Economic consequences of the liberalization of foreign economic activity in Russia. Liberalization of foreign economic activity - abstract

20.09.2019

Let us consider in detail the contradictory influence of the policy of liberalization of foreign economic activity on the formation of the institution of trade intermediation as an object of regional management.

Almost seven years have passed since the beginning of the radical economic reform announced in Russia, and the desired modernization of Russian society, aimed at creating an efficient and competitive economy, has not yet been achieved, as well as the organic and profitable inclusion of our country in the world economy by opening the economy. Moreover, the scale and duration of the decline in production are unparalleled in peacetime history.

So, according to the State Statistics Committee Russian Federation, the total volume of industrial production in 1997 amounted to 49% of the already crisis level of 1990, including: in the chemical and petrochemical industry - 42.8%, mechanical engineering and metalworking - 37.3%, forestry, woodworking and pulp and paper - 34.4%, building materials industry - 31.7%, light industry - 13.7%. Crisis phenomena hit not only production, but also social sphere, structural distortions in the economy have intensified, and the problems of public debt have become aggravated. "With the annual (in 1998) probable revenues of the Federal budget in the amount of 367.5 billion rubles, the state internal debt of the Russian Federation, according to the chairman of the State Duma Security Committee V. Ilyukhin, is 785.9 billion rubles, and the external debt "$140 billion. The result of this will be the complete dependence of the Russian Federation on foreign capital and the final destruction of the country's economy." As a result of this - a decrease in the standard of living of the population compared with the pre-reform period. Suffice it to say that today Russia has fallen back to 57th place in the world in terms of living standards.

There are different points of view on the reasons for the deepest crisis in all spheres of the country's economic and social life, on the reasons for undermining the foundations of the country's national economic security, and they are trying to explain them from different political positions. Representatives of one position believe that the phenomena of the crisis are a legacy of the past, the Soviet command and administrative system. Others believe that the crisis is the price for reforms, and whether you like it or not, you have to put up with it. Still others argue that a market economy has been built in Russia and there seems to be no crisis any more. The new version of the government's program for the development of the economy in 1997-2000 mainly reflects the latter point of view. What is striking in it is the non-alternative predetermination of the liberalization of the economy and the lack of desire to predict and comprehend other options for reform. Moreover, it is argued that inflation has been defeated, production has stabilized, payment and financial discipline has been strengthened, conditions have been created for activating business activity and structural restructuring of the economy, raising the standard of living of the people on this basis. As a result of the work done in the first six years of the reforms, it is argued that the foundation of a market economy capable of further development has been built. A similar conclusion - "a market economy has been built in Russia" - is also made in the last address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly. The authors of the government program are convinced that "the course of reforms, which was carried out under extremely difficult conditions, has justified itself and will now bear fruit. Stage II begins - the stage of structural adjustment and economic recovery."

Such assessments of the current economic development, given until the August 1998 crisis, as well as the orientation of the government program towards the transformation of the Russian economy into a "market economy", in our opinion, are theoretically untenable. This was shown and proved by domestic economists, who rallied on the basis of a theoretical concept reflected in the materials of the St. Petersburg economic forums held in 1997 and 1998. We are closer to the point of view of the authors of the already mentioned monograph "The Economy of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the Eve of the Third Millennium", who believe that we should strive not for a market economy, but for a mixed economy. The modern economy is a mixed economy with a high degree of state participation and a social focus on human development.

The nomination of the market and the "market economy" as the goal and super-task of the reform reforms in Russia led to the fact that the goals and means of the reforms were reversed, that is, the goals were sacrificed for the means. The imposition of recipes of romantic monetarism on Russia, the denial of the regulatory role of the state substantiate the "withdrawal" of the state from the economy in theory, but in practice leads to rampage of the elements, arbitrariness, to undermine the country's overall development potential and complicate its progress towards a new civilization, which developed countries have already begun to build. .

Based on these general theoretical assumptions, let us now evaluate the process of liberalization not in the domestic market, but in foreign economic activity and trace its contradictory influence on the development of the institution of foreign economic intermediaries.

The experience of the 20th century has shown that developed foreign countries go for a complete liberalization of foreign trade only after achieving high competitiveness of their goods. The CIS countries, including Russia, abandoned the state monopoly on foreign trade in the 1990s without reaching these milestones, and largely under the influence of WTO requirements, misunderstood ideas about opening their economies to meet the world.

This, in turn, caused a division of opinion among domestic economists regarding the economic rationale for the liberalization of foreign trade. Supporters of the first point of view proceed from the idea that foreign competition will help to defeat domestic monopoly and determine which industries have prospects in the domestic and foreign markets and, therefore, it is necessary to use such an element of "shock therapy" as an open comparison by consumers of domestic and foreign goods, for which it is necessary to open (by liberalizing foreign trade as much as possible) all channels for the penetration of foreign goods and services into the domestic market. Figuratively speaking, it is necessary, they say, to teach domestic commodity producers to “swim” by “throwing them” into the turbulent waters of the world market: whoever survives will inevitably begin to produce goods at the world level.

Another, opposite point of view proceeds from the fact that domestic industry needs protection and, therefore, the Russian economy should be “opened” towards the world market very carefully and in stages, having previously trained domestic producers to “swim” according to market rules, that is, to cover domestic producers with high import tariffs, support the import of materials and components with subsidies, a special rate of the national currency.

We share the views of those authors who, analyzing the practice of reforms, argue that the dialectic of openness in relation to the transitional national economy is not understood clearly enough, that the transition to openness is interpreted too simplistic - as the liberalization of foreign economic activity, behind which in practice only the liberalization of foreign trade is hidden.

