The battle on the river dates back to 1238. Battle on the river Sit: background, course of the battle, consequences. How did the fighting develop?
Battle of the River Sit, or Sith battle- the battle that took place on March 4 between the army of Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir and the corps of Burundai. One of the central events of the Western (Kipchak) campaign of the Mongols (-) and the Mongol invasion of Russia (-), in particular, one of the key battles of the Mongol campaign against North-Eastern Russia (-).
Prerequisites
After the death of Grand Duke Yuri, the Grand Duke's throne was occupied by his brother, Prince of Pereyaslavl Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, under whose direct control were the Vladimir Principality and Pereyaslavl-Zalessky Principality.
The army of Burundai turned out to be weakened after the battle ("they suffered a great plague, and a considerable number of them fell"), which was one of the reasons for Batu's refusal to go to Novgorod.
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Notes
Literature
- Sakharov N.A. The Battle of the City in Chronicles, Traditions, and Literature. Marginal notes. - Publisher Alexander Rutman, 2008.
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An excerpt characterizing the Battle of the River City
Everything that was done during this time around her and with her, all this attention paid to her by so many intelligent people and expressed in such pleasant, refined forms, and the pigeon purity in which she now found herself (she wore white dresses with white ribbons) - all this gave her pleasure; but because of this pleasure, she did not miss her goal for a moment. And as always happens that in a matter of cunning, a stupid person leads smarter ones, she, realizing that the purpose of all these words and troubles was mainly to convert her to Catholicism, to take money from her in favor of the Jesuit institutions (about which she hinted), Helen, before giving money, insisted that she be subjected to those various operations that would free her from her husband. In her conception, the significance of any religion consisted only in the fact that, in satisfying human desires, to observe certain decorum. And for this purpose, in one of her conversations with her confessor, she urgently demanded from him an answer to the question of the extent to which her marriage binds her.They sat in the living room by the window. There were dusk. Flowers smelled from the window. Helen was wearing a white dress that showed through her shoulders and chest. The abbot, well-fed, but with a plump, smoothly shaven beard, a pleasant strong mouth and white hands folded meekly on his knees, sat close to Helen and with a thin smile on his lips, peacefully - admiring her beauty with a look from time to time looked at her face and expounded his opinion to their question. Helen smiled uneasily, looked at his curly hair, smooth-shaven, blackening, full cheeks, and waited every minute for a new turn in the conversation. But the abbe, although obviously enjoying the beauty and intimacy of his companion, was carried away by the skill of his craft.
The reasoning of the leader of conscience was as follows. In ignorance of the significance of what you were undertaking, you took a vow of marriage fidelity to a man who, on his part, having entered into marriage and not believing in the religious significance of marriage, committed blasphemy. This marriage did not have the double meaning it should have. But in spite of that, your vow bound you. You backed off from him. What did you do with it? Peche veniel or peche mortel? [A venial sin or a mortal sin?] Peche veniel, because you did an act without ill intent. If you now, in order to have children, would enter into a new marriage, then your sin could be forgiven. But the question again splits in two: the first ...
“But I think,” said Helen, suddenly bored, with her charming smile, “that I, having entered into the true religion, cannot be bound by what the false religion has imposed on me.
The directeur de conscience [Guardian of conscience] was amazed at this Columbus egg set before him with such simplicity. He admired the unexpected speed of his student's progress, but he could not give up his labors of intellectually constructed edifice of arguments.
- Entendons nous, comtesse, [Let's look at the matter, countess,] - he said with a smile and began to refute the reasoning of his spiritual daughter.
Helen understood that the matter was very simple and easy from a spiritual point of view, but that her leaders made difficulties only because they were afraid of how the secular authorities would look at this matter.
And as a result of this, Helen decided that it was necessary to prepare this matter in society. She aroused the jealousy of the old nobleman and told him the same thing as the first seeker, that is, she put the question in such a way that the only way to get rights to her was to marry her. The old important person was for the first minute as struck by this proposal to marry a living husband as the first young person; but Helen's unshakable conviction that it was as simple and natural as the marriage of a girl had an effect on him. If even the slightest sign of hesitation, shame or secrecy in Helen herself were noticeable, then her case would undoubtedly have been lost; but not only were there no signs of secrecy and shame, but, on the contrary, she told her close friends (and this was the whole of Petersburg) with simplicity and good-natured naivety that both the prince and the nobleman had made an offer to her and that she loved both and was afraid to upset him. and another.
A rumor instantly spread throughout Petersburg, not that Helen wanted to divorce her husband (if this rumor spread, very many would rebel against such an illegal intention), but a rumor spread directly that the unfortunate, interesting Helen was at a loss about which of the two she should marry. The question was no longer to what extent this was possible, but only which party was more profitable and how the court would look at it. There were indeed some inveterate people who did not know how to rise to the height of the question and saw in this plan a desecration of the sacrament of marriage; but there were few of them, and they were silent, while most were interested in questions about the happiness that befell Helen, and what choice is better. They didn’t talk about whether it’s good or bad to marry a living husband, because this question, obviously, had already been resolved for people smarter than you and me (as they said) and to doubt the correctness of the solution of the issue meant to risk showing their stupidity and inability live in the light.
Only Marya Dmitrievna Akhrosimova, who came to St. Petersburg that summer to meet with one of her sons, allowed herself to express her opinion, contrary to public opinion, directly. Meeting Helen at the ball, Marya Dmitrievna stopped her in the middle of the hall and, in the general silence, said to her in her rough voice:
- You have started getting married from a living husband. Do you think you've come up with something new? Beware, mother. It's been invented for a long time. In all ... ... they do it that way. - And with these words, Marya Dmitrievna, with her usual formidable gesture, rolling up her wide sleeves and looking around sternly, passed through the room.
Although they were afraid of her, Marya Dmitrievna was looked upon in Petersburg as a cracker, and therefore, from the words spoken by her, they noticed only a rude word and repeated it in a whisper to each other, assuming that this word contained all the salt of what was said.
Prince Vasily, who lately had especially often forgotten what he said, and repeated the same thing a hundred times, said every time he happened to see his daughter.
- Helene, j "ai un mot a vous dire," he told her, taking her aside and pulling her hand down. - J "ai eu vent de certains projets relatifs a ... Vous savez. Eh bien, ma chere enfant, vous savez que mon c?ur de pere se rejouit do vous savoir… Vous avez tant souffert… Mais, chere enfant… ne consultez que votre c?ur. C "est tout ce que je vous dis. [Helen, I need to tell you something. I heard about some kinds of ... you know. Well, my dear child, you know that your father's heart rejoices that you ... You endured so much... But, dear child... Do as your heart tells you. That's my whole advice.] And, always concealing the same excitement, he pressed his cheek to his daughter's cheek and walked away.
Bilibin, who has not lost his reputation as the smartest person and was Helen's disinterested friend, one of those friends that brilliant women always have, friends of men who can never turn into the role of lovers, Bilibin once in a petit comite [small intimate circle] said to his friend Helen view of the whole thing.
In 1237, at the beginning of winters, a terrible danger began to rapidly approach Russia from the northeast. Almost right next to the Russian borders, huge hordes of the Mongol-Tatar horde crept up. It was this historical battle that played an important role in the end of the reign of Prince Vladimir.
The Mongols dealt their first blow to the lands of Ryazan. After the Mongol horde defeated the local princely squad in the open field, they successfully captured the capital city. All people were completely ruined. After that, the Mongol invaders decided to move to the northern lands. They successfully and without great losses were able to take Kolomna and then Moscow itself. Detachments of the Mongol riders quickly decided to head to the deepest lands of Russia. On their way, as paths, they used the mouths of the river, which became hard from frost.
When the Great Prince of Vladimir named Yuri Vsevolodovich learned the news that Moscow and Kolomna now belong to the Mongol invaders, he decided to punish the enemy and push him back to his lands. To do this, he decides to gather a huge army of skilled soldiers. He left his possessions and, accompanied by his friends, went to the northern lands of his state. Along with this, he sent the fastest messengers to other principalities so that they would be warned of the enemy's invasion and help in the battle against him. He hoped that his brother Yaroslav, who ruled Kyiv, his nephew Alexander, who was the prince of Novgorod, and many other princes who were also his relatives, would help him with reinforcements. But he had less and less time to gather a huge army.
As soon as Yuri's squad moved away from Vladimir, Mongol soldiers approached him. The invaders settled near the walls of the principality when Yuri left it. In 1238, in early February, after long attempts and attacks, the Mongols managed to subdue the cities of Vladimir, which were considered the most important, and even the capital itself. But Prince Yuri had not yet been defeated. As long as people knew that he was alive, they could actively resist. Moreover, it is customary for Mongol warriors to capture or destroy the current ruler of the country, otherwise they cannot recognize their victory.
After Vladimir was taken, the invaders divided into three detachments. The main army followed Batu Khan towards Torzhok to the northwest. The second army decided to stay and start plundering the nearest settlements in the east of Vladimir. The rest began to make their way north.
And at the same time, Prince Yuri, along with his large army, settled down on a tributary of the City River. He was expecting quite impressive reinforcements. Yuri was waiting for the regiments of Yaroslav Prince of Kyiv to come to his aid. And the other brother was able to send only one squad to help Yuri. His nephews also had to help with troops. Only Svyatoslav and Konstantinovich managed to bring their friends, but the Kyiv troops could not have time. Novgorod troops did not respond to the call at all.
This whole battle could have gone completely differently if Yuri had been able to muster a larger army. But time was pressing on him. The number of his warriors reached ten thousand. This was a good result, because each principality sent only the most trained and professional fighters to help. If the battle had taken place on an open field, Yuri would have won a quick victory, but the Mongol invaders staged a surprise ambush for Yuri.
In 1238, on the City River, Yuri's detachment of three thousand soldiers was attacked by the Mongol-Tatars from a completely opposite side from which they were expected. The Mongols greatly outnumbered the detachment and won.
Yuriy and his nephew Vsevolod died in this battle. Only Svyatoslav, Vladimir and the third Konstantinovich could save their lives. The rest of Yuri's relatives were taken prisoner, and later also killed by the Mongol-Tatars.
Thus, in 1238, all the confidence of the people in their liberation from the invaders was dispelled. This defeat was partly due to the inept command of some princes. But this battle protected the Mongols from new invasions for several years, because the army was badly damaged.
Battle on the River City (Sitskaya battle) - a battle that took place on March 4, 1238 on the river. City between the troops of the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich and the Mongols under the leadership of Burundai, temnik Batu.
After the Mongols invaded the principality of Vladimir, Yuri left the capital of the principality and went into the forests near the City River, where the scattered remnants of the troops gathered. 1238, February 7 - Vladimir was taken. Yuri's wife and two of his sons died. The Mongols approached the City from the side of Uglich, which they had devastated.
The outcome of the battle was decided by the approach of a fresh Mongol army under the command of Batu. The Russian army was surrounded and almost completely killed. Prince Yuri was killed, his head was cut off and presented as a gift to Khan Batu. A crushing defeat in the Battle of the City River predetermined the fall of North-Eastern Russia under the rule of the Golden Horde, which lasted until 1480, until the famous standing of troops and Khan Akhmat on the Ugra.
Where did the battle take place?
The Battle of the City River entered Russian history as one of the most tragic and, at the same time, the most important. And despite its significance, this battle turns out to be one of the most mysterious. For almost two hundred years, historians have been arguing about the place where the battle took place. Some attribute it to the upper reaches of the City, others are sure that the battle took place closer to the mouth of the river. There is also a third version that combines both others - Russian troops stood along the entire length of the river, divided into separate regiments, and therefore it is impossible to talk about a specific place, because this place was, in fact, the entire City River. However, even this version cannot answer many questions.
Background. Battle
After Vladimir was taken, the main forces of the Mongol army moved to Tver and Torzhok, and the secondary forces, led by Burundai, were sent to the Volga cities.
1238, the beginning of March - the squads of several princes of northeastern Russia gathered on the Sit River under the leadership of Yuri Vsevolodovich. There were his brother Prince Pereyaslavl Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich and three nephews Vasilko, Vsevolod and Vladimir Konstantinovichi. At that time, the Grand Duke was camped on a tributary of the Mologa River, the City. He was waiting for help and could hope for serious reinforcements. However, the prince did not wait for the troops from Kyiv and Novgorod.
Burundai's troops operated throughout Mongolian military science. Long-range and deep reconnaissance, covert movement, the destruction of all kinds of informers - the lessons of Genghis Khan were not in vain. On March 3, Burundai's army discovered the Russian guard regiment of Governor Dorozha (about 3,000 people). After a short fierce battle, the Russians were defeated by superior enemy forces and almost completely destroyed. According to the legend, Dorozh himself managed to escape and, having galloped several tens of kilometers, reached the troops of the Grand Duke. “The Tatars bypassed us,” he managed to report. However, even if this was the case, Dorozh's message came late: the entire Mongol army was already sitting on the heels of the governor.
