Losses of the parties in the Battle of Kursk. Kursk Bulge or Oryol-Kursk Bulge - how to

All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments

Moscow City Branch

Military Historical Club

M.KOLOMIETS, M.Svirin

with the participation of O. BARONOV, D. NEDOGONOV

AT Your attention is invited to an illustrated edition dedicated to the fighting on the Kursk Bulge. Compiling the publication, the authors did not set themselves the goal of giving a comprehensive description of the course of hostilities in the summer of 1943. They used as primary sources mainly domestic documents of those years: combat logs, combat and loss reports provided by various military formations, and protocols of work commissions engaged in July-August 1943 in the study of new models of German military equipment. The publication deals mainly with the actions of anti-tank artillery and armored forces and does not consider the actions of aviation and infantry formations.

P after the completion of the winter 1942-43. the offensive of the Red Army and the counterattack of the German operational group "Kempf" The Eastern Front in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe cities of Orel-Kursk-Belgorod took on bizarre shapes. In the Orel region, the front line went into the location of the Soviet troops in an arc, and in the Kursk region, on the contrary, it formed a depression in a westerly direction. This characteristic configuration of the front prompted the German command to plan the spring-summer campaign of 1943, in which the stake was placed on the encirclement of Soviet troops near Kursk.

Subdivision 150mm self-propelled guns on the chassis of the French tractor "Lorrain" before the battles.

Oryol direction. June 1943

The plans of the German command

H Despite the defeat at Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus, the Wehrmacht was still quite capable of advancing, delivering fast and powerful blows, which was demonstrated by the battles of the spring of 1943 near Kharkov. However, under the prevailing conditions, the Germans could no longer conduct a large-scale offensive on a wide front, as in previous summer campaigns. Some representatives of the German generals proposed to start a positional war, actively developing the occupied territories. But Hitler did not want to give up the initiative to the Soviet command. He wanted to inflict a powerful blow on the enemy at least on one of the sectors of the front, so that a decisive success with insignificant losses of his own would allow him to dictate his will to the defenders in future campaigns. The Kursk ledge, saturated with Soviet troops, was the best suited for such an offensive. The German plan for the spring-summer campaign of 1943 was as follows: deliver powerful blows in the direction of Kursk from the north and south under the base of the ledge, encircle the main forces of the two Soviet fronts (Central and Voronezh) and destroy them.

The conclusion about the possibility of destroying Soviet troops with small own losses followed from the experience of summer operations in 1941-42. and to a large extent was based on an underestimation of the capabilities of the Red Army. After successful battles near Kharkov, the German high command decided that the crisis on the Eastern Front had already passed and that success in the course of the summer offensive near Kursk was beyond doubt. On April 15, 1943, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6 on the preparation of the Kursk operation, called the "Citadel", and the study of the subsequent large-scale offensive to the east and southeast, which received the code name "Operation Panther".

Before coming. "Mapder III" and panzergrenadiers at the starting position. July, 1943

"Tigers" of the 505th battalion on the march.

Due to the exposure of neighboring sectors of the Eastern Front and the transfer of all operational reserves to the disposal of Army Groups "Center" and "South", three mobile strike groups were formed. The 9th Army was located south of Orel, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were located in the Belgorod region. The number of troops employed in Operation Citadel was seven army and five tank corps, which included 34 infantry, 14 tank, 2 motorized divisions, as well as 3 separate heavy tank battalions and 8 assault gun battalions, which accounted for more than 17 percent of the infantry , up to 70 percent of armored and up to 30 percent of motorized divisions from total German troops on the Eastern Front.

It was originally planned to start offensive operations on May 10-15, but later this period was postponed to June, then to July due to the unavailability of Army Group South (some authors believe that this period was postponed due to the unavailability of the Panther tanks, however, according to Manstein's reports, on May 1, 1943, he had a shortage in his units personnel, reaching 11-18%.

German tank PzKpfw IV Ausf G in ambush. District of Belgorod, June 1943

"Ferdinand" of the 653rd tank destroyer battalion before the battles.

The presence of tanks and assault guns in other units of the ground forces

Besides: StuG 111 and Stug 40 assault guns in assault battalions and anti-tank companies of infantry divisions -
455: assault 105-mm howitzers - 98, assault infantry guns StulG 33 in the 23rd tank division - 12. 150-mm self-propelled guns "Hummel" - 55 and more than 160 anti-tank self-propelled guns "Marder". For the rest of the ACS, exact data is not available.

The plans of the Soviet command

G The main feature of the Battle of Kursk, which distinguishes it from other operations of the Second World War, was that it was here, for the first time in two years since the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, that the Soviet command correctly determined the direction of the main strategic offensive of the German troops and managed to prepare in advance for it.

In the course of analyzing the situation that developed on the Central and Voronezh fronts in the spring of 1943, based on information transmitted by British intelligence, as well as short-term strategic games in the General Staff in April 1943, it was assumed that it was the floor of Kursk that the German command would try to take revenge for the Stalingrad "boiler".

During the discussion of plans to counter the German offensive, the staff of the General Staff and members of the Headquarters proposed two options for the summer campaign of 1943. One was to inflict a powerful preemptive strike on the German troops even before the start of the offensive, defeat them in deployment positions, and then go into a decisive offensive by the forces of five fronts in order to quickly reach the Dnieper.

The second provided for the meeting of the advancing German troops with a defense in depth prepared in advance, equipped with a large amount of artillery, in order to exhaust their forces in defensive battles and then go on the offensive with fresh forces from three fronts.

The most ardent supporters of the first version of the campaign were the commander of the Voronezh Front N. Vatutin and a member of the military council of the front N. Khrushchev, who asked for the strengthening of their front with one combined arms and one tank armies in order to go on the offensive by the end of May. Their plan was supported by the Stavka representative A. Vasilevsky.

The second option was supported by the command of the Central Front, who rightly believed that a preemptive strike would be accompanied by heavy losses of Soviet troops, and the reserves accumulated by the German troops could be used to prevent the development of our offensive and deliver powerful counterattacks during it.

The problem was resolved when the supporters of the second option were supported by G. Zhukov, who called the first scenario "a new version of the summer of 1942", when the German troops not only repulsed the premature Soviet offensive, but were able to encircle the bulk of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space for an attack on Stalingrad . I. Stalin, apparently convinced by such a clear argumentation, took the side of a defensive strategy.

203-mm B-4 howitzers of the breakthrough artillery corps in positions.

The presence of a tank and artillery weapons in some armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts

Notes:
* - there is no division into medium and light tanks, however, in the 13th amia there were at least 10 T-60 tanks and approx. 50 T-70 tanks
** - including 25 SU-152s, 32 SU-122s, 18 SU-76s and 16 SU-76s on captured chassis
*** - including 24 SU-122, 33 SU-76 on domestic and captured chassis
**** - including medium tanks M-3 "General Lee"
For the Voronezh Front, the data are rather contradictory, since the front-line reports submitted by the chief of logistics and the commander differ significantly. According to the summary of the chief of logistics, another 89 light T-60 and T-70), as well as 202 medium tanks (T-34 and M-3), should be added to the indicated number.

Preparing for battle

P The forthcoming battles posed a number of most difficult tasks for the command of the Red Army. Firstly, the German troops spent in 1942-43. reorganization and re-equipment with new models of military equipment, which provided them with a certain qualitative advantage. Secondly, the transfer of fresh forces from Germany and France to the Eastern Front and the total mobilization carried out allowed the German command to concentrate on this sector a large number of military formations. And, finally, the lack of experience in the Red Army in conducting successful offensive operations against a strong enemy made the Battle of Kursk one of the most significant events of the Second World War.

Despite the numerical superiority domestic tanks, qualitatively they were inferior to German combat vehicles. The newly formed tank armies turned out to be cumbersome and difficult to manage formations. A significant part of the Soviet tanks were light vehicles, and if we take into account the often extremely poor quality of crew training, it becomes clear how difficult the task awaited our tankers when they met with the Germans.

Somewhat better was the position in the artillery. The basis of the material part of the anti-tank regiments of the Central and Voronezh fronts was the 76-mm divisional guns F-22USV, ZIS-22-USV and ZIS-3. Two artillery regiments were armed with more powerful 76-mm guns mod. 1936 (F-22), transferred from the Far East, and one regiment - 107 mm M-60 guns. The total number of 76-mm guns in anti-tank artillery regiments was almost twice the number of 45-mm guns.

True, if in the initial period of the war the 76-mm divisional gun could be successfully used against any German tank at all ranges of actual fire, now the situation has become more complicated. The new heavy German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", modernized medium tanks and assault guns expected on the battlefields were practically invulnerable in the frontal part at a distance of over 400 m, and there was no time to develop new artillery systems.

Preparation of the firing point by the crew of the anti-tank gun of Sergeant Tursunkhodzhiev. The picture shows a 76.2 mm F-22 mod. 1936 one of the IPTAP reserve of the High Command. Oryol direction, July 1943

by order State Committee Defense (GOKO) in the spring of 1943, the production of 57-mm anti-tank (ZIS-2) and tank (ZIS-4M) guns was resumed, which was stopped in the fall of 1941 due to high complexity. However, by the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, they did not have time to get to the front. The first artillery regiment, armed with 57-mm ZIS-2 guns, arrived at the Central Front only on July 27, 1943, and at Voronezh even later. In August 1943, the T-34 and KV-1s tanks also arrived at the front, armed with ZIS-4M guns, which were called "tank-fighter". In May-June 1943, it was planned to resume production of 107-mm M-60 guns, but for the needs of anti-tank defense, they turned out to be excessively heavy and expensive. In the summer of 1943, the TsAKB was developing the 100-mm S-3 anti-tank gun, but it was still far from being put into service. The 45-mm battalion anti-tank gun, improved in 1942, was adopted in the winter of 1943 under the M-42 index to replace the 45-mm gun mod. 1937, but its use did not give a noticeable advantage, since it could only be considered effective enough when using a sub-caliber projectile against the side armor of German tanks from short distances.

The task of increasing the armor penetration of domestic anti-tank artillery by the summer of 1943 was reduced mainly to the modernization of existing armor-piercing ammunition for 76-mm divisional and tank guns. So, in March 1943, a 76-mm sub-caliber projectile was mastered in mass production, penetrating armor up to 96-84 mm thick at a distance of 500-1000 m. However, the volume of production of sub-caliber shells in 1943 was extremely insignificant due to the lack of tungsten and molybdenum, which were mined in the Caucasus. The shells were issued to the commanders of the guns of anti-tank regiments
(IPTAP) to the account, and the loss of at least one projectile was punished quite severely - up to demolition. In addition to sub-caliber, 76-mm guns were also introduced into the ammunition load in 1943 armor-piercing shells a new type with localizers (BR-350B), which increased the armor penetration of the gun at a distance of 500 m by 6-9 mm and had a more durable hull.

Heavy tank KV-1s of the guards of Lieutenant Kostin of the heavy tank regiment of the breakthrough of the 5th Guards Tank Army before the battles. July, 1943

Tested in the fall of 1942, cumulative 76-mm and 122-mm shells (called "armor-piercing") began to enter the troops in April-May 1943. They could penetrate armor up to 92 and 130 mm thick, respectively, but due to the imperfection of fuses, they cannot was used in long-barreled divisional and tank guns (most often the projectile exploded in the gun barrel). Therefore, they were included only in the ammunition of regimental, mountain guns and howitzers. For arming the infantry, the production of hand-held anti-tank cumulative grenades with a stabilizer was started, and for anti-tank rifles(PTR) and DShK heavy machine guns, new armor-piercing bullets with a carbide core containing tungsten carbide were introduced.

Specially for the summer campaign of 1943, in May, the People's Commissariat of Armaments (NKV) was issued a large overplanned order for armor-piercing (and semi-armor-piercing) shells for guns that were not previously considered anti-tank: 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as 122-mm and 152-mm long-range cannons and cannon-howitzers. The NKV enterprises also received an additional order for Molotov cocktails KS and easel high-explosive flamethrowers FOG.

76-mm divisional gun mod. 1939/41 ZIS-22 (F-22 USV), one of the main Soviet anti-tank weapons in the summer of 1943

In the artillery workshops of the 13th Army in May 1943, 28 "portable jet guns" were manufactured, which were separate rails from the Katyusha, mounted on a light tripod.

All available light artillery weapons (caliber from 37 to 76 mm) were aimed at fighting tanks. Heavy cannon-howitzer batteries, heavy mortars and units of Katyusha rocket launchers also learned to repel tank subframes. For them, temporary memos and instructions for firing at moving armored targets were specially issued. Anti-aircraft batteries armed with 85-mm cannons were transferred to the reserve of the fronts to cover especially important directions from tank attacks. It was forbidden to fire on aircraft with batteries allocated for anti-tank missile defense.

The rich trophies captured during the Battle of Stalingrad were also preparing to meet the former owners with fire. At least four artillery regiments received captured materiel: 75 mm PaK 40 guns (instead of 76 mm USV and ZIS-3) and 50 mm RaK 38 guns (instead of 45 mm guns). Two anti-tank artillery regiments, transferred to the fronts for reinforcement from the Stavka reserve, were armed with captured 88-mm FlaK 18 / FlaK 36 anti-aircraft guns.

But not only the material part occupied the minds of the national command. To no lesser extent, this also affected (for the first, and, apparently, the last time) questions of organization and thorough combat training of personnel.

First, the staff of the main anti-tank defense unit, the anti-tank artillery regiment (IPTAP), was finally approved, which consisted of five four-gun batteries. The larger unit - the brigade (IPTABr) - included three regiments and, accordingly, fifteen batteries. Such consolidation of anti-tank units made it possible to counteract large numbers of enemy tanks and at the same time maintain an artillery reserve for operational fire maneuver. In addition, the fronts also included anti-tank brigades of a combined arms type, which were armed with one light artillery regiment and up to two battalions of anti-tank rifles.

Secondly, in all artillery units, fighters were selected who had achieved success in the fight against new German tanks (not only the Tiger and Panther were new; many gunners until the summer of 1943 did not meet with new modifications of the PzKpfw IV and StuG assault guns 40), and were placed as commanders of guns and platoons in newly formed units. At the same time, the crews that were defeated in battles with German tanks, on the contrary, were withdrawn to rear units. For two months (May-June), a real hunt for "cannon snipers" was conducted among the artillery units of the fronts. These gunners were invited to the IPTAP and IPTABr, which, by order of the Headquarters, in May 1943 increased their pay and rations. For additional training of IPTAP gunners, in addition to practical ones, up to 16 combat armor-piercing shells were also allocated.

By the forces educational units from captured medium tanks they made mock-ups of the "Tigers", welding them on the frontal part of the hull and turret with additional armor plates. Many gunners, practicing shooting at moving mock-ups (dummy models were towed on long cables behind artillery tractors or tanks), achieved the highest skill, managing to hit the gun barrel, commander's cupola or mechanic's viewing device from a 45-mm or 76-mm cannon. a tank driver moving at a speed of 10-15 km / h (this was the actual speed of the tank in battle). The crews of howitzers and large-caliber guns (122-152 mm) also underwent mandatory training in firing at moving targets.

Engineering support of defense lines

To At the beginning of July 1943, the Kursk ledge was defended by the next grouping of Soviet troops. The right front of the ledge, 308 km long, was occupied by the troops of the Central Front (front commander - K. Rokossovsky). In the first echelon, the front had five combined arms armies (48th, 13th, 70th, 65th and 60th), the 2nd tank army, as well as the 9th and 19th tank corps were located in the reserve. The left front, 244 km long, was occupied by the troops of the Voronezh Front (front commander - N. Vatutin), having in the first echelon the 38th, 40th, 6th Guards and 7th Guards armies, and in the second echelon - the 69th Army and 35 th Guards Rifle Corps. The front reserve consisted of the 1st Tank Army, as well as the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps.

