If Khrushchev's decade passed under the sign of reforms, noisy political, ideological and economic campaigns, then the twenty years, from the mid-60s to the mid-80s, when the political leadership of the country was mainly headed by L.I. Brezhnev is called the time of stagnation - the time of missed opportunities. It began with rather bold reforms in the field of the economy, it ended with an increase in negative trends in all areas public life, stagnation in the economy, the crisis of the socio-political system.

In fairness, it should be noted that the economic policy pursued during this period of time proclaimed goals that corresponded to the spirit of the time. It was supposed to ensure a significant increase in the material well-being of the Soviet people on the basis of the intensification of social production, the main means of which was scientific and technological progress.

By the beginning of the 70s. the main directions of the scientific and technological revolution were determined. These included:

Creation of new types of automated technological processes of production (synthesis of mechanics and electronics) and automated control systems based on the integration of achievements in electronics, instrumentation, electronic computing engineering, new sub-branches of machine tool industry associated with the creation of robotics and flexible automated systems, laser technology and communications;

Development on the basis of the achievements of aerospace technology of new systems of transportation, information, control, methods of scientific research;

Development of more and more diverse materials in terms of their combination of properties, specialized for their intended purpose, new structural materials, multi-composition, ceramic, ultra-pure, etc.;

Expansion and improvement of the energy base of production based on the development of nuclear energy, bioenergy, geo- and solar energy;

Creation on the basis of the achievements of genetic engineering of biotechnological industries, the emergence of bionics.

In each of these areas, new industries contributed in the 70-80s. a significant contribution to the development and improvement of production, mainly in advanced industrial countries. A progressive movement has begun in such important areas as integrated automation of production and management, electronization and biotechnologization of economic activity, the use of nuclear energy, research and development outer space and the World Ocean. New industries have created guidelines for the economy of the future, the transition of the world economy into the electronic, nuclear and space age.

All these aspects of the participation of new industries in the scientific and technological development of capitalist society were most clearly manifested in the USA, Japan and the FRG. In our country, in the development of scientific and technological policy, not all trends in scientific and technological revolution were taken into account. Not capturing the features of its new stage, the leadership of the USSR for a long time considered it necessary to focus on the development of only the main direction of scientific and technological progress. From the very beginning, automation of production processes was singled out as such. It was recognized that it was precisely this that concealed the possibility of transforming material production, management and achieving a multiple increase in labor productivity. It was also argued that the most important achievements of the natural and technical sciences of the 20th century find their material embodiment in complex automation in a concentrated form.

The selection of one direction of scientific and technical progress instead of the whole complex, as required by the scientific and technological revolution, was another miscalculation. In fairness, it should be noted that in the field of automation, despite the proclaimed priority, no tangible results have been achieved. This was largely due to the lack of specific measures to restructure the economy.

The need to accelerate the pace of scientific and technological progress in the 1970s and 1980s became especially acute. At party congresses, decisions were made on the need to shift the emphasis in economic policy by shifting the center of gravity from quantitative to qualitative indicators. It was recognized that the extensive growth factors of the national economy had exhausted themselves and were leading to stagnation, that it was necessary to more actively develop the industries that determine scientific and technological progress. At the same time, grandiose tasks were put forward: during the 70s, in just one decade, to transfer the economy to a qualitatively new stage of expanded reproduction, and in the 80s. - complete the transfer of the economy to the path of intensification; bring all branches of the national economy to the forefront of science and technology; achieve a significant increase in labor productivity, allowing for 85-90% of the increase in national income.

At the same time, against the background of large-scale goals, the means to achieve them looked rather traditional. Hopes were pinned on the implementation of the task formulated at the 24th Party Congress and confirmed in the decisions of subsequent congresses - "to organically combine the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of socialism." Moreover, it was meant to focus on factors of an ideological nature, as well as centralized methods of leadership. The advantages of socialism meant nothing more than the planned development of the economy, the centralization of resources, socialist competition, etc. The use of such a thesis manifested the desire of the country's leadership to unreasonably exaggerate the potential of the socialist system, to avoid the need to introduce economic incentives that destroy the existing overly centralized management system .

It cannot be denied that certain work was carried out in the country to carry out technical reconstruction. If in 1971 there were 89,481 mechanized production lines in industry, then in 1985 - 161,601; automatic lines, respectively, 10917 and 34278. The number of complexly mechanized, automated and complex-automated sections, workshops, industries increased during this period from 44248 to 102140, and similar enterprises - from 4984 to 7198.

Nevertheless, there was no sharp turn in increasing the efficiency of production. The decisions of the 24th-26th Party Congresses remained, in essence, only directives. The course proclaimed by them for intensification during the 70s. did not give any noticeable results. Worse than that, neither in the ninth nor in the tenth five-year plans industry coped with the plans (as well as construction and agriculture). The tenth five-year plan, contrary to declarations, did not become a five-year plan of efficiency and quality.

It was not possible to correct the situation in the first half of the 1980s. The economy, by inertia, continued to develop to a large extent on an extensive basis, focused on the involvement in production of additional labor and material resources. The pace of introduction of mechanization and automation did not meet the requirements of the time. Manual labor by the mid-80s. about 50 million people were employed: about a third of the workers in industry, more than half in construction, three-quarters in agriculture.

In industry, the age characteristics of production equipment continued to deteriorate. The implementation of measures on new technology did not lead to an increase in efficiency - actual costs increased and profits declined.

As a result, labor productivity growth rates and some other performance indicators have seriously decreased. If we compare the average annual growth of the most important national economic indicators, we can see that it has been decreasing from five-year period to five-year period. So, in terms of national income used for consumption and accumulation, there was a decrease from 5.1% in the ninth five-year plan to 3.1% in the eleventh five-year plan, in industrial products, respectively, from 7.4 to 3.7%, in terms of the productivity of social labor - from 4.6 to 3.1%, in terms of real per capita income - from 4.4 to 2.1%.

However, the severity of the impending crisis in the 70s. was smoothed out by the unexpected wealth in the form of petrodollars that fell upon the country. The conflict between the Arab states and Israel that broke out in 1973 led to a sharp rise in oil prices. The export of Soviet oil began to bring a huge income in foreign currency. It was used to purchase consumer goods, which created the illusion of relative prosperity. Enormous funds were spent on the purchase of entire enterprises, complex equipment and technologies. However, the low efficiency of economic activity did not allow rational use of unexpected opportunities.

The economic situation in the country continued to worsen. The inefficient economy proved unable to solve the problems of raising the standard of living of the working people. In fact, the task set in 1971 at the 24th Congress of the CPSU was a failure - to significantly strengthen the social orientation of the economy, increasing the pace of development of the sectors of the national economy that produce consumer goods. The residual principle of resource allocation - first production, and only then man - dominated socio-economic policy.

The unresolved food problem, which directly depended on the state of agriculture, also had a negative impact on the social development of society. For 1965-1985 670.4 billion rubles were invested in it. The result was disappointing. In the eighth five-year plan, the increase in gross output amounted to 21%, in the ninth - 13, in the tenth - 9, in the eleventh - 6%. Finally, in 1981-1982. development rates amounted to 2-3% and were the lowest for all the years of Soviet power (excluding the periods of civil and Great Patriotic War). Many disproportions arose and became more acute in the national economy. The country, which has huge resources, has come across a shortage of them. A gap formed between social needs and the achieved level of production, between effective demand and its material coverage.

The underestimation of the acuteness and urgency of transferring the economy to intensive methods of development, the active use of the achievements of scientific and technological progress in the national economy led to the accumulation of negative phenomena in the country's economy. There were a lot of calls and conversations on this subject, but things practically stood still. From congress to congress, from five-year plan to five-year plan, more and more new tasks in the field of scientific and technical progress were put forward. Most of them have remained unfulfilled.

Among them - the solution of the structural restructuring of the economy. For decades, the Soviet economy retained its macrostructure, the main characteristics of which remained virtually unchanged. This is, firstly, a constant extensive increase in the production of primary resources and, in general, the production of means of production to the detriment of the development of consumer industries and non-material industries. Secondly, an excessively centralized mechanism for the distribution and redistribution of all types of resources (material, labor, financial) with the maximum narrowing of the scope of commodity-money relations. Thirdly, the super-priority resource provision of the military-industrial complex and its dominance over all other sectors of the national economy.

As a result, the Soviet economy looked rather contradictory. On the one hand, it included a number of high-tech, knowledge-intensive areas of production activity, which are mainly part of the military-industrial complex, on the other hand, it had a very significant, typical for Third World countries, traditional area with a low level of efficiency, weak competitiveness, and price disproportions. generally do not meet the requirements of the world market.

Of course, the fact that many decisions of the party congresses were half-hearted, not always consistent, also had negative consequences. Much was said at the 24th, 25th, and 26th Congresses of the CPSU about the urgent need for the technical re-equipment of enterprises. However, mechanical engineering did not receive priority, it developed approximately at the level of the entire industry. Therefore, the material base of technological progress did not meet the increased needs. The old practice continued: capital investments went mainly to new construction, while the equipment of operating enterprises was aging, and existing equipment and technologies were increasingly lagging behind the best world examples.

The decisions taken at party congresses in the field of scientific and technological progress were not connected with real steps to expand and develop democratic institutions, i.e., the mechanism by which alone it was possible to set in motion the human factor and thereby contribute to the implementation of decisions.

On the contrary, the Brezhnev leadership took the path of curtailing criticism of Stalin's personality cult and its consequences; resolute suppression of the democratic movement that originated in society during the years of Khrushchev's reforms. In fact, these attitudes in the sphere of domestic policy were oriented towards strengthening the methods of administration in the management of society, and strengthened the authoritarian-bureaucratic tendencies in relations between leaders and subordinates. There was no sober, scientific analysis of the current trends in the economy. As a rule, the reasons for the delay in raising the efficiency of social production were hushed up or revealed without the necessary sharpness and depth.

However, the most main reason associated with the preservation of the economic mechanism of management and the management system that took shape during the years of the pre-war and post-war five-year plans, that is, during the period of extensive development of the national economy. Subsequently, the operating mechanism of managing and managing the economy, remaining practically unchanged, was at best subject to only partial, and insignificant changes. Thus, the measures taken during the economic reform of the second half of the 1960s, outlined by the September (1965) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, did not adequately affect the fundamental foundations of the process of increasing the efficiency of production. One direction of economic reform excluded the other. Along with the proposed introduction of economic controls, the process of strengthening centralized leadership continued. The mechanism of managing and managing the economy has become a mechanism for slowing down our economic and social development.