The lack of a scientifically proven concept of Russia's inclusion in the world market leads to discord in assessments of the role of foreign trade liberalization in boosting the country's economy. Some analysts, for example, argue that "serious positive changes" have taken place in foreign trade, "its positive influence on national producers and consumers".

Other researchers give directly opposite estimates, consider the current sphere of foreign trade "a sphere of plunder and loss of the country's national wealth" on the grounds that up to 40% of imports and 10 -12% of exports remain unaccounted for, i.e., they are illegal operations, and belong to the authorities statistics to “unorganized trade”.

The difference in assessments leads to various measures proposed to correct the situation that has developed with the structure of export-import operations: from proposals to completely curtail the activities of private intermediaries and return to the state monopoly on foreign trade to the complete abolition of any restrictions on trade with the West.

To determine which of the existing points of view is closer to the economic realities of Russia, it is necessary to consider future development scenarios based on the first and second points of view. In our analysis, we will proceed from the following theoretical assumptions. Any economy "looks" at the outside world through a kind of "prism" - a system of its foreign economic institutions. If a country lays claim to a worthy place in it, it is necessary to bring them into line with the current situation in the external sphere and the situation in the national economy. The analysis shows that the development strategy foreign economic relations and the concept of foreign economic policy developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 1992 - 1993 paid insufficient attention to the qualitative side - the role of foreign economic relations as a factor of balance in the national economy.

A study of foreign experience shows that liberalization can be called a program of reforms that bring the country's trading system closer to the paradigm of neutrality of incentives for trade in the domestic market and exports. In our economic science, the term “liberalization” is still understood rather one-sidedly - “as an expansion of the freedom of economic actions of economic entities, the removal of restrictions on economic activity liberation of entrepreneurship”. This meaning of this term has penetrated into the concept of “liberalization of foreign trade”, and from there, alas, into the practice of foreign economic activity. This idea of the liberalization of foreign economic activity (essentially reducible to the liberalization of foreign trade), in our opinion, not only did not eliminate the distorting "optics" of the WEC, but also increased the distortions in the development national economy. Let us note, by the way, similar processes in other countries of the former socialist camp. Both in Russia and in other post-socialist countries, liberalization was implemented through political decisions, that is, it was relatively fast. In Western Europe after the Second World War, the “thawing of frozen markets” required a fairly significant evolutionary development. Many experts attribute this speed to the importance for the governments of post-socialist countries to identify the economy of their countries as a market economy, which is due to external pressure from the IMF, WTO, and others when obtaining foreign loans. We consider this point of view to be well founded.

Naturally, the system of foreign economic relations, being integral part National economy, cannot but experience nationwide collisions. However, the reason is not only in the general economic stagnation associated with the collapse of the USSR (payment and credit, monetary and financial, production and technical, scientific and research ties have been broken; the single information space and the regulatory and legal field have disappeared). The protracted institutional crisis of the system of foreign economic relations was also due to the direction of development of the system of these relations. For decades, the cultivation and growth of a structurally skewed trade turnover has introduced and is still introducing a deep structural deformation in heavy engineering, transport, ecology, etc. The share of machinery and equipment in the total volume of Russian exports practically did not grow in the 1990s, as evidenced by the data for 1993 and 1997 presented in Fig. 3 and 4. On the whole, in 1990 - 1997 this indicator decreased from 20 to 8.1%.

Rice. 3. Commodity structure of Russia's exports in 1993 (at actual prices, excluding unorganized exports).

Rice. 4. Commodity structure of Russia's exports in 1997 (at actual prices, excluding unorganized exports).

Numerous attempts to turn the tide in the framework of the supply and marketing and trade and intermediary model of the FES did not lead to positive results. Import of production lines, construction of turnkey plants and purchase of samples latest technology did not save the situation, since the majority of engineering products become morally obsolete even before their production begins at Russian factories.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Russia's share in world trade has been about 1%. A particularly alarming situation has developed with regard to engineering products. Deindustrialization is gaining momentum, because the resource base of the machine-building complex, and above all, the military-industrial complex, is being undermined. Last but not least, this is due to the current Russian doctrine of foreign economic activity liberalization, because it is built on a comprehensive trade and intermediary doctrine, while the world economy switched to a reproduction model in the late eighties.

And here there is a danger that the absence of a national strategy in the development of the FEC will objectively encourage separatism on the part of the subjects of the Federation, as well as some financial and industrial groups, pushing them to make narrowly selfish decisions. State interests are often replaced by the interests of economic groups. The deepening of this process gives our external partners (and competitors) huge advantages, forms the basis for economic dictatorship in solving issues of a national strategic nature.

As in the case with the search for the causes of the crisis in the Russian economy, in the study of the causes of the crisis in Russia's foreign economic relations, an intellectual breakthrough is needed based on new thinking, an appeal to the latest concepts of geopolitics that are not in demand by the authorities to form a foreign trade policy adequate to today's decisions that relies primarily on protection of national interests, national economic security.

And only within the framework of this new thinking will it be possible to truly objectively assess the features of Russian foreign trade policy, and, consequently, the role of trade intermediaries in its implementation. In the meantime, we must state that the inconsistency of the impact of liberalization of foreign economic activity on the efficiency and general direction of the development of trade mediation is due to the real correlation of protectionism and liberalization in the economic policy of the state.

What is meant? The modern trade policy of states is distinguished by the development and confrontation of two trends: protectionism and liberalization.

