Who created the tank kv 1. History of creation. At the beginning of the great war

". In addition, this tank is a turning point and an important milestone in the development of domestic tank building, and the world too. The KV became a stage in the development of the famous Leningrad school of tank building, which throughout its history has created many excellent vehicles. Many of the design solutions used on modifications of the KV tank were applied in later Soviet vehicles.

The history of the creation of the KV tank began at the end of 1938 with a decree of the USSR Defense Committee, which ordered the design bureau of the Leningrad Kirov Plant to start creating a heavy tank, with anti-ballistic armor and powerful weapons. The Kirov Plant was not the only enterprise that worked on the creation of a heavy tank for the Red Army. In the same Leningrad, plant No. 185 received a similar task. In general, it should be noted that at that time the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bbuilding a powerful tank with anti-shell armor was in the air, and the leadership of the USSR perfectly understood the need to create such a machine.

In the middle and at the end of the 30s, multi-turreted tanks were "in vogue". It was believed that by installing many towers on a tank, one could seriously increase its combat power. According to this scheme, the T-28 and T-35 were mass-produced in the USSR, the PzKpfw NbFz V was created in Germany, and the Vickers “Independent” was created in England. This share has not passed and promising heavy tanks. Initially, the future KV was supposed to be made according to a multi-tower scheme and install three towers. This tank at the drawing stage was called SMK (S.M. Kirov). At the same time, a group of young specialists working at the Kirov Plant created a heavy single-turret tank with a diesel engine on the basis of the SKM. The tank turned out to be very successful and at the end of 1939 was adopted by the Red Army. The new car received the proud name of KV (Klim Voroshilov).

Tank characteristics

The Soviet KV-1 tank had a classic layout. The control compartment was at the front of the vehicle, followed by the fighting compartment, then the engine compartment and the transmission compartment. The crew of the KV-1 tank consisted of five people: tank commander, driver, gunner, loader and machine gunner.

The hull of the tank consisted of rolled armor, the thickness of which reached 75 mm. The tank was armed with a 76 mm cannon. Initially, the L-11 gun was installed on the machine, then the F-32, and after several months of the war, the ZIS-5 gun. The tank also had several machine guns: coaxial, course and stern. On some machines, an anti-aircraft machine gun was also installed. KV-1 had a diesel engine with a power of 600 hp. The mass of the tank was 47.5 tons. Below are brief technical characteristics of the tank.

common data
Crew, people		5
Length, mm		6675
Width, mm		3320
Height, mm		2710
Clearance, mm		450
Reservation / angle of inclination, mm / hail:
forehead of the body (top sheet)		75/30
hull side		75/0
feed (top sheet)		60/50
forehead of the tower		75/20
gun mask		90
Speed, km/h:
road average		25
Maximum		34
Power reserve, km		225
Armament
gun		cannon L-11/F-32/F-34
Caliber, mm		76
Ammunition, shells L-11 / F-32, ZiS-5,		111/114
machine guns		DT
Quantity, pcs		4
Power point
Engine		diesel V-2K, V-shaped
Number of cylinders		12
Power, hp		600
Fuel used		diesel DT, gas oil grade "E"
Tank capacity, l:		600-615
Transmission
Main clutch	multi-disk, dry
Gearbox
Type of		three-way, with a transverse shaft arrangement
Number of gears, forward / backward		5/1

Immediately after the creation of the KV-1 tank was supposed to go to the test, but it turned out differently. It was at this time that the Soviet-Finnish war began and the car was sent to the front instead of a training ground. Together with the KV, the T-100 and SMK were sent to the Karelian Isthmus. As part of the 20th tank brigade, experimental vehicles entered the battle and took part in the assault on the Mannerheim Line. The QMS was blown up by a land mine, and the KV showed itself with better side and received rave reviews. True, it turned out that the 76-mm gun was not suitable for destroying long-term fortifications.

In 1941, they planned to produce several hundred units of the KV-1, as well as the KV-2 (a tank with a 152-mm howitzer mounted on it) and the KV-3 tank, which had even thicker armor and more weight. Drawings of even heavier machines appeared. The assembly of HF took place at several factories. At the same time, no one was engaged in finalizing the weak points of the KV-1, but there were enough of them: an unsuccessful gearbox, an unusable air filter, poor visibility from the tank. Well, gigantomania and the pursuit of quantity at the expense of quality will play a cruel joke on Soviet gunsmiths more than once.

Tank KV-1 in the Great Patriotic War

A fairly large number of KV-1 tanks were in service with units of the western districts, so these vehicles entered the battle from the very first day of the war. The Russian tank caused a real shock to the Nazis, the Wehrmacht had nothing similar at that time. Not a single German anti-tank gun took the armor of the Russian KV-1, not a single German tank could do anything with the Russian giant. Only an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, which the Nazis often used as an anti-tank gun, could cope with the KV-1.

At the end of 41, the main assembly of KV tanks was transferred to the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant.

But most of the losses of these tanks at the beginning of the war were precisely due to breakdowns and malfunctions. Crews simply abandoned their tanks and left. The weak points of the KV-1 were in the first place: the poor quality of components and assemblies, poor visibility from the tank, an unsuccessful gearbox, and especially a lot of complaints about the air filter. Tankers often could not get to the battlefield. But even more depressing was the picture of the training of tank crews. The tankers had practically no experience in driving their tanks.

Well-trained tankers, who knew the characteristics of their vehicle, performed real feats on them. So, for example, a tank company (5 vehicles) of Lieutenant Kolobanov destroyed 22 enemy tanks in an hour without suffering any losses. Russian tankers on the KV often simply crushed German tanks, and there are many descriptions of such feats, both in Soviet and German documents.

Disadvantages of the tank and attempts to eliminate them

But if we talk about the shortcomings of the KV-1 tank, then the main one is not the engine or the air filter. This tank was simply not needed. At the beginning of the war, he had no worthy opponents. Not a single German anti-tank gun or tank penetrated his armor, but they also did not take the armor of the T-34. And a howitzer or an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun easily disabled both tanks. Both the KV and T-34 were armed with the same 76-mm guns, but the "thirty-four" was more mobile, and it was cheaper. The KV-1 tank is a huge slow tank that moved over rough terrain not much faster than a pedestrian, so it was easier to hit it than the T-34.

This was until the year 43, when the Germans began to mass-produce "Tigers" and "Panthers". At this point, the KV-1 tank was instantly obsolete. long guns German tanks they pierced the armor of the KV at such distances at which the gun of the latter did not threaten the enemy. You can also add that the KV tank was able to "kill" any road, few bridges could withstand the weight of this giant.

In 1942, the KV-1S (high-speed) was released. It was made in the same way. On this tank, armor protection was reduced, thereby reducing the weight of the vehicle, and some of the problems of the KV-1 were eliminated. The undercarriage of the car was improved, visibility was improved, there were fewer problems with the gearbox. The speed characteristics of the tank have become better. In 1943, another modification of the tank was released - the KV-85, armed with an 85-mm cannon. But they managed to release this car only in a small series (less than 150 pieces) and it did not play an important role in the history of the war.

Video about KV-1

In the period from 1940 to 1944, 4775 KV tanks of various modifications were produced. These machines played an important role, especially in the initial phase of the war. Unfortunately, this tank went into production without eliminating the defects that were identified at the stage of factory tests. In the war, these shortcomings had to be paid with blood. On the basis of the KV tank, a heavy IS tank was created, which became a more advanced machine and could withstand the German Tigers and Panthers on equal terms.

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The experience of using medium and heavy tanks in the war with Finland showed that 30-40 mm armor can no longer provide protection against anti-tank gun fire and that it is very difficult to control multi-turreted tanks in battle. For this reason, the new heavy tank KV-1 received projectile protection and was made with a single turret, with a classic layout. In front of the welded box-section hull, there was a control compartment, in the middle - a fighting compartment, and the power plant was located in the rear of the hull.

The tank was produced with two types of turret: welded from sheets with a thickness of 75 mm or cast with a wall thickness of 95 mm. During production, the armor protection of the hull was reinforced with additional 25 mm screens, and the wall thickness of the cast turret was increased to 105 mm. Therefore, it is not surprising that the KV-1 emerged victorious from the battle, sometimes carrying dozens of dents from shells on its armor. Initially, the 76.2 mm L-11 gun was installed, then the F-32 of the same caliber, and from 1941 the KV was produced with the 76.2 mm ZIS-5 gun. KV-1 was mass-produced from 1940 to 1942. A total of 4800 KV machines of various modifications were produced. The KV-2, KV-3, KV-8, KV-9 and other tanks were created on the basis of the KV-1.

Combat use of the KV-1 tank

In places!

"CONSTRUCTION AND ACTION OF THE CREW AT THE TANK (*)

1. At the command (signal) "To the vehicles", the crew lines up in front of the tank, facing the field, in one line, one step ahead of the tracks, in the following order: tank commander - CT, gun commander (shooter) - KO, driver junior (loader) - M, senior driver - MV, radiotelegraph operator - R, and accept the command "Attention".

2. At the command (signal) "In places", landing is carried out in the following order: everyone turns around, the senior driver climbs into the tank through the front hatch and sits in his place, followed by a radio telegraph operator and closes the hatch behind him; the tank commander takes a step to the left and lets the gun commander go ahead, who climbs onto the tank and runs to the turret on the starboard side, opens the hatch and sits down in his place; he is followed by the tank commander; the last to sit down is the junior driver, who closes the hatch behind him.

3. After landing the crew in the tank, the tank commander gives the command: "Prepare for loading." On this command, the senior driver opens the central fuel cock, creates pressure in the fuel system, turns on the ground. The junior driver opens the fuel and oil valves, after which the senior driver reports that the engine is ready for starting.

At the command "Start", the senior driver squeezes the main clutch, gives a signal and starts the engine. After starting the engine, the tank commander gives a signal that the tank is ready to move.

4. At the command (signal) "To the cars", the exit from the tank is carried out in the following order: the radiotelegraph operator is the first to leave through the front hatch, followed by the senior driver, who closes the hatch; through the turret hatch, the junior driver (mechanic) is the first to go out and stands in front of the tank, the tank commander comes out behind him, then the gun commander, who closes the turret hatch.

Upon leaving the tank, the crew lines up in the order indicated in the diagram in Fig. 109, and remains in this position until the command (order) of the platoon commander.
=======================

(*) The crew of a tank with a large turret consists of 6 people: tank commander, gun commander, foreman driver, junior driver, radiotelegraph operator and castle officer.

The German offensive launched on June 22, 1941, caught the Red Army by surprise - it was not properly deployed and was in the middle of a global reorganization process. During 1941, the USSR army suffered huge losses in manpower and equipment, having lost most of its gigantic tank fleet. Despite the poor overall performance of the Soviet troops, the invulnerability of the KV-1 and KV-2 came as a shock to the Germans. They did not have at their disposal tanks comparable to the KB in terms of armor and armament, and had a small number of anti-tank guns capable of destroying them. In his memoirs "Soldier's duty" Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky wrote: "The KB tanks literally stunned the enemy. They withstood the fire of guns of absolutely all German tanks. But in what form they returned from the battle! Their armor was all dented from enemy artillery fire."

In July 1941, Soviet troops had 500 KV-1 and KV-2 tanks. In October 1941, the production of KV-2 tanks was suspended, as tank factories began to be evacuated to the east. By this time, only 434 cars had been produced. They were used in positional battles during the defense of Moscow in the winter of 1941 and near Stalingrad as part of the 62nd Army of Major General V. Chuikov. An effective means capable of KB was the fire of 88-mm anti-aircraft Flak guns 35/36. For example, this is how the commander of the German 41st Panzer Corps, General Reinhart, describes the clash with KB tanks from the 2nd Panzer Division (we are talking about the battles of June 23-24 in the Rossiniai area.

“About a hundred of our tanks, a third of which were Pz.IVs, prepared for a counterattack. Some of them were directly in front of the enemy, but most were located on the flanks. Suddenly, they were squeezed from three sides by steel monsters, trying to destroy which was an empty thing. On the contrary ", soon some of our tanks were put out of action ... Giant Russian tanks came closer and closer. One of them approached the shore of a swampy pond where our tank was. Without hesitation, a black monster pushed him into the pond. The same thing happened with German cannon, which failed to dodge quickly.

Its commander, when he saw the approaching heavy enemy tanks, opened fire on them. However, this did not cause even minimal damage to them. One of the giants quickly rushed to the cannon, which was 100 meters away from him. Suddenly, one of the fired shells hit the tank. He stopped as if struck by lightning. He's ready, the gunners thought with relief. "Yes, he's ready," the gun commander told himself. But soon their feelings were replaced by a cry: "He's still moving!" Without any doubt, the tank moved, its tracks creaked, it approached the cannon, threw it away like a toy and, pressing it into the ground, continued on its way.

The story of General Reinhart is supplemented by the memoirs of one of the officers of the 1st Panzer Division:
"KV-1 and KV-2 were 800 meters from us. Our company opened fire - to no avail. We moved closer and closer to the enemy, who continued to move forward. A few minutes separated us only 50-100 m. Each opened fire, but without success: the Russians continued on their way, all our shells bounced off them.We found ourselves in a threatening situation: the attacking Russians knocked over our artillery and wedged into our battle formation.Only pulling up anti-aircraft guns and firing from short distances, we managed to stop the onslaught of enemy armor.Then our counter-attack drove the Russians back and established a defensive line at Vasiliskis. The fight was over."

According to the memoirs of D. Osadchy, the commander of a company of KV-1 tanks in the 2nd Panzer Division, "June 23-24, even before entering the battle, many KB tanks, especially KV-2, failed during the marches. Especially big problems were with gearbox and air filters. June was hot, there was a huge amount of dust on the roads of the Baltic States and the filters had to be changed after an hour and a half of engine operation. Before entering the battle, the tanks of my company managed to replace them, but not in the neighboring ones. As a result, by the middle of the day, most of the vehicles in these companies broke down.

Near Leningrad, perhaps the most famous battle took place with the participation of KV, in which he happened to demonstrate all his positive qualities in the most striking way. On August 19, 1941, in the area of ​​the Krasnogvardeyets, a KV company under the command of Z.G. Kolobanova, consisting of five KV tanks, destroyed 43 German tanks in one battle, three of them by ramming. The crew of Z.G. Kolobanova burned 22 tanks within an hour. The KV safely endured the hit of 156 armor-piercing shells fired from tank guns from a distance of less than 200 m. For the sake of justice, it should be noted that the Soviet tank acted from an ambush, and the enemy vehicles were "locked" in the marching column and deprived of maneuver.

The fate of the KB from the 6th mechanized corps of the Western Osobok military district is sad. Having practically failed to fire a single shot at the enemy, these KBs, due to lack of fuel, were either blown up by their crews or simply abandoned.
KB tanks were more active on the Southwestern Front. But here, too, the main losses of these machines were not from enemy fire, but due to illiterate operation, lack of spare parts and technical malfunctions. And of course, one cannot ignore the actions of KB tanks in the light general condition in which the tank troops of the Red Army were located by June 1941.