The capitalist countries experienced something similar in the 1970s. At this time, there was a deterioration in the conditions of reproduction, caused by a deep crisis in the structure of the capitalist economy. The economic mechanism ceased to stimulate economic development in the new situation. At the same time, there was a relative shortage of risk capital, which was used to develop new industries in production. Capital was directed to quieter and more profitable areas, undermining long-term prospects for economic growth and improved farm efficiency. The turning point of the 70s-early 80s. was characterized by a general slowdown in economic growth rates, weak utilization of production capacities, and a slowdown in the growth rates of economic efficiency indicators (primarily labor productivity and capital productivity). So, if the growth rate of labor productivity in the US manufacturing industry in 1955-1978. amounted to 2.7%, then in 1978-1979. - 1.45%. In Japan, respectively - 9.26 and 7.05%, in Germany - 6.05 and 4.08%, in France - 5.87 and 5%, in the UK - 3.63 and 1.56%.

The capitalist world immediately reacted to the new phenomena of reproduction taking place. And 70-80s. became a time of change in the economic mechanism. The main emphasis was placed on the restructuring of the economy, curbing inflation and stimulating investment. At the same time, appropriations for scientific research and their centralized planning were increased, an extensive system of new state bodies for managing science was created, and legislative acts were adopted to accelerate the pace of scientific and technological progress. For example, in the United States, the Stevenson-Widler New Technologies Act, the economic recovery tax law, the Joint R&D Act, etc. were adopted. In Japan, the State Administration for Science and Technology was established with the rights of the ministry. In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Education and Science, as well as the Interministerial Committee for Science and Research, began to operate.

The change in demand and the new opportunities for scientific and technical progress, which are almost equally effective for enterprises of different sizes, have led to the need to transform the organizational structure of production in the direction of abandoning megalomania, lowering the boundaries of the optimal size of enterprises and making it more flexible.

More advanced forms of organization of labor and production began to be applied. The increasing costs of labor force reproduction were offset by job rotation, expansion of work assignments, creation of circles for innovation and product quality, and the use of flexible work modes. Under the influence of scientific and technical progress, the share of highly skilled workers increased. In combination with the improvement of the means of labor, this contributed to the development of a steady trend of increasing labor productivity.

The needs of the scientific and technological revolution led to the strengthening of the role of the state in the economy. As a result, the main sectors and branches of the production sphere have adapted to the new economic conditions of reproduction. The leading capitalist countries began to quickly pick up the pace of accelerated economic development. In our country, instead of a balanced analysis of the current internal situation, praising what has been achieved and hushing up shortcomings prevailed.

Estimates of the foreign policy of the USSR, as well as economic, in the 60s-80s. were also apologetic in nature, giving the impression of complete well-being achieved in this area.

The political leadership of the country, headed by Brezhnev, in determining foreign policy priorities, as before, proceeded from the notion that humanity is going through a long historical period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The capitalist countries were viewed as carriers of aggressive tendencies, allies of the forces of reaction that hindered the development of progressive transformations taking place in the world.

And yet, despite the attempts made by the conservative forces to make foreign policy more orthodox, the course towards total confrontation with the capitalist countries, primarily with the United States, was rejected. Keeping the peace became the top priority.

However, the path to détente proved difficult. World in the mid-1960s more than once violated by regional and internal conflicts, in which the USSR and the USA were involved in one way or another. The Cold War, somewhat mitigated by Khrushchev's initiatives, is by no means a thing of the past; The policy of the United States and its allies was not particularly balanced either. In 1965, the United States, which was providing military assistance to the government of South Vietnam, extended hostilities to the DRV, subjecting it to bombardments. In 1967, a conflict broke out between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The USSR supported the Arab countries in this conflict, the USA supported Israel. In 1968, the USSR sent troops into Czechoslovakia during the emerging political crisis, which caused a negative reaction in the world.

Nevertheless, there was a sphere of common interests between the USSR and the USA related to the prevention nuclear war. In this respect, the Soviet-American Moscow summit in 1972 played an enormous role. It opened the way for the détente of international tension. In the summer of 1975, in Helsinki, the leaders of European states, as well as the United States and Canada, signed the Final Act - a kind of set of principles of interstate relations that meets the requirements of a policy of peaceful coexistence.

In addition, a number of important Soviet-American agreements were signed to prevent nuclear war and limit nuclear weapons.

All this created favorable opportunities for improving the international situation and finally overcoming the legacy of the Cold War. However, this did not happen. In the second half of the 70s. the process of detente slowed down, and in the early 1980s the world began to be drawn into a new "cold war", the confrontation between East and West sharply intensified.

Responsibility for the failure of the detente policy is borne by both sides: the USA and the USSR. The logic of the Cold War turned out to be stronger than the objective need for a new type of international relations, affirmed by detente. The world was rapidly growing tension. In 1979, the Soviet Union sent its troops into Afghanistan, which sharply increased anti-Soviet sentiment in the world.

At the end of the 70s. a new round of the arms race began. In response to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR took measures to prevent violation of the established military parity. However, our country could no longer withstand a new round of the arms race, since the military-economic and scientific-technical potential of the West far exceeded the potential of the Warsaw Pact countries. By the mid 80s. the CMEA countries produced 21.3% of the industrial output of the world, and the developed capitalist countries - 56.4%. An arms race could only ruin the country. It was necessary to look for new ways to ease international tension.

The period of stagnation was complex and contradictory in its own way. Society did not stand still. Changes took place in it, new needs accumulated. But the historically established socio-political system began to slow down its movement, giving rise to a state of stagnation.

After the dismissal of N. Khrushchev, in October 1964, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. Brezhnev became the General Secretary of the Central Committee: A. Kosygin became Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; member of the Presidium responsible for the ideological sphere - M. Suslov.

All power, including legislative power, was concentrated in the hands of the executive bodies: the highest, constantly functioning body of state power, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the highest executive body, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and locally, the executive committees of the Soviets. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, consisting of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities, was subordinate to the Supreme Soviets of the Union and Autonomous Republics, the Councils of Regions, Cities and Districts. million people and became one of the largest in the world. Under Brezhnev, his personal secretariat received considerable size. Emphasis on personnel work increased, the former pre-Khrushchev structure of party, Komsomol and trade union bodies was restored. Regional, regional and district party committees were restored instead of the former fabricated and Economic councils were abolished and large state committees were created (Goskomtsen, Gossnab, State Committee for Science and Technology).In 1977, a new ("Brezhnev") Constitution of the USSR was adopted, building so: called developed socialism .

THE BREZHNEV ERA (1964–1985)

"Golden Age" of nomenclature

Although the leaders who replaced Khrushchev had disagreements, they were united in the main. It was necessary to strengthen power and calmly enjoy the position achieved. Later, they finally became convinced that trying to rebuild the system is very dangerous and troublesome. It's better not to touch anything. It was during this era that the formation of the gigantic bureaucratic machine of socialism was completed, and all its fundamental flaws were clearly manifested. Gradually, some of Khrushchev's measures were canceled, which in one way or another limited the nomenclature, and sectoral ministries were restored.

Political life was now much calmer and even more secret than before. Using his position as General Secretary (Secretary General), L. I. Brezhnev, who did not seem to be a leader, became the main leader. Once again it became clear that under the dominance of the CPSU, the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee is a key one. It was with her help that both Stalin and Khrushchev managed to “take away” power from their more prominent associates.

During the years of Brezhnev's rule, the position of the ruling stratum has strengthened, and its well-being has grown. The nomenclature was still a caste, which had everything special: apartments, dachas, trips abroad, hospitals, etc. She did not know the shortage, since she also purchased goods in special stores. That is why those in power were especially interested in low prices: the more difficult it was to buy something for an ordinary citizen, the fuller was the ruble of the nomenklatura.

The nomenklatura was not a completely isolated layer from the people. Rather, they were numerous concentric circles, and the closer each of them stood to the population, the less opportunities they had. Accordingly, an increasing number of positions and professions became the privilege of the nomenklatura, for example, teachers of higher educational institutions. And the defense of a candidate's dissertation began to be furnished with such complex rules, recommendations, directions, which very much resembled the painful path of a medieval student to a master.

The upper strata of the nomenclature were now less and less filled with people from the lower ones, for the most part these positions were opened only for relatives and friends of high leaders. Such, for example, is the path of Brezhnev's son-in-law Churbanov, who from an ordinary officer became a general and deputy minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On the other hand, those who had already fallen into the corresponding circle were much less likely to be removed from it: they were, as it were, moved from one leading place to another. Because of the love of the nomenklatura for "warm places", the number of officials in the country grew much faster than the total number of employees.

Relations within the nomenklatura system were characterized by servility, bribery and various “gifts”, ousting talented people, rubbing points on superiors, appointing only one’s own to positions (and in some, especially non-Russian, republics, selling posts), etc. Despite the lack of jurisdiction of higher the leaders of ordinary laws, all the same, various scandalous cases that could not be hushed up often broke out, such as the “big caviar case”, when high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Fisheries illegally sold black caviar abroad.

The Brezhnev era is undoubtedly the "golden age" of the nomenklatura. But it ended as soon as production and consumption finally came to a standstill.

Economy: reforms and stagnation.

The Brezhnev era was later called the "stagnant period". The term “stagnation” originates from the political report of the Central Committee to the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, read by M. S. Gorbachev, in which it was stated that “stagnation phenomena began to appear in the life of society” both in the economic and social spheres. Most often, this term refers to the period from L. I. Brezhnev's coming to power (mid-1960s) to the beginning of perestroika (second half of the 1980s), marked by the absence of any serious upheavals in the political life of the country, as well as social stability and relatively high standard of living (as opposed to the era of the 1920s-1950s). However, the "stagnation" did not begin immediately. On the contrary, in 1965 they proclaimed an economic reform conceived under Khrushchev. Its essence was to give enterprises more freedom, to force them to fight for increasing profits and profitability, to link the results of labor and earnings (for this, part of the profits was left to enterprises to pay bonuses, etc.).

The reform gave some results, revived the economy. The increase in purchase prices had a positive effect on agriculture. However, its limited nature soon became apparent. The deepening of the transformations meant a weakening of the power of the nomenklatura, which it did not want to go for. Therefore, gradually everything returned to its original place. The plan, the gross figures remained the main ones. The branch ministries continued to take all the profits from those who performed better and to divide everything as they saw fit.

The main reason for the failure of the reform was the very essence of the Soviet model of socialism (as opposed to the Yugoslav, Hungarian or Chinese): a rigid concentration of all resources in the center, a gigantic system of redistribution. In power were officials who saw their purpose in planning for everyone, distributing and controlling. And they did not want to reduce their power. The underlying reason for this system was the dominance of the military-industrial complex. It was not possible to make this sector a market one.

