"Flying fortresses": how combat helicopters work in Syria. Helicopters become the main strike force in Syria Krasnopol guided missiles

One week after start special operation Aerospace Forces of Russia against terrorist group"Islamic State", the first shots of the combat use of our helicopters got on the Internet. In a video filmed on October 7 by militants, Mi-24P helicopters of the Russian Aerospace Forces provided support to Syrian troops near Al-Lataminah. Later, the work of our helicopter pilots was noted in other sectors of the Syrian front. The question immediately arose why the Russian command decided to use the "old men" of the "twenty-fourth" in Syria, and not the new Mi-35M, Mi-28N or Ka-52. In this article, we will try to answer this question by considering various arguments for and against.

The Mi-24P helicopter used by the RF Armed Forces in Syria was tested in combat operations in Afghanistan, Chechnya and South Ossetia, therefore spared from childhood growing pains inherent in all new machines. Since the time of Afghanistan, the helicopter has been perfectly adapted to operations in hot climates and high dustiness, which is extremely important in the Middle East theater of operations. The same Ka-52 has not yet taken part in combat operations in desert conditions, unlike the MI-35 and Mi-28, which are in service with the Iraqi army, so its first combat test in such difficult conditions might have been associated with certain difficulties.

Mi-24P is a transport and combat helicopter, which, if necessary, can be used to evacuate crews shot down by militants (or crashed for technical reasons) aircraft. Alas, this possibility cannot be ruled out, so the landing compartment of the "twenty-four", accommodating eight people or four stretchers, may well come in handy. The Ka-52 does not have a troop compartment, and the Mi-28N can only be used for evacuation as a last resort, because its technical compartment is not well suited for transporting people.

The main advantage of the Mi-24P over its "colleagues" is its firepower. The helicopter, in addition to the GSH-30K double-barreled gun, has six suspension points for guided and unguided weapons, on which anti-tank guided missiles(ATGM), unguided aircraft missiles (NAR), bombs, as well as outboard fuel tanks(PTB). The experience of fighting illegal armed formations in Afghanistan and Chechnya has shown that the main weapon of the helicopter is the NARs, which are most preferable to use against the enemy’s manpower, especially when the attacked enemy is trying to disperse. There are not so many targets for ATGMs, because militants are not as saturated with armored and automotive vehicles as the regular army. Nevertheless, we believe that guided missiles must be carried by a helicopter in the amount of several pieces.

Since Russian bombers are bombing not only on the line of contact between Syrian troops and ISIS, but also behind the lines of the Islamic State, if it is necessary to evacuate the crews of the Su-34, it will be very useful to be able to use hanging tanks on the suspension of helicopters. At the same time, it remains possible to use the entire range of weapons (ATGM, NAR), which will be needed to destroy militants trying to capture downed pilots.

The optimal armament suspension on the Mi-24P is probably as follows: several ATGMs on two pylons and NAR units on four pylons. If it is necessary to work at a great distance from the base, the suspension option can be as follows: ATGM on two pylons, NAR units on two pylons, PTB on two pylons. In any of these options, the helicopter is capable of providing a serious fire impact on the enemy.

Now consider its competitors. Both the Mi-35M and the Mi-28N have only 4 suspension points, respectively, their firepower is weaker than on the older brother, and when working at a great distance from the base, the range of weapons will also be weakened due to the suspension of the PTB, leaving under the ATGM or NAR has only two pylons. The Ka-52 has six suspension points, like the Mi-24P, but the guided missiles for this helicopter, according to some reports, have not yet passed the entire test cycle. It seems to us that it would be unreasonable to send a helicopter to war, which is deprived of the ability to attack armored objects and fortified firing points of militants with guided weapons.

Also, the possibility of sending the Mi-28N to Syria could be affected by the August crash of one of the helicopters of this type on demonstration flights during the Aviadarts competition. Undoubtedly, until the end of the work of the commission investigating this incident, it would be wrong to use a vehicle in the combat zone that may have problems with the health of the material part.

Of course, the new type of helicopters (Mi-28N, Ka-52) have improved ability to work "on the ground" on their own, without resorting to air controllers, as well as a higher chance of evading an attack using MANPADS, but it seems that Russian Ministry defense decided that the use of a machine proven over the years, which has large quantity options with weapon suspension and large evacuation capabilities, in this situation it will be preferable. Given that until now there has been no particular frequency of use of MANPADS by militants, perhaps there is a reason for this.

During military operation in Syria, the Russian Armed Forces tested many of the latest models in combat Russian weapons and technology. At the same time, for the first time, vehicles that had been in service for more than a dozen years were used in combat for the first time. However, first things first.

