Tactics of warfare in the forest. Armament of a platoon Let's consider the tactics of combat in the forest using the example of the most familiar to us zone of forest terrain of a temperate climate. For effective combat in the forest, it is necessary to regroup the platoon. Depending on the combat mission and the region in which the fighting takes place, the specifics, composition and armament of the unit may change. But, since ambushes are always the main danger for the group, the structure of the platoon should provide maximum resistance to them and minimize casualties. The platoon is divided into 4 squads of 4 fighters each (“fours”) and 4 combat “twos”. In three combat "fours" are: machine gunner (PKM), assistant machine gunner (AK with GP), sniper (VSS), shooter (AK with GP). In one of the "fours" the sniper needs to have an IED. These are the three main combat units. The squad leader is a sniper. All the fighters of the "quartet" act in his interests. In one of the "fours" are the platoon commander (VSS) and the radio operator (AK). The fourth combat "four" includes: a machine gunner (PKM), an assistant machine gunner (AKMN with PBS), a grenade launcher (RPG-7), an assistant grenade launcher (AKMN with PBS). This is the fire department. It follows the lead watch. Its task is to create a high density of fire, stop and delay the enemy while the main forces turn around and take up positions to repel the attack. The squad leader is a machine gunner, and all the fighters of the "four" act with their fire, ensuring his work. The combat "twos" are the head and rear patrols and 2 side guards. Their armament is the same and consists of AK with GP, AKS-74UN2 with PBS is also appropriate. For machine guns, it is better to use magazines from the RPK for 45 rounds. Each fighter, except for machine gunners, an assistant grenade launcher and a radio operator, carries 2-3 RPG-26s, and preferably MRO-A or RGSH-2. After the start of the clash, the "four" fire countermeasures, following the head patrol, also open fire on the enemy, suppressing his activity with machine-gun fire and fire from RPG-7. The assistant machine gunner and the assistant grenade launcher of the fire resistance group are armed with AKMN with PBS. This allows them, once again without being illuminated, to destroy the enemy, representing an immediate danger to the machine gunner and grenade launcher. If the enemy is detected from the front by the head patrol, and the patrol remains unnoticed, the arrows from the PBS destroy the enemy with fire from a silent weapon. From the features of such a structure, it can be seen that the fighters in the platoon are somehow grouped in pairs. This contributes to combat coordination, the development of conditional signals, and a better understanding of each other. At the same time, it should be noted that it is often appropriate to divide a platoon in half, 12 fighters each. Each group performs a specific combat mission. In this situation, a dozen will act differently. Each reinforced squad includes 2 PKM (Pecheneg) machine gunners, 2 VSS snipers, 8 riflemen (AK + GP). The second squad includes an RPG-7 grenade launcher and two shooters with AKMN + PBS. With such an organization in the squad on the march, 3 fighters (machine gunner and 2 shooters), core (4 shooters, 2 snipers) and rear guards (machine gunner, 2 shooters) go on the head patrol. In case of a sudden collision with the enemy, the lead patrol opens heavy fire and holds the enemy while the rest turn around. In the event of a sudden collision with superior enemy forces, the rear patrol takes up an advantageous position and covers the withdrawal of the entire group. In the forest area, open areas are not very common - as a rule, these are the banks of rivers and lakes, burnt areas, hilltops, glades. That is, basically the area is “closed”. The range of fire contact in such conditions is minimal, and there is no need for long-range weapons (such as Kord, ASVK, AGS and even SVD), but the soldiers should have a pistol or submachine gun as an additional weapon. A great tactical advantage in the forest is the use of mines. The most convenient, in my opinion, is MON-50. It is relatively light and practical. Each of the fighters of the group, except for machine gunners, an assistant grenade launcher and a radio operator, can carry at least one mine. Sometimes it is convenient to use the MON-100, which, with a mass of 5 kg, provides a defeat corridor 120 meters long and 10 meters wide. It is convenient to install it on clearings and roads, directing it along them or along the edge of the forest. POM-2R mines are also needed, truly irreplaceable. After being brought into combat position, the mine becomes armed in 120 seconds and throws four 10-meter target sensors in different directions. The radius of the circular defeat - 16 meters. It is very convenient for mining when a group retreats, or when it is necessary to quickly create a minefield in the enemy's path. Summarizing the above, we note: the result is a platoon armed with 4 PKM or Pecheneg machine guns, 3 VSS silent sniper rifles, 1 SVU-AS, 1 RPG-7; 17 fighters each have 2-3 RPG-26 grenade launchers (34-51 pcs.), 2 AKMN with PBS, 14 fighters are armed with GP and carry at least 18 mines MON-50 and 18 mines POM-2R.

PROMOTION OF A GROUP FROM 10 TO 30 PEOPLE

1. Breaking into groups of 7-9 people, the distance of movement between groups in open areas of the forest is 30-40 meters, in light forest 20 meters, in the forest 10-15 meters, the main requirement is direct visibility between groups;
2. A reconnaissance group moves in front of the vanguard group (at a distance of twice the line of sight) in order to identify enemy ambushes. Its composition is 2-3 people, the movement in a line in line of sight from each other, the presence of radio communication between themselves and the main group is recommended;
3. When an ambush is detected, it is necessary (if the reconnaissance group is not detected) to immediately stop the movement, disguise, inform the main group. And in no case should you attack on your own, unless there is a two-fold or more numerical advantage.

   Example options for action:

   • If the scouts were not found, and the enemy is an ambush or a barrier post, it is necessary to call a group from the main detachment (7-9 people), this group is divided into two parts and goes around the ambushes on both sides, hitting the rear and sides, while the reconnaissance group distracts itself the enemy but do not expose themselves and fire from cover from a safe distance;
   • If the scouts are detected, an ambush or a barrage post, the second option is to immediately cover for firing and continue to act according to the previous method
   • If the scouts are not detected or detected, and the enemy is a detachment of more than 6-8 people, the scouts disguise themselves and call two detachments from the main column (the point is that when attacking, you need a twofold superiority over the enemy).

One of the best and simple tactics of fighting in the forest is the “double tail”. The group advances in a column of two in a checkerboard pattern, the right side of the column is responsible (observes) for the right side of the path of movement, the left for the left. When attacking, the columns, starting from the “tail”, bend in a semicircle and move towards the place of conflict, as a result, the location of the enemy is taken into the ring. For this type of attack, one factor is needed - more radio stations.

GROUP PROMOTION FROM 4 TO 10 PEOPLE

It is better to move in two identical lines in a checkerboard pattern, the front line should occupy protected positions (behind stumps, in natural ravines, bushes, behind trees, etc.), and the back column quickly moves 10-20 meters further than the front, after which it takes up protected positions, and the covering group itself moves forward and so on. When an enemy is detected or comes under fire, it is necessary to estimate the number of the enemy and either attack or retreat, but in the same order as they moved on the march. The ranks should not be widely stretched, because you can miss a camouflaged enemy, so each fighter has his own sector of fire (the direction of firing which for one fighter does not exceed 90 degrees).

GROUP PROMOTION OF UP TO 4 PEOPLE

It is advisable to move exactly in twos, and the advancement of each two can occur in an arbitrary order (both in a column and in a line), the main thing is not to lose sight of a fighter from your two and at least one person from another. When moving, stops are necessarily made (after two or three minutes) to look around and listen to sounds that are not related to the sounds of the forest. Such groups are the least vulnerable to detection and therefore can be used for deep reconnaissance in enemy territory or neutral territory. It can be used for a surprise raid (with a quick retreat) on a larger Vran force, but it is not recommended to engage similar enemy groups due to early detection of the group.

DEFENSE TACTICS

Necessary actions carried out in preparing positions for defense:

1. Choosing a dominant position for firing and observation
2. Camouflage positions for firing and surveillance
3. Availability of escape routes;
4. Convenient exit for counterattack;
5. Distribution of sectors of fire and observation
6. Relationship with the command center and between other positions

Necessary actions in defense

1. Upon detection of the enemy, immediately report to the remaining positions and to the command center, report the approximate number of the enemy, the place of their detection and the intended direction of movement;
2. The distant lines of defense, if poorly camouflaged - retreat to the main lines, if well camouflaged - let the enemy through and, after a fire collision with the main lines of defense, hit the rear;
3. The main lines of defense, let the enemy in only at a distance of confident defeat and after that open simultaneous fire on predetermined sectors;
4. When reloading weapons - notify - - partners, to cover their sector of fire, simultaneous reloading with more than one partner along the defensive line is not allowed;
5. The counterattack is carried out on a common signal, simultaneously, but leaving fire cover
6. When breaking through the defense, it is recommended to send additional forces there, if this is not possible, to retreat in an organized manner deep into the defended territory;
7. With a significant superiority of the enemy, and the surrounding defense lines, collect the remaining fighters and at the same time break through with all your forces in one (predetermined) direction.

REMEMBER

• When defending, the losses of the attacking side are at least 50% greater than those of the defenders;
• The better the camouflage of defensive positions, the later the enemy will find them, respectively, he will come closer and the fire of the defenders will be more effective;
• The more smoothly the process of reloading weapons, the less “blind” sectors remain and the less likely it is to break through the defense line;
• The presence of radio communications for most players gives an advantage in the possession of information during the battle.

Offensive- the main type of combat carried out in order to defeat the enemy and capture important areas (frontiers, objects) of the terrain. It consists in defeating the enemy with all available means, a decisive attack, the rapid advance of troops into the depths of his location, the destruction and capture of manpower, the capture of weapons, military equipment and designated areas (boundaries) of the terrain.

Attack- the rapid and non-stop movement of tank, motorized rifle and paratrooper units in battle order, combined with intense fire.

During the attack, a fighter in the squad relentlessly follows the armored vehicles and destroys enemy fire weapons, primarily anti-tank ones, with his fire.

Attack

Depending on the task being performed and the conditions of the situation, an offensive can be carried out on an infantry fighting vehicle (armored personnel carrier, tank), inside (except for a tank) or by landing from above.

The submachine gunner and machine gunner should be aware that when firing through loopholes, the direction of fire should be 45-60 °; and shooting is carried out only in short bursts of loopholes; the direction of fire should be 45-60 °; and shooting is carried out only in short bursts.

Actions of personnel in armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles during an attack on combat vehicles.

Attack on foot

When attacking on foot, at the command of the squad leader "Squad, prepare to dismount", the soldier puts the weapon on the safety lock, removes it from the loophole (when operating as an assault force inside the vehicle) and prepares to dismount. When the car reaches the dismounting line at the command "To the car", he jumps out of the combat vehicle and at the command of the squad leader "Squad, in the direction (such and such), directing (such and such), - to battle, forward" or "Squad, follow me - to battle "takes its place in the chain with an interval between employees of 6-8 m (8-12 steps) and firing on the move at a run or at an accelerated pace as part of the squad continues to move towards the front line of the enemy.

Deployment of the squad from pre-battle order to combat.

The attack must be swift, a slow-moving fighter is a convenient target for the enemy.

In cases where a squad performs a maneuver in connection with a change in direction of movement or a soldier encounters an obstacle, it is strictly forbidden to change his place in the battle order of the squad. During the offensive, monitor the neighbors on the right and left, monitor (the signals) given by the commanders and clearly follow them, if necessary, duplicate the commands to the neighbors.

Overcoming the minefield along the passage after the tank.

Overcoming a minefield along a passage made in advance in case of impossibility of using armored vehicles.

Approaching the enemy trench at 30-35 m, the fighter, at the command of the commander "Grenade - fire" or on his own, throws a grenade into the trench and crouching with a swift jerk with a shout of "Hurrah!" resolutely breaks into the front line of defense, destroys the enemy with point-blank fire and unceasingly continues the attack in the indicated direction.

Attack on the front line of the enemy's defense. Fire grenades.