The liberalization of foreign trade is understood as a set of state measures to ensure free foreign trade turnover, reduce customs, tariff and other barriers. AT modern conditions the weakening of restrictions on foreign trade and the liberalization of foreign trade is one of the main requirements of international communication. The fulfillment of these requirements was demanded by Russia's new allies, various international organizations IMF (International Monetary Fund), GATT / WTO (World Trade Organization), etc. The problems of foreign trade liberalization for Russia are currently relevant mainly because, under the slogan of facilitating mutual exchange and access to national markets, industrialized countries are penetrating and consolidating in the markets developing countries. Liberalization is opposed by protectionism, which is characterized by the introduction of high customs duties on imported goods.

The choice of protectionism, which helps the development of national industry, or freedom of trade, which allows direct comparison of national production costs with international ones, is the subject of a centuries-old dispute among economists, theorists and practitioners.

Each of these areas is a priority in certain periods of development of regional and world trade. If in the 1950s and 1960s tendencies towards liberalization prevailed, then in the 1970s and 1980s a wave of new protectionism swept through.

It is interesting to note in this connection that a 1994 analysis of the foreign trade policies of 59 developing countries and countries with economies in transition conducted by IMF experts showed that 4 countries adhered to a policy of liberalization (free trade), opening the domestic market to foreign competition; 22 countries combined the approaches of liberalization and protectionism (this is called a moderate trade regime, where elements of free trade and protectionism are combined in some proportions); in most countries (33), overt protectionism prevailed.

Thus, the history of the 20th century is rich for world trade in both waves of protectionism and waves of liberalization of trade regimes. What should be used in Russia? If we proceed from the inappropriateness of blind copying of liberal theories and the idealization of the regulatory qualities of the market, then Russia (as well as other CIS countries) needs its own model of behavior in world trade, a model that can be conditionally called “reasonable protectionism”.

Reasonable protectionism for domestic producers does not mean protecting them from competition in general, but concessional government lending for new developments, guarantees for private investors focused on exports or import substitution. Without reasonable protectionism for the period of reforms, the market for a number of Russian goods (textiles, a number of foodstuffs, household appliances, etc.), as past years have shown, is almost completely replaced by imports, which entails a reduction in employment and budget revenues.

Reasonable protectionism can and should become an instrument not only of Russia's balanced foreign economic policy, but also a method of competition in Western markets. This is evidenced by the skilful use of protectionist measures by those countries that advocate liberalization in politics.

For example, the member countries of the European Community (EU) apply to the Russian Federation, which has taken a course towards the liberalization of its foreign trade (to be allowed, among other things, to the markets of the EU countries), very painful protectionist measures - prohibitive tariffs, discriminatory quotas and various sanctions against Russian goods, primarily for reasons of competition. The developed countries of the West are especially opposed to Russian science-intensive goods and products.

Today, the elements of protectionism that are observed in Russia's foreign trade policy are not always justified by the country's poor readiness to admit any imports to the Russian market and the desire to protect national producers. Sometimes they are dictated by other circumstances. For example, a one-time (3%) increase in customs duties on imported goods from August 15, 1998 to December 31, 1999 is due to the government's desire to patch up “holes” in the state budget, find additional sources of funds for paying pensions, salaries to state employees, etc. Such “protectionism” puzzles even our partner in the customs union, Belarus, because the introduction of higher duties was not agreed with the government of this country.

Reasonable protectionism, in our opinion, is not only the optimal strategy for Russia's behavior in the foreign economic sphere, but also in many respects the art of management, which is acquired empirically and not in one year, the art of state regulation of the foreign economic sphere.

In our assessment, the liquidation of the foreign trade monopoly was carried out hastily, ill-considered, without the preparation of pre-prepared "withdrawal" lines. As a result, we have what we have - an increase in distortions in the structure of export-import deliveries that took shape back in the 70s.

The geo-economic approach makes it possible to take a fresh look at various aspects of foreign economic activity, including helping to clarify the role and impact of its liberalization on the establishment of the institution of trade intermediation in the course of opening up the national economy.

Analysis of the development of foreign economic activity in Russia in 1992 - 1997. shows that we have been drawn into a large-scale foreign economic war. And since it proceeds differently than a regular trade war (bursts about "Bush legs"), non-specialists do not notice it. But it is important for us to know whether trade intermediaries are involved in this war. The answer is yes. But not on the Russian side. Such a conclusion follows logically from the chain of the following arguments using geoeconomic approaches.

It seems that in the course of the enthusiasm for the struggle for "perestroika and glasnost", the leadership of the USSR lost sight of geo-economic innovations - the transnationalization of the world economy, the transition from the trade model of foreign economic relations to the production and investment model, the evolution of commodity forms and the emergence of "commodity programs", the formation of new subjects of world economic communication, acting not at international, but at inter-enclave "junctions" of the division of labor, etc. A serious strategic miscalculation has been made. The old bureaucratic habit of the administrative apparatus had an effect - an inattentive and belated reaction to scientific recommendations.