Strategic missile carrier Tu-160 "White Swan" with Kh-101 missiles

Tu-160 "White Swan" supersonic strategic missile-carrying bombers, which are called Blackjack in the West, began to operate as early as 1987. However, the first combat use Swans took place in Syria in 2015.

Now Russia has 16 such aircraft, but soon up to 50 modernized aircraft should enter service.

The formidable missile carrier, which is considered a means of nuclear deterrence, destroyed terrorists conventional ammunition- KAB-500 air bombs and X-101 cruise missiles.

The latter should be mentioned separately, since they were also used for the first time in Syria. it cruise missiles a new generation, with a fantastic flight range - 5500 kilometers, several times more than European and American counterparts. The rocket is oriented in space using a combined navigation system: inertial plus GLONASS. The X-101 flies in the altitude range from 30 meters to 10 kilometers, is invisible to radars and is very accurate - the maximum deviation from the target at the maximum range does not exceed five meters. Unlike its predecessors, the missile can also destroy moving targets. The mass of the high-explosive fragmentation warhead Kh-101 is 400 kilograms. The nuclear version of the missile, the Kh-102, carries a 250 kiloton warhead.

According to a number of experts, using in Syria strategic aviation, Russia tested a new strategy, revolutionizing military affairs.

Small missile ships of the Buyan-M project with Caliber missiles

Project 21631 Buyan-M small missile ships are multi-purpose ships of the river-sea class. Their weapons include artillery mount A-190, machine gun mounts of 14.5 and 7.62 mm calibers, as well as anti-aircraft artillery complex"Duet", and anti-ship cruise missiles "Caliber-NK" and "Onyx". Autonomous navigation of such a ship can last up to ten days.

During the war in Syria, Caliber cruise missiles managed not only to pass baptism of fire, but also acquire the status of world famous. The hits of these missiles on targets, filmed by drones, as well as video recordings of their launches became one of the business cards Russian Navy.

Unlike foreign competitors, "Caliber" can fly in a wide range of speeds from subsonic to three times the speed of sound. Guidance on the final section of the trajectory is carried out using noise-protected active radar heads homing.

Missiles are capable of overcoming any anti-aircraft and missile defense. The flight takes place at an altitude of 50 to 150 meters, and when approaching the target, the missile drops to twenty meters and strikes, which cannot be prevented. The flight of missiles is carried out along a complex trajectory with a change in altitude and direction of movement. This gives her the opportunity to approach the target from any direction unexpected for the enemy.

As for the accuracy of the hit, the expression "hit the bull's eye" is appropriate here. For example, the export version of the "Caliber" shoots at 300 kilometers and destroys a target with a diameter of 1-2 meters. It is clear that the missiles used by the Russian Navy have even higher accuracy characteristics.

In Syria, Caliber launches were carried out from small missile ships"Uglich", "Grad Sviyazhsk", "Veliky Ustyug", "Zeleny Dol" and "Serpukhov" (as well as from other types of ships and submarines).

Russian winged Calibers have already become a headache for the United States - after all, in the anti-ship version they are more effective than the American Tomahawks, and their placement on small displacement ships creates many difficulties for potential adversaries.

Guided projectiles "Krasnopol"

In Syria, for the first time, Russian guided missiles were used to eliminate terrorists. artillery shells Krasnopol. firing range modern modifications"Krasnopol" is 30 kilometers. Weight explosive in ammunition of this type is from 6.5 to 11 kilograms.

One of the main features of the machine is its high maneuverability. Besides, " Night Hunter"can perform combat missions at any time of the day.

The armored cockpit of the helicopter protects the crew from 20-mm projectiles and armor-piercing bullets. Armor also protects the most important systems helicopter. The Mi-28N is equipped with a radar located above the propeller hub. The use of this complex allows you to effectively search, detect, recognize and defeat ground and air targets. The helicopter is armed with a 30 mm automatic cannon. It can also carry guided (anti-tank) or unguided (against infantry and light vehicles) air-to-ground missiles. The possibility of installing air-to-air missiles is also provided, which allows the Mi-28UB to destroy not only aircraft and helicopters, but also small-sized drones and even cruise missiles. The helicopter has four suspension points and, among other things, can be used to lay minefields.

Two such helicopters were on board the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier during the Syrian campaign. There, the Ka-52K took to the air and carried out test launches of missiles.

Ka-52K "Katran" is a shipborne version of the Ka-52 "Alligator" and is designed for patrolling, fire support for landing troops on the coast, solving problems of antiamphibious defense on cutting edge and in tactical depth at any time of the day.