If a soldier is forced to fight in a trench or communication, then he advances as quickly as possible. Before entering a break in a trench or communication path, he throws a grenade and fires 1-2 bursts from his personal weapon ("combing with fire"). It is advisable to inspect the trench together, with one moving along the trench, and the second bending down from above a little behind, warning the soldier in the trench about bends and other dangerous places (dugouts, blocked slots, rifle cells). Wire obstacles in the form of "hedgehogs", "slingshots", etc., placed by the enemy in a trench, are thrown upwards with a bayonet-knife attached to the machine gun, and if they are mined, they go over the trench. Detected mine-explosive barriers are marked with brightly visible signs (scraps of red or white cloth) or destroyed by demolition. Moving along the trench, you should make as little noise as possible, using bayonet-knife injections, blows with a butt, a magazine or an infantry shovel to destroy the enemy.

Fight in the trench.

Trench advance.

Infantry fighting vehicles (APCs), when dismounting personnel, move in leaps, behind the attackers, from cover to cover, at a distance of up to 200 m providing reliable fire cover, and in the case of weak enemy anti-tank defense and in combat formations of dismounted units.

Fire is fired over the chain of the squad and in the gaps between the squads. In some cases, armored vehicles are reduced to armored groups, and are also used for fire support of attackers, firing from permanent or temporary firing positions.

The sniper, acting in the attacking line, or behind the attackers, carefully observes the battlefield and hits the most dangerous targets first of all (ATGM crews, grenade launchers, machine gunners, as well as enemy command personnel). Sniper fire is also effective on aiming and observation devices of enemy combat vehicles.

An offensive in depth, as a rule, is carried out by landing on armored vehicles, obstacles and obstacles, as a rule, are bypassed, the enemy in the discovered strongholds and centers of resistance is destroyed by a swift attack to the flank and rear.

Sometimes fighters in the course of an offensive, when advancing to the line of attack, can move behind an infantry fighting vehicle (APC) under the cover of armor.

Offensive under the cover of armored vehicles.

Attack in the city

Combat in the city requires from the soldier the ability to outwit the enemy, determination and iron restraint. The defending enemy is especially cunning, his counterattacks and fire should be expected from everywhere. Before the attack, it is necessary to reliably suppress the enemy, and during the attack, conduct preemptive fire in short bursts at the windows, doors and embrasures (breaks in the walls, fences) of the attacked and neighboring buildings. When advancing to the object, use underground communications, gaps in the walls, forest plantations, dustiness of the area and smoke. When conducting a battle in a city, combat pairs or troikas (combat crews) should be formed in squads (platoons), while taking into account the individual combat experience of the fighters and their personal affection. During the battle, the maneuver and actions of one must be supported by the fire of comrades in the calculation, and the actions of the calculation by the fire of other calculations and armored vehicles.

Calculation actions as part of a triple

When conducting an offensive in a city, soldiers move on the battlefield, as a rule, in short dashes from cover to cover with reliable fire support from comrades and combat vehicles. Under enemy fire, the length of the dash should not exceed 8-10 meters (10-12 steps), while straight movement should be avoided, moving in a zigzag.

Ways to move when fighting in the city

Target designation for combat vehicles is carried out with tracer bullets, for which each submachine gunner must have one magazine equipped with cartridges with tracer bullets.

Approaching the building, a fighter throws a hand grenade into the windows (doors, gaps) and, firing from a machine gun, penetrates inside.

While fighting inside the building, the soldier acts quickly and decisively before bursting into the room, it is "combed" with fire or bombarded with grenades. You should be wary of closed doors. they can be mined. Indoors, very often the enemy hides behind a door or pieces of furniture (sofas, armchairs, cabinets, etc.).

Moving along the floors, it is necessary to shoot through the landings with fire, move from the platform with a throw, move from top to bottom while crouching so as to notice the enemy before he notices you (your legs).

Actions when moving up stairs

Calculation actions as part of a troika during indoor combat

Locked doors are destroyed by a grenade or a burst from a machine gun at the lock. Having captured the building and cleared it of the enemy, you should move faster to the next one, not giving the enemy the opportunity to gain a foothold in it.

offensive in the mountains

During an offensive in the mountains, the main role in destroying the enemy is assigned to infantry subunits, artillery, and aviation.

When attacking the enemy, one should pin him down with fire, widely use maneuvers with the aim of reaching the flank and rear, occupying dominating heights and conducting a top-down attack.

Separation maneuver to exit for a top-down attack

In the mountains, when attacking, it is necessary to move, as a rule, at an accelerated pace or in short dashes, while more than half of the attackers must cover the movement of comrades on the battlefield with fire. In the mountains, as well as in the city, it is advisable to use the tactics of combat crews.

Calculation actions when advancing to the line of attack (to the starting point for attack)

When throwing hand-held fragmentation grenades from the bottom up, it is recommended to use grenades with a contact fuse of the RGO, RGN type or throw a grenade of the RGD-5, RG-42 type through the enemy's trench (shelter). When throwing a grenade from top to bottom, do not throw it or throw it exactly into the trench, taking into account the grenade rolling down the slope.

An offensive in a settlement, mountains and forests requires an increased consumption of ammunition, especially hand grenades, so when preparing, you should take ammunition in excess of the installed wearable ammunition, but you should always remember to save and preserve the emergency stock, which is also increasing.

Approximate list of ammunition in the conduct of hostilities in the village, mountains and forests.

Type of weapon	Ammunition	Note
AC	300-400
AKS-74	450-500
AKMS	300-450
PKM	800-1200	including and assistant
VSS	250-300
SVD	100-200	w.h. for PC
RPG-7	5-8	distributed: 2-3 at the grenade launcher; 3 at the assistant; 2-4 with other squad soldiers.
F-1, RGO, RGD-5, RG-42, RGN	4-8	mainly for submachine gunners.
RPG-18 (22, 26)	1-2	everyone except the grenade launcher
Smoke grenadesRDG-2b, 2x	2-3	to the department

Fire from an RPG-7 hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher and RPG-18 (22, 26) rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades in the mountains, a populated area and in a forest is also recommended to be fired at the enemy’s manpower located behind shelters with the expectation of hitting it with fragments and the blast wave of an exploding grenade.

In the period from 2012 to 2015, Finland carried out a reform of the doctrine of land warfare. A significant difference from the previously adopted concept was the rejection of linear defense with a firm hold of lines. The new Finnish approach resembles the zone defense doctrine (Raumverteidigung) developed by the Austrian General Emil Spanochi (Emil Spannocchi), which stipulated that the defending side would avoid large defensive battles and that the regular army will go over to waging a small war with constant raids on the supply lines of the advancing enemy.

Tactical innovations of our time

The new Finnish doctrine is similar to the American concept of distributed operations (DistributedOperations). This approach means moving to combat operations with relatively small but well-trained units. One of its main elements is the coordinated actions of spatially dispersed parts on one object (target).

The Finnish military proceeds from the assumption that the traditions, the level of training and support of the Russian army as the main potential enemy will not allow it to operate off-road in the wooded and swampy areas, which will create favorable conditions for constant attacks on the columns of advancing troops stretched along the forest roads. Finnish Army (Maavoimienuudistettutaistelutapa - Taistelu), which is available on the Internet.

In fact, the Finnish army in 2012 officially began to switch to a style of warfare similar to guerrilla warfare.

Stop. Stop. Stop. Such a statement may seem very strange. Popular mythology around the Soviet-Finnish (Finnish/Winter) War of 1939-1940. calls it the conduct of partisan actions as one of the main features of Finnish tactics. For example, Pasi Tuunanen, Associate Professor of the Department of Military History and Lecturer of the Faculty of History at the University of Eastern Finland, in his book “The effectiveness of the Finnish armed forces in the Winter War, 1939-1940” (FinnishMilitaryEffectiveness in theWinterWar, 1939-1940) indicates that the attacks of small Finnish divisions into encircled Soviet troops (the so-called "motti") and the conduct of partisan operations by the Finns were one of the significant factors that determined the overall high efficiency of the Finnish army during this war.

However, in reality, it turns out that "partisan" tactics began to take root in the Finnish doctrine of land warfare only after more than seventy years after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war. Moreover, its implementation by the Finnish military specialists themselves is directly connected, among other things, with the emergence of modern communication and positioning systems, without which coordinated strikes by dispersed units are extremely difficult.

Experience of the Finnish War

Giving excessive and unjustified significance to partisan actions during the Soviet-Finnish war is directly connected with attempts to find the reason for the success of the actions of Finnish units against the formations of the Soviet army when fighting in the forests. Here it should be noted that the mere conduct of combat operations on the ground, with a large number of forests, does not automatically mean that in each battle the tactics of action will differ from the typical tactics used for combat operations in open spaces. For example, the tactical situation that arose when it was necessary to bring down the Finnish barrier on the road, which prevented the advance of the column of advancing Soviet troops, fits well into the standard tactical task of organizing a frontal attack with pressing against the fire shaft and / or using other methods of interaction inherent in battle tactics in open area. However, the failure of the fighting directly in the forests also played a significant role in the failure of the Soviet offensives in the forest area. Attempts to bypass off-road the blocking positions of the Finns by the Soviet troops, as a rule, did not lead to success.

The history of battles gives many such examples:

In the period from December 12 to 17, 1939, the 184th regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 37th rifle regiment of the 56th division made several attempts to bypass the Finnish defensive positions on the Kollaa River through the forest in the direction of the Loimola station, with forces up to two battalions. However, these attempts were thwarted by Finnish troops.

Thus, attempts to conduct maneuverable combat operations in the forests by our troops took place, but they often ended in failure.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to compare the contribution of general tactical failures of the Soviet troops and failures in specific forest battles to the failures of Soviet offensives. Nevertheless, it is obvious that mistakes in the tactics of the forest battle had an impact on the overall result of the hostilities.

Hypothesis

Let's try to look at the general scheme of actions of units in a forest battle in relation to the conditions of the Soviet-Finnish war. The obvious features of forest combat include relatively short distances for detecting the enemy and firing. A wall of trees and bushes hides the enemy. It is difficult to achieve the suppression of enemy firepower as a prerequisite for performing one's own maneuvers in a forest firefight. The location of the enemy's fire weapons is poorly visible, and if they are discovered, the enemy will only be pulled back a couple of tens of meters back - and they again turn out to be hidden. In addition, it is difficult to see not only the enemy, but also soldiers from their own units. Do not forget that the forest is actually a non-orientated or low-orientation area. Everything looks about the same everywhere. Maneuvering own units faces certain difficulties. In order not to lose each other in the forest, most of the time it is necessary to maintain relatively dense formations with reduced distances between individual units and soldiers within these units. Artillery guidance is difficult, and the operation of tanks and other armored vehicles off the roads is almost impossible. Units with heavy weapons are virtually blind and forced to move along a few roads, often getting into traffic jams, and as a result, have limited effectiveness.

Forest conditions make tactics more primitive. Forest combat is predominantly infantry versus infantry combat at relatively short ranges. It should be noted that a shooting battle can very often turn into a chaotic and uncontrolled firefight, since the instinct of self-preservation pushes the soldiers to shoot at the enemy as often as possible, even in cases where this is not advisable.

Such a battle is won by the side that can organize the simultaneous fire of more small arms at the enemy than the enemy can use to return fire, especially at the beginning of the clash. All forest combat tactics are aimed at achieving the highest possible density of infantry fire and thus achieving fire superiority over the enemy. To simplify, the forest fight is, as a rule, “who will shoot whom”, if not in the physical (inflicting losses), then at least in the psychological (overwhelmed by the superiority of the enemy) plan. Maneuvering in the forest is complicated by the fact that the part allocated for maneuver, as a rule, is instantly lost from sight, which makes its interaction with the main group a difficult task.