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Thanks to the creation of the KV tanks ("Kliment Voroshilov"), the Soviet Union became the only state in 1941 that had massive quantities of heavy tanks with anti-cannon armor. The Germans called the KV a monster.

Searches and experiments

The main drawback of most tanks of the second half of the 1930s was weak armor, which was penetrated by the fire of anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns.
KV-1 was different from them. It was created in 1939 under the leadership of J. Ya. Kotin. The tank had a 76 mm gun and three 7.62 mm guns. machine gun. The crew of the tank - 5 people.
The first HF passed military trials during the Soviet-Finnish war, which was the first conflict where heavy tanks with anti-shell armor were used. At that time, Soviet heavy tanks KV and multi-turreted SMK and T-100, operating as part of the 20th tank brigade, were tested at the front.

If in tank battles, which were a rare occurrence in the Finnish War, the latest vehicles did not take part, then they turned out to be indispensable in breaking through enemy fortifications. KV-1 withstood hits from almost any anti-tank gun projectiles. At the same time, the 76-mm gun was not powerful enough to deal with enemy pillboxes. Therefore, already during the war, on the basis of the KV-1, the development of a tank with an enlarged turret and an installed 152 mm began. howitzer (future KV-2). At the same time, based on the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war, it was decided to abandon the creation of heavy multi-turreted tanks, which turned out to be expensive and difficult to manage. The choice was finally made in favor of KV.

Unmatched

As of June 1941, the KV could be considered one of the strongest heavy tanks in the world. In total, at the beginning of June 1941, there were 412 KV-1s in the Red Army units, very unevenly distributed among the troops.
There is a well-known case in June 1941 in the Rassenaya area, when one KV-1 fettered the actions of a German division for almost two days. This KV was part of the 2nd Panzer Division, which brought a lot of trouble to the German troops in the first days of the war. Apparently having used up its fuel supply, the tank took up a position on the road near the swampy meadow. One of the German documents noted:

“There were practically no means to deal with the monster. The tank cannot be bypassed, around the swampy terrain. Ammunition could not be brought in, the seriously wounded were dying, they could not be taken out. An attempt to destroy the tank with fire from a 50-mm anti-tank battery from a distance of 500 meters led to heavy losses in crews and guns. The tank was not damaged, despite the fact that, as it turned out, received 14 direct hits. From them there were only dents on the armor. When the 88-millimeter gun was brought to a distance of 700 meters, the tank calmly waited until it was put into position and destroyed it. Attempts by sappers to undermine the tank were unsuccessful. The charges were insufficient for the huge caterpillars. Finally, he became a victim of cunning. 50 German tanks feigned an attack from all sides to divert attention. Under cover, they managed to advance and disguise the 88-mm gun from the rear of the tank. Of the 12 direct hits, 3 pierced the armor and destroyed the tank."

Unfortunately, most of the KV was lost not due to combat reasons, but due to breakdowns and lack of fuel.

KV-1s

In 1942, the production of a modernized version, the KV-1s (high-speed), was launched, which was put into service on August 20, 1942. The mass of the tank was reduced from 47 to 42.5 tons by reducing the thickness of the armor plates of the hull and the size of the turret. Tower - cast, acquired a slightly different appearance and equipped with a commander's cupola. The armament remained similar to the KV-1. As a result, the speed and maneuverability increased, but the armor protection of the tank decreased. A more powerful 85-mm cannon was supposed to be installed on the KV-1s (a similar prototype was preserved in Kubinka), but this tank did not go into production. Subsequently, on the basis of the Kv-1s with an 85 mm gun, the KV-85 was created, which, however, did not become massive due to the switch in production to IS tanks. The soldiers nicknamed the tank "kvass".

End of the road

In tank battles, at least until the middle of 1942, the German troops could do little to oppose the KV-1. However, during the fighting, the tank's shortcomings were also revealed - relatively low speed and maneuverability compared to the T-34. Both tanks were armed with 76 mm guns. True, the KV had more massive armor in comparison with the "thirty-four". HF also suffered from frequent breakdowns. When moving, the tank broke almost any road, and not every bridge could withstand a 47-ton tank. The heavy tank "Tiger" appeared with the Germans at the end of 1942, surpassing any heavy tank at that time of the war. And the KV-1 turned out to be practically powerless against the "Tiger", armed with a long-barreled 88-mm cannon. The "Tiger" could hit KB at great distances, and a direct hit by an 88-mm projectile would disable any tank of that time. So, on February 12, 1943, near Leningrad, three "Tigers" knocked out 10 KB without damage from their side.

Since the middle of 1943, the KV-1 has become less and less common on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War - mainly near Leningrad. Nevertheless, the KV-1 served as the basis for the creation of a number of Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns. So, on the basis of the KV, the SU-152 was created, armed with 152 howitzer-guns. Only a few KV-1 units have survived to this day in Russia, which have become museum exhibits.

Heavy tank

Official designation: KV-1
Start of design: 1939
Date of construction of the first prototype: 1939
Stage of completion: mass-produced in 1939-1943, used on all sectors of the Eastern Front until May 1945.

The rapid progress of anti-tank artillery, which took place in the mid-1930s, led to the fact that the tanks, literally recently put into service, had already become obsolete. First of all, this affected cars of the middle and heavy class. By 1936, the only Soviet heavy tank was the five-turreted T-35, which, in addition to its grandiose size, was distinguished by very powerful weapons. Then he fully met the requirements, but after evaluating the use of anti-tank guns in the Spanish Civil War, it was concluded that the “thirty-fifth” in terms of protection practically did not differ from light tanks. In addition, the T-35 had very low running characteristics, which greatly reduced its chances of surviving a modern battle. Attempts to strengthen the reservation by shielding (applying an overlay layer of armor) and introducing conical towers were temporary measures that had practically no effect on the combat effectiveness of these machines, but they were also in no hurry to abandon the construction of multi-tower giants. The fact is that at that time there was no worthy replacement for them, and then they made a compromise decision - to continue building the T-35 and at the same time start designing a completely new heavy tank, with no less powerful weapons and strong armor.
In the autumn of 1938, the NKO of the USSR put forward requirements for such a combat vehicle, still focusing on the old concept of a multi-turreted tank with at least 60 mm armor and obligatory armament, consisting of 76 mm and 45 mm guns. This is how QMS projects appeared (developed by SKB-2, chief designer Zh.Ya.Kotin) and T-100 (designed by the Design Bureau of Plant No. 185 in Leningrad). At first, variants with the placement of weapons in five towers were really considered, but later their number was reduced to three. Both cars turned out to be surprisingly similar both externally and in technical specifications, it only remained to determine which of them would be adopted ...

At the same time, the NPO ordered the design of a heavy tank with a single turret. Apparently, the point here was not only in the “safety net just in case”. The practice of using multi-turreted T-35 tanks in a training battle showed that the commander of the vehicle had a very difficult time in terms of controlling all parts of the fighting compartment. Sometimes it turned out that the commander of each of the five towers chose his own target and fired on his own. Of course, it was much easier to deal with two or three towers, but their presence was already considered to some extent an excess.
The design of a single-turret tank was entrusted to SKB-2, where, under the guidance of engineers L.E. Sychev and A.S. Ermolaev, a group of VAMM graduate students developed an out-of-competition tank project, now better known as HF ("Klim Voroshilov").
Naturally, the SMK tank was taken as the basis, but one should not assume that the KV was its “reduced single-turret copy”. The length of the tank was indeed significantly reduced, and the main armament, which consisted of 76.2 mm and 45 mm tank guns, was concentrated in one tower, which in size (both external and internal) was almost the same as the SMK. At the same time, however, the DK turret course machine gun had to be abandoned, since there was simply no room for it.
The crew was accordingly reduced to 5 people. The total weight saved in this way made it possible to increase the thickness of the front plates of the hull and turret to 75 mm, thus surpassing the original record that had previously been firmly held by the French heavy tank 2C. In addition, instead of the AM-34 aircraft engine, the diesel V-2 was installed on the KV. Although it had less power (500 hp versus 850 for the SMK), this type of motor burned less expensive fuel and was more fireproof. This entailed a change in the stern of the hull, the height of which became less due to the use of a new roof over the engine compartment. The undercarriage of the tank, as applied to one side, consisted of six road wheels with internal shock absorption and individual torsion bar suspension, and three rubber-coated support rollers. The lantern drive wheel had a removable ring gear and was mounted at the rear. The combat weight of the KV reached 47 tons.

In early December 1938, the layout commission approved the final appearance of the SMK tank, recommending that the third (stern) turret be removed from it and the armament be strengthened. Then one of the first versions of the KV was presented, which also received good reviews and was recommended for construction. Five months later, on April 9, 1939, the technical design was approved and the construction of a prototype soon began, which was completed at the end of August. After the modifications, on September 1, 1939, the KV prototype made its first run at the factory test site.
Further events unfolded no less rapidly. On September 5, the tank was sent to Moscow for demonstration new car the leadership of the country. The premiere show took place on September 23 and made the most favorable impression. Together with the KV, the SMK tank conducted a demonstration of its capabilities, so that the top leadership of the country could easily agree on the opinion of both vehicles.
The QMS was the first to enter the test track. According to the memoirs of the driver of the KV tank, P.I. Petrov, there were strong fears that the “two-turret”, which had a longer base chassis, would show the best data when overcoming obstacles, but everything turned out quite the opposite. The SMK easily overcame the scarp, then the ditch and lingered a little on the funnels. A shorter HF, on the contrary, easily passed all the obstacles, which caused applause from those present. However, not everything went as smoothly as we would like. The V-2 engine regulator worked intermittently, and therefore Petrov had to drive the tank at constantly high speeds, which threatened with an accident. In the course of overcoming water obstacles on the Moskva River, the tank began to be flooded with water, but the KV was very lucky that time.

After that, on October 8, the KV was returned to the Leningrad plant for current repairs and obsolescence of the identified defects. A little over a month later, on November 10, 1939, the tank was sent to the NIBT training ground, where they began full-scale factory tests. Within a few days, having covered 485 km, 20 more various defects were revealed in the design of the KV, primarily related to the operation of the power plant and transmission.

Based on the results of the tests, it was determined that the KV tank is better than its two-tower counterparts in terms of the main indicators. The lower height of the KV, obtained due to the absence of a turret box, favored better protection and projectile resistance of the tank. Driving characteristics also turned out to be higher, since the HF had a shorter undercarriage while maintaining its width. But most importantly, now the commander of the vehicle could control the fire of guns and machine guns without dispersing forces. As negative qualities, the cramped work of the crew in the fighting compartment, the absence of a course machine gun and the overweight of the vehicle were noted. The last drawback, first of all, had a negative impact on the operation of the most important components and assemblies of the HF. If the undercarriage and suspension of the tank could still withstand significant loads, then the transmission and engine worked at their limit. The developers were advised to deal with these shortcomings as soon as possible, but throughout the entire period of operation of the KV tanks, it was not possible to completely eliminate them.

Quite expectedly, KV tests were interrupted in December 1939. Just a few days after the start of the Soviet-Finnish war, units of the Red Army faced a very serious problem in the form of long-term fortifications erected on the Karelian Isthmus. The “Mannerheim Line” turned out to be an extremely “hard nut to crack” and it was not at all easy to break through it with the help of only artillery and aviation. To storm the Finnish positions, a powerful assault tank with anti-shell armor was required, and that was not produced in mass quantities in the USSR at that time. The only heavy vehicle capable of operating in harsh winter conditions was the T-28 medium tank, but its 30 mm frontal armor was easily penetrated by Finnish anti-tank guns. Fortunately, they didn’t think of using the five-turreted T-35s at that time, although some domestic and foreign “historians” claim without a shadow of embarrassment that the Red Army lost from 60 to 90 (!) Tanks of this type on the Karelian Isthmus. So the appearance of new heavy tanks, even in prototypes, has become very timely.

Thus, field tests smoothly turned into combat ones, with all the ensuing consequences. The decision to transfer tanks to combat units was made by the leadership of the Leningrad Military District, sending KV, SMK and T-100 to the 91st Tank Battalion (TB) of the 20th Tank Brigade (TBR). The crew of the KV tank during the period of combat testing was mixed: G.Kachekhin (tank commander), military engineer of the 2nd rank P.Golovachev (driver), Red Army soldiers Kuznetsov (gunner) and A.Smirnov (radio operator), as well as specialists testers of the Kirov plant A. Estratov (mechanic, he is also loading) and K. Kovsh (spare driver, during the battles he was outside the tank). New cars were not immediately thrown into Finnish positions. The first two weeks the crews mastered the tanks. Along the way, a 45-mm cannon was removed from the KV, replacing it with a 7.62-mm DT machine gun. This tank went into battle only on December 18th. The tankers were faced with a difficult task - to break through the Finnish defenses in the Babokino area. Prior to this, they tried to solve the task using medium-sized T-28s, but in conditions of strong anti-tank guns, the weakly armored “twenty-eighths” suffered losses and did not achieve a positive result. The battle, which began on the morning of December 18, unfolded approximately according to the same scenario, only next to the T-28 were heavy tanks. In winter conditions, when the snow camouflaged the Finnish bunkers well, the KV crew had to act almost blindly. At the very beginning of the battle, the T-28 leading in front was hit and blocked the KV road. Bypassing it, the commander noticed an enemy fortified point and orders to open fire on it. After a few minutes, it became clear that several bunkers were firing at the tank at once, but the 37-mm Finnish anti-tank guns could never penetrate the thick armor of the KV. While there was a fight with the first bunker, another shell hit the front of the tank. Since the shelling continued, it was then impossible to establish the nature of the damage, and Kachekhin decided to move on. At the end of the battle, an order was received to approach the next wrecked T-28 and, if possible, evacuate it, which was done. The result of the first experience of the combat use of the KV was impressive: not a single hit right through, one hit each in the barrel, front plate and hub of the 4th track roller, three hits in the tracks of the right caterpillar and on the side. The damage was examined by the highest officer ranks and the head of the armored department, concluding that the KV tank is invulnerable to modern anti-tank guns.

The barrel of the gun was not replaced the next day, and on the evening of December 19, by a decree of the NPO of the USSR, the KV tank was adopted by the Red Army. And this despite the fact that even the installation series of these machines has not yet been ordered, and the first prototype has traveled no more than 550 km. As for the additional verification of such important components as the suspension, transmission and running gear, which failed in the first place, they acted as follows - since these elements had a greater degree of unification with the QMS, the test results of both tanks were combined, concluding that they were passed satisfactorily. The director of the Kirov Plant (LKZ) was instructed to “remove all defects found during testing” and start serial production from January 1, 1940, having handed over 50 tanks by the end of the year.