The main customer and consumer of weapons was the state itself, which spared no funds for it. A huge number of enterprises of heavy and even light industry were tied to the defense industry, working in secrecy. There could be no talk of any self-financing here. And in order to ease the burden of military spending, the state sent all the best to the military-industrial complex. Therefore, it did not want to allow the free sale of raw materials, materials, energy, the free movement of workers of a certain qualification. And without this, what kind of market can we talk about. So all the enterprises remained tightly tied by controlling and planning bodies to each other without the opportunity to look for partners themselves, to decide what and how much to produce.

Production was much more subordinated to the convenience of planning and control by officials than to the interests of the consumer or profit margins. It was supposed, according to planners, to constantly grow, moreover, “from what has been achieved,” that is, from the indicators of the previous period. As a result, mostly military or waste production often grew. The costs of such growth became more and more significant, the economy was more and more "costly" in nature. In fact, growth was for the sake of growth. But the country was no longer able to give more and more money for him. It began to slow down until it reached almost zero. Indeed, there was a “stagnation” in the economy, and with it a crisis of the system. Returning to the reasons for the failure of reform, let's say that oil revenues became the main opportunity to abandon it. The Soviet Union actively developed oil and gas fields in Siberia and the North (as well as other minerals in the vast expanses of the East, North, Kazakhstan, etc.). Since the beginning of the 1970s, world oil prices have risen many times over. This gave the USSR a huge influx of currency. All foreign trade was restructured: the main exports were oil, gas and other raw materials (as well as weapons), the main imports were machinery, equipment, goods for the population and food. Of course, the currency was actively spent on bribing foreign parties and movements, espionage and intelligence, trips abroad, etc., etc. Thus, the leadership received a powerful source of maintaining the system unchanged. The flow of petrodollars finally buried the economic reform. The import of grain, meat, etc. made it possible to preserve the unprofitable collective-farm-state-farm system. Meanwhile, despite all the efforts and gigantic costs, the results in agriculture were even more deplorable than in industry.

Since the 1950s, the scientific and technological revolution (STR) began in the world, associated with the introduction of electronics, artificial materials, automation, etc. We could not reduce the technological gap with the West in any way. It was possible to compete with him only in the military sphere through exorbitant exertion of forces and industrial espionage. Constant talk about "combining the advantages of socialism with the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution" only emphasized our backwardness. When planning, enterprises had no incentives for technical progress; inventors only annoyed managers. Under these conditions, the Brezhnev team decided that oil exports could also solve the problem of underdevelopment. The country began to sharply increase purchases of modern equipment abroad. In just 4 years from 1972 to 1976, imports of Western technology increased 4 (!) times. Thus, the government managed to slightly increase labor productivity, increase production, and organize the production of many modern goods. But by doing this, she completely corrupted our business executives, lowered the already low technical level of engineers, and drove her designers into a corner.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the country had exhausted its growth opportunities by attracting new workers, developing new deposits, and building enterprises. When world oil prices went down sharply, it meant a crisis of the entire socialist system. She is too accustomed to petrodollars.

The coming to power of L. Brezhnev. Kosygin reforms

As a result of a change in the party and state leadership in 1964, L. Brezhnev became the head of the Soviet state. He was a representative of the post-Stalin generation of Soviet leaders who began to take leading roles after the 20th Party Congress. Being a native of the Dnepropetrovsk region, L. Brezhnev in 1939 became the secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee of the CP(b)U. During the Second World War, he served as head of the political department of the 8th Army and the political directorate of the 4th Ukrainian Front. After the war, he headed the Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk regional committees of the party, and since 1950 he became the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldova. Since 1957 - Member, and since 1960 - Head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Most of the time of L. Brezhnev's tenure as head of state (1964-1982) was characterized by a slowdown in the country's economic development, stagnation in many areas of public life, growth of corruption and the shadow economy. All this was evidence of a deep crisis in the Soviet model of development. The exception is the first five years of his tenure in power.

The VIII five-year plan of 1965–1970, which is also called the “golden one”, passed under the sign of the reform activities of the then Chairman of the Council of Ministers A. Kosygin. Kosygin's reforms - reforms of the system of planning and economic management. They turned out to be the largest post-war years an attempt to transform the economy in accordance with the spirit of the times, which was simultaneously carried out in several sectors: agriculture, industry, construction. The reforms were characterized by the use of economic management methods. The economic independence of enterprises expanded, and the role of material incentives for workers increased. Their implementation was supposed to help overcome the disproportionality in the development of various sectors of the economy, reduce their cost.

Thanks to the implementation of the Kosygin reforms, there was a reduction in planned indicators; financial incentive funds were created at enterprises; regardless of profit, a fixed payment was introduced for the use of production assets by the enterprise; industrial construction began to be financed by loans, not subsidies; it was forbidden to change plans without the consent of the management of enterprises; economic councils were disbanded and the sectoral management system was restored; purchase prices for agricultural products have increased; there was a redistribution of part of the national income in favor of the agricultural sector.

The first results of the reforms were encouraging: during the Golden Five-Year Plan, the annual growth in labor productivity was on average 6.5% higher than in the first half of the 1960s, wage funds increased 1.5 times; for 1966–1970 government purchases of grain increased by almost a third compared to the years of the previous five-year plan. As a result of these measures, agricultural production revived, the provision of cities with food products improved, and almost all the five-year targets were met in full.

Economic stagnation. The progressive management methods used during the years of the Kosygin reforms gave a positive trend. However, since the early 1970s the pace of reforms in the economic sphere began to fall. The main reason was that the reform was not aimed at a systemic change in the old economic mechanism of economic management. It only somewhat modified the distribution of functions between the central and lower levels, while the essence of the command-administrative system remained unchanged. The country's leadership tried to get out of this situation by increasing the number of sectoral ministries and departments, which only exacerbated the crisis.

Even in the reform of 1965, there was a combination of two trends dangerous for the country: the policy of maximizing profits and the principle of costly management. As a result, the Soviet economy found itself in a state of protracted crisis. Intersectoral competitions continued, enterprises met and exceeded planned targets, and reports increasingly included non-produced value, for which employees regularly received salaries and bonuses. There was a launch of inflationary mechanisms. Volume money supply ceased to correspond to its commodity supply. The depreciation of the ruble was aggravated by an imperfect pricing policy: the growth in the cost of luxury goods and high-quality goods negatively affected its condition, making it less and less significant. This led to the fact that over time, Soviet money was no longer perceived as a real measure of value. Its significance was reduced to its use as a means of payment, circulation and accumulation, which became their primary function: from 1970 to 1985, the volume of monetary investments of the population in savings banks increased by 6.5 times, more and more unused money accumulated in the accounts of enterprises.

The costly energy-intensive economy made it difficult to move from an industrial to a post-industrial society, in which the stake was placed on computerization and the development of information technologies. By the end of the 1970s. lagging behind the leading Western countries in these components has become very noticeable. The monetary incomes of citizens grew faster than the production of consumer goods, the deficit grew, the pace of housing construction slowed down, the environmental situation worsened (poisoning by waste from paper mills in Lake Baikal, the death of the Aral Sea). The resumption of large-scale construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) gave rise to a lot of social problems, the non-chernozem zone of the RSFSR continued to lag behind in the pace of development. The economy experienced serious problems due to the ongoing arms race. The growth of the military-industrial complex undermined the position of other industries, leading to their stagnation. In 1981–1985 there was a drop in the average annual growth rate of the national income to 3.5%, while in the years of the 8th Five-Year Plan this figure was 7.7%. The same trend was observed with respect to the growth rate of labor productivity - 3% against 6.8%.

The lack of material incentives and the personal interest of collective farmers in the results of their work led to a crisis in the agricultural sector. Multibillion-dollar state investments (in 1966-1980 agriculture received almost 400 billion rubles) could not change the situation and already in the early 1980s. the majority of collective farms and state farms were recognized as unprofitable. From 1964 to 1988 developed arable land decreased by 22 million hectares, while the loss of agricultural products during harvesting ranged from 20 to 40%. The insufficient development of social infrastructure in rural areas forced peasants to move to cities. The stagnation of agriculture forced the state to go on economic experiments. So, in the 1970s. Agro-industrial associations were created everywhere, which, however, did not justify itself. There was a food problem in the country, it was necessary to expand the import of agricultural products. Social differentiation began to grow, based not on labor indicators, but on the degree of access to scarce goods and undeserved privileges.

All this the state tried to neutralize due to the large-scale sale of petroleum products and other energy resources. An analysis of statistical data shows that if in 1965 the USSR exported 75.7 million tons of oil and oil products, then in 1985 - 193.5 million tons. This became possible due to the development of new deposits in Western Siberia. About 40% of exported oil was sold for freely convertible currency. Thus, if in 1965 the Soviet budget received 670 million dollars from the sale of oil, by 1985 this figure had grown 19.2 times, amounting to a colossal amount of almost 13 billion dollars. In addition to "black gold", an important resource export was natural gas.

For some time, the receipt of "petrodollars" made it possible to maintain the appearance of prosperity and stability. The standard of living of Soviet citizens slowly increased until the mid-1970s, after which it remained quite high for more than five years. However, by the end of the period of “stagnation”, the illusory nature of statements about the superiority of the socialist model of development over the capitalist one and the unreality of building a communist society in the USSR became obvious.

Undoubtedly, even in these years the USSR had certain successes. Space exploration continued (the Soyuz-Apollo international project, the Salyut series of orbital stations), the construction of the Soyuz main gas pipeline (Orenburg - the western borders of the USSR), the world's largest thermonuclear installation Tokamak T-10 was put into operation . The research vessel "Yuri Gagarin", which has no analogues in the world, was launched into the water.

Manifestations of "stagnation" in social and political life

In the first years of his tenure at the head of the party, L. Brezhnev tried to exercise collective leadership of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU (since 1966 - the Politburo). However, the peculiarity of the party-state system of the USSR was the impossibility of functioning without a bright leader - the first person, who after 1967 became L. Brezhnev. He significantly strengthened his positions by placing Y. Andropov at the head of the KGB, and appointing A. Grechko as Minister of Defense. These were people devoted to him.

In the early 1970s in the political course of the party leadership, conservative tendencies are finally affirmed. So, in the ideological sphere, de-Stalinization is actually curtailed: the facts were ignored political repression, violent methods of collectivization were justified, the reasons for the defeats of the Red Army at the initial stage of the Second World War were distorted. The key role in these processes belonged to the main party ideologist M. Suslov.