In the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, the Steppe Front (front commander I. Konev) was defending, consisting of six combined arms, one tank army, as well as four tank and two mechanized corps. The defense of the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge differed sharply from that in the battle of Moscow and Stalingrad. It was deliberate, prepared in advance and carried out in conditions of some superiority in forces over the German troops. When organizing the defense, the experience accumulated by Moscow and Stalingrad was taken into account, especially in terms of engineering and barrage measures.

In the armies of the first echelon of fronts, three defensive lines were created: the main army line of defense, a second line of defense 6-12 km from it, and a rear defensive line, located 20-30 km from the first. In certain especially critical areas, these belts were strengthened by intermediate lines of defense. In addition, the forces of the fronts also organized three additional front-line defensive lines.

Thus, on the alleged directions of the main enemy attacks, each front had 6 lines of defense with a separation depth of up to 110 km on the Central Front and up to 85 km on the Voronezh Front.

The volume of work carried out by the engineering services of the fronts was colossal. Only in the location of the Central Front in April-June, up to 5,000 km of trenches and communications were dug, more than 300 km of wire obstacles were installed (of which about 30 km were electrified), more than 400,000 mines and land mines were installed, over 60 km of gouges, up to 80 km of anti-tank ditches.

To enlarge - click on the image

The system of engineering obstacles in the main defensive zone included anti-tank ditches, gouges and scarps, tank traps, surprises, land mines and minefields. On the Voronezh Front, for the first time, explosive mines (MOF) were used, which were a box with incendiary bottles, in the center of which a saber, a grenade or an anti-personnel mine was placed. From such land mines, several barrier fields were created, which proved to be very effective both against infantry and against light and medium tanks.

In addition, in order to carry out the operational laying of mines directly in front of the advancing tanks (in those years called “impudent mining”), special mobile barrage detachments (PZO) were organized as part of an engineering assault sapper company, reinforced by a platoon of anti-tank rifles and / or a machine-gun platoon on cargo off-road vehicles or captured armored personnel carriers.

The main line of defense was divided into battalion areas (up to 2.5 km along the front and up to 1 km in depth) and anti-tank strongholds, covered by a network of engineering barriers. Two or three battalion districts formed a regimental sector (up to 5 km along the front and up to 4 km in depth). Anti-tank strongholds (formed by artillery of rifle regiments and divisions) were located mainly in battalion defense areas. The advantage of the northern sector of defense was that all anti-tank strongholds located in the sector of rifle regiments, by order of the front commander K. Rokossovsky, were united into anti-tank areas, commandants of which were appointed commanders of rifle regiments. This facilitated the process of interaction between artillery and rifle units when repulsing enemy attacks. On the southern front, by order of the representative of the Headquarters A. Vasilevsky, this was prohibited, and anti-tank strongholds often had no idea about the state of affairs in neighboring defense sectors, being, in essence, left to themselves.

By the beginning of the fighting, the troops occupied four defensive lines - entirely the first (main) line of defense and most of the second, and in the directions of a probable enemy strike, also the rear army line and the first front line.

To enlarge - click on the image

All the armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts were significantly reinforced with RVGK artillery. The command of the Central Front had at its disposal, in addition to 41 artillery regiments of rifle divisions, also 77 artillery regiments of the RVGK, not counting anti-aircraft and field rocket artillery, i.e. a total of 118 artillery and mortar regiments. The anti-tank artillery of the RVGK was represented by ten separate IPTAP and three IPTABr (three regiments each). In addition, the front included three combined-arms anti-tank brigades and three light artillery brigades (three light artillery regiments each), which were also transferred to anti-tank defense. Taking into account the latter, the entire anti-tank artillery of the RVGK of the front consisted of 31 regiments.

The Voronezh Front included, in addition to 35 artillery regiments of rifle divisions, also 83 reinforcement artillery regiments, i.e. also 118 artillery and mortar regiments, of which there were a total of 46 anti-tank regiments.

The anti-tank regiments were almost completely equipped with materiel and personnel (in terms of the number of guns - up to 93%, in terms of personnel - up to 92%). There was not enough means of traction and vehicles (especially on the Voronezh front). The number of motors per gun ranged from 1.5 to 2.9 (with the prescribed number - 3.5). Cars with a carrying capacity of 1.5 to 5 tons (GAZ, ZIS and American trucks) were most widely represented, and tractors of the STZ-5 (Nati) type (up to half of the required number) and off-road cars of the Willis type "and GAZ-67 (up to 60% of the prescribed amount).

On the northern face, the troops of the 13th Army received the greatest means of artillery reinforcement as they were located in the most threatened direction. On the southern front, reinforcements were distributed between the 6th Guards and 7th Guards Armies.

On both fronts, special artillery and anti-tank reserves were created. In addition to regular anti-tank guns, they also included battalions and companies of armor-piercers, as well as anti-aircraft guns of 76 and 85 mm caliber removed from air defense. In order to somehow compensate for the weakening of air defense, the Headquarters handed over to the command of the fronts additional units of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 12.7-mm machine guns. Anti-aircraft guns, transferred to the category of anti-tank guns, were installed for the most part in pre-equipped positions near the tank-dangerous directions of the near rear of the front. It was forbidden to fire on aircraft from these batteries, and their ammunition load consisted of armor-piercing shells for more than 60%.

Sergeant Filippov's ZIS-22 gun crew is preparing to meet German tanks.

Heavy 203-mm B-4 howitzer of the breakthrough artillery corps in position under a camouflage net. Oryol direction, July 1943

A camouflaged Soviet medium tank in ambush on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri.

Defensive battles on the northern face

2 On July 1943, the commands of the Central and Voronezh fronts received a special telegram from the Headquarters, which stated that the start of the German offensive should be expected between July 3 and 6. On the night of July 5, reconnaissance of the 15th Infantry Division of the 13th Army encountered a group of German sappers who were making passages in minefields. In the ensuing skirmish, one of them was taken prisoner and showed that the German offensive should begin on July 5 at 3 o'clock in the morning. The commander of the Central Front, K. Rokossovsky, decided to preempt the German offensive by conducting artillery and air counter-training. At 02:20, a 30-minute artillery counter-preparation was carried out in the zone of the 13th and 48th armies, in which 588 guns and mortars were involved, as well as two regiments of field rocket artillery. During the shelling, the German artillery responded very sluggishly, a large number of powerful explosions were noted behind the front line. At 04:30 the counter-preparation was repeated.

The air strike on both fronts failed due to its unsatisfactory preparation. By the time our bombers took off, all german planes were in the air, and the bombing fell mostly on empty or half-empty airfields.

At 05:30, the German infantry, supported by tanks, attacked the entire defense zone of the 13th Army. The enemy exerted especially strong pressure on the right flank of the army - in the Maloarkhangelskoye area. Mobile barrage fire (PZO) stopped the infantry, and tanks and assault guns hit the minefields. The attack was repulsed. After 7 hours 30 minutes, the Germans changed the direction of the main attack and launched an offensive on the left flank of the 13th Army.

Until 10:30 a.m., the German troops could not get close to the positions of the Soviet infantry, and only after overcoming the minefields did they break into Podolyan. Units of our 15th and 81st divisions were partially surrounded, but successfully repulsed the attacks of the German motorized infantry. According to various reports, during July 5 in minefields and from fire Soviet artillery the Germans lost between 48 and 62 tanks and assault guns.

On the night of July 6, the command of the Central Front carried out a maneuver with artillery reserves and, following the order of the General Staff, prepared a counterattack against the German troops that had broken through.

The artillery breakthrough corps of General N. Ignatov, a mortar brigade, two regiments of rocket-propelled mortars, two regiments of self-propelled artillery, two tank corps (16th and 19th), a rifle corps and three rifle divisions were involved in the counterattack. Infantry and tanks of the 16th. struck on the morning of July 6 on a front up to 34 km wide. Enemy artillery was silent, suppressed by the fire of the breakthrough artillery corps, but the tanks of the 107th tank brigade, having pushed the German troops in the direction of Butyrka by 1-2 km, came under sudden fire from German tanks and self-propelled guns buried in the ground. AT short term the brigade lost 46 tanks, and the remaining 4 retreated to their infantry. The commander of the 16th, seeing this situation, ordered the 164th tank brigade, moving in a ledge after the 107th brigade, to stop the attack and retreat to its original position. The 19th, because, having spent too much time preparing a counterattack, was ready for it only in the afternoon and therefore did not go on the offensive. The counterattack did not reach main goal- restoration of the former line of defense.

"Tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion are moving towards the front line. July 1943

A column of French cars of one of the motorized units of the German troops. Orlovskoe example, July 1943

Command tank PzKpfw IV Ausf F in combat. Orlovskoye for example.

The radio relay station of the Army Group "Center" maintains contact with the headquarters of the 9th Army. July 1943

After the transition of our troops to the defense, the Germans resumed their offensive against Olkhovatka. From 170 to 230 tanks and self-propelled guns were thrown here. Positions of the 17th Guards. corps lines were reinforced here by the i-th guards. an artillery division, one IPTAP and a tank regiment, and the Soviet tanks standing on the defensive were dug into the ground.

Fierce fighting took place here. The Germans quickly regrouped and delivered short powerful blows by tank groups, between attacks on the heads of the infantrymen of the 17th Guards. pages of the corps were bombed by German dive bombers. By 16 o'clock, the Soviet infantry retreated to their original positions, and the 19th, because. received an order to conduct a counterattack against the exposed flank of the German group. Having begun the strike at 1700 hours, our tank corps was met with dense fire from German anti-tank and self-propelled guns and suffered heavy losses. However, the German attack on Olkhovatka was stopped.

Artillerymen of the 13th Army are firing at enemy assault guns. July 1943

German tanks of the 2nd Panzer Division on the offensive. July 1943

To enlarge - click on the image

Armor-piercers change their firing position. July 1943

Tanks T-70 and T-34 of the 2nd Panzer Army move forward for a counterattack. July 1943

Tank reserves move to the front. The picture shows American medium tanks "General Lee", supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease. July 1943

German gunners reflect the attack of Soviet tanks. July 1943

Anti-tank self-propelled guns -Mapder III "covers the advance of German tanks.

Loss of materiel of the 2nd Panzer Army in defensive battles

Note: The general list of losses does not include the losses of attached units and subunits, including three tank regiments armed with Lend-Lease tanks.

Defense c. Ponyri

P After failures on the flanks of the 13th Army, the Germans concentrated their efforts on taking the Ponyri station, which occupied a very important strategic position, covering the Orel-Kursk railway.

The station was well prepared for defense. She was surrounded by guided and unguided minefields, in which a significant number of captured aerial bombs and large-caliber shells were installed, converted into high-explosive land mines. The defense was strengthened by tanks buried in the ground and a large number of anti-tank artillery (13th IPTABr and 46th light artillery brigade).

Against the village "1st Ponyri" On July 6, the Germans threw up to 170 tanks and self-propelled guns (including up to 40 "Tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion) and infantry of the 86th and 292nd divisions. Having broken through the defenses of the 81st page of the division, the German troops captured the 1st Ponyri and quickly moved south to the second defense line in the area of ​​the 2nd Ponyri and st. Ponyri. Until the end of the day, they tried three times to break into the station, but were repulsed. The counterattack carried out by the forces of the 16th and 19th tank corps turned out to be inconsistent and did not reach the goal (repulse the "1st Ponyri"). However, the day for the regrouping of forces was won.

On July 7, the Germans could no longer advance on a wide front and threw all their forces against the defense center of the Ponyri station. At about 8 o'clock in the morning, up to 40 German heavy tanks (according to the classification that existed in the Red Army, German medium tanks PzKpfw IV Ausf H were considered heavy), supported by heavy assault guns, advanced to the defense zone and opened fire on the positions of Soviet troops. At the same time, the "2nd Ponyri" were attacked from the air by German dive bombers. After about half an hour, the Tiger tanks began to approach the forward trenches, covering the medium tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry. Heavy assault guns with fire from a place on the discovered firing points supported the offensive. The dense PZO of large-caliber artillery and the "impudent mining", carried out by units of engineering assault brigades with the support of divisional guns, forced the German tanks five times to retreat to their original position.

However, at 10 am, two battalions of German infantry with medium tanks and assault guns managed to break into the northwestern outskirts of the "2 Ponyri". The reserve of the commander of the 307th division, brought into battle, consisting of two infantry battalions and a tank brigade, with the support of artillery, made it possible to destroy the group that had broken through and restore the situation. After 11 o'clock the Germans launched an attack on Ponyri from the northeast. By 3 p.m. they had taken possession of the May 1 state farm and came close to the station. However, all attempts to break into the territory of the village and the station were unsuccessful. July 7 was a critical day on the Northern Front, when the Germans had great tactical successes.

Heavy assault guns "Ferdinand" before the attack of Art. Ponyri. July 1943

On the morning of July 8, German troops, supported by 25 medium tanks, 15 Tiger heavy tanks and up to 20 Ferdinand assault guns, again attacked the northern outskirts of St. Ponyri. When the attack was repulsed by the fire of the 1180th and 1188th IPTAP, 22 tanks were hit, including 5 Tiger tanks. Two Tiger tanks were set on fire with bottles of KS thrown by infantrymen Kuliev and Prokhorov from the 1019th joint venture.

In the afternoon, German troops again tried to break through bypassing Art. Ponyri - through the agricultural "May 1". However, here the attack was repulsed by the efforts of the 1180th IPTAP and the 768th LAP, supported by infantry and a battery of "portable jet guns". On the battlefield, the Germans left 11 burned-out and 5 wrecked medium tanks, as well as 4 wrecked assault guns and several armored vehicles. Moreover, according to the reports of the infantry command and artillery reconnaissance, 3 German combat vehicles fell to the share of "jet guns". The next two days will not bring anything new to the disposition of troops in the area of ​​​​st. Ponyri. On July 9, the Germans put together an operational strike group of 45 Tiger heavy tanks of the 505th heavy tank battalion (according to other sources - 40 Tiger tanks), the 654th battalion of Ferdinand heavy assault guns, as well as the 216th division of 150 -mm assault tanks and a division of 75-mm and 105-mm assault guns. The command of the group (according to the testimony of the prisoners) was carried out by Major Kal (commander of the 505th battalion of heavy tanks). Directly behind the group were medium tanks and motorized infantry in armored personnel carriers. Two hours after the start of the battle, the group broke through the agricultural "May 1st" to the village. Burnt. In these battles, the German troops used a new tactical formation, when the line of Ferdinand assault guns moved in the forefront of the strike group (rolls in two echelons), followed by the Tigers, covering the assault guns and medium tanks. But at the village Burnt, our artillerymen and infantrymen let the German tanks and self-propelled guns into a pre-prepared artillery fire bag, formed by the 768th, 697th and 546th LAP and the 1180th IPTAP, supported by long-range artillery fire and rocket mortars. Having found themselves on the floor with powerful concentrated artillery fire from different directions, having also hit a powerful minefield (most of the field was mined by captured aerial bombs or land mines containing 10-50 kg of toll buried in the ground) and subjected to raids by Petlyakov dive bombers, German tanks stopped. Eighteen combat vehicles were hit. Some of the tanks left on the battlefield turned out to be serviceable, and six of them were evacuated at night by Soviet repairmen, after which they were transferred to the disposal of the 19th. to replenish the lost materiel.