For the most effective use of the fire capabilities of an infantry unit, soldiers must be placed in a deployed line (chain). So the shooting soldiers do not interfere with each other to fire, they are relatively dispersed, do not form a group target for the enemy. When moving towards the enemy, the chain leaves the field of invisibility at about the same time, which does not allow the enemy to focus fire on emerging targets in turn. He is forced to immediately disperse his fire.

However, chaining has known disadvantages. When moving, it is extremely difficult to keep the chain structure. Soldiers are constantly huddled together, especially in poorly trained units. The reason for this is that people look forward when moving, and to keep themselves in line with other soldiers, you need to constantly look sideways in both directions, which, in the absence of the appropriate habit, is not done or is not done often enough. Well-defined landmarks, the direction of which coincides with the desired direction of movement for each individual soldier in the chain, as a rule, is not enough. The different levels of physical fitness of the soldiers contribute to the fact that one of the soldiers in the chain runs ahead, and someone lags behind. Only in the case of constant control of one's position in the common line, it turns out to keep one's position in the chain relative to others unchanged.

In addition, for a soldier, the need to maintain the formation of the chain for the purposes of effective control of the movements and fire of the unit may not be at all obvious, or at least clearly secondary compared to the task of saving his own life.

Therefore, for fast movements, they use a formation in a column - in it, a soldier can look around much less, to maintain his place in the formation, it is enough for him to see where the soldiers moving ahead of him are moving. Since each side will strive to place soldiers in a deployed line, those who know how to maneuver faster win, namely, deploy in a chain from a marching formation (column), quickly bring their units to the deployment site and make other rebuilds (turning the chain to the right and left) . Thus, the ability to quickly maneuver and reorganize combat subunits from column to line and back becomes one of the main means (in addition to quantitative superiority over the enemy) to achieve fire superiority in forest combat. Superiority over the enemy in the speed of rebuilding allows you to create a temporary local advantage in firepower and fall on the enemy with fire from a larger number of barrels than the enemy has at a given time and in a given place to fire back. Considering the features of a forest battle actually leads us to ... principles of linear tactics in the 18th century. Of course, we are not talking about complete identity (the density of formations and their depth differ significantly, there is no requirement for the continuity of the line of shooters, etc.), but the main tactical ideas are very similar. The fight in the forest can be called a kind of "reserve of linear tactics." Maintaining linear formations is one of the main means of controlling subunits, and the speed of maneuvering them is a decisive factor in obtaining a fire advantage over the enemy. Enemy soldiers late to the firefight site, located in some 100 meters, can be completely turned off from the battle. This creates parcels of destruction piecemeal for a late deployment unit.

Unit formations for forest combat are the key to victory in forest combat

Now let's turn to the constructions used by the Finns when moving in the forest. The main maneuvering units used in fighting in the forests were company and battalion level subunits. The basis of these formations was the use of many parallel columns by squads, with a special group of postings to which these columns are oriented.

Three parallel guide paths are laid for the battalion - one for each of the two companies going in the first echelon and the center one for the battalion. If the moving unit is a regiment, then another regimental guide track will be laid in the middle between the two forward battalions (7 guide tracks in total). Each guide path is laid by a separate escort group the size of one compartment (one platoon is allocated to the regiment escort group).

The wiring groups mark the guide trails. Here it is probably worth noting that the standard recommendation for reconnaissance units - not to make notches or other marks as they move in the forest, changes directly to the opposite. In any case, a large group after passing through the forest leaves a well-marked trace, which cannot be hidden. Trail marking (with paper, rags, branches broken in a uniform way, moss balls put on branches, etc.) helps for orientation and movement to the rear and back.

The escort group moves 50-100 meters from the main formations of the company, and 4 advanced sentinels go at a distance of visual communication from it. Forward lookouts should be about 150 meters from the main company formations. The trailing group of wiring carries a flag to clearly indicate its position. The column of the escort group is built in the following sequence: two forward sentinels, responsible for laying (cutting through) the trail, an orienteer with a compass, responsible for checking the map and compiling a table of movements, the commander, the first trail marker, 2 step counters (the first one counts in pairs of steps, the second in meters at the rate of 60-63 pairs of steps are equal to 100 meters), the second trail marker with a flag. Before the start of the movement, a table of future movements is compiled, as you move forward, the table is supplemented with records of actual movements (the coordinates of the starting and turning points, the estimated and actual time of movement, the time of arrival and departure from intermediate landmarks, distance in meters and in pairs of steps, azimuths) are recorded. Note that when skiing, counting steps is practically impossible due to slipping and rolling of skis - the distance can be measured with a rope 50 meters long.

The escort group, if possible, does not participate in the battle, but hides with the beginning of the battle. After the battle, it becomes the core around which the unit is assembled.

The movements of the entire company or battalion formation are made from one landmark to another. The entire route is divided into sections, the length of which should not be more than two kilometers, and if there is a threat of a collision with the enemy - up to one kilometer. After passing each segment, a short pause is arranged for five to ten minutes, during which the organization and relative position of the units are restored and additional orientation measures are taken. The high speed of movement inevitably leads to the collapse of the structure, and, as a result, to the loss of time to restore the organization.

To maintain the relative position of the units, separate observers are allocated who constantly maintain visual communication with other units.

At the moment the entire formation of the company stops, sentinels are sent in all directions. If possible, specially trained dogs are used for early detection of the enemy. All movements are carried out, if possible, silently.

However, the main difference between the Finnish construction is not the presence of a posting group (it can also be when building the main part of the unit simply in a column), but the construction of the main group itself.

The platoons that make up the main group move in parallel columns of squads (for example, the first echelon of a battalion may consist of 12 parallel columns of squads), which, if necessary, deploy in a chain. The turn into a chain in this case is greatly simplified - the deployment into a chain from the detachment column is a relatively simple task that does not require much time.

The following formations of a platoon are possible: four columns of squads "in line"; “square” - two parallel columns of squads in front, two behind (in the second echelon, looking at the back of the head to the squads of the first echelon); "triangle" - three parallel columns of compartments in front - one behind, in the second echelon. The choice of building one of these formations depends on two factors: the density of the forest and the location relative to the flank. In a dense forest, branches are built "in a line", in light forests - "square". The platoons that ended up on the flank of the battalion go either in a “square” or “triangle”.

Squads are assigned predetermined positions in formation. By default, the leader is the leftmost compartment of the first echelon. Closing (during the transition to a marching formation) of a platoon is carried out to it, and this squad remains in place. If closing to the right or left is necessary (for example, when attacking the enemy in the flank or if it is necessary to change the direction of movement at a right angle), the two squads move to the space located between the two corner platoons on the side to be moved. The platoon commander with assistants follows one forward squad, the deputy platoon commander follows another.

Illustrations

The Finnish squad of 9 people along the front in a chain and in a column occupies 25 meters (3 meters between soldiers). A platoon of 4 squads in parallel columns in two echelons, a square measuring 100 by 100 meters.

One squad can stretch along the guide path to the entire depth of the company formation (platoons are arranged in a "square").

Dedicated observers for the movements of the escort group are located 15 meters from the guide path.

The construction of the company "square".Option. The second echelon is marching in formation. The right platoon of the first echelon - "in line", the left platoon of the first echelon - "square".

Building a company with an open flank on the left. Option. The escort group is extended to the depth of the first echelon. One section of the left platoon of the first echelon is deployed in a chain.

Battalion formation option. There are three guide trails inside the battalion. The regiment's guide path is shown on the left. The second echelon goes to march formations in the immediate vicinity of the guide trails.

Battalion formation option. The battalion escort group has been stretched to the second echelon. All branches go in parallel columns.

Comparison of building efficiency; "instinctive" choice of unfavorable construction.

Thus, the Finnish divisions of the company and battalion level actually always carry out rapprochement with the enemy in pre-battle formations.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the movement through the forest in relatively large units was carried out by the Finns not for very long distances. So, for example, the maximum length of the "bypass" for the winter conditions of the forest area of ​​the northern Ladoga region was estimated by the Finns at about five kilometers. Carrying weapons and ammunition over longer distances wears down soldiers to the point where they lose their combat capability.

Of course, in summer, forest maneuvers can be over long distances. In the summer of 1944, during the battles near Ilomantsi, forest detours were carried out by the Finns for about 7-12 kilometers.

In summer, soldiers get less tired when moving in the forest, but even in this case, the need to bring ammunition and food from the rear, the need to carry out the wounded, limits the range of forest maneuvers by large infantry subunits.

Therefore, movement in pre-battle formations is carried out not at such great distances. Being in pre-battle formations at the very beginning of a forest clash, which very often begins suddenly at close range, it remains to make only one reorganization. The columns of the squads in front are re-arranged through the standard method of scattering into a chain. This action is simple and quite fast. Thus, a compromise is reached between the need to follow in columns when moving through a forest area and the need to reduce deployment time at the start of a clash.

For comparison, a subunit located in a company or, even more so, a battle column deploys for battle much more slowly, thereby providing the enemy with a significant tactical advantage.

Deployment options from a marching column to a chain. The need for intermediate rebuildings is visible, during which the possibility of firing is limited.

If we turn to the experience of using linear tactics, then the development of rebuilding from battalion columns to the line occupied a significant place in the overall training of units, and was quite difficult even in open areas (there were different methods of rebuilding, but their coverage is beyond the scope of this article), while that the soldiers were very close to each other. Of particular difficulty lies in the fact that when rebuilding a battalion, it is necessary to maintain the unity of its constituent units (platoons, squads) - a battalion cannot simply deploy as a crowd of single soldiers. Violation of the structure makes it difficult to maneuver and control the fire of units in battle. This requires a specific, pre-agreed algorithm of actions.

Troops that have no experience of exercises in the forests will inevitably use formations in a common large column, as the most simple and self-evident. The patrols sent in different directions obviously do not give the column enough time to deploy. Preemptive deployment at the tactical level results in an organized battle line fighting the crowd.

Here we can refer to the experience of using linear tactics in the 18th-19th centuries. He showed that deployment from column to line under fire was virtually impossible, or at least difficult.

Alexander Zhmodikov, "The Science of Victory": Tactics of the Russian Army in the Era of the Napoleonic Wars; St. Petersburg, Moscow, "Eurasia", 2016, pp. 188, 199, 554

Crowd fire is always less effective than guided fire from a detached unit. Thus, a subunit that preempts the enemy in rebuilding at the very beginning of a clash, ceteris paribus, wins a firefight.

It is noteworthy that the Finns did not rely solely on guard units, and there is no flank guard on the move at all (patrols are sent only when they stop). The dense forest prevents the dispatch of guards to any significant distance from the main unit. Often, patrols cannot move away from the main unit beyond the line-of-sight range - otherwise they will quickly be lost. As a result, guards in a forest battle often cannot notify the enemy in a timely manner. If a more or less large unit marches through the forest in a column, even if it receives a warning from its sentinels about the enemy, it simply does not have time to turn around before the clash begins. The only solution is to move in pre-battle formations.

The ability to wade through the forest in pre-combat formations, which made it possible to quickly deploy in a chain - this is the very "sword-hoarder" of the forest battle, which allowed the Finns to win fights in the forest.

Some confirmation

This assumption may seem oversimplified, but there are a number of factors that show that this is the reason. Forest maneuvers are complex, despite their apparent simplicity and even rudimentary nature - there is always a high risk that the unit will disintegrate into a poorly managed crowd simply because of the difficulties of making a forest march off-road or at the time of deployment.

The ability to line up and hold line formations during movements, as well as the speed of rebuilding, gave significant tactical superiority to infantry in the wars of the 18th-19th centuries. You can try to draw the following analogy: in the conditions of the Soviet-Finnish conflict, during the forest battles, the Soviet infantry was in the position of the Turkish troops operating in a crowd against Suvorov's well-trained infantry, operating in well-developed formations.