The fact that the combat use of the two-tower SMK was far from being so successful also played its part. This tank, in terms of projectile resistance, showed its best, but during the battle on December 17, 1939, on the Kyameri-Vyborg road, the SMK ran into a disguised mine and lost its course. The crew was successfully evacuated on a nearby T-100, but the damaged vehicle was towed for repairs only after the war. At the same time, Finnish scouts managed to remove the hatch cover from the tank.
At the same time, the situation with the pilot batch of KV was corrected. In total, 12 vehicles were ordered, which received additional “U” indices - for example, the KV prototype, according to the documents, passed as U-0 (tank of the installation series, zero sample). In addition, the military demanded that the tank be equipped with a 152-mm howitzer, which came as a surprise to the designers. The main problem was not so much in the improvements in the design of the tank, but in the absence of an appropriate tank gun. In fairness, it should be noted that nowhere in the world cannons with a caliber of more than 105 mm were placed on heavy tanks - by the way, here the championship belonged to the French 2C, one of the samples of which was operated for some time with just such a weapon.

For the “artillery” tank, it was necessary to re-develop a new enlarged turret on the same chase and look for a 152-mm howitzer. The first version with the 1909\1930 howitzer was immediately rejected, preferring the newer M-10 model 1938. Work in this direction was carried out by a team of engineers, which included about 20 people, under the leadership of N. Kurin. The young designers were given only a few days, having transferred them to the barracks. Two weeks later, they began to manufacture the first prototype of such an installation, called MT-1. In January 1940, it was installed on an experimental KV tank, recently withdrawn from the front for modifications, and on February 10 it was fired at at the shooting range. In addition to the original design of the MT-1, the gun barrel was closed with a special cover that was supposed to protect it from bullets and shrapnel, but this improvement turned out to be ineffective and not other tanks abandoned it. Instead, special rings made of armor 10 mm thick were put on the howitzer barrel. In production, this solution was used on all production tanks.

On February 17, 1940, the U-0 and U-1 tanks (with MT-1 installations) were again sent to the front. On February 22, the U-2 tank with the turret of the experimental U-0 tank with a 76.2-mm gun went to the front, and on February 29, the U-3 tank with the MT-1 installation. They also managed to build and send to the front the U-4 tank (the last of the installation series with the MT-1), but on March 13, 1940, a truce was signed and it was not possible to test this tank in battle. Since numerical designations began to be used much later, KV with the MT-1 installation was called “KV with a large tower”, and with a 76-mm gun - “KV with a small tower”.

The received KV tanks and the only copy of the T-100 were reduced to a separate tank company, passing it first to the 13th, and then the 20th brigade. Since in March the line of fortifications had already been broken through, it was not possible to test tanks with a “big tower” by firing at pillboxes in combat conditions. Nevertheless, the report on the combat use of the KV indicated that the tanks showed themselves well, but also noted their overweight and insufficient engine power.

Production production tanks KV “with a small tower”, renamed KV-1, was planned to start at the end of March 1940, but due to the fact that the LKZ was not ready for the mass production of new products, until the beginning of May, KV from the installation series were still assembled here .

The leadership of the ABTU of the Red Army, very concerned about the incoming reports, proposed to conduct a full test cycle in order to identify all defects in the KV design. In May 1940, such tests were carried out at the training grounds in Kubinka and near Leningrad on the U-1, U-7 tanks (both with a 76-mm gun) and U-21 (with a 152-mm howitzer).
Having traveled 2648 km, the tank of the U-1 installation series failed several times due to technical reasons due to transmission and engine failures, which were replaced twice. The U-7 and U-21 tanks covered a little less - 2050 and 1631 km, but this did not save them from similar problems at all. Among the most significant shortcomings, the unsuccessful design of the transmission and air filter, insufficient strength of the tracks and road wheels, tightness in the fighting compartment, and poor visibility were noted. The tower also caused a lot of problems: on the KV-1 it weighed 7 tons, and on the KV-2 - 12 tons. In this regard, there were problems with rotation associated with large efforts on the handles of the guidance mechanisms and the low power of the electric motors. In addition, when heeling, the turret on the tanks of the first series could not turn at all.

The required order of 50 vehicles was quite realistic to hand over by the end of the year, but at the end of May the plant received a new order. Now it was required to manufacture 230 KV of both modifications in the period from July to December, of which 15 units by August and another 70 by September. The plant was pressured “from above”, insisting on the delivery of finished products on time. In fact, in July 1940, the plant produced 5 tanks, while the remaining 10 were accepted on August 22-24.
Knowing what measures might follow in case of failure to comply with this order, the director of the LKZ Saltsman reported that the deliveries of tanks were on schedule. Understanding the current situation, military engineer 2nd rank Shpitanov, who was a military representative from the army, went to meet the factory workers and signed payment certificates backdated (July 31). This fact of “egregious violation” was described in detail in a letter written by another representative of the military reception, military engineer 2nd rank Kalivoda. The full text of this document can be read in the issue “Frontline Illustration. History of the KV tank. Its essence was as follows:

- the plant is not in a hurry to finalize the KV tanks

- all tanks, even those accepted by the military representative, have a huge number of defects

- the plant management hides the shortcomings of the HF.

In addition, a few more significant shortcomings of the tanks of both the installation and the first series were revealed. At the same time, the military engineer only indirectly took into account the fact that LKZ and SKB-2 were heavily loaded with current work, and it was required to carry out the plan without delay. As a result, an authoritative commission was appointed, which generally confirmed the conclusions made by Kalivoda, but only “disciplinary sanctions” were made as a punishment for all those responsible.

However, it was impossible to say that the plant did nothing to eliminate the identified defects. In July 1940, 349 constructive changes, of which 43 were related to the technological process. In August-September, the number of changes increased to 1322 and 110, respectively. For the whole of 1940, LKZ produced 243 tanks, exceeding the plan, but the quality of production still suffered greatly due to the great rush.

The design of the KV tank of the 1939 model was based on the design of the QMS and borrowed many elements from it. First of all, this concerned the chassis and individual elements of the hull. However, the rest of the components and assemblies were designed anew.

The chassis of the KV tank of the 1939 model, compared to the SMK, was shortened by one track roller and one support roller, respectively, which had a positive effect on the weight characteristics and maneuverability of the tank. Applied to one side, the undercarriage consisted of the following items:

- six road wheels with internal shock absorption and individual torsion bar suspension;

— three supporting rollers with rubber bandages;

- front steering wheel;

- rear drive wheel with a cast hub and two 16-tooth rims;

- caterpillar chain of 87-90 tracks 700 mm wide and 160 mm pitch, tracks - cast, made of steel 35KhG2 with two rectangular windows for the teeth of the drive wheel.

The hull was a rigid welded box with differentiated armor, during assembly of which corners and overlays were used to increase rigidity. The nose of the hull consisted of upper, middle and lower armor plates. The upper and lower armor plates with a thickness of 75 mm were installed at an angle of 30. The average armor plate with a thickness of 40 mm had an installation angle of 85 and a hole on the left side for the antenna output. In the upper armor plate, cutouts were made for the driver's hatch and a ball machine gun mount. The bottom sheet was equipped with two tow hooks.

Onboard armor plates were made in the form of a single casting with a thickness of 75 mm. They were made 6 holes for the passage of the axles of the suspension balancers and 3 holes for the passage of the brackets of the supporting wheels. In the front part, a crank mechanism bracket was welded on which the guide wheel was attached, in the rear part, holes for installing the onboard gearbox. The combat compartment was separated from the engine compartment by an armored partition.

The roof was made in the form of three armored sections. The first section, 40 mm thick, closed the fighting compartment and had a cutout for the turret, to protect which side rails 80 mm high and 40 mm thick were welded. The second section, 30 mm thick, with hatches for access to engines and cooling system fillers, protected the engine compartment. In the roof of the transmission compartment of a similar thickness, there were two hatches for access to the transmission mechanisms.

The bottom consisted of a front sheet 40 mm thick and a rear sheet 30 mm thick. The armor plates were butt welded and attached to the side sections. In front of the bottom, next to the driver's seat, there was an emergency hatch. In the rear there were four holes for draining fuel and a sub-engine hatch.

The turret of the KV-1 tank of the first series was riveted and welded and had a faceted shape. The forehead, sides and stern were made of armor 75 mm thick, the mantlet of the gun was 90 mm thick. The sides were installed at an inclination of 15, the frontal armor plate - 20. The wing was made of a single 40-mm armor plate. It had cutouts for the commander's hatch and sights. The sides had viewing slots with glass blocks. A machine-gun turret was sometimes mounted on the base of the hatch for firing at air targets.

Unlike the SMK tank, which was equipped with the M-17 aviation gasoline engine, the KV tank received the V-2K diesel engine. Its maximum power was 600 hp. at 2000 rpm, nominal - 500 hp at 1800 rpm. The engine had 12 cylinders installed in a V-shape at an angle of 60 °; The fuel used was diesel fuel of the “DT” brand or gas oil of the “E” brand, which was in three fuel tanks with a capacity of 600-615 liters. Two tanks were installed in front of the hull in the control compartment (with a capacity of 230-235 liters) and the fighting compartment (with a capacity of 235-240 liters). The third tank, with a capacity of 140 liters, was located on the port side in the fighting compartment. With respect to the medium tank T-34 of the same year of manufacture, such placement of fuel tanks was more rational and allowed to avoid unnecessary losses. The fuel supply was carried out by the pump NK-1. The engine could be started using two ST-4628 electric starters with a power of 4.4 kW or compressed air from two cylinders. To cool the engine, two tubular radiators with a capacity of 55-60 liters were used, installed along the sides of the engine with an inclination towards it.

The transmission of a mechanical type consisted of a multi-disk main dry friction clutch, a 5-speed two-shaft gearbox, multi-disk dry friction side clutches with belt floating brakes and two planetary double-row onboard gearboxes.

The means of communication consisted of a telephone and telegraph radio station 71TK-3 and an internal intercom TPU-4-bis. The electrical equipment (made according to a single-wire circuit) included a GT-4563A generator with a power of 1 kW and four 6-STE-144 batteries with a capacity of 144 amperes each. Consumers of electricity were the swivel mechanism of the tower, communications equipment, control devices, interior lighting equipment, headlights and an electric signal.

The crew of the tank consisted of five people: a driver, gunner-radio operator, commander, gunner and loader. The first two of them were located in the control compartment in front of the hull, the other three were in the fighting compartment.

On the KV-1 tanks of the 1939 model, a 76.2 mm L-11 gun with a barrel length of 30.5 calibers was installed. This artillery system, created by the LKZ Design Bureau, had good armor penetration characteristics and could hit any type of enemy tank at a distance of up to 500 meters. The initial speed of the armor-piercing projectile was 612 m / s, which made it possible to penetrate a vertically installed armor sheet up to 50 mm thick at a specified distance. Elevation angles ranged from -7° to +25°; A shot from a cannon was made with the help of foot and manual mechanical descents. For aiming at the target, the TOD-6 telescopic sight and the PT-6 panoramic periscope sight were used.

At the same time, the original recoil system used on the L-11 was its weak point. In the design of the recoil device, the compressor liquid was in direct contact with the knurler air through a special hole, which was blocked at certain angles of rotation of the gun. As a result, after several shots, the liquid boiled up, which often led to damage to the gun. This defect was most acutely revealed during the 1938 maneuvers, during which most of the T-28 tanks, recently re-equipped from KT-28 to L-11, turned out to be incapable of combat. The defect was corrected by applying an additional hole, but this did not save the situation as a whole.

Light small arms included four 7.62 mm DT machine guns. The first of them was installed in the frontal hull sheet on the left in front of the gunner-radio operator. The ball mount provided firing horizontally within 30 °, and vertically from -5 ° to + 15 °; The second machine gun was paired with a cannon, and the third was also mounted on the stern in a ball mount. In contrast to the course diesel fuel, the firing angles along the vertical ranged from -15 ° to + 15 °; The fourth machine gun was a spare and was transported in stowage on the left side of the hull.

Ammunition for the gun consisted of 111 shots. The range of ammunition was quite wide and included unitary cartridges from divisional guns of the 1902\1930 model. and sample 1939, as well as from the regimental gun model 1927:

- high-explosive fragmentation grenade OF-350 (steel) or OF-350A (cast iron) with a KTM-1 fuse;

- F-354 high-explosive grenade with KT-3, KTM-3 or 3GT fuses;

- armor-piercing tracer unitary projectile BR-350A and BR-350B with MD-5 fuse;

- projectile with bullet shrapnel (Sh-354T) or Hertz shrapnel (Sh-354G) with a 22-second tube or T-6 tube;

— projectile with rod shrapnel Sh-361 with tube T-3UG;

- shell with buckshot Sh-350.

One of the main tasks for the coming 1941 was the re-equipment of the tank with a more reliable weapon. Although the L-11 guns, released in 1939, were finalized, their installation in the KV-1 and T-34 tanks was considered as a temporary measure. Instead, in 1940, the production of F-32 guns, developed for the design bureau of plant No. 92 under the leadership of V.G. Grabin, was to be launched. Using the regimental 76.2-mm cannon as a basis, the “Grabintsy” managed to create a simple and reliable tank artillery system. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1940, Leningrad continued to produce the L-11, while simultaneously trying to improve its design. Only after the direct intervention of the head of the ABTU D.G. Pavlov (in May 1940) did they start to establish production of the F-32 at the LKZ. Until the end of the year, only 50 guns were made, and they began to be put on KV-1 tanks only from January 1941.

Compared with the L-11, the vertical guidance angles slightly decreased (from -5 ° to + 25 °), but this disadvantage was compensated by the better reliability of the gun and higher combat qualities. The F-32 guns with a barrel length of 31.5 caliber were equipped with a wedge semi-automatic shutter of a mechanical copy type. The failure brake was hydraulic, the knurler was hydropneumatic. The maximum rollback length was 450 mm. The gun was balanced by means of a load fixed to the sleeve catcher bracket. In addition to this, the TOD-6 telescopic sight was replaced by the TOD-8.

The delay in re-equipping the KV did not benefit. The fact is that at the same time, the T-34 tanks received F-34 guns, the power of which was higher than that of the F-32. A reasonable solution seemed to be the installation of a more powerful artillery system with a caliber of 85-mm or 95-mm. The same design bureau of plant No. 92 was actively engaged in the development of such guns, and during the years 1939-1940 several promising samples were received for testing. For the KV-1 tank, a 76.2 mm F-27 gun was chosen, which had the ballistics of a 3K anti-aircraft gun of a similar caliber with an initial projectile velocity of 813 m / s. In terms of weight and dimensions, the F-27 fit perfectly into the tank turret, and in April 1941 the experimental tank was successfully tested. However, due to the start of work on the KV-3 project, it was concluded that the KV-1 could well get by with a less powerful weapon.

As part of further modernization, a tank design was developed under the designation Object 222. A distinctive feature of this vehicle was a new turret with an F-32 cannon and a new turning mechanism, frontal armor increased to 90 mm, a 10RT radio station, a new planetary gearbox, a commander's cupola, an improved driver's viewing device and a number of other changes. Partially separate modernized units were tested on experimental KVs in April-May 1941, but it was not possible to fully implement the project of an improved tank due to the outbreak of war.