The attack was repeated the next day. But even now the German troops failed to break through to Art. Ponyri. A large role in repelling the offensive was played by the PZO, supplied by a special-purpose artillery division (203-mm howitzers and 152-mm howitzers-cannons). By noon, the Germans withdrew, leaving seven more tanks and two assault guns on the battlefield. On July 12-13, the Germans carried out an operation to evacuate their wrecked tanks from the battlefield. The evacuation was covered by the 654th division of assault guns "Ferdinand". The operation was generally successful, but the number of Ferdinands left on the battlefield with damaged mines and artillery fire undercarriage increased to 17. The counterattack of our infantrymen with the support of a battalion of T-34 tanks and a battalion of T-70 (from the composition of the 3 deployed here) pushed back the German troops that had approached the outskirts of Ponyri. At the same time, the Germans did not have time to evacuate the damaged heavy Ferdinands, some of which were set on fire by their own crews, and some by our infantrymen, who used KS bottles against the crews of vehicles that offered resistance. Only one "Ferdinand" received a hole in the side in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe brake drum, although it was fired upon by seven T-34 tanks from all directions. In total, after the fighting in the area of ​​​​st. Ponyri - 21 Ferdinand assault guns remained with a damaged undercarriage, a significant part of which were set on fire by their crews or advancing infantrymen. Our tankers, who supported the infantry counterattack, suffered heavy losses not only from the fire of German assault guns, but also because, approaching the enemy, a company of T-70 tanks and several T-34s mistakenly fell into their own minefield. It was the last day when the German troops came close to the outskirts of Art. Ponyri.

German artillery is shelling the positions of the Soviet troops. July-August 1943.

Assault guns "Ferdinand", lined on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri. July 1943

The battlefield after the counterattack of the owls. troops in the area of Ponyri - pos. Burnt. On this field, German assault guns "Ferdinand" and a company of Soviet T-34 / T-70 tanks were blown up by the action of Soviet land mines. July 9-13, 1943

German tank PzKpfw IV and armored personnel carrier SdKfz 251, lined up on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri. July 15, 1943

Special Purpose Artillery Division Gen. Ignatiev when repelling the German offensive at st. Ponyri. July, 1943

"Ferdinand", lined with artillery near the village. Burnt. The gun mantlet was damaged, the starboard roller and drive wheel were broken.

Broken by a direct hit from a heavy shell, the Bryummber assault tank. Outskirts of st. Ponyri 15 July 1943

Tanks of the 3rd Regiment of the 2nd Panzer Division, knocked out on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri. July 12-15, 1943

The wrecked PzBefWg III Ausf H is a command vehicle with a dummy gun and a telescopic antenna.

A PzKpfw III Ausf N support tank armed with a short-barreled 75 mm gun.

Defensive battles of the 70th army

AT the defense zone of the 70th Army, the most fierce battles unfolded in the area of ​​​​the village. Kutyrki-Warm. Here, the 3rd Fighter Brigade bore the brunt of the blow of the German tank troops. The brigade organized two anti-tank areas in the Kutyrki-Teploye area, each of which had three artillery batteries (76-mm guns and 45-mm guns), one mortar battery (120-mm mortars) and a battalion of anti-tank rifles. During July 6-7, the brigade successfully held back enemy attacks, destroying and knocking out 47 tanks here. Interestingly, the commander of one of the batteries of 45-mm guns, Captain Gorlitsin, positioned his guns behind the reverse slope of the ridge and hit the emerging German tanks in the opening bottom before the tank could respond with aimed fire. Thus, in a day, his battery destroyed and damaged 17 tanks, without losing a single person from their fire. July 8 at 8:30 a group of German tanks and assault guns in the amount of up to 70 pieces. with submachine gunners on armored personnel carriers went to the outskirts of the village. Samodurovka and, with the support of dive bombers, carried out an attack in the direction of Teploe-Molotychi. Until 11:30 a.m., the artillerymen of the brigade, despite the heavy losses suffered from air raids (until July 11, 1943, German aircraft dominated the air), held their positions, but by 12:30 p.m., when the enemy launched a third attack from the Kashar region in the direction Warm, the first and seventh batteries of the brigade were almost completely destroyed, and the German panzergrenadiers managed to occupy Kashara, Kutyrki, Pogoreltsy and Samodurovka. Only on the northern outskirts of Teploe did the sixth battery hold out, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 238.1 the fourth battery and mortars fired, and on the outskirts of Kutyrka, the remnants of the armor-piercing unit, supported by two captured tanks, fired on the German infantrymen who had broken through. Colonel Rukosuev, who commanded this anti-tank area, brought his last reserve into battle - three light batteries of 45-mm cannons and a battalion of anti-tank rifles. The breakthrough was localized.

Panzergrenadiers and anti-tank self-propelled guns "Mapder III" in battle near the village. Kashara.

German six-barrel rocket launchers "Nebelwerfer" in the reflection of the Soviet counterattack.

Sergeant Kruglov's 45-mm gun crew knocked out 3 German tanks in battle. July 1943

Medium tanks MZ at the starting position. Orlovskoye for example. July-August 1943

On July 11, the Germans tried again to strike here with large forces of tanks and motorized infantry. However, now the advantage in the air was for Soviet aviation, and the strikes of Soviet dive bombers mixed up the battle formation of the tanks deployed to attack. In addition, the advancing troops met not only with the 3rd Fighter Brigade, which had been badly battered the day before, but also with the 1st Fighter-Anti-Tank Brigade and two anti-aircraft divisions deployed to this area (one of the divisions was armed with captured 88-mm Flak anti-aircraft guns eighteen). Within two days, the brigade repulsed 17 tank attacks, knocking out and destroying 6 heavy (including 2 Tigers) and 17 light and medium tanks. All in all, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bdefense between us. points Samodurovka, Kashara, Kutyrki. Warm, height 238.1, on a field measuring 2 x 3 km after the fighting, 74 wrecked and burned German tanks, self-propelled guns and other armored vehicles, including four Tigers and two Ferdinands, were found. On July 15, with the permission of the front commander K. Rokossovsky, this field was filmed by newsreels who came from Moscow, and it was after the war that they began to call it “the field near Prokhorovka” (there were no and could not be “Ferdinands” near Prokhorovka, which flicker on the screen “Prokhorovka " field).

The armored ammunition transporter SdKfz 252 follows at the head of the assault gun column.

"Tiger", shot down by the calculation of Sergeant Lunin. Orlovskoye for example. July 1943

Soviet scouts who captured a serviceable PzKpfw III Ausf N and brought it to the location of their troops. July 1943.

Defensive battles on the southern front

4 On July 1943, at 4 p.m., after air and artillery strikes on the outpost positions of the Voronezh Front, German troops with forces up to an infantry division, supported by up to 100 tanks, conducted reconnaissance in force from the Tomarovka area to the north. The battle between the outposts of the Voronezh Front and the reconnaissance units of the Army Group "South" lasted until late at night. Under the cover of battle, the German troops took up their starting position for the offensive. According to the testimony of German prisoners captured in this battle, as well as defectors who surrendered on July 3-4, it became known that the general offensive of the German troops on this sector of the front was scheduled for 2 hours 30 minutes on July 5.

To alleviate the position of the outposts and inflict losses on the German troops at their starting positions, at 22:30 on July 4, the artillery of the Voronezh Front conducted a 5-minute artillery attack on the identified positions of the German artillery. At 3 o'clock in the morning on July 5, the counter-preparation was carried out in full.

Defensive battles on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge were distinguished by great bitterness and heavy losses on our part. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the nature of the terrain was more conducive to the use of tanks than on the northern face. Secondly, the representative of the Stavka A. Vasilevsky, who was watching the preparation of the defense, forbade the commander of the Voronezh Front, N. Vatutin, to combine anti-tank strongholds into areas and give them to infantry regiments, believing that such a decision would complicate management. And, thirdly, German air supremacy lasted here almost two days longer than on the Central Front.

The German troops delivered the main blow in the defense zone of the 6th Guards Army, along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, simultaneously in two sectors. Up to 400 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in the first section, and up to 300 in the second.

The first attack on the positions of the 6th Guards. army in the direction of Cherkasy began at 6 o'clock on July 5 with a powerful raid by dive bombers. Under the cover of a raid, a motorized infantry regiment went on the attack with the support of 70 tanks. However, he was stopped in the minefields, having been additionally fired upon by heavy artillery. An hour and a half later, the attack was repeated. Now the forces of the attackers have been doubled. In the forefront were German sappers, trying to make passages in the minefields. But the fire of the infantry and artillery of the 67th Infantry Division and this attack was repelled. Under the influence of heavy artillery fire, German tanks were forced to break formation even before they came into fire contact with our troops, and the "impudent mining" carried out by Soviet sappers greatly hampered the maneuver of combat vehicles. In total, the Germans lost 25 medium tanks and assault guns here from mines and heavy artillery fire.

German tanks, supported by assault guns, attack the Soviet defenses. July 1943. The silhouette of a bomber is visible in the air.

To enlarge - click on the image

Tank destroyer "Mapder III" follows the exploded medium tank MZ "Lee".

A column of one of the motorized units of the German troops follows the front. Oboyanskoye, for example, July 1943

Unable to take Cherkasskoye with a frontal attack, the German troops struck in the direction of Butovo. At the same time, several hundred German aircraft attacked Cherkasskoye and Butovo. By noon on July 5, in this area, the Germans managed to wedge into the defense zone of the 6th Guards. army. To restore the breakthrough, the commander of the 6th Guards. army I. Chistyakov brought in an anti-tank reserve - the 496th IPTAP and the 27th IPTABr. At the same time, the front command gave an order to the 6th. advance to the Berezovka area in order to liquidate the emerging dangerous breakthrough of German tanks with a flank attack.

Despite the emerging breakthrough of German tanks, by the end of the day on July 5, the artillerymen managed to restore a precarious balance, however, at the cost of heavy losses of personnel (up to 70%). The reason for this lay in the fact that the infantry units in a number of defense sectors retreated randomly, leaving artillery on direct fire without cover. During the day of continuous fighting in the Cherkasskoe-Korovino area, the enemy lost 13 tanks from IPTAP fire, including 3 heavy Tiger tanks. Our losses in a number of units totaled up to 50% of the personnel and up to 30% of the materiel.

On the night of July 6, a decision was made to strengthen the defensive lines of the 6th Guards. army with two tank corps of the 1st tank army. By the morning of July 6, the 1st Tank Army, with the forces of the 3rd Mechanized and 6th Tank Corps, took up defensive positions at the line intended for it, covering the Oboyan direction. In addition, the 6th Guards. The army was additionally strengthened by the 2nd and 5th Guards. shopping mall, which went to cover the flanks.

The main direction of German attacks the next day was Oboyanskoye. On the morning of July 6, a large column of tanks moved along the road from the Cherkasskoye area. The guns of the 1837th IPTAP, hidden on the flank, opened a sudden fire from a short distance. At the same time, 12 tanks were hit, among which only one Panther remained on the battlefield. It is interesting to note that in these battles, Soviet artillerymen used the tactics of the so-called "flirtatious guns", allocated as bait to lure enemy tanks. "Flirting guns" opened fire on the columns from a long distance, forcing the advancing tanks to deploy in minefields and expose their sides to the batteries standing in ambush.

As a result of the fighting on July 6, the Germans managed to capture Alekseevka, Lukhanino, Olkhovka and Trirechnoye and reach the second defensive line. However, on the Belgorod - Oboyan highway, their advance was stopped.

Attacks of German tanks in the direction of Bol. Beacons also ended in nothing. Having met dense fire from Soviet artillery here, the German tanks turned to the northeast, where, after a long battle with units of the 5th Guards since. they managed to capture Luchki. The 14th IPTABr, advanced from the reserve of the front and deployed at the line of Yakovlevo, Dubrava, played an important role in repelling the German strike, knocking out up to 50 German combat vehicles (the data was confirmed by the report of the trophy team).

The artillerymen of the SS unit support the attack of their infantry with fire. Prokhorovskoe eg.

Soviet T-70 tanks of the "Revolutionary Mongolia" column (112 brigade) move forward to attack.

Tanks PzKpfw IV Ausf H of the Grossdeutchland (Grossdeutschland) division are fighting.

Field Marshal Manstein's headquarters radio operators at work. July 1943

German Panther tanks of the 10th tank brigade, PzKpfw IV Ausf G of the Grossdeutchland division and StuG 40 assault guns in the Oboyan direction. July 9-10, 1943

On July 7, the enemy brought up to 350 tanks into battle and continued attacks in the Oboyan direction from the Bol region. Lighthouses, Red Dubrava. All units of the 1st Tank Army and the 6th Guards entered the battle. army. By the end of the day, the Germans managed to advance in the Bol area. Beacons for 10-12 km. inflicting heavy losses on the 1st Panzer Army. The next day, in this sector, the Germans brought into battle about 400 tanks and self-propelled guns. However, the night before, the command of the 6th Guards. The army transferred the 27th IPTABr to the threatened direction, the task of which was to cover the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. By morning, when the enemy broke through the defenses of the infantry and tank units 6th Guards army and the 1st Panzer Army and, it seemed, went out on an open highway, two “flirting” guns of the regiment opened fire on the column from a distance of 1500-2000 m. The column rebuilt, pushing heavy tanks forward. Up to 40 German bombers appeared over the battlefield. Half an hour later, the fire of the “flirting guns” was suppressed, and when the tanks began to reorganize for further movement, the regiment opened fire on them from three directions from an extremely short distance. Since most of the regiment's guns were on the flank of the column, their fire was very effective. Within 8 minutes, 29 enemy tanks and 7 self-propelled guns were knocked out on the battlefield. The blow was so unexpected that the remaining tanks, not accepting the battle, quickly went towards the forest. Of the damaged tanks, the repairmen of the 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army were able to repair and put into operation 9 combat vehicles.

On July 9, the enemy continued to attack in the Oboyan direction. Tank and motorized infantry attacks were supported by aircraft. The strike groups managed to advance up to 6 km here, but then they ran into well-equipped anti-aircraft artillery positions adapted for anti-tank guns and tanks dug into the ground.

In the following days, the enemy stopped ramming our defenses with a direct blow and began to look for weak spots in it. Such a direction, according to the German command, was Prokhorovskoye, from where it was possible to go to Kursk by a roundabout way. To this end, in the Prokhorovka area, the Germans concentrated a grouping, which included the 3rd since, numbering up to 300 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The infantrymen of the division "Das Reich" help to pull out the stuck "Tiger".

Tankers of the 5th Guards. tank army prepare the tank for battle.

StuG 40 Ausf G assault gun shot down by Captain Vinogradov.

AT On the evening of July 10, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from the Headquarters to conduct a counterattack on large group German troops, accumulated in the Mal. Beacons, Ozerovsky. To conduct a counterattack, the front was reinforced by two armies, the 5th Guards, under the command of A. Zhadov, and the 5th Guards Tank, under the command of P. Rotmistrov, transferred from the Steppe Front. However, the preparation of a counterattack, which began on July 11, was thwarted by the Germans, who themselves delivered two powerful blows to our defense in this sector. One - in the direction of Oboyan, and the second - to Prokhorovka. As a result of sudden strikes, some formations of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies retreated 1-2 km in the direction of Oboyan. A much more serious situation has developed in the Prokhorovsky direction. Due to the sudden withdrawal of some infantry units of the 5th Guards Army and the 2nd Tank Corps, the artillery preparation for a counterattack, which had begun as early as 10 July, was thwarted. Many batteries were left without infantry cover and suffered losses both in deployment positions and on the move. The front was in a very difficult position. German motorized infantry entered the village. Prokhorovka and proceeded to force the Psel River. Only the rapid entry into battle of the 42nd Infantry Division, as well as the transfer of all available artillery to direct fire, made it possible to stop the advance of German tanks.