Russian troops had just begun to build up for defense, when at dawn on March 4, 1238, the Mongol cavalry fell upon her. Despite desperate resistance, the Russians could not withstand the blow. The Mongols were able to cut the Russian army, and then push it back to the river, where the last, tragic for the Russians, act of battle took place.
Bishop Kirill finds the headless body of Prince Yuri on the battlefield
Reasons for the defeat
It is possible that the defeat is also the fault of the prince himself, who sent part of his forces to help the ambush regiment, which was even further away and also attacked by another group of steppe dwellers. So the chronicles report and state that Yuri Vsevolodovich did not help the ambush regiment either, and weakened himself. Significant numerical superiority was on the side of the Mongol army.
And the main thing that the prince and his governors failed to do was the organization of a security system. Trying to avoid any clashes with the Mongols, they were completely unaware of their own movements. Intelligence and surveillance of the Mongolian troops was not organized. Therefore, the attack of the Mongols was a complete surprise for the Russians. Having delved into the swampy jungle, the Grand Duke himself set a trap, while a hopeless one in the land of completely swampy forest jungle.
Stele on the banks of the River City commemorating the battle of 1238
Results of the battle
The defeat of the Russian troops on the City River was complete. Almost all the warriors of the prince died or were captured, the prince himself fell in battle, later his severed head would be donated to Batu. His brother Svyatoslav (killed in captivity) and nephew Vsevolod died.
So the flower of the Russian army was destroyed on the City River. Russia suffered a severe defeat, which determined its difficult fate for many years. Thus, the battle on the City is an attempt to resist the impending Horde. The troops of the Mongol-Tatars captured the Vladimir-Suzdal principality.
The mystery of the Battle of Sit still exists, both in the reasons for the sudden secret encirclement of Prince Yuri's troops throughout almost the entire course of the City (more than 100 kilometers), and in the means and unsolved ways of Burundai's temnik. How did a huge mass of troops (about 40,000 horsemen - four darkness) imperceptibly approach and surround the Russian troops, passing through vast spaces on three sides?
The very official date of the Battle of Sit, March 4, 1238, is in doubt. The date March 4, 1238 is the exact date of the death of the Rostov prince Vasilko Konstantinovich, who was tortured to death in the Shirensky forest along with the crowd.
Referring to the historian S. M. Solovyov, who was engaged in determining the location of the Shiren forest, V. A. Chivilikhin in his book "Memory" indicates that the Shiren forest is now 24 kilometers from the city of Kashin and 40 kilometers from the city of Kalyazin on the river Shirenka, a tributary of the Medveditsa River, i.e., about 100 kilometers from the sites of the Sitsk battle. He believes that after the battle, Burundai walked to this forest for 3 days. Then, in his opinion, the Battle of Sit took place on March 1, 1238.
In our opinion, based on the same historical fact, the most likely date of the Battle of Sit is March 2, 1238, since Burundai was in a hurry to help the main forces of Batu Khan, who had already taken Tver on February 21, 1238 and stormed Torzhok for the second week. After that, Batu Khan had to go to Novgorod. In the event of an insufficiently justified delay, Burundai risked having his head cut off. The khan had no other punishments. Therefore, Burundai covered this path in 1.5-2 days.
However, according to S. A. Musin-Pushkin, expressed in his book "Essays on the Molozhsky District", the Shirensky forest was located on the border of the Uglich and Romanovo-Borisoglebsky counties, where, as he claims, there was a tract of Shirena and Vasili wasteland. However, on the territory of the Ramensky village council of the current Borisoglebsky district, the Shirenka river flows, and the village of Shirenye is located 10 kilometers on the territory of the Yaroslavl district. From the site of the Sitskaya battle to the Shirenka River (through Myshkin) is about 100 kilometers. Consequently, this detachment walked for two days. It follows that the Battle of Sit took place on March 2, 1238.
It should be noted that Burundai could not go to the Shirena tract or the Shirenka River, since this path would lead them to the southeast, and not to the west - to Torzhok and Novgorod. The prisoners with Prince Vasilko were led by another small detachment, which was instructed to take away the loot and the prisoners.
At present, on the issue of the place of the battle, scientists and local historians have basically come to a consensus, which is that in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Mogilitsy and Bozhonka there was a battle with the regiment of Dorozh (Dorofey Semenov); in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Ignatov, Stanilov, Yuryevsky, Krasny - the battle of the central regiment under the command of Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich himself (there were three villages on the Sit River with the same name "Ignatovo": near Sysoev, near Stanilov and next to Semenovsky); the battle is recognized in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Semenovskoye, Ignatovo, Knyaginino, Pokrovskoye, Velikoye Selo, but the scope of this battle is silent, because the monument to the dead soldiers stands opposite Ignatov, near Stanilov, which is not entirely fair.
Most scientists and local historians recognize two directions of movement of the Tatar detachments to the Sit. The first is from the headwaters of the City from Koya, the second is from the mouth of the City. But there is no firm opinion from where the detachments came to the mouth of the City and to Koy. For example, Semyon Musin-Pushkin claims that the detachment came to the mouth of the City from Galich, and to Stanilov - from Bezhetsk, through Red Hill.
Obviously, Batu Khan stopped his troops in the Ryazan - Kolomna - Moscow - Vladimir region for a thorough and deep reconnaissance of the routes to Rostov - Yaroslavl - Mologa - Sit; to Rostov - Uglich - Coy - Resurrection; to Uglich - Myshkin - Nekouz - Latskoe - Semenovskoye. Plans were carefully developed to capture Pereyaslavl, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Tver, Torzhok, Vologda, Galich (which they could not take) and the Battle of Sit. There were other tasks, for example, fodder for about 300,000 horses and food for more than 100,000 riders, etc.
Taking Vladimir on February 7, 1238, Batu sent a detachment, possibly detachments, to defeat and destroy Suzdal and other weaker cities - to Yuryevets, Dmitrov, Kostroma, while simultaneously entrusting them with the function of collecting and escorting the loot, capturing and escorting prisoners to Tver and Torzhok for use in the construction of structures for storming the fortress walls and filling up the ditches with their corpses, as well as convoying slaves for the slave trade and using them in the Horde.
The main forces of Batu, passing Yuryev-Polsky, attacked and destroyed within five days, Pereslavl-Zalessky. Having covered a distance of 205 kilometers in two and a half days, they began to storm Tver.
The battle of Sit will take place after the capture of Tver on March 2, 1238 (the official date is March 4, 1238). That is why Prince Yuri expected an attack by the Tatar-Mongols from Tver, through Bezhetsk and Red Hill along the shortest path. Yuri mistakenly believed that Batu had all his strength in Tver and Torzhok. You can reproach Prince Yuri for the lack of long-range reconnaissance in the southern and southeastern directions. Some chronicles note that Yuri's guards overslept the enemy.
From the foregoing, one more important conclusion can be drawn, namely, the main forces of Batu Khan did not participate in the Sit battle, and could not participate, since at that time they were conducting the most difficult, two-week assault on Torzhok. They did not have time to participate in the assault on Rostov the Great and Suzdal. There were other units there.
An interesting conclusion about the speed of movement of Batu Khan, It makes it possible to determine the approximate timing of the capture of other cities. It turns out that the average speed of their movement was about 80 kilometers per day. This is the maximum possible speed in winter. Obviously, the steppes are accustomed to rest in the saddle.
For the assault and capture of Rostov the Great, Yaroslavl, Vologda, Galich and the defeat of the troops of Prince Yuri, Batu Khan had to send strong detachments, at least five tumens (tumen is equal to darkness), that is, 50,000 horsemen, under the general command of Burundai. Rostov was taken on February 20, 1238, then the detachment under the general command of Burundai was divided: part of it went to Yaroslavl; at the head of the main forces, Burundai went to Uglich, where he further divided his forces, forming two (first and second) operational detachments to attack the Sit. The third operational detachment to attack the troops of Prince Yuri from the north and northeast was the Yaroslavl detachment (about one darkness). The first operational detachment (two darknesses) was commanded by Burundai himself, going from Uglich up the Voroksa River to Koya, then to the village. Voskresenskoye to the City, the Second went from Uglich to Myshkin - Nekouz - Latskoye - Semenovskoye, with a detachment in Nekouz of a smaller part of the detachment to Stanilovo. The Yaroslavl (third) operational detachment went along the Volga, the Mologa River to the mouths of the City and Udrusa rivers.
It is on the borders of Uglich and Yaroslavl that we are approaching the beginning of unraveling the mystery of the secret encirclement of all three detachments of Prince Yuri, individually stretched over 100 kilometers by the beginning of the battle in the City, with small guard detachments advanced along the western coast and, presumably, with a reserve regiment on on the eastern bank between Semyonovsky and Krasny, as well as detachments guarding convoys in Semenovsky, Knyaginin and on the left bank in Veliky Selo (between Pokrovsky and Breitovo).
The solution to the mystery of the secrecy of the environment lies in the fact that Burundai, in contrast to the noisy pogroms, arson and robbery by the main forces of Batu Khan, used the tactics of covert passages at night with the creation of a regime of absolute non-penetration of refugees, heralds and scouts to the Sit, as well as small detachments, marching to Prince Yuri. And the pogroms of all the villages of these regions, with the complete destruction of the villages, the massacre of people and the withdrawal of those who accidentally remained prisoners, were after the battle.
Obviously, a deep massive covert reconnaissance was carried out along all roads and paths, with the capture of "tongues". In addition to intelligence, a regime was created to isolate the entire City area from the outside world. Moreover, the secret outposts of the Tatar-Mongols, which penetrated at night along all roads and paths, were obviously echeloned, otherwise at least one hero would have broken into the camp of Prince Yuri to report the danger.
Thus, the first operational detachment of Burundai secretly concentrated near the village of Voskresensky, and the Yaroslavl detachment in the forest on the left bank of the Mologa above the village of Vetrina, in the area of the later built village of Penye (now in the flood zone). The second operational detachment, separated from the detachment of Burundai in Uglich and heading through Myshkin - Nekouz - partly to Stanilov, but mainly to the Semenovsky convoys, also approached secretly. The path was closer to this detachment: to Stanilov - 71 kilometers, and through Latskoye to Semenovsky - 113 kilometers.
Timur-Len wrote in detail about the use of the "raid" tactics by the Tatar-Mongols. Its use in the Sith battle is confirmed by many chronicles and recognized by all researchers.
By the beginning of the battle, the Russian regiments were located in the following order. The first, a 3,000-strong cavalry regiment led by voivode Dorozh, was located in the upper reaches of the City, in the area of the villages of Mogilitsa and Bozhonka, with the aim of timely detection (reconnaissance) of the enemy and oncoming combat with his advanced detachment.
The second - the central detachment - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Ignatovo - Stanilovo - Yuryevskoye - Krasnoe. There was the camp of the commander, Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich, with positions equipped for battle, with carts in the area of the third regiment.
The third detachment (regiment of the right hand) - in the area of \u200b\u200bSemenovsky, Ignatov (next to Semenovsky), Petrovsky, St. Merzleev and Veliky Selo, which is now gone. The tasks of the detachment are to ensure the northern flank of the Russian troops and participate in the main battle. In accordance with the tactics of the Russian troops of that time, there should also be a reserve (ambush) regiment. The reserve regiment of Prince Yuri, most likely, was placed on the east bank of the City, since Yuri considered it safe (he didn’t even lead the wiring towards the east), or rather between Semenovsky and Krasny, so that during the battle the regiment could go to the rescue both in the camp Yuri, and to the northern regiment.
All three detachments by the time of the battle were stretched over a distance of more than 100 kilometers. Burundai, having gone out to the City, knew exactly the location of these detachments. Both from his reconnaissance and from the prisoners, he also learned about the passage of the Dorozh regiment in the upper reaches of the City past the village of Voskresenskoye, where he went, waiting for the meeting of Batu's advance detachment from Bezhetsk, for he, like Yuri, believed that all enemy forces were in Tver and Torzhok.
So, having gone to the City near the village of Voskresenskoye, Burundai, in pursuit of Dorozh, sent a strong detachment (about one darkness) to destroy him near the villages of Mogilitsy, Bozhonki and others. This detachment smashed, cut and burned everything in its path, because there was nothing to hide.
That is why for a long time many scientists and local historians, including S.A. Musin-Pushkin, had the opinion that the Tatar-Mongols came from the west - from Bezhetsk through Red Hill. In fact, the main forces of Burundai went from Voskresensky, down the City.