After a serious illness suffered in 1974, L. Brezhnev paid less and less attention to governing the country, the situation was getting out of control, and negative personal qualities the Soviet leader stood out even more prominently. Passion for flattery and awards (L. Brezhnev had 220 Soviet and foreign orders and medals) culminated in the fact that he was awarded four stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union and the Order of Victory, he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor and Marshal of the Soviet Union. The trilogy of memoirs written on his behalf ("Small Land", "Renaissance", "Virgin Land") became the object of fair criticism and ridicule. The authority of the leader of the party and the state has fallen significantly.

At this stage of the existence of the Soviet state, the introduction of representatives of the party into all the leading structures, often without the necessary professional qualities. Party bodies represented government institutions, public organizations and even the interests of individual republics. In practice, this led to the growth of the bureaucracy and the transformation of the party nomenklatura into a special caste that stood above ordinary Soviet citizens, which violated the very essence of the socialist system. These changes were reflected at the legislative level in the Constitution of the USSR of 1977, art. 6 which assigned to the CPSU leadership in the life of society.

The period of "stagnation" was also characterized by the growing skepticism of ordinary citizens towards the official ideology and distrust of party leaders, as well as the legal nihilism of a significant part of the population. In turn, the authorities tried to respond by strengthening the repressive impact on society. Not only was the de-Stalinization begun by N. Khrushchev curtailed, but censorship was also tightened, a new wave of arrests of representatives of the creative intelligentsia on charges of “anti-Soviet agitation” (A. Sinyavsky, Yu. Daniel, A. Ginzburg, etc.) swept through.

dissident movement

The anti-democratic actions of the authorities led to the emergence new form opposition movement - dissidence. Dissidents in the USSR are citizens who openly expressed their disagreement with the communist ideology that dominated society and the foundations of the Soviet system. From the mid 1960s to the early 1980s. dissidence was the dominant form of independent civic activism in the social and political life of the Soviet Union. The most active participants in the dissident movement were representatives of the creative intelligentsia, the clergy, and believers. Many of them were subjected to repression.

There are several stages in the development of the dissident movement in the USSR:

• 1961–1968 At this stage, the main method of activity of dissidents was the compilation of letters addressed to the leaders of the country and signed by famous figures of science and culture. The form of distribution of dissident ideas was "samizdat" - typewritten magazines, literary and journalistic collections. In the youth environment, the first informal associations arise in opposition to the Komsomol. In December 1965, the first human rights demonstration took place on Pushkinskaya Square in Moscow, organized by A. Sakharov, A. Ginzburg, L. Bogoraz.
• 1968 - mid 1970s This period was characterized by active forms of protest. Since April 1968, the dissidents began to publish the Chronicle of Current Events. The leaders of the dissident movement were academician A. Sakharov, writers A. Solzhenitsyn and A. Ginzburg, poetess and translator N. Gorbanevskaya, publicist L. Bogoraz. In August 1968, eight dissidents held a rally on Red Square to protest against the introduction Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia and the forceful suppression of the "Prague Spring". The work of A. Sakharov “Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom” (1968) became a kind of manifesto for the dissident movement. And in 1969, the first open public association in the Soviet Union was created - the Initiative Group for the Protection of Human Rights in the USSR.

Many creative people who were critical of Soviet reality had to leave the country - A. Solzhenitsyn, M. Rostropovich, I. Brodsky, A. Tarkovsky, Yu. Lyubimov and others. Many famous athletes and scientists also left abroad. Since the early 1970s Citizens of Jewish nationality are leaving the USSR en masse. Dissident organizations also operated in a number of republics (Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian, Lithuanian, Estonian). Their participants, in addition to upholding human rights, demanded that the national interests of their peoples be observed.

• Mid 1970s - mid 1980s- this time was characterized by the organizational design of the dissident movement. After the USSR joined the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, the dissidents created the Moscow Group for Promoting the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords (1976). It was headed by human rights activist Y. Orlov. Members of the group were subjected to constant pressure from the KGB. In 1982, it ceased to exist.

Dissidents were exiled (A. Sakharov), sent to camps (Yu. Sinyavsky, Y. Daniel, A. Ginzburg) and psychiatric hospitals(“the Grigorenko case”, “the Sharansky case”), were expelled abroad and deprived of their citizenship. To combat manifestations of dissent in the KGB, a special 5th Directorate was created, but the ideas of dissidents were gaining more and more popularity every year, bringing the collapse of the Soviet system closer.

1. "Stagnation". USSR during the systemic crisis

The period of 1964-1985 in historical and journalistic literature is figuratively called "stagnation". This figurative name does not accurately reflect the processes that took place in the second half of the 60s - the first half of the 80s, but reflects the general trend of the socio-economic and political development of the Soviet system. "Stagnation" did not provide for the cessation of the development of the country. Reforms were carried out (the second half of the 1960s), five-year plans were implemented, active construction was carried out, etc. It was typical for those times to achieve relative social and material stability, quite decent compared with previous periods of the standard of living of the bulk of the population. The essence of "stagnation" is that the Soviet government was seized by a systemic crisis that manifested itself in all spheres of life: the economy, politics, the social sphere, public morality, etc.

Construction of a blast furnace. Dnepropetrovsk region, 1967

Scheme: Structural Crisis of the Soviet Model of Socio-Political Development

Economic crisis:

- shortage of goods;

- failure or slow adoption of new technologies;

- low quality of most goods;

- food crisis; chronic crisis of agriculture;

- hidden inflation (growth in prices at a constant size wages;

- predominantly extensive way of economic development;

- high production costs, energy intensity and material consumption of products;

- the emergence of a shadow economy ("guilds").

Political crisis:

- military adventures and inability to solve them (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angolat. etc.);

- the inability of senior management to respond to new trends in the development of the world. "Aging" of leadership in 1982, the average age of senior management exceeded 70 years);

- the incapacity of the legislative bodies, all the most important issues were resolved in a narrow circle of the top party leadership;

- loss of dynamism in the development of the Soviet model and, accordingly, its attractiveness for other countries;

- corruption in the highest echelons of power: bribery, criminalization, career advancement on the basis of acquaintance, family ties, personal loyalty;

- increased repression against dissidents (dissidents).

Ideological crisis:

- disappointment in the correctness of the chosen path of development (building communism);

- difference between ideological dogmas and realities of life;

- awareness of the unreality of achieving the goal of building communism;

- the growth of the dissident movement and sentiment in society;

- increased ideological pressure on society.

Ecological crisis:

- mindless exploitation of natural resources;

- lack of scientific justification for the placement of production facilities;

- destruction of the natural environment suitable for human life (pollution of water bodies, atmosphere, etc.);

- the gradual degradation of the nation (genetic changes, the growth of childhood diseases and the birth rate of unhealthy children, the reduction in the birth rate, the increase in the number of chronic diseases, etc.

Moral crisis:

- the emergence of the phenomenon of double morality (differences between the declared style of behavior and real aspirations and attitudes; irresponsibility, the desire to shift responsibility to another);

- the growth of the prestige of professions, positions that allow you to receive unearned income;

- growth in the number of domestic crimes;

- the desire to achieve the goal illegally;

- growth in the number of economic (economic) crimes;

- growing consumer sentiment;

- the rapid spread of drunkenness and alcoholism.

Stages of the period of "stagnation"

Stages	years	Characteristic
	1965-1970	An attempt to carry out economic reforms that would little streamline the economy of the USSR after the "Reform fever" of the Khrushchev period (Kosygin's reforms).
ІІ	1970-1982	Growing crisis, "conservation" of the existing system in the USSR
	1982-1985	Changes in the party leadership. Crisis Awareness Soviet society.

2. Official ideological concept. Constitution of 1977

With the removal of Khrushchev from power, there is a gradual departure from the proclaimed course towards the direct construction of communism. In 1967, the concept of a "developed socialist society" was put forward, which stated that it was impossible to make an immediate "leap" into communism. Time must pass during which socialism must develop on its own basis. It is this kind of socialism that is called "mature", "Developed". Since there was also another term - "real socialism", which explained the difficulties that exist in society. The characteristics of a developed socialist society were recorded in the preamble to the Constitution of the USSR in 1977. The main components of developed socialism are "a nationwide state" and "a new historical community of people - the Soviet people". It was argued that under developed socialism, society develops without conflicts under the "scientific" leadership of the CPSU.

Yu. Andropov somewhat harmonized the concept of "developed socialism" with the existing realities. He recognized the existence of contradictions and national problems in Soviet society. The solution of these problems should be carried out by "restoring order" and accelerated scientific and technological progress.

The building of developed socialism should not stop the "ideological struggle against the influence of the West." The Constitution (fourth) adopted on October 7, 1977, in addition to the above mentioned in Article 6, officially secured the leading and guiding role of the CPSU. The Constitution asserted the strengthening of the role of the union center in economic and political life at the expense of the union republics.

Like previous Constitutions, a prominent place in the Basic Law was assigned to a block of socio-economic rights, which were supplemented by new ones: the right to work. On the free education and medical care, recreation, pensions, housing. The constitution also secured the expansion of the rights of public organizations.

The entire Constitution of 1977 was democratic in nature, if its provisions are not compared with real life.

Interesting to know

The period of stagnation in the USSR is characterized as neo-Stalinism - the restoration of the entire economic, political, repressive system, the cult of personality, with some consideration of modern development.

From the very beginning of Khrushchev's removal from power, the Brezhnev leadership has been trying to rehabilitate Stalinism or Stalin personally. In 1965, in a report dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, Brezhnev noted Stalin's contribution to the defeat of fascism. The audience responded with applause.

On XXIII with the entry of the CPSU (1966) was carried out the first attempt to officially rehabilitate Stalin. This was previously reported by the Chinese (Mao Zedong) and Albanian (Khoja) leaders, who actively insisted on the abolition of decisions XX and XXII from the entrances. The communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, France, Yugoslavia, having learned about this, announced that they would recall their delegates in protest. Thus, the attempt was not implemented. However, texts about Stalin's personality cult were removed from textbooks. Books and films began to appear that showed the special role of Stalin in history.

The second attempt to rehabilitate Stalin took place in 1969, when Pravda was about to publish an article condemning the decisions of the 20th and 23rd CPSU Congresses on Stalin's personality cult. At the last minute, Brezhnev refused to publish and prepare the corresponding resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Leonid Brezhnev (1906 - 1982)

After the death of Brezhnev, Yu. Andropov also prepared a decree on the rehabilitation of Stalin. But his death interrupted this work.