The next laziness, the 5th Guards. the tank army, reinforced by attached units, was ready to launch an offensive against Luchki and Yakovlevo. P. Rotmistrov chose the line of army deployment to the west and southwest of st. Prokhorovka at the front 15 km. At this time, the German troops, trying to develop their offensive in a northerly direction, struck in the defense zone of the 69th Army. But this attack was more of a distraction. By 5 o'clock in the morning, units of the 81st and 92nd Guards. rifle divisions of the 69th Army were driven back from the defensive line and the Germans managed to capture the villages of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, Vypolzovka. There was a threat to the left flank of the unfolding 5th Guards. tank army, and, by order of the representative of the Stavka A. Vasilevsky, the front commander N. Vatutin gave the order to send the mobile reserve of the 5th Guards. tank army in the defense zone of the 69th army. The reserve group under the command of General Trufanov at 8 o'clock in the morning launched a counteroffensive against the German troops that had broken through.

At 8:30 a.m., the main forces of the German troops, as part of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkopf tank divisions, which included up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 42 Tiger tanks), went on the offensive in the direction Art. Prokhorovka in the strip of highway and railway. This grouping was supported by all available air forces.

Tanks of the 6th Panzer Division on the way to Prokhorovka.

Flamethrowers before the attack.

Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns SdKfz 6/2 firing at Soviet infantry. July 1943

After a 15-minute artillery preparation, the German group was attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards. tank army. Despite the suddenness of the strike, the masses of Soviet tanks in the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm were met by concentrated fire from anti-tank artillery and assault guns. The 18th tank corps of General Bakharov broke through to the Oktyabrsky state farm at high speed, and, despite heavy losses, captured it. However, the village Andreevka and Vasilievka, he met an enemy tank grouping, and which had 15 Tiger tanks. Trying to break through the German tanks blocking the path, fighting a head-on battle with them, units of the 18th Panzer Corps were able to capture Vasilievka, but as a result of the losses they suffered, they could not develop the offensive and at 18 o'clock went on the defensive.

The 29th Panzer Corps fought for Hill 252.5, where it was met by tanks of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler". Throughout the day, the corps fought a maneuverable battle, but after 16 hours it was pushed back by the approaching tanks of the SS Tottenkopf division and, after dark, went on the defensive.

The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, at 14:30 suddenly collided with the SS Panzer Division Das Reich moving towards it. Due to the fact that the 29th Panzer Corps was stuck in battles at a height of 252.5, the Germans inflicted on the 2nd Guards. the tank corps hit the exposed flank and forced it to withdraw to its original position.

Assault guns withdraw after the battle. Division unknown.

Command tank PzKpfw III Ausf To the SS division "Das Reich" follows the burning medium tanks "General Lee". Presumably, Prokhorovskoye, for example. July 12-13, 1943

Scouts of the 5th Guards. tank army on Ba-64 armored vehicles. Belgorod eg.

2nd Panzer Corps, which provided a junction between the 2nd Guards. tank corps and the 29th tank corps, was able to somewhat push the German units in front of him, but came under fire from assault and anti-tank guns pulled up from the second line, suffered losses and stopped.

By noon on July 12, it became clear to the German command that the frontal attack on Prokhorovka had failed. Then it decided, by forcing the river. Psel, part of the forces to go north of Prokhorovka to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which the 11th Tank Division and the remaining units of the SS Totenkopf Panzer Division (96 tanks, a motorized infantry regiment, up to 200 motorcyclists, supported by two divisions of assault guns) were allocated ). The grouping broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards. rifle division and by 13 o'clock had mastered the height of 226.6.

But on the northern slopes of the height, the Germans stumbled upon stubborn resistance from the 95th Guards. rifle division of Colonel Lyakhov. The division was hastily reinforced with an anti-tank artillery reserve consisting of one IPTAP and two separate divisions of captured guns. Until 18:00, the division successfully defended itself against the advancing tanks. But at 20:00, after a powerful air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and heavy losses of personnel, the division, under the blows of approaching German motorized rifle units, withdrew beyond the village of Polezhaev. Artillery reserves were already deployed here, and the German offensive was stopped.

The 5th Guards Army also failed to fulfill the assigned tasks. Faced with massive fire from German artillery and tanks, the infantry units moved forward a distance of 1-3 km, after which they went on the defensive. In the offensive zones of the 1st Panzer Army, 6th Guards. Army, 69th Army and 7th Guards. Army decisive success also did not happen.

Soviet self-propelled howitzer SU-122 in the area of ​​the Prokhorovsky bridgehead. July 14, 1943.

Repairmen evacuate a downed T-34 under enemy fire. The evacuation is carried out strictly according to the instructions, so that the frontal armor remains facing the enemy.

"Thirty-four" of the plant number 112 "Krasnoye Sormovo", somewhere near Oboyan. Most likely - 1st Panzer Army, July 1943.

Thus, the so-called tank battle near Prokhorovka" did not at all take place on some separate field, as they said before. The operation was carried out on a front with a length of 32-35 km and was a series of separate battles with the use of tanks by both sides. In total, according to the estimates of the command of the Voronezh Front, 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides participated in them. 5th Guards the tank army, which operated in a strip 17-19 km long, together with attached units, by the beginning of the battles, consisted of 680 to 720 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the advancing German group - up to 540 tanks and self-propelled guns. In addition, from the south in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka was attacked by the Kempf group, consisting of the 6th and 19th tank divisions, which had about 180 tanks, which were opposed by 100 Soviet tanks. Only in the battles on July 12, the Germans lost west and southwest of Prokhorovka, according to reports from the front command, about 320 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources - from 190 to 218), the Kempf group - 80 tanks, and the 5th Guards. tank army (excluding the losses of General Trufanov's group) - 328 tanks and self-propelled guns (total losses of materiel of the 5th Guards Tank Army with attached units reached 60%). Despite the large concentration of tanks on both sides, the main losses to tank units were by no means inflicted by enemy tanks, but by enemy anti-tank and assault artillery.

T-34 tanks knocked out during the Soviet counter-offensive near Prokhorovka.

"Panther", lined with a gun ml. Sergeant Egorov at the Prokhorovsky bridgehead.

The counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front did not end with the destruction of the wedged German grouping and therefore, immediately after completion, it was considered a failure, but since it made it possible to disrupt the German offensive bypassing the cities of Oboyan and Kursk, its results were later recognized as a success. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the number of German tanks participating in the battle and their losses, given in the report of the command of the Voronezh Front (commander N. Vatutin, member of the military sonnet - N. Khrushchev), are very different from the reports of unit commanders. From this we can conclude that the scale of the "Prokhorov battle" could be greatly inflated by the front command in order to justify the heavy losses of personnel and materiel during the failed offensive.

German T-34 of the Das Reich division, shot down by Sergeant Kurnosov's gun crew. Prokhorovskoe eg. July 14-15, 1943

The best armor-piercers of the 6th Guards. armies that knocked out 7 enemy tanks.

Fighting east of Belgorod

H The battles against the German army group "Kempf" in the defense zone of the 7th Guards Army were less fierce. This direction was not considered the main one, and therefore the organization and density of anti-tank guns per 1 km of the front were lower than on the Belgorod-Kursk one. It was believed that the Northern Donets River and the railway embankment would play a role in the defense of the army line.

On July 5, the Germans deployed three infantry and three tank divisions in the Grafovka, Belgorod sector and, under air cover, began to cross the North. Donets. In the afternoon, their tank units went on the offensive in the Razumnoye, Krutoy Log sector in the eastern and northeastern directions. The anti-tank stronghold located in the Krutoy Log area repulsed two large tank attacks by the end of the day, knocking out 26 tanks (of which 7 were previously blown up by mines and land mines). On July 6, the Germans again advanced in a northeasterly direction. To reinforce the 7th Guards Army, the front command reassigned four rifle divisions to it. The 31st IPTABr and the 114th Guards IPTAP were transferred to her from the army reserve. To cover the junction between the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, the 131st and 132nd separate battalions of anti-tank rifles were involved.

The most difficult situation developed in the Yastrebovo area, where the enemy concentrated up to 70 tanks and struck along the riverbed. Reasonable. The 1849th IPTAP, which approached here, did not have time to turn around before the approach of the German troops, and then the commander of the folder put forward a second battery for a sudden flank attack on moving tanks. Hiding behind the buildings, the battery approached the tank column at a distance of 200-500 m and, with a sudden flank fire, set fire to six and knocked out two tanks. Further, for an hour and a half, the battery repelled tank attacks, maneuvering between buildings, and withdrew only by order of the regiment commander, when the regiment was preparing for battle. Until the end of the day, the regiment repulsed four large tank attacks, knocking out 32 tanks and self-propelled guns. The loss of the regiment amounted to 20% of the personnel.

German motorized unit on the offensive in the Belgorod region.

To strengthen the defense, the brigade commander also sent the 1853rd IPTAP to Yastrebovo, which was located in the second echelon behind the 1849th.

On July 7, the Germans brought their artillery here, and after a powerful air raid and artillery preparation (from 9:00 to 12:00), their tanks went on the attack under the cover of a barrage. Now their attack was carried out in two directions - along the river. Reasonable (a group of more than 100 tanks, self-propelled guns and other armored combat vehicles) and a frontal attack from a height of 207.9 in the direction of Myasoedovo (up to 100 tanks). The infantry cover left Yastrebovo, and the artillery regiments were put in a difficult position, as the infiltrated enemy infantry began to bombard the positions of the batteries from the flank and rear. Since the flanks were exposed, the enemy managed to cover two batteries (3rd and 4th), and they had to retreat back by guns, defending themselves both from tanks and then from infantry. Nevertheless, the breakthrough on the left flank was localized by the 1853rd IPTAP, which was stationed in the second echelon. Soon units of the 94th Guards approached. page divisions, and the situation, rocked, was saved. But in the evening, the infantry, which did not have time to gain a foothold, hit the floor with a powerful air strike and, after processing by artillery, left Yastrebovo and Sevryukovo. The 1849th and 1853rd IPTAPs, which suffered heavy materiel losses in the morning, could not hold back the German tanks and infantry that rushed after our fleeing infantry, and retreated in battle, taking with them all the damaged guns.

Anti-tank self-propelled guns "Marder-lll" follow the streets of Kharkov.

German anti-aircraft gunners cover the crossing across the Donets. July 1943

From July 8 to 10, the fighting in this area was local in nature, and it seemed that the Germans were exhausted. But on the night of July 11, they launched a surprise attack from the Melehovo region to the north and northwest in order to break through to Prokhorovka. The infantry units of the 9th Guards and 305th Rifle Divisions, which were defending in this direction, did not expect such a powerful blow, withdrew. To cover the exposed section of the front, on the night of July 11-12, the 10th IPTABr was transferred from the Stavka reserve. In addition, the 1510th IPTAP and a separate PTR battalion were involved in this area. These forces, together with the infantry units of the 35th Guards. page of the corps, did not allow the development of an offensive in the direction of art. Prokhorovka. In this area, the Germans managed to break through only to the Sev River. Donets.

The last major offensive operation was carried out by German troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge on July 14-15, when they tried to encircle and destroy our units defending in the Teterevino, Druzhny, Shchelokovo triangle with counter attacks on Shakhovo from the Ozerovsky and Shchelokovo regions.

"Tiger" on the street of Belgorod. July 1943

"Tigers" in the battle for vil. Maksimovka. Belgorod eg.

Soviet scouts in an ambush at the padded self-propelled guns "Marder III".

On the morning of July 14, the German troops, who went on the offensive, managed to surround some units of the 2nd Guards. because and the 69th Army, but the troops not only held on to most of the previously occupied positions, but even constantly counterattacked (2nd Guards since). It was not possible to destroy the encircled grouping until July 15, and by dawn it reached the location of its troops with minimal losses.

The defensive battle lasted two weeks (from July 5 to July 18) and achieved its goal: to stop and bleed the German troops and save their own forces for the offensive.

According to reports and reports on the operation of artillery on the Kursk Bulge, during the period of defensive battles, 1861 enemy combat vehicles (including tanks, self-propelled guns, assault guns, heavy cannon BAs and cannon armored personnel carriers) were hit and destroyed by all types of ground artillery.

Repairmen are restoring a wrecked tank. Field repair team of Lieutenant Schukin. July 1943

Offensive operation in the Oryol direction

O The peculiarity of the offensive near Kursk was that it was carried out on a broad front by large forces of three fronts (Central, Voronezh and Steppe), with the participation of the left wing of the Western and Bryansk fronts.

Geographically, the offensive of the Soviet troops was divided into the Oryol offensive operation (the left wing of the Western, as well as the Central and Bryansk fronts) and the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (the Voronezh and Steppe fronts). The Oryol offensive operation began on July 12, 1943 with a strike from the Western and Bryansk fronts, which were joined on July 15 by the Central. The main defensive zone of the Army Group "Center" on the Oryol ledge had a depth of about 5-7 km. It consisted of strongholds interconnected by a network of trenches and communications. Wire fences in 1-2 rows of wooden stakes were installed in front of the front edge, reinforced in critical directions with wire fences on metal racks or Bruno spirals. There were also anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. On the main directions, a large number of machine-gun armored caps were installed, from which it was possible to conduct a dense crossfire. All settlements were adapted for all-round defense, anti-tank obstacles were set up along the banks of the rivers. However, many engineering structures were not completed, since the Germans did not believe in the possibility of a wide offensive by Soviet troops on this sector of the front.

Soviet infantrymen are mastering the English armored personnel carrier "Universal". Orlovskoye for example. August 1943

To carry out the offensive operation, the General Staff prepared the following strike groups:
- at the northwestern tip of the Orlov ledge, at the confluence of the Zhizdra and Resset rivers (50th Army and 11th Guards Army);
- in the northern part of the ledge, near the city of Volkhov (61st Army and 4th Tank Army);
- in the eastern part of the ledge, east of Orel (3rd Army, 63rd Army and 3rd Guards Tank Army);
- in the southern part, in the area of ​​​​st. Ponyri (13th, 48th, 70th armies and 2nd tank army).

The forces of the advancing fronts were opposed by the German 2nd Panzer Army, 55th, 53rd and 35th Army Corps. According to domestic intelligence, they had (including army reserves) up to 560 tanks and self-propelled guns. In the divisions of the first echelon, there were 230-240 tanks and self-propelled guns. The grouping operating against the Central Front included three tank divisions: the 18th, 9th and 2nd. located in the offensive zone of our 13th Army. There were no German tank units in the offensive zone of the 48th and 70th armies. On the side of the attackers there was an absolute superiority in manpower, artillery, tanks and aircraft. In the main directions, the superiority in infantry was up to 6 times, in artillery up to 5 ... 6 times, in tanks - up to 2.5 ... 3 times. German tank and anti-tank units had been significantly weakened in previous battles and therefore did not put up much resistance. The rapid transition of the Soviet troops from defense to a large-scale offensive did not give the German troops the opportunity to reorganize and complete the repair and restoration work. According to the reports of the advancing units of the 13th Army, all the captured German field repair shops were filled with damaged military equipment.

T-34s equipped with PT-3 minesweepers are moving towards the front. July-August 1943

German anti-tank gun PaK 40 firing at attacking Soviet tanks. Scissors for cutting barbed wire are fixed on the shield of the gun. August 1943

Tank destroyer and assault gun unit on vacation.