The second encirclement detachment, presumably, was sent by Burundai to the mouth of the Vereksa River, 5-8 kilometers from Voskresensky, then up along it, to the Kovalevsky Creek and further north, to join the northern third encirclement detachment in order to close the encirclement ring.
The third, northern detachment of the encirclement, just mentioned, separated, as one might assume, from the Yaroslavl operational detachment when approaching the mouth of the City River and rushed further up the Mologa (13 kilometers higher) to the fortified settlement of Old Kholopye. Much later, c. Borisogleb with the estate of Musin-Pushkin. The detachment took Staroe Kholopye, went up the Udruse River, scattered through the villages up to Suminsky, and through Novinka, Krutets, Windmill, closing the encirclement, together with the second detachment rushed through Fedorkovo to Velikoye Selo, Turbanovo, Staroe Merzleevo, and from Khalev to Pokrovskoe. This is how, in my opinion, the encirclement of Prince Yuri's troops should have taken place. Such a scheme of "raid" does not contradict the chronicles, it is confirmed by folk traditions of all these places, by separate conclusions of scientists and local historians.
Now you can imagine the entire course of the Sith battle. Since all the detachments of Burundai approached without haste, covertly, and their actions were agreed in advance, there were no large time intervals between battles in different places. However, the first battle should be considered the defeat of the three thousandth Dorozh regiment at night, in the morning, on March 2, 1238. It must be assumed that the attack on him was made when his main part was in the peasant huts of the villages of Mogilitsy, Bozhonki and others, because Prince Yuri and Dorozh had been waiting for the attack for 8 days.
Naturally, for many days Dorozh could not keep the regiment in the saddle, having warm huts. Hundreds, but rather dozens of riders guarded the western directions. Dorozh considered his rear to be safe. Villages with Russian soldiers were simultaneously surrounded. A mortal battle began near the huts.
Russian soldiers jumping out of the huts were chopped down near the doors and windows. Very few managed to break out of the encirclement. It was a fierce battle. Voivode Dorozh, who had jumped to Prince Yuri, reported: "Prince, the Tatars have already bypassed us ... We were waiting for them from Bezhetsk, and they came from Koy."
Having passed the deserted lowland area of the mouth of the City, the Yaroslavl detachment attacked the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages: Cherkasovo, Ivan-Svyatoy, Breitovo, Ostryakovka and others.
Simultaneously with the offensive from the mouth of the City, the second operational (Nekouz) detachment of Burundai attacked the carts in Knyaginin and Semenovsky and began to smash their fortifications (according to legend, there was a monastery in Semenovsky). This Nekouz detachment had discovered the ambush regiment earlier and attacked it with the main force. The ambush failed. The reserve regiment was the first after the Dorozha regiment to take a hit while moving to the aid of the village of Semenovsky. The battle flared up. Perhaps Prince Yuri gave the command, but rather, the commander of the third regiment of the right hand himself sent part of his soldiers to help Semenovsky through the Sit. The battle became fierce near the village of Ignatovo (near Semenovsky).
At this time, the third (northern) encirclement detachment attacked the Great Village, surrounded it and destroyed it along with the people (the Great Village did not revive), and then hit the regiment of the right hand in the village. Pokrovsky and began to push the soldiers from the shore to the ice of the City. From the other side, from Knyaginino, Semenovsky and the nearby village of Ignatovo, they also began to push Russian soldiers onto the ice of the City. Prince Yuri supposedly had about 15,000 soldiers, more than half of which were poorly trained militias. The peasants also participated in the battle, but they were at best with pitchforks and ordinary axes.
Burundai had at least forty thousand horsemen in all the detachments participating in the battle of Sit. He brought about two darknesses to Voskresensky in the City. About one darkness was the second (Nekouz) operational detachment and about one darkness was in the third (Yaroslavl) detachment.
The superior forces of Burundai surrounded the Russian troops in parts, squeezing the encirclement ring, and by the evening of the same day completely destroyed both regiments: the central one, led by Prince Yuri, in the Stanilovo - Yuryevskaya - Krasnoye region, and the northern regiment of the right hand, in the area Semenovskoe - Ignatovo - Pokrovskoe. Prince Yuri died in the village of Yuryevskaya.
In the region of Semenovskoye - Ignatovo - Pokrovskoye, the battle flared up earlier than in the very camp of Yuri in Stanilov, so the chroniclers may correctly assert that Yuri divided his troops, sending part to help the northern regiment, and thereby hastened his death. Therefore, it was here that the most fierce battle could have taken place, because the entire regiment of the right hand, the reserve regiment and part of the troops of the central regiment took part in it. Here, surrounded in parts by Russian soldiers from both banks, they were pushed back onto the ice of the City by superior forces, where so many fighters accumulated that the ice could not stand it and broke through.
There is a legend about a huge number of corpses on both sides in the ice breaks, they stopped the flow of the river, forming a dam. This place became known as "plotishcha".
The army of Burundai was so weakened in the Battle of Sit that this fact served as one of the reasons for Batu Khan's refusal to storm Novgorod the Great with a population of thirty-five thousand.
In conclusion, we can say: by the beginning of the battle, Prince Yuri had three combat line regiments at a considerable distance from each other and a reserve (ambush) regiment; to carry out the Sit operation and completely encircle the Russian troops, Burundai divided the army into three operational detachments and three encirclement detachments; the invasion of the Sit by all the detachments of Burundai was carried out secretly, in deep secrecy, all scouts, witnesses and small detachments approaching the City were destroyed.
The Sit battle took place in three places: in the area of the villages of Mogilitsy and Bozhonka (the battle of the Dorozh regiment); in the area of Stanilovo - Yuryevskaya - Ignatovo - Krasnoe (battle of the central regiment under the command of Prince Yuri); in the area of Semenovskoye - Ignatovo - Pokrovskoye (here, according to the assumption, there was the most fierce battle involving, in addition to the regiment of the right hand of the reserve regiment and part of the central regiment sent by Yuri to help).
Municipal educational institution
Beloselskaya secondary school
MOU Beloselskaya secondary school
Supervisor:
history teacher
MOU Beloselskaya secondary school
1. Introduction 3
2. "And byst slashing evil ..."
2.1. Why Sit? 4
2.2. Dispute over the location of the battle. Historiography of the issue. 4-12
2.3. Physical and geographical description of the City. 12-13
2.4. Possible routes of the Mongols to Sit and the reasons for their sudden attack
to the Russian army. 13-17
2.5. The location of the Russian army and its strength. 17-20
2.6. Plans of Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich. 20-21
2.7. Battle 22-23
3. Conclusion 24
4. References 25
5. Annex 26
1. INTRODUCTION
At the end of 1237, having captured and completely ruined Ryazan, Kolomna and Moscow, hordes of the Horde went to the throne city of Vladimir - the residence of the Grand Duke of Vladimir-Suzdal Yuri Vsevolodovich. The sad experience accumulated by that time in the defense of Russian cities besieged by numerically superior enemy forces led to the need to change the tactics of confronting foreign invaders, since it is much more difficult to defend in besieged wooden cities than in open areas. Therefore, Grand Duke Yuri, leaving his family in the city, left Vladimir at the end of 1237 to gather the Russian squads of North-Eastern Russia under his banner and become a barrier to the further advance of the Tatars.
The battle took place on March 4, 1238 on the Sit River. The Russian regiments were unable to provide organized resistance, especially since the Mongol-Tatars had a numerical superiority. Many Russian soldiers and the Grand Duke himself died in the battle.
It should be said that the battle on the City is still largely a mystery to historians. They do not have accurate information about the number of Russian and Tatar troops, about the consequences of the battle, there is still a dispute about the place of the battle. The unresolved nature of this problem is evidenced by the fact that at the moment there are two monuments in memory of this battle on the territory of different regions (Yaroslavl and Tver). It is very difficult to find the place of the battle, a very fleeting event, by archaeological methods. It was almost impossible to organize a funeral, especially to build mounds, in those conditions, and weapons, as a rule, were the usual military booty of the winners. It is possible that some of the dead were subsequently transported to cities for burial, some were buried on the spot, and some were left without burial. Considering that even the body of the Yaroslavl Prince Vsevolod was never found, what can we say about ordinary soldiers.
Objective: based on available sources, reconstruct the events of the Sith battle.
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to the following tasks:
§ study historical sources on this issue;
§ to analyze the physical and geographical features of the City to determine the most advantageous location of the Russian troops;
§ identify the possible ways of the Mongols to the Sit and the reasons for their covert attack on the Russian army;
§ put forward your version of the course of the Sith battle.
When meeting with the battle on the river. To sit with specialists, and even ordinary lovers of native history, a lot of questions arise. Some of them will never be answered, and historians are left with only speculation; The rest of the questions are still waiting to be resolved. The greatest probability of discovering new data arises during archaeological excavations, but since the collapse of the USSR, large-scale archaeological research has not been carried out. But in our days, the so-called “black archeology” is flourishing, as a result of which historical monuments are irrevocably destroyed, the most valuable cultural layers are violated, and with them the mystery of unraveling the mysteries of the past.
On the basis of chronicle sources and works of Russian historians, local historians, we will try to consider the main issues related to the Battle of Sit. The study of different points of view on this issue will allow you to form your own view of events. Unfortunately, almost no data on the battle has been preserved; they are limited to a few chronicle lines.
The battle did not receive proper coverage in Russian noble-bourgeois historiography. Even such a major historian as yov, only 10 lines are devoted to the battle on the City. Soviet historians have given little attention to this topic either. In works on the history of military art, literally 2-3 phrases are said. So in the capital work of Colonel E. Razin it says: "On the City River ... Vladimir squads tried to resist, but were surrounded and defeated on March 4, 1238."
The battle of Sit was studied in most detail by a major Soviet historian. In his works, he talks about the need for archaeological research. “Sit is still waiting for its researchers,” he writes.
2. "AND BE SHUTTER OF EVIL..."
2.1. WHY SIT?
The choice of the City River for the military camp by Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich was quite successful. Sit provided the Russian army with a number of important advantages. The places there are deaf, and the dense forests covered the prince from the direct blow of the Mongol cavalry, it was not easy to get here along the forest roads in winter, and he hoped to wait here for help from the brothers and northern cities. Forests covered the Grand Duke's camp from the flanks, and its narrow valley to some extent balanced the forces of the opponents, which was beneficial for the small Russian rati. The rugged and forested terrain also contributed, mainly to foot Russian soldiers, to repel the attacks of the horsemen of the steppes.
Yuri's camp, moreover, was connected by a large land road with Novgorod, covered by forests from the Mongol avant-gardes. On the ice of the Mologa, sleigh tracks went to the camp: from the south - from the Volga, and from the north from Beloozero. These roads ensured the arrival of reinforcements from the rich Volga and northern cities: Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Uglich, Ksnyatin, Tver, Kashin, Vologda, Veliky Ustyug, etc. Light ice roads made it possible to continuously provide the troops with food and fodder.
The military importance of the City was very significant. The threat from the north prevented Batu from disbanding his troops to "round up" the northeastern lands with small detachments, which allowed part of the Russian population to take refuge in the forests and flee beyond the Volga. The Mongols were forced to allocate up to half (or maybe more) of their troops, directly against the Grand Duke, as well as to blockade the City area. This significantly weakened the offensive in the main - Novgorod direction. For the same reason, the small town of Torzhok fought the Horde for two weeks, having neither a squad nor a prince. As a result, the Mongols lost a lot of time and effort, and Novgorod became inaccessible to them.
2.2. DISPUTE ABOUT THE PLACE OF THE BATTLE. HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE QUESTION
Our chronicles did not indicate the place of the battle, and this gave rise to a dispute between historians and local historians. Some of them (academician) claimed that the battle was within the villages of Bozhenki or Mogilitsy within the Tver region. Other historians (A. Preobrazhensky, -Pushkin) considered the place of the battle the village of Yuryevskoye and the village. Red within the Yaroslavl region. The place of death of Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich was also controversial.
Further study of the battle on the river. The city is associated with the use of archaeological materials. Historians, on the basis of these materials, tried to clarify the place of the camp of Yuri Vsevolodovich, the place of the battle; reconstruct the course of the battle using excavation data and local toponymy; check the annalistic information about the battle. Archaeological research in the City Basin, which lasted several decades, is an example of how, based on approximately the same source materials, researchers come to completely opposite conclusions.
