bottle-throwers of the flame-throwing teams, obviously, were revealed a terrible military secret: how to use the aiming bar of the Mosin rifle for aimed shooting with a bottle at a given distance, determined by eye. As I understand it, there was simply no time to teach the rest of the illiterate infantrymen this “tricky business”. Therefore, they themselves adapted a sleeve from a three-inch rifle to the cut of a rifle barrel and themselves "out of school hours" were trained in aimed bottle throwing.
When meeting with a solid barrier, the body of the AZH-2KS ampoule was torn, as a rule, along the solder seams, the incendiary mixture splashed out and ignited in air with the formation of a thick white-
th smoke. The combustion temperature of the mixture reached 800 ° C, which, when it got on clothes and open areas of the body, caused the enemy a lot of trouble. No less unpleasant was the meeting of the sticky CS with armored vehicles - starting from a change in the physicochemical properties of the metal during local heating to such a temperature and ending with an indispensable fire in the engine-transmission compartment of carburetor (and diesel) tanks. It was impossible to clean off the burning COP from the armor - all that was required was to stop the access of air. However, the presence of a self-igniting additive in the CS did not rule out spontaneous combustion of the mixture again.
Here are a few excerpts from the combat reports of the Great Patriotic War, published on the Internet: “We also used ampoules. From an inclined tube mounted on a sled, a shot of a blank cartridge pushed out a glass ampoule with a combustible mixture. She flew along a steep trajectory at a distance of up to 300-350 m. Breaking when falling, the ampoule created a small but stable fire, hitting the enemy’s manpower and setting fire to his dugouts. The consolidated ampoule company under the command of Senior Lieutenant Starkov, which included 17 crews, fired 1620 ampoules in the first two hours. “The ampoule-throwers moved in here. Acting under the cover of infantry, they set fire to an enemy tank, two guns and several firing points.
By the way, intensive shooting with black powder cartridges inevitably created a thick layer of soot on the barrel walls. So after a quarter of an hour of such a cannonade, the ampoule-throwers would probably find that the ampoule rolls into the barrel with more and more difficulty. Theoretically, before this, carbon deposits, on the contrary, would somewhat improve the obturation of the ampoules in the barrel, increasing their firing range. However, the usual range marks on the sight bar, for sure, “floated”. About banniks and other tools and devices for cleaning ampoule gun barrels, probably, it was mentioned in the technical description ...
And here is a completely objective opinion of our contemporaries: “The calculation of the ampoule gun was three people. The loading was carried out by two people: the first number of the calculation inserted the expelling cartridge from the treasury, the second put the ampoule itself into the barrel from the muzzle. “The ampoules were very simple and cheap“ flamethrower mortars ”, they were armed with special ampouling platoons. The combat manual of the infantry of 1942 mentions the ampoule gun as a standard infantry weapon. In combat, the ampoule gun often served as the core of a group of tank destroyers. Its use on the defensive generally justified itself, while attempts to use it on the offensive led to large losses in crews due to the short firing range. True, they were not without success used by assault groups in urban battles - in particular, in Stalingrad.
There are also memories of veterans. The essence of one of them boils down to the fact that in early December 1941, Major General D.D. Lelyushenko was delivered 20 ampoules. The designer of this weapon also came here, as well as the commander himself, who decided to personally test the new equipment. In response to the designer's comments on loading the ampoule launcher, Lelyushenko grumbled that everything hurts cunningly and for a long time, and the German tank will not wait ... At the first shot, the ampoule broke in the ampoule launcher barrel, and the entire installation burned down. Lelyushenko, already with metal in his voice, demanded a second ampoule. Everything happened again. The general became "angry", switching to profanity, forbade the fighters to use weapons so unsafe for calculations and crushed the remaining ampoules with a tank.
The use of APC-203 for filling ampoules of AJ-2 with military chemical substances. The leaning fighter pumps out excess liquid, standing near the tripod installs plugs on the filling necks of the AZh-2. Photo 1938
Quite a likely story, although not very pleasant in the general context. As if the ampoule guns did not pass factory and field tests ... Why could this happen? As a version: the winter of 1941 (all eyewitnesses mentioned this) was very frosty, and the glass ampoule became more fragile. Here, unfortunately, the respected veteran did not specify what material those ampoules were made of. The difference in temperatures of thick-walled glass (local heating), which is fired when fired by the flame of the expelling charge, can also affect. Obviously, in severe frost it was necessary to shoot only with metal ampoules. But "in the hearts" the general could easily ride through the ampoules!
Filling station ARS-203. Photo 1938
Fire cocktail frontline spill
It is only at first glance that the scheme for using the ampoule gun in the troops seems to be primitively simple. For example, the crew of an ampoule gun at a combat position fired off the wearable ammunition and dragged the second ammunition load ... What is simpler - take it and shoot. Look, Senior Lieutenant Starkov's two-hour consumption of the unit exceeded one and a half thousand ampoules! But in fact, when organizing the supply of troops with incendiary ampoules, it was necessary to solve the problem of transporting far from safe incendiary ammunition from factories from the deep rear.
Ampoule tests in the pre-war period showed that these munitions, when fully equipped, can withstand transportation no further than 200 km along peacetime roads in compliance with all rules and with the complete exclusion of "road adventures". In wartime, things got much more complicated. But here, no doubt, the experience of Soviet aviators came in handy, where ampoules were equipped at airfields. Prior to the mechanization of the process, the filling of ampoules, taking into account the unscrewing and wrapping of the fitting plug, required 2 man-hours per 100 pieces.
In 1938, for the Red Army Air Force at the 145th NKAP plant, a towed aircraft filling station ARS-203, made on a single-axle semi-trailer, was developed and later put into service. A year later, the self-propelled ARS-204 also entered service, but it was focused on servicing aircraft pouring devices, and we will not consider it. ARSs were mainly intended for pouring military chemicals into ammunition and isolated tanks, but they turned out to be simply indispensable for working with a ready-made self-igniting incendiary mixture.
In theory, in the rear of each rifle regiment, a small unit was supposed to work to equip ampoules with a mixture of KS. Without a doubt, it had an ARS-203 station. But KS was also not transported in barrels from factories, but cooked on the spot. To do this, any products of oil distillation (gasoline, kerosene, solarium) were used in the frontline zone, and according to the tables compiled by A.P. Ionov, different amounts of a thickener were added to them. As a result, despite the difference in the initial components, a CS was obtained. Further, it was obviously pumped into the ARS-203 tank, where the self-ignition component of the fire mixture was added.
However, the option of adding the component directly into the ampoules, and then pouring the CS liquid into them is not excluded. In this case, ARS-203, in general, was not so necessary. And an ordinary soldier's aluminum mug could also serve as a dispenser. But such an algorithm required that the self-igniting component be inert for some time in the open air (for example, wet white phosphorus).