Soviet tank 22nd battalion. enters the burning village. Voronezh front.

German tank PzKpfw IV Ausf H, shot down by a Glagolev gun. Orlovskoe example, August 1943

On the morning of July 12, at 05:10, immediately after the rain, the Soviet command undertook aviation and artillery preparation, and at 05:40 the assault on the Oryol ledge from the north and northeast began. By 10:00 the main defensive line of the German troops was broken through in three places, and units of the 4th Panzer Army went into the breakthrough. However, by 16:00, the German command was able to regroup forces and, having withdrawn a number of units from under the station. Ponyri, stop development Soviet offensive. By the evening of the first day of the offensive in the northwest, Soviet troops were able to advance 10-12 km, in the north - up to 7.5 km. In the eastern direction, progress was insignificant.

The next day, the northwestern group was sent to destroy large strongholds in the villages of Staritsa and Ulyanovo. Using a smoke screen and demonstrating an attack with. Staritsa from the north, the advancing units secretly bypassed the settlements and launched a tank attack from the southeast and west. Despite good provision settlements, the enemy garrison was completely destroyed. In this battle, the units of the engineering assault search proved to be the best, which skillfully “smoked out” the German firing points in the houses with flamethrowers. At this time in Ulyanovo, the advancing troops with false attacks pulled the entire German garrison to the western outskirts, which made it possible to break into the village on tanks almost unhindered from the side of the village. Staritsa. During the liberation of this important stronghold, the losses on the part of the attackers were small (only ten people were killed).

With the elimination of these centers of resistance, our troops opened the way to the south and southeast. The troops advancing in these directions created a threat to the communications of the Germans between Orel and Bryansk. For two days of fighting, but according to the testimony of prisoners, the German 211th and 293rd infantry divisions were practically destroyed, and the 5th Panzer Division, which suffered heavy losses, was withdrawn to the rear. The defense of the German troops was broken through on a front of 23 km and to a depth of 25 km. However, the German command competently operated with the available reserves, and by July 14, the offensive in this sector was suspended. The fighting took on a positional character.

The troops of the 3rd Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Army, advancing on Orel from the east, successfully crossed several water barriers and, bypassing pockets of resistance, tried to break through to Orel on the move. By the time of entering the battle on July 18. 3 Guards the tank army had T-34 tanks - 475, T-70 tanks - 224, guns and mortars - 492. They created a serious danger for the German troops to cut their grouping in half, and therefore anti-tank reserves were introduced against them on the evening of July 19.

Fighters and commanders of engineering and sapper assault brigade who distinguished themselves in the battles for the Eagle.

The pontoon park N-2-P is moving towards the front. Orlovskoye for example.

"Forward, to the Eagle!" Heavy 203-mm B-4 howitzers on the march.

However, since the front was broken through in a wide area, the actions of the German command resembled patching holes in Trishkin's caftan, and were ineffective.

On July 22, the forward units of the 61st Army broke into the Volkhov, improving the position of the troops of the Bryansk Front. At the same time, the troops of the 11th Guards. armies cut the Bolkhov-Orel highway, creating a threat of encirclement to the German Bolkhov group.

At this time, the 63rd Army and units of the 3rd Guards. tank army fought heavy battles with the 3rd tank division of the Germans, transferred from Novo-Sokolniki, and units of the 2nd tank and 36th mechanized divisions, transferred from Ponyri. Particularly heavy fighting unfolded in the interfluve of Zush, Oleshnya, where the Germans had a well-prepared defensive line, which they tried to occupy with suitable forces. The troops of the 3rd Army on the move seized a bridgehead on the banks of the river. Oleshnya in the Alexandrov area, where the transfer of tanks of the 3rd Guards began. tank army. But south of Aleksandrovka, the offensive was unsuccessful. It was especially difficult to deal with German tanks and assault guns buried in the ground. Nevertheless, by July 19, our troops reached the river. Oleshnya along its entire length. On the night of July 19, along the German line of defense on the river. Oleshnya was dealt a powerful air raid, and in the morning artillery preparation began. At noon, Oleshnya was forced in several places, which created a threat of encirclement of the entire Mnensky group of Germans, and on July 20 they left the city almost without a fight.

On July 15, units of the Central Front also went on the offensive, taking advantage of the withdrawal of part of the German forces from Ponyri. But until July 18, the successes of the Central Front were rather modest. Only on the morning of July 19, the Central Front broke through the German defense line 3-4 km in the direction to the north-west, bypassing Orel. At 11 o'clock, tanks of the 2nd Panzer Army were introduced into the gap.

The crew of the SU-122 receives a combat mission. North of Orel, August 1943

SU-152 of Major Sankovsky, which destroyed 10 German tanks in the first battle. 13th Army, August 1943

It is interesting to note that the artillery pieces handed over to the tank troops for reinforcement were towed by some of the advancing tanks of the 16th Tank Corps. (for which the tanks were equipped with towing hooks), and their calculations were tank landings. The unity of the ammunition of tank and anti-tank guns helped to cope with the problem of the ammunition supply of the guns, and most of the ammunition was brought up by standard tractors (Studebaker, GMC, ZiS-5 cars and the STZ-Nati tractor) and was used by both gunners and and tankers. Such an organization helped to effectively use artillery and tanks in overcoming the enemy's fortified points. But they had little to shoot at tanks. The main targets of Soviet tanks and anti-tank artillery were machine-gun armored caps, anti-tank guns and German self-propelled guns. However, the 3rd TC. the same 2nd Panzer Army used the attached anti-tank and light artillery illiterately. The regiments of the Central Brigade were attached to tank brigades, which split them into bag-yards, transferring them to tank battalions. This destroyed the leadership of the brigade, leading to some that the batteries were left to their own devices. Tank battalion commanders demanded that the batteries accompany the tanks under their own power in their combat formations, which led to unreasonably large losses of equipment and personnel of the 2nd IPTABr (trucks in the combat formations of tanks were easy prey for all types of weapons). Yes, and the 3rd shopping mall. suffered heavy losses in the Trosna area, trying to attack the fortified positions of the German grenadiers, reinforced with anti-tank self-propelled guns and assault guns, without reconnaissance and artillery support. The offensive of the Central Front developed slowly. To speed up the advance of the front units and in view of the heavy losses in tanks, on July 24-26, the Stavka transferred the 3rd Guards. tank army from the Bryansk Front to the Central. However, by this time the 3rd Guards. the tank army also suffered heavy losses and therefore could not seriously affect the speed of the front advance. On July 22-24, the most difficult situation was created for the German troops defending near Orel. To the west of the Volkhov, Soviet troops created the greatest threat to the main communications of the German troops. On July 26, a special meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters on the situation of German troops at the Orlovsky bridgehead. As a result of the meeting, it was decided to withdraw all German troops from the Oryol bridgehead to the Hagen line. However, the retreat had to be delayed whenever possible due to the unavailability of the defense line in engineering terms. However, from July 31, the Germans began a systematic withdrawal of their troops from the Oryol bridgehead.

To enlarge - click on the image

In the first days of August, battles began for the suburbs of the city of Orel. On August 4, the 3rd and 63rd armies fought in the eastern suburbs of the city. From the south, Orel was surrounded by mobile formations of the Central Front, which put the defending German troops in a difficult position and forced an urgent withdrawal. By August 5, the fighting in the city had moved to the western outskirts, and on August 6 the city was completely liberated.

At the final stage of the struggle for the Orlovsky bridgehead, the battles unfolded for the city of Karachev, covering the approaches to Bryansk. The battles for Karachev began on August 12. An important role in the course of the offensive was played by the engineering units, which restored and cleared the roads destroyed by the German troops during the retreat. By the end of August 14, our troops had broken through the German defenses east and northeast of Karachev, and the next day captured the city. With the release of Karachev, the liquidation of the Oryol group was practically completed. By August 17-18, the advancing Soviet troops reached the Hagen line.

With it is read that the offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. As early as July 16, German troops stationed in the area of ​​the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, fearing flank attacks by the Soviet troops, began to retreat to their original positions under the cover of powerful rearguards. But the Soviet troops could not immediately begin the pursuit of the enemy. Only on July 17, parts of the 5th Guards. army and 5th Guards. tank armies were able to shoot down the rearguards and advance 5-6 km. On July 18-19 they were joined by the 6th Guards. army and 1st Panzer Army. The tank units advanced 2-3 km, but the infantry did not follow the tanks. In general, the advance of our troops these days was insignificant. On July 18, all available forces of the Steppe Front under the command of General Konev were to be brought into battle. However, until the end of July 19, the front was engaged in a regrouping of forces. Only on July 20, the troops of the front, consisting of five combined arms armies, managed to advance 5-7 km.

On July 22, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts launched a general offensive and by the end of the next day, having broken through the German barriers, they basically reached the positions that our troops occupied before the start of the German offensive on July 5. However, the further advance of the troops was stopped by German reserves.

The headquarters demanded that the offensive be continued immediately, but its success required a regrouping of forces and replenishment of personnel and materiel. After listening to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters postponed the further offensive by 8 days. In total, by the beginning of the second phase of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts had 50 rifle divisions. 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps and, in addition, 33 tank brigades, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments. Despite the regrouping and replenishment carried out, the tank and artillery units were not fully staffed. The situation was somewhat better near the Voronezh Front, in the zone of which more powerful counterattacks by the German troops were expected. So, the 1st Panzer Army by the beginning of the counteroffensive had T-34 tanks - 412, T-70 - 108, T-60 - 29 (549 in total). 5th Guards the tank army at the same time consisted of 445 tanks of all types and 64 armored vehicles.

Artillerymen of the fighter brigade (combined arms type) pursue the retreating enemy.

The offensive began at dawn on August 3 with a powerful artillery preparation. At 8 am, infantry and breakthrough tanks went on the offensive. The German artillery fire was erratic. Our aviation reigned supreme in the air. By 10 o'clock the advanced units of the 1st Panzer Army had crossed the Vorksla River. In the first half of the day, the infantry units advanced 5-6 km, and the front commander, General Vatutin, brought the main forces of the 1st and 5th Guards into battle. tank armies. By the end of the day, units of the 1st Panzer Army advanced 12 km into the depths of the German defense and approached Tomarovka. Here they met a powerful anti-tank defense and were temporarily stopped. Connections of the 5th Guards. The tank army advanced much further - up to 26 km and reached the Dobraya Volya area.

In a more difficult situation, parts of the Steppe Front advanced north of Belgorod. Lacking such means of reinforcement as Voronezh, its offensive developed more slowly, and by the end of the day, even after the tanks of the 1st mechanized corps were brought into battle, units of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 km.

On August 4 and 5, the main efforts of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were aimed at eliminating the Tomarovsky and Belgorod corners of resistance. On the morning of August 5, units of the 6th Guards. armies began fighting for Tomarovka and by evening cleared it of German troops. The enemy actively counterattacked in groups of 20-40 tanks with the support of assault guns and motorized infantry, but to no avail. By the morning of August 6, the Tomarovsk resistance center was cleared of German troops. The mobile group of the Voronezh Front at that time advanced 30-50 km deep into the enemy defenses, creating a threat of encirclement for the defending troops.

On August 5, the troops of the Voronezh Front started fighting for Belgorod. Troops of the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Having crossed the Northern Donets, the troops of the 7th Guards came to the eastern outskirts. army, and from the west Belgorod was bypassed by mobile units of the 1st mechanized corps. By 18 o'clock the city was completely cleared of German troops, a large amount of abandoned German equipment and ammunition was captured.

The liberation of Belgorod and the destruction of the Tomarovsky center of resistance allowed the advancing mobile groups of the Voronezh Front as part of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies to enter the operational space. By the end of the third day of the offensive, it became clear that the pace of the offensive of the Soviet troops on the southern front was much higher than the floor of Orlom. But for the successful offensive of the Steppe Front, he did not have enough tanks. By the end of the day, at the request of the command of the Steppe Front and a representative of the Headquarters, 35 thousand people, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KV-lc tanks were allocated to the front for replenishment. In addition, the front was reinforced by two engineering brigades and four regiments of self-propelled artillery.

Grenadier after the battle. August 1943

On the night of August 7, Soviet troops attacked the German resistance center in Borisovka and took it by noon the next day. In the evening our troops took Grayvoron. Here intelligence reported that a large column of German troops was moving towards the city. The artillery commander of the 27th Army ordered that all available artillery weapons be brought forward to destroy the column. More than 30 large-caliber guns and a battalion of rocket-propelled mortars suddenly opened fire on the column, while new guns were hastily installed in positions and included in the firing. The blow was so unexpected that many German cars were left perfectly serviceable. In total, more than 60 guns of caliber from 76 to 152 mm and about 20 rocket launchers took part in the shelling. More than five hundred corpses, as well as up to 50 tanks and assault guns, were left by German troops. According to the testimony of the prisoners, these were the remnants of the 255th, 332nd, 57th infantry and part of the 19th tank division. During the fighting on August 7, the Borisov grouping of German troops ceased to exist.

On August 8, the right-flank 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to the Steppe Front, and on August 9 also the 5th Guards. tank army. The main direction of the Steppe Front's offensive was now bypassing the Kharkov grouping of German troops. At the same time, the 1st Panzer Army received an order to cut the main railway and highway roads leading from Kharkov to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozova.

By the end of August 10, the 1st Panzer Army managed to capture the Kharkov-Poltava railway, but further its advance to the south was stopped. Nevertheless, Soviet troops approached Kharkov at a distance of 8-11 km, threatening the communications of the Kharkov defensive grouping of German troops.

StuG 40 assault gun, knocked out by Golovnev's gun. Akhtyrka region.

Soviet self-propelled guns SU-122 in the attack on Kharkov. August 1943.

Anti-tank gun RaK 40 on a trailer near the RSO tractor, left after shelling near Bogodukhov.

Tanks T-34 with infantry landing in the attack on Kharkov.

In order to somehow improve the situation, on August 11, German troops launched a counterattack in the Bogodukhovsky direction on parts of the 1st Panzer Army with a hastily assembled group, which included the 3rd Panzer Division and parts of the SS Panzer Divisions Totenkopf, Das Reich and Viking. This blow significantly slowed down the pace of the offensive not only of the Voronezh, but also of the Steppe Front, since the latter had to take part of the units to form an operational reserve. By August 12, in the Valkovsky direction south of Bogodukhov, the Germans were constantly attacking with tank and motorized infantry units, but they could not achieve decisive success. How they failed to recapture the Kharkiv-Poltava railway. To reinforce the 1st Tank Army, which by August 12 had only 134 tanks (instead of 600), the battered 5th Guards was also transferred to the Bogodukhovskoye direction. tank army, which included 115 serviceable tanks. On August 13, during the fighting, the German squadron managed to penetrate somewhat into the junction between the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards. tank army. The anti-tank artillery of both armies ceased to exist, and the commander of the Voronezh Front, Gen. Vatutin decided to bring into battle the reserves of the 6th Guards. army and all reinforcement artillery, which deployed south of Bogodukhov.

On August 14, the intensity of German tank attacks subsided, while units of the 6th Guards. armies made significant progress, advancing 4-7 km. But the next day, the German troops, having regrouped their forces, broke through the defense line of the 6th Panzer Corps and went to the rear of the 6th Guards. army, which was forced to withdraw to the north and go on the defensive. The next day, the Germans tried to build on their success in the band of the 6th Guards. army, but all their efforts ended in nothing. During the Bogodukhov operation against enemy tanks, the Petlyakov dive bombers performed especially well, and at the same time, the insufficient effectiveness of the Ilyushin attack aircraft was noted (by the way, the same results were noted during defensive battles on the northern face).