Analysis of specific combat skills in the forest

If you try to compile a list of forest winter combat skills that an ordinary soldier who has not specially prepared for forest battles most likely does not know, then it will turn out to be quite small. Many of these skills are fairly obvious and, even without initial training, are relatively quickly reinvented. It is unlikely that these skills could have a significant impact on the outcome of forest battles.

Here is a sample list of them:

1. Taking off the warmest clothes before starting to move (work) to avoid excessive sweating, and putting them on after stopping. Option - unbuttoning and fastening clothes.
2. Shaking off snow from clothes before it has melted and wet clothes from the heat of the human body, especially in relation to mittens (gloves), clothes around the knees, elbows, that is, those places where clothes are squeezed and fabrics can get wet through to the skin.
3. Chewing on snow or using hoods with masks (scarves) to prevent visible vapor from coming out of the mouth.
4. Clinging to tree trunks for camouflage.
5. Minimizing the amount of lubricant on the weapon so that it does not fail to fire.
6. Carrying freezing compasses, pistols inside the upper layers of clothing.
7. Drying footcloths, socks, gloves, mittens inside clothes with the heat of the human body.
8. Taking into account the factor of moisture condensation on the metal elements of the weapon when brought into a warm room (including a heated tent or hut): the weapon is either left outside or wiped dry immediately after being brought into the room.
9. The use of spruce branches as bedding when spending the night or standing on the snow for a long time as an insulating material.
10. Quick removal and dressing of skis (including in the prone position). It should be noted that Finnish mounts were more convenient than Soviet ones, but with a certain skill in handling mounts, the difference in dressing speed could be reduced so as not to have a significant practical impact on the actions of combat units.
11. Leaving notches, broken branches, rags in the forest to mark the routes of movement, hanging the route to maintain the direction of movement by resection, covering traces with spruce branches or even with your hands.
12. Use of portable stoves for winter tents. Here we are talking not only about the handicraft production of stoves from buckets and other improvised materials, but also about making fires in huts and in snow houses. In fairness, it should be noted that this is associated with a number of difficulties. For example, when using an open fire to heat the internal volume of makeshift shelters, the snow that forms part of the roof of these shelters begins to melt, and, accordingly, there is a risk of wetting clothes. There are a number of tricks so that for a fire bred in a hut there is normal draft and the hut does not smoke. But in general, these obstacles are surmountable.
13. Early reversal of removed skis toes back to save time in case of need for a quick retreat.
14. Shelter "Finnish snowdrift", when a coniferous tree is cut down for the purpose of arranging a shelter for observation and shooting, and I use a small section of the trunk with the most sprawling branches as a "roof", on which snow is poured from above.
15. Throwing grenades on skis is not overhead, but with a side throw.
16. Using a second compass behind the column to correct the direction of movement of the column (a soldier walking behind the column sees its deviation from the given azimuth very well).
17. Using a staff with a "slingshot" at the end to press branches to the ground, which must be stepped over to reduce traffic noise.
18. The use of "ice concrete" (sweep away water and stone materials) in the construction of defensive positions.
19. Chopping only the lower branches of trees and shrubs to the level of human growth to clear the sectors of fire.
20. Undermining grenades (thawing by making a fire) of a frozen layer of earth before digging trenches.
21. Construction of snow walls in order to accumulate snow brought by the wind for further use in equipping positions.
22. Different types of crawling with the help of removed skis.
23. Frequent change of advanced soldiers, laying a ski track or trail across the virgin snow.

Publications about the Finnish war are often full of descriptions of this kind of "little tricks" as evidence of the Finns' special ability to fight in the forests. Moreover, it is often forgotten that these skills, even in the absence of their preliminary development, are quickly developed by trial and error. Obviously, these tricks cannot serve as an explanation for the success of the Finns in forest battles.

Even these "implicit" skills are obviously not sufficient to explain the Finnish success in forest combat. They are notable for the fact that they have something in common. All of them contribute to the speed of maneuvering combat units.

Pre-war Finnish tactical views

In favor of the thesis that the tactics of the Finnish army largely followed the traditions of linear tactics in the actions of the infantry, one more argument can be made. In the pre-war period, the Finns were very critical of the possibilities of borrowing tactical innovations that appeared during the 1st World War in Europe. They believed that the wooded and swampy terrain of Finland would not allow using the experience of fighting in open spaces, which took place in the European theater of operations of the First World War. So, for example, considering the role of tanks, many Finns believed that they would not have a significant place in the wars in Finland. Positional battles were considered impossible in Finland because the forest with many impenetrable spaces contributes to the offensive, not defense. The tactics of the assault groups that developed during the 1st World War were not considered suitable for Finland due to the fact that the positional defense that gave rise to this tactic, according to the views of the Finns, should not have arisen on their territory due to the predominance of wooded and swampy terrain. The Finns believed that the forest largely neutralized the possibilities for effective artillery fire. It also made the experience of the First World War in Europe of limited use as a base for the training of the Finnish army. All this was reinforced by the ideological self-perception and self-identification of the Finns as "people of the forest", living by different rules than "people of open spaces" from the rest of Europe. As a result, in the pre-war period, the Finnish military considered the non-stop infantry strike (attaqueaoutrance) as the basis of the tactics of the Finnish army. The Finnish doctrine proposed to fight with methods close to the approaches of the European armies, which were before the start of the First World War. That is, in fact, according to the rules, which are relatively not far removed from linear tactics.

Lack of tactical features as a feature of Finnish tactics

An indirect confirmation of the conclusion made is the absence of any special tactical methods of conducting combat in the forest in Finnish pre-war guiding documents. Deployment from a marching column into several parallel columns of pre-battle order, and then into a chain (several parallel chains) was nothing special at that time. From the point of view of a Finnish company and battalion-level officer who went through forest battles during the Winter War, there was nothing tactically unconventional in the actions of his unit. He acted according to well-known tactical patterns that an infantry officer of any European country of that time should have known.

The construction of parallel columns is also known to domestic tactical instructions.

The nuance was that the European armies, including the Soviet one, no longer thought in canons, more characteristic of linear tactics. The speed of deployment of infantry columns in battle formations has largely lost its significance for them. They already thought in terms of the interaction of artillery fire, tank strikes and infantry attacks. But in the conditions of the forest area, somewhat "old-fashioned" tactical schemes with an emphasis on the speed of infantry deployment proved to be more relevant and applicable.

Presumably, it was the absence of something special in the actions of the Finnish infantry in the forest battles that gave rise to attempts to explain the success of the Finnish army in a set of important, but, in general, secondary skills, techniques and actions. Including, an active search for actually insignificant partisan elements in the actions of the Finnish armed forces.

It should be emphasized that the simplicity of the idea of ​​gaining a tactical advantage in forest battles through special forms of formations and, as a result, the speed of formations, does not mean that it is easy to implement. Even in open areas, infantry maneuvering is not just difficult, but very difficult. It should be repeated that even the seemingly very simple task of keeping the chain line while moving across an open field actually requires considerable effort. A moving chain always strives to huddle together, and when huddled together, the subdivisions that make up the chain are mixed up and their controllability drops sharply. If the soldiers do not have the practice of exercises, then the speed of rebuilding on the ground will be extremely low. It requires manual control by officers with constant adjustments and stops. A certain barrier is the fact that in peacetime, working out rebuilding can be psychologically perceived as some kind of not very necessary game. As a result, they do not pay due attention to this and do not invest very much in making it work.

Conclusion

Concluding this article, it should be emphasized that despite the introduction of the most modern means of communication and navigation, and, as a result, a significant simplification of artillery and aviation firing, as well as maneuvering during operations in a forest area, in their main features, the features of a battle in a forest remain this day. Troops that do not know how to quickly maneuver infantry units of the company and battalion level when moving through forests off the roads cannot be considered prepared for combat operations in a wooded and swampy area. The experience of previous wars remains largely relevant to this day.

Appendix

Note that there are different ways to deploy from a column to a chain. The most famous and familiar to the Russian reader is the “herringbone” deployment, that is, such a method when one soldier from the column goes in one direction, the next - in the opposite direction, the third - in the direction where the first soldier was moving, but further from the center future chain and so on. The first soldier in the column remains in place.

Deployment from a column into a chain "Christmas tree" from domestic instructions.

As you know, there are other options for performing this maneuver: a) by entering, when the entire unit in the column turns around the forward soldiers, which become the center of rotation of the entire column, clockwise or counterclockwise

Deployment from a column into a chain by "going in"

b) an institution by the letter "G" or the number "7" - when the unit goes in the column to the turning point, after which it changes the direction of movement in such a way that the movement continues parallel to the front line and perpendicular or almost perpendicular to the previous direction of movement

c) spreading along the letter “T” - the unit, having reached the turning point, as in the institution method, begins to diverge simultaneously in two directions in directions perpendicular to the previous direction of movement, while one soldier goes in one direction, the next in the opposite direction, the one who follows him - in the same direction where the first soldier went, and so on.

The Finns used this option: the column is divided approximately in half - passing part of the column by “going in” turns in one direction, and the back of the column also “goes in” in the other direction, while adjusting its position so as to stretch flush with the first part of the column. The benefits of this deployment method include the ability to preserve the established "twos" or "triples" that are lost during herringbone deployment as neighboring soldiers move in opposite directions when deployed. At the same time, Finnish deployment is as fast as herringbone deployment.

Andrey Markin

Rapid urbanization, which is typical of most states in general, makes it necessary to pay special attention to the preparation of army and special units for combat operations in populated areas. The neglect of such training cost the Russian army unreasonably large losses during the fighting in the city of Grozny in the winter of 1995. The usual combined-arms tactics of deploying units to conduct an offensive in the field turned out to be unsuitable for battles in the city. Obtaining the necessary skills went immediately into practice, was richly paid for with blood, and forced Russian strategists to think about the advisability of revising the combat training program.

The main reasons for the unpreparedness of the federal forces for an effective assault on Grozny (the most striking, but not the only sad example) were:

• underestimation of the resistance of militants, their weapons and training, including engineering;
• overestimation of one's own strengths. For example, the role of armored vehicles, aviation and artillery during the storming of the city;
• lack of a unified strategy and control system for a heterogeneous group;
• disgusting coordination and communication between divisions;
• low training of personnel: general, special and psychological.

This list could be continued, but the purpose of this chapter is not a detailed analysis of the Chechen war, in particular its political and ideological aspects. One thing is important - the city was taken only thanks to the courage of the Russian soldier. But something else is even more important: there was a need to learn lessons, in this case tactical ones.

One of the reasons that by the mid-90s most of the Russian troops were not ready for urban battles lies in the fact that the Afghan experience gave us a little in this regard. It would be more appropriate to study the experience of the defense of Stalingrad during the Second World War. But now you can not complain about the lack of experience in combat operations in populated areas.

By far, the city is the most complex theater of operations. Combat in a populated area quickly consumes forces, often without affecting success. Dense buildings limit the mobility of assault units, make it difficult to maneuver in order to concentrate efforts in the right directions, limit reconnaissance activities, complicate the control of units during combat and target designation, reduce the effectiveness of radio communications, limit shelling, visibility, limit and modify the use of various types of weapons and etc. Without a doubt, in a populated area it is much more preferable to keep the defense than to storm. Especially if it is possible to prepare positions in advance.

For assault units, the main complicating factors can be:

• the absence of a detailed scheme of a settlement (NP) and reliable intelligence about the enemy and his defense system;
• the presence of an extensive network of underground communications;
• the presence in the city of the civilian population, whose fate is not indifferent to the assault forces;
• the presence in the NP of historical and architectural monuments, as well as other structures, the preservation of which is important for the attackers.

In this chapter, the assault on a settlement is considered from the point of view of regular troops.