Therefore, an analysis of the course of market reforms has shown that today in Russia (as, indeed, in all other CIS countries), instead of a reproduction model of foreign economic relations, there are only scattered rudiments of it, namely:

a) "islands" of modern entrepreneurship (and even then, as the experience of joint ventures (JV) in the Oryol region shows in favor of a foreign partner). In Russia in 1995, according to the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation, for 1 million 946 thousand domestic enterprises and organizations there were only 21 thousand joint and foreign enterprises, or 1.08% (Orl. Region - 0.43%);

b) extremely small volumes of foreign investments. According to the State Statistics Committee of Russia, in 1995 there were 18.9 US dollars of foreign investment in the economy per inhabitant of the country, in the Oryol region - a little more than 20 dollars per inhabitant. For comparison, in China this figure was 145 US dollars. In 1997, foreign investment in the Oryol region increased sharply - up to $210 per person, but the situation in Russia as a whole remained at the same level. Foreign investors are extremely cautious about investing in the economy of our country. In general, the CIS countries, due to political risks, imperfect legislation and inability to draw up business plans, are at the end of the list of 150 states in terms of the degree of favorable investment climate;

c) the formation of new market foreign economic structures on an associative and transnational basis - a kind of “starting carriers” of geo-economic processes (TNCs, FIGs, consortiums) - with the introduction of new forms of interaction with state authorities, operations in the world economic arena, etc. Without the transition on the reproduction model of foreign economic relations, it is impossible to overcome the structural imbalance in the economy. Trade turnover with a skewed structure “drives” other sectors into a structural crisis - engineering, transport, etc. In turn, in the foreign economic sphere, as in other sectors of the economy, the interests of managerial pyramids and power elites are intertwined. There is lobbying for the interests of individual industries at the expense of all others.

That is why, from the standpoint of geoeconomics, Russia needs to transform foreign economic relations from a trade-intermediary model to a reproduction one. And for this it is necessary to develop and adopt a new foreign economic doctrine at the national level. We agree on this issue with other authors who believe that in Russia "as long as there is no foreign economic doctrine, there is no foreign economic policy."

Remaining within the framework of the trade and intermediary doctrine of foreign economic relations, the national economy falls into a protracted period of exhaustion. The country continues to stubbornly supply energy carriers, raw materials, and intellectual resources to the foreign market, without being a link in the world reproduction process, without integrating into the world economy.

Our country is traditionally denied access to world economic organizations, financial and other international institutions, while we are holding back the admission of a "foreign element" into our reproduction processes. This is also facilitated by internal factors: the trade model of the WES "does not get along" with the emerging economic interaction. The situation is also aggravated by the struggle of representatives of economic nationalism with supporters of comprador approaches.

As part of the formation of a reproduction model of WPP, a foreign trade block should be singled out. Being the most important even of the world reproductive core, it, in turn, cannot but influence the direction of including the Russian economy in internationalized chains, its speed and efficiency. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, all the attributes and institutions associated with servicing the trade bloc (and, of course, the institution of trade intermediation) will be of great importance. Geoeconomic strategies do not cancel them.

A comprehensive study of the process of liberalization of the foreign economic sphere of the Russian economy leads us to the conclusion that this process is determined by general approaches to the form of the chosen modernization of society and methods of opening the Russian economy to the world economy at the turn of the late 80s and early 90s of the twentieth century. It turns out that the deepening of the general economic and social crisis in our country is the result not so much of the “difficult” legacy of the Soviet command-administrative economy, but of an incorrectly chosen course of reforms that did not begin with strengthening the monetary system, mobilizing all the forces of the country to rise and restructure production and improvement of the economic mechanism, as all developed countries did in such cases, but with the development of the spontaneous forces of the market according to monetarist recommendations, a “shock” release of prices and hyperinflation, a collapse in production, looting (under the guise of popular privatization) of state property, the collapse of a single economic space, opening of customs borders and suppression in the country of own production, especially in manufacturing industries laziness. Under the guise of a struggle against state monopolism, the economic role of the state was undermined, the merging of the state bureaucracy with the newborn capital, including mafia capital, and the formation of not a mixed economy, but “state-oligarchic capitalism” began. The “withdrawal” of the state from the economy under the guise of following the classical schemes for building a “market economy” turned into the fact that the criminal world has deeply penetrated into all levels of government, believed in its impunity and seeks to determine some aspects of our national economic policy, jeopardizing national economic security.

Under these conditions, the liberalization of foreign economic relations, and then foreign economic activity, in the absence of a well-thought-out geo-economic doctrine, inevitably turned into an increase in the “old” distortions in the structure of foreign trade turnover, an exorbitant growth in the number of foreign economic intermediaries who, acting on an unregulated legal field, received additional opportunities to deceive the state and its clients, and the institution of foreign economic intermediation itself has become a convenient channel for criminal structures to launder "dirty money" and legalize it in foreign currency accounts in other countries. Foreign economic mediation is additionally attractive for the shadow economy and the criminal world because the state and its law enforcement agencies practically do not take serious measures to return foreign exchange earnings for illegal export-import operations, which in such cases simply turn into elementary theft of money from the population from their subsequent harboring abroad. It is no coincidence that many experts note that in the public mind, participation in foreign economic mediation is directly associated with the criminal sphere.

Assessing the degree and directions of liberalization of foreign economic activity, declared a priority policy by the current political leadership of the country, we can definitely say that trade intermediaries, in the case of a successful foreign economic strategy, work for the country, and in the case of an unsuccessful one (as now ) - objectively against the country, because they serve (strengthen) the “distortions” of the foreign trade balance, unwittingly participating in the “foreign economic war” being waged against our country on the wrong side.

Experts have calculated that it is possible to talk about the food independence of a developed country only if the import of food products does not exceed an average of 30%. According to data for 1997, food imports to Russia reached the level of 50%, i.e., they crossed the critical line beyond which there is a real threat to the country's independence and food security (see Appendix 4).