In 1846 an article was published by the Colonel of the General Staff “On the art of war and the conquests of the Mongol-Tatars and the Central Asian peoples under Genghis Khan and Tamerlane”, in which he wrote about the campaign of Grand Duke Yuri: “Georgy from Vladimir should move to Tver, but, probably, the movement of the Mongols to Moscow and then sending a weak detachment of the Mongols to Torzhok, prevented him from following this road. And George was forced to rush along the northern routes leading from Vladimir through Uglich to Novgorod ... In all likelihood, the position of the Vladimir prince was on the border of the current Tver and Yaroslavl provinces. The troops of Batu, divided into detachments, after plundering the Vladimir principality, gradually approaching the west, through Tver and Yaroslavl, so unexpectedly bypassed the flanks of Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich that the patrol sent for reconnaissance, galloping, informed the prince that the Tatars had bypassed him and were close. The Grand Duke had barely begun to establish squads, when the Tatars appeared on the flank, attacked the troops of the Grand Duke and completely defeated them. Away from the positions about twenty versts to the north, there is the village of Mogilitsy, where legends about the great slaughter of the Russians by the Tatars on the Sit River still survive. There, probably, the Grand Duke was thrown back with a squad, and he died there ... "
1) the messages of the chronicles - Lavrentiev, Voskresenskaya, Novgorod, Vologda-Perm, Trinity, etc., as well as legends preserved by the people's memory are ignored. All of them unanimously say that the battle with the Mongols was on the Sit River itself, and not somewhere 20 miles from it.
2) The positions of Prince Yuri are placed where there are continuous forests and vast swamps, and there are almost no villages.
The conclusion suggests itself - the colonel's version is supported neither by knowledge of the geography of the river, nor by archaeological excavations, nor by agreement with sources (chronicles), i.e., scientific knowledge. Yuri Vsevolodovich needed a spacious place, with many villages, where he hoped to gather a large army.
The first of the historians who visited the river Sit was a famous scientist, academician. Wanting to establish the place of the battle, he in 1848. left for the Tver province, where, according to his information, a river flowed. He reached the village of Bozhenki, where, on the basis of inquiries from old-timers and a survey of barrow groups, he named the vicinity of Bozhenka in the upper reaches of the City as the place of the battle between the Grand Duke's regiments and the Mongols. He wrote about this as follows: “Approaching the village, I saw several burial mounds. So that's where it was - an unfortunate battle, or better to say, defeat. A large mound rises near the church itself, five sazhens high ... ”The local priest told Pogodin that, according to legend, the battle took place near the village of Bozhenki, and Prince Yuri was killed not far from here, near Sidorov Creek. Then the academician made an attempt to excavate a barrow in the cemetery near the church, but failed. Pogodin was satisfied with the information received from the priest: “Having found the village of Bozhenki, it was as if I lay down on my laurels and could not pay attention to anything.” Consequently, the village of Bozhenki was the first to be discovered by an academician. His authoritative word left its mark on historical literature and initiated a dispute about the place of the battle on the Sit River and the place of death of the Grand Duke. If academician Pogodin went down the river to Yuryevsky, Krasnoy, Lopatin, Pokrovsky, even Breitov and collected the legends and traditions preserved there, then he would have to think and not decide so quickly the question of the place of the battle and “not lie on the laurels”.
At the end of the winter of 1238. the entire course of the City River from the headwaters to the mouth was covered by military measures: mobilization, the movement of military detachments, outposts, food and fodder carts. During the attack of the Mongols, separate skirmishes took place in many places, watchmen died, detachments and retreating troops who did not have time to approach the main battlefield died. The few surviving local residents had the impression that the battle took place right near their village. As they say, “in battle, it seems to every soldier that the main blow is directed against him. Over time, new settlers came to the deserted Sit, generations changed, and with them, ideas about a distant event were transformed beyond recognition. A few centuries later, most of the villages already claimed the role of a "historical place". It is impossible not to take into account local legends, but some historians paid too much attention to them, which only confused the mysteries of the Sith battle. Oral traditions, "were", legends, stories are found in many in any ancient settlement in Russia. Often they are associated with local toponymy.
Yaroslavl local historians also expressed their idea of the place of the battle with the Mongols. A. Preobrazhensky, who surveyed the mounds of the City in 1853, provides interesting data on the remains of fortifications. On the left bank, "versts 12 from the village. Pokrovsky, and in the direct direction from the City River about eight versts", he discovered low embankments, and the interviewed peasants of neighboring villages indicated that "before, a small ditch was noticeable from embankment to embankment, so that the embankments with the ditch formed an oblong quadrangle." In addition, also on the left bank of the City, “two versts from the village of Pokrovsky”, there was “an earthen rampart more than 15 sazhens long, up to 3 sazhens high and about 7 sazhens at the sole”. Local residents told A. Preobrazhensky about the finds in the rampart and near it "human bones and ancient weapons." A. Preobrazhensky suggested that the battle was in the area of the villages of Pokrovskoye, Semyonovskoye, the village of Ignatovo within the Yaroslavl province. Preobrazhensky fortifications in the northern part of the modern Sitsky opolye are very remarkable. It is possible that a line of fortifications passed here, including those that covered the opole from the attack of the Mongols from the north. In the same "Ethnographic Collection" an article was placed, which spoke in support of A. Preobrazhensky, regarding the place of the battle. He refuted the opinion, which proved that Yuri Vsevolodovich camped on the Sit River at the turn of the Yaroslavl and Tver provinces and walked towards Bezhetsk. Referring to the chronicles, Nadezhdin pointed out the prince's path to Yaroslavl, and then the Volga and Mologa to the mouth of the Sit River, where he became a camp in the lower reaches. The place of the battle in the lower reaches of the river was confirmed by the fact that the body of the prince was picked up by Bishop Kirill of Rostov. After the departure of the Mongols, the bishop was returning from Beloozero, where he was hiding from the steppes. On the way back, he stopped at the Sit, found the body of the prince and brought him to Rostov. But he could do this only if the place of death was not far from the mouth of the river. The bishop could hardly reach the village of Bozhenki, which was located at a distance of about 100 km from the mouth of the river. This assumption Nadezhdin is unconvincing. The bishop, who abandoned his flock in a difficult moment, would be ready to go further Bozhenok in order to somehow rehabilitate his cowardice. the first suggested that near the villages of Bozhenki and Mogilitsy, within the Tver province, there was only a battle between the forward detachment of Dorozh with the Mongols, which Yuri sent to the “wires”, that is, to reconnaissance, but not the battle of the main forces. This version was quickly picked up by almost all subsequent explorers of the City.
In 1859 writes that grave mounds and various kinds of earthen fortifications were traced along the banks of the City from the mouth to the villages of Krasnoe and Bozhenki "with bardysh, arrows and other finds." In the vicinity of the village of Pokrovskoye, “earth towns” that had survived by the time of his trip were noted, where “according to local legend, Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich was killed.”
Of particular value are the archaeological excavations carried out in the City in the 60s. 19th century famous Yaroslavl local historian. He examined more than 20 mounds near the village of Pokrovskoye and left a detailed description of them. According to his observations, there were no mounds in the upper reaches of the City (including in the area of the villages of Bozhenki and Mogilitsy) up to the village of Stanilovo. The first group of 10 mounds was located on the right bank of the City, not far from the village. Pokrovsky, then all the mounds were located on the left bank of the City. Of the numerous mounds of the river (up to 200), the mound group on the left bank to the northeast of the village of Pokrovskoye is especially interesting. Nine mounds of this group are located on a low ledge. Which he considered the remnant of the settlement.
Twenty-four mounds near the village. Pokrovskoe, near the villages of Ignatovo and Merzleevo were excavated. The burials of a part of the mounds were lost, the description of the finds given suffers from brevity and insufficient accuracy, however, even in this form, the results of the excavations were very important. Sabaneev noted that some of the skeletons were found scattered, their limbs were separated even before burial (Ignatievsky Kurgan), on many skeletons “traces of edged weapons are very clearly visible; in some, the bones were chopped, in others the skulls bear clear traces of strong breaks and cuts, and, finally, in the third, rusty blades of small iron knives were found between the ribs.
The combat significance of the mounds was also confirmed by Sabaneyev by the fact that very few things were found with the skeletons, and part of the excavated mounds "belongs to the Tatars." It should be noted that some burial mounds (up to 10%) had an incorrect orientation, which is common during hasty burials in winter conditions. A similar phenomenon was noted during excavations at the cemetery of the victims of the Mongol pogrom in Staraya Ryazan. In addition, Sabaneev wrote that the mounds of the City (excavated near the village of Pokrovsky) are very similar in nature of burials and related material to the Vladimir mounds of the time of the Mongol invasion, excavated in 1866. (the so-called "Vladimir small group").
Based on an inspection of the area and questions from old-timers, Sabaneev wrote that “bones and remains of weapons are still found in the fields and washed out with water, but in the old days this happened much more often.” Sabaneev restores the picture of the battle in this form: the Tatars approached from the west, “by the Pereyaslav-Ksnyatinsky road through Kashin”, and in the “sources of the City there was only a skirmish of the forward detachment of Dorozh, and the main mass of the troops, taken by surprise in the camp, fled and littered with their corpses of the shore of the City up to the very mouth, where, when crossing the Mologa, she suffered a final defeat. An interesting point - how could an initially fleeing and defeated army finally be defeated on Mologa? And why did the Russians have to run along the river to the mouth, and not to the close and saving forest? The Mongols were faster than Russian warriors, especially on foot, and it was like death to run from the Mongols along a flat ice road. Sabaneev attributed the beginning of the battle to the Mikhalevsky mounds located on the Sit River near the village of Yuryevskoye and the village. Pokrovskoe. In 1866 the well-known Yaroslavl local historian appeared in the press. He used the material about the battle that had accumulated by that time and entered into polemics with Academician Pogodin, Colonel Ivanin and the archaeologist Gatsissky. In his speech, he called the area of Ignatovo and Yuryevskoye the place of the battle, where Prince Yuri was killed. In his opinion, in the area with. Bozhenki were the burial mounds of Dorozh warriors. In 1881, he opposed the characterization of the Sit barrows as having "combat significance". . He believed that traces of the camp of Yuri Vsevolodovich in the City could not be preserved at all. Since “at such a time of the year it is extremely inconvenient to become a camp, and it is absolutely impossible to make earthen trenches with the means of that time; therefore, it seems more likely to us that there was no camp at all, the troops were simply stationed in the villages. Arguing with, he argued that the mounds of the City belonged entirely to the X-XI centuries, and did not have a military origin, they were poured, according to Ivanovsky, "peaceful measure and all." Ivanovsky rejects obvious facts - the results of Sabaneev's excavations. With all the apparent persuasiveness (in total, Ivanovsky excavated about 150 mounds out of 250 that were available in the City), the data cannot refute the conclusions. First of all, Ivanovsky’s report does not indicate which groups of mounds were discussed; undoubtedly, in the City, among the hundreds of mounds, there were many earlier burials that were peaceful burials. A group of mounds near the village. Pokrovsky, excavated, was not mentioned at all in Ivanovsky's report, and indications of numerous finds of weapons and skeletons by local residents in the first half of the 19th century were not used. However, the publication of the results of the Ivanovsky excavations led to the fact that historians stopped connecting the City mounds and the remains of earthen fortifications with the battle and subsequently tried to clarify the place of the battle and its course solely on the materials of toponymy and local legends. So in 1886, based entirely on folk legends, he called the place of the battle the surroundings of the village of Ignatovo, and in 1889 - with. Bozhenki, and his only argument was that Bozhenki had some kind of “Batu trees”, known to local peasants.
About the place of the battle on the river. Sit spoke in the press and Nizhny Novgorod archaeologist. He, following the example of his teacher, himself in the late 80s. 19th century went to the Sit, unearthed a mound in the cemetery near the church with. Goddesses. Then he rode along the banks of the City to the very mouth. On the way from Bozhenok to the village of Lopatina, he dug up mounds, which, as it turned out, had nothing to do with the battle. These were the burials of the ancient inhabitants of the region - the Meryan tribes. By definition, his excavations were "purely ethnographic". He did not investigate the Intercession burial mounds and put "folk memory, legends and geographical names" as the basis for his further research. Local legend, recorded by Gatsissky, connects the battle with the surroundings of Bozhenok and “even accurately” determines the place where Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich died - on an island in a swampy swamp five versts from the village. Goddesses. The scheme of the battle, developed, looks like this: “The place of the battle is the vicinity of the village of Bozhenki; pursuit of the faltering Russian squads approximately to the villages of Stanilov and Yuryevsky. He repeats the same thing in his book “On Sundovik. In Zary. On the City, on the River”, published in 1890. In Nizhniy Novgorod.