Before storming a settlement, the troops need to surround it and cut off any connection between the besieged and the outside world (which was not done during the capture of Grozny in 1995). Attempts to take it on the move can result in big losses for the attackers. Such tactics can be effective if there is accurate intelligence about the weak defenses of the enemy.

In Chechnya, Russian troops, before storming a village occupied by militants, first announced their intention to carry out an invasion and offered the extremists to voluntarily lay down their arms and surrender, and civilians to leave the danger zone along the provided corridor. Practice has shown that in most cases no one surrenders and not all civilians leave the settlement. Some were forcibly held by militants, hiding behind them as hostages. Some refused to leave on their own. Many provided active assistance to extremists, which does not allow them to be defined as “civilians”. However, the use of such a practice can significantly reduce losses both among the civilian population and among the assault units.

When leaving a settlement before an assault, under the guise of civilians, militants almost always try to infiltrate. This is done for various purposes, including to provide disinformation to the besieging forces. Therefore, a check and search of all persons leaving the encirclement is mandatory.

In contrast to the tactics of long, exhausting sieges of past centuries, when the garrison was brought to exhaustion, such actions are excluded in modern warfare.

First, a long siege causes complications of a political nature.

Secondly, the defenders usually have sufficient food supplies for a long stay in isolation.

Thirdly, in this way a small garrison can bind a significant group.

Fourthly, the besieged have time to prepare engineering defensive lines. The assault on the village of Pervomaiskoye in Chechnya in January 1996 showed that several days were enough to establish good positions.

Bombardment and artillery shelling of a populated area does not cause significant damage to the defenders, especially in a city with high-rise buildings and a network of underground utilities. The actions of helicopters that deliver targeted strikes on garrison positions are more effective. The senseless destruction of buildings usually does not cause the desired damage to the defenders, but subsequently can impede the advance of the assault groups, since, together with the remaining buildings, favorable conditions are created for sheltering the defenders and their military equipment, building well-equipped strongholds in engineering terms, defensive areas and centers of resistance. In addition, after the end of hostilities, everything may have to be restored, and the residents left homeless will become another headache that threatens a humanitarian catastrophe. The destruction of buildings is not excluded, it is often necessary. But such actions (as well as other actions in war) must be justified and make sense.

When entering a populated area, the troops move rapidly but cautiously along the designated directions within the city and in its suburbs, seizing positions and gaining a foothold on them. Developing the pace of movement, the advancing groups should not break away from each other. This is fraught with the fact that the enemy, hiding, will cut the units of the attackers, surround them and destroy them, using the positional advantage. The most obvious example of such tactics is the January assault on the city of Grozny in 1995. Having launched columns of armored vehicles, the militants began to cut them off from the main forces and destroy them. Military equipment was not capable of effectively countering grenade launchers at close range.

Ignorance of the city by the federal forces also had an effect.

The fast pace of the offensive is sometimes fraught with neglect of the danger of possible mining of the routes of probable advance. It is recommended to bypass the strong strongholds of the defenders, which are difficult to capture with a frontal attack. The offensive should be developed in those directions where the enemy's defense is weaker. Subsequently, after isolating the most difficult defense nodes and their surroundings for assault, the attackers can use the advantage gained. In order to break down the active resistance of such strongholds, weak points are groped in the defense. Aviation, armored vehicles and artillery can also be used to capture them. Moreover, direct fire will bring the greatest benefit.

If it is necessary to concentrate efforts in a certain direction or to capture important objects, attackers can land tactical airborne assault forces from helicopters. However, such a landing is a risky undertaking. At the same time, in most cases, losses are inevitable both among helicopters and among the landing force.

The assault on a populated area is characterized by the extremely high role of small units and each fighter in its implementation. In the German statute "Driving Troops" of 1933, a battle in a populated area is characterized as follows: "It is played out at close range, and its outcome usually depends on the independent actions of junior commanders." Therefore, the attacking group is divided into assault detachments ranging from a platoon to a battalion. Such groups (detachments) can be reinforced by tank, artillery and engineering units.

It is mandatory to have a significant mobile reserve, which is assigned various tasks. The reserve can be sent to help assault units that encounter insurmountable resistance or suffer significant losses. Attackers may need the help of specific specialists - snipers, sappers, flamethrowers, grenade launchers, signalmen and others. Therefore, the reserve should be multifunctional and be able to meet any needs.

The reserve can also be sent to develop an offensive in the event of a slowdown in the rate of advance of any assault detachment in a certain direction. If the forward advancing units can advance successfully at a good pace without encountering stubborn resistance, the reserve can move in a second wave, carefully checking the captured territories and objects for mines and hidden enemies. In addition, in the captured large houses and other buildings, it is necessary to leave several fighters who will guard it and control the rear space. This will protect the forward units from strikes to the rear by infiltrated or hidden enemies. A prerequisite for such cover groups is the choice of positions that provide the best observation, and the presence of communication with the main groups. Assigned to cover groups are usually fighters from the reserve.

Just as an attacking grouping is broken up into assault detachments, so the general plan of an offensive operation is broken up into parts. That is, the capture of a settlement or part of it consists of the seizure by troops of individual sections: microdistricts, quarters, streets, squares, parks, enterprises, houses, etc.

Each assault detachment is assigned its own tasks, final and current. For example, the ultimate task for the battalion is to reach the bridge and organize a strong point there. To achieve it, the battalion needs to go through the three indicated quarters, in which it is necessary to take possession of certain buildings and clear the territory of the enemy. The tasks of capturing individual buildings are distributed among the companies and platoons of the battalion.

To successfully complete such a complex task, the commanders of assault units must have maps or diagrams of the settlement, know the assigned tasks and have reliable communication with the operation control center and among themselves.

The best for orientation in the locality are large-scale maps (containing the names of streets, squares, house numbers, etc.) and multi-color plans at a scale of 1:10,000 or 1:15,000. It is desirable that they be fresh. More additional useful information will be given by aerial photographs of defensive objects (planned and prospective). A good addition to these documents may be: schemes of underground and other communications; description of the city and suburbs; other information that gives an idea about the features of the given settlement as a whole and individual objects. In the future, undoubtedly, special units will make more extensive use of electronic maps in combination with satellite navigation devices, which not only help to navigate the city well, but also provide data on the position of their troops with high accuracy and speed.

The command must constantly have information about the progress of the offensive and coordinate the actions of all groups, since in the conditions of the city each unit is forced to act almost independently. Combat experience shows that the enemy can take advantage of the inconsistency and unevenness of advance between subunits and infiltrate at the junctions between units. In advance, however, it is possible to calculate the uniformity of progress only approximately. Therefore, it is important to make frequent adjustments to the course of the operation.

Another danger inherent in urban combat is the risk of nearby friendly units coming under fire. At the beginning of the operation to take the city of Grozny in January 1995, the militants used this tactic. Taking advantage of the fact that the assault was conducted by many heterogeneous units, which usually had neither direct communication between themselves, nor a single command, and coordination issues took a lot of time, they provoked different units of the federal forces into fire contacts with each other. For example, using knowledge of the area and not having any signs of belonging to bandit formations, the militant made his way between two posts of federal forces and opened fire from small arms (usually it was a compact submachine gun of the Chechen production "Volk") in the direction of each post. After that, the militant left this place, often hiding weapons and becoming a “civilian”. At first, the fighters at the posts opened a hurricane of non-aimed fire in the direction of the shooting, that is, in fact, in the direction of the neighboring post. Those, of course, answered them with fire. However, this tactic did not cause any significant losses in the federal forces and was quickly exposed.

Armored vehicles move along the streets in sync with the advancing infantry. Getting ahead of the assault squads is fraught with the destruction of equipment. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers that have strayed from cover become easy prey for grenade launchers. Armored vehicles firing direct fire. Its cannons suppress enemy firing points, destroy heavy weapons, destroy obstacles that have arisen and make passages in the walls. Armored vehicles also cover the movement of infantry.

Artillery, tactical and army aviation can be involved in the destruction of specific objects, creating fires and suppressing the enemy in defended structures. However, due to the fact that the opposing sides are at a short distance in the settlement, there is a significant risk that their units will fall under this fire.

The tactics of using tanks in the city has its own characteristics

Causing significant damage during the storming of the city is not yet a guarantee of success in Grozny

To avoid this, it is necessary that artillery and aviation deliver targeted strikes only at the command of the commanders in charge of the assault operations, after agreeing on the time and place of the strike. Naturally, such interaction presupposes the existence of reliable communication channels. In Grozny in the winter of 1995, according to various estimates, losses from "friendly" fire ranged from 40 to 60%.

The movement of infantry is carried out not only along the streets, but also through courtyards, parks, underground utilities, gaps in walls, roofs of houses. When advancing, the accumulation of equipment and personnel should be avoided.

Assault groups must include sappers who search for and neutralize mines and booby traps, carry out demolition work in order to make passages in walls or other obstacles and obstacles, as well as to clear barricades, rubble and destruction.

Group tactics

Now directly about the tactics that are used during the assault in small groups.

Action in pairs is the basis of combat coordination ...

For the best interaction, mutual control and mutual assistance, as well as to facilitate the management of the unit as a whole, the groups are divided into pairs or triplets. Fighters in pairs or trios (hereinafter simply pairs) operate in close contact with each other, are constantly within line of sight and maintain voice communication. They must regularly monitor their comrades on the principle of "everyone is responsible for everyone." In order for such pairs to act effectively and have a high level of mutual understanding, it is necessary to form them in advance, even in the process of preparation. Thus, the fighters will develop not only friendly relations, but also a sense of understanding and foreseeing the actions of a comrade. During joint training, the couple will exchange experience and develop a single tactic of action, even develop their own language of communication. The same system, for example, operates in the French Foreign Legion, where the soldiers are divided into pairs (binoms). However, snipers, machine gunners, grenade launchers, etc., and so operate in pairs in a regular manner.

The interaction between couples is also important. When carrying out any movements during the assault, it is necessary to organize mutual cover to ensure safety. One group covers, the second - makes a maneuver. And vice versa.

Infantry movement is made in short throws from cover to cover. During movement, a distance of four to seven meters must be constantly maintained between fighters and groups. Even in the absence of enemy fire, fighters should be careful not to linger in open areas for more than two to three seconds. Inspection of potentially dangerous directions (windows, attics, breaks) should be carried out continuously.

The main cover of the units is carried out by machine gunners, snipers and grenade launchers. Moreover, machine gunners can conduct “disturbing” fire at suspicious places where the enemy may be. Snipers and grenade launchers, on the other hand, shoot at the identified positions of the enemy. After the advanced units pass the next line, it is fixed in the occupied positions and ensures the approach of the cover group, which is pulled up to new positions.

Especially for snipers

When the unit moves on foot along the street, armored vehicles are used as cover. A distance must be maintained between infantrymen and combat vehicles and hilling must be excluded. The infantry moves along the walls, having previously distributed control in all directions, especially the opposite side of the street. Thus, when moving along a street with multi-storey buildings, two pedestrian columns control the situation over each other.

The movement of columns only along the streets is the wrong tactic, which is likely to lead to heavy losses of units, and even to complete destruction. An advance with gaps in battle formations allows the defenders to reach the rear and flanks of the attackers and deliver effective strikes against them. In this case, the whole offensive strategy breaks down, which turns into a chaotic battle that is difficult to manage. Defenders entrenched in houses will gain a positional advantage, while troops caught in the street will be in unfavorable conditions. They will be shot down from above and pelted with hand grenades. In addition, one should not forget about the danger of mining the streets.

To maintain a single line of attack, neighboring subunits must have constant communication with each other and coordinate their actions. Guards are left in the checked buildings (this was discussed above).