ARS-203 was specially designed to mechanize the process of filling ampoules АЖ-2 to the working volume in the field. On it, from a large reservoir, liquid was first poured simultaneously into eight measuring tanks, and then eight ampoules were filled at once. Thus, it was possible to fill 300-350 ampoules in an hour, and after two hours of such work, the 700-liter tank of the station was emptied, and it was again filled with CS liquid. It was impossible to speed up the process of filling the ampoules: all the overflows of liquids took place in a natural way, without pressurization of the container. The filling cycle of eight ampoules was 17-22 s, and 610 liters were pumped into the working capacity of the station using a Garda pump in 7.5-9 minutes.
The PRS station is ready to fill four ampoules АЖ-2. The pedal is pressed, and the process has begun! Refueling incendiary mixtures made it possible to do without a gas mask. Photo 1942
Obviously, the experience of operating the ARS-203 in the ground forces turned out to be unexpected: the performance of the station, focused on the needs of the Air Force, was considered excessive, as well as its dimensions, weight and the need to be towed by a separate vehicle. The infantry needed something smaller, and in 1942, in the OKB-NKAP of the 455th plant, the Kartukovites developed a field filling station for the PRS. In its design, dipsticks were abolished, and the filling level of opaque ampoules was controlled using a Glass SIG-Extremely simplified version of the ORS nasal tube. for use in the field. Capacity of working re-
the tank was 107 liters, and the mass of the entire station did not exceed 95 kg. The PRS was designed in a "civilized" version of the workplace on a folding table and in an extremely simplified one, with the installation of a working container "on stumps". The productivity of the station was limited to 240 ampoules of AZh-2 per hour. Unfortunately, when the field tests of the PRS were completed, the ampoule guns in the Red Army had already been removed from service.
Russian reusable "faustpatron"?
However, it would not be entirely correct to unconditionally classify a 125-mm ampoule gun as an incendiary weapon. After all, no one allows himself to consider the barrel artillery system or the Katyusha MLRS as flamethrowers, which fired, if necessary, incendiary ammunition. By analogy with the use of aviation ampoules, the designers of the 145th plant proposed to expand the arsenal of ammunition for the ampoule gun by using modified Soviet anti-tank bombs PTAB-2.5 of cumulative action, created at the very beginning of World War II.
In the book by E. Pyryev and S. Reznichenko "Bomber armament of Russian aviation in 1912-1945." in the PTAB section it is said that small cumulative bombs in the USSR were developed only in GSKB-47, TsKB-22 and SKB-35. From December 1942 to April 1943, they managed to design, test and work out the full program of 1.5-kg PTAB cumulative action. However, at the 145th plant I.I. Kartukov dealt with this problem much earlier, back in 1941. Their 2.5-kg ammunition was called the AFBM-125 high-explosive armor-piercing mine of 125 mm caliber.
Outwardly, such a PTAB strongly resembled the high-explosive bombs of Colonel Gronov of small calibers during the First World War. Since the wings of the cylindrical tail were welded to the body of the aviation ammunition by spot welding, it was not possible to manage to use the mine in the infantry by simply replacing its tail. The new mortar-type plumage was installed on aerial bombs with an additional propellant charge built into it in a capsule. The ammunition was fired as before, with a blank 12-gauge rifle cartridge. Thus, in relation to the ampoule-launcher, the system was obtained in some Step-Mina fBM. 125 without additional NO active-reactive. contact fuse fuse.
For quite a long time, the designers had to work on improving the reliability of cocking the mine's contact fuse on the trajectory.
BFM-125 mine without an additional contact fuse fuse.
Meanwhile, the problem in the episode of 1941 mentioned above with the commander of the 30th Army, D.D. Lelyushenko could also occur when firing early models of FBM-125 high-explosive armor-piercing mines from ampoules. This is also indirectly indicated by Lelyushenko’s grumbling: “Everything hurts cunningly and for a long time, the German tank will not wait,” since inserting an ampoule and loading a cartridge into a conventional ampoule gun did not require any special tricks. In the case of the use of the FBM-125, before firing, the safety key had to be unscrewed from the ammunition, opening the fire to the powder press of the safety mechanism holding the inertial striker of the contact fuse in the rear position. To do this, all such ammunition was supplied with a cardboard cheat sheet with the inscription "Turn out before firing", tied to a key.
The cumulative recess in the front of the mine was hemispherical, and its thin-walled steel lining rather formed a given configuration when filling explosives, rather than playing the role of a shock core during the cumulation of a combat charge of ammunition. The documents indicated that the FBM-125, when fired from standard ampoules, was designed to disable tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles, vehicles, as well as to destroy fortified firing points (DOTov.DZOTovipr.).
Armored plate with a thickness of 80 mm, confidently pierced by the FBM-125 mine at field tests.
The nature of the outlet of the same punched armor plate.
Landfill tests of the ammunition took place in 1941. Their result was the launch of the mine into pilot production. Military tests of the FBM-125 were successfully completed in 1942. The developers proposed, if necessary, to equip such mines with irritant military chemicals (chloracetophenone or adamsite), but this did not come to that. In parallel with the FBM-125, the OKB-NKAP of the 455th plant also developed the armor-piercing high-explosive mine BFM-125. Unfortunately, its combat properties are not mentioned in the factory certificates.
Cover the infantry with smoke
In 1941, it passed field tests developed at the plant No. 145 named after. CM. Kirov aviation smoke bomb ADSH. It was designed to set up vertical camouflage (blinding the enemy) and poisonous smoke (fettering and exhausting the enemy’s combat forces) curtains when dropping bombs from an aircraft. On aircraft, the ADS were loaded into ampoule-bomb cartridges, after removing the safety forks of the fuses. Checkers spilled out in one gulp when the doors of one of the sections of the cassette were opened. Ampoule-bomb cartridges were also developed at the 145th plant for fighters, attack aircraft, long-range and short-range bombers.
The contact fuse has already been made with an all-round mechanism, which ensured its operation when the ammunition fell to the ground in any position. The fuse spring protected the fuse from triggering in the event of an accidental fall, which did not allow the drummer to prick the igniter primer with insufficient overloads (when falling from a height of up to 4 m onto concrete).
It is probably no coincidence that this ammunition also turned out to be made in 125 mm caliber, which, according to the assurances of the developers, made it possible to use ADSh from standard ampoule guns. By the way, when fired from an ampoule gun, the ammunition received an overload much greater than when it fell from 4 m, which means that the saber began to smoke already in flight.
Even in the pre-war years, it was scientifically proven that covering your troops is much more effective if you smoke it, and not your own infantry, in an attack on a firing point. Thus, the ampoule gun would turn out to be a very necessary thing when, before an attack, it was necessary to throw a few checkers a couple of hundred meters to the bunker or bunker. Unfortunately, it is not known whether ampoule guns were used on the fronts in this variant...