The only unit that was armed with KV tanks after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war was then the 20th brigade, which was armed with 10 vehicles of the installation batch (U-0, U-2, U-3, U-11, U-12 , U-13, U-14, U-15, U-16, U-17). The crews of the tank brigade had considerable combat experience and, most importantly, they mastered the new equipment well. During the operation of KV tanks of the installation series in the interwar period, the question of the low reliability of the transmission, which could not withstand overloads and often failed, as well as the overweight of the vehicles, was repeatedly raised. Based on the experience gained, it was supposed to create training units for each tank brigade, but in the summer of 1940 all KV tanks were withdrawn from the 20th brigade and transferred to the 8th TD of the 4th MK. At the same time, the 2nd TD of the 3rd MK in the Baltics began to receive new tanks, where the first KV-1 and KV-2 (with the MT-1 installation) arrived in August. To train tank crews, several KV-1s were sent to the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization (Moscow), the Leningrad Advanced Training Courses for the command staff of tank troops and the Saratov Tank Technical School. By December 1, 1940, the troops had 106 new heavy tanks, and by June 1, 1941 their number had grown to 370. They were distributed among the military districts as follows.

Kyiv OVO - 189

Western OVO - 75

Baltic OVO - 59

Privolzhsky VO - 18

Odessa Military District - 10

Oryol VO - 8

Leningrad VO - 4

Moscow VO - 3

Kharkov VO - 4

It is worth noting here that only 75 machines were in direct operation, while the remaining 295 were idle waiting for spare parts or were under maintenance. However, the number of heavy tanks continued to increase further.

As you can see, the vast majority of KV-1 was concentrated in the border districts. Although the existence of a plan for an attack on Germany (Operation Thunderstorm) is called into question, such a large number of heavy vehicles in shock units (mechanized corps) makes one think about the opposite.

At the tip of the main attack of the Soviet strike group in the western direction was the 6th mechanized corps subordinate to the 10th army. The formation of the corps began on July 15, 1940 near Bialystok, and by June 1, 1941, it had 999 tanks, 114 of which were KV-1 and KV-2. According to the latest data, the 6th MK received the largest number of new types of vehicles before the war, even to the detriment of other units. On June 22, the total number of tanks increased to 1131, which amounted to 110% of the regular strength. However, such a rapid quantitative growth had negative consequences. In view of the wide variety of types of tanks (XT-26, BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, T-28, T-34, T-37, T-38, T-40, KV-1, KV-2 and tractors AT-1) there were great difficulties in providing fuel and spare parts, so that not all vehicles were in combat condition. And yet the 6th MK was a very formidable force. The 4th TD (63 units) then had the largest number of KV tanks, and the 7th TD had 51 vehicles of this type.

On June 22, 1941, the corps, due to the lack of communication with the army headquarters, did not conduct active operations. At this time, it was possible to repair the apartments in which the officers were quartered. Only in the evening did the directive of Marshal Timoshenko arrive to strike at Suwalki and destroy the enemy by June 24th. General I.V. Boldin gave the order to concentrate tank divisions northwest of Bialystok, but this decision later turned out to be fatal for the entire corps. During June 23, units of the 6th MK tried to break through the roads to the designated line through the randomly retreating units of the 10th Army. The corps was repeatedly bombed and attacked from the air, suffering significant losses on the march. Finally, having arrived in the designated area, Boldin's group was in a very difficult position. Neighboring units retreated, exposing their flanks, there was no air support, and there was practically no fuel left in the hull. Despite this, the front command ordered a strike at 10 am on June 24 in the direction of Grodno - Merkina and by the end of the day to capture the Lithuanian city. The tanks of the 6th MK moved in the indicated directions: the 4th division to the Indura, the 7th division in two columns - the 13th TP to the Forge, and the 14th TP to the Old Oak. The offensive was immediately opened by German reconnaissance aircraft, which made it possible for infantry and tank units located 20-30 km from the initial line to prepare a tight defense. Having practically no contact with the enemy, the 4th TD entered the Lebezhan area, having lost many tanks from the attacks of dive bombers. At the same time, in the report of the division commander, it was indicated that the KV tanks withstood direct hits of air bombs and suffered the least losses. At this time, the 7th TD entered into battle with the German infantry units in the Kuznitsa - Staroe Dubrovoye area.

Despite the weakening of the corps by constant fighting on June 25, the offensive continued. No reconnaissance and artillery preparation was carried out - the tanks went into frontal attacks on German positions, being destroyed by anti-tank fire, however, due to the presence of a huge mass of tanks, the enemy's defenses were broken through. The advance of the 6th MK was stopped near the settlements of Indura and Staroe Dubrovoye.

Not knowing about the state of affairs and the losses suffered by the corps, Marshal Pavlov on the evening of June 25 ordered to start a withdrawal and go to Slonim to regroup. This order remained unfulfilled - the Volkovysk-Slonim road was literally littered with broken and abandoned equipment, and in some places a detour became impossible. In addition, the Germans landed troops, capturing several important bridges, so that the surviving tanks had to be simply abandoned or flooded in the rivers.

In fact, by the evening of June 29, the corps ceased to exist. Separate groups were still trying to break through the environment, although it was almost impossible to do this. Many light tanks were burned near the villages of Klepachi and Ozernitsa, through which the corps headquarters made its way.

Probably the last battle was fought by the tankers of the 6th MK on July 1. On the evening of that day, two T-34s and one KV-1 from the 13th TP burst into Slonim from the direction of the forest. They managed to knock out one German tank and fire at the headquarters of one of the units. The Germans, in turn, knocked out both "thirty-fours", but they could not cope with the KV - they tried to transport a heavy tank to the other side of the Shchara River, but the wooden bridge could not withstand the 47-ton vehicle and collapsed.

Obviously, in the same area, the KV-1 and the composition of the 11th MK subordinate to the 3rd Army ended their combat path. In total, the corps had 3 units of heavy tanks of this type (two in the 29th TD and one in the 33rd TD), and the bulk of the tanks were BT and T-26 of various modifications. They entered the battle at about 11 am on June 22, covering the approaches to Grodno. After a series of battles at the turn of Gibulichi, Olshanka, Kulovtse (16 km southwest of Grodno), Sashkevtse Corps, according to the command, lost 40-50 tanks, mostly light ones, in two days. What followed was what was to be expected - the 11th MK was deployed to strike at Grodno, captured by the Germans just a few hours ago. The offensive began on 24 June and resulted in a total of about 30 tanks and 20 BA remaining in both divisions. During the retreat, the corps withstood a heavy battle near the Ross River, blowing up bridges behind it. Coming to the Shchara River, the commander of the 29th TD ordered to prepare 18 of the most combat-ready tanks for an attack, draining fuel from the rest and removing small arms. Having destroyed the German barrier, the shock group went further, and at this time the Germans recaptured the bridge and the main forces of the corps had to again knock out the enemy. The next day, the crossing was restored, but German aircraft destroyed it and did not allow it to be restored again. As a result, almost all the remaining equipment had to be destroyed on the western bank of the Shchara, and only a few tanks were transported to the opposite bank. KV was no longer among them ...

Located to the north of the 2nd TD of the 3rd MK, whose headquarters was in Ukmerge (Lithuania), on June 20, it had 32 KV-1 and 19 KV-2 out of 252 tanks. It was this division that withstood the first blow of the Germans, detaining the enemy on the Dubyssa River. About the feat of the crew of a single KV-2, blocking the passage of the Germans across the river, you can read in separate article. Next, the actions of the corps as a whole will be considered.

From June 23 to June 24, instead of taking up a tough defense, Soviet tanks launched several counterattacks. So, on the morning of June 23, German tanks, having broken through a loose defensive formation, bypassed the positions of the 3rd and 4th tank regiments from the left flank. To remedy the situation, 6 KV tanks were allocated from the 3rd TP, which forced the enemy to withdraw, while knocking out two tanks without loss on their part. At noon, the division went on the offensive on a front only 10 km wide. According to eyewitnesses, the density of tank formations was so high that almost every shot of the German anti-tank guns hit the target. Having reached the city of Skaudville, Soviet tanks met with a powerful German grouping, which, in addition to the 114th motorized division, included two artillery battalions and a connection of light tanks (about 100 units). In the oncoming tank battle, KVs especially distinguished themselves, which destroyed enemy anti-tank guns and tanks not only with cannon-machine-gun fire, but also crushed them with caterpillars.

Being subjected to constant attacks from the air and remaining practically surrounded, the command of the 2nd TD did not receive an order to retreat to a new line. All this led to the fact that on the afternoon of June 26, a group of German tanks and motorized infantry went around the positions of the brigade from the rear, completely surrounding it and almost completely destroying the command of the 3rd MK. In the evening, when the German attacks were repulsed, no more than 20 tanks remained in the 2nd TD, most of which had almost no fuel and ammunition. The new commander, General Kurkin, ordered to disable all the surviving vehicles and make their way to their own. Subsequently, the crews that emerged from the encirclement, having acquired precious combat experience, formed the backbone of the 8th tank brigade under the command of P.A. Rotmistrov.

In the 7th MK, which arrived near Polotsk at the end of June, there were 44 combat-ready tanks KV-1 and KV-2. However, already on a short march, inexperienced drivers burned the main clutches on 7 cars, and several more HFs were out of order for other reasons. The corps went into battle on July 7, having lost 43 KV tanks of both types by the 26th - in other words, it practically ceased to exist as a combat unit.

One of the first to fight was the 20th TP (10th TD, 15th MK), fully equipped with KV tanks. The regiment stationed in the city of Zolochiv near Lvov was alerted on June 22 at about 7 am. The battalion column moved out of the city towards the border a few hours later, ahead of it was a military outpost, consisting of light tanks. It was they who were the first to be ambushed approximately and could not warn the KVs following about the danger. On the way of the column, the Germans placed several anti-tank batteries and light tanks, hoping that the Soviet vehicles following behind would also become their easy victims. However, everything happened quite the opposite. Despite the fact that the KV-1 had to attack the enemy directly in the open wheat field, heavy tanks showed an undeniable advantage over the German vehicles, forcing the enemy to leave their positions with minimal losses. However, this success was not built upon. The command of the Southwestern Front sought to oust the Germans by “crushing them in mass”, which ultimately led to the loss of the most combat-ready 20th tank regiment, which suffered heavy losses already on June 23 during German air raids. Judging by the report of the commander of the 10th TD, from June 22 to August 1, the division irretrievably lost 11 KV tanks in battle, another 11 were knocked out, left due to the impossibility of evacuation - 22, destroyed by their own crews - 7, stuck on obstacles - 3, remained in the rear due to lack of fuel and spare parts - 2. That is, out of 56 tanks, only 22 were lost directly in combat conditions.

One of the strongest units before the war was the 4th MK with headquarters in Lvov. This corps had 101 KV tanks of various modifications, 50 of which belonged to the 8th TD and 49 of the 32nd TD. On the first day of the war, heavy tanks were just advancing to combat positions, while two battalions of medium T-28s and a motorized infantry battalion struck in order to knock out parts of the German 15th motorized corps, which had broken through to Radekhov. Only partial success was achieved, and on the morning of June 23, the army command set the task of the 32nd TD to finally defeat the enemy. However, being on the march, the division received a new order - to destroy the German units in the Great Bridges area. Having established interaction with the 3rd cavalry division, the tankers began to carry out a combat mission, but in the evening the 2nd TD was thrown to eliminate another enemy grouping located in the Kamenka area. As a result, the forces of the division were divided. Two tank battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lysenko remained near Radekhov and during the continuous battle, which lasted from 7 to 20 hours, destroyed 18 tanks and 16 guns with their own losses of 11 tanks.

On the morning of June 24, the 8th TD was withdrawn from the corps, and the 32nd TD was ordered to concentrate at Nemirov, where the next morning the division entered into battle with the German 9th Panzer Division. Since by that time most of the tanks were on the verge of exhausting their motor resources, the command acted very wisely by sending KV tanks in the first echelon, and concentrating T-34s and T-26s along the flanks. This tactic brought success - the enemy immediately lost 37 tanks, several armored vehicles and anti-tank guns. The losses of the 32nd TD turned out to be much less and amounted to 9 tanks and 3 BA. However achieved success was not fixed due to the lack of support from the infantry units.

In the evening of the same day, the division was forced to leave the encirclement with the remaining forces, destroying 16 tanks in a counterattack and losing 15 of its own.
During this time, power in Lvov actually passed into the hands of the nationalists, who sowed panic not only among the civilian population, but also in the rear. Soviet troops began to gradually leave the city, on the outskirts of which the 32nd TD and 81st MD were still fighting, and by July 1 Lvov was occupied by German troops.

Subsequently, units of the 8th and 32nd Panzer Divisions fought defensive battles, inflicting significant damage on the enemy. For example, on June 9, near the village of Zherebki, tanks of the 32nd TD, with the support of aviation from the Southwestern Front, destroyed more than 30 enemy tanks in several battles. However, the 63rd TP, the most combat-ready at that time, itself had 30 tanks (out of 149 at the beginning of the war), which forced the command to withdraw the division to the rear. On the afternoon of July 12, the remaining tanks entered Kyiv, taking up defense in the UR, and the personnel departed for the Vladimir region.

By the beginning of the war, the 43rd Panzer Division of the 18th Mechanized Corps had only 5 KV-1s. Its individual units began to fight the very next day, but the division went into battle only on June 26, inflicting a sudden blow to the flank and rear of the 11th division of the 48th motorized corps of the Germans. Only two heavy tanks took part in this attack, however, this was enough for the mixed tank group of Colonel Tsibin (it also included 75 light T-26s and KhT-130 \ 133 and 2 medium T-34s) to throw the enemy back 30 km and went to Dubno. Eleven T-26s, 4 flamethrower tanks and both KV-1s were lost in this battle. The report of the division commander on its actions from June 22 to August 10, 1941 indicated the following:

“... Pursuing the enemy infantry, our tanks were met by fire from enemy tanks from ambushes from a place, but (the ambush) was attacked by the KV and T-34 tanks that rushed forward, and after them the T-26 tanks ... The KV and T-34 tanks, not having a sufficient number of armor-piercing shells, they fired with fragmentation shells and crushed and destroyed enemy tanks and anti-tank guns with their mass, moving from one line to another ... ”

Soon the number of heavy tanks was reduced to zero, because due to technical problems in enemy territory, the rest of the vehicles had to be left. The 8th mechanized corps was interesting in that, in addition to light tanks, it had 51 heavy five-turreted T-35 tanks. There were also plenty of new types of vehicles - on June 22, the corps included 100 T-34s, 69 KV-1s and 8 (according to other sources - 2) KV-2s.
On the morning of June 22, the 8th MK was ordered to go to Sambor, and in the evening the corps was redirected to Kurovitsa, where advanced German forces were expected to appear. Having reached the designated area, the tanks were again turned to the west, with the task of reaching Lvov. Here they met with the retreating units of the 32nd TD and were stopped by the command on the Western Bug River. Part of the forces was forced to engage in battle with the Ukrainian nationalists, while the rest went to the area of ​​Srebno, Boldura, Stanislavchik, Razhniuv. By the evening of June 24, almost without meeting the Germans, the losses were calculated. Having passed 495 km, the corps lost almost 50% of its original composition on the march. Most annoying of all was the loss not only of new equipment, but also of a large number of tractors, tractors and vehicles with ammunition. Being in such an unfavorable situation, the corps was forced to obey the next order and advance in the direction of Brody, Berestechko, Boremel, where it fought fierce battles for the next three. Since the situation in other sectors of the front was rapidly changing for the worse, part of the forces of the 12th TD, which was then on the march from Brody to Podkamen, was thrown near Dubno and Kozin. 25 T-34 and KV tanks were tasked with covering the advance of the corps from the south-western direction, while the rest of the forces were replenished with fuel and ammunition. Only a few hours were allotted for everything, after which the division went on the offensive against Dubno, freeing several settlements and overturning the German barriers. One of the main tasks was to connect with units of the 7th Motorized Division, but this was never done. On June 28, the Germans themselves switched to attacking operations, reaching the rear of the Soviet formations. However, it was not possible to achieve an easy victory here. Two groups of tanks (six KV and four T-34s) allocated to liquidate the German breakthrough literally shot down enemy vehicles in a head-on collision without incurring their own losses.