Building Storm

Storm a large building, in which the enemy holds the defense, is a sure way to unreasonably large losses. First you need to take positions opposite him, and if possible, around him. It is necessary, if possible, to identify the firing points of the defenders and estimate the most optimal routes for the movement of assault groups. The least preferred paths of advance are the most natural ones.

Before you directly enter the building, you must try to destroy the maximum number of enemies. This task is mainly assigned to snipers, machine gunners, grenade throwers and flamethrowers. They do not stop their actions even after the entry of stormtroopers into the building. However, the latter should not be allowed to fall under "friendly" fire. Therefore, as the infantry moves up, the covering ones transfer fire to the upper floors and fire accurately. Machine gunners cease to pour fire on the alleged locations of the enemy.

Grenade throwers and flamethrowers must be especially careful. Snipers are the most useful. It is desirable to achieve reliable communication and coordination between the attack aircraft and the cover group under such conditions, but in a real battle it is very difficult.

To combat enemy firing points, armored vehicles and artillery can also be actively involved, which fire at direct fire. However, the fire stops before the attack aircraft. Under certain conditions, the commander may decide to attack the building without artillery preparation. This happens when the commander relies on the surprise and secrecy of the beginning of the assault.

Entry into a building through natural and predictable routes, through windows and doors, carries a high level of risk.

Firstly, such paths are often mined, and secondly, in most cases they are under the gun of the defenders. Therefore, the penetration must go through the breaches made. They are pierced by firing from cannons, grenade launchers and ATGMs. To achieve greater surprise, attack aircraft can penetrate openings immediately after breaking through. In this case, the defenders will not have time to reorganize their orders. However, it is important that the assault units do not suffer at the moment of penetration, so the starting positions for them should be placed at a safe distance.

The tactics of penetration immediately after the formation of a breach is not always used. It is often safer to make a few breaches first and only then attack. If the enemy does not allow attack aircraft to approach the object of assault with aimed fire, the attack can be launched after setting up a smoke screen.

Haste during the storming of the building leads to heavy losses. Having reached the starting line, the assault detachment needs to regroup and look around. The commander plans the order of further actions and brings it to his subordinates.

Undoubtedly, the unit that purposefully prepared for combat operations in urban conditions will achieve the greatest success and the least losses. Each fighter and each pair must work out various options for action so that everyone does his job without a team and is ready to replace comrades who are out of action. After all, the commander will not be able to control all the soldiers, especially since providing each soldier of the Russian army with a personal radio station is an unrealizable dream.

Negotiations on radio stations before the assault regarding the upcoming attack are permitted only if closed radio channels are used.

After taking the building, it is necessary to carefully check it and, if necessary, neutralize all found explosive devices. Now this building is becoming the starting point for further offensive. The commander, having received a report that the building has been cleared, checks the personnel, determines the dead and wounded, plans defensive actions and reports to headquarters. First of all, measures are taken for all-round defense, since the enemy may try to launch a counterattack in order to regain lost positions. This is especially likely if the building is tactically advantageous.

The lower approaches are, if possible, blocked by engineering methods. Particular attention should be paid to cellars and various underground passages. During the assault on the city of Grozny, the federal troops did not risk going underground, since this threatened with heavy losses. Therefore, all exits to the surface were filled up and often mined. However, planting mines in a building that is used as a defensive line is a risky practice. It is likely that in the hustle and bustle one of his soldiers can blow up on them.

The assault group distributes positions on different floors and sectors of fire. The commander deals with the prisoners (if any) and plans a further offensive. Thus, the assault team moves from building to building, leaving in the captured groups for protection, unless this function is taken over by the reserve.

The experience of the defense of Stalingrad is interesting, in which, as is known, one of the most difficult street battles of the Second World War took place.

To storm any object, assault groups, consolidation groups and a reserve were allocated. Designed to perform one task, they constituted a single assault group of urban combat. The strength, composition and armament of each group could vary depending on the object and the task.

The main shock core of the entire group were attacking groups of six to eight people each. Of the total composition of the assault group of urban combat, they accounted for about 30%. They were the first to break into buildings, bunkers and independently fought inside the facility. Each group had its own specific task (site).

The rest of the attached forces, which included fighters of various specialties, ensured the advancement of the attacking groups, the development of the offensive and consolidation at the facility. The consolidation group was also divided into several subgroups, which broke into the building from different directions following the attacking groups on a signal from the commander. Having penetrated the building and destroyed the firing points, they immediately began to create their own defenses and stop all enemy attempts to recapture the building or come to the aid of the attacked garrison.

The reserve was used to replenish and reinforce the attacking groups, to counter a possible enemy counterattack from the flanks and rear. If necessary, or in case of heavy losses, new, additional attacking groups could be quickly formed and brought into battle from the reserve.

The assault was carried out both with preliminary artillery preparation and without it, with the expectation of surprise.

The experience of recent wars shows that assault groups achieve greater success after a preliminary artillery strike. An illustrative example is the 76th Airborne Division, whose regiment could not take the stronghold of the militants on the western outskirts of Grozny for 2.5 hours. After an artillery strike, the point was taken in 10 minutes with minimal losses.

Now about what concerns the assault operations at night. If the attackers have enough manpower to spare, a night attack can be a significant success. For the most part, the groups storming the building have a very rough idea of ​​\u200b\u200bits layout and the defending enemy. Especially about those "surprises" that the enemy has prepared in the building. Therefore, there is a risk of heavy losses during a night assault.

This does not mean that in the dark it is impossible to storm buildings at all. But with the greatest chance of success and minimal (or no) casualties, only a well-trained, professional unit can carry out a nighttime takeover of a building. At the same time, it must have good intelligence about the enemy's defenses. In addition, all fighters and the group as a whole must have modern equipment and weapons: individual night vision devices, flashlights attached to weapons, silent weapons, remote listening devices, etc.

Elite anti-terrorist and sabotage units are quite capable of carrying out such operations, which has been repeatedly proven in practice. But what can be said about the chances of success for an ordinary Russian motorized rifle platoon, where everyone has one night vision binoculars, and at best one flashlight per squad!

Darkness can be used to accumulate forces before the assault and pull them up to the nearest distance to the object, in order to start the attack from new positions at dawn.

At night, great attention should be paid to the protection of their positions. Artillery positions are especially at risk of attack.

City defense

The defense of a populated area is organized not only for the purpose of holding it, but also to achieve superiority over the enemy by taking advantage of building development, knowledge of the terrain, and preliminary preparation of defense. A small garrison, even in the absence of heavy weapons, can bleed a significantly larger assault force in terms of numbers and power of weapons.

If there is time to prepare for defense, the garrison equips positions. These can be randomly located centers of resistance, which are located in the most convenient places for protection. But in most cases, the construction of defense is organized, systemic in nature with a single command and coordination of the actions of all groups.

Most often, the city is divided into lines, strongholds, nodes of resistance (a combination of several strongholds), which are located in such a way that the features of the terrain and buildings contribute to the maximum defensive actions and in every possible way hinder offensive ones. Naturally, the ability of the garrison to provide defensive lines with firepower and personnel is taken into account. In many cases, the defenders occupy only the forward lines and, if it is impossible to hold them, retreat to the next line. In such cases, a reserve is allocated, which is sent to weak areas or to places of breakthrough.

If the garrison has enough forces to cover all directions, then an echeloned defense is built. But even in this case, most of the personnel are stationed at the forefront. Up to 30% of the defenders can be in the second echelon. The forces of the reserve or the second echelon are usually sent to close the breakthrough or to carry out a counterattack. For example, to return the advantageous positions captured by the enemy.

It is considered a tactical mistake if the advanced defensive line coincides with the outskirts of the settlement. The removal of the line of defense in front of the settlement was practiced at the beginning of the 20th century, but with modern weapons, this is a sure way to defeat. The most preferable is the location of the defensive line near the outskirts.

When planning the defense, the garrison is divided into units. Subdivisions, in turn, are assigned to areas, sectors, sectors, strong points. When choosing the location of positions, not only favorable engineering conditions are taken into account, but also the paths of the probable advance of the enemy assault groups.

When artillery is located on the outskirts, fire is fired at the troops advancing on the settlement in the normal field battle mode. If guns and armored vehicles are located in the depths of a settlement, they should be guided by direct fire. Usually the most likely directions for artillery fire are along the streets. Moreover, the calculations are focused on firing at large targets: armored vehicles and other vehicles. The tactics of a competent assault does not involve accumulations of infantry in open spaces. But, if an accumulation of manpower is noticed or assumed in any building, artillery can fire with the aim of collapsing this building.

Also, the fire of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and cannons can be used to suppress enemy firing points. But the possibility of using such tactics is limited, because in a real battle with dense buildings, the clash distances are very short. The firing points of the opposing sides are usually located no further than 100 meters from each other. Tanks and artillery cannot fire on the upper floors of high-rise buildings. BMPs have a big advantage in this situation. But it is heavy weapons that will become the first targets for the advancing enemy. Therefore, artillery should focus on meeting the enemy with fire as soon as he appears on the distant approaches. We must not forget that the maneuver of defending armored vehicles and artillery is not only limited, but often even impossible. Therefore, in order to reduce the probability of defeat, it is advisable to bury armored vehicles in the ground, drive them into caponiers, or use engineering structures for shelter. For example, low stone fences.

Defensive troops can successfully use mortars for indirect fire on close targets and partially compensate for the limitations in the use of field artillery pieces. Mortar fire can be concentrated and barrage. Concentrated fire is conducted on areas of possible (or known) accumulation of enemy manpower and equipment, and barrage - to cover open areas of defense. Mortars are also convenient from the point of view of the possibility of operational maneuver.

When preparing a settlement for an assault, the garrison actively uses mining. The most promising for laying is, of course, the roadway. Its mining can be carried out with different types of explosive devices. In addition, when planning mining, it is necessary to calculate the most probable paths and directions of movement of assault groups (gardens, flower beds, etc.). Promising for laying explosive devices in the premises are also places convenient for equipping positions and areas of the alleged accumulation of enemy forces. They often use anti-personnel weapons installed with elements of "surprise".

Checkpoint "Rock-37" two days before the attack of militants on the city. These fighters spent the next four weeks surrounded

In a populated area, firing positions can be located in ordinary trenches in the city of Grozny. February 1995

Powerful land mines are laid in buildings in such a way that, when detonated, they cause the collapse of structures. Methods for initiating such charges may be different, but radio control is preferred. In this case, the probability of detecting a charge is reduced or its operation is achieved with a minimal effect. However, radio-controlled detonation can be complicated by limited visibility and some other factors. In addition to mining, the defenders can arrange artificial engineering barriers that hinder the actions of the attackers. It is also desirable to mine such barriers.

Since the fight against armored vehicles and other large enemy targets is a paramount task, it is important for the defending forces to properly distribute fire weapons to destroy them: grenade launchers, ATGM launchers, flamethrowers, etc. Their positions must meet certain requirements. They should allow for review and fire in given sectors, that is, in places where enemy equipment is most likely to appear, to hide and protect the position as much as possible and be able to quickly change it.

To organize a powerful and "viscous" defense, the garrison must make the most efficient use of positions - both natural and artificial. For equipping positions, it is recommended to use buildings with semi-basement and basement rooms that provide the possibility of firing at the adjacent territory. Despite the fact that the offensive is expected in a certain direction, they are all preparing for all-round defense with overlapping sectors of fire and observation.

Underground communications are best suited for withdrawal. For the movement of infantry, the removal of the wounded and the delivery of ammunition through an open expanseable space, communication passages are being prepared. Defensive positions in general should make it possible to move frequently from one embrasure to another. The change of positions is especially important for snipers, machine gunners, flamethrowers and grenade throwers. For the latter, it is also important to have space behind them for the unhindered exit of the jet stream.