Foreign trade intermediaries make a great contribution to the delivery of food to Russia. At the same time, many types of food remain unsold by domestic producers, domestic food industry enterprises stop or drag out a miserable existence. Such economic behavior of intermediaries is explained not so much by superficial reasons (brighter packaging of goods, longer shelf life of the product, and hence the timing of its sale), as by deep ones: by purchasing food abroad at dumping prices, intermediaries get the opportunity to make super profits, especially since many intermediaries working in the food market, there were benefits for taxation and payment of customs duties. This is especially true for a wide variety of “funds”: veterans, the disabled, children and families, sports, and so on. The peak of “fondism” came in 1992-1993, when a huge amount of duty-free imported alcohol, cigarettes and other food products was moved across the borders of our state, which was not yet equipped with strict customs rules, allegedly in support of the disabled, orphans, sports veterans and law enforcement veterans. organs. In fact, it was a real robbery of the state, and at the same time a blow to the domestic processing and food industries. When import privileges for all types of business entities were abolished, some of the intermediaries, in an effort to maintain their super-profitable business, found a way out in smuggling, and even commercial structures created by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs do not disdain this.

There is a point of view on the liberalization of foreign economic activity as a powerful stimulus for the growth of foreign trade turnover, the growth of the positive balance of Russia's foreign trade. Indeed, if we trace the final indicators of Russia's foreign trade from 1992 to 1996 according to the data of state statistical reporting, and then according to customs statistics, then on the basis of Fig. 5, one can at first glance draw conclusions about the positive results of the reform of foreign economic activity.

Rice. 5. Foreign trade of Russia (in billions of US dollars), including

unorganized trade (“shuttle traders”).

But, on the other hand, the above figures and examples for various sectors of the national economy and regions of Russia indicate that in conditions when the state has not yet mastered to the proper extent those control and regulatory functions that should be inherent in it in a modern society of mixed economy, and sometimes deliberately refuses these functions under the pressure of criminal structures or specific groups of the power elite, the emphasis only on liberalization, the rejection of the policy of reasonable protectionism leads to an increase in negative trends in the development of foreign economic relations and the economy as a whole, weakening national security and the role of Russia in world trade as a whole.

That is why blocking external threats during the transition to an open economy through the liberalization of foreign economic activity becomes a vital imperative for the future national economic policy, and this is impossible without strengthening the role of the state, without returning to the partially lost state regulation of the foreign economic sphere, in particular foreign trade, and, consequently, to the state regulation of trade and intermediary activities in foreign economic activity. Since a significant proportion of such regulation since the mid-90s has been increasingly moving from the national level to the level of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, to the level of regions, regional studies and regional management begin intensive research in this area. This is understandable: today, regional markets are practically not protected from the expansion of foreign producers. Attempts to build their own "customs space", to introduce "posts" on the borders of the territories, regions in order to check the transport that imports products from other regions into their territories, have no legal basis either in the Constitution of the Russian Federation or in the current Russian legislation, because violate the common economic and customs space of Russia.

Regulation of the foreign economic activity of resellers throughout the region, which does not have a solid legal framework and well-established methods, is becoming an urgent practical task for state and municipal employees. The solution of this urgent problem is impossible without taking into account the general processes of regionalization of the Russian economy.

The concept of liberalization

AT modern world the process of economic liberalization is considered global issue world community, which covers all countries of the world, which contributes to the implementation of free market competition between business entities.

Basic economic function the state is to create and control the implementation of legislative acts, create new jobs, support small and medium-sized businesses at all levels.

Today, in many countries there is a process of liberalization, which manifests itself in the form of a reduction in control by state bodies.

Liberalization can be internal economic and external economic, that is, the interests of all participating countries are considered.

Liberalization of foreign trade activity is a set of measures to ensure free foreign trade turnover, which leads to a reduction in customs and tariff barriers.

Today, the liberalization of foreign trade is the main requirement international community. The main requirements for liberalization were put forward by international organizations that are engaged in the control and implementation of international norms and rules.

The problems of liberalization of foreign trade today are relevant, as they allow to carry out their activities in countries with developed economies. Liberalization is opposed by protectionism, which is characterized by high rates of customs duties on all goods that are imported into Russia.

Consistent actions to liberalize foreign economic activity are a necessary process that will lead Russia to the development of the national economy in the face of existing competition. For this, it is necessary governmental support national commodity producer to sell their products on international markets.

Foreign economic activity liberalization processes

Consolidation is a strategy that is directed by the state to protect the interests of producers.
Mobilization of the domestic economy.
Diversification of the economy. Coercive measures that are aimed at developing new sectors of the economy.
Development of the Russian economy by increasing the growth of the ruble.
Reducing the outflow of capital outside the territory of Russia.

The liberalization of the external economy in the conditions of an unstable market position may lead to the failure of domestic enterprises to compete with foreign manufacturers.

Remark 1

The adopted resolution by the Russian government on the abolition of the state monopoly on foreign trade led to a new situation in the state. Bans on the import of goods into Russia were lifted and the exchange rate was liberalized. The measures taken to regulate state policy have led to intense competition between exporters.

The results of the liberalization policy carried out:

the shortage of goods disappeared;
the appearance on the domestic market of a large number of foreign goods;
many citizens of Russia were involved in the process of foreign trade activities;
foreign trade turnover of the state began to increase.

As the experience of countries with a well-developed economy shows, support from the state is necessary in terms of regulating foreign economic activity. At the state level, the following changes are taking place:

protection of the national commodity producer;
taking measures that will be aimed at increasing exports;
attracting investors to the development of the Russian economy;
stabilization of the exchange rate;
adoption and control of legislative acts on the regulation of foreign economic activity.