The crew is trying to level the overturned tank PzKpfw III Ausf M. SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".

German troops retreat across the Donets River. August 1943

T-34 tanks knocked out in the Akhtyrka area.

Soviet troops are moving towards Kharkov.

The Steppe Front had the task of destroying the Kharkov defensive center and liberating Kharkov. Front commander I. Konev, having received intelligence about the defensive structures of German troops in the Kharkov region, decided to destroy, if possible, the German grouping on the outskirts of the city and prevent the withdrawal of German tank troops into the city limits. On August 11, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive bypass of the city and began its assault. But only the next day, after the introduction of all artillery reserves, it was possible to wedge a little into it. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the 5th Guards. the tank army was involved in repulsing the German snowcock in the Bogodukhov area. There were not enough tanks, but thanks to the actions of artillery, on August 13, the 53rd, 57th, 69th and 7th Guards. armies broke through the outer defensive contour and approached the suburbs.

Between August 13-17, Soviet troops started fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov. The fighting did not stop at night. The Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. So, in some regiments of the 7th Guards. Army on August 17, there were no more than 600 people. The 1st mechanized corps had only 44 tanks (less than the number of a tank brigade), more than half were light. But the defending side also suffered heavy losses. According to the reports of the prisoners, in some companies of the units of the Kempf group defending in Kharkov, there were 30 ... 40 people left.

German gunners fire from the IeFH 18 howitzer at the advancing Soviet troops. Kharkov direction, August 1943

Studebakers with ZIS-3 anti-tank guns on a trailer follow the advancing troops. Kharkov direction.

A Churchill heavy tank of the 49th Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment of the 5th Tank Army follows a wrecked eight-wheeled armored car SdKfz 232. On the side of the tank turret there is an inscription "For Radyanska Ukraine". Kharkov direction, July-August 1943.

Scheme of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation.

To enlarge - click on the image

On August 18, German troops made another attempt to stop the troops of the Voronezh Front, striking north of Akhtyrka on the flank of the 27th Army. The strike force involved the Grossdeutchland motorized division, deployed from near Bryansk. 10th Motorized Division, parts of the 11th and 19th Panzer Divisions and two independent heavy tank battalions. The grouping consisted of about 16 thousand soldiers, 400 tanks, about 260 guns. The grouping was opposed by units of the 27th Army, consisting of approx. 15 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks and up to 180 guns. To repel a counterattack, up to 100 tanks and 700 guns could be brought in from neighboring sectors. However, the command of the 27th Army was late in assessing the timing of the offensive of the Akhtyr group of German troops, and therefore the transfer of reinforcements began already during the German counteroffensive that had begun.

On the morning of August 18, the Germans carried out a strong artillery preparation and launched an offensive against the positions of the 166th division. Until 10 o'clock the division's artillery successfully repulsed the attacks of German tanks, but after 11 o'clock, when the Germans brought up to 200 tanks into battle, the division's artillery was put out of action, and the front was broken through. By 1300, the Germans had broken through to the headquarters of the division, and by the end of the day they had advanced in a narrow wedge to a depth of 24 km in a southeasterly direction. To localize the strike, the 4th Guards were introduced. tank corps and units of the 5th Guards. tank corps, which attacked the group that had broken through to the flank and rear.

The long-range 152-mm Br-2 gun is preparing to open fire on the retreating German troops.

German gunners reflect the attack of the Soviet troops.
Despite the fact that the strike of the Akhtyrskaya grouping was stopped, it greatly slowed down the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and complicated the operation to encircle the Kharkov grouping of German troops. It was only on August 21-25 that the Akhtyrskaya corps was destroyed and the city was liberated.

Soviet artillery enters Kharkov.

Tank T-34 on the outskirts of Kharkov.

"Panther", lined by the calculation of Guards. senior sergeant Parfenov on the outskirts of Kharkov.

At a time when the troops of the Voronezh Front were fighting in the Bogodukhov area, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached Kharkov. On August 18, the troops of the 53rd Army began fighting for a heavily fortified forest area on the northwestern outskirts of the city. The Germans turned it into a fortified area, stuffed with machine-gun emplacements and anti-tank guns. All attempts by the army to break through the massif into the city were repulsed. Only with the onset of darkness, having advanced all the artillery to open positions, did the Soviet troops succeed in knocking the defenders from their positions, and by the morning of August 19 they reached the Uda River and in some places began crossing.

Due to the fact that most of the retreat routes of the German grouping from Kharkov were cut off, and the threat of complete encirclement loomed over the group itself, in the afternoon of August 22, the Germans began to withdraw their units from the city limits. However, all attempts by the Soviet troops to break into the city ran into dense artillery and machine-gun fire from the units left in the rearguard. In order to prevent the German troops from withdrawing combat-ready units and serviceable equipment, the commander of the Steppe Front ordered a night assault. Huge masses of troops were concentrated in a small area adjacent to the city, and at 2 am on August 23 they began the assault.

"Tame" "Panther" on the street of the liberated Kharkov. August-September 1943

Total losses of tank armies during offensive operations

Note: The first digit - tanks and self-propelled guns of all brands, in brackets - T-34

Irretrievable losses amounted to T-34 tanks - up to 31%, for T-70 tanks - up to 43% of total losses The sign "~" marks very contradictory data obtained indirectly.

The units of the 69th Army were the first to break into the city, followed by units of the 7th Guards Army. The Germans retreated, hiding behind strong rearguards, reinforced tanks and assault guns. At 0430 hours, the 183rd division reached Dzerzhinsky Square, and by dawn the city was largely liberated. But only in the afternoon ended the fighting on its outskirts, where the streets were clogged with equipment and weapons abandoned during the retreat. In the evening of the same day, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov, but the fighting continued for another week to destroy the remnants of the Kharkov defensive group. On August 30, the inhabitants of Kharkov celebrated the complete liberation of the city. The Battle of Kursk is over.

CONCLUSION

To The battle of Ur was the first battle of the Second World War, in which masses of tanks took part on both sides. The attackers tried to use them according to the traditional scheme - to break through defensive lines in narrow areas and further develop the offensive. The defenders also relied on the experience of 1941-42. and initially used their tanks to carry out counterattacks designed to restore the difficult situation in certain sectors of the front.

However, this use of tank units was not justified, since both sides underestimated the increased power of the anti-tank defense of their opponents. For the German troops, the high density of Soviet artillery and the good engineering preparation of the defense line turned out to be unexpected. The Soviet command, on the other hand, did not expect the high maneuverability of the German anti-tank units, which quickly regrouped and met the counterattacking Soviet tanks with well-aimed ambush fire even in the conditions of their own offensive. As practice showed during the Battle of Kursk, the Germans achieved the best results using tanks in the manner of self-propelled guns, firing at the positions of the Soviet troops from a long distance, while infantry units stormed them. The defenders, on the other hand, achieved better results, also using tanks "in a self-propelled way", firing from tanks dug into the ground.

Despite the high concentration of tanks in the armies of both sides, anti-tank and self-propelled artillery still remained the main enemy of armored combat vehicles. The total role of aviation, infantry and tanks in the fight against them was small - less than 25% of the total number of those shot down and destroyed.

Nevertheless, it was the Battle of Kursk that became the event that prompted the development by both sides of new tactics for the use of tanks and self-propelled guns in the offensive and defense.

The Battle of Kursk in terms of its scale, military, as well as political significance, is rightfully considered one of the key battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. The battle on the Kursk Bulge finally established the power of the Red Army and completely broke the morale of the Wehrmacht forces. After it, the German army completely lost its offensive potential.

The Battle of Kursk, or as it is also called in Russian historiography - the Battle of the Kursk Bulge - is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5-August 23).

Historians call the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk the two most significant victories of the Red Army against the forces of the Wehrmacht, which completely turned the tide of hostilities.

In this article, we will learn the date of the Battle of Kursk and its role and significance during the war, as well as its causes, course and results.

The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk can hardly be overestimated. If it were not for the exploits of the Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans were able to seize the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, moving again to Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army defeated most of the combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and he lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, as they were already depleted.

In honor of the victory, August 23 forever became the Day of Russian Military Glory. In addition, the largest and bloodiest tank battle in history took place during the battles, as well as a huge amount of aircraft and other types of equipment.

The Battle of Kursk is also called the Battle of the Fiery Arc - all because of the crucial importance of this operation and the bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.

The Battle of Stalingrad, which took place earlier than the Battle of Kursk, completely destroyed the plans of the Germans regarding the rapid capture of the USSR. According to the Barbarossa plan and the blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell swoop even before winter. Now the Soviet Union gathered its strength and was able to seriously challenge the Wehrmacht.

During the Battle of Kursk on July 5-August 23, 1943, according to historians, at least 200 thousand soldiers died, more than half a million were wounded. At the same time, it is important to note that many historians consider these figures to be underestimated and the losses of the parties in the Battle of Kursk may be much more significant. Mostly foreign historians speak about the bias of these data.

Intelligence service

A huge role in the victory over Germany was played by Soviet intelligence, which was able to learn about the so-called Operation Citadel. Soviet intelligence officers began to receive messages about this operation as early as the beginning of 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was placed on the table of the Soviet leader, which contained complete information about the operation - the date of its implementation, the tactics and strategy of the German army. It was hard to imagine what would happen if intelligence did not do its job. Probably, the Germans would still have managed to break through the Russian defenses, since the preparations for Operation Citadel were serious - they were preparing for it no worse than for Operation Barbarossa.

At the moment, historians are unsure exactly who exactly delivered these essential knowledge. It is believed that this information was obtained by one of the British intelligence officers John Cancross, as well as a member of the so-called "Cambridge Five" (a group of British intelligence officers that was recruited by the USSR in the early 1930s and worked for two governments at once).

There is also an opinion that the intelligence officers of the Dora group, namely the Hungarian intelligence officer Sandor Rado, transmitted information about the plans of the German command.

Some historians believe that one of the most famous intelligence officers of the Second World War period, Rudolf Ressler, who at that time was in Switzerland, transferred all the information about Operation Citadel to Moscow.

Significant support for the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to hack the German Lorenz cipher machine, which transmitted messages between members of the top leadership of the Third Reich. The first step was to intercept plans for a summer offensive in the Kursk and Belgorod region, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.

Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future battlefield, he already knew how the strategic offensive of the German army would go. However, there is no confirmation of his words - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the offensive operation "Citadel" and was able to adequately prepare for it, so as not to leave the Germans a chance to win.

Preparing for battle

At the beginning of 1943, offensive actions were carried out by the German and Soviet armies, which led to the formation of a ledge in the center of the Soviet-German front, reaching a depth of 150 kilometers. This ledge was called the "Kursk Bulge". In April, it became clear to both sides that one of the key battles that could decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front would soon begin over this ledge.

There was no consensus in the German headquarters. For a long time, Hitler could not work out an exact strategy for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were opposed to the offensive at the moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it began right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army could prepare for it. The rest either believed that it was time to go on the defensive, or to launch an offensive in the summer.

Despite the fact that the most experienced commander of the Reich (Manshetein) was against it, Hitler nevertheless agreed to launch an offensive in early July 1943.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943 is the Union's chance to consolidate the initiative after the victory at Stalingrad, and therefore the preparation of the operation was treated with a previously unprecedented seriousness.

The state of affairs at the headquarters of the USSR was much better. Stalin was aware of the plans of the Germans, he had a numerical advantage in infantry, tanks, guns and aircraft. Knowing how and when the Germans would advance, the Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications to meet them and set up minefields to repel the attack, and then go on the counteroffensive. A huge role in the successful defense was played by the experience of Soviet military leaders, who, in two years of hostilities, were still able to work out the tactics and strategy of warfare of the best military leaders of the Reich. The fate of Operation Citadel was sealed before it even began.

Plans and forces of the parties

The German command planned to conduct a major offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge under the name (code name) "Citadel". In order to destroy the Soviet defense, the Germans decided to inflict descending strikes from the north (the region of the city of Orel) and from the south (the region of the city of Belgorod). Having broken the enemy defenses, the Germans were to unite in the area of ​​the city of Kursk, thus taking the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts into a complete encirclement. In addition, the German tank units were supposed to turn east - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the armored reserves of the Red Army so that they could not come to the aid of the main forces and help them get out of the encirclement. Such tactics were not at all new for German generals. Their tank flanking attacks worked for four. Using such tactics, they were able to conquer almost all of Europe and inflict many crushing defeats on the Red Army in 1941-1942.

To carry out Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated in Eastern Ukraine, on the territory of Belarus and Russia, 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people. Of these, 18 divisions were armored and motorized. Such a large number of panzer divisions was common for the Germans. The forces of the Wehrmacht have always used lightning-fast attacks of tank units in order not to give the enemy even a chance to group up and fight back. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in the capture of France, which surrendered before it could fight.

The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht were Field Marshal von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Manstein (Army Group South). The strike forces were commanded by Field Marshal Model, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were commanded by General Herman Goth.

The German army before the start of the battle received the long-awaited tank reserves. Hitler sent more than 100 heavy Tiger tanks, almost 200 Panther tanks (first used at the Battle of Kursk) and less than a hundred Ferdinand or Elefant (Elephant) tank destroyers to the Eastern Front.

"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" - were one of the the most powerful tanks for the period of World War II. Neither the Allies nor the USSR at that time had tanks that could boast such firepower and armor. If the "Tigers" Soviet soldiers have already seen and learned to fight against them, then the "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" caused a lot of problems on the battlefield.

The Panthers are medium tanks that are slightly less armored than the Tigers and were armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 42 cannon. These guns had an excellent rate of fire and fired over long distances with great accuracy.

"Ferdinand" is a heavy self-propelled anti-tank installation (PT-ACS), which was one of the most famous during the Second World War. Despite the fact that its numbers were small, it offered serious resistance to the tanks of the USSR, as it possessed at that time almost the best armor and firepower. During the Battle of Kursk, the Ferdinands showed their power, perfectly withstanding hits from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery hits. However, its main problem was the small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore the tank destroyer was very vulnerable to infantry, which could get close to it and blow them up. It was simply impossible to destroy these tanks with head-on shots. Weak spots were on the sides, where they later learned to shoot sub-caliber shells. The weakest point in the defense of the tank is the weak chassis, which was disabled, and then the stationary tank was captured.

In total, Manstein and Kluge received less than 350 new tanks at their disposal, which was catastrophically insufficient, given the number of Soviet armored forces. It is also worth highlighting that approximately 500 tanks used during the Battle of Kursk were obsolete models. These are the Pz.II and Pz.III tanks, which were already irrelevant at that time.

During the Battle of Kursk, the 2nd Panzer Army included elite Panzerwaffe tank units, including the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "DasReich" and the famous 3rd Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (she or "Death's Head").

The Germans had a modest number of aircraft to support infantry and tanks - about 2,500 thousand units. In terms of guns and mortars, the German army was more than twice as inferior to the Soviet one, and some sources point to a threefold advantage of the USSR in guns and mortars.

The Soviet command realized its mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time they built a powerful defensive line that could hold off the massive offensive of the German armored forces. According to the plans of the command, the Red Army was to wear down the enemy with defensive battles, and then launch a counteroffensive at the most disadvantageous moment for the enemy.

During the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the Central Front was one of the most talented and productive army generals, Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops took on the task of defending the northern front of the Kursk salient. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Bulge was General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin, a native of the Voronezh Region, on whose shoulders the task of defending the southern front of the ledge fell. Marshals of the USSR Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky were in charge of coordinating the actions of the Red Army.