In multi-storey buildings, firing positions are located not only in depth, but also on floors, creating a multi-tiered system for simultaneous shelling of the enemy from upper and lower floors. At the same time, most of the firepower is located in the lower floors of buildings and semi-basements. Buildings that interfere with shelling can be destroyed in advance. Firing positions are usually prepared behind stone fences and walls. For firing, not only the windows of buildings, but also artificial camouflaged breaches are used as loopholes. Such a position is more difficult for the enemy to detect and hit.

Individual actions in the city

It has already been said above that in the conditions of urban combat, the role of not only small units, but also of each individual soldier increases significantly. This chapter provides recommendations for conducting individual actions in urban combat conditions.

Before entering a city (village, settlement, etc.), it is necessary that every soldier has an idea of ​​the layout, if not of the entire settlement, then at least of that part of it in which he will have to act. It is no secret that during the assault on the city of Grozny in January 1995, the federal troops had a very vague idea of ​​its layout and, moreover, of the defense system. And this despite the fact that the city of Grozny was his own, Russian city, and not the territory of another state. Moreover, before the assault, scouts from among the Chechens who supported the federal government threw themselves into it. But at the time of the assault, the units of the federal forces had an insufficient number of fresh maps and diagrams and guides, including fighters who had previously lived in Grozny.

Equipment features

Outfit and equipment for urban combat are slightly different from the usual ones. A simple fighter (machine gunner) needs an increased supply of hand grenades. Also, the consumption of grenades for the underbarrel grenade launcher will be increased, since its role in the settlement is more significant than in the field or forest. In addition to fragmentation grenades, flash noise and tear grenades (if it is necessary to take someone alive), as well as smoke bombs, will come in handy.

At short distances, the role and possibility of using additional weapons - pistols, knives - increase. They can come in handy when it is impossible to fire from the main weapon (the reason does not play a role). But additional weapons will only be useful when they are available for quick draw and ready for immediate use. Therefore, a fighter should think about his placement in advance and practice in a quick draw.

Wearing body armor is a moot point. It is covered in the chapter on personal equipment. Most fighters wear it only when driving in transport or to perform a separate task. Wearing an armored helmet is quite justified.

Each unit and each fighter operating in the city may be cut off from the main forces and will be forced to act independently for a long time. During the storming of the city of Grozny by bandit formations in August 1996, the units of the federal forces, which were surrounded "thanks" to the betrayal of the high command, were forced to fight for about a month. Many of them did not receive assistance from the main forces with either ammunition, provisions, or personnel. Therefore, before the performance, it is necessary to take a reasonable supply of food, spare batteries for the devices used, etc.

Be sure to have a flashlight, even if you have to act during daylight hours.

If the uniform of the enemy has an external similarity with the uniforms of the attackers, it is necessary to introduce a single system of visual identification for all of your soldiers. Each fighter must have a sign that is not characteristic of the traditional form of clothing, clearly visible from afar. For example, during the assault on the city of Grozny in January 1995, federal troops wore white armbands on their left sleeves. If the operation is delayed for a long time, the identification system may change periodically, since it can be used by the enemy. It is important to bring the changes to all soldiers at the same time.

It is not recommended to wear sneakers or other light shoes with soft soles in the city. Underfoot there will be a large amount of broken glass, boards with nails and other sharp and dangerous objects. In addition, movement on stairs and simply uneven surfaces is fraught with a dislocation of the ankle. In order to reduce the likelihood of such an injury, you must wear shoes with high berets and tighten the lacing tightly. Knee pads and elbow pads, special gloves, dust goggles will be useful. During the battle, a lot of dust and building chips rise among the buildings, which make it difficult not only to observe, but also to breathe. Therefore, a respirator may come in handy.

Movement

When moving in a populated area, an encounter with the enemy can occur at any moment. In this case, shooting will be carried out at a very short distance, and often at close range. Therefore, the weapon must be ready for immediate use.

The machine must be loaded, removed from the fuse and have a cartridge in the chamber. To be ready for the immediate opening of aimed fire, one should move without lifting the butt of the machine gun from the shoulder, while the barrel goes down a little. When moving between houses, the trunk rises up, controlling the windows. Another way to hold is to rest the butt against the elbow bend. The barrel is directed upwards. This method also has its adherents. The barrel turns in the same direction in which the fighter is looking.

In the village, the sight of the machine gun is set to 100 m, the fuse is set to firing in single mode. Firing bursts is effective only in some cases. For example, when suddenly meeting a group of enemies at close range. In most situations, it makes more sense to shoot single shots. The effect is not less, but the savings in ammo is significant.

When firing from a machine gun, you do not need to wait for the store to be completely empty. If the magazine is partially empty and there is a pause in the battle, you can change the magazine. And you can finish off the missing ammo. To do this, you need to carry cartridges in bulk in a special pocket, which is securely fastened. In order for the shooter to be able to control the consumption of cartridges, starting to equip the magazine, you need to insert three tracer cartridges. All of them can not be shot. As soon as at least one tracer has flown, you need to change the store.

It is even better if there is a cartridge left in the chamber, in which case you will not have to waste time juggling the bolt. However, in the heat of battle, it seems doubtful that a soldier would think about such trifles as counting the rounds fired. In any case, it is better to change an incompletely used magazine than to waste time reloading at a critical moment.

If you throw away empty magazines, there will be problems. But in a tense situation, it is better not to waste time placing them in a vest or pouch. Moreover, in the heat of battle, you can mix up empty and full magazines. When firing from a stationary position, empty magazines must be thrown into one place. When a pause occurs, they must be equipped and placed on yourself.

A hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher (reusable) must also be ready for immediate use. However, it is not always possible to apply it exactly in the place where the need arose. This is due to the danger posed by a jet stream when fired from behind a grenade launcher. Therefore, the grenade launcher must not only be attentive to the choice of positions, but also, when moving, constantly have an idea of ​​​​the possibility of immediate firing. After all, comrades walking behind can suffer from a shot. When it rains, a package is put on the grenade that does not prevent firing.

The underbarrel grenade launcher must also be ready for quick use, that is, be loaded. You don’t need to put it on the fuse (at least the Russian GP-25), since a significant effort is already required for a shot, which practically eliminates the possibility of an accidental shot. You should not fire from the GP-25 at a distance closer than 40 meters, since in this case the grenade may not have time to cock. It is dangerous to shoot at the windows of a high-rise building while standing at its foot, because if it misses, the grenade will ricochet and fall back.

All actions must be performed in pairs (triples). Members of the couple must constantly see each other and know where the other comrades are. There are no such statistics, but many fighters died from the bullets of their own comrades, who confused them with the enemy. However, one should not gather in groups, putting others at risk.

You can not be in an open place motionless. You must either move or hide. Movements occur in quick short dashes from cover to cover. Thus it is impossible to lose orientation in space. It is always necessary to remember which side is yours, which side is strangers. In conditions of dense buildings and uneven advancement of different groups and individual fighters, the situation is changing very quickly. Therefore, if you shoot at everything that moves and suddenly appears, you can hit your own.

For confident orientation, you need to stop more often (in cover) and look around. Movements should be planned, not chaotic.

Before running, you need to clearly understand the direction and goal, upon reaching which the fighter must again take a protected position. Only in the event of falling under sudden enemy fire, it is necessary to immediately occupy the nearest shelter. With dense fire, and in general to reduce risk and increase stealth, movements can be made crawling or on all fours. You need to move along walls, bushes, rubble and other objects, without running out into open places. Smoke is often used to overcome dangerous spaces. It saves from aimed fire.

Any movement must take place under mutual cover. Covering is carried out not only when moving, but also when pauses occur for various reasons: providing assistance, reloading, etc. In this case, voice contact must be maintained. If you need to leave the active battle, you must inform your partner about this.

When moving through an unfamiliar settlement, you need to remember the road, since there is little hope for guides.

Passing under the windows, you need to bend down, and jump over the windows located below waist level. Moving indoors, you should also avoid the appearance of windows and breaks opposite. The enemy can hit with fire from another building or from a different external position.

It is necessary to focus on the "left-handed rule". It lies in the fact that physiologically it is more convenient and faster for a person to transfer fire to the left. This rule applies to right-handers. For lefties it's the other way around. That is, the movement of weapons outward, whether it be a pistol or an assault rifle, is less natural and convenient. The transfer of fire and the conduct of aimed fire to the right (for the right-hander) or to the left (for the left-hander) are associated with the need to turn the hull. The exception is shooting a pistol with one hand. Much follows from this rule, and it will be mentioned further on.

When choosing a firing position or when observing, it is necessary (hereinafter all for the right-handed person) to look out and fire to the right of the object you are hiding behind. Thus, almost the entire body will be protected, with the exception of the right shoulder and arm, as well as the right side of the head. When shooting to the left of the obstacle, the shooter is forced to open up completely. The appearance of a head over a protective object is generally unacceptable. The closer to the ground the head is, the less it will be conspicuous to the enemy. It is even better if there is a mirror (preferably on a rod), with which you can observe without leaning out.

However, the mirror can give glare that unmasks the position. Therefore, when using it, you need to consider where the sun is. In general, if you have a choice of direction, it is better to enter from the side of the sun so that it blinds the enemy, and not you.

If it is necessary to fire to the left of the protective obstacle, it is better to shift the machine gun to the left hand. Although it is inconvenient and unusual, it is much safer. The same goes for pistol shooting.

When driving around any obstacle (for example, the corner of a building), it must be done on the right. In the event of a sudden encounter with the enemy and the need to immediately open fire, the weapon will immediately be directed at the enemy with a minimum "openness" of the fighter's body. To go around the corner on the left, it is also necessary to shift the machine to the left hand. You should not be afraid of inconvenience, since at such short distances it is difficult to miss from a machine gun even from an uncomfortable position. Or you need to send the lefty forward.

Going around the corners, you need to stay away from them. Then the panorama will open gradually and unpleasant surprises will be discovered in time. The bending must be done slowly. In this case, the fighter must be ready both for opening fire and for a quick bounce back.

In general, the movement should be slow and careful. In addition to the frontal direction, the danger is represented by various dormer windows, breaks and openings, which can be located both above and below. It is very difficult to detect the presence of the enemy in them until he gives himself away. In addition, there is always the danger of hitting mines. In the conditions of buildings, these are mainly stretch marks and various "surprises". Anything can be put on stretch. Doors and various valuables (for example, tape recorders, televisions) are especially often mined. Objects whose movement is logical and predictable are at the greatest risk. Mines are laid in places most convenient for a firing position. Piles of various objects and corpses are often mined. Since this is usually done in a hurry, the simplest methods are chosen. A grenade without a ring is placed under the corpse.

Moving the body releases the trigger lever. The calculation is made that, seeing his comrade lying motionless, the first reaction will be the desire to check whether he is wounded or killed.

All suspicious objects are hooked by a cat anchor on a rope and displaced. In this case, it is necessary to be in cover, since the explosion can be of great power. In the absence of a rope, a long pole or board can be used. Closed doors are undermined or the lock (other locking device) is fired. At the same time, safety measures must be observed. And not only individual ones. We must not forget about the comrades who may be in the affected area from the ricochet or from the consequences of the explosion.

For prevention, it will be useful to flash the door with a few shots. For the same reason, you cannot stand in front of the door yourself. You should be more careful with metal doors, as there is a risk of ricochet, especially from small-caliber bullets and low penetration. Knocking down doors is risky enough.

Modern ammunition has a very high penetrating power and allows you to hit an enemy behind walls made of certain materials and other, at first glance, durable structures. Often, psychologically, soldiers perceive easily shot through objects as a reliable shelter. You need to remember this, not only hiding from the enemy, but also trying to hit him through cover. Damaging fire can even be fired through a wooden floor or stairs.