11.1.7 Foreign economic liberalization

Foreign economic liberalization is a process of reducing government regulation economic activity(both external and internal). It manifests itself in the fact that nationalization was replaced by privatization, in the reduction of subsidies to certain sectors of the economy, in the reduction of state regulation of TNCs and became the main direction in foreign economic policy in the 50s. XX century, replacing foreign economic protectionism. For example, many countries have reduced the level of customs taxation by several times. In recent decades, there has been a process of liberalization of the international movement of capital, which has engulfed developed countries. They liberalized both the import and export of capital. Currency and settlement relations have also been liberalized, and currency control is maintained in order to obtain statistical data on the movement of the currency and the state of settlements with the outside world.

In developing countries and countries with economies in transition, foreign economic liberalization began much later. In order to protect their sectors of the economy, which are not competitive in the world market, these countries set foreign economic customs duties higher than in developed countries by 20-30%. An example is the increased duties on the import of used foreign cars into Russia in order to protect products of the domestic automotive industry that are not competitive not only in the world, but also in the domestic market. State regulation of other forms of international economic relations is much more tangible in these countries. But even in these countries, the level of foreign economic liberalization is higher than it was in the 1970s. 20th century

Other manifestations of economic protectionism are also strong. Not only high customs duties are actively applied, but also various non-tariff restrictions: import quotas; anti-dumping legislation; rules for registration and evaluation of imported goods; technical standards and sanitary norms. All these elements of economic protectionism are sometimes more effective barriers to restricting imports than customs duties. In combination with tariff customs regulation, they make it possible to implement flexible protectionist measures in relation to individual sectors and areas of the international economy. Even in developed countries, there are sectors and areas that are closed or limited for the application of foreign capital: the defense industry, transport, and some service industries. Thus, even in the foreign economic policy of developed countries, economic protectionism is combined with the liberalization of the economy.

(Materials are given on the basis of: E.A. Maryganova, S.A. Shapiro. Macroeconomics. Express course: tutorial. - M.: KNORUS, 2010. ISBN 978-5-406-00716-7)

Common to all post-socialist countries was the elimination of the state monopoly of foreign trade. All other features of transformational changes in the entire group of countries under consideration turned out to be specific. The initial conditions that existed before the beginning of the transformation of foreign economic activity in different countries were also special. This section of the course in economics will focus on Russian peculiarities these transformations.

The foreign economic sector of Russia before the start of market reforms , inherited from the centrally planned economy, differed significantly from the foreign economic sector of countries with market economies.

This manifested itself in the following features:

There was practically no legislation corresponding to the new conditions of foreign economic activity and no real possibilities for controlling this process.

The structure and price level of most goods in the country were significantly different from those on the world market.

The ruble was not convertible (with some reservations).

Russia practically did not participate in the world capital market.

The economy was already in the process of international disintegration associated with the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

The negative consequences of the collapse of the CMEA were exacerbated by the collapse of the unified national economic complex of the USSR.

It should be added to this one more negative fact for the start of transformations: the economic difficulties of the second half of the 1980s. led "suddenly", "overnight" (in a few years) to the fact that the country owed the former fraternal socialist countries at least ten billion dollars. The fact is that as a result of the short-sighted policy of the Soviet leadership over the previous decades, huge flows of fuel and raw material resources to the socialist countries were taken into account not in world market prices, but in conditional and very low prices, not in world currencies, but in the so-called convertible rubles.

But in these decades, our exports prevailed over imports, even with such pricing. In the late 1980s, the growing economic difficulties and the exposed consumer market in the country required massive deliveries of consumer goods to the USSR. The predominance of imports over exports in trade with the European socialist countries for only five years in the second half of the 1980s. made Russia a debtor to these countries, but not in conditional convertible rubles, but in real dollars.

An additional problem that made conversions difficult. The Russian government made a political decision to take over the payment of all the debts of the USSR. Possible positive economic consequences of this decision could appear only much later. And at the beginning of the transformational transformations, this immediately turned into a heavy debt burden for the state budget of the new Russia.

These were the special features of the foreign economic sector of Russia before the start of the liberalization of the foreign trade sphere. In such difficult conditions transformations in the foreign economic sphere began with the elimination of two types of state monopoly under socialism: the foreign trade monopoly and the banking monopoly.

A simple act to abolish the state monopoly on foreign trade created a fundamentally new situation in the country. In general, foreign economic reform in a transitional economy can be characterized as liberalization of foreign economic activity.

The most important areas of foreign economic reform were the following:

The abolition of the state monopoly of foreign trade.
Instead of specialized and essentially state-owned enterprises that traded with the outside world, at first practically all enterprises, many of which had not yet been corporatized, received the right to carry out these operations.
Almost all restrictions on imports were lifted.
Finally, a partial but nonetheless radical liberalization of the exchange rate was carried out, with some reservations and restrictions.

All this was done at the very end of 1991 and in 1992 at a very adverse conditions: a sharp liberalization of prices in the presence of an acute shortage of virtually all goods and a crisis in public finances.

Such a general liberalization of foreign economic activity almost immediately showed its negative traits . First of all, it led to intense competition between Russian exporters and a general deterioration in export conditions. Export volumes fell sharply, and with many commodities in short supply on the domestic market, export earnings were not enough to meet the necessary imports of goods. As a result of the liberalization of foreign trade, Russia's foreign trade turnover in 1992 more than halved compared with 1990.

Therefore, in the second half of 1992, the process of strengthening state control over the export of goods began, that is, the process of partial liberalization of foreign trade. It manifested itself not only in the restoration of export control, but also in the introduction of temporary, and a little later, permanent import customs tariffs. Gradually, empirically, almost by touch a system of regulation of foreign economic activity of a new type was formed characteristic of a market economy.