On the same day, the corps was prudently taken to the front reserve. Of the 899 tanks in combat, only 96 were lost - a good indicator, given plight, in which units of the 8th MK operated. The greatest losses fell on the share of heavy tanks T-35, which by July 1 did not exist at all. The KV and T-34 tanks lost the least - 3 and 18 vehicles, respectively.

Left with 207 combat-ready tanks (43 KV, 31 T-34, 69 BT-7, 57 T-26 and 7 T-40), the corps left on July 2 to Proskurov, from where 134 vehicles were sent to Kharkov for repairs. Then the remnants of the 8th MK were transferred to Nizhyn, where in mid-July the corps administration was disbanded.

In the battle of Brody, he took very Active participation 15th mechanized corps under the command of Major General I.I. Karpezo. At disposal were 64 (according to other sources - 60) KV, 51 T-28, 69 (according to other sources - 71) T-34, 418 BT-7 and 45 T-26 of various production series, as well as 116 armored vehicles BA-10 and 46 BA-20. The bulk of the heavy tanks were part of the 10th TD, and only one KV-1 was in the 37th TD, which was basically equipped with BT tanks.

The first battle of the advance detachment of the 10th TD, which consisted of the 3rd battalion of the 20th TP (T-34 and BA-10), was carried out on the morning of June 23 near Radekhov. Soviet tankers managed to knock out 20 tanks here and destroy 16 anti-tank guns, losing 6 "thirty-fours" and 20 armored vehicles. The detachment was forced to leave their positions only when they ran out of ammunition and fuel, leaving the city to the Germans. The rest of the division acted in discord and could not provide support to their comrades. For example, on the night of June 23-24, two battalions of German Pz.Kpfw.III attacked a column of BT-7 tanks, knocking out 46 of them with minimal losses of their own.

Having no information about the enemy, the 37th division entered the Adama area, where there were no enemy tanks at all. At the same time, the 19th TP of the 10th TD got stuck in the swampy area between Sokoluvka and Konty. His first battalion consisted of 31 KV-1 tanks and 5 BT-7 tanks, the second was fully equipped with T-34s, and the third had only light tanks - as you can see, this unit was very powerful and posed a serious threat if the material was used correctly. Having barely got out of the swamp, on June 25, the regiment received an order to advance on Brody. The tanks had to travel about 60 km in the heat and in conditions of heavy dustiness of the roads. According to the report of the commander of the heavy tank battalion, Captain Z.K. Slyusarenko, half of the vehicles were stuck due to numerous breakdowns, and no enemy tanks were found near Brody. Immediately followed by an order from the command to return to the previous area, but at dawn on June 26, another order was received - to move to Radekhov, where the 10th mechanized and 20th tank regiments entered the battle. Of the 31 KV, 18 vehicles took part in the attack, which went head-on on the German anti-tank batteries. The battalion managed to advance only 2 km, losing 16 tanks in this attack. Subsequently, Captain Slyusarenko recalled:

“Enemy shells cannot penetrate our armor, but they break caterpillars, demolish towers. KB lights up to my left. A plume of smoke with a fiery, sting-thin core shot up into the sky above him. "Kovalchuk is on fire!" - skipped a heart. I can’t help this crew in any way: twelve cars are rushing forward with me. Another KB stopped: the shell ripped off its turret. KB tanks were very strong vehicles, but they clearly lacked speed and agility.”

A day earlier, the 20th tank regiment got into a similar situation, which, when attacking enemy positions, irretrievably lost 4 heavy vehicles. The remaining KV divisions were used separately and did not bring much benefit.

To save the remaining tanks on June 28, permission was received to retreat. The division, which still possessed about 30 heavy tanks, moved to Toporuv, where a capital bridge made it possible to transport the KV to the other side of the river. From June 30 to July 2, tankers fought several battles in Busk, Krasny, Koltuva and Tarnopol, losing a few more vehicles, until the order was given to withdraw to Podvolochisk. On the road to the new location, the division commander, Major General Ogurtsov, ordered to equip defensive positions in order to delay the German tank column that had broken through. Around 8 pm, the German tank unit was ambushed, losing 6 tanks and 2 guns. The next morning, the 19th TD went to the Zbruch River, the bridge over which was blown up. Unable to transport heavier vehicles, Ogurtsov sent 6 KV-1s and two T-34s south to the Tarnorud region, where this group was tasked with delaying the German advance as much as possible. On July 8, the main forces received a new combat mission - to capture the city of Berdichev and at the same time organize the defense of the crossings across the Gnilopyat River and at the Plekhovaya settlement.

On July 10, the 15th and 16th mechanized corps launched a counteroffensive, inflicting powerful blows south of Berdichev against parts of the German 11th Panzer Division, which had mainly medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV. the battles for the city lasted two days, and the Soviet tanks broke into the streets of Berdichev twice, but without the support of the infantry they were forced to retreat. Particularly distinguished in these battles was the consolidated tank detachment of the 10th TD, in which almost all the surviving KV tanks were assembled. They had to act in conditions of strong anti-tank defense, and the Germans themselves tried to counterattack as soon as they were given a suitable opportunity. In one of these attacks against eight BT-7s, twelve Pz.Kpfw.IIIs participated, but two KV-1s (recently received from the factory) came to the aid of their comrades in a timely manner, one of which was commanded by the commander of the 16th mechanized corps A.D. Sokolov . The Germans, seeing the further futility of this attack, preferred to retreat, which made it possible for the infantry to occupy the previously captured airfield and move forward a couple of kilometers. On the morning of July 11, a flamethrower battalion KhT-130 and KhT-133 under the command of Captain Krepchuk from the 44th TD broke into Berdichev, and KV and T-34 from the 10th TD came out from the southern outskirts. They managed to temporarily drive the Germans out of Berdichev, but a few hours later the enemy quickly counterattacked, forcing our units to retreat. The flamethrower battalion suffered the most, in which 5 vehicles remained. Sokolov reinforced it with two KV-1s and one T-34, but by the end of the day only 4 tanks survived. The command of the division failed to organize a withdrawal - by July 13, all KVs and most of the "thirty-fours" were lost. Attempts to inflict deblocking blows with the help of BT tanks were unsuccessful. By the end of July 17, the 10th Panzer Division, being completely surrounded, practically ceased to exist as a combat unit.

In fairness, it should be noted that the 1st German Panzer Group, advancing on Kyiv, lost 40% of its tanks in 13 days, some of which could not be restored. Although the Soviet armies failed to destroy the German troops in this area, they significantly delayed the advance of the enemy deep into the right-bank Ukraine, although almost all T-34 and KV tanks were lost. In the 37th Panzer Division, things were much worse - by June 15, it had only 6 tanks left (one T-34 and five BT-7) and 11 BA-10s, while the command reported the destruction of “24 tanks and 8 tankettes ... ”

The report on the actions of the 15th mechanized corps, submitted on August 2, 1941, indicated that the KV tanks had proven themselves on the good side. At the same time, their main shortcomings were emphasized: when a projectile and large-caliber bullets strike, the turret jams, the engine resource is extremely small, the main and side clutches often fail, and only another KV could evacuate a knocked-out KV. Below is the statistics of losses and availability of HF on the Southwestern Front, compiled on August 1, 1941:

- sent for repair to industrial plants - 2 (4th mechanized corps);

- left at the place of quartering units - 10 (2 in the 4th mechanized corps, 6 in the 8th mechanized corps, 2 in the 19th mechanized corps);

- fell behind on the way and went missing - 24 (8 in the 4th mechanized corps, 10 in the 8th mechanized corps, 5 in the 15th mechanized corps, 1 in the 19th mechanized corps);

- transferred to other parts - 1 (4th mechanized corps);

- irretrievable losses - 177 (73 in the 4th mechanized corps, 28 in the 8th mechanized corps, 52 in the 15th mechanized corps, 2 in the 19th mechanized corps, 22 in the 22nd mechanized corps).

- in total, as of August 1, in parts of the South-Western Front there were 7 combat-ready KB - 1 in the 22nd mechanized corps and 6 in the 8th mechanized corps.

Thus, in the battles in Ukraine, the troops of the Southwestern Front lost 94% of all KV-1s available on June 22, 1941. By the way, on the Western Front, over the same period of time, this figure was 100% ...

As already mentioned, unsuccessful actions in Belarus and the Baltic states led to the fact that on July 16 the advanced German units were on the near approaches to Orsha and Shklov, pinching the remnants of the armies of the Western Front in pincers. The 7th Panzer Division, which had pulled ahead, with the support of a paratrooper, cut the Minsk-Moscow highway, blocking the Soviet armies' escape route. A day later, in the region of Dukhovshchina, a major battle took place, during which the 69th Panzer and 110th Rifle Divisions inflicted several counterattacks on the Germans, but, having suffered heavy losses, were forced to retreat to their original lines. During this time, in the region of Orsha and Smolensk, the 16th Army, which had recently arrived from the Far East, in which there were 1300 tanks, was almost completely surrounded.

By July 19, the German 10th Panzer Division captured Yelnya, forming a large ledge pushed to the east. Here, the Soviet command had a real opportunity to create its own boiler, but for now, the offensive of the enemy forces on this sector of the front was trying to delay the 38th rifle and 101st tank divisions (80 BT-7 and 7 KV-1) under the command of General Rokossovsky. First, they were given the standard offensive task of hitting Dukhovshchina and Yartsevo, then developing the offensive on Smolensk. In the battle for Yartsevo, this group managed to stop the 7th Panzer Division, and the city changed hands several times. Heavy tanks proved to be the best here, especially since the basis of the German forces were light Pz.38 (t) and medium Pz.Kpfw.III, whose armor could not withstand shelling from a 76-mm KV gun.

At the end of July, the Rokossovsky group was taken to a new line, but by this time the tank division had lost most of its BTs, and only two T-34s and three armored vehicles arrived from the replenishment. This, however, did not greatly affect the decision of the Headquarters to again strike at Smolensk. From July 25 to July 27, the troops of the 28th and 30th armies managed to break through the German positions and advance several tens of kilometers along the Smolensk highway. In parallel, the 101st TD again launched an offensive against Yartsevo, capturing the city and gaining a foothold on the opposite bank of the Vop River. Over the next two days, tankers continuously attacked the Germans in the Yelnya region, but did not achieve success. Only on June 30, Soviet tanks struck 13 (!) times at the positions of the SS division “Reich” and the 10th Panzer Division. All this led to the fact that on September 10, the remnants of the Rokossovsky group had to be taken to the rear for reorganization, due to large losses in the materiel.

In parallel with it, the 28th Army of General V.Ya.Kachalov was advancing. In the period from July 18 to 27, its formations advanced along the Smolensk highway, inflicting on the Germans, in their words, "critical losses." However, on August 1, having regrouped his forces, Guderian sent two army and one motorized corps to eliminate this breakthrough. Near Roslavl, the remnants of the 28th Army were almost completely destroyed. About 250 tanks, 359 guns, 38,000 personnel, including the army commander, were lost. The total losses in tanks in the battles near Smolensk are estimated at 2000 units.

By the end of August, having defeated the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts, the Germans actually received an open road to Moscow, where there was no continuous line and long-term fortifications. However, in the southern direction, the Army Group of the Southwestern Front continued to stubbornly defend, covering the approaches to Kyiv. The front commander, General Kirponos, had 69 divisions and 3 brigades at his disposal. Of these, in the Korostenets direction, with a length of about 200 km, 6 tank and 3 mechanized divisions of the 5th Army operated under the overall command of General Potapov. The strike force in this area was made up of units of the former 9th, 19th and 20th MK, where the bulk of the tanks still consisted of T-26s and BTs. By the end of July, after a month of continuous fighting, about 140 tanks remained in the mechanized corps, but at the same time, the Germans did not have them at all (!). Until August 10, having received about a hundred KV-1s and T-34s as replacements, Potapov's group launched counterattacks, forcing the Germans to deploy additional divisions to the north, instead of delivering a concentrated attack on Kyiv.

At the same time, a major battle was taking place in the Uman direction, in which the remnants of the 15th, 16th and 24th mechanized corps took part. Many divisions had no more than 30% of the staff, and there were only a few new tanks in them. Trying to prevent a new encirclement, the command of the Southwestern Front, the forces of the 6th and 26th armies, launched several counterattacks on the flank of the German 1st Panzer Group, temporarily stopping its advance to the south. At the same time, the 2nd Mechanized Corps was withdrawn from the Southern Front, where on July 20 there were 468 tanks and 155 armored vehicles. The lion's share of tanks in it was still BT-7 and T-26, but the 11th TD also had several KV-1 and T-34 units - at the beginning of the war there were 50 and 10 of them, respectively. During the battles on the Dniester River, which took place from June 23 to July 9, the division did not lose a single heavy tank and only four "thirty-fours", while the main losses fell on light BTs (about 20 units). Having taken the line on the Reut River, the 2nd MK was soon assigned to the reserve. At that moment, it included 10 KV-1, 46 T-34, 275 BT-7, 38 T-26, 9 KhT-130 \ KhT-133, as well as 13 T-37 and T-38 amphibious tanks. Field brigades repaired heavy tanks in a timely manner, which made it possible to avoid losses among the KV outside combat conditions.

Near Uman, the corps received the task of holding the city and defeating the enemy grouping. All day on July 22, tanks attacked the enemy, forcing him to retreat to the Berestovets area, irretrievably losing only five BT-7s and five T-34s. However, further the Germans put up very fierce resistance. On July 23, the 11th and 16th tank divisions were able to advance several kilometers, reaching the settlement of Yarovatka and the stations of Potash and Podobnaya, where they had to fight defensive battles, covering the withdrawal of units of the 6th and 12th armies . During this time, the number of tanks in the corps was reduced to 147 units (KV-1, T-34 - 18, BT - 68, T-26 - 26, KhT - 7, T-37 - 27), but more armored vehicles remained - 90 BA -10 and 64 BA-20. Rolling back, the 2nd MK over the next two weeks was left practically without materiel, and on August 6, an order was issued by the commander of the 6th Army to destroy all equipment left without ammunition and fuel ... Colonel Kuzmin led the remnants of the 11th TD out of the encirclement, which allowed August to form on its basis the 132nd tank brigade.