When firing heavy ADSh bombs from a 125-mm ampoule gun, its sights could only be used with amendments. However, great accuracy of shooting was not required: one ADS created an impenetrable creeping cloud up to 100 m long.
an additional expelling charge was impossible, for firing at the maximum distance it was required to use a steep trajectory at elevation angles close to 45 °.
Regimental agitation initiative
The plot for this section of the article about the ampoule was also borrowed by me from the Internet. Its essence was that one day the political officer, having come to the sappers in the battalion, asked who could make a propaganda mortar mine? Pavel Yakovlevich Ivanov volunteered. He found the tools at the site of the destroyed forge, he made the body of the ammunition from a chock, adapting a small powder charge to burst it in the air, the fuse from a fuse cord, and the stabilizer from cans. However, the wooden mortar mine turned out to be light and fell slowly into the barrel without breaking through the primer.
Ivanov reduced its diameter so that the air from the barrel came out more freely, and the primer stopped falling on the firing pin. In general, the craftsman did not sleep for days, but on the third day the mine flew and exploded. The leaflets swirled over the enemy trenches. Later, he adapted an ampoule gun for firing wooden mines. And in order not to cause return fire on his trenches, he carried it to the neutral zone or to the side. Result: German soldiers once crossed over to our side in a group, drunk, in broad daylight.
This story is also quite plausible. It is quite difficult to make an agitation in a metal case from improvised means in the field, but from wood it is quite possible. In addition, such ammunition, according to common sense, should be non-lethal. Otherwise, what kind of propaganda is there! But factory propaganda mines and artillery shells were in metal cases. To a greater extent, so that they fly further and so as not to greatly disrupt ballistics. However, before that, it never occurred to the designers of the ampoule gun to enrich the arsenal of their offspring with such a kind of ammunition ...
noloader, with a piston valve. Shooting mechanisms - similar in systems of both calibers.
The Ampulomet easel mortars were not put into service. According to the classification of artillery systems, samples of both calibers can be attributed to hard-type mortars. Theoretically, the recoil forces when firing high-explosive armor-piercing mines should not have increased compared to throwing ampoules. The mass of the FBM was greater than that of the AZh-2KS, but less than that of the ADSH. And the expelling charge is the same. However, despite the fact that the Ampulomet mortars fired along more flat trajectories than the classic mortars and bombers, the former were still much more “mortar” than the Katyusha Guards mortars.
conclusions
So, the reason for the removal of ampoule guns from the armament of the ground forces of the Red Army at the end of 1942 was officially their insecurity in handling and use. But in vain: ahead of our army was not only an offensive, but also numerous battles in settlements. That's where it would come in handy.
100-mm mounted anti-tank mortar in the process of loading.
By the way, the safety of using a knapsack flamethrower in an offensive battle is also very doubtful. Nevertheless, they were returned "to service" and used until the end of the war. There are front-line memories of a sniper, where he claims that an enemy flamethrower is always visible from afar (a number of unmasking signs), therefore it is better to aim it at chest level. Then, from short distances, a bullet from a powerful rifle cartridge pierces right through both the body and the tank with the fire mixture. That is, the flamethrower and the flamethrower "cannot be restored."
The calculation of the ampoule gun could also be in exactly the same situation when bullets or fragments hit incendiary ampoules. Glass ampoules in general could be smashed against each other by a shock wave from a close gap. And in general, the whole war is a very risky business ... And thanks to the "hussars of the generals Lelyushenko" such hasty conclusions were born about the low quality and combat inefficiency of individual types of weapons. Remember, for example, the pre-war ordeals of the designers of the Katyusha MLRS, mortar weapons, submachine guns, the T-34 tank, etc. Our gunsmith designers in the overwhelming majority were not amateurs in their field of knowledge and no less than generals sought to bring victory closer. And they were "dipped" like kittens. The generals are also easy to understand - they needed reliable models of weapons and with "fool protection".
And then, the warm memories of infantrymen about the effectiveness of Molotov cocktails against tanks against tanks look somehow illogical against the backdrop of a very cool attitude towards ampoules. Both are weapons of the same order. Unless the ampoule was exactly twice as powerful, and it could be thrown 10 times further. It is not entirely clear here why there were more claims "in the infantry": to the ampoule gun itself or to its ampoules?
External suspended non-drop container ABK-P-500 for salvo use of small-caliber air bombs from high-speed and dive bombers. In the foreground are ampoules АЖ-2KS made of four spherical segments with edges sealed inside.
One of the options for a hand-held (non-branded) flamethrower developed by the designers of plant No. 145 of the NKAP during tests in 1942. At such a range, only hogs can be pitched from this “aerosol can”.
At the same time, the same “very dangerous” AZH-2KS ampoules in Soviet attack aviation remained in service at least until the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945 (in any case, M.P. Odintsov’s attack aviation regiment used them already on the German territory by tank columns hiding in the forests). And this is on attack aircraft! With unarmored bomb bays! When from the ground all the infantry of the enemy is hitting them from anything! The pilots were well aware of what would happen if only one stray bullet hit the cartridge with ampoules, but, nevertheless, they flew. By the way, a timid mention on the Internet that ampoules were used in aviation when firing from such aircraft ampoule guns is absolutely untrue.
Here is a small illustration:
Suppose I read in a 12-volume book (which usually exaggerates the strength of the Germans and satellites opposing us) that by the beginning of 1944 on the Soviet-German front, the ratio of forces in artillery pieces and mortars was 1.7: 1 (95,604 Soviet against 54,570 enemy). More than one and a half overall superiority. That is, in active sectors it could be brought up to three times (for example, in the Belarusian operation, 29,000 Soviet against 10,000 enemy) Does this mean that the enemy could not raise his head under the hurricane fire of Soviet artillery? No, an artillery piece is just a tool for firing shells. There are no shells - and the gun is a useless toy. And providing shells is just the task of logistics.
In 2009, at VIF, Isaev posted a comparison of the ammunition consumption of Soviet and German artillery (1942: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1718/1718985.htm, 1943: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/ forum/0/archive/1706/1706490.htm , 1944: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1733/1733134.htm , 1945: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/ 0/archive/1733/1733171.htm). I collected everything in a table, supplemented it with rocket artillery, for the Germans I added from Hann the consumption of captured calibers (often it gives an insignificant addition) and the consumption of tank calibers for comparability - in Soviet figures, tank calibers (20-mm ShVAK and 85-mm non-anti-aircraft) are present. Posted. Well, grouped a little differently. It turns out to be pretty interesting. Despite the superiority of Soviet artillery in the number of barrels, the Germans fired shells in pieces, if we take artillery calibers (i.e. guns 75 mm and higher, without anti-aircraft guns), the Germans have more:
USSR Germany 1942 37,983,800 45,261,822 1943 82,125,480 69,928,496 1944 98,564,568 113,663,900
If translated into tons, then the superiority is even more noticeable:
USSR Germany 1942 446.113 709.957 1943 828.193 1.121.545 1944 1.000.962 1.540.933
Tons here are taken by the weight of the projectile, not the shot. That is, the weight of metal and explosives falling directly on the head of the opposing side. I note that I did not count the armor-piercing shells of tank and anti-tank guns for the Germans (I hope you understand why). It is not possible to exclude them for the Soviet side, but, judging by the Germans, the amendment will come out insignificant. In Germany, consumption is given on all fronts, which begins to play a role in 1944.