In 1902 the book of the famous public figure of the Yaroslavl province, writer and local historian - Pushkin was published under the title "Essays of the Mologa district". In it, the author described the battle on the river. Sit. He knew the river and the villages along it well. Collected Musin-Pushkin and legends of the local population about the battle. In his opinion, Prince Yuri came to the Sit River along this path: Vladimir, Rostov, Uglich, Myshkin, Nekouz, Stanilovo, where he set up his camp.
The author admits that in the area of Bozhenok and Mogilits there were skirmishes between the advanced detachments of the Mongols and the regiment of Dorozh, and the battle itself was in the area of Stanilov. In this battle, according to Musin-Pushkin, the steppe inhabitants used a tactical technique called a horseshoe or roundup. It consists in the simultaneous capture of the flanks by cavalry and the encirclement of the enemy. At the same time, a large detachment of Mongols moved along the City from the side of Bezhetsk and Red Hill, and the other - along the Volga and Mologa. The latter, in the lower reaches of the Sit River, attacked the prince's carts, began to rob and burn them, and kill people. To repel the Tatars, the prince divided his army into two parts and thereby hastened his death. In the area of the village of Ignatovo, the fight was so fierce that the ice on the river broke, and a dam was formed from the corpses, which raised the water in the river. According to legend, this coast was called "ploshcha". Prince Yuri died, according to Musin-Pushkin, near the village of Yuryevskoye, where his body temporarily rested under a limestone slab.
The Musin-Pushkin version is vulnerable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the researcher ignores the chronicle, which directly states that the prince went to the Sit through Yaroslavl. Secondly, the attack of the Mongols from the mouth of the river and from the upper reaches (from the rear and front), if it took place, cannot be called a raid, that is, a complete encirclement of the enemy. Yury's flanks were covered by huge forests and swamps, so a "raid" in the classical sense of the word was impossible in the City. Thirdly, in early March, such a small river as the Sit could hardly break through. It is more likely that in the spring, when the river opened up, many corpses of dead soldiers accumulated near the “ploshches” - hence the name. Fourthly, Yuryevskoye, like hundreds of other villages bearing this name in Russia, probably had nothing to do with the Grand Duke, and owed its name to the founder of the village.
More pre-revolutionary historians did not deal with the issue of the place of the battle on the Sit River; in Soviet historiography, the events associated with the battle were not the subject of special research at all, with the exception of small articles of a local history nature.
In 1932-33. mounds on the City were examined by a detachment of the Middle Volga archaeological expedition AIMC under the leadership.
The report of this detachment states that “a number of barrow groups on the City River, examined in the 80s. of the last century by Ivanovsky, are now destroyed by excavation, many are plowed open. The materials of the expedition nevertheless note that the barrows on the City near the villages of Pokrovskoye, Semyonovskoye and Seminskoye and a number of barrows on the Sebli River gave “things of the late XII - early. XIII century". Unfortunately, the results of the archaeological work of this expedition are limited to this indication. Archaeological substantiation of the annalistic news about the battle on the City apparently did not attract the attention of scientists of the Middle Volga expedition. The non-systematic nature of the excavations, the lack of a complete description of the archaeological work in the City, the conflicting opinions of historians, the arguments of which are almost impossible to verify, the promotion of "folk memory" as the main source of research - cause difficulties in summing up. As the historian says: “Only new archaeological work on the City River, carried out by modern scientific methods, can bring clarity to this issue. Meanwhile, there is almost no material of this kind.
Since 1933 no more scientific archaeological work was carried out. Only "black archaeologists" and local "amateurs" are active, causing great damage to the cause of uncovering the secrets of the Sith battle. Every year the field for scientific methods is shrinking more and more. But sometimes the finds are accidental. So in the 1960s. local historian from Rostov in his article "The Tragedy of the Russian Land" mentions the discovery in the village of Ivanovskaya during earthworks of a burial place in which about 30 skulls and pieces of chain mail, axes, swords and other finds were found. According to the opinion, the Dorozh detachment was sent to the area of the village of Bozhenki to stop the Mongols from reaching the Sit River from the side of Bezhetsky Verkh. In the forest surrounding Bozhenki, there may have been a clearing through which the steppes could penetrate. It was ordered to be blocked by Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich. This version is probably closer to the truth, but the location of the clearing near Bozhenki is controversial. The local historian was inclined to believe that the main battle took place near the village of Yuryevskoye. In 1963, in his article “In the wake of the battle with the Tatar-Mongols on the Sit River in 1238,” he wrote: “About 45-47 years ago, I heard from a local priest, a very old man, that prayers to Prince Yuri were held annually in the Yuryevskaya chapel, and this supposedly made it possible to preserve to this day the place of the temporary burial place of Prince Yuri. Under the influence of this legend, one gets the impression that the main battle between the Russians and the Tatars in the City took place precisely in the vicinity of Yuryevsky. Kudryavtsev also connects Dorozha’s battle with the Mongols with the legend: “The authenticity of the legend is also confirmed by the rite of “commemoration of the dead”, which was observed on the mounds in the recent past, in the memory of our contemporaries. The rite was observed on March 4, that is, on the day of the battle in the City. Information about this rite was obtained by Kudryavtsev from a Rostov local historian. Interesting information about a certain stone with an inscription found in Yuryevsky. “The place of his () temporary burial on the battlefield is marked by a dilapidated chapel, in which the remains of a limestone tombstone with some kind of inscription in Slavic script are stored. The slab is broken into several pieces, and some of them are lost. Because of this, it is difficult to establish the text of the inscription. In general, Kudryavtsev continues the traditions of researchers of the 19th - early 20th centuries, making references to the "folk memory", as well as to toponymic local historians.
The well-known writer V. Chivilikhin does not specify the place of the battle, but still believes that “in the area of the present villages of Pokrovsky, Stanilov and Yuryevsky, Yuri Vsevolodovich settled in a camp, preparing for a partisan struggle - the only possibility of resistance ... "
In this case, V. Chivilikhin was clearly carried away. The whole princely family was in Vladimir, and the capital was looking forward to help from Yuri Vsevolodovich; under such conditions, partisan struggle was out of the question. In addition, partisanship has always been the business of the people, and not of princes or kings.
The most original version was put forward by local historian Sergei Alekseevich Ershov, a retired captain of the second rank. He believes that the Russian troops were located at the beginning of the battle along the City River, at a distance of more than 100 km, and almost all of this space was in full swing. In his article, Ershov writes: “The Sitsk battle took place in three places: in the area of the villages of Mogilitsy and Bozhonka (the battle of the Dorozh regiment); in the area of Stanilovo - Yuryevskoye, Ignatovo - Krasnoye (battle of the central regiment under the command of Prince Yuri); in the Semyonovskoye - Ignatovo - Pokrovskoye area. Here, according to the assumption, there was the most fierce battle with participation in it, except for the regiment of the right hand of the reserve regiment and part of the central regiment sent by Yuri to help.
The local historian placed a small Russian army on a vast territory, where it should have simply dissolved.
The results that can be summed up when summarizing the archaeological, ethnographic and local history material boil down to the fact that there really was a big battle on the Sit River, and this is confirmed by chronicle information. At the same time, the geography of the finds of the remnants of weapons and human bones suggests that the battle took place on the territory of the “Sit opolye”, which is located in the middle reaches of the Sit River. The skeletons with traces of cold weapons and related weapons found during excavations of the mounds prove that the village of Pokrovskoye was one of the centers of the battle. Only near this village were the remains of warriors of the 13th century found in barrows. That is why one of the modern historians considers the area of the village of Pokrovsky to be the center of the battle. Intercession mounds, as well as the remains of a settlement with traces of fortifications, noted by A. Preobrazhensky, convincingly prove that a battle was in full swing in this area, and if not all, then a significant part of it. The only settlement found in the City near Pokrovsky stubbornly hints at the location of the grand duke's camp (or headquarters). Objections about the impossibility of building a fortified camp in winter conditions are not convincing enough, since Yuri Vsevolodovich could also use the previously existing settlement for his camp. Also, the local population and militias could be involved in the construction of fortifications.
Almost all known finds of bones and weapons come from the villages of Pokrovskoye (mounds), Ignatovo (mounds), Ivanovskoye (30 skeletons), Semyonovskoe, Bailovskoe. All these villages are located on the territory of the so-called Sitsky opolye. -Markov points to this opole stream with the eloquent name "Military". A more complete description of the battle on the City River is difficult to give without the involvement of new archaeological materials. This would be helped by a re-examination of the surviving burial mounds, as well as settlements, in order to determine which of them existed at the time of the battle. It is possible that many villages arose in subsequent centuries, introducing toponymic confusion with their names. Excavations of the settlement could also give interesting results. The most promising area for archaeologists remains the "Sitskoe opolye". In the meantime, after you can say: "Sit is still waiting for its researchers."
2.3. PHYSICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CITY
In determining the location of the battle on the Sit River, the study of the physical and geographical features of the river can help. The Sit River is small, originates in the forests, 20 km east of the Novgorod city of Bezhetsk (now in the Tver region), near the village of Saburovo. The length of the river is 153 km, the Yaroslavl region accounts for 98 km, i.e. 64%. The Sit River flows in various physical and geographical conditions, which had a significant impact on the structure of its valley. Based on the features of the terrain, the river can be divided into three sections. The first is the upper course of the river. It is located in Bezhetsky Verkh, a rather high place. Its relief is hilly and flat. Absolute height - 172-225m. One of the high points, located 6-7 km from the source of the river, is called "Hill", its height is 225 m. The width of the river at the source is about 1m, and only at the border, between the upper and middle sections, the width of the river becomes 10-12m. The river is shallow. The valley is developed only in the lower part of the segment, there is a floodplain and the first terrace above the floodplain. The upper reaches of the City are cut off from the middle and lower reaches of the river by forests and marshes, called Swamp. From the depths of swamps and forests, from the north, the river of the same name, the Bolotea, approaches the riverbed of the City. Part of the swamps of the Bolotei did not freeze even in winter.
The second section starts from the village of Bolshie Smenki. At 25-30km. from the sources, the Sit enters a large lowland. Its length is 40 km., Width - 30 m. The relief is flat, the height above sea level is 130-136m. In some places there are small hills with gentle slopes and singly elongated manes. A significant part of the lowland is occupied by vast swamps. These include Mokeikha, Solodikha, Zybinskoe and others. The floodplain of the river here is well developed and during the flood it is widely flooded with water. Within the lowland, the river has tributaries: Obluchye, Bolotya, Vereksa, Moshnaya, Voronovka. The Sit River from the mouth of Bolotei to the village of Filippovo flows along an artificial channel dug in the 60s. XX century Its length is 12 km. Such a large hydrotechnical work is associated with the extraction of peat in the swamps of the Sitskaya lowland.
The third section is the lower reaches of the river. Outside the Sitskaya lowland, near the village of Kolegaeva, the Sit makes a sharp turn and goes strictly to the north. A little higher than this village, it enters the region of the moraine plain. Its relief is hilly, the height ranges from 148-182m. The river valley in this segment is not wide when compared with the valleys of other Yaroslavl rivers - Ustya, Kotorosl. Its width ranges from 340-375m. The slopes of the bedrock bank are steep, the modern floodplain and the terrace above the floodplain are poorly developed. The width of the river at Kolegaev is 26m, Shcherbinin - 40m, Pravdin - 40m, Stanilov - 48m, Nazarov - 55m. In a number of places the riverbed has an extension reaching 70-80m. In this section, 23 rivers and several streams flow into the river. Most of them (23) are left-bank. In addition, the primary banks of the river are significantly pitted with deep ravines. The lower reaches of the Sit are very picturesque. The valley of the middle and lower City is framed on the west and east by mighty forests full of swamps, and to this day it is hardly passable. The upper reaches of the river and its lower course were quite densely populated even in the distant past. This is evidenced by the presence of a large number of burial mounds located on the banks of this river. The Finno-Ugric peoples, who inhabited this area from the 6th - 7th centuries, were buried in them. n. e. Later, the Slavs appeared here, who were attracted by fertile lands, an abundance of animals in the forests, fish in the river, as well as the presence of a good waterway - the City, connecting the population with the largest waterway - the Volga. Small villages and villages cling to the riverbed of the City. Closer to the lower reaches, near the mouth of the left tributary of the City - the Kamenka River, the City valley pushes the forest apart and forms a small opole about 10 km. in diameter. Free from forests and swamps, the lands of the opolye were densely built up with villages of local residents - Sitskars.