Following the tank divisions of the 2nd MK, their fate was repeated by the 12th TD, assembled from the remnants of the 8th Corps and supplemented by new KV-1 and T-34s that came straight from the factory. On the morning of August 7, the troops of General Kostenko, with the support of tank groups, reached the Ros River southeast of Boguslav. The next day, the consolidated mobile group, which consisted of parts of the 12th TD and the 5th Cavalry Corps, received the task of breaking through to the Dnieper through Rzhishchev, striking the enemy's flank. Stubborn battles here continued until August 12, bringing only new losses in tanks. This made it possible by August 24 to completely liquidate the Soviet grouping near Uman and defeat the troops in the "Gomel cauldron".

Having crossed the Dnieper, the front command prepared for the defense of Kyiv, having previously pulled up reserves. In particular, the 10th and 11th tank brigades, formed on the basis of the “horseless” 43rd division, arrived at the front from Kharkov. Each of them had about 100 KV-1, T-34 and T-60 tanks, two artillery battalions, and a motorized rifle battalion. The 12th, 129th and 130th brigades, staffed in the same way, went next to Kyiv.

However, the command could not properly use these forces. Parts were transferred to the front quite quickly, but they were brought into battle separately. As a result, the 1st Panzer Group Kleist, which had not received reinforcements from Germany for a month and had only 190 tanks, defeated the troops of the Southwestern Front. After the end of the Kyiv battle, on September 20, 1941, 884 Soviet tanks became the trophies of the Germans, some of which were in good condition.

In the course of repelling the next German offensive against Moscow, carried out as part of Operation Typhoon, the 4th brigade, formed from the crews of the defeated 15th TD, was especially successful. The brigade had 49 tanks (T-34 and KV-1 battalion and T-60 light tank battalion). The brigade was commanded by Colonel Katukov, who at the end of June 1941 took part in a tank battle in western Ukraine. Then under his leadership was the 20th TD, equipped with BT tanks of various modifications. In the battle near Klevan, the division lost almost all of its materiel and was reorganized into a rifle division, but Katukov drew the right conclusions from this. He later wrote in his memoirs:

“... The experience of fighting in Ukraine for the first time made me think about the issue of the widespread use of tank ambushes ...”

On October 4, 1941, the tanks of the 4th brigade advanced onto the Orel-Tula road, along which the 4th tank division of Langerman was advancing. Without wasting his energy on a head-on collision, Katukov decided to act more carefully. When the Germans moved to Tula on October 6, Soviet tanks launched a sudden flank attack, destroying more than 30 tanks. Then Katukov withdrew to previously prepared positions and met the enemy at the village of Pervy Voin south of Mtsensk. In the battle, which lasted 12 hours, the Germans lost another 43 tanks, 16 anti-tank guns and up to 500 soldiers, while the 4th brigade had minimal losses in equipment. By the end of the battle, it turned out that the brigade had lost only 6 tanks, of which 2 were completely burned out, and 4 were able to be evacuated to the rear for repairs. The KV tanks in this battle were used as reinforcement vehicles, spending part of the time in reserve.
The final defeat of Langerman's division took place on 11 October. Entering the outskirts of Mtsensk, abandoned by the Soviet troops, the column of the 4th Panzer Division stretched for almost 12 km, so that the artillery and infantry units attached to it were out of the radio communication zone. At that moment, the Germans were attacked by Soviet tanks, which cut the column into several parts. A few hours later, the battle was over - according to the Germans themselves, in the battles near Mtsensk, the 4th Panzer Division lost 242 tanks, practically ceasing to exist. Of this number, 133 tanks were destroyed by the Katukovites, earning the title of the 1st Guards for their brigade.

However, in most cases, the KV-1 was used in the old fashioned way. For example, at the end of October 1941, the newly formed 29th brigade under the command of Colonel K.A. Malygin was transferred to the 16th Army. The brigade had two tank battalions (one with 4 KV-1 and 11 T-34s, the second was equipped with 20 T-60 tanks), a battalion of submachine gunners, artillery and mortar batteries. In the first battle on October 29, defending the village of Rozhdestvenno, 24 tanks and two armored personnel carriers were knocked out and destroyed. However, the very next day, the brigade was given the task of capturing the village of Skirmanovo, which the Germans turned into a well-defended stronghold. Malygin was well aware that a frontal attack, at best, would lead to heavy losses, but he could not argue with the order. Here is how the commissar of the 29th brigade V.G. Gulyaev described this scene:

“To coordinate the efforts of the two brigades, Colonel Myakunin arrived from the headquarters of the front. Malygin proposed to bypass Skirmanovo on the left and strike at the flank and rear. But the representative of the front strongly rejected this option. He believed that there would not be enough time or energy for a roundabout maneuver.

“But to attack here in the forehead means to send people to death,” Malygin stood his ground.

- And what do you want to do without losses in the war? - Myakukhin objected with a caustic grin ... "

In the first attack, the brigade lost six T-34s. Then, trying to break through the defenses from the south, the Germans knocked out five T-60s, one "thirty-four" and one KV. As a result, by the end of the day on October 30, 19 tanks remained in the 29th brigade. By the way, by the same time, only 2 KVs, 7 T-34s and 6 BT-7s remained in the famous 1st Guards Tank Brigade. and allowed the Germans to reach Klin on November 22. The task of defending the city was assigned to the 25th and 31st brigade, but the tanks were still mediocre, and by the end of November 24, both brigades, in which no more than 10 tanks remained, were to leave the city. By December 5, Soviet troops left Naro-Fominsk and nearby settlements. According to Zhukov, then “the most threatening moment was created” in the battle for Moscow. Trying to push the enemy back, the command planned several spontaneous counterattacks, although in most tank units only 10 to 30% of the original composition remained.

While the enemy did not pull up the reserves, the headquarters carried out a new counteroffensive, this time more prepared. By the forces of the 16th and 20th armies, by December 25, 1941, the enemy was pushed back by almost 100 km, having lost about 150 tanks, which were out of order due to technical problems, and it was not possible to evacuate them due to the rapid advance of the Soviet troops .

In 1941, in connection with the transition of industry to "military rails", the design of the KV-1 tank underwent a number of changes. In the autumn of 1941, to increase the cruising range, they began to install 3-5 additional fuel tanks on the side fenders (they were not connected to the power system), and the stamped tracks were replaced with cast ones. Since December 1941, the 71TK-3 radio station was replaced by 10-R. After the transfer of KV-1 production to ChKZ, some of the tanks were equipped with cast turrets, which differed from welded ones in the rounded shape of the aft niche. The thickness of the reservation was increased to 82 mm.

Instead of the F-32 cannon, the stock of which ended at the end of 1941, they began to install the ZIS-5. This gun was created on the basis of the F-34, differing from it in the design of the elements of the cradle and armored mask. Outwardly, the tanks with the new gun could be distinguished by the length of the barrel, which was 41.5 calibers. Due to the modifications carried out, the initial velocity of the armor-piercing projectile increased to 680 m/s, although this was no longer enough to fight the German Pz.IV equipped with long-barreled 75-mm guns. The vertical guidance angles remained the same as those of the F-32, but the recoil length was reduced to 390 mm.

The installation of the new gun entailed the replacement of the TOD-8 telescopic sight with the TMFD-7 and the PT-6 periscope sight with the PT-4-7. Due to the lack of TMFD-7, some of the tanks could be equipped with alternative sights 9T-7, 10T-7 or 10T-13. Instead of PT-4-7, the installation of PT-4-3 was provided. To combat new German tanks, the BR-353A armor-burning projectile with a BM fuse was introduced into the ammunition load since 1942, which, at an initial speed of 352 m / s, can penetrate armor up to 75 mm thick at a distance of up to 1000 meters. In addition to armor-burning ammunition, BR-350P and BR-350PS sub-caliber ammunition arrived, which had an initial speed of 965 m / s. Their armor penetration at a distance of 500 meters was 92 mm, and at a distance of 1000 meters - 60 mm. Since October 1943, BR-345A sub-caliber armor-piercing tracer shells appeared. The total stock of shells increased to 114 pieces. However, all of the above measures did not lead to a significant improvement in the design of the KV-1 and for the most part were “wartime measures”.

After receiving the first information from the front about the combat use of heavy tanks at the LKZ, work began on strengthening the armor of the KV. The only weapon that could penetrate the frontal armor of a Soviet tank was the 8.8 Flak 18 anti-aircraft gun. Anti-aircraft shells, even without an armor-piercing steel core, had a muzzle velocity of 810 m / s and could penetrate a sheet of 80 mm armor set at an angle of 30 degrees with distance 1000 mm. At shorter distances, this figure increased to 87-97 mm. As a rule, the KV-1 was able to disable after 2-3 hits on the turret and hull. In this regard, it is interesting to mention that the leadership of the Red Army was well aware of the reports on the use of the Flak 18 in France, where this gun was used to fight the French B-1bis heavy tanks, the armor of which was not inferior to the KV-1, but timely conclusions in 1940 were not possible. were not made.

Since only the LKZ remained the only plant that produced the KV-1 in mass quantities, its specialists developed a simple but effective armor enhancement scheme, previously used on the T-28 medium tank. 25-mm armor plates were additionally welded onto the tank turret, bringing the total armor thickness to 100 mm. At the same time, a small gap remained between the turret and the hinged armor, which improved the protection of the tank during shelling with cumulative (then they were called “armor-burning”) shells.

The tanks modified in this way could be distinguished by the huge rivets through which the hinged armor plates were attached. In Soviet and some Russian sources they were sometimes called KV-1e(“shielded”). According to some reports, work to strengthen the reservation in the fall of 1941 was also carried out by the Leningrad Metal Plant.

The bulk of the “shielded” tanks were sent to the Leningrad Front, but the positional nature of the hostilities did not allow full disclosure of all the capabilities of the KV. In addition, tank units constantly complained about the overweight of the tank, which entailed not only technical problems. After the march of even a few KV units, the road along which they passed became impassable for other types of equipment, including caterpillar ones. Bridges that could withstand a 47-48-ton vehicle were discussed earlier - there were often cases when the HF was carried out into the river along with a structure that was clearly not designed for such loads. As for the cross-country ability of a heavy tank on loose soil or swampy terrain, in this regard, the KV was much inferior to the T-34, in which this indicator also did not differ for the better.

All these factors led to the fact that in the spring of 1942, work was launched to lighten the heavy tank in order to increase its mobility and speed performance. The design of the new modification was carried out by ChTZ specialists, who were given a difficult task.
Based on the experience of the battles, which showed that even 100 mm armor does not save from the concentrated fire of 75 mm anti-tank guns or 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, it was decided to partially weaken the armor protection of the turret and hull. Now the thickness of its frontal part was 82 mm, sides and roof - 40 mm, stern - 75 mm. The tower was cast and had a completely new, streamlined shape with a single hatch. According to the experience of German tank builders, a commander's cupola with five glass blocks was introduced, which allowed the tank commander to conduct all-round observation of the battlefield without the use of optical instruments. The thickness of the armor of the frontal part of the hull corresponded to the usual KV-1 and was 75 mm, but the sides were covered with 40 mm armor. To reduce the mass of the tank, lightweight track rollers were used, and the width of the cast track tracks was reduced to 608 mm. In addition, the individual components of the power plant were lightened, in which the lubrication and cooling system was improved.

One of the most important moments was the installation of a new gearbox, designed by engineer N.F. Shashmurin. She had 10 gears (eight forward and two reverse) and was equipped with a demultiplier. In addition, a new main clutch and final drives were installed on the tank. The composition of the armament has not changed, however, due to the lack of ZiS-5 guns, F-34s were installed on serial tanks - in this case, the ammunition increased from 90 to 114 shells. On the modified tank, the commander's seat was moved from the front right to the rear left corner, behind the gunner's back. The responsibility of the loader was transferred to the arrow of the stern machine gun, and the machine gun itself was moved to the left, which allowed the tank commander to shoot from it.

In sum, these measures made it possible to bring the mass of the modified KV-1 to 42,500 kg and increase its mobility. During state trials, which took place from July 28 to August 20, 1942, the new heavy tank showed the best speed characteristics with virtually the same level of armor protection. On the last day of testing, it was accepted into service under the designation KV-1s(“high-speed”) and since the end of the same month, he began to replace the conventional KV-1 on the conveyor. In September 1942 alone, the Chelyabinsk plant produced 180 serial tanks, but by the end of the year, the production of KV-1s began to decline. The reason for this step was quite understandable - apart from more powerful armor, the heavy tank had no advantages over the medium T-34.

In September 1942, Katukov, a Major General of the Panzer Troops whom we know, was summoned to the Headquarters of the High Command, and answered Stalin’s question about tanks that KV-1s often fail, break bridges, are too slow and are no different in armament from “thirty-fours ". The problem of the KV was to equip it with more powerful guns, then the question of their effectiveness would be put in a completely different way ...

Although Katukov's opinion was subjective and did not fully reflect the opinion of all tankers, in many respects the combat general, who had gone through more than one tank battle, was absolutely right. The main problem of the KV-1 at that time was precisely in armament, since by the beginning of 1943 the 76.2-mm ZiS-5 gun turned out to be practically powerless against the armor of the new German tanks Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther”, Pz.Kpfw.VI “Tiger ” and new modifications of the medium tank Pz.Kpfw.IV (with hinged armored screens). But back in 1940, an order was given for the construction and subsequent launch into mass production of tanks KV-3, equipped with a 107 mm ZiS-6 gun, and ( T-220) with an 85 mm F-39 gun. In terms of armor and armament power, these combat vehicles were noticeably better than the serial KV-1, but in the summer of 1941, in connection with the outbreak of war, work on them was suspended, and then completely stopped. As a result, the tank armies of the Red Army until the autumn of 1943 were forced to be content with the existing fleet of heavy tanks, inferior to the new German cars similar class. As a result of this, from August 1942, the production of the KV-1s began to be gradually curtailed and completely stopped in December, temporarily replacing it with an “intermediate” heavy tank.

Such a large number on the designation of the next modification of the KV denoted the caliber of the gun with which the tank was equipped. As has been repeatedly pointed out, one of the most significant shortcomings of the KV-1 was its short-barreled 76.2 mm gun, which by the autumn of 1942 could not successfully deal with heavy enemy armored vehicles. When choosing a new gun, the emphasis was on defeating the 100-mm frontal armor of the German Panther and Tiger heavy tanks. The most effective in this regard were the 122-mm A-19 gun, the 152-mm ML-20 howitzer gun and the 85-mm 52-K anti-aircraft gun mod. 1939. It was the latter that became the prototype of the D-5T tank gun, the development of which was completed in May 1943. To speed up testing and subsequent mass production, the hull, undercarriage and turret were transferred from the KV-1s almost unchanged. The assembly of the KV-85 tanks began in August, but it was produced in small numbers, since in the spring of 1944 a more advanced IS-2 tank was put into mass production. For the same reason, the GBTU did not accept the version with the 122-mm D-25T gun for serial construction.