Before entering a room or going around a corner, you must throw a grenade there. The grenade should be thrown with a slowdown. That is, after releasing the trigger lever, you need to hold it for two seconds, and then throw it. Such actions require composure, but they will not throw it back to you. After all, a slowdown of three to four seconds is enough time to take countermeasures or shelter from being hit by shrapnel. If comrades are in the affected area, some experts recommend warning them by shouting “Grenade!” or "Shards!". However, enemies are also warned by this cry. In addition, there is no guarantee that the comrades will hear the cry or have time to respond to it in a timely manner.

Therefore, it would be more correct to throw a grenade, knowing for sure that none of your own would be hurt. And yet, conditional shouts are also needed in the case when grenades are thrown by the enemy. Everyone who sees her should warn their people about this with a loud cry. At the same time, you yourself need to jump into the nearest shelter or dive around the corner and open your mouth so that the eardrums are not damaged by the blast wave.

Many instructors recommend literally throwing "pocket artillery" at all suspicious places. Theoretically, this is how it should be. But one fighter is unlikely to take more than 15-20 grenades with him. At the same time, you still need to put stretch marks and leave a few pieces to continue the battle. Therefore, total grenade throwing is permissible during a short-term assault, after which it will be possible to replenish the stock.

Throwing tear gas grenades is not widely used in a combat situation. After all, he not only does not hit the enemy, but also does not guarantee that the enemy is not capable of resistance. In addition, the enemy may have gas masks, and persons under the influence of alcohol or drugs are usually not affected by tear gas.

In addition, the attackers themselves need to take individual measures for protection. It is also difficult to predict how a gas cloud will "behave". The greatest effect of tear gas grenades is achieved when it is necessary to force enemies in an enclosed area to surrender or leave it. Flashbang grenades produce a stunning effect during the explosion and are used in cases where the enemy needs to be taken alive.

Immediately after the grenade explosion, you need to break into the room. It should be remembered that an explosion does not guarantee a complete defeat. The enemy can take cover behind some solid object or hide in another room. Therefore, the calculation is made not only on the damaging effect of the grenade, but also on stunning, stunning the enemy. Having burst into the room, you must be prepared for the immediate opening of fire. In a large room, you can open preventive fire at places where the enemy can hide. But random shooting in all directions can lead to the defeat of their own fighters by ricochet. Fire can be fired without entering the room through the doorway.

The entrance to the premises is made quickly, without delays against the background of the opening. Movement goes obliquely to the wall.

All hit enemies must be checked. You can not move on without making sure that all opponents are dead and without searching them. Perhaps, during the search, the necessary information will be found. For example, maps of minefields, walkie-talkies tuned to enemy frequencies, defense plans, etc.

Moving forward, you can not leave unchecked objects behind. Checked premises can be marked with conventional signs (usually with chalk) for the units coming behind and for yourself, since you may then have to return to the passed premises. Detected mines in the absence of sappers are indicated. In simple cases, you can try to neutralize an explosive device yourself with the help of a "cat" or eliminate it by detonating it with another explosive device or shoot it from a safe distance. But it's still risky.

When moving through a building in the absence of a loud noise background, it is necessary to listen to extraneous sounds. Accordingly, the fighters themselves should move as quietly as possible. To mislead a potential enemy, you need to actively use distracting noises. At the same time, you yourself need to be critical of suspicious sounds. It is not so difficult to distinguish the sound of a thrown stone from the crackling of broken glass underfoot.

The assault on the building must be prepared in such a way as to make it on the first try. Practice shows that an unsuccessful assault strengthens the will of the defenders and undermines the morale of the attackers. And tactically, the enemy will be able to foresee further methods and ways of attack and regroup accordingly. Therefore, once the action has begun, it is no longer possible to stop. Even with significant losses. Otherwise, they will then increase many times, both during the retreat and during the second attempt.

Collision with the enemy at a short distance

Often a soldier comes under fire without understanding where the fire is coming from. At the moment it is more important to hide, to leave the line of fire. To do this, you need to quickly rush to the nearest shelter. In order not to waste time searching for it, even when moving, you should mark suitable places along the way and move between shelters in short throws. In no case should you run away, although for many this is the most natural, instinctive movement. In this case, the enemy will calmly shoot the fleeing man in the back.

In the specialized literature and various articles on urban combat, one can often find recommendations to move to the left (to the right of the enemy) when suddenly meeting with the enemy. In this case, there is a reference to the "left-handed rule" mentioned above.

When you read such recommendations, doubts arise not only about the author's relevant combat experience, but also about his theoretical training. Such advice can really work when meeting with an enemy armed with a pistol. But for a military clash, where the main weapon is a machine gun, everything is different.

Yes, the "left-handed rule" works, but there are other factors besides it, proving once again that mindless cheating from each other is not always useful.

First, for most people, the most natural movement (somersault) to the right.

Secondly, according to the “left-handed rule”, the transfer of fire to the right (for a right-hander) is more difficult and unnatural than to the left. But when you put your opponent in a difficult position, you put yourself in the same position. Moreover, a standing enemy has the ability to move the weapon to the right by turning the entire body, and you, being on the move, are unlikely to be able to do this without acrobatic training.

Thirdly, we must not forget about the inherent properties of automatic weapons. What does the enemy do when meeting you at a short distance? His most likely and dangerous reaction is to point the barrel of his machine gun at you and immediately open fire with a burst. What will the machine do? Having sent the first bullet in the direction of the original direction, its barrel will begin to take it to the right and up. Just in the direction that some theorists recommend running away. Of course, the enemy can carry out fire adjustments in the course of your movement, but there are only a few such professionals. The vast majority will shoot exactly as described above. Moreover, we should not forget that all this happens in a matter of moments.

So the first thing to do is to run for cover. If there is an opportunity to shoot towards the enemy on the move - great. In this case, aiming is not necessary, as this will slow down the movement. The machine gun does not rise for aiming, the fire is fired immediately from its original position. It is important to confuse the enemy, scare, make him think about his safety. If it doesn't work, no big deal. The main thing is to survive the first seconds. Make active use of your peripheral vision.

The same "theorists" recommend throwing grenades at the enemy on the go. You can try if you already have them ready to throw. But this is doubtful. It is unlikely that anyone will be able to simultaneously look for cover, move towards it, shift the machine gun and get grenades, prepare them for a throw and throw them. All movements should be simple. But they need to be worked out in advance. Not a single person in such a situation will think and remember what was written about it in books. His body will think and act for him.

In any case, in any environment, you must immediately leave the line of fire. Even falling to the floor can save you from being hit, since the fire is usually fired at chest level. Opening fire without moving to the side is unacceptable, since the enemy may have an advantage in time and start shooting first. But even without this, there is always a great risk of suffering from the bullets of even a wounded enemy.

In the opposite situation, when an enemy group falls under your fire, you must immediately prioritize hitting targets. The first to be destroyed are enemies who are ready for the immediate use of weapons (opening them) or throwing grenades. In the second place - explicit commanders, grenade launchers, snipers, machine gunners. Fleeing enemies are destroyed last. When destroying a group, it is advisable to start from the back. Then the front ones will not immediately understand that they have been detected, and will not immediately take adequate measures. In the noise of the surrounding combat, your shots may not be recognized immediately. Especially if silent weapons are used. If you kill the one running in front, then the rear ones, seeing his fall, will immediately react to this.

If a comrade was injured during the movement of the group, he should be picked up by those running nearby, dragged into cover and provided with emergency assistance, or immediately handed over to the orderlies, if any. If a comrade was wounded in an open area, shot through by the enemy, when moving to a shelter, you should not immediately rush to rescue him, otherwise you can get under fire yourself. Chechen snipers used this tactic extensively. They intentionally wounded the serviceman in such a way that he could not move independently. Since for a Russian soldier from time immemorial the life of a comrade was no less valuable than his own, the wounded immediately rushed to save. Snipers (sniper) also wounded these soldiers. When the rest of the comrades realized that it was pointless to run to help, the snipers finished off the motionless wounded.

Therefore, to save a wounded comrade, it is necessary to immediately install a smoke screen. Snipers, grenade launchers and machine gunners should try to identify enemy sniper positions and suppress them. It is better to pull out the wounded with the help of a rope thrown to him.

Snipers in the city are generally the most dangerous enemies. When preparing for battle, they choose (if necessary, equip) several positions for themselves: both for observation and for shooting. Snipers can operate alone, but more often with a partner or under the cover of several submachine gunners. A group of snipers can also work.

Sniper Point Suppression Tactics the enemy does not justify itself with a flurry of indiscriminate fire. After firing from the depths of the room, the sniper changes position and usually remains invulnerable. To neutralize it is necessary to calculate its position and destroy it when it appears. Best of all, snipers and grenade launchers cope with this task. If an enemy sniper is not operating in territory under his control, small search teams are engaged in searching for him. When faced with them, it is very difficult for a pair of snipers (the most common practice) to counter an assault team.

Actions in the dark

In the dark, you can not act with a cavalry charge. Progress is made slowly and carefully. Do not enter a dark room until the eyes have adapted to the darkness. To speed up addiction, this technique is used. A few minutes before entering a dark room, one eye closes and opens already in the dark.

If there are lights, the task is simplified. In fact, without them it is better not to enter the darkness. If it is possible to light the room from a safe place outside, this should be used. For example, one soldier will light the room (in a safe manner) through the dormer window and draw attention to himself. At this time, other fighters will carry out penetration. They themselves will be in the dark, but the main volume of the room will be illuminated. If you want to enter yourself, the lantern must be held aside at arm's length.

This issue is now quite controversial. For example, some American police instructors recommend holding a flashlight in the hand crossed at the wrist with the hand holding the gun. Thus, the flashlight beam is always directed in the same direction as the gun barrel. This is definitely good. However, it is not always possible and convenient to fire with two hands. Holding a gun with two hands somewhat restricts movement and limits spatial freedom (the term is not official). The main drawback of this method of holding is the provocation of the hidden enemy to shoot at the source of light, that is, directly at the owner of the lantern.

Statements that “now all criminals are literate and know that they need to shoot not at a light source, but nearby,” do not stand up to criticism. Indeed, in such a situation, firing, rather, will be conducted not according to knowledge, but according to instincts. This technique involves the use of a pistol, since automatic weapons abroad have long been equipped with special flashlights. However, Russian soldiers can only be offered to improvise themselves with the adaptation of ordinary flashlights.

When moving in the dark, you can improvise. For example, to sit down, raising the lantern in an outstretched hand. Or put it down, or throw it so that it illuminates the direction of the alleged enemy shelter, and make a silent maneuver yourself. In this case, distractions can be used.

The most primitive is a throw towards some object. You can periodically turn on the flashlight, confusing and blinding the enemy. However, with such outbreaks, you yourself can lose orientation. Moreover, for such actions, the flashlight should be turned on by pressing a button, and not by a slider or, moreover, by turning the “head”. After each flash, you need to change position. This technique is very effective and less dangerous than driving with a constantly on light source. Some illuminated areas can be dashed through. When driving in the dark, you do not need to make unnecessary noise, smoke and reveal your presence and location with senseless shooting.

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude about the requirements for a lantern. Naturally, it must be compact, reliable, powerful and durable. Turning it on should be done both with a button (it only shines when it is held down) and with a constant light toggle switch. Of course, the flashlight must be shockproof.

The best solution would be to use instruments and night vision goggles. But we must not forget that night vision devices produce radiation that is detected by enemy optics.

The use of small arms that are not equipped with flame arresters or devices for silent and flameless firing also greatly unmasks the positions of shooters in darkness.

In the variety of buildings of the settlement and enemy locations under the influence of dozens of different factors, a lot of different situations arise, each of which is unique. The conduct of hostilities in a populated area requires special preliminary training: combat, physical and tactical. However, a soldier who does not know how to think, improvise and act in difficult situations will have a hard time even with special training. But it will be much worse for his comrades, since in the city the interaction between soldiers and units is especially important.