Sitskari are not numerous and until recently were famous for carpentry and crafts for the manufacture of river boats or longboats. Sitskari's speech is also peculiar. Its features indicate the population of the City valley as a separate group of Slavs in the East Slavic massif of the population of the upper Volga. It is not known what tribes they came from - perhaps from the Slovenes of Novgorod or from the Krivichi of the Polotsk land (now Belarus). The upper course of the river, crossing the Bezhetsky top, belonged to the possessions of Novgorod the Great. Below the shifting massif of Bolotei, to the northeast, along the City valley, there were lands that already belonged to the Vladimir-Suzdal, and later to the Uglich princes. The border between them passed along the Sitskaya lowland, the Swamp divided the principalities. In this area there is a village with an eloquent name - Sheldomez (went to the boundary). A small village in the 13th century may have served as a landmark. The village of Bozhenki adjoined the Bezhetsky top and therefore belonged to Novgorod.
Of course, he took into account that the army of the Mongols was cavalry, and the Russian rati were mostly on foot and, moreover, small. To counter the cavalry, it was necessary to choose a place with rugged terrain and forested, so that the Mongols were forced to fight dismounted. Such a place that made the actions of the Horde cavalry difficult was only the lower Sit with its previously noted features. It was easy to build various kinds of defensive structures here, especially notches. For these purposes, it was possible to mobilize the local population. On the upper City, thanks to the flat terrain, the Mongols could fight on horseback and maneuver quite freely, which immediately put the small Russian army at an disadvantage. Appropriate Russian militias had to be placed somewhere and organized from them combat units - regiments. For this, again, the lower Sit was ideally suited with its opole and numerous villages. This area, moreover, had no side roads, and the enemy could attack only from the mouth or upper reaches of the City, which facilitated the defensive tasks of the Russian army. The most convenient places for repelling the onslaught of a superior enemy were sections of the river below Stanilov near the village of Yuryevskoye, where the forests came close to the City. In the north, such a place was with. Storozhevo, which locked the opole from the side of the river mouth. It made no sense to stretch the communications of the Russian troops further, and it was even dangerous, because, starting from Stanilov, the troops became vulnerable to flank attacks. An analysis of the physical and geographical features of the river, as well as archaeological research, confirms the point of view of those historians who consider the Lower Sit to be the site of the battle.
2.4. POSSIBLE WAYS OF THE MONGOLS AND THE REASONS FOR THEIR SUDDEN ATTACK ON THE RUSSIAN ARMY
Most researchers recognize three possible directions of movement of the Mongols to the Sit: the first - from the upper reaches of the City, from Bezhetsk; the second is from the mouth of the City; the third - from Uglich. In this case, the routes are assumed in various variations. For example, Semyon Musin-Pushkin believed that a detachment of Mongols came to the mouth of the City from Galich along the Volga and Mologa, and to Stanilov from Bezhetsk, through Red Hill, that is, the Horde went two ways. Gudz-Markov speaks only about the southern route of the Mongols: “But the enemy approached from the south, from the upper reaches of the City. Hopes for forests and swamps that do not freeze in winter did not come true. believed that the Mongols approached the area where the Russian troops were located from the west, by the Pereyaslav-Ksnyatinsky road through Kashin, and then by the upper reaches of the City.
As you know, after the capture of Vladimir, the Mongols were divided into several detachments. South of the City, the main grouping of the Mongols was busy taking the cities of Voloka-Lamsky, Tver, Torzhok, and others, where they met stubborn resistance and clearly lacked strength. This is evidenced by the two-week defense of Torzhok, not the strongest city, which, moreover, defended itself on its own without the help of Novgorod. The weakened grouping of the Mongols was located on the borders of the powerful Novgorod land and could expect a large and fresh Russian army to come out against them. Given the dispersion of the Horde forces, the battle with a strong Novgorod army had a certain risk. Under such conditions, further fragmentation of the Mongol army was inexpedient and even dangerous. Burundai, in accordance with the tactics of the steppe, sought to take the Russian squad by surprise, while the movement of the aerial and populated road through Bezhetsk and beyond was not suitable for a sudden strike.
The Volga and Mologa, as powerful and lively tracks, were just as little suitable for a sudden blow.
Against the rear strike from the mouth of the City, the fact that the Russian soldiers retreated and fled to the north after the defeat, which is also confirmed by archaeological finds. A bold and original version of the encirclement of Russian troops was put forward by a local historian. He was born in the City, was also a military man, and his point of view is very interesting. Ershov placed Russian regiments at a distance of more than 100 km. along the City River with guard detachments along the west bank. The local historian suggests that the Mongols simultaneously reached Voskresensk, Semyonovsky and Stanilov. At the same time, the forward regiment of Dorozh was immediately cut off and destroyed, the battle formation of the Russians was cut in two places, and the Yaroslavl group came out to the rear, and in turn surrounded the troops of Yuri Vsevolodovich. Such an operation, perhaps, would be worthy of modern general staffs with the most accurate maps and other special equipment. The encirclement of Russian troops in such a range is determined by the ethnographer, characteristic of the Mongols, by the round-up tactics. It is difficult to agree with this. As noted earlier, the Sit does not flow along the steppe, but along a huge wooded and swampy region with very few roads, which were built in the 13th century. was less than now. In pre-Mongol times, the Russian population preferred to settle closer to navigable rivers and large lakes, since there was then an excess in them for the small population of Russia. The population began to deepen into the massifs of forests and swamps later, after the intensification of the devastating raids of the steppes. The severity of feudal requisitions also began to drive farmers into remote places where they could hide from the princely and boyar administration, at least for a while. Most of the villages and villages arose only in the XVIII-XIX centuries, when there was a significant increase in the population, which no longer had enough land in their usual habitats. For pre-Mongol Russia, the locations of Nekouz, Latskoye and many other modern villages were unattractive because of their remoteness from rivers, and hence from convenient roads and fisheries. When studying the events of the 13th century, one should be careful about the toponymy of the 20th century. Historical science would be helped by archaeological research in the villages of the Sit Valley, which would make it possible to find out the time of their occurrence. In addition to dubious roads, in his work for the movement of the Mongolian detachments he indicates small rivers and streams, of little use for the movement of the cavalry. Forests, swamps, snow could not allow the Mongol detachments to surround the Russian troops with the precision of a clockwork. Moreover, any accident - a notch or an ambush - could disrupt the maneuver and even be disastrous for the Mongols. In the forest, the steppes lost their mobility, deep snow was a serious obstacle for the cavalry. In such unfavorable conditions, the division of the Horde into separate detachments over a vast territory could give a significant advantage to the Russian squads. Prince Yuri could destroy the Mongol forces in parts. The Grand Duke would not have chosen Sit for his camp if it had been convenient for numerous flank attacks.
Burundai knew about this and counted, therefore, only on a sudden and massive strike of his entire corps in favorable conditions, which only the Sitskoye field provided.
suggests that the Mongols destroyed the guard regiment, attacked from the rear, fronts, flanks, and also cut the Russian disposition in two places. All this, according to the local historian, happened simultaneously. But could it be? It is known that in battles, troops that did not have time to line up and turn around, as a rule, could not offer serious resistance to the enemy, especially on cavalry. The same thing happened during the encirclement and dissection of troops. At the same time, the attacking side always suffered minimal losses compared to the defending side. Chronicles also speak of a fierce battle and heavy losses of the Mongols. This means that a regular oncoming battle took place in the City, otherwise there would have been just a massacre of scattered Russian crowds.
about the path of the Mongols to the City, he says: “The Mongol-Tatars began a campaign against Yuri Vsevolodovich immediately after the fall of Vladimir. At first they "chased along Yuria and princes to Yaroslavl." However, from Rostov, the main forces of Burundai turned north, to Uglich (having, apparently, received from the prisoners more accurate information about the location of the grand ducal camp); On the morning of March 4, the Tatar avant-gardes approached the City River.
The version is the most plausible. Indeed, after the capture of the capital of the principality - Vladimir, a large Mongol corps moved north. The steppe people quickly took Rostov, Uglich, Yaroslavl, cutting the eastern communications of Prince Yuri. After that, in accordance with their own tactics, the Mongols conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the City area. Soon they learned that they were waiting for them in the northern direction, which means that there would be heavy losses in the event of a frontal collision.
Yaroslavl was taken by the Mongols in mid-February, and after that Burundai did not take active actions against Yuri Vsevolodovich for more than a half month. Time, apparently, was spent on reconnaissance, the development of the operation and its thorough preparation. In particular, the Mongol commander needed to concentrate his forces in the Uglich region, hidden from the Russians. For this purpose, sweeping of the territory by numerous small detachments was used. The Mongols placed particular hope in disinformation. Saboteurs, under the guise of merchants, penetrated the Russian camp, conducted reconnaissance, supplied the prince with disinformation, and at the same time tried to sow panic in the Russian army. Intelligence gave Burundai information about the number of Russian rati and its location. We found out the steppes and the location of Russian patrols from Bozhenki in the south to Storozhevo in the north. From the information received, Burundai concluded that the Russians were expecting an attack from the north or from the south, but from the direction of Uglich, that is, they did not conduct reconnaissance in the east direction at all. Yuri Vsevolodovich, who came to the Sit along the Volga and Mologa, expected an attack from here. An ideal ice road, convenient for a large army, led along these rivers to the Russian camp. The capture of Yaroslavl was supposed to convince the Grand Duke of the correctness of his own assumptions. After reconnaissance, Burundai decided to go to the Sit from Uglich. It was not the most convenient road for a large cavalry force, but it promised success. Most likely, there was no permanent sleigh route there, since the small Sitskari maintained contact with the outside world through Bezhetsk, as well as Mologa and the Volga, where the main trade routes went. Burundai went to the City, apparently, where the modern roads pass through Myshkin and Nekouz. This allowed him to go to the river at Stanilov, directly at the very opolye, and, therefore, bypass the more southern Russian patrols. This path made it possible to make the most of the element of surprise, which means guaranteeing victory. It must also be taken into account that this was the shortest path to the camp of the Grand Duke. From Uglich, the Mongols could also go to the City along the Korozhechna River, with an exit near the village of Voskresenskoye, but this route had a number of drawbacks. The winding Korozhechna lengthened the road and did not approach the City itself. The Mongols would have had to go by small tributaries of the Korozhechna and City, which, like the forests, were covered with deep snow, as well as blockages of washed trees. This road led the steppes too far from the Russian camp, which was its main drawback. When moving to the opol along the City, random Russian patrols could detect the Mongols early and quickly raise the alarm, which would allow the Grand Duke to cover the southern defile with the clearing in time. Burundai also took into account the fact that, on the occasion of wartime, the Sit turned into a relatively busy route along which carts, separate detachments of militia moved, patrols and messengers rode, teams of hunters and fishermen roamed (the army had to be fed). In order to maintain maximum secrecy, the Mongols needed to go to the Sit as close as possible to the location of the Russian camp, and besides, early in the morning, when traffic along the river froze, and the frozen patrols huddled closer to housing. Only the route Uglich - Stanilovo met these requirements, but not Korozhechna, neither the upper nor the lower reaches of the City. From Stanilov to the opolya, the Mongols had a short spurt, and even if the prince had had time to warn the sentinels, there was no time left to block the river in a narrow forest valley near Yuryevsky. Most likely, this is how events unfolded in the City. On the move, the large body of Burundai had to stretch considerably and, in order to mitigate this circumstance, the Mongol commander probably chose an intermediate camp near the river, in the most sheltered and deserted place. All Horde forces were concentrated here with the strictest observance of secrecy. Patrols of the most experienced warriors were sent out in all directions. Not a single passer-by was supposed to get away from their well-aimed arrows.
Early in the morning of March 4, 1238, the well-oiled Mongol car rushed forward. Further events were predetermined by the strategic talent of Burundai and the flawless work of his services. Apparently, the Mongol commander did not limit the preparation for the Russian camp by the above measures. With the capture of the Volga cities, Burundai completely cut off all the eastern communications of Prince Yuri. Batu, having gone to Tver and Torzhok, blocked the Russian army from the south, preventing the approach of the regiments of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich to the City. It is quite logical to assume that the Mongols cut off the Grand Duke from the north as well. “Separate detachments of the Tatar cavalry went far to the north and northeast. The chroniclers report on the campaigns of the Tatar detachments to Galich-Mersky and even to Vologda. As you know, the latest archaeological work carried out in Galich testifies to the capture of this city by the Mongols. In particular, scientists have found traces of a conflagration in the city dating back to the time of the invasion. Until recently, most historians adhered to Tatishchev's version, according to which GalichzMersky "was not taken." Perhaps someday archeology will shed light on the fate of Vologda. The capture of it by the Mongols allowed them to prevent the approach to the City of detachments of the Ustyug, Belozersk and other northern militias, most of whom were proficient in weapons due to their way of life. Agriculture in the north was not developed, and the locals were mainly engaged in crafts: hunting, fishing, beekeeping, as well as trips to neighboring Finno-Ugric tribes for tribute. The arrival of such an “audience” on the Sit was undesirable for Burundai, and therefore it is logical to assume that Vologda was taken by the Mongols. It was also extremely important for the steppes to prevent the supply of food and weapons from the north to the Russian camp. The capture of Vologda made Ustyuzhans and Belozersk think about their own safety. In such a situation, the Russian army in the City found itself in a huge strategic loop.