During the war, attempts were made to strengthen the armament by installing a 122 mm U-11 howitzer in a new turret. This version, which received the designation , was tested in March 1942 and was recommended for mass production as a fire support tank (essentially - self-propelled guns).
A more radical option provided for the installation of three guns (two 45 mm 20K and one 76.2 mm F-34) in a fixed wheelhouse. A heavy tank with similar armament was tested at the end of 1941, after which the armament was reduced to two F-34 guns. As expected, such an upgrade did not find support and remained at an experimental level.

The last attempt to seriously improve the characteristics of the KV was made in mid-1942 and led to the appearance of the “medium tank with heavy armor”. Since it was possible to achieve a reduction in the huge mass of the tank only by reworking its undercarriage on the KV-13, it was shortened by one track roller, as a result of which the hull length decreased to 6650 mm, and the width to 2800 mm. In terms of armament and equipment, the medium tank did not differ from the KV-1.
In tests conducted in the fall of 1942, the KV-13 proved to be not the best - the car constantly broke down, and in terms of the sum of its characteristics, it turned out to be worse than the T-34. However, the path chosen by the designers turned out to be correct and subsequently led to the appearance of much more successful IS-1 and IS-2 tanks.

With flamethrower modifications, things were much better. The first heavy tank of this type was created by the LKZ forces to replace the light OT-130 and OT-133, most of which were lost in the summer battles of 1941. Compared to the conventional KV-1, its flamethrower modification KV-6 had a minimum of differences, since the ATO-41 flamethrower was mounted in the frontal hull plate instead of the course machine gun. There was no information about the number of vehicles built, but in September 1941 four tanks were sent to the disposal of the 124th brigade operating on the Leningrad front.
Work in this direction was continued in Chelyabinsk, where the production of a modification began in January 1942, and then KV-8s. On these tanks, the flamethrower was installed in the turret, which increased the destruction sector. However, due to the tightness in the fighting compartment, the ZiS-5 gun had to be replaced with a more compact 20K 45-mm caliber. To hide this drawback from the enemy, the muzzle of the gun was equipped with an additional casing. The total production of KV-8 of all modifications amounted to 137 copies.
During the combat use of the KV-8, it quickly became clear that without the support of tanks with stronger weapons, as a rule, these were serial KV or T-34 \ 76, flamethrower units suffered heavy losses. The engineers of factory #100 tried to correct this shortcoming, and in the spring of 1942 they proposed a modification with a 76.2 mm cannon and an ATO-41 flamethrower, essentially returning to the KV-6 variant. They refused from its serial production, believing that the existing “eights” would be enough for the front.

As the tank troops were saturated with new equipment, heavy KV tanks began to be gradually converted into BREMs, removing the turret with the main armament from them and installing the equipment necessary for such vehicles. About the exact number of such tractor tanks, designated as KV-T, the information was not saved.

However, work on the design of a heavy tractor-transporter was started shortly before the war. The need for such a machine was felt not only in the BTV of the Red Army, but also in other branches of the military. Theoretically, a heavily armored transporter could follow infantry or tank units, towing behind field gun. After the appearance of the KV and repeated demands from the Soviet-Finnish front, the LKZ began to create a similar machine. The transporter was developed from January 1940 by a team led by the lead engineer N. Khalkiopov and bore the design designation . True, at that time his main task was to evacuate wrecked tanks from the battlefield.

Compared to the KV tank, the tractor-transporter received a completely new layout. The transmission compartment was located in front, behind it there was a control compartment and a place for technicians, an engine was installed in the middle part of the hull, and the aft part of the hull was reserved for the transport compartment. The machine used most of the elements from the chassis of the KV-1, including road wheels and suspension, but the drive and steering wheels (the location of which has changed) were redesigned. In addition, three supporting wheels were replaced with four.

Work on the Object 212 tractor moved quickly, and by February 1940, a full-size wooden mock-up was ready. Representatives of ABTU spoke positively about the new armored vehicle, but it was not possible to advance further work. It was not even obtained permission to build a prototype. A possible reason for this step was the high workload of the LKZ with the production of mass-produced KV-1s, so that there were simply no human resources or production capacities left to fine-tune the Object 212.

During the war years, they remembered another method of using tanks. In the mid 1930s. several experiments were carried out on installation on light tanks BT-5 missile weapons. The system turned out to be unfinished, although it showed good destructive characteristics. A few years later, in May 1942, factory #100 started designing a similar setup for the KV-1 tank. The most effective seemed to be the use of 132-mm rockets from the BM-8. On the sides of the tank, two armored boxes with two guides for the RS were attached, which were controlled from the driver's seat. This system, which received the designation KRAST-1 (short tank rocket artillery system), was tested at the Small Arms Research Range near Chebakul station and earned a good rating from the military. With the advent of the KV-1s modification, the system was transferred to new pattern tank. According to the test results, the director of ChKZ Zh.Ya. Kotin considered it necessary to apply to the NKTP with a proposal for the serial production of KRAST-1. In his appeal, it was indicated that this system is easy to use, does not require large material costs and can be installed by field repair teams. However, the People's Commissariat did not give permission for the release of KRAST-1.

As can be seen from the above material, heavy tanks KV-1, for a number of reasons, could not make a decisive contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, it was an epoch-making and no less legendary vehicle than the well-known T-34.

Interestingly, before the war, German intelligence was well aware of the presence in the Soviet troops of completely new tanks with anti-ballistic armor, which are capable of withstanding long-term shelling from 37-mm and 50-mm anti-tank guns. The first information about the combat use of these machines came from Finland back in 1940, but Hitler stubbornly refused to believe in the existence of KV tanks in mass quantities. On December 5, at the next meeting, the Fuhrer stated literally the following:

“The Russians are inferior to us in armament ... Our Pz.III tank with a 50-mm cannon is clearly superior to the Russian tank. The bulk of Russian tanks have poor armor…”

German General Staff ground forces had the same information:

“Scarce data on Soviet tanks: they are inferior to ours in armor and speed. Maximum armor - 30 mm ... Optical devices - very bad: muddy glass, small angle of view.

All this rather referred to the T-26 and BT light tanks, although these vehicles were no worse than the German Pz.II and Pz.III in terms of the sum of their characteristics. German tankers were able to verify this even during the civil war in Spain, and in the fall of 1939, on the territory of defeated Poland, the Soviet and German sides arranged a kind of exchange of experience, demonstrating their main tanks. The Germans had a positive overall impression of the Soviet light tanks - they concluded that the Pz.II and Pz.III were superior in terms of protection and optical equipment. However, at that time, none of them knew about the work on the KV and T-34 tanks ...

In the first days of the war, the appearance of the KV-1 and KV-2 tanks was a very unpleasant surprise for the Germans. The bulk of anti-tank artillery and tank guns could not cope with them, but the most unpleasant fact was that the German tank industry did not have the opportunity to deliver anything of equal value at that time. It was possible to disable the KV only by destroying its undercarriage, but not all crews had the opportunity to do this in combat conditions. Particularly hard hit were divisions equipped with Czech light tanks Pz.35(t) and Pz.38(t), whose guns were only suitable for combating lightly armored vehicles.
There is one more interesting fact- in the summer of 1941, the KVs had a much greater effect on the Germans than the T-34s. Unlike them, heavy tanks were equipped with crews from officers who had much better combat training. Here are a few examples of the combat use of the KV-1, which took place in June-August 1941. The Thuringian 1st Panzer Division, advancing in the Baltic states, was one of the first to come under a massive attack by Soviet heavy tanks. The following was recorded in the battle report:

“KV-1 and KV-2, which we met here for the first time, were something unprecedented! Our companies opened fire from about 800 meters, but to no avail. The distance was reduced, while the enemy approached us without showing any concern. Soon we were separated by 50 to 100 meters. A fierce artillery duel did not bring the Germans any success. Russian tanks continued to advance as if nothing had happened, and armor-piercing shells simply bounced off them. Thus, an alarming situation developed when the Russian tanks went straight through the positions of the 1st Panzer Regiment towards our infantry and to our rear. Our tank regiment, having made a full turn, hurried after the KV-1 and KV-2, following almost in the same formation with them. During the battle, using special ammunition, we managed to disable some of them from a very short distance - from 30 to 60 meters. Then a counterattack was organized and the Russians were driven back. A defensive line was created in the Vosiliskis area. The fighting continued."

More dramatically describes the meeting with KV in his book “Eastern Front. Hitler goes East” Paul Karel is an eyewitness of one of the battles near Senno, which took place on July 8, 1941. The Soviet tanks most likely belonged to the 5th mechanized corps, and their opponent was the 17th tank division.

“At dawn, the advanced regiment of the 17th Panzer Division entered into action. He passed through high grain wheat crops, through potato fields and bushy wastelands. Shortly before 11:00 a.m., Lieutenant von Ziegler's platoon came into contact with the enemy. Letting the Germans closer, the Russians opened fire from well-camouflaged positions. After the first shots, the three battalions of the 39th Panzer Regiment fanned out on a wide front. Anti-tank artillery hastened to the flanks. A tank battle began, which occupied a prominent place in military history - the battle for Senno.

A fierce battle blazed from 11.00 until dark. The Russians acted very skillfully and tried to go into the flank or rear of the Germans. The sun was hot in the sky. On the vast battlefield here and there tanks blazed, German and Russian.

At 17.00, German tankers received a signal on the radio:

- Save ammo.

At that moment, the radio operator Westphal heard the commander's voice in his tank:

— Heavy enemy tank! Tower - at ten o'clock. Armor-piercing. Fire!

“Direct hit,” Sergeant Serge reported. But the Russian monster, it seems, did not notice the projectile. He just went ahead. Two, three, then four tanks from the 9th company hit the Soviet car from a distance of 800 - 1000 m. No sense. And suddenly he stopped. The tower turned. A bright flame flared up. A fountain of mud shot up 40 meters in front of the tank of non-commissioned officer Gornbogen from the 7th company. Gornbogen hurried out of the line of fire. The Russian tank continued to advance along the dirt road. There was a 37 mm anti-tank gun.

- Fire! But the giant didn't seem to care. Grass and straw of crushed ears stuck to its wide caterpillars. The driver was in last gear - not an easy task, given the size of the car. Almost every driver had a sledgehammer at hand, with which he hit the gearshift lever if the box started to act up. An example of the Soviet approach. One way or another, their tanks, even heavy ones, ran briskly. This lane is right on the anti-tank gun. The gunners fired like hell. There are twenty meters left. Then ten, then five. And now the colossus ran right into them. The fighters of the calculation jumped to the sides with shouts. The huge monster crushed the gun and, as if nothing had happened, rolled on. Then the tank took a little to the right and headed for the field artillery positions in the rear. He completed his journey fifteen kilometers from the front line when he got stuck in a swampy meadow, where he was finished off by a 100-mm long-barreled gun of divisional artillery.

The commander of the 41st German motorized army corps, Reinhardt, later recalled the battles with the 2nd Panzer Division:

“About a hundred of our tanks, of which about a third were Pz.Kpfw.IVs, took up their starting positions for a counterattack. Part of our forces was to advance along the front, but most of the tanks were to go around the enemy and strike from the flanks. From three sides we fired at the iron monsters of the Russians, but all was in vain. The Russians, on the contrary, led effective fire. After a long fight, we had to retreat to avoid a complete rout. Echeloned along the front and in depth, the Russian giants came closer and closer. One of them approached our tank, which was hopelessly bogged down in a swampy pond. Without any hesitation, the black monster drove over the tank and pressed its tracks into the mud. At that moment, a 150 mm howitzer arrived. While the artillery commander warned of the approach of enemy tanks, the gun opened fire, but again to no avail.

Forced to appreciate the new Soviet tanks and the famous German commander Heinz Guderian. For the first time, he was able to get acquainted with the KV in July 1941 - in one of the battles, the forces of the 18th Panzer Division captured several of these vehicles, which they managed to knock out with the help of an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun. The next meeting with the KV took place only in October near Bryansk and Tula, when units of the 4th Panzer Division were practically powerless against the tanks of the Soviet 1st Tank Brigade and suffered heavy losses.

Thanks to their resilience and the ability to use trusted equipment, a number of crews showed fantastically high efficiency. What is the battle carried out by a single KV-1 tank under the command of Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov on August 18, 1941. This battle has been repeatedly described in various publications (for example, in the article "The Hero Who Didn't Become a Hero" on the site "Courage"), so let's focus on its main points.
The 3rd tank company of the 1st tank battalion of the 1st Red Banner tank division consisting of 5 KV-1 was allocated to cover the Leningrad direction in the Krasnogvardeysk region. Standing at the fork of three roads, Kolobanov sent two tanks to the side branches, and he himself prepared to meet the enemy on the Tallinn highway. Having dug out the caponier and carefully disguised the tank, Kolobanov waited until the morning of August 19, when a German column of 22 tanks appeared on the horizon. The enemy, unaware of the ambush, went to the limit close range, which made it possible for Soviet tankers to knock out the lead and trailing vehicles during the first minute of the battle, and then the KV crew set fire to the rest of the enemy tanks.

An equally striking fact of the skillful use of the KV-1 can be the battle near the villages of Nefedyevo and Kuzino, where units under the command of Colonel M.A. Sukhanov stubbornly defended themselves for several days. The enemy captured both settlements On December 3, and on the night of December 5, Sukhanov had to prepare an offensive in order to dislodge the Germans from their positions. From the reinforcements, he was assigned a battalion of the 17th brigade, consisting of one (!) KV-1 tank. However, even one heavy tank was enough to break through the German defenses - this KV was commanded by Lieutenant Pavel Gudz, who already had 10 enemy vehicles on his account. Earlier, in the summer of 1941, this young lieutenant distinguished himself, acting as part of the 63rd TP of the 32nd TD near Lvov. On the morning of June 22, his platoon, which consisted of five KV-1s, two T-34s and two BA-10s, entered the battle with the German advance detachment, completely defeating it. The share of the Gudz crew accounted for 5 wrecked German tanks. In this case, the oncoming battle was completely contraindicated, so the KV crew, using the darkness and artillery support, was able to covertly approach the forward positions near the village of Nefedvo. As it turned out, the enemy forces were very significant - more than 10 tanks alone were counted. However, the Germans were not saved by numerical superiority at all - the battle began with the fact that at dawn the KV almost point-blank shot two German tanks and, wedged into their defensive order, knocked out 8 more cars. The remaining 8 were forced to leave the village ...

On November 8, 1941, the KV-1 crew under the command of Lieutenant A. Martynov from the 16th brigade of the Volkhov Front distinguished themselves. Having taken the fight with 14 German tanks near the village of Zhupkino, Soviet tankers knocked out five of them and captured three more as trophies. Then these tanks were repaired and soon included in the brigade.