The ratio of the number of troops was far from on the side of Germany. According to estimates, the Central and Voronezh fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including units of the troops of the Steppe Front (Steppe Military District). The number of Wehrmacht fighters did not exceed 900 thousand people. In terms of the number of tanks, Germany was less than two times inferior to 2.5 thousand versus less than 5 thousand. As a result, the balance of power before the Battle of Kursk looked like this: 2:1 in favor of the USSR. The historian of the Great Patriotic War Alexei Isaev says that the size of the Red Army during the battle is overestimated. His point of view is subject to great criticism, since he does not take into account the troops of the Steppe Front (the number of soldiers of the Steppe Front who participated in the operations totaled more than 500 thousand people).

Kursk defensive operation

Before giving a full description of the events on the Kursk Bulge, it is important to show a map of actions in order to make it easier to navigate the information. Battle of Kursk on the map:

This picture shows the scheme of the Battle of Kursk. The map of the Battle of Kursk can clearly show how combat formations acted during the battle. On the map of the Battle of Kursk, you will also see symbols that will help you assimilate the information.

The Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was strong and the Germans were soon waiting for resistance, which the Wehrmacht had not received in the entire history of its existence. On the day the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet army pulled up a huge amount of artillery to the front to give a response artillery barrage that the Germans would not expect.

The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (defensive stage) was planned for the morning of July 5 - the offensive was to take place immediately from the northern and southern fronts. Before the tank attack, the Germans carried out large-scale bombardments, to which the Soviet army responded in kind. At this point, the German command (namely Field Marshal Manstein) began to realize that the Russians had learned about Operation Citadel and were able to prepare the defense. Manstein repeatedly told Hitler that this offensive at the moment no longer made sense. He believed that it was necessary to carefully prepare the defense and try first to repulse the Red Army and only then think about counterattacks.

Start - Arc of Fire

On the northern front, the offensive began at six o'clock in the morning. The Germans attacked a little west of the Cherkasy direction. The first tank attacks ended in failure for the Germans. A solid defense led to heavy losses in the German armored units. And yet the enemy managed to break through 10 kilometers deep. On the southern front, the offensive began at three o'clock in the morning. The main blows fell on the settlements of Oboyan and Korochi.

The Germans could not break through the defenses of the Soviet troops, as they were carefully prepared for battle. Even the elite panzer divisions of the Wehrmacht were hardly moving forward. As soon as it became clear that the German forces could not break through on the northern and southern fronts, the command decided that it was necessary to strike in the direction of Prokhorov.

On July 11, fierce fighting began near the village of Prokhorovka, which escalated into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk outnumbered the German ones, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. July 13-23 - The Germans are still trying to carry out offensive attacks, which end in failure. On July 23, the enemy completely exhausted his offensive potential and decided to go on the defensive.

tank battle

It is difficult to say how many tanks were involved on both sides, since the data from various sources differ. If we take the average data, then the number of tanks of the USSR reached about 1 thousand vehicles. Whereas the Germans had about 700 tanks.

The tank battle (battle) during the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge took place on July 12, 1943. Enemy attacks on Prokhorovka began immediately from the western and southern directions. Four panzer divisions were advancing in the west and about 300 more tanks were heading in from the south.

The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops gained an advantage, as rising Sun the Germans shone directly into the viewing devices of the tanks. The battle formations of the parties mixed up quite quickly, and already a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to make out where whose tanks were.

The Germans found themselves in a very difficult position, since the main strength of their tanks was in long-range guns, which were useless in close combat, and the tanks themselves were very slow, while in this situation much was decided by maneuverability. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) armies of the Germans were defeated near Kursk. The Russian tanks, on the contrary, gained an advantage, as they had a chance to target the weak spots of heavily armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (especially the famous T-34s).

However, the Germans nevertheless gave a serious rebuff from their anti-tank guns, which undermined the morale of the Russian tankers - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks did not have time and could not form orders.

While the bulk of the tank troops were tied up in battle, the Germans decided to use the Kempf tank group, which was advancing on the left flank of the Soviet troops. To repel this attack, the tank reserves of the Red Army had to be used. In the southern direction, by 14.00, Soviet troops began to push the German tank units, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening, the battlefield was already far behind the Soviet tank units and the battle was won.

Tank losses on both sides during the battle near Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation looked like this:

• about 250 Soviet tanks;
• 70 German tanks.

The above figures are irretrievable losses. The number of damaged tanks was much larger. For example, the Germans after the battle of Prokhorovka had only 1/10 fully combat-ready vehicles.

The battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle that took place in just one day. But the largest battle took place two years earlier also between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front near Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4,500 tanks collided with each other. The Soviet Union had 3700 pieces of equipment, while the Germans had only 800 units.

Despite such a numerical advantage of the tank units of the Union, there was not a single chance of victory. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the quality of the German tanks was much higher - they were armed with new models with good anti-tank armor and weapons. Secondly, in Soviet military thought at that time there was a principle that "tanks do not fight tanks." Most of the tanks in the USSR at that time had only bulletproof armor and could not penetrate the thick German armor themselves. That is why the first largest tank battle was a catastrophic failure for the USSR.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 23, 1943 with the complete victory of the Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht forces. As a result of bloody battles, the German army was exhausted and drained of blood, a significant number of tanks were either destroyed or partially lost their combat effectiveness. The German tanks participating in the battle near Prokhorovka were almost completely disabled, destroyed or fell into the hands of the enemy.

The ratio of losses during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 4.95:1. The Soviet army lost five times as many soldiers, while the German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were wounded, as well as tank troops were destroyed, which significantly undermined the combat power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

As a result of the defensive operation, the Soviet troops reached the line, which they occupied before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans went on the defensive.

During the Battle of Kursk there was a radical change. After the Germans exhausted their offensive capabilities, the Red Army counteroffensive began on the Kursk Bulge. From July 17 to July 23, the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation was carried out by Soviet troops.

The operation was carried out by the Southwestern Front of the Red Army. Its key goal was to pin down the Donbas grouping of the enemy so that the enemy could not transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk salient. Despite the fact that the enemy threw his almost best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the South-Western Front still managed to capture bridgeheads and with powerful blows pin down and surround the Donbass group of Germans. Thus, the Southwestern Front significantly helped in the defense of the Kursk Bulge.

Miusskaya offensive operation

From July 17 to August 2, 1943, the Mius offensive operation was also carried out. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to pull the fresh reserves of the Germans from the Kursk Bulge to the Donbass and defeat the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To repel the attack in the Donbass, the Germans had to transfer significant aviation and tank units to defend the city. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops failed to break through the German defenses near the Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

The offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk continued successfully for the Red Army. The next important battles on the Kursk Bulge took place near Orel and Kharkov - the offensive operations were called "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev".

The offensive operation "Kutuzov" began on July 12, 1943 in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel, where two German armies opposed the Soviet troops. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans were unable to hold bridgeheads on July 26, they retreated. Already on August 5, the city of Orel was liberated by the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943, for the first time in the entire period of hostilities with Germany, that a small parade with fireworks took place in the capital of the USSR. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of Orel was an extremely important task for the Red Army, which it successfully coped with.

Offensive operation "Rumyantsev"

The next main event of the Battle of Kursk during its offensive phase began on August 3, 1943 on the southern face of the arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was called "Rumyantsev". The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts.

Already two days after the start of the operation - on August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And two days later, the forces of the Red Army liberated the city of Bogodukhov. During the offensive on August 11, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway communication line of the Germans. Despite all the counterattacks of the German army, the forces of the Red Army continued to advance. As a result of fierce fighting on August 23, the city of Kharkov was recaptured.

The battle for the Kursk Bulge was already won by the Soviet troops at that moment. This was understood by the German command, but Hitler gave a clear order to "stand to the last."

The Mginskaya offensive operation began on July 22 and continued until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR were as follows: to finally thwart the plan of the German offensive against Leningrad, prevent the enemy from transferring forces to the west and completely destroy the 18th Wehrmacht Army.

The operation began with a powerful artillery strike in the enemy direction. The forces of the parties at the time of the start of the operation on the Kursk Bulge looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks on the side of the Wehrmacht.

Despite strong artillery preparation, the German army put up fierce resistance. Although the forces of the Red Army managed to immediately capture the first echelon of the enemy's defense, they could not advance further.

In early August 1943, having received fresh reserves, the Red Army again began to attack German positions. Thanks to the numerical superiority and powerful mortar fire, the Soviet soldiers managed to capture the enemy's defensive fortifications in the village of Porechie. However, the spacecraft again could not advance further - the German defense was too dense.

A fierce battle between the opposing sides during the operation unfolded for Sinyaevo and Sinyaevo Heights, which were captured by Soviet troops several times, and then they passed back to the Germans. The fighting was fierce and both sides suffered heavy losses. The German defense was so strong that the command of the spacecraft decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and go on the defensive. Thus, the Mginskaya offensive operation did not bring final success, although it played an important strategic role. To repel this attack, the Germans had to use the reserves, which were supposed to go to Kursk.

Smolensk offensive operation

Until the Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Kursk 1943 began, it was extremely important for the Headquarters to defeat as many enemy units as possible, which the Wehrmacht could send under the Course to contain the Soviet troops. In order to weaken the enemy's defenses and deprive him of the help of reserves, the Smolensk offensive operation was carried out. The Smolensk direction adjoined the western region of the Kursk salient. The operation was codenamed "Suvorov" and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive was launched by the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, as well as the entire Western Front.

The operation ended in success, as in its course the beginning of the liberation of Belarus was laid. However, most importantly, the commanders of the Battle of Kursk achieved the pinning down of as many as 55 enemy divisions, preventing them from going to Kursk - this significantly increased the chances of the Red Army forces during the counteroffensive near Kursk.

To weaken the positions of the enemy near Kursk, the forces of the Red Army carried out another operation - the Donbas offensive. The parties' plans for the Donbas basin were very serious, because this place served as an important economic center - the Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. There was a huge German grouping in the Donbass, which numbered more than 500 thousand people.

The operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front. On August 16, the Red Army forces met serious resistance on the Mius River, where there was a heavily fortified defensive line. On August 16, the forces of the Southern Front entered the battle, which managed to break through the enemy defenses. Especially in the battles, the 67th showed up from all the regiments. The successful offensive continued and already on August 30, the spacecraft liberated the city of Taganrog.

On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Kursk itself ended, however, the Donbass offensive operation continued - the forces of the spacecraft had to push the enemy across the Dnieper River.

Now important strategic positions were lost for the Germans and the threat of dismemberment and death hung over Army Group South. To prevent this, the leader of the Third Reich nevertheless allowed her to move beyond the Dnieper.

On September 1, all German units in the area began to retreat from the Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and three days later, during the fighting, Stalino was taken or, as the city is now called, Donetsk.

The retreat for the German army was very difficult. Wehrmacht forces were running out of ammunition for artillery pieces. During the retreat, the German soldiers actively used the tactics of "scorched earth". The Germans killed civilians and burned villages as well as small towns along their path. During the Battle of Kursk in 1943, retreating in cities, the Germans plundered everything that came to hand.

On September 22, the Germans were thrown back across the Dnieper River in the area of ​​​​the cities of Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. After that, the Donbass offensive operation came to an end, ending complete success Red Army.

All the operations undertaken above led to the fact that the Wehrmacht forces, as a result of the fighting in the Battle of Kursk, were forced to withdraw beyond the Dnieper in order to build new defensive lines. The victory at the Battle of Kursk was the result of increased courage and fighting spirit Soviet soldiers, the skill of commanders and the competent use of military equipment.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943, and then the Battle of the Dnieper, finally secured the initiative on the Eastern Front for the USSR. No one else doubted that the victory in the Great Patriotic war will be for the USSR. This was understood by the allies of Germany, who began to gradually abandon the Germans, leaving the Reich even less chance.

Many historians also believe that the Allied offensive on the island of Sicily, which at that moment was occupied mainly by Italian troops, played an important role in the victory over the Germans during the Battle of Kursk.

On July 10, the Allies launched an offensive in Sicily and the Italian troops surrendered to the British and American forces with little or no resistance. This greatly spoiled Hitler's plans, since in order to hold Western Europe he had to transfer part of the troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the position of the Germans near Kursk. Already on July 10, Manstein told Hitler that the offensive near Kursk must be stopped and went into deep defense beyond the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not be able to defeat the Wehrmacht.

Everyone knows that the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its beginning is associated with the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were also funny (interesting) facts during the Battle of Kursk. One of these cases is associated with the KV-1 tank.

During a tank battle, one of the Soviet KV-1 tanks stalled and the crew ran out of ammunition. He was opposed by two German Pz.IV tanks, which could not penetrate the armor of the KV-1. German tankers tried to get to the Soviet crew by sawing through the armor, but nothing came of it. Then two Pz.IVs decided to drag the KV-1 to their base in order to deal with the tankers there. They hitched up the KV-1 and started towing it. Somewhere in the middle of the way, the KV-1 engine suddenly started up and the Soviet tank dragged two Pz.IVs with it to its base. The German tankers were shocked and simply abandoned their tanks.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

If the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad ended the period of defense of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, then the end of the Battle of Kursk marked a radical turning point in the course of hostilities.

After a report (message) about the victory in the Battle of Kursk arrived on Stalin's desk, general secretary stated that this was only the beginning and very soon the Red Army troops would oust the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.

The events after the Battle of Kursk, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. The victories were accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the defense.

The liberation of cities after the Battle of Kursk continued, for example, already in November 1943, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, the city of Kyiv, was liberated.

A very important result of the Battle of Kursk - change in the attitude of the allies towards the USSR. A report to the President of the United States, written in August, said that the USSR now occupies a dominant position in World War II. There is proof of this. If Germany allocated only two divisions for the defense of Sicily from the combined troops of Great Britain and the United States, then on the Eastern Front the USSR attracted the attention of two hundred German divisions.

The United States was very worried about the successes of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the USSR continued to pursue such success, the opening of a "second front" would be unnecessary and the United States would then not be able to influence the fate of Europe without benefit to itself. Therefore, the opening of a "second front" should follow as soon as possible while US assistance was needed at all.

The failure of Operation Citadel led to the disruption of further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which were already prepared for execution. The victory near Kursk would allow developing an offensive against Leningrad, and after that the Germans went to occupy Sweden.

The result of the Battle of Kursk was the undermining of Germany's authority among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front made it possible for the Americans and the British to deploy in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat of Germany, the leader of fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini, broke off agreements with Germany and left the war. Thus, Hitler lost his true ally.

Success, of course, had to be paid dearly. The losses of the USSR in the Battle of Kursk were huge, as, indeed, were the German ones. The balance of power has already been shown above - now it's worth looking at the losses in the Battle of Kursk.

In fact, it is rather difficult to establish the exact number of deaths, since data from different sources vary greatly. Many historians take average figures - these are 200 thousand dead and three times as many wounded. The least optimistic data speaks of more than 800 thousand dead on both sides and the same number of wounded. The parties also lost a huge number of tanks and equipment. Aviation in the Battle of Kursk played almost a key role and the loss of aircraft amounted to about 4 thousand units on both sides. At the same time, aviation losses are the only ones where the Red Army lost no more than the German one - each lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like this 5:1 or 4:1 according to various sources. Based on the characteristics of the Battle of Kursk, we can conclude that the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war was in no way inferior to the German ones, while at the beginning of hostilities the situation was radically different.

Soviet soldiers near Kursk showed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were even celebrated abroad, especially by American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army was also noted by the German generals, including Manshein, who was considered the best commander of the Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards "For participation in the Battle of Kursk."