Isolated from all his possessions, deprived of the approach of large reserves, Yuri Vsevolodovich found himself in an almost hopeless situation. The Mongols successfully solved the problem of isolating the Russian troops in the City. The Grand Duke learned about what was happening in his principality only shortly before the battle, when it was too late to change anything.
2.5. LOCATION OF THE RUSSIAN TROOP AND ITS NUMBERS
Most historians and local historians are inclined to believe that the Russian army in the City was stretched along the entire river from the mouth to Bozhenki. This is usually justified by the need to quarter squads in the villages. The mentioned group of researchers is characterized by the concept of a local historian, who believes that the Russian army was divided into several regiments and stood along the City at a distance of more than 100 km. At the same time, he determines the number of Russian regiments at 15 thousand people. Attention is drawn to the fact that according to Ershov's plan, in the presence of a regiment of the right hand, there is no regiment of the left hand, but an ambush regiment is indicated. This state of affairs contradicts historical information about the organization of Russian troops in the XII-XIII centuries. It is known that four years after the Battle of Sitsk, Alexander Nevsky used an ambush regiment on Lake Peipus. Military historians believe that this was a novelty for the Russian army. Ershov writes: "In accordance with the tactics of the Russian troops of that time, there should also be a reserve (ambush) regiment." The number of Russian soldiers could hardly reach 15 thousand, as Yershov says about this. The entire Vladimir-Suzdal Principality could put up about 22 thousand combatants and militias, but most of them died in the battle of Kolomna, during the defense of the capital (Vladimir) and many other cities. It is more likely that only a few hundred grand ducal combatants came to the Sit with Yuri Vsevolodovich. His nephews (Vladimir Uglichsky, Vasilko Rostovsky, Konstantin Yaroslavsky) brought to the camp thinned squads (which even before the Mongols numbered several hundred people) and small detachments of militias. The specific princes of small towns could bring to the Sit only a meager number of soldiers, with whom it would be unthinkable to go to the rescue of Vladimir. The princes from small towns who fled to the Sit did not change the picture either. So, when the Mongols approached, Prince Yuri Starodubsky took away his family and property "... beyond Gorodets, beyond the Volga, into the forests," and he himself went to Yuri Vsevolodovich on the Sit "with a small army." Unfortunately, it is not known whether the Starodub prince managed to reach the Russian camp. The opinions of historians on this matter contradict, and the annals are silent. The most significant detachment was brought to the Sit by the brother of the Grand Duke Svyatoslav. The raid of his squad from Pereyaslavl South can be called heroic. Svyatoslav did not leave his older brother in trouble, traveled many hundreds of kilometers, including through the territory occupied by the enemy, and managed to come to the aid of Yuri Vsevolodovich. The Mongols could not prevent Svyatoslav from breaking through to the Sit. Here there is a failure in the work of steppe reconnaissance. Apparently, the Mongols did not expect a daring raid by the Russian prince and simply overlooked it. A weak mobilization base forces Yuri Vsevolodovich to take peasants into his army. There was nothing to arm them with, since long-empty arsenals remained in the cities, soon captured by the enemy. The chronicles do not say anything about the participation of the Ustyuzians with the Belozersk in the Sitskaya battle, and perhaps this confirms indirect information about the capture of Vologda by the Mongols. In fact, Yuri Vsevolodovich had only to recruit soldiers in the City, Mologa and the Volga forests, mainly from peasants and fishermen. Before the Mongol invasion, peasants were not trained in military affairs and, as a rule, did not participate in wars. Without armor and, at best, with spears, they were not the best opponent for the heavily armed steppe horde. Taking into account all the factors discussed, it seems that the army of the Grand Duke barely exceeded 5-8 thousand people, and the warriors made up the smallest part of the total number of soldiers. There was no need to stretch such an army at a distance of more than 100 km.
Initially, Yuri Vsevolodovich's headquarters may have been located in the village of Stanilovo, but after the squads approached and placed them in the only convenient place - the Sitsky opole, the prince's headquarters was moved there. Most likely, the Grand Duke used the ancient settlement discovered by A. Preobrazhensky near the village of Pokrovskoye, on the left bank of the river, to place his headquarters. It was the only fortified site found in the City. Numerous villages located on the opole were quite enough for the location of a small Russian rati. Since several princes and few warriors gathered in the City, Yuri Vsevolodovich, in order to avoid quarrels, entrusted the organization of troops to an experienced governor from his boyars - Zhiroslav Mikhailovich.
To protect the opolye from an unexpected enemy attack, in the Yuryev area, where the City valley was compressed by forests, Russian soldiers probably cut down a notch, completely blocking the river and its environs. For the free movement of their convoys and detachments through the bend of the river from Yuryevsky to Krasnoy, a clearing was made, which, moreover, shortened the path. Along the clearing, there may have been sawn trees to quickly block the clearing. The defile, created by nature and people, made it possible to cover the Russian location from a quick throw of cavalry and made it possible to hold the enemy with relatively small forces. Unfortunately, the notch, most likely, was small in width, which allowed the Mongols to quickly go around it. The clearing was probably guarded by a small detachment of soldiers, whose task was to quickly block the clearing and defend it until the main Russian forces approached. Most of the chronicles testify that Yuri Vsevolodovich sent a detachment of Dorozh "into the clearings in three thousand." However, the very word "clearing" caused a dispute among scientists. in his "Explanatory Dictionary" explains it as intelligence. This opinion is also confirmed by Sreznevsky in the Dictionary of the Old Russian Language. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the three thousandth detachment (at least a third of the entire army) was not suitable for reconnaissance. assumed that the "clearing" is the village of Proseki near Bezhetsk. It is difficult to agree with this. Why would chroniclers talk about a small, unremarkable village, when one could call the city of Bezhitsa, well-known at that time. In addition, sending up to a third of the army over a long distance would not be reconnaissance, but a split of the army, with the threat of its destruction in parts by the mobile detachments of the Mongols. Russian governors would not take such a reckless step. There were no traitors and cowards among them, so it is impossible to judge them by modern standards. Based on the indicated location of the Russian troops, it is appropriate to assume that a small detachment was stationed in Stanilov, whose task was to cover and control the notch from the south. Separate detachments were sent to the most threatened areas. The first of them, numbering one or two hundred cavalry soldiers, was located in Bozhenki and Mogilitsy. He was assigned the duties of long-range reconnaissance to the south and early warning services. A smaller detachment was not suitable for such a task, since it would be extremely vulnerable even to small steppe units. A couple of hundred Russian soldiers could easily repel the onslaught of the Mongol reconnaissance (usually a hundred) and quickly retreat to the main forces before the Horde tumens approached. Putting a large detachment, especially a whole regiment (Dorozha), at such a distance from the headquarters did not make any practical sense, but this would weaken the already small main army. Russian governors and princes, who had rich combat experience, could not help but understand this.
The second detachment, larger than the southern outpost, was sent north. His tasks were more significant, since the northern direction was considered by Yuri Vsevolodovich the most threatened for the Russian rati. The prince expected the appearance of the Mongols precisely from the mouth of the City, that is, from the north, where there were large ice routes along the Volga, Mologa and City. In the lower reaches of the City to this day there is a village called Storozhevo. It crowns the Sitskoye opolye from the north and, as it were, blocks the approaches to it from the mouth of the river. To the north of Storozheva Sit becomes wider, and its valley is moved apart by fields and numerous villages, since the conditions for the life of the population, due to the proximity of trade routes, were favorable here. Storozhevo, with forests and swamps adjacent to the river, was the most successful place for blocking the Mongols' path to the Russian camp. So the name of this village cannot be accidental. Here, apparently, powerful notches were created, and possibly other fortifications. The most experienced and well-armed warriors were selected for outposts. Perhaps these circumstances prompted Burundai to carry out his operation from the eastern direction, which was very inconvenient for the Mongol cavalry. In general, the location of the Russian troops was very successful. They covered strategic directions from the north and south. Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich could easily maneuver with his forces on a fairly wide Sitsky opole, even in the event of a blow from the steppes from two sides. To give an effective rebuff to the Mongols was prevented by the lack of long-range reconnaissance in all directions and the lack of forces. Yury Vsevolodovich paid little attention to the southern direction. Powerful echeloned notches would not allow the Mongols to quickly roll out to the Sitskoye field and use the surprise factor. Nevertheless, one must pay tribute to the prince for the skillful location of the Russian squads, with better knowledge of the enemy, Yuri Vsevolodovich could successfully fight the Horde, but, unfortunately, history did not give him such a chance. But new generations of commanders learned from the mistakes of Prince Yuri and other Russian princes, getting to know the dangerous enemy better.
So in 1380, when Dmitry Ivanovich, using careful long-range reconnaissance in different directions, outplayed Mamai and Jagiello long before the Battle of Kulikovo. The steppe people did not use the experience of their predecessors, the same Burundai, and suffered a crushing defeat, despite the superiority of their forces.
2.6. PLANS OF GRAND DUKE YURI VSEVOLODOVICH
The plans of Yuri Vsevolodovich changed significantly from the moment the prince left Vladimir and before the start of the battle. Initially, the Grand Duke, leaving his family and almost the entire army in the capital, expected to quickly gather new troops from the surviving lands of his principality, as well as from Novgorod, and then go to the rescue of Vladimir. The main argument for Yuri's plans was the powerful fortifications of the capital with a strong garrison, as well as security features on the approaches to it. The prince hoped for the duration of the defense of Vladimir. The prince's family left in Vladimir served as a guarantee of this confidence. At first glance, it is surprising that the prince, intending to free Vladimir from the siege, did not go to his aid for more than a month, as if he was in no hurry. The prince was in a hurry, but the collection of sufficient forces was delayed, because in the Vladimir-Suzdal land they were practically gone, and Yuri Vsevolodovich was looking forward to help from other lands. Indeed, could the prince go to the rescue of the capital with several thousand almost unarmed militias and peasants? In addition, people needed to be organized, trained, armed. Novgorodians refused to give help, hastily fortifying their city and pulling troops from their vast possessions. Under such conditions, Yuri Vsevolodovich could only expect help from his brothers. The Suzdal chronicler writes like this: “Waiting for your brother Yaroslav from the regiment and Svyatoslav with his retinue.” At the same time, the chronicler, mentioning Svyatoslav, speaks of a squad, and when mentioning Yaroslav, he speaks of regiments, that is, of the large forces of this prince, and this is no coincidence. Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich, back in 1228, with the support of his elder brother Yuri, began to reign in Pereyaslavl South. In 1238 he managed to come to Sit to his brother with his retinue, consisting of part of the Pereyaslavites, and mainly of the Yuryevites. The city of Yuryev Polsky was the lot of this prince in the Vladimir land. The military forces of Svyatoslav were small, but still outnumbered the squads of the nephews of Prince Yuri, so the arrival of Svyatoslav to the Sit was very important for the Grand Duke.
However, only Yaroslav Vsevolodovich could provide decisive assistance to the Russian troops in the battle. In 1238 he reigned in Kyiv, and in the north he belonged to Pereyaslavl Zalessky, in Novgorod his son Alexander (future Nevsky) reigned. Occupying Kyiv in 1236, Yaroslav took with him several noble Novgorodians, a hundred people of Novotorzhan, Pereyaslav and Rostov regiments. in 1238, it was hardly inferior to the Grand Duke, and he had a considerable mobilization resource. From the south, he could bring his northern squads, the troops of the Kyiv land of some South Russian princes. In addition, Yaroslav would certainly have called his son Alexander from Novgorod, at least with a personal team and volunteers from the Novgorod land. It is possible that on the way to the north, the Smolensk regiments could join the brother of the Grand Duke of Vladimir. And didn’t Yaroslav save Smolensk from the Mongols? The chronicles do not say anything about this, but the fact that the Mongols, moving south, bypassed the rich city, is suggestive. The steppe inhabitants, weakened by the campaign, could frighten the large fresh Russian forces stationed in this city. Indirectly, this circumstance is confirmed by the fact that in the same 1238, Yaroslav smashes a large Lithuanian army that was trying to take Smolensk. The assistance provided to Smolensk was probably caused by the prevailing winter of 1238. allied relations of local princes with Yaroslav.