Tab.: Leadership of the USSR during the period of "stagnation"

Party leaders	State leaders	Heads of government
General Secretaries Central Committee of the CPSU (until 1966 first secretaries)	Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR	Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
L. Brezhnev (1964-1982) Y. Andropov (1982-1984) K. Chernenko (1984-1985)	A. Mikoyan (1964-1965) N. Podgorny (1965-1977) L. Brezhnev (1977-1982) Y. Andropov (1982-1984) K. Chernenko (1984-1985)	A. Kosygin (1964-1980) M. Tikhonov (1980-1985)

3. A. Kosygin's reforms and other reforms of the "stagnation" period.

By the early 1960s, the pace of developmentindustry and agriculture slowed down. The growth of national profits for 1958-1964 was halved. The gap between demand and its real commodity coverage has grown, especially with regard to individual food products. Price increases have begun, not only official, but also hidden, due to a change in the range of products. In a word, in the early 60s emerged from the elements of stagnation, phenomena of a pre-crisis nature, increased social tension in society.

The search for a new economic mechanism that would ensure high production efficiency began even under N. Khrushchev. The initiator of a broad discussion on economic issues was Professor O. Lieberman of the Kharkov Engineering and Economic Institute. In September 1962, his article "Plan, Profit and Prize" appeared in the Pravda newspaper. In the article, the author proposed to strengthen the economic independence of enterprises, free central planning from trifling tutelage over factories and factories. The system put forward by him was based on the principle: what is beneficial to society should be beneficial to every enterprise.

The discussion around Lieberman's proposals influenced the preparation of the economic reform, which went down in history under the name "Kosygin's Reforms" (after the name of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR).

In 1964-1965, new schemes of the economy were tested and worked out in the course of experiments that gave positive results. After that, they began to spread to all enterprises, as well as agriculture and management.

Tab.: ReformsA. Kosygin

Spheres covered by reforms	A. Kosygin's reforms
Industry	Improving the system of planning and increasing the independence of enterprises. Strengthening economic incentives and increasing the material interest of labor collectives.
Agriculture	Reducing plans for mandatory grain deliveries. Establish firm plans for the purchase of products for five years. Increase in purchase prices. Introduction of surcharges for above-plan production. Introduction of guaranteed wages for collective farmers. The abolition of restrictions on personal subsidiary plots. Strengthening the material and technical base of collective farms and state farms. Grants and capital investments in agriculture.
Office	Transition from the territorial principle of management to the branch one. Restoration of the system of ministries.

And unfortunately, all measures gave only a temporary result, they had a particularly positive effect on the fulfillment of the planned tasks of the VIII Five-Year Plan (1966-1970), which was called the "golden one". In fact, the reforms were doomed, because they tried to combine two mutually exclusive economic systems: administrative-command and market.

Interesting to know

Many scholars believe that the Eighth Five-Year Plan, the five-year reform period, was particularly successful, marked by an acceleration in the pace and a rapid increase in production efficiency. It is even called "gold", the only one that was completed. According to official statistics, 1966-1970 indicators were the best for the period of 60-80s. According to the five-year plan, 1900 (250 in Ukraine) new enterprises were built. A unified energy system was created, the process of electrification of villages was completed.

Alternative point of view.

K. Valtukh, V. Lavrovsky argue that the results of the five-year plan are somewhat more modest.

V. Selyunin and G. Khanin argue that economic indicators even worsened over the given period: in the USSR as a whole, national income increased by 22% against 24% over the previous five years, labor productivity - by 17% against 19%, etc. Worse began to be usedbasic production assets, the material consumption of products has increased, and indicators in mechanical engineering have been rapidly declining. The high reported figures were achieved through a hidden increase in wholesale prices. As a result, the reforms of the 1960s rather upset the old economic mechanism than created a new one. They only defined rational economic prospects.

The reforms achieved the slightest success in agriculture, which in the future did not provide the country with the necessary food products. The USSR became one of the world's largest importers of agricultural products. New prices, a firm plan for the delivery of products, allowances for excess sales, significant capital investments stimulated the expansion of agricultural production for a while. However, practice has shown that the reasons for the backwardness of the agricultural sector of the economy are rooted much deeper and without development various forms property and management, without the emancipation of the initiative and enterprise of the peasantry, positive changes in agriculture are impossible.

In industry, the command-administrative system eventually nullified any independence of enterprises. First, the number of planned indicators increased (labor productivity, average wages, production costs, etc.). The system of centralized logistics was preserved, which was never replaced by the system of wholesale (wholesale) trade. The indicator of sold products “did not differ much from the “shaft”, since sales volumes (with a chronic shortage of goods) grew from an increase in output, that is, a shaft. Thus, a costly mechanism is preserved. Improving the quality, the introduction of new samples was not economically justified. In practice, material incentives for labor did not work either. The better the enterprise worked, the more rigid were the norms for the formation of incentive funds.

Thus, the reforms were doomed - through internal inconsistency and inconsistency. In addition, the top party leadership showed no interest in its implementation, although no one canceled the reforms. And after the "Prague Spring" (1968), the restrained attitude of the Kreforms was replaced by their objections. Thus, the resolution of the 24th Congress of the CPSU stated: "The experience of the Czechoslovak events again reminded us of the need to increase vigilance against the intrigues of imperialism and its agents in the countries of the socialist community, of the importance of a consistent struggle against right-wing opportunism, which, under the guise of "improving" socialism, is trying to emasculate the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism and clears the way for the penetration of bourgeoisideology".

In 1979, the Soviet leadership made another attempt to revive the country's economy by improving the economic mechanism and increasing the role of party leadership. But there was no sharp acceleration of the economy. Also, the creation of large agro-industrial complexes (AIC) and the adoption of the "Food Program" (1982) did not give any positive result.

The last attempt to carry out the "Large-scale economic experiment", which foresaw the relaxation of central planning and distribution, some changes in pricing at the level of individual enterprises and regions, was carried out in 1983 for General Secretary Yu. labor discipline with the help of law enforcement agencies. But his short term in office did not allow the "experiment" to manifest itself, although there was some increase in economic indicators.

Average annual growth rates for five years (%)

Indicators	VIII (1966-1970)	IX (1971-1975)	X (1976-1980)	XI (1981-1985)
Gross social product
national income
Capital investments
Labor productivity
industrial products
agricultural products

Interesting to know

1. In the 70-80s, the USSR's oil export revenues amounted to 180 billion dollars. Most of them were spent on the military-industrial complex, on the purchase of agricultural products and consumer goods.

2. By 1960-1987, the fixed assets of the national economy (equipment, machinery, buildings) increased by 8 times, and their return decreased by 2 times.

3. Of the 160 million tons of steel smelted in the USSR, 20 million went to chipping.

4. 60% of the products produced were not in demand.

5. For one unit of weapons produced by NATO countries, 7 were produced in the USSR.

6. The shadow economy ("Tsekhoviki") consumed 10% of resources, produced - 20% of the national income.

7. By the beginning of the 80s, the USSR produced more than the USA, tractors - 5 times; iron ore- 4 times; oil, cement, steel, machine tools - 2 times.

8. In the 70s, industrial production in the USSR was 33% of the American one; agriculture -14%.

9. The relative reduction in the Soviet Union of expenditures on Scientific research, deepening the scientific and technological gap with the United States. So, in 1985 in the USA there were 1,500 thousand of the latest computers and 17 million personal computers, in the USSR there were only a few tens of thousands of similar obsolete models.

10. In the early 1980s, manual labor accounted for 40% of industry, 60% in construction, and 75% in agriculture.

4. Social policy

The social policy of the Soviet Union has always been a matter of pride: no unemployment, the world's lowest prices for bread, milk, rent, free education and medical care, etc. However, during the period of stagnation, negative phenomena were observed in this area. At present, the social sphere was financed exclusively on a residual basis. That already quickly began to give negative manifestations. Thus, in the 1980s, housing construction was significantly reduced, which immediately exacerbated the housing problem. In 1984, so many square meters were built. m. of housing, as in 1960 (It should be noted here that the area of ​​apartments in new buildings was twice as much as in the 60s).

Cuts in health care costs immediately affected the state and quality of public services. So, if in the 60s the USSR had the lowest mortality rate in the world, then in the 80s the USSR was already in 35th city in terms of life expectancy and in 50th in terms of child mortality.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the food problem had worsened significantly. Billions of dollars were spent to cover the shortage of agricultural products. The main source for purchases was the export of oil and other natural resources. In fact, there was a consumption of natural resources. Food difficulties led to the fact that in the 70s, food cards began to appear in some regions. There was a hidden price increase. So if big cities were more or less provided with agricultural products at low state prices, then the population of small towns could buy it only through a network of cooperative auctions or markets, where prices were much higher.

In the 1970s and 1980s, a rapid decline in the real incomes of citizens began. In terms of consumption, the Soviet Union in this period ranked 77th in the world.

All this testified to the fact thathold the status of a superpower was possible only through a relative increaseexploitation of workers, reduction of social programs, ruthlessexploitation of natural resources.

5.Dissident movement

Khrushchev's "thaw" gave rise to hopes and at the same time brought disappointment. The process of renewal of society developed extremely inconsistently. In the meantime, young people who had a taste of freedom were striving for drastic changes. That Khrushchev's reforms were superficial; that they did not touch the foundations of totalitarianism led to the emergence of a dissident movement, acquired its distribution after the removal of Khrushchev from power.

Dissidence(Dissenters) - Speech against the existing political system or generally accepted norms of a certain country, opposition to the official ideology and politics; apostasy from the teachings of the mainstream church.

Periodization of the dissident movement in the USSR

Formative period (1965-1972)	Activities of A. Sinyavsky, Yu. Daniel, A. Amalrik, L. Chukovsky, A. Ginzburg, Yu. Galansky, B. Bukovsky, A. Marchenko, S. Kovalev, L. Bogaraz, P. Grigorenko and others. The beginning of the campaign against A. Sakharov and A. Solzhenitsyn.
Crisis period (1973-1974)	Trial of P. Yakir and V. Krasin
Period of wide international recognition (1974-1975)	Expanding the geography of the dissident movement. Expulsion of A. Solzhenitsyn from the country. Formation of the Soviet section of Amnesty International. Award Nobel Prize A. Sakharov
Helsinki period (1976-1982)	Activities of the Helsinki Group. Trials of Yu. Orlov, A. Scheransky, G. Yakunin, A. Marchenko. Expulsion of A. Sakharov.

The dissident movement in the second half of the 60s - the first half of the 80s, compared with the movement of the Khrushchev "Thaw" period, had its own characteristics: it became more massive and organized, illusions about the ideas of socialism and communism were discarded, the movement became pronounced anti-totalitarian; almost the entire ideological spectrum was traced in the views of dissidents; relations with the public of Western countries and international human rights organizations are being established; denies violent methods of struggle; dissidents seek to legalize their activities, 80% of dissidents were intelligentsia.