Another interesting fact is that children also participated in the Battle of Kursk. Of course, they did not fight on the front lines, but they provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle, with the help of children, hundreds of kilometers of railways were built, which were necessary for the rapid transportation of military and supplies.

Finally, it is important to fix all the data. Date of the end and beginning of the Battle of Kursk: July 5 and August 23, 1943.

Key dates of the Battle of Kursk:

• July 5 - 23, 1943 - Kursk strategic defensive operation;
• July 23 - August 23, 1943 - Kursk strategic offensive operation;
• July 12, 1943 - a bloody tank battle near Prokhorovka;
• July 17 - 27, 1943 - Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation;
• July 17 - August 2, 1943 - Miusskaya offensive operation;
• July 12 - August 18, 1943 - Oryol strategic offensive operation "Kutuzov";
• August 3 - 23, 1943 - Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation "Rumyantsev";
• July 22 - August 23, 1943 - Mginskaya offensive operation;
• August 7 - October 2, 1943 - Smolensk offensive operation;
• August 13 - September 22, 1943 - Donbass offensive operation.

Results of the Battle of the Fiery Arc:

• a radical turn of events during the Great Patriotic War and World War II;
• complete fiasco of the German campaign to seize the USSR;
• the Nazis lost confidence in the invincibility of the German army, which lowered the morale of the soldiers and led to conflicts in the ranks of the command.

August 23 marks the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by the Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. Almost two months of intense and bloody battles led the Red Army to this important victory, the outcome of which was not at all a foregone conclusion. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember about it a little more.

Fact 1

The ledge in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February-March 1943 for Kharkov. The Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.

Battle of Kursk

Fact 2

The Battle of Kursk is one of the key battles of World War II, not only because of the scale of the battles that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. The victory in this battle meant the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after the Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. And that means we are advancing from now on. The defense was over.

Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At the conference held in November-December 1943 in Tehran, on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

Fact 3

1943 was a year of difficult choices for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if you attack, then how large-scale tasks should you set for yourself? Both Germans and Russians had to answer these questions one way or another.

Back in April, G. K. Zhukov sent his report to the Headquarters on possible military operations in the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation would be to wear down the enemy on their defenses, destroying as many tanks as possible, and then bring in reserves and go on the offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge was discovered.

As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was to create a defense in depth (8 lines) in the most likely areas of the German offensive - on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient.

In a situation of similar choice, the German command decided to advance in order to keep the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then, Hitler outlined the objectives of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to wear down the Soviet troops and improve the balance of power. Thus, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops were determined to attack decisively.

Construction of defensive lines

Fact 4

Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of German attacks, mistakes were inevitable with such a scale of planning.

Thus, the Headquarters believed that a stronger grouping would advance in the Orel region against the Central Front. In reality, the southern grouping, which acted against the Voronezh Front, turned out to be stronger.

In addition, the direction of the main German attack on the southern face of the Kursk salient was inaccurately determined.

Fact 5

Operation Citadel was the name of the plan of the German command to encircle and destroy the Soviet armies on the Kursk ledge. It was planned to deliver converging strikes from the north from the Orel region and from the south from the Belgorod region. The shock wedges were supposed to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of the Gotha tank corps towards Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to overwhelm the Soviet tank forces.

Soviet tankers inspecting the wrecked "Tiger"

Fact 6

Often the battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the multi-day battle that took place already in the first week of the war (June 23–30), 1941, was larger in terms of the number of participating tanks. It happened in Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides converged near Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks participated in the battle of 41.

Fact 7

In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially counted on the strength of their new armored vehicles - the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual novelty was the Goliath wedges. This caterpillar self-propelled mine without a crew was remotely controlled by wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these tankettes were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.

Memorial in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Kursk

In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazis' dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.

Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, planes - such was the order of Adolf Hitler - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, indicatively, avenging all the previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.

(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful operation "Citadel" that Hitler assumed the opportunity to bargain with Soviet side truce. This was repeatedly stated by the German generals.)

It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable tank "Tiger", which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was too tough for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During the meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: "We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks"

The Battle of Kursk began on July 5, and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the "Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the Victory of the Soviet Troops in the Battle of Kursk."

Moiarussia has collected the most interesting facts about this great confrontation:

Operation Citadel

In April 1943, Hitler approved military operation codenamed Zitadelle ("Citadel"). For its implementation, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk salient.

German sources wrote: “The Kursk ledge seemed to be a particularly suitable place for delivering such a blow. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful grouping of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to defeat those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge would significantly shorten the front line ... True, even then someone claimed that the enemy was expecting the German offensive in this area and ... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians ... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that the operation "Citadel" would succeed if it was undertaken soon"

The Germans were preparing for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. The start of it was postponed twice: either the guns were not ready, or the new tanks were not delivered, or the new aircraft did not have time to pass the tests. On top of that, Hitler's fears that Italy was about to withdraw from the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. Fanatic Hitler believed that if you strike at the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this particular battle, then

"The victory at Kursk," he declared, would strike the imagination of the whole world.

Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk ledge, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that he would lose this battle by the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, but thanks to an ambitious strategically correct plan developed and the latest weapons, which, according to the assurances of the military specialists of the Soviet army, would be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority would be absolutely vulnerable and useless.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time in vain. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolai Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin's initial support for Vatutin's plan, Rokossovsky's safer plan was approved - "wait, wear down and go on the counteroffensive." Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and, first of all, by Zhukov.

However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.

(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images)

Having waited for the latest technology - the tanks "Tigers" and "Panthers", the Germans on the night of July 5, 1943 began their offensive.

That same night, Rokossovsky had a telephone conversation with Stalin:

- Comrade Stalin! The Germans are on the offensive!

- What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.

“Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin!” - answered the commander.

Rokossovsky was not mistaken.

Agent Werther

On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, an exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command appeared on Stalin’s desk, signed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was the visas of Hitler himself. He put it in three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.

Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command, except for his code name - "Werther". Various researchers put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.

Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of the alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even in the top of the Third Reich during the Second World War, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. For all the time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not allow a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.

Hitler's personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The heads of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss residency as if they were asking for information in some kind of information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that in all phases of the war in Russia, the agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Part of the transmitted information could only be obtained from the highest German military circles.

- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer's Headquarters.

Biggest tank battle

"Kursk Bulge": Tank T-34 against the "Tigers" and "Panthers"

The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.

Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the warring parties to this day causes fierce disputes among historians.

Classical Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and decrease the number of German ones.

None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.

Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin and others), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some of them probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).

Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander tank company, a direct participant in the battle:

According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk salient, destroy the Russian troops involved in it, and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on a truce.

In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives detailed description the disposition of the battle, its course and result:

“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans had to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly, units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the course of the battle.

The unexpected attack on the deep-seated spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible way. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.

The Russians drove, if they ever got that far, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fumes - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, partly colliding with each other, Russian infantrymen jumping between them, desperately trying to orient themselves and easily turning into a victim of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who also stood on this battlefield.

The attacking Russian tanks - there should have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed.

As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans "with surprisingly small losses" occupied "almost completely" their previous positions.

The Germans were stunned by the extravagance of the Russian command, which threw hundreds of tanks with armored infantrymen to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.

“Stalin allegedly wanted to court-martial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We saw no chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against the superior forces of the enemy, unless significant reinforcements were given. However, there were none."

It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded, as he did not justify the high hopes placed on him by the Headquarters.

One way or another, the Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of the plans for the German summer offensive.

It is believed that Hitler himself ordered the termination of the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and the need to send German reinforcements to Italy loomed.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"

Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95

When they talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel - the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the onslaught of the Wehrmacht was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out their two offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than Citadel.

On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat was stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to Kutuzov, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Oryol.

On August 3, 1943, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation. "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then proceeded to liberate the territory of the Left-Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing forces of the Nazis and went to Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 am, the troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943 in Moscow it was held to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Maresyev's feat

Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. The painting "The Tale of a Real Man." Photo: Kommersant

The book of the writer Boris Polevoy "The Tale of a Real Man", which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.

But not everyone knows that the glory of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, was born precisely during the Battle of Kursk.

Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived at the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, faced distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him in pairs, fearing that the pilot with prostheses would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.

Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him to his pair. Maresyev coped with the task, and in the midst of the fighting on the Kursk Bulge he made sorties on an equal basis with everyone else.

On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexei Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.

This story immediately became known all over the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Interestingly, during his participation in the battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to service after amputation of both legs.

Battle of Kursk - losses of the parties

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irretrievable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.

After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces on the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for launching a general strategic offensive.

In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of the dead, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge"

Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.

August 23, 1943 - is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the longest and most long way retreats on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.

As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, greatness and stamina were demonstrated to the whole world. Soviet soldier. Our allies have no doubts and hesitations about the right choice of side in this war. And the thought that let the Russians and the Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the side faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which at the end of the war will get vast territories. However, that's another story...

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A nation that forgets its past has no future. So once said the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. In the middle of the last century, "fifteen sister republics", united by "Great Russia", inflicted a crushing defeat on the plague of mankind - fascism. The fierce battle was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - the Kursk Bulge, one of the fateful battles that marked the final mastery of the strategic initiative by our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. From that time on, the German occupiers began to be smashed at all frontiers. A purposeful movement of fronts to the West began. Since that time, the Nazis have forgotten what it means "forward to the East."

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place on 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the primordially Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again gained strength. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander by the Teutonic Knights on 04/05/1242. Of course, the weapons of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans with their main forces tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks.

If we pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, the summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density per 1 km of the front.

Battle disposition

The offensive of the Red Army after the Battle of Stalingrad from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by the defeat of about 100 enemy divisions, driven back from North Caucasus, Don, Volga. But due to the losses suffered by our side, by the beginning of the spring of 1943, the front had stabilized. On the map of hostilities in the center of the front line with the Germans, in the direction of the Nazi army, a ledge stood out, to which the military gave the name Kursk Bulge. The spring of 1943 brought a lull to the front: no one attacked, both sides forcedly accumulated forces in order to again seize the strategic initiative.

Preparation of Nazi Germany

After the Stalingrad defeat, Hitler announced mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew, more than covering the losses incurred. "Under arms" were 9.5 million people (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready active troops (5.3 million people) were on the Soviet-German front.

The Führer was eager to seize the strategic initiative in the war. The turning point, in his opinion, was to occur precisely on that sector of the front, where the Kursk Bulge was located. To implement the plan, the Wehrmacht headquarters developed the strategic operation "Citadel". The plan envisaged the application of attacks converging to Kursk (from the north - from the region of the city of Orel; from the south - from the region of the city of Belgorod). In this way, the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts fell into the "cauldron".

Under this operation, 50 divisions were concentrated in this sector of the front, incl. 16 armored and motorized, totaling 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this grouping, the transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: Panther and Tiger tanks, Ferdinand assault guns.

In preparing the Soviet troops for battle, one should pay tribute to the military talent of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov. Together with the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, he reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin the assumption that the Kursk Bulge would become the main future battlefield, and also predicted the approximate strength of the advancing enemy grouping.

Along the front line, the Nazis were opposed by the Voronezh (commander - General Vatutin N.F.) and the Central Fronts (commander - General Rokossovsky K.K.) with a total number of 1.34 million people. They were armed with 19 thousand mortars and guns; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As you can see, the advantage was on their side). Secretly from the enemy, behind the listed fronts, the reserve Steppe Front (commander I.S. Konev) was located. It consisted of a tank, aviation and five combined arms armies, supplemented by separate corps.

The control and coordination of the actions of this group was carried out personally by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

tactical battle plan

The idea of ​​Marshal Zhukov assumed that the battle on the Kursk Bulge would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

A bridgehead in depth (300 km deep) was equipped. The total length of its trenches was approximately equal to the distance "Moscow - Vladivostok". It had 8 powerful lines of defense. The purpose of such a defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, to deprive him of the initiative, making the task of the attackers as easy as possible. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, two offensive operations were planned. First: the operation "Kutuzov" with the aim of eliminating the fascist group and liberating the city of "Eagle". Second: "Commander Rumyantsev" for the destruction of the Belgorod-Kharkov group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk Bulge took place from the Soviet side "on defense". For offensive operations, as tactics teach, two or three times the number of troops was required.

Shelling

It so happened that the time of the offensive of the fascist troops became known in advance. On the eve of the German sappers began to make passages in the minefields. Soviet front-line intelligence started a fight with them and took prisoners. From the "tongues" it became known the time of the offensive: 03-00 07/05/1943

The reaction was prompt and adequate: On July 5, 1943, Marshal Rokossovsky K.K. (Commander of the Central Front), with the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. It was an innovation in combat tactics. Hundreds of Katyushas, ​​600 guns, 460 mortars were fired at the invaders. For the Nazis, this was a complete surprise, they suffered losses.

Only at 4-30, having regrouped, they were able to carry out their artillery preparation, and at 5-30 go on the offensive. The Battle of Kursk has begun.

The beginning of the battle

Of course, our generals could not predict everything. In particular, both the General Staff and the Headquarters expected the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, to the city of Orel (which was defended by the Central Front, the commander was General Vatutin N.F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk Bulge from the German troops was focused on the Voronezh front, from the north. Two battalions of heavy tanks, eight tank divisions, a division of assault guns, and one motorized division moved against the troops of Nikolai Fedorovich. In the first phase of the battle of the first hot spot became the village of Cherkasskoe (actually wiped off the face of the earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions held back the advance of five enemy divisions for a day.

German offensive tactics

This Great War is famous for martial art. The Kursk Bulge fully demonstrated the confrontation between the two strategies. What did the German offensive look like? Heavy equipment was moving ahead along the attack front: 15-20 Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. They were followed by from fifty to a hundred Panther medium tanks, accompanied by infantry. Driven back, they regrouped and repeated the attack. The attacks were like the ebb and flow of the sea, following each other.

Let's follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Zakharov Matvey Vasilievich, we will not idealize our defense of the 1943 model, we will present it objectively.

We have to talk about the German tactics of tank combat. The Kursk Bulge (this must be admitted) demonstrated the art of Colonel-General Herman Goth, he "jewellery", so to speak about tanks, brought his 4th Army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, the most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, turned out to be much to the left, i.e. out of business. The opposing 6th Guards Army (commander I. M. Chistyakov) had a density of guns per 1 km - 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly on the 6th Army, far from the most powerful, came the blow of the Army Group "South", commanded by the most gifted strategist of the Wehrmacht, Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was one of the few who constantly argued on issues of strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which in 1944, in fact, he was dismissed).

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

In the current difficult situation, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army brought into battle strategic reserves: the 5th Guards Tank Army (Commander Rotmistrov P.A.) and the 5th Guards Army (Commander Zhadov A.S.)

The possibility of a flank attack by the Soviet tank army in the area of ​​the village of Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General Staff. Therefore, the divisions "Dead Head" and "Leibstandarte" the direction of the strike was changed to 90 0 - for a head-on collision with the army of General Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov.

Tanks on the Kursk Bulge: 700 combat vehicles went into battle from the German side, 850 from ours. An impressive and terrible picture. As eyewitnesses recall, the roar was such that blood flowed from the ears. They had to shoot point-blank, from which the towers turned off. Coming to the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire on the tanks, from which the tanks flared with torches. The tankers were, as it were, in prostration - as long as he was alive, he had to fight. It was impossible to retreat, to hide.

Of course, it was unreasonable to attack the enemy in the first phase of the operation (if during the defense we suffered losses one to five, what would they be like during the offensive?!). At the same time, real heroism was shown by Soviet soldiers on this battlefield. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In our time, the day of its end - August 23 - is annually met by residents of the country as Russia.