The ship's "Katran" differs from the basic version by the presence of a shortened folding wing, which was modified to accommodate heavy weapons, and a blade folding mechanism, which allows it to be compactly located in the hold.

Nevertheless, despite the "miniature dimensions", the Ka-52K has formidable weapons. These are torpedoes, depth charges and cruise anti-ship missiles.

The helicopter is equipped with a laser-beam weapon guidance system and the Okhotnik video image processing system. Optoelectronic complex "Vitebsk" protects "Katran" from missiles with infrared homing heads.

Tank T-90

However, the Tu-160, Mi-28N and Admiral Kuznetsov are not the only well-known "oldies" first seen in combat in Syria.

For the first time, T-90s were used by Syrian troops in the province of Aleppo in 2016.

In addition, for the first time in Syria, they tested the T-90 secret weapon - the Shtora-1 optoelectronic suppression system, designed just to protect the tank from ATGMs.

Syrian tankers highly appreciated the capabilities of the T-90. They called its only drawback the lack of air conditioning, which makes it difficult to fight in the desert.

Recently it became known that the tank was modernized taking into account the Syrian experience.

Armored cars "Typhoon"

The new Russian Typhoon armored vehicles were also tested in Syria for the first time. In early 2017, a Typhoon-K armored vehicle was spotted there.

K63968 "Typhoon-K" is a cabover multifunctional modular vehicle. Modified for transportation personnel can accommodate up to 16 people. The landing of troops can be carried out both with the help of a ramp and through the door. The cab of the car is protected by reinforced armor. It also provides for the installation of a bulletproof shield on the windshield.

The new armored car is not afraid of even some types of RPGs. From these "tank killers" the car is saved by special attachments that reliably protect the crew from cumulative jets. Typhoon wheels are bulletproof and equipped with special anti-explosion inserts.

The mass of the fully equipped Typhoon is 24 tons, the length of the hull is 8990 millimeters, and the width is 2550 millimeters. 450 Horse power engines allow the armored car to move at a speed of 110 kilometers per hour.

The machine is built on a 6x6 wheel formula, which allows it to easily overcome impassability, snow drifts and any other types of obstacles. In Syria, Typhoons are used not only to transport personnel, but also, for example, to deliver humanitarian aid.

repost with el-murid

A rather curious text from the Web regarding an overview of the tactics of the military structures of the Islamic State based on the siege of Mosul. It is worth remembering that the plan for the defense of Mosul and its organization were provided with the direct participation and leadership of the former commander of the Tajik OMON Gulmurod Khalimov, who had a colossal practical experience war in Tajikistan, as well as a serious theoretical training obtained including in pindosne.
The war of the forces of the Caliphate against the Iraqi army gave a lot of analytical material that allows us to evaluate some of the features of the strategy and tactics of conducting combat operations by the troops of the Islamic State.

The basis of the strategy of the Caliphate is the knowledge of the strategy and tactics of the Pindosni, Iraq and Iran, the knowledge political views the leadership of these countries and their generals to wage a full-scale war. Therefore, when preparing units, we took into account strengths coalition forces (absolute superiority in the air, in armored vehicles, in heavy weapons) and the lack of their own ability to organize modern air defense, active means to counter the Air Force in most of the territory of the Caliphate.

The strategy and tactics are based on the lessons of not only the Middle East wars, but also actions in a war with a technologically superior enemy using the lessons of the Afghan, Chechen and Vietnam Wars. The war began to unfold according to a fundamentally new scenario with "non-classical tactics and strategy."

Artillery plays a significant role in warfare, especially its light models, such as recoilless guns, mortars and grenade launchers, which are easily carried by calculation from place to place or can be transported by car (or, as in cases with BO, installed in the back). Also, howitzer artillery and MLRS pose a serious threat to the enemy, causing great damage to infantry and equipment various types. The problem with this type of weapon is their size and the difficulty of discreet transportation. Therefore, advance preparations are made for PU missile systems and their rocket crews, as well as towing artillery crews of a network of underground tunnels, basements, first floors of buildings and shelters for stockpiles of weapons and personnel. Most of the launch points for unguided rockets (NURS) during defensive battles are determined in advance. For each individual point, for each individual launcher, data is prepared for firing from underground tunnels and shelters.

Part of the trigger points are masked so that they can be reused. For this, houses damaged by shelling of artillery and enemy aircraft can also be used. Often, during such shelling, holes appear in the reinforced concrete ceiling slabs, sufficient for firing through them from basements where installations like the RPU-14 can be placed. After launch, such an installation hides under the protection of the surviving part of the roof, which greatly complicates its subsequent detection for aerial reconnaissance enemy. In addition, concrete positions and bunkers, anti-tank weapons and mine traps are prepared in advance for the defense of missile installations, missile stockpiles and launch areas. Unlike the partisan experience of using autonomous launchers in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, when light rockets were launched randomly, manually, without causing much damage to the enemy, ISIS often uses massive rocket and mortar attacks, which requires the organization of available " missile troops"military style.