Currents of the dissident movement in the 60-80s

for socialism with a "human face";

national liberation

democratic human rights

religious

In their struggle, the dissidents used the following methods: mass events; letters of protest to the governing bodies of the USSR; protests, open letters, appeals to international organizations, governments of democratic countries; publication and distribution of samizdat; actions of solidarity with other peoples subjected to oppression from the totalitarian system; support for the Crimean Tatars in their desire to return to their homeland; was equal rights of peoples; distribution of leaflets; individual protests, creation of human rights organizations.

Since the mid-1960s, continuous, albeit few, protests began against the communist system and against the communist ideology.

In the early 1970s, the dissident movement gained strength and the regime felt threatened by it. In 1972, a general "pogrom" of the human rights movement took place. Widespread repression was used against its participants. The movement was also weakened by the fact that some of its members agreed to cooperate with the regime and began to call on others to do so. Against the most famous participants in the movement - Academician Andrei Sakharov (author of the Soviet hydrogen bomb) and writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a campaign of persecution was launched through mass media. In 1974, Solzhenitsyn was forcibly deported abroad, and Sakharov was actually under house arrest.

Andrey Sakharov

From the note of the KGB and the Prosecutor General's Office of the USSR to the Central Committee of the CPSU (November 1972)

In accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the KGB bodies are carrying out significant preventive work to prevent crimes, suppress the actions of organized subversive activities of nationalist, revisionist and other anti-Soviet elements, as well as to localize politically harmful groups that have arisen in a number of places.

Over the past five years, 3096 such groups have been identified, 13602 people who were part of them have been prevented?

Similar groups were found in Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Tula, Vladimir, Omsk, Kazan, Tyumen. In Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan and other cities.

After the USSR in Helsinki signed an agreement on the protection of human rights, the dissident movement intensified. In 1976 there were groups to promote the implementation of the Helsinki agreements in the USSR ("Helsinki groups") in Moscow, Ukraine, Lithuania, and a year later - in Georgia and Armenia. The organizers of the groups were well aware that the Soviet Union signed the agreement only for the sake of ideological effect, but in reality was not going to fulfill it. Therefore, they took over public control over the implementation of the signed document. In Ukraine, notable members of the "Helsinki groups" were Levko Lukyanenko, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Mikhail Goryn and others.

Having planned the intervention in Afghanistan, and assuming what kind of reaction it would cause in the world, the Kremlin regime decided to at least neutralize the opposition inside the country. In November 1979, the arrests of members of the "Helsinki groups" - active participants in the human rights movement. In 1980, Academician Sakharov was exiled to the city of Gorky (now Nizhny Novgorod), which was closed to foreigners.

By the beginning of the 1980s, almost all active participants in the dissident movement were imprisoned or in exile.

Despite the repressions by the KGB, the human rights movement in the USSR did not stop, it was replenished with new people.

The dissident movement in the USSR is one of the brightest historical pages. A rather small group of intellectuals gradually spread the ideas of democracy, awakened the national consciousness and pushed the population to oppose the existing system.

2. Perestroika (1985-1991).

By the mid-1980s, the USSR was gripped by an economic, social and political crisis. The totalitarian system of command-administrative methods of management no longer met the requirements of the time. There was an urgent need to update all aspects of society, its economic foundations, social life, political structure, and the spiritual sphere.

In March 1985 MS Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Mikhail Gorbachev

From the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gromyko during the presentation of the candidacy of M. Gorbachev to the participants of the extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 11, 1985

“Does he always keep the heart of the matter in focus? speaks directly about his position, does the interlocutor like it, maybe not? able to analytically approach problems? Does he not only analyze problems well, but also make generalizations and conclusions?

Mikhail Sergeevich has a party approach to people, the ability to organize people, to find a common language with them. Isn't it for everyone? The ability to see the main links and subordinate the secondary ones to the main ones is characteristic to a strong degree. Is this skill a virtue and a great virtue? in the person of M. S. Gorbachev, we are a figure of a wide scale, an outstanding figure who will worthily hold the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.”

At first, the new leadership did not yet realize the full depth of the crisis that had engulfed Soviet society. The way out of the crisis (the detrimental consequences of "stagnation" - then, this term appeared to characterize Brezhnev era) was considered to accelerate socio-economic development (the author of the concept is the economist Aganbegyan) by doubling the economic potential and technical re-equipment of production based on the latest achievements of the scientific and technological revolution, restoring order, eradicating such phenomena as alcoholism, etc., updating the party and state apparatus. At the April (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a course was proclaimed to accelerate socio-economic development.

In 1986, the XXVII Congress of the CPSU was held, at which Gorbachev managed to introduce a new concept of international relations, relegating the "class struggle" to the background and putting forward the position of the interconnection of all world phenomena. He began to gain worldwide recognition, which gave him an additional trump card in the struggle for power.

The development of specific measures for the reforms (which later became known as Perestroika) turned out to be not a simple matter. Carrying out reforms in accordance with the traditional command-administrative practice turned out to be impossible. Bureaucratic methods gave significant distortions in the implementation of reforms (a clear confirmation of this is the anti-alcohol campaign and the fight against unearned income) and side effects, completely leveled the reforms.

In addition, the concept of acceleration has shown its incapacity. Focused on accelerating the development of mechanical engineering, it further reduced the production of consumer goods and thereby intensified inflationary trends and deficits. Unlike traditional crises inherent in a market economy, the crisis of the Soviet economy combined not only a decrease in growth rates in terms of indicators, but also a decrease in production volumes. To this was added inflation (hidden), shortages in the wholesale and consumer markets.

Then M. S. Gorbachev, at the January plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1987, raised the issue of developing a personnel policy for the party in the conditions of perestroika, which should provide personnel for the implementation of reforms. At the same time, the plenum began and new policy publicity. This policy provided for a dosed, party-controlled disclosure of the truth of the tragic pages of the Soviet past to the people in order to restore the people's trust in the Communist Party. In addition, it was planned to stop the persecution of political views and pursue an open policy in front of its citizens.

Thus, for the first time in the entire Soviet history, the CPSU assumed responsibility for the "deformations" that had been made in the development of Soviet society. In the media, at first timidly, and then at the top of their voices, critical motives began to be traced. Began the process of rehabilitation of the repressed in the 30-50s. But many people found it difficult to overcome stereotypes in the perception of history and modernity. A friend because their ideals were being destroyed, others because it affected their past when they made a career in the fight against "enemies of the people."

A kind of symbol of resistance to changes not only in life, but also in consciousness was the publication in the newspaper "Soviet Russia" of an article by the Leningrad chemistry teacher Nina Andreeva ("I can not give up my principles"), in which the conservative (Stalinist) model of Soviet history was actually defended. The appearance of the article meant that there were forces in the party leadership that shared the position of the author. At the same time, this article became an impetus for the consolidation of conservative forces.

At present, an attempt is being made to reform the Soviet economy on the basis of "self-financing", "self-management", "self-sufficiency". The reforms were based on two components:

a) expanding the independence of labor collectives (the law "On State Enterprises and Associations";

b) expanding the scope of private initiative (the law "On cooperation", "On individual labor activity").

But there was inconsistency in the implementation of these reforms, and besides, they did not wrest the economy from the hands of the bureaucracy. In addition, the Soviet economy retained the same trends as before: extensiveness, absolute centralization, command-administrative management methods. The hypertrophied predominance of the mining, machine-building, and military economy was preserved. The militarization of the economy, the growth of construction in progress, hidden inflation and the growing deficit.

It became clear that the successful implementation of economic reforms is impossible without reforming political system.

The decision to reform the political system was made at the nineteenth party conference, which took place in June 1988, Gorbachev proposed to the highest government bodies make the Congress of Soviets, and turn the Verkhovna Rada into a permanent legislative body. The Congress of Soviets began its work on May 25, 1989. Its work was radically different from previous sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Despite the conservative nature of the electoral system, among the deputies there was a significant number of supporters of radical reforms, who united in an inter-regional deputy group, which actually became the parliamentary opposition. Other groups declared their existence, associations of deputies for professional and political interests. The most conservative positions were occupied by the Soyuz group, which advocated maintaining the unity of the USSR at any cost.

With such a variety of political views, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR actually turned into a speaker, leads the meetings and must follow the line of the majority. This led to misunderstandings between Gorbachev, who was the chairman of the USSR Supreme Council and at the same time the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the conservative forces in the party, who accused him of softness. The democratization of public life gave impetus to the emergence of political parties, popular movements and fronts, the revival of national liberation movements, came up with the ideas of economic, cultural and national revivalindigenous nations in their republics. At first, these movements did not oppose Soviet power. In their composition, they were predominantly intellectuals.

In the summer of 1989, the working class enters the political arena. In July, strikes swept the mining areas: Kuzbass, Donbass, Karaganda. The impetus for the start of mass strikes was the deterioration in the provision of mining towns with food and basic necessities. In general, since the summer of 1989, periodic crises in the supply of certain goods have occurred in the USSR: the "sugar crisis", the lack of detergents, the "tea crisis", the "tobacco crisis", etc. The real reason for the strikes was the inability of the command and control system to implement reforms that would provide a solution to social problems.

The government of the USSR, headed by Ryzhkov, was forced to take emergency measures. In May 1990, the government decided to publish a program for the transition to a regulated market economy. The promulgation of the program caused a rush of demand. People started buying everything. The implementation of the program had to be stopped, and the government was dismissed.

S. Shatalin and G. Yavlinsky developed an alternative program "500 days". According to her, it was supposed to create a foundation for a market economy, the denationalization of the public sector, the formation of private property and at the same time stabilize the financial sector. (Analogue of the Polish "shock therapy"). However, this program, after being considered by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, was changed so much that the essence of the plan turned out to be emasculated.

In October 1990, Gorbachev proposed a compromise program. But this compromise, in fact, did not give anything for real reforms, and this program, like all previous ones, failed. The top union leadership turned out to be unable to carry out economic reforms, and this gave additional arguments to the forces that advocated the liquidation of the USSR.

Against the backdrop of economic turmoil and in the conditions of the formation of a multi-party system, the demand for the liquidation of Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR, which consolidated the leading role of the CPSU in the state, is increasingly beginning to sound. At the III Congress of Soviets in March 1990, Article 6 was abolished, and MS Gorbachev was elected the first president of the USSR.

The elections of 1990 became a turning point in the life of Soviet society. These were the first democratic elections. As a result of the elections, the deputies changed radically, especially in the union republics (in the Baltic States, Georgia, Armenia, the CPSU suffered a complete defeat), which further intensified the political struggle.