Having learned about the devastation of the Vladimir land, Yaroslav abandoned Kyiv and hurried to the north, but, unfortunately, did not have time to help Yuri, because Batu's troops were operating on the Tver-Torzhok line, and the road to the Sit was cut off. It is not known how far Yaroslav advanced and where he stopped, but it may have been Smolensk. The regiments of Yaroslav could decide the outcome of the battle on the City in favor of the Russian troops, but the strategy of the steppe commanders prevented such a development of events, showing their superiority. The younger brother of Yuri Vsevolodovich - Yaroslav was an experienced and talented military leader. His life was filled with many glorious victories over Lithuania, Finns, Germans, etc. As early as 1234, he smashed German knights on the ice of the Emayegi River in the Baltic. Perhaps here his 14-year-old son Alexander acquired valuable military experience that would be useful to him in the future on Lake Peipsi. The brothers Yuri and Yaroslav, despite the customs of those years, were bound by an ancient and sincere friendship. This is evidenced by the fact that in inter-princely strife they always supported each other and never seriously conflicted with each other. It was precisely such a comrade-in-arms that the Grand Duke needed in the difficult winter of 1238. “And wait for your brother Yaroslav, and don’t be without him,” the chronicler notes sadly. With the help of sources, you can figure out the original plans of Yuri Vsevolodovich. The situation is much more complicated with their transformation on the eve of the battle, when the prince found out about the current situation in his principality. Chronicles do not report anything about this, and one can only manage with assumptions. Apparently, in late February - early March, Yuri Vsevolodovich learns terrible news about the fate of his land. “The news came to Grand Duke Yuri: Vladimir was taken, and in the cathedral church the bishop and princess with their daughters-in-law and grandchildren died from fire, and your eldest son Vsevolod and his brother were killed outside the city and people were beaten, and the Tatars are coming at you. Hearing this, he cried out in a loud voice, with tears, weeping for the lawful Christian church and for the people, and for his wife, and for the children. And, sighing from the depths of his heart, he began to pray: - Alas, Lord, it would be better for me to die than to live in this world. Today, for the sake of it, I was left alone! And then the Tatars suddenly came up. He put aside his sadness ... ". The Laurentian Chronicle says that the prince received information about the course of the war already on the eve of the Mongol attack. All plans of Yuri Vsevolodovich collapsed overnight, and he himself, apparently, fell into a state of shock. The Grand Duke found himself in an impasse. He couldn't muster enough strength. The Russian army was isolated in the City. There was nothing to defend: cities were taken, the land was devastated, people were killed, such was the harsh reality of that time. The prince could no longer carry out his new plans. Events developed according to the scenario of the Mongol commanders. And what could Yuri Vsevolodovich do in the current situation? It seems only one thing - to go towards the enemy and lay down his head with honor. It no longer made sense to sit out in the dense forests, and the prince and his warriors, who had lost everything, were burning with one desire - to take revenge!
2.7. BATTLE
The most common version of the Battle of Sit by the historian Markov, who believed that the Mongols attacked from Bezhetsk. In his opinion, Yuri, having received news of the enemy from Tver, Torzhok and Uglich, “sent Dorozh’s husband with three thousand soldiers to the upper reaches of the City to the swamps of the Swamp ... Dorozh accepted the battle with the Mongols at Bozhonka. Many Russian soldiers fell. The surviving warriors retreated along the riverbed of the City to the village of Mogilitsy, into the very belly of the Swamp. Dorozh himself hurried to Prince Yury Vsevolodovich with terrible news - “already, prince, we have been bypassed around the Tatars for days.” According to this version, the Mongols attack Dorozh from where he goes, that is, there is a frontal collision. Then who and where did the steppe dwellers bypass? Further, Dorozh abandons his regiment and, instead of messengers, hurries himself to the prince to report on an incomprehensible detour, moreover, for many tens of kilometers. Quote further: “It was a complete surprise for Yuri Vsevolodovich ... The Mongols detachments began to rapidly advance along the City valley from south to north. At individual villages, the Mongol horsemen were blocked by small detachments of Russian warriors. But they were unable to hold back the Mongol equestrian lava and folded their courageous heads with honor.
The Laurentian Chronicle says: “Prince Yury sent Dorozh to prosiks in three thousand men and ran Dorozh and speeches: and about already, the prince walked around us around the Tatars for a day. Prince Yuria heard the same thing on his horse, with his brother Svyatoslav and with his nephews (sons), with Vasilko Konstantinovich, and with Vsevolod, and Volodimer, and with his men, and going against the filthy ones, and the prince began to put up regiments and behold suddenly hastening the Tatars to the Sit against Prince Yury, the prince put aside all sorrow and go to them, and step up both regiments, and by slashing evil, and running before the foreigners, and then the Grand Duke Yury Vsevolodich was killed, on the river to the City and his many howls perished…”. The chronicle does not say anything about the defeat of Dorozh's regiment, but only that he ran back. This meant that he did not personally return to the prince, but with his regiment. Dorozh, as a governor, personified the regiment he commanded, and for those times this was a common occurrence. Chronicles are full of expressions “the prince went”, “the prince took the city”, but this does not mean that he acted alone. When a prince or voivode ran home with a defeated army, the chronicles said “the third one himself came running,” that is, in small numbers. In the chronicle, Dorozh informs the prince that “the Tatars walked around us for a day” (the word “about” in Russian means “nearby”, and it is strange that it is usually interpreted as a complete encirclement of the Russian army, but the chronicler did not specify who the Tatars walked around - the Dorozha regiment or the entire Russian army.
Another chronicle says that Dorozh (Dorofey Semyonovich) “did not depart a little, return again and tell, river:“ The prince has already bypassed us the Tatars. These words do not contradict other sources and confirm the fact that the Russian regiment, having retreated not far from the location of the troops, discovers the Mongols and returns under the threat of encirclement.
And now - a presentation of his own version of the course of the battle, based on the content of the sources. Yuri Vsevolodovich, having received information about the catastrophe that occurred with his family and principality, as well as about the area of \u200b\u200boperations of the Tatars near Tver and Torzhok, decides to go to the last battle. The prince also receives vague news that the Mongols are already on their way to him, most likely from Bezhetsk. Yuriy sent Dorozh's 3,000th detachment up the City as a vanguard, the rest of the army had to follow him later, since the throughput of the narrow valley of the City was small. Through the forest blockages, completely narrow clearings were made, and even a small Russian army had to stretch for kilometers. When the Russian column passed Stanilovo, the warriors of Dorozh discovered the advanced patrols of the Mongols on the eastern shore. For the steppes, the advance of the Russian regiment also turned out to be unexpected, perhaps due to the early dark morning. Dorozh quickly assessed the threat looming over the regiment, which could be cut off from the main forces and then destroyed. The governor gives the command to quickly return to the camp. The Mongolian detachments, realizing that they were discovered, attacked the Russian soldiers stretched out on the march, the first battles flared up. However, the main forces of the steppes had not yet managed to reach the City, and Dorozh's detachment managed to retreat to the main forces without great losses. received news of the appearance of the Mongols, the Russian camp was still sleeping. The warriors were stationed in villages at a great distance. Assessing the situation, "Prince Yuriy all on his horse." Having quickly gathered the squads that were nearby - his nephews and his own, the prince moved towards the Mongols in order to meet them in the narrowest part of the City valley and prevent them from breaking out into the field. Voivode Dorozh, rapidly retreating, probably did not take care of blocking the glades. The prince tried to correct this mistake, but did not have time. Nevertheless, the oncoming battle flared up in the narrow part of the valley, and Yuri's squads with Dorozh's regiment for quite a long time managed to hold the line in the Yuryevskoye-Krasnoye region from the onslaught of the Mongols. At this time, the voivode Zhiroslav gathered detachments of the militia stationed in the villages and prepared them for battle. The Mongols could not use their numerical superiority in this part of the City, and then Burundai sent pre-allocated units around the Russian troops. The maneuver was difficult, because the steppe people had to make their way to the opol in deep snow, moreover, in the forest. The Mongols lost a lot of time, but they no longer had a choice. Finally, the Mongol detachments began to reach the southern edge of the opolya and slowly accumulate there. At this time, Yuri Vsevolodovich was firmly connected with the squads by frontal combat. The prince sought death in battle and soon found it. Left without a leader, the Russian troops began to retreat. The Mongols, breaking out into the field, were finally able to turn around on a wide front and fully realize their numerical superiority. The last way out remained for the Russians - to retreat to Pokrovsky, where the voivode Zhiroslav Mikhailovich was concentrating detachments of militia. The mass of the Mongols, spreading over the opole, embraced the flanks of the thinned squads, and individual detachments of the steppes had already leaked into the rear of the Russians. The battle began to fall apart. Some Russian detachments were cut off and tried to gain a foothold in the villages, where it was easier for foot soldiers to repel the swift attacks of the mounted Mongols. On the way to Pokrovsky, almost all the princes and combatants died. This also explains the obscurity of the death of the Grand Duke - there were no eyewitnesses to his death. “God knows how he died, others talk a lot about him,” the Novgorod chronicler notes. In the afternoon, all the Mongol forces approached Pokrovsky, where detachments of militia were stationed, led by the governor Zhiroslav. They were mostly peasants and artisans, poorly trained and armed. They could not resist the massive blow of the Mongols for a long time, and soon the flight began, since the forest was nearby.
3. CONCLUSION
The Mongol-Tatar invasion of the years can rightly be called the first historically recorded patriotic war of the Russian people against the conquerors. And before that, Russia had to fight with foreign invaders, but the confrontation never took on such a scale, did not cover almost the entire territory of the state, and was not accompanied by such terrible victims. Only the Patriotic Wars of 1812 and 1941-45 are comparable to those events. Unfortunately, this first patriotic war ended in defeat for our people, because the forces were too unequal. Steppe hordes, gathered in the territory from the Pacific Ocean to the Dnieper, moved to Russia. The Horde was not opposed by a single state, a single army, with a single command, the enemy was poorly known, and therefore miscalculations were made.
Nevertheless, this war was no less glorious than other wars waged by the Russian people with their enslavers. It was also accompanied by mass heroism and selflessness. In the terrible years of the invasion, there was not a single Russian city that would surrender to the enemy, not a single Russian prince who would go to bow to the conquerors. Until the last, princes, combatants, militias fought with the horde and still drank a bitter cup, and the dead, as you know, "have no shame."
As a result of the battle, Yuri Vsevolodovich himself and his nephew Vsevolod were killed. The brother of the last Vasilko was captured and also, then was killed. Of the princes, only the third Konstantinovich could escape - Vladimir and Yuri's brother Svyatoslav. So on March 4, 1238, the last hopes for the success of the resistance to the invaders in the Vladimir-Suzdal land were dispelled. Unfortunately, it is worth recognizing that the indecisive and not entirely logical actions of some Russian princes were not the last factor that decided the outcome of the struggle. And first of all, this concerns Yuri Vsevolodovich, who died on the banks of the City. On the other hand, the heroic struggle of the Russian people bled the Mongols dry. Their next major campaign to the West they will begin only in two and a half years.
4. REFERENCES
1. GAIMK Archaeological work of the Academy on new buildings in the 1st century. M.1935.
2. About the place of the battle on the banks of the City. "Nizhny Novgorod provincial sheets" 1889. No. 4.
3. Hudz-Markov Rus in chronicles of the 5th-13th centuries. Moscow, 2005.
4. "Veil over the Battle of Sit" magazine "Rus" No. 6, 1996.
5. The overthrow of the Mongol-Tatar yoke. M .: "Enlightenment", 1973., p.31-33
6. A, Essays on the history of the Yaroslavl region. Yaroslavl, 1997.
7. Lestvitsyn battles on the City River. "Yaroslavl Provincial Gazette" 1868, No. 41.
8. By March 4, 1889, the day of honoring the memory of those killed in 1238 in the battle with the Tatars on the river. City. Tver, 1889.
9. "Professor Pogodin's travel notes for some internal provinces" Magazine "Moskvityanin" No. 12 1848 p.113.
10. Volost Pokrovo-Sitskaya. "Ethnographic collection". v.1, 1853
11. PSRL - M, 1962, v.1
12. Stories of Russian chronicles. M. 1993.
13. Sabaneev burial mounds of the Mologsky district. "Proceedings of the Yaroslavl Provincial Statistical Committee" t V, 1868, p. 43,76,79,89.
14. Tatishchev Russian. vol. III. M.: AST: Ermak, 2005.
15. "Memory" M .: "Contemporary", 1983.
16. "The tragedy of the Russian land", Art. from the Nekouz district newspaper "Forward" No. 11 of February 7, 1998.
Annex 2
Map of the River Sit showing the proposed site of the battle