In the Soviet army, on average, 3.6-3.8 shells were fired per day on the barrel of a gun from 76.2 mm and above in the active army (without RGK). The figure is quite stable both in years and in calibers: in 1944, the average daily shot for all calibers was 3.6 per barrel, for a 122-mm howitzer - 3.0, for 76.2 mm barrels (regimental, divisional, tank) - 3.7. The average daily shot per mortar barrel, on the contrary, is growing year by year: from 2.0 in 1942 to 4.1 in 1944.
As for the Germans, I do not have the presence of guns in the army. But if we take the total availability of guns, then the average daily shot per barrel of 75-mm and higher caliber in 1944 will be about 8.5. At the same time, the main workhorse of divisional artillery (105-mm howitzers - almost a third of the total tonnage of shells) shot an average of 14.5 shells per barrel per day, and the second main caliber (150-mm divisional howitzers - 20% of the total tonnage) about 10, 7. Mortars were used much less intensively - 81-mm mortars fired 4.4 rounds per barrel per day, and 120-mm only 2.3. Regimental artillery guns gave a consumption closer to the average (75-mm infantry gun 7 rounds per barrel, 150-mm infantry gun - 8.3).
Another instructive metric is the expenditure of shells per division.
The division was the main organizational building block, but typically the divisions were reinforced by units. It is interesting to see what supported the middle division in terms of firepower. In 1942-44, the USSR had in the active army (without the RGC) about 500 calculated divisions (weighted average: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). There were approximately 5.5 million in the ground forces of the active army, that is, there were approximately 11 thousand people per division. This "had to" naturally, taking into account both the actual composition of the division, and all the reinforcement and support units that worked for it both directly and in the rear.
Among the Germans, the average number of troops per division of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way, decreased from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, approximately 1.45-1.25 times "thicker" than the Soviet one. At the same time, the average daily shot on the Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and on the German - three times more (16.2 tons). If we calculate for 10,000 people of the active army, then from the Soviet side to support their actions in 1944 5 tons of ammunition were spent per day, and from the German 13.8 tons.
The American division in the European theater in this sense stands out even more. It had three times as many people as the Soviet one: 34,000 (this is without Supply Command troops), and the daily ammunition consumption was almost ten times more (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day per 10,000 people, that is, more than three times more than in the Red Army.
In this sense, it was the Americans who implemented the recommendation of Joseph Vissarionovich "to fight with little blood but with a lot of shells." It can be compared - in June 1944 the distance to the Elbe was approximately the same from Omaha Beach and from Vitebsk. The Russians and the Americans also reached the Elbe at approximately the same time. That is, they ensured the same speed of advancement for themselves. However, the Americans on this route used up 15 tons per day per 10,000 personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month in killed, wounded, captured and missing. Soviet troops advancing at the same speed spent (specifically) three times less shells, but they also lost 8.5% per month. Those. speed was provided by the expenditure of manpower.
It is also interesting to see the distribution of the weight consumption of ammunition by types of guns:
I remind you that all the numbers here are for artillery of 75 mm and above, that is, without anti-aircraft guns, without 50 mm mortars, without battalion / anti-tank guns with a caliber of 28 to 57 mm. Infantry guns include German guns with this name, Soviet 76-mm regiments and American 75-mm howitzer. The remaining guns weighing less than 8 tons in combat position are counted as field guns. Systems such as the Soviet 152 mm ML-20 howitzer gun and the German s.FH 18 fall here at the upper limit. Heavier guns, such as the Soviet 203 mm B-4 howitzer, the American 203 mm M1 howitzer or the German mm mortar, as well as 152-155-170-mm long-range guns on their carriages fall into the next class - heavy and long-range artillery.
It can be seen that in the Red Army the lion's share of fire falls on mortars and regimental guns, i.e. to fire on the near tactical zone. Heavy artillery plays a very insignificant role (in 1945 more, but not by much). In field artillery, forces (by weight of projectiles fired) are roughly evenly distributed between the 76mm cannon, 122mm howitzer, and 152mm howitzer/howitzer cannon. Which leads to the fact that the average weight of the Soviet projectile is one and a half times less than the German one.
In addition, it should be noted that the farther the target, the (on average) it is less covered. In the near tactical zone, most of the targets are somehow dug / covered, while in the depths there are such uncovered targets as advancing reserves, enemy troops in clusters, headquarters locations, etc. In other words, a projectile that hits the target in depth on average does more damage than a projectile fired at the leading edge (on the other hand, the dispersion of projectiles at long distances is higher).
Then, if the enemy has parity in the weight of fired shells of shells, but at the same time keeps half as many people at the front, thereby he gives half as many targets to our artillery.
All this works for the observed loss ratio.
(As an extended commentary on
By the end of the 30s, almost all participants in the coming world war had formed common directions in the development of small arms. The range and accuracy of the defeat was reduced, which was offset by a greater density of fire. As a consequence of this - the beginning of the mass rearmament of units with automatic small arms - submachine guns, machine guns, assault rifles.
The accuracy of fire began to fade into the background, while the soldiers advancing in a chain began to be taught shooting from the move. With the advent of airborne troops, it became necessary to create special lightweight weapons.
Maneuvering war also affected machine guns: they became much lighter and more mobile. New varieties of small arms appeared (which was dictated primarily by the need to fight tanks) - rifle grenades, anti-tank rifles and RPGs with cumulative grenades.
Small arms of the USSR of the Second World War
The rifle division of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War was a very formidable force - about 14.5 thousand people. The main type of small arms were rifles and carbines - 10420 pieces. The share of submachine guns was insignificant - 1204. There were 166, 392 and 33 units of easel, light and anti-aircraft machine guns, respectively.
The division had its own artillery of 144 guns and 66 mortars. The firepower was supplemented by 16 tanks, 13 armored vehicles and a solid fleet of auxiliary automotive and tractor equipment.
Rifles and carbines
The main small arms of the infantry units of the USSR in the first period of the war was certainly the famous three-ruler - 7.62 mm rifle S.I. qualities, in particular, with an aiming range of 2 km. 
The three-ruler is an ideal weapon for newly drafted soldiers, and the simplicity of the design created huge opportunities for its mass production. But like any weapon, the three-ruler had flaws. A permanently attached bayonet in combination with a long barrel (1670 mm) created inconvenience when moving, especially in wooded areas. Serious complaints were caused by the shutter handle when reloading.