Cardinal changes in the USSR accelerated the process of bankruptcy of the CPSU. In the past, the monolithic (20 million) CPSU in 1990 was split into various currents. In 1990, a split in the republican communist parties also took shape. One part moved to the positions of European social democracy, the other - aggressively - took communist positions (the Communist Party of the RSFSR, which was formed in 1990 and opposed any reforms).

In July 1990, the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU was held. This congress was held in conditions when the party had lost its monopoly on power. The Politburo lost the functions of the Supreme Power. Thus, another blow was dealt to the CPSU. The center of political power in the state moved to the Rada. This led to the fact that the CPSU began to turn from a "state party" into a state within a state, with its own closed lines of communication, a network of informers, encrypted communications, significant material privileges, etc. After the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU, more than 4 million people left it, and a significant number stopped paying membership dues. B. N. Yeltsin, the chairman of the Moscow and Leningrad Soviets G. Kh. Popov, A. A. Sobchak left the party. The participants of the Democratic Platform advocated an organized exit from the CPSU and the creation of the Democratic Platform (later it became the Republican Party). In the summer of 1991, part of the members of the Communist Party of the RSFSR created a new party - the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia, headed by A. Rutskoi. At the same time, a movement for democratic reforms began to take shape, led by Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. This development of events led to the strengthening of aggressive conservative forces in the CPSU, in 1991 they were moving to decisive action.

Perestroika in the USSR (1985-1991)

Period	To give	Characteristic
	April 1985 - January 1987 (From the April 1985 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU).	An attempt to implement the concept of accelerating the socio-economic development of the country. Fight against alcoholism and drunkenness.
ІІ	January 1987 - summer 1988 (From the January Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XIX Conference of the CPSU).	Formation of the concept of restructuring. The beginning of economic reform. Beginning of personnel changes. The beginning of publicity.
	Summer 1988-May 1989 (From the XIX Party Conference to the I Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR).	The beginning of the implementation of reforms of the political system. Formation of new state authorities - From the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. The beginning of the emergence of political parties.
	Summer 1989-August 1991 (From I From the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to the attempted coup d'état on August 19-21, 1991).	1989 - Activities And Since the Congress of Soviets of the USSR. rises economic crisis. The first miners' strikes. The beginning of the formation of political opposition. 1990 - the beginning of the liquidation of the CPSU monopoly on power. Declaration of the sovereignty of the Union republics. Program "500 days". Strengthening the confrontation between the center and the union republics. 1991 - A sharp aggravation of the economic situation. Failure of economic reforms. Growing social tension. The split in the CPSU. Attempts to suppress national liberation movements. Development of a new union treaty. GKChP. End of perestroika.

Consequences and results of the restructuring:

1. The liquidation of the totalitarian regime in the USSR, the destruction of the hegemony of the CPSU in political life.

2. The collapse of the USSR. The emergence of independent states on its territory, including Ukraine.

3. The collapse of the planned economic system, the creation of real conditions for the formation of market relations.

4. Pluralization of public and political life, creation of a multi-party system.

5. The end of the Cold War, the change in the balance of power in the world.

6. Liquidation of the "world socialist system".

Thus, the restructuring led to diametrically opposite results, which were expected.

3. The collapse of the USSR: causes and consequences

The democratization of society, the policy of "Glasnost" revived, it seemed that the national question had been resolved long ago. With conclusions, the leaders of national movements began to return, they believed. that the current moment is most suitable for starting an active struggle for self-determination. First time existence national question started talking after the events in Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan) in December 1987, when Kazakh youth took to the streets of the city with mass protests. She protested against the appointment of a Russian leader of the republic. The speech was suppressed by force. The following year, another national problem emerged. On February 20, the regional council of Nagorno-Karabakh (an autonomous region within Azerbaijan, 98% populated by Armenians) asked to transfer it to Armenia. This decision was supported by mass rallies and strikes of the NKAR population. In response, the Azerbaijanis carried out pogroms of the Armenian population in the territory of Azerbaijan, the city of Sumgayit became the center of the pogroms. By order of Gorbachev, troops were brought into the city. Life demanded an immediate change in national policy at the national level, but the center was in no hurry to do so.

In April 1989, in Tbilisi, a demonstration of national democratic forces was brutally dispersed by the army, and blood was shed.

Meanwhile, political reform began, steadily leading to an even greater activation of the national movement. 18May 1989 Lithuania was the first of the Soviet republicsadopted the Declaration of Sovereignty. In June, there were bloody clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in Uzbekistan.

Scheme: The collapse of the USSR

Discrediting the central government and the CPSU

Tightening ambitions political leaders and local elites

The activities of the West aimed at undermining and disintegrating the USSR are purposefully directed

Cause to break up An attempt by the State Emergency Committee (GKChP) to carry out a coup d'état

March 11, 1990 SupremeCouncil of Lithuania announced the restoration of full state sovereignty of the Lithuanianstate. At this time, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR adopted a law that regulated the procedure for secession of the republics from the USSR. Lithuania's actions caused a negative reaction in Moscow. Gorbachev appealed to the Verkhovna Rada of Lithuania for the immediate cancellation of the canceled document. But Lithuania's reaction was negative. It was not political pressure or economic blockade that could change Lithuania's position. By its actions, Lithuania marked the beginning of the "revolution of sovereignties." Most of the union and even autonomous republics adopted declarations of sovereignty. State sovereignty was declared by the Verkhovna Rada of the RSFSR, headed by B. Yeltsin. Such actions can be explained by the struggle between the union and the new Russian political elite, a sober assessment of historical realities. Simultaneously with the "parade of sovereignties" interethnic conflicts (Tbilisi, Karabakh, Baku, etc.) escalated. Their initiators were mainly forces that advocated the preservation of the Union.

Feeling the fragility of their position, the conservative forces launch a massive psychological attack, escalate the situation, threatening the inevitability of war and great loss of life. In February 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted emergency powers to M. Gorbachev. There were also changes in Gorbachev's inner circle.

The coming of the reactionaries to power immediately made itself felt. January 13, 1991 in the capital of Lithuania, Vilnius was an attempted coup. On the night of January 13, 1991, a military group launched an operation that was moving quite successfully, thousands of unarmed residents of Vilnius began to defend independence. There were clashes with the troops in the area of ​​the television center, during which 13 people were killed and dozens were injured. Both the world community and all the democratic forces of the USSR stood in defense of Lithuania. The Soviet leadership retreated.

Similar events unfolded in Latvia. By March 1991, the situation in the USSR became even more aggravated. The miners began an indefinite strike demanding the resignation of Gorbachev, the USSR Armed Forces, the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the transfer of power temporarily for consideration by the Federation Council.

Holding a referendum on March 17, 1990 about future fate Union, in which 3 / 4 of the population voted forUnion (the question was formulated in such a way that voters had to choose either the old Union or the updated one), did not stop its collapse. The consequences of the referendum were twofold. To the questions about the preservation of the Union, the Republican Verkhovna Rada added the question whether citizens approve of the declaration of state sovereignty. And the majority was too. The Baltic republics, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova officially did not take part in the referendum at all.

Then Gorbachev embarked on a new tactical option. At the end of April 1991, in his residence near Moscow, Novo-Ogaryovo, he managed to sign an agreement with the leaders of 9 republics, promptly preparing a new union treaty. The draft union treaty was published and changed several times and was of a compromise nature. The main thing in the Novo-Ogorovsky agreement was that after 6 months elections to new allied bodies were to be held.

This agreement marked the beginning of negotiations according to the "9 1" formula and lasted from May to July 1991. The main question that was discussed was how the union should be - a federation or a confederation. At the talks, the most irreconcilable position was occupied by Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, the power structures in the Russian Federation were strengthened. June 12, 1991 B. Yeltsin in general direct elections was elected president of Russia.

Boris Yeltsin(1931 - 2007)

At this time, the reactionary forces, relying on the party apparatus, the top of the KGB, a significant part of the generals and the leaders of the military-industrial complex, intensified the preparation of the rebellion.

On the morning of August 19, it was announced on radio and television that Gorbachev was ill, that the perestroika he had begun had reached a dead end and that the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) was taking full power. Its members included G. Yanaev, V. Pavlov, B. Pugo, V. Kryuchkov, D. Yazov, G. Baklanov - Gorbachev's deputy for the Defense Council, V. Starodubtsev - chairman of the Peasants' Union and A. Tizyakov is one of the leaders of the military industry. Troops were sent to Moscow. The manifesto of the GKChP spoke of the unrest in the country, the destruction of the Soviet people. It was promised that private property would be supported and that each family would receive 0.15 hectares of land, that prices would be lowered and wages raised, and that each family would receive housing.

But the democratic public rose up against the rebellion. The Verkhovna Rada of Russia became the center of resistance against the conspiracy. Already on the morning of August 19, B. Yeltsin issued a series of decrees that qualified the rebellion as a coup d'état, demanded contact with Gorbachev (with whom he was completely disconnected), appealed to the workers to start a general strike, and the military not to follow the orders of the State Emergency Committee. On August 21, the organizers of the rebellion were arrested. The activities of the CPSU were banned, the reform of the KGB was announced, and a decision was made on a radical military reform. But the main thing was that the all-Union republics proclaimed their independence, began to create their own armies, take control of allied property.

The Soviet Union began to fall apart. On September 9, 1991, the independence of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia was recognized. Gorbachev is making efforts to save something from the Union. But the results of the referendum in Ukraine December 1, 1991 crossed out all attempts to restoreUnion.

Then, on December 8, 1991, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha near Brest, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich signed an agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which stated that "that the USSR as a subject international law geopolitical reality ceases to exist, "then Yeltsin called US President Bush, and Shushkevich - Gorbachev and said that the Soviet Union was no more.

Leonid Kravchuk - the first President of Ukraine

On December 21, 1991, a meeting took place in Alma-Ata, where Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Armenia joined the CIS. Subsequently, Moldova and Azerbaijan joined the CIS, and in 1994 - Georgia. In Alma-Ata, the Declaration was proclaimed the cessation of the existence of the USSR. On December 25, M. Gorbachev signed a decree on taking up the functions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and announced his resignation from the post of President of the USSR. On this day, the red flag of the USSR was lowered on the flagpole above the Grand Kremlin Palace and the flag of Russia was raised. December 26, 1991 one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the former USSR, which managed to collect, adopted a formal declaration on the demise of the USSR.

The international community recognizedindependence of all former Soviet republics of the USSR.