At the same time, in order not to lose the prepared calculations, ISIS uses the tactics of not “nomadic launchers”, but “roaming launcher crews”. This was important in the conditions of the dominance of coalition aviation in the air. With a good supply of NURS, it was necessary to save the prepared calculations, which, when moving for the subsequent launch, were not unmasked by the launcher. With this tactic, applying missile strikes carried out by the rapid departure of the calculations from shelters and the concealment of the calculation in underground tunnels immediately after the volley. At the same time, launchers or guides for NURS were used repeatedly without changing positions.

In order to ensure the survivability of mobile launchers for launching rockets, alternating tactics were used to occupy the towed launchers with false and true launchers, hiding them immediately after launch in the opposite direction (thus eliminating the possibility of detecting a real shelter). The method of simulating the activity of the calculation of the launcher at a false launch site was often used.

IS mainly locate their warehouses, headquarters and firing positions inside populated areas, seeking to relocate weapons and units so that it differs little from the migration of civilians. Part of the PU was serviced local residents, and this was done in the courtyards of ordinary residential buildings. The same goes for pre-prepared VBIEDs, often waiting in the covered garages of residential buildings. As a result, a combination of prepared systems of decoys and true targets, imitation launchers or missile crews allow ISIS to achieve a situation where air force strikes become much less effective than they can be. At the same time, istishkhadi themselves perform the function of attack aircraft, inflicting great damage and causing confusion in the enemy camp.

In strictly tactical terms, IS fighters managed to apply three pre-prepared tactics: they prevented the enemy from using helicopters with infantry support; created a threat to his tanks and armored personnel carriers; forced the infantry to engage in battle at a short distance and hand-to-hand combat, which they are not used to (which is evidenced by the large losses during the attacks of the Inghimasians).

Also, the leaders of the Caliphate put into effect a pre-prepared operational-strategic method: the transfer of hostilities to the routes of supply of weapons, equipment and aviation munitions from the places of their receipt to the front line. The technique of "exporting resistance abroad" is also applied. Here we are talking not about terrorist attacks against the West, but about the expansion of IS through voluntary accession and the creation of vilayats in Afghanistan, Libya, Nigeria and other countries.

The war proceeded according to the scenario that IS offered to its opponents. Anticipating that government forces, backed by the Peshmerga, would attempt a breakthrough in eastern Mosul (indeed, pushing them to do so), IS prepared a meter by meter battle zone. The way out was not bunkers, the construction of which requires a lot of time and materials and would certainly have been noticed by aviation, but the equipment of tens of thousands of trenches 50 centimeters wide and 60 centimeters deep, covered with branches that turn into additional separate shelters, as well as digging tunnels with disguised entrances connecting these trenches among themselves.

In order to limit the use of aviation, and primarily combat helicopters, combat operations were used at ultra-short distances of 50-75 meters, which did not allow the coalition to use combat helicopters because of the possible defeat of their soldiers. When the government infantry advanced, the Mujahideen let it in as close as possible and, jumping out of the trenches, struck from close range. Always operating as part of a unit, government troops found themselves disoriented during close combat. Such a battle did not allow the use of army and attack aircraft because of the risk of striking at their own. This tactic calls into question the use of helicopters: in such conditions, they cannot fire machine guns at enemy units. In addition, ISIS has no units in the full sense of the word. The enemy is met by small well-trained and armed groups, dispersed in their places and always ready to counterattack. Therefore, helicopters prefer to stay away from enemy positions in order to minimize losses from RPGs and heavy machine guns which can be inflicted on them by the Mujahideen from ambushes.

ISIS amirs skillfully used the terrain and an extensive network of bunkers, underground passages messages and shelters, underground command posts. These command posts often they are underground, well-fortified communications in villages, sometimes hundreds of meters long, with depots of weapons and ammunition, from where IS units carried out defensive operations, either suddenly shelling the enemy, or just as suddenly disappearing. In such not even bunkers, but entire underground villages, you can long time live autonomously without replenishing food and ammunition. Hiding in the tunnels, the Mujahideen easily evaded air and artillery raids, and then, if necessary, moved from one "village" to another without any problems, creating the illusion of their large number, which negatively affected the morale of the enemy troops. At the same time, coalition troops, revealing such shelters, simply blow them up, not risking using them themselves for surprise attack attempts, because. the risk of an ambush is great, which will invariably lead to heavy losses among the attackers, because numerical superiority and superiority in armament in conditions of cramped tunnels do not play any role.