On its basis, a sniper rifle and a series of carbines of the 1938 and 1944 models were created. Fate measured the three-ruler for a long century (the last three-ruler was released in 1965), participation in many wars and an astronomical "circulation" of 37 million copies.
Sniper with Mosin rifle (with optical sight PE model 1931)
Sighting range SVT-40 - up to 1 km. SVT-40 won back with honor on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. It was also appreciated by our opponents. A historical fact: having captured rich trophies at the beginning of the war, among which there were quite a few SVT-40s, the German army ... adopted it, and the Finns created their own rifle, the TaRaKo, based on the SVT-40.
The creative development of the ideas implemented in the SVT-40 was the AVT-40 automatic rifle. It differed from its predecessor in the ability to conduct automatic fire at a rate of up to 25 rounds per minute. The disadvantage of AVT-40 is low accuracy of fire, strong unmasking flame and a loud sound at the time of the shot. In the future, as the mass receipt of automatic weapons in the troops, it was removed from service.
Submachine guns
The Great Patriotic War was the time of the final transition from rifles to automatic weapons. The Red Army began to fight armed with a small amount of PPD-40 - a submachine gun designed by the outstanding Soviet designer Vasily Alekseevich Degtyarev. At that time, PPD-40 was in no way inferior to its domestic and foreign counterparts. 
Designed for a pistol cartridge cal. 7.62 x 25 mm, PPD-40 had an impressive ammunition load of 71 rounds, placed in a drum-type magazine. Weighing about 4 kg, it provided firing at a speed of 800 rounds per minute with an effective range of up to 200 meters. However, a few months after the start of the war, he was replaced by the legendary PPSh-40 cal. 7.62 x 25 mm.
The creator of the PPSh-40, designer Georgy Semenovich Shpagin, was faced with the task of developing an extremely easy-to-use, reliable, technologically advanced, cheap-to-manufacture mass weapon. 
From its predecessor - PPD-40, PPSh inherited a drum magazine for 71 rounds. A little later, a simpler and more reliable sector carob magazine for 35 rounds was developed for him. The mass of equipped machine guns (both options) was 5.3 and 4.15 kg, respectively. The rate of fire of the PPSh-40 reached 900 rounds per minute with an aiming range of up to 300 meters and with the ability to conduct single fire.
To master the PPSh-40, several lessons were enough. It was easily disassembled into 5 parts, made using the stamping-welded technology, thanks to which, during the war years, the Soviet defense industry produced about 5.5 million machine guns.
In the summer of 1942, the young designer Alexei Sudaev presented his brainchild - a 7.62 mm submachine gun. It was strikingly different from its "older brothers" PPD and PPSh-40 in its rational layout, higher manufacturability and ease of manufacturing parts by arc welding. 
PPS-42 was 3.5 kg lighter and required three times less time to manufacture. However, despite the quite obvious advantages, he never became a mass weapon, leaving the palm of the PPSh-40.
By the beginning of the war, the DP-27 light machine gun (Degtyarev infantry, cal 7.62mm) had been in service with the Red Army for almost 15 years, having the status of the main light machine gun of infantry units. Its automation was driven by the energy of powder gases. The gas regulator reliably protected the mechanism from pollution and high temperatures.
The DP-27 could only conduct automatic fire, but even a beginner needed a few days to master shooting in short bursts of 3-5 shots. The ammunition load of 47 rounds was placed in a disk magazine with a bullet to the center in one row. The store itself was attached to the top of the receiver. The weight of the unloaded machine gun was 8.5 kg. Equipped store increased it by almost 3 kg.
It was a powerful weapon with an effective range of 1.5 km and a combat rate of fire up to 150 rounds per minute. In the combat position, the machine gun relied on the bipod. A flame arrester was screwed onto the end of the barrel, significantly reducing its unmasking effect. DP-27 was serviced by a gunner and his assistant. In total, about 800 thousand machine guns were fired.
Small arms of the Wehrmacht of World War II
The main strategy of the German army is offensive or blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg - lightning war). The decisive role in it was assigned to large tank formations, carrying out deep penetrations of the enemy defenses in cooperation with artillery and aviation.
Tank units bypassed powerful fortified areas, destroying control centers and rear communications, without which the enemy would quickly lose combat capability. The defeat was completed by the motorized units of the ground forces.
Small arms of the infantry division of the Wehrmacht
The staff of the German infantry division of the 1940 model assumed the presence of 12609 rifles and carbines, 312 submachine guns (automatic machines), light and heavy machine guns - respectively 425 and 110 pieces, 90 anti-tank rifles and 3600 pistols.Small arms of the Wehrmacht as a whole met the high requirements of wartime. It was reliable, trouble-free, simple, easy to manufacture and maintain, which contributed to its mass production.
Rifles, carbines, machine guns
Mauser 98K
The Mauser 98K is an improved version of the Mauser 98 rifle, developed at the end of the 19th century by the brothers Paul and Wilhelm Mauser, the founders of the world-famous arms company. Equipping the German army with it began in 1935. 
Mauser 98K
The weapon was equipped with a clip with five 7.92 mm cartridges. A trained soldier could accurately fire 15 times within a minute at a distance of up to 1.5 km. Mauser 98K was very compact. Its main characteristics: weight, length, barrel length - 4.1 kg x 1250 x 740 mm. The indisputable merits of the rifle are evidenced by numerous conflicts with its participation, longevity and a truly sky-high "circulation" - more than 15 million units.
Automatic MP-40 "Schmeisser"
Perhaps the most famous small arms of the Wehrmacht during World War II was the famous MP-40 submachine gun, a modification of its predecessor, the MP-36, created by Heinrich Volmer. However, by the will of fate, he is better known under the name "Schmeisser", received thanks to the stamp on the store - "PATENT SCHMEISSER". The stigma simply meant that, in addition to G. Volmer, Hugo Schmeisser also participated in the creation of the MP-40, but only as the creator of the store. 
Automatic MP-40 "Schmeisser"
Initially, the MP-40 was intended to arm the commanders of infantry units, but later it was handed over to tankers, armored vehicle drivers, paratroopers and special forces soldiers.
However, the MP-40 was absolutely not suitable for infantry units, since it was an exclusively melee weapon. In a fierce battle in the open, having a weapon with a range of 70 to 150 meters meant for a German soldier to be practically unarmed in front of his opponent, armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles with a range of 400 to 800 meters.
Assault rifle StG-44
Assault rifle StG-44 (sturmgewehr) cal. 7.92mm is another legend of the Third Reich. This is certainly an outstanding creation of Hugo Schmeisser - the prototype of many post-war assault rifles and machine guns, including the famous AK-47. 
StG-44 could conduct single and automatic fire. Her weight with a full magazine was 5.22 kg. In the sighting range - 800 meters - "Sturmgever" was in no way inferior to its main competitors. Three versions of the store were provided - for 15, 20 and 30 shots with a rate of up to 500 rounds per minute. The option of using a rifle with an underbarrel grenade launcher and an infrared sight was considered.