In order to quickly saturate, at least in some volume, the empty domestic consumer market, imported consumer goods were not taxed at all until mid-1992. import duties. In order to prevent an ultra-fast jump in domestic energy prices (which in the Soviet economy were tens of times lower than world prices), which would inevitably lead to the instant bankruptcy of the vast majority of manufacturing enterprises, it was necessary to immediately introduce export tariffs. In order to replenish the treasury, which was almost empty by the end of 1991, from the beginning of 1992, mandatory sales of 40% of foreign exchange earnings at a special rate and 10% at a market rate were introduced.

As a result of the almost instantaneous opening of the Russian market, the country's economy turned out to be almost defenseless against the massive expansion of foreign producers. With the low competitiveness of most domestic goods produced by the manufacturing industry and agriculture, this brought most Russian enterprises to the brink of bankruptcy. Only those enterprises that produced fuel and raw materials, or such goods, the production costs of which (with an acceptable quality for the world level) in Russia were noticeably lower, survived. The latter was ensured by low wages and the energy and raw materials component of these costs.

Another salutary circumstance for our economy turned out to be, paradoxical as it may sound, its weakness. The fact is that the massive import of foreign goods was limited by the volume of foreign exchange earnings, which was a derivative of the volume of our exports. As exports declined, foreign exchange earnings also decreased, which constrained the purchasing power of domestic importers.

In addition, the outflow of capital abroad that began immediately also reduced the volume of foreign exchange earnings that could be used to import goods. This self-regulation of foreign economic activity, which began spontaneously, led to the fact that almost immediately, starting from 1991, the country's trade balance became positive. Positive foreign trade balance growing from year to year with its natural fluctuations.

At the same time, the actual freedom of foreign exchange transactions, which was a consequence of the freedom of foreign trade, as well as the general weakness of the state at that time, led to another phenomenon characteristic of the Russian transitional economy - negative balance of payments . main reason This is a massive outflow of Russian capital abroad.

Huge, reaching individual goods up to a hundred times, the gap in price levels for the vast majority of goods within the country and on world markets has become a source of colossal savings, appropriated by the top management of the still former state enterprises. Financial flows were transferred to specially created enterprises, which were already private, which were organized by management specifically for these purposes. The policy was simple: costs to state enterprises, profits to their private firms. The outflow of capital abroad began. To do this, foreign exchange earnings simply remained there, since it was not yet clear how long this freedom would continue and how it could end.

It is obvious that the entrepreneurs of those industries that were able to export competitive goods abroad primarily benefited from such liberalization. These commodities were mainly commodities and energy products: oil, gas, timber, fertilizers, metals. Thus, the liberalization of foreign trade almost instantly created powerful financial and political support for the new government and became a powerful factor in the initial accumulation of capital.

It is necessary to note some general positive results of liberalization of foreign economic activity in a transitional economy. Positive results for the Russian economy from the policy of liberalization of foreign economic activity were obtained almost immediately.

First, only thanks to this liberalization, despite the high price of such progress, the total shortage of goods, characteristic of the last period of the existence of the Soviet socialist economy, was liquidated and liquidated very quickly.

Secondly, the appearance on the domestic market of foreign goods in large quantities turned out to be the only and powerful factor in partially overcoming the general monopolization, which was also characteristic of the Soviet socialist economy.

Thirdly, thanks to such a policy, millions of Russian citizens ("shuttle traders", whose number reached 15 million people) became involved in foreign trade activities, which became for most of them a source of albeit small, but relatively stable incomes during the difficult years of the first phase of transformational transformations - transition to the market. At the same time, which was very important for the country at that time, this mass phenomenon made it possible to reduce social tension in the country.

Fourth, as early as 1993, the country's foreign trade turnover began to grow, and although during the first, downward phase of transformational transformations it did not reach the pre-crisis level, it remained positive all this time (since 1992).

In carrying out foreign economic reform , as in the entire transformation process, it is quite two stages can be distinguished .

A pronounced feature of the first stage of reforms in this area can be considered the weak influence of the state on the development and implementation of an active policy to stimulate domestic economic growth and improve the efficiency of the Russian economy with the help of a new foreign economic mechanism. However, state regulation in this area began to grow not at the end of the downward phase of the transformation process. and almost immediately after the one-act liberalization of foreign economic activity - since 1993, the state began to carry out a contradictory, but partially protectionist policy .

Nevertheless, in the implementation of this policy, one can single out a period starting approximately from 2000, coinciding with the upward phase of transformational transformations.

To assess the role of the new foreign economic policy Russian state, it is necessary to briefly formulate those key problems of the Russian economy, in the solution of which the purposeful use of new foreign economic mechanisms could be important. In other words, the need for a new foreign economic policy explained by the following key facts:

First: the low level of efficiency of many sectors of Russian production, which is manifested in a low level of labor productivity, high production costs (despite a number of price advantages that still remain, primarily in terms of wages and energy prices), and a low technological level of production in most industries. , not enough competitiveness of most of our products.

Second: a noticeable lag in the high-tech sector of the economy and a pronounced raw material and fuel structure of our production and exports.

Third, the place of the Russian economy in the world economy is not high enough, which does not correspond to either the country's resource potential or its needs, which is manifested in the slow average annual dynamics of Russian GDP over the past one and a half to two decades.

Fourth: insufficient and inefficient accumulation, capital outflow, insufficiently stimulating high-tech investment import policy.

Fifth, it is impossible to raise the technical level of Russian industry without importing high technologies.