Numerous minefields were planted in the front line, which took time and lives from the advancing, and also forced them to move along those routes where the attack on them was most convenient. By moving their armored vehicles in places free from mines, government troops approach the most trained warriors of the Caliphate, trained in guerrilla operations and armed with anti-tank systems to destroy armored vehicles at long distances and RPGs. The considerable saturation of combat groups with machine guns helps in this, which does not allow the army infantry to make maneuvers on the battlefield and bypass the positions of the Mujahideen. As always in urban battles, high efficiency shows mass application snipers. All this, combined with the sudden and deadly attacks of the istishkhadi, brings a consistently high result in clashes with the military.

The caliphate created an effective and repeatedly duplicated communication system, starting with wired and ending with personal beepers, which made it possible to conduct a clear control of the troops. The fighting in Mosul appears to have employed a decentralized leadership tactic that has virtually thwarted all efforts to undermine governance. The encircled ISIS units received help from the nearest unit, based not on the orders received, but on the basis of the situation when the amirs made their own decisions. An example of this can be the battles for the al-Salam hospital, when during the day the units of the 9th armored division, together with reinforcements from the "golden men", not only failed to defeat the outnumbered fighters of the Caliphate, but they themselves were surrounded when help approached the Mujahideen .

Good controllability and organization of units is also one of the keys to high efficiency. Even when the coalition managed to deliver serious blows to ISIS, the control system functioned. For example, part of the districts of eastern Mosul was taken by the federal forces of Iraq, but even these districts of the city were not completely controlled by the military, and their losses there remained stably high, while field commanders The ISIS responsible for this area of ​​"work" did not cease to direct the actions of the Mujahideen and sent assistance to the areas occupied by the federals, trying, based on the situation, to evacuate as much as possible even the bodies of martyrs from the battlefields.

Mujahideen act not only by methods guerrilla war, but also use the tactics of small units of the regular army. During the fighting, they operate as part of units of up to 50 people, but most often in groups of 15-20 people. The actions of small groups of 6-8 people are effective, which carry 5-8 ATGMs, 1-2 machine guns, and an additional supply of missiles is located in well-camouflaged bunkers. These groups hit enemy tanks and other armored vehicles at a distance of 1.5-2 km and can operate even at night using night vision devices. ATGMs are used not only against armored vehicles, but also to destroy enemy personnel occupying positions in houses and various buildings. Especially effective in the latter case is the use of old Malyutka ATGMs. Underbarrel grenade launchers are actively used to defeat manpower.

A characteristic tactical technique of the ISIS is the mining of roads and paths deep behind enemy lines, incl. forces of local underground/partisan formations and the actions of small mobile groups along the supply lines of the federal army and against government roadblocks. The tactics are simple and effective: laying mines on the road (especially in places where pursuit can be organized), a short but powerful fire attack and a withdrawal, often followed by intense mortar fire of various calibers. In addition to material and human losses, such rear surprise attacks turn out to be a great psychological blow to the supply troops of the Iraqi troops, who cannot feel safe even in the deep rear.

As for enemy technology. The Mujahideen are aware of the weakness of the thermal imager in the rear hemisphere of the Abrams M1A2 tanks. This machine, with a good set of weapons, can cost 50 million dollars, but it has two "dead corners" of the thermal imager in the rear of the hull, in other words, two points that can be approached so that the commander and crew notice the enemy in the immediate vicinity only at the very the last moment, that is, does not have time to react. Also, the effectiveness of a thermal imager is greatly reduced in heat, dust and heavy smoke, which is an almost invariable attribute of the war in Iraq. This made it possible to disable and destroy about ninety Abrams alone and only in Mosul, not to mention a variety of other equipment.

Thus, based on all of the above, we can draw a simple conclusion: the war continues and will continue for a very long time, much longer than the imaginary masters of the world would like and may well end in their defeat, but only Allah knows whether this is destined to come true.

PS. And in addition to this text. ISIS statistics on battles in Iraq for 1431 Hijri (September 2016 to September 2017) have been released. As you can see, the main losses (more than half) of the Iraqi army fell on the IS vilayets of Ninewa, Diyala and Jazira - in fact, we are talking about the battle for Mosul. The casualties included the army, military police, Peshmerga and As-Sahwa divisions. Shiite pro-Iranian ISIS proxies are traditionally included in a separate list, without mixing them with everyone else. Here we are talking about a purely existential approach - this opponent of ISIS denies the right to be considered an enemy, dehumanizing him to the level of animals. Actually, the Shiites pay the same.