It was not without its shortcomings. The assault rifle was heavier than the Mauser-98K by a whole kilogram. Her wooden butt could not withstand sometimes hand-to-hand combat and simply broke. The flames escaping from the barrel gave away the location of the shooter, and the long magazine and sighting devices forced him to raise his head high in the prone position.
The 7.92mm MG-42 is quite rightly called one of the best machine guns of World War II. It was developed at Grossfuss by engineers Werner Gruner and Kurt Horn. Those who experienced its firepower were very frank. Our soldiers called it "lawn mower", and the allies - "Hitler's circular saw."
Depending on the type of shutter, the machine gun accurately fired at a speed of up to 1500 rpm at a distance of up to 1 km. Ammunition was carried out using a machine-gun belt for 50 - 250 rounds. The uniqueness of the MG-42 was complemented by a relatively small number of parts - 200 and the high manufacturability of their production by stamping and spot welding.
The barrel, red-hot from firing, was replaced by a spare one in a few seconds using a special clamp. In total, about 450 thousand machine guns were fired. The unique technical developments embodied in the MG-42 were borrowed by gunsmiths in many countries of the world when creating their machine guns.
Everyone is familiar with the lubok image of the Soviet "soldier-liberator". In the view of Soviet people, the Red Army soldiers of the Great Patriotic War are emaciated people in dirty overcoats who run in a crowd to attack after tanks, or tired elderly men smoking cigarettes on the parapet of a trench. After all, it was precisely such shots that were mainly captured by military newsreels. In the late 1980s, filmmakers and post-Soviet historians put the "victim of repression" on a cart, handed over a "three-ruler" without cartridges, sending fascists towards the armored hordes - under the supervision of barrage detachments.Now I propose to see what really happened. It can be responsibly stated that our weapons were in no way inferior to foreign ones, while being more suitable for local conditions of use. For example, a three-line rifle had larger gaps and tolerances than foreign ones, but this "flaw" was a forced feature - gun grease, thickening in the cold, did not take the weapon out of combat.
So, review.
N agan- a revolver developed by the Belgian gunsmiths brothers Emil (1830-1902) and Leon (1833-1900) Nagans, which was in service and produced in a number of countries at the end of the 19th - the middle of the 20th century. 
TC(Tulsky, Korovina) - the first Soviet serial self-loading pistol. In 1925, the Dynamo sports society ordered the Tula Arms Plant to develop a compact pistol chambered for 6.35 × 15 mm Browning for sports and civilian needs.
Work on the creation of the pistol took place in the design bureau of the Tula Arms Plant. In the autumn of 1926, the designer-gunsmith S. A. Korovin completed the development of a pistol, which was named the pistol TK (Tula Korovin).
At the end of 1926, TOZ began producing a pistol, the following year the pistol was approved for use, receiving the official name "Pistol Tulsky, Korovin, model 1926."
TK pistols entered service with the NKVD of the USSR, middle and senior officers of the Red Army, civil servants and party workers.
Also, the TC was used as a gift or award weapon (for example, there are known cases of awarding Stakhanovites with it). Between the autumn of 1926 and 1935, several tens of thousands of Korovins were produced. In the period after the Great Patriotic War, TK pistols were kept for some time in savings banks as a backup weapon for employees and collectors. 
Pistol arr. 1933 TT(Tulsky, Tokareva) - the first army self-loading pistol of the USSR, developed in 1930 by the Soviet designer Fedor Vasilyevich Tokarev. The TT pistol was developed for the 1929 competition for a new army pistol, announced to replace the Nagant revolver and several foreign-made revolvers and pistols that were in service with the Red Army by the mid-1920s. The German cartridge 7.63 × 25 mm Mauser was adopted as a regular cartridge, which was purchased in significant quantities for the Mauser S-96 pistols in service. 
Mosin rifle. 7.62-mm (3-line) rifle of the 1891 model (Mosin rifle, three-line) is a repeating rifle adopted by the Russian Imperial Army in 1891.
It was actively used from 1891 until the end of the Great Patriotic War, during this period it was repeatedly modernized.
The name of the three-ruler comes from the caliber of the rifle barrel, which is equal to three Russian lines (an old measure of length equal to one tenth of an inch, or 2.54 mm - respectively, three lines are equal to 7.62 mm).
On the basis of the rifle of the 1891 model and its modifications, a number of samples of sports and hunting weapons, both rifled and smoothbore, were created. 
Simonov automatic rifle. 7.62 mm automatic rifle of the Simonov system of 1936, AVS-36 - Soviet automatic rifle designed by gunsmith Sergei Simonov.
It was originally designed as a self-loading rifle, but in the course of improvements, an automatic fire mode was added for use in an emergency. The first automatic rifle developed in the USSR and put into service. 
With Tokarev self-loading rifle. 7.62-mm self-loading rifles of the Tokarev system of the 1938 and 1940s (SVT-38, SVT-40), as well as the Tokarev automatic rifle of the 1940 model, a modification of the Soviet self-loading rifle developed by F. V. Tokarev.
The SVT-38 was developed as a replacement for the Simonov automatic rifle and was adopted by the Red Army on February 26, 1939. The first SVT arr. 1938 was released on July 16, 1939. On October 1, 1939, gross production began at the Tula, and from 1940 at the Izhevsk Arms Plant. 
Self-loading carbine Simonov. The 7.62 mm Simonov self-loading carbine (also known as SKS-45 abroad) is a Soviet self-loading carbine designed by Sergei Simonov, put into service in 1949.
The first copies began to arrive in active units at the beginning of 1945 - this was the only case of using the 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge in World War II. 
Tokarev submachine gun, or the original name - Tokarev's light carbine - an experimental model of automatic weapons created in 1927 for the modified Nagant revolver cartridge, the first submachine gun developed in the USSR. It was not adopted for service, it was released by a small experimental batch, it was used to a limited extent in the Great Patriotic War. 
P submachine gun Degtyarev. 7.62-mm submachine guns of models 1934, 1934/38 and 1940 of the Degtyarev system are various modifications of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet gunsmith Vasily Degtyarev in the early 1930s. The first submachine gun adopted by the Red Army.
The Degtyarev submachine gun was a fairly typical representative of the first generation of this type of weapon. It was used in the Finnish campaign of 1939-40, as well as at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. 
Shpagin submachine gun. 7.62-mm submachine gun of the 1941 model of the Shpagin system (PPSh) is a Soviet submachine gun developed in 1940 by designer G.S. Shpagin and adopted by the Red Army on December 21, 1940. PPSh was the main submachine gun of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War. 
After the end of the war, in the early 1950s, the PPSh was withdrawn from service with the Soviet Army and gradually replaced by the Kalashnikov assault rifle, it remained in service with the rear and auxiliary units, parts of the internal troops and railway troops for a little longer. In service with paramilitary security units was at least until the mid-1980s.