Results

The reforms of the second half of the 60s did not eliminate the negative manifestations of the Soviet system, which called for fundamental reforms. But the Soviet government, on the contrary, “conserved” existing system which led to its comprehensive crisis. For a long time, manifestations of the crisis were hidden. Only after the change of leadership of the country, when M. Gorbachev came to power, attempts began to be made to get out of the crisis. However, it was not possible to find an effective recipe. The crisis ended with the collapse of the USSR.

Questions and tasks:

1. What period and why in the history of the USSR was called "stagnation"?

2. What is the essence of the crisis of the Soviet system?

3. What changes took place in the official ideological concept in the 70-80s?

4. Why was the administrative-command system turned out to be ineffective and led to the degradation of the USSR economy?

5. Determine the reasons for the beginning of the restructuring. Define the term.

6. What periods of perestroika (indicate the chronological framework) correspond to the slogans: "Acceleration", "More socialism!", "More democracy!"?

7. Why was M. Gorbachev at the end of his term in power morepopular abroad than in the USSR?

8. In 1862, the Russian thinker N. Chernyshevsky explained: “Glasnost is a bureaucratic expression coined to replace the expression “freedom of speech”, and invented behind the hunch that the expression “freedom of speech” may seem unpleasant or harsh to anyone." Express your opinion on the statement Or does it characterize the onoprocesses that took place in the USSR in the late 1980s?

9. Reveal the causes and prerequisites for the collapse of the USSR. What was the main reason?

In October 1964, after the dismissal of N. S. Khrushchev, L. I. Brezhnev became the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. His many years in power (1964-1982) publicists of the 80s. called the "stagnation period".

Indeed, these 18 years of Soviet history are practically not marked by outstanding events and achievements. After Khrushchev's "thaw", life in the country seemed to freeze in place. The new leadership, having proclaimed a course towards further democratization of the country, correcting the "voluntaristic" mistakes of N. S. Khrushchev, very soon curtailed it. Both in character and intellect, Brezhnev did not possess the qualities of a leader of a great power, necessary for a radical renewal of society. His weakness as a leader opened up great opportunities for the omnipotence of the party-state bureaucracy. The slogan of "stability" put forward by the new leader of the country meant in practice the rejection of any attempts at a radical renewal of Soviet society. "Running on the spot" was the first to be started by the highest party and state officials, who made their responsible positions practically for life. Most of the ministers, secretaries of the regional committees of the CPSU held positions for 15-20 years. In the composition of the key body of power of the USSR of those years - the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, most of its members were over 15 years, in the Central Committee of the CPSU - more than 12 years. By the beginning of the 80s. The average age of top managers has reached 70 years. Many of them, including Brezhnev, were physically unable to properly manage the great country. Politburo meetings often lasted 15-20 minutes, decisions were approved without discussion, unanimously. Important Decisions, such as the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, were taken in a narrow circle, without the knowledge and approval of the Supreme Council. Party congresses were increasingly ceremonial in nature. Criticism and self-criticism curtailed. The speeches of the delegates were reduced to self-reports and praises of the Politburo headed by L. I. Brezhnev.

The progressive disintegration of the party and state apparatus had a detrimental effect on all spheres of the life of Soviet society. Already in the late 50s. the slowdown in the rate of economic development was clearly marked. The growth of national income slowed down. In 1961-1965. it grew by only 5.7%. This was much less than in the previous five-year plan, and not enough for a stable rise in the living standards of people and for meeting the needs of defense.

In September 1965, the country's leadership made a serious attempt to revive the country's economy and improve the outdated economic mechanism. The main direction of the economic reform, initiated by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin, was a change in the conditions for planning and strengthening economic incentives. Now enterprises could independently plan the rate of growth in labor productivity, reduce costs, and set wages. The heads of enterprises were given the opportunity to more freely dispose of their profits. All this created the interest of enterprises in cost-effective work and improvement of economic indicators. However, the process of mastering the new economic mechanism dragged on for years. Even before the start of the reform in 1965, the economic councils were liquidated, and the management of industries passed to the newly created ministries. A single State Planning Committee of the USSR, Gossnab, Goskomtsen of the USSR were organized, which was difficult to combine with the declared independence of enterprises. The reform did not change the foundations of the command-administrative system. Target directive planning was not eliminated, but only limited to a few indicators. Kosygin failed to fully implement the economic reform, which was not needed by the highest party and state elite. Ministries and departments worked in the old way. Their apparatus increased, new chapters appeared. In addition, even a slight expansion of independence allowed enterprises to underestimate planned targets and choose easier solutions for themselves. As a result, the efficiency of the economy fell, and the level of its manageability decreased. The final economic reform, and with it the possibility of further democratic transformations in the country, were buried in 1968, when the military intervention of the Warsaw Pact countries interrupted the "Prague Spring" - an attempt at democratic reforms in the "brotherly" Czechoslovakia.

After the events of 1968, conservative tendencies intensified in the country's leadership. From the pages of newspapers and magazines, any mention of the "cult of personality", Stalin's crimes, disappeared. The word "market" became a criterion of political unreliability, economic reform in industry and agriculture was curtailed.

In the 70s. economic growth in the country practically stopped. The economy of the USSR was extremely "militarized", that is, it worked mainly for the military-industrial complex. Factories of the USSR in the early 80s. produced tanks 4,5 times more than the United States, nuclear submarines- 3 times, armored personnel carrier - 5 times. At the same time, the defense industry of the USSR worked 2-3 times more people than in the USA. The excessive military burden on the national economy has led to colossal disproportions. Many necessary things have disappeared from the sale, many hours of queues have become habitual again. The semblance of the well-being of the national economy, which was maintained in the 70s, was provided by "oil doping". It was the export of oil, the price of which increased almost 20 times in those years, and other types of valuable raw materials that allowed the USSR to exist relatively comfortably, "solving" food, space and other "complex" problems. Mainly due to the export of irreplaceable natural resources in the 60-70s. there was an intensive development of the eastern regions of the country, large national economic complexes were formed and developed - West Siberian, Sayan, Kansk-Achinsk. Over the years, Volzhsky (VAZ) and Kama (KamAZ) automobile plants, new petrochemical complexes, and defense industry enterprises have appeared corresponding to the world level.

At the same time, the USSR was lagging behind the world level in the use of microelectronic technology. Despite a number of unique scientific developments in the national economy, scientific and technological progress was practically not felt. About 40% of workers were engaged in manual labor in the industry of the USSR, and 75% in agriculture. Obsolete industries demanded colossal volumes of extraction of natural resources, which were depleted catastrophically. The USSR lagged behind the advanced countries in the production of modern household appliances. The ministries and departments, which became a major economic force and practically subjugated the state apparatus, preferred not to deal with the troublesome modernization of existing industrial enterprises, but to build more and more new ones. As a result, every year the number of unfinished plants and factories grew, and mountains of unidentified aging imported equipment accumulated. After 1968, instead of real reforms, protracted experiments were carried out in the Soviet Union with the expansion of self-supporting enterprises, the introduction of the “conditionally net production” indicator, which in the end ended in nothing.

After Khrushchev's "thaw" stagnation manifested itself in literature and art. The ideological basis of the conservative policy in the field of spiritual life was the conclusion, first published by Brezhnev in 1967, about building a "developed socialist society" in the USSR. The concept of "developed socialism" appeared in official documents as an alternative to the bankrupt course of building communism in our country. And in this sense it was a step forward. But contained in the concept of substantiation of the “complete and final solution of the national question”, the social homogeneity of Soviet society, the absence of any contradictions in it, contributed to the conservation of all the vices of the Soviet system, led society away from real problems. This led to the growth of dogmatic tendencies in science and art, and to a deep crisis in all spiritual life.

In November 1969 A.I.__Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the Writers' Union for his speeches against overt and covert censorship of works of art. In January 1970, the editor of the Novy Mir magazine, A. T. Tvardovsky, was removed from his post. In the 70s. increasingly banned the publication of works of art objectionable to the party leadership. In September 1974, an exhibition was destroyed by bulldozers in Moscow. contemporary art. The talented films of A. A. Tarkovsky practically did not have a wide distribution in the country. Because of the stuffy atmosphere of "stagnation" many famous poets, writers, directors ended up abroad: V. P. Aksenov, I. A. Brodsky, V. E. Maksimov, A. I. Solzhenitsyn, V. N. Voinovich, A. A. Tarkovsky, Yu. P. Lyubimov, M. L. Rostropovich, G. P. Vishnevskaya and many others (see Emigration).

Despite many obvious facts of "stagnation", "solemn march on the spot", Brezhnev's "rule" was not a period of complete "stagnation", just as it did not become a period of "developed socialism". Behind the outer shell in the life of Soviet society, important and complex transformations took place, the crisis of the entire Soviet system grew and deepened. The internal needs of society and citizens for greater freedom, pluralism of opinions and activities are found in the 70s. its reflection in the emergence of new, non-state structures in the economy, ideology and social sphere. Along with the planned economy, the "guilds" were strengthened. The shadow economy grew, allowing the distribution of products and incomes in accordance with the preferences of consumers. Entire enterprises were involved in semi-legal and illegal activities. The income of the shadow economy was in the billions. The most important consequence of Khrushchev's liberalization was the crystallization of the germs of civil society, that is, the emergence of public organizations and associations of citizens independent of the state. Due to the closeness and repressiveness of the Brezhnev regime, very soon these public structures acquired an anti-socialist, anti-state orientation. Since the mid 50s. separate extremely small groups of dissidents tried to find their place in the life of society, to contribute to its renewal. However, the repressions that fell upon them pushed them onto the path of opposition to the state. The trial in February 1966 of the writers A. Sinyavsky and Y. Daniel, accused of publishing literary works in the West, became a powerful accelerator of the dissident movement, various forms of civic activity (see Dissident and human rights movement in the USSR). He contributed to the further formation of public opinion in the country. Many hundreds of people took part in the distribution of samizdat works and the collection of human rights information. "Dissident" slogans of glasnost, democratization of public life, creation rule of law find a response among the intelligentsia, part of the ruling class. In the 70s. there was a final registration of the movement as a sovereign political force. Its total number reaches 500-700 thousand people, and together with families about 3 million people, i.e. 1.5% of the total population of the country.

The formation of the Soviet ruling class, the basis of which was a layer of top party and state officials, is the most important outcome of the stagnant period. By the mid 80s. finalized " new class”, in essence, no longer needed public property and was looking for a way out for the opportunity to freely manage, and then own personal, private property. By the mid 80s. the Soviet totalitarian system (see Totalitarian regime in the USSR) actually lost support in society and its collapse became a matter of time (see Perestroika in the USSR).