Sixth: the search for an optimal place in the international division of labor that corresponds to Russian characteristics presupposes flexible state regulation of this sphere of activity based on the implementation of a generally liberal course.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that, despite the general commitment to the liberal economic course of governments Western countries and the openness of their economies, the role of the state in the implementation of active protective foreign economic activity is not questioned at all.

The main directions of the modern foreign economic strategy follow from the listed main problems of the Russian economy.

A simple act to abolish the state monopoly on foreign trade created a fundamentally new situation in the country. On the whole, foreign economic reform in a transitional economy can be characterized as the liberalization of foreign economic activity.

The most important areas of foreign economic reform were the following:

The abolition of the state monopoly of foreign trade.

Instead of specialized and essentially state-owned enterprises that traded with the outside world, at first practically all enterprises, many of which had not yet been corporatized, received the right to carry out these operations.

Almost all restrictions on imports were lifted.

Finally, a partial but nonetheless radical liberalization of the exchange rate was carried out, with some reservations and restrictions.

All this was done at the very end of 1991 and in 1992 under very unfavorable conditions: a sharp liberalization of prices in the presence of an acute shortage of virtually all goods and a crisis in public finances.

Such a general liberalization of foreign economic activity almost immediately showed its negative traits. First of all, it led to intense competition between Russian exporters and a general deterioration in export conditions. Export volumes fell sharply, and with many commodities in short supply on the domestic market, export earnings were not enough to meet the necessary imports of goods. As a result of the liberalization of foreign trade, Russia's foreign trade turnover in 1992 more than halved compared with 1990.

Therefore, in the second half of 1992, the process of strengthening state control over the export of goods began, that is, the process of partial liberalization of foreign trade. It manifested itself not only in the restoration of export control, but also in the introduction of temporary, and a little later, permanent import customs tariffs. Gradually, empirically, practically by touch, a system of regulation of foreign economic activity of a new type, characteristic of a market economy, was formed.

In order to quickly saturate, at least in some volume, the empty domestic consumer market, imported consumer goods were not subject to import duties at all until mid-1992. In order to prevent an ultra-fast jump in domestic energy prices (which in the Soviet economy were dozens of times lower than world prices), which would inevitably lead to instant bankruptcy of the vast majority of manufacturing enterprises, export tariffs had to be immediately introduced. In order to replenish the treasury, which was almost empty by the end of 1991, from the beginning of 1992, a mandatory sale of 40% of foreign exchange earnings at a special rate and 10% at a market rate was introduced.

As a result of the almost instantaneous opening of the Russian market, the country's economy turned out to be almost defenseless against the massive expansion of foreign producers. With the low competitiveness of most domestic goods produced by the manufacturing industry and agriculture, this has brought most Russian enterprises to the brink of bankruptcy. Only those enterprises survived that produced fuel and raw materials or such goods, the production costs of which (with an acceptable quality for the world level) in Russia were noticeably lower. The latter was ensured by low wages and the energy and raw materials component of these costs.

In addition, the outflow of capital abroad that began immediately also reduced the volume of foreign exchange earnings that could be used to import goods. This self-regulation of foreign economic activity, which began spontaneously, led to the fact that almost immediately, starting from 1991, the country's trade balance became positive. The positive foreign trade balance increased from year to year with its natural fluctuations.

At the same time, actual freedom currency transactions, which was a consequence of the freedom of foreign trade, as well as the general weakness of the state at that time, led to another phenomenon characteristic of the Russian transitional economy - a negative balance of payments. The main reason for this is the massive outflow of Russian capital abroad.

The huge gap in price levels for the vast majority of goods within the country and on world markets, reaching up to a hundred times for individual goods, became the source of colossal savings embezzled by the top management of the still former state-owned enterprises. Financial flows were transferred to specially created enterprises, which were already private, which were organized by management specifically for these purposes. The policy was simple: costs - to state-owned enterprises, profits - to their private firms. The outflow of capital abroad began. To do this, foreign exchange earnings simply remained there, since it was not yet clear how long this freedom would continue and how it could end.

It is obvious that, first of all, the entrepreneurs of those industries that were able to export competitive goods abroad benefited from such liberalization. These commodities were mainly commodities and energy products: oil, gas, timber, fertilizers, metals. Thus, the liberalization of foreign trade almost instantly created powerful financial and political support for the new government and became a powerful factor in the initial accumulation of capital.

Some general positive results of the liberalization of foreign economic activity in the transitional economy should also be noted. Positive results for the Russian economy from the policy of liberalization of foreign economic activity were obtained almost immediately.

Thirdly, thanks to this policy, millions of Russian citizens ("shuttle traders", whose number reached 15 million people) became involved in foreign trade activities, which became for most of them a source of albeit small, but relatively stable income in the difficult years of the first phase. transformational transformations - transition to the market. At the same time, which was very important for the country at that time, this mass phenomenon made it possible to reduce social tension in the country.

In carrying out foreign economic reform, as in the entire transformation process, it is quite possible to distinguish two stages.

A pronounced feature of the first stage of reforms in this area can be considered the weak influence of the state on the development and implementation of an active policy to stimulate domestic economic growth and improve the efficiency of the Russian economy with the help of a new foreign economic mechanism. However, state regulation in this area began to increase not at the end of the downward phase of the transformation process, but almost immediately after the one-act liberalization of foreign economic activity - since 1993, the state began to pursue a contradictory, but partially protectionist policy.

Nevertheless, in the implementation of this policy, one can single out a period starting approximately from 2000, coinciding with the upward phase of transformational transformations.

Economic consequences of the liberalization of foreign economic activity in Russia. Liberalization of foreign economic activity - abstract

Foreign economic activity liberalization processes

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