Also, in the post-war period, PPSh was supplied in significant quantities to countries friendly to the USSR, was in service with the armies of various states for a long time, was used by irregular formations, and throughout the 20th century was used in armed conflicts around the world.
Submachine gun Sudayev. 7.62-mm submachine guns of the 1942 and 1943 models of the Sudayev system (PPS) are variants of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet designer Alexei Sudayev in 1942. Used by Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War.
Often PPS is considered as the best submachine gun of World War II. 
Gun "Maxim" model 1910. Machine gun "Maxim" model 1910 - easel machine gun, a variant of the British machine gun Maxim, widely used by the Russian and Soviet armies during the First World War and the Second World War. The Maxim machine gun was used to destroy open group targets and enemy fire weapons at a distance of up to 1000 m. 
Anti-aircraft variant
- 7.62-mm quad machine gun "Maxim" on the U-431 anti-aircraft gun
- 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun "Maxim" on the U-432 anti-aircraft gun 
P Ulmet Maxim-Tokarev- Soviet light machine gun designed by F. V. Tokarev, created in 1924 on the basis of the Maxim machine gun. 
DP(Degtyareva Infantry) - a light machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev. The first ten serial DP machine guns were manufactured at the Kovrov plant on November 12, 1927, then a batch of 100 machine guns was transferred to military trials, as a result of which the machine gun was adopted by the Red Army on December 21, 1927. DP became one of the first samples of small arms created in the USSR. The machine gun was massively used as the main weapon of fire support for infantry at the platoon-company level until the end of World War II. 
DT(Degtyarev tank) - a tank machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev in 1929. Entered service with the Red Army in 1929 under the designation "7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system arr. 1929" (DT-29) 
DS-39(7.62-mm machine gun Degtyarev model 1939). 
SG-43. 7.62 mm Goryunov machine gun (SG-43) - Soviet machine gun. It was developed by the gunsmith P. M. Goryunov with the participation of M. M. Goryunov and V. E. Voronkov at the Kovrov Mechanical Plant. Adopted on May 15, 1943. SG-43 began to enter the troops in the second half of 1943. 
DShK and DShKM- heavy machine guns chambered for 12.7 × 108 mm. The result of the modernization of the heavy machine gun DK (Degtyarev Large-caliber). DShK was adopted by the Red Army in 1938 under the designation "12.7 mm heavy machine gun Degtyarev - Shpagin model 1938"
In 1946, under the designation DShKM(Degtyarev, Shpagin, modernized large-caliber,) machine gun was adopted by the Soviet Army. 
PTRD. Anti-tank single-shot rifle arr. 1941 of the Degtyarev system, put into service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to fight medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances up to 500 m. Also, the gun could fire at pillboxes / bunkers and firing points covered with armor at distances up to 800 m and at aircraft at distances up to 500 m. 
PTRS. Anti-tank self-loading rifle mod. 1941 of the Simonov system) is a Soviet self-loading anti-tank rifle, put into service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to fight medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances up to 500 m. Also, the gun could fire at pillboxes / bunkers and firing points covered with armor at distances up to 800 m and at aircraft at distances up to 500 m. During the war some of the guns were captured and used by the Germans. The guns were named Panzerbüchse 784 (R) or PzB 784 (R). 
Dyakonov grenade launcher. A rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system, designed to destroy living, mostly closed, targets with fragmentation grenades that are inaccessible to flat-fire weapons.
It was widely used in pre-war conflicts, during the Soviet-Finnish War and at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. According to the state of the rifle regiment in 1939, each rifle squad was armed with a rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system. In the documents of that time it was called a manual mortar for throwing rifle grenades. 
125 mm ampoule gun model 1941- the only model of the ampoule gun mass-produced in the USSR. It was widely used with varying success by the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, it was often made in semi-handicraft conditions.
The most commonly used projectile was a glass or tin ball filled with a flammable liquid "KS", but the range of ammunition included mines, a smoke bomb, and even makeshift "propaganda shells". With the help of a blank 12-gauge rifle cartridge, the projectile was fired at 250-500 meters, thus being an effective tool against some fortifications and many types of armored vehicles, including tanks. However, difficulties in use and maintenance led to the fact that in 1942 the ampoule gun was withdrawn from service. 
ROKS-3(Knapsack Flamethrower Klyuev-Sergeev) - Soviet infantry backpack flamethrower of the Great Patriotic War. The first model of the ROKS-1 backpack flamethrower was developed in the USSR in the early 1930s. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the rifle regiments of the Red Army had flamethrower teams consisting of two squads, armed with 20 ROKS-2 knapsack flamethrowers. Based on the experience of using these flamethrowers at the beginning of 1942, the designer of the Research Institute of Chemical Engineering M.P. Sergeev and the designer of the military plant No. 846 V.N. Klyuev developed a more advanced backpack flamethrower ROKS-3, which was in service with individual companies and battalions of backpack flamethrowers of the Red Army throughout the war. 
Bottles with a combustible mixture ("Molotov Cocktail").
At the beginning of the war, the State Defense Committee decided to use bottles with a combustible mixture in the fight against tanks. Already on July 7, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted a special resolution “On anti-tank incendiary grenades (bottles)”, which ordered the People's Commissariat of the Food Industry to organize, from July 10, 1941, the equipment of liter glass bottles with fire mixture according to the recipe of Research Institute 6 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition. And the head of the Military Chemical Defense Directorate of the Red Army (later - the Main Military Chemical Directorate) was ordered to begin "supplying military units with hand-held incendiary grenades" from July 14th.
Dozens of distilleries and beer factories throughout the USSR turned into military enterprises on the go. Moreover, the "Molotov Cocktail" (named after the then deputy I.V. Stalin for the State Defense Committee) was prepared directly on the old factory lines, where only yesterday they poured soda, port wines and fizzy "Abrau-Durso". From the first batches of such bottles, they often did not even have time to tear off the "peaceful" alcohol labels. In addition to the liter bottles indicated in the legendary "Molotov" decree, the "cocktail" was also made in beer and wine-cognac containers with a volume of 0.5 and 0.7 liters.
Two types of incendiary bottles were adopted by the Red Army: with self-igniting liquid KS (a mixture of phosphorus and sulfur) and with combustible mixtures No. 1 and No. 3, which are a mixture of aviation gasoline, kerosene, ligroin, thickened with oils or a special hardening powder OP- 2, developed in 1939 under the leadership of A.P. Ionov - in fact, it was the prototype of modern napalm. The abbreviation "KS" is deciphered in different ways: and "Koshkin's mixture" - by the name of the inventor N.V. Koshkin, and "Old Cognac", and "Kachugin-Solodovnik" - by the name of other inventors of liquid grenades.
A bottle with a self-igniting liquid KC, falling on a solid body, broke, the liquid spilled and burned with a bright flame for up to 3 minutes, developing a temperature of up to 1000°C. At the same time, being sticky, it stuck to the armor or covered up viewing slots, glasses, observation devices, blinded the crew with smoke, smoking it out of the tank and burning everything inside the tank. Getting on the body, a drop of burning liquid caused severe, difficult to heal burns.
Combustible mixtures No. 1 and No. 3 burned for up to 60 seconds at temperatures up to 800 ° C and emitting a lot of black smoke. As a cheaper option, bottles of gasoline were used, and as an incendiary, thin glass ampoules-tubes with KS liquid were used, which were attached to the bottle with the help of pharmaceutical rubber bands. Sometimes the ampoules were put inside the bottles before being thrown. 
B body armor PZ-ZIF-20(protective shell, Frunze Plant). It is also CH-38 of the Cuirass type (CH-1, steel breastplate). It can be called the first mass Soviet body armor, although it was called a steel breastplate, which does not change its purpose.
The bulletproof vest provided protection against the German submachine gun, pistols. Also, the bulletproof vest provided protection against fragments of grenades and mines. The body armor was recommended to be worn by assault groups, signalmen (during the laying and repair of cables) and when performing other operations at the discretion of the commander.
Information often comes across that the PZ-ZIF-20 is not a bulletproof vest SP-38 (SN-1), which is not true, since the PZ-ZIF-20 was created according to the documentation of 1938, and industrial production was established in 1943. The second point is that in appearance they have 100% similarity. Among the military search detachments, it has the name "Volkhov", "Leningrad", "five-section".
Reconstruction photo: 
Steel bibs CH-42 
Soviet assault engineer-sapper guards brigade in steel bibs SN-42 and with DP-27 machine guns. 1st ShISBr. 1st Belorussian Front, summer 1944.
ROG-43 hand grenade
ROG-43 hand fragmentation grenade (index 57-G-722) of remote action, designed to defeat enemy manpower in offensive and defensive combat. The new grenade was developed in the first half of the Great Patriotic War at the plant. Kalinin and had the factory designation RGK-42. After being put into service in 1943, the grenade received the designation ROG-43.
Hand smoke grenade RDG.
RDG device
Smoke grenades were used to provide curtains of 8 - 10 m in size and were used mainly to "dazzle" the enemy in shelters, to create local curtains in order to mask the crews leaving the armored vehicles, as well as to simulate the burning of armored vehicles. Under favorable conditions, one RDG grenade created an invisible cloud 25-30 m long.
Burning grenades did not sink in water, so they could be used to force water barriers. The grenade could smoke from 1 to 1.5 minutes, forming, depending on the composition of the smoke mixture, thick gray-black or white smoke.
RPG-6 grenade.
RPG-6 exploded instantly at the moment of impact on a rigid barrier, destroyed armor, hit the crew of an armored target, its weapons and equipment, and could also ignite fuel and explode ammunition. Military tests of the RPG-6 grenade took place in September 1943. The captured Ferdinand assault gun was used as a target, which had frontal armor up to 200 mm and side armor up to 85 mm. The tests carried out showed that the RPG-6 grenade, when the head part hit the target, could penetrate armor up to 120 mm.
Hand anti-tank grenade mod. 1943 RPG-43
Hand-held anti-tank grenade model 1941 RPG-41 percussion
RPG-41 was intended to combat armored vehicles and light tanks with armor up to 20 - 25 mm thick, and could also be used to combat bunkers and field-type shelters. The RPG-41 could also be used to destroy medium and heavy tanks when it hit the vehicle's weak points (roof, tracks, undercarriage, etc.)
Chemical grenade model 1917
According to the "Temporary rifle charter of the Red Army. Part 1. Small arms. Rifle and hand grenades ”, published by the head of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR in 1927, a hand chemical grenade mod. 1917 from a stock prepared during the First World War.
Grenade VKG-40
In service with the Red Army in the 1920-1930s was the muzzle-loading "Dyakonov grenade launcher", created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized. 
The grenade launcher consisted of a mortar, a bipod and a quadrant sight and served to defeat manpower with a fragmentation grenade. The barrel of the mortar had a caliber of 41 mm, three screw grooves, was rigidly fastened in a cup screwed onto the neck, which was put on the rifle barrel, being fixed on the front sight with a cutout.
RG-42 hand grenade
RG-42 model 1942 with a UZRG fuse. After being put into service, the grenade was assigned the index RG-42 (1942 hand grenade). The new UZRG fuse used in the grenade became the same for both the RG-42 and the F-1.
The RG-42 grenade was used both offensively and defensively. In appearance, it resembled an RGD-33 grenade, only without a handle. RG-42 with a fuse UZRG belonged to the type of remote offensive fragmentation grenades. It was intended to defeat enemy manpower.
Rifle anti-tank grenade VPGS-41
VPGS-41 when using
A characteristic distinguishing feature of ramrod grenades was the presence of a "tail" (ramrod) inserted into the bore of the rifle and serving as a stabilizer. The grenade was fired with a blank cartridge.
Soviet hand grenade mod. 1914/30 with protective cover 
Soviet hand grenade mod. 1914/30 refers to anti-personnel fragmentation hand grenades of remote action of the double type. This means that it is designed to destroy enemy personnel with hull fragments during its explosion. Remote action - means that the grenade will explode after a certain period, regardless of other conditions, after the soldier releases it from his hands.
Double type - means that the grenade can be used as an offensive, i.e. grenade fragments have a small mass and fly at a distance less than the possible throw range; or as defensive, i.e. fragments fly at a distance exceeding the throwing range.
The double action of the grenade is achieved by putting on the grenade the so-called "shirt" - a cover made of thick metal, which provides, during the explosion, fragments of a larger mass flying over a greater distance.
Hand grenade RGD-33
An explosive charge is placed inside the case - up to 140 grams of TNT. Between the explosive charge and the case, a steel tape with a square notch is placed to obtain fragments during the explosion, rolled up in three or four layers. 
The grenade was equipped with a defensive cover, which was used only when throwing a grenade from a trench or shelter. In other cases, the protective cover was removed.
And of course, F-1 grenade
Initially, the F-1 grenade used a fuse designed by F.V. Koveshnikov, which was much more reliable and convenient in the use of the French fuse. The deceleration time of the Koveshnikov fuse was 3.5-4.5 sec.
In 1941, the designers E.M. Viceni and A.A. Bednyakov developed and put into service instead of Koveshnikov's fuse, a new, safer and simpler fuse for the F-1 hand grenade.
In 1942, the new fuse became the same for F-1 and RG-42 hand grenades, it was called UZRG - "unified fuse for hand grenades."
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After the above, it cannot be argued that only rusty three-rulers without cartridges were in service.
About chemical weapons during the Second World War, the conversation is separate and special ...