And here is another example of the resilience of a single heavy tank that was surrounded, but to the last resisted the German units trying to destroy it. Despite the fact that this episode was taken from a foreign source and the period of action dates back to 1943, there are a number of inconsistencies in it, which does not allow us to fully verify its authenticity.

“One of the KV-1 tanks managed to break through to the only road that supplied the German shock group of troops in the northern bridgehead, and block it for several days. The first unsuspecting trucks delivering equipment were immediately shot and burned by a Russian tank. There was practically no way to destroy this monster. Because of the swampy terrain, it was impossible to bypass it. The supply of food and ammunition stopped. Seriously wounded soldiers could not be evacuated to the hospital for surgery, and they died. An attempt to disable the tank with a battery of 50-mm anti-tank guns firing from a distance of 450 meters ended in heavy losses for the crews and guns.

The Soviet tank remained unscathed, despite, as it was later established, 14 direct hits. The shells left only bluish dents on his armor. When the camouflaged 88-mm anti-aircraft gun was pulled up, the Soviet tankers coolly allowed it to be installed 600 meters from the tank, and then destroyed it, along with the crew, before it had time to fire the first shell. The attempt of sappers to undermine the tank at night also turned out to be a failure.

True, the sappers managed to sneak up on the tank shortly after midnight and plant explosives under the tank's tracks. But the wide tracks suffered little damage from the explosion. The blast wave tore off several pieces of metal from them, but the tank retained its mobility and continued to inflict damage on the rear units and block the delivery of equipment. Initially, Russian tankers received food at night from scattered groups of Soviet soldiers and civilians, but then the Germans cut off this supply source, cordoning off the entire surrounding area.

However, even this isolation did not force the Soviet tankers to leave the advantageous position they had taken. In the end, the Germans managed to deal with this tank, resorting to the following maneuver. Fifty tanks attacked the KV from three sides and opened fire on it to attract the attention of the crew. Under the cover of this distraction, another 88 mm anti-aircraft gun was positioned and camouflaged behind the Soviet tank, so that this time it could open fire. Out of 12 direct hits, three shells pierced the armor and destroyed the tank…”

However, there were other reviews about the meetings with the KV-1. For example, Franz Kurowski's book "500 Panzer Attacks" describes whole line battles with the participation of Soviet heavy vehicles, the opponents of which were German tank aces. Already in the first chapter, devoted to the combat path of Michael Wittmann (132 wrecked tanks and self-propelled guns and 138 anti-tank guns), you can read the following:

“... A gap appeared in the telescopic sight between the trees. Then he saw the barrel of the KV gun, behind it - the front plate, and, finally, a mighty tower. He hesitated a little, adjusting his aim slightly. Then Clink pressed the fire button. The echo of a powerful gun shot and the crushing impact of a projectile on armor almost merged. The shell hit the joint between the hull and the turret, tearing the turret off the tank. The heavy turret rumbled to the ground, and the muzzle of the long-barrelled gun burrowed into the soft ground. A few seconds later, two surviving crew members jumped out of the tank ... "

It should be noted that the author “slightly” embellished most of the moments of this fight. The action took place at the end of June 1941 in the area of ​​​​the cities of Rivne, Lutsk, Brody, where the largest tank battle in the history of wars unfolded. In this battle, at a height of 56.9, Witman's only self-propelled gun (and he fought on the StuG III Ausf.C with the StuK 37 L / 24 short-barreled gun) was immediately opposed by 18 Soviet tanks, three of which Witman himself identified as KV-1. But the fact is that in June 1941 the Germans did not yet know the names of the new Soviet tanks and therefore referred to them as “26-ton” (T-34) or “50-ton” (KV-1). But these are trifles - the main doubts are caused by the terrifying effectiveness of the German short-barreled 75-mm cannon, which the Germans themselves called "stump". This gun was originally created for fire support of infantry and tanks, so the task of fighting enemy armored vehicles was not set before it. However, provided that an armor-piercing projectile of the Gr38 H1 type with an initial speed of about 450 m / s was used, it was indeed possible to penetrate a 75-mm vertical armor sheet, only this could be done from a distance of no more than 100 meters. Of course, there was no question of any “turret failure” in the case of Wittman - a 4.4 kg projectile simply did not have the necessary weight indicators and impact power for this. It would be another matter if the projectile pierced the side armor and caused detonation of the ammunition load, but in this case no one survived from the crew.
Similar descriptions in foreign literature on German tankers can be found in abundance. As a rule, the Germans will certainly remain the winners in them, and “turret failures” and “torn hulls” of Soviet tanks (mainly T-34) are encountered there at times too often.

However, after the appearance of medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.V "Panther" and Pz.VI "Tiger" in the Wehrmacht, the situation for the KV-1 became much more complicated. The same Witman, in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, on his "tiger" successfully shot on his "tiger" Soviet heavy tanks dug into the ground from a distance of about 500 meters, while shells of a 76.2-mm cannon could not penetrate his frontal armor.

Somewhat earlier, in February 1943, in a battle near Lake Ladoga, a detachment of “tigers” from the 502nd tank battalion collided with a KV-1 group and, having knocked out two Soviet vehicles, forced the rest to retreat. A year later, on June 25, 1944, in the battle of Shapkovo, the same “tigers” from the 2nd company of the 502nd battalion under the command of Captain Leonhardt successfully repelled the attack of Soviet infantry and tanks, knocking out three KV-1s without their own losses.

After the completion of the Moscow operation, major offensives on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, such as this, were not carried out until the end of 1942. This made it possible to saturate, to some extent, tank units battered in battles with new equipment. Although the production of KV at the Chelyabinsk plant had already gained momentum, many tanks arriving at the front had a lot of technological defects. In this regard, Stalin suggested that the GBTU reduce the production of heavy tanks and equip tank brigades according to the new state - 5 KV-1 and 22 T-34. The proposal was accepted almost immediately, and already on February 14, 1942, the formation of the 78th brigade with 27 tanks was completed, and a few weeks later several more brigades of a similar composition left for the front.

Although the KV-1 was much inferior to the “thirty-four” in terms of mass, the presence of heavy tanks in parts, up to the appearance of new vehicles with more powerful weapons by the Germans, played a big role. In May 1942 alone, the Chelyabinsk plant sent 128 tanks to the front: 28 fell to the Bryansk Front, 20 to the Kalinin Front, 30 to the Crimean Front, and another 40 went to the Don and the Caucasus.

The KV-1 brought the greatest benefit just in the southern and northern directions. The new KV-1s that had entered service by that time (November-December 1942) were transferred to the Guards tank regiments, which, according to the state, were supposed to have 214 personnel and 21 KV-1s or “Churchill” tanks. These units were attached as reinforcements to rifle and tank formations and were essentially assault units. For the first time they went into battle on the Don and Voronezh fronts in December 1942, taking part in the defeat of the encircled units of the Paulus group near Stalingrad. The most significant number of heavy tanks at that time was at the disposal of the Don Front, which had at its disposal five guards tank regiments on the KV-1s and two on the Churchill. They were used very intensively, which led to the huge losses suffered by the guards during this period. Part of the regiments by the beginning of January had only 3-4 tanks, which continued to be used to break through the enemy defenses together with the infantry.

In the midst of the Battle of Stalingrad, in October-November 1942, no less heavy battles were going on near Vladikavkaz and Nalchik. The main striking force here was made up of medium tanks T-34 and light T-60 and T-70, while there were no more than two dozen heavy tanks. The 37th army, which occupied the defense here, had no tanks at all, and in order to strengthen it, the 52nd tank brigade, the 75th brigade and the 266th brigade were put forward to help. There were 54 vehicles in total, of which only 8 were KV-1s (all of them belonged to the 266th battalion). The forces were clearly not equal - against them the Germans put up the 13th Panzer Division of the III Panzer Corps, which had modified medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.F2, equipped with 75-mm long-barreled guns 7.5 KwK 40 L / 43, the projectile of which pierced armor plate with a thickness of 98 mm from a distance of 100 meters and an 82 mm sheet from a distance of 1000 meters. Thus, it became possible to successfully hit any Soviet tank at distances beyond its limits. The defensive operation, which began on October 26, mainly involved "thirty-fours" and light T-70s, while the 266th tank battalion remained in reserve. Fighting to contain the enemy lasted a little more than a week, and on November 6, the battalion, as part of a mixed group, launched a counteroffensive near the settlement of Gizel. The Germans skillfully defended themselves by burying their own vehicles in the ground, and for the whole day they were able to knock out 32 tanks and destroy another 29. Nevertheless, with the help of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, who arrived in time, the tankers managed to surround the enemy, leaving him only a narrow 3-km passage. The final defeat of the German tank group ended on November 11 at the cost of heavy losses, however, the Soviet troops also managed to capture 140 tanks and self-propelled guns, mostly out of order.

In the history of the KV tank, there was such, not the most famous, combat episode. In November 1942, when the German offensive on the Don was successfully developing, the advanced units of the enemy motorized infantry easily reached the Novocherkassk direction and by July 21 reached the Mokry Log farm. The forces to repel the attack from the Soviet side in this sector of the front were very modest - units of the 25th Cahul border regiment and police divisions of the NKVD troops. Heavy artillery was completely absent at their disposal, but the 37th Army helped with armored vehicles, allocating several tanks from the 15th brigade.
The Germans moved in two columns, and in the second they counted up to 100 units of heavy equipment. It was reckless to engage in open battle with them, and the command of the 15th brigade decided to inflict maximum damage on the enemy by placing tanks in ambush. For this, a group of two KV-1 and one T-34 was allocated. Tank commanders: junior lieutenants Mikhail Ivanovich Bozhko and Grigory Dmitrievich Krivosheev and senior lieutenant Nikolai Fedorovich Gauzov.
They decided to arrange an ambush between the farms of Mokry Log and Mokry Kerchik, the distance between which was 15 km. The exact chronology of this battle has not been preserved, since only two of the 14 crew members managed to survive: Senior Lieutenant Gauzov (died in battle in 1944) and Sergeant N.A. Rekun (gun commander of the second KV). This is how this battle is described in the presentation of the commander of the 15th brigade, Major Savchenko, and the commander of the 1st tank battalion, senior lieutenant Vasilkov, who spoke about it only on November 21, 1942:

“07/21/1942, in the area of ​​​​the village of Mokry Log, the KV tank of senior lieutenant Gauzov received the task with two other tanks to prevent the enemy’s motorized tank column from breaking through to the city of Shakhty and ensure the withdrawal of units of the 37th Army and its rear. Having chosen a convenient position and carefully disguised the tank, Senior Lieutenant Gauzov waited for the appearance of the Nazi column. Despite the fact that there were up to 96 tanks in the column, comrade. Gauzov at a distance of 500-600 meters opened fire from a cannon and both machine guns, forcing the enemy column to turn around and take an unequal battle. The battle lasted 3.5 hours. Being in the ring of fire, Senior Lieutenant Gauzov showed composure, Bolshevik restraint and heroism. On his tank, optical instruments were withdrawn from enemy artillery fire and sighting device. Comrade Gauzov got out of the tank and, being on it, continued to accurately adjust the fire of his cannon. The tank caught fire but, nevertheless, Gauzov did not give up the fight. Commanding: “Direct fire. For beloved Stalin. For the motherland. Fire". For the dead brother. “For the company commander who fell in battle. Fire”, he continued to repel the attack of the pressing enemy.

According to Soviet data, the KV crew destroyed 16 German tanks, 2 armored vehicles, 1 anti-tank gun and 10 vehicles with enemy soldiers and officers. Gauzov himself was seriously wounded in his right leg, but managed to get out to his own. Later, for his heroism, he is worthy of being awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. Even if we assume that the number of destroyed German vehicles was smaller (the battlefield remained with the Germans), this does not diminish the feat of the Soviet tankers, who entered into a deliberately unequal battle. It is very difficult to delay the advance for 3-3.5 hours, and the battle of July 21, 1942 in this respect is quite comparable with the feat of the crew of the KV-2 tank near the Dubysa River and the battle of the KV-1 crew under the command of Kolobanov in 1941.

Events on the Middle Don developed more dramatically. As part of Operation Little Saturn, the troops of the Southwestern Front had to break through the defenses on the weakest sector of the front, where the Romanian and Italian troops were located. As before, most of the available tanks were T-34s and T-70s, although the 1st Mechanized Corps had 114 British infantry tanks "Matilda" and 77 "Valentine". Heavy tanks KV-1 were then part of the 1st and 2nd tank corps, where respectively there were 5 and 38 vehicles of this type. Little is known about the fate of these tanks. Apparently, the 2nd TC lost most of the KVs in the January battles of 1943, transferring the surviving vehicles to the 1st TC.

Heavy tanks played a significant role in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation, which was carried out from January 13 to January 27, 1943. Of the 896 tanks of the Voronezh Front, 112 vehicles accounted for KV of various modifications. Most of them were transferred to the direct support of the infantry of the front's three strike groups. For example, in the 40th Army, the 116th and 86th TBs had 23 and 6 KV-1s, respectively, and the 262nd TP operated as part of the 18th Rifle Corps with 21 KV-1s tanks. Thanks to tactical flexibility, this time it was possible to avoid major losses, breaking through the enemy defenses in all three directions and destroying his main forces.

Building on the success achieved at Stalingrad, the command of the Voronezh Front in mid-January developed a plan for a new offensive, called the "Star". The main striking element was the 3rd Panzer Army, which was the most powerful division of the Red Army. It consisted of two tank corps, a separate tank brigade, two rifle divisions, mortar and anti-tank regiments. There were no more than a dozen KV tanks and most of the time they were kept as an operational reserve. The operation, whose task was to liberate Kharkov, ended in partial success, while the 3rd Army lost only one KV, 33 T-34s, 5 T-70s and 6 T-60s in the period from January 20 to February 18, 1943. By the time the operation was completed, only one KV-1 remained in the 12th shopping mall and the 179th brigade. At the same time, the report of the army headquarters emphasized that heavy tanks have severe wear of engines that have worked 50-70 engine hours in harsh winter conditions and require repair.

The 2nd Panzer Army, which operated nearby, had no less forces. It was formed at the beginning of 1943 and placed near the town of Yelets, where the replenishment of materiel and personnel gradually took place. In February, it was decided to use the army in carrying out offensive operation near Dmitriev-Lgovsky and Sevsk. The tanks had to travel 250-270 km to the place of their new deployment, so it is not surprising that out of 408 vehicles, only 182 reached the deadline set for February 15. It took another week to fully concentrate forces and by February 24, army units reached their starting line on the river Swapa. The composition of the 2nd that is interesting in that it was one of the few formations where there were separate units equipped only with KV-1 tanks. We are talking about the 29th separate guards tank regiment, which included 15 heavy vehicles. In addition, 11 KV-1, 1 T-34, 41 T-60 and T-70 light tanks, as well as 49 British tanks were part of the 16th Tank Corps. The offensive was, on the whole, successful and no combat losses among the HF were reported.

The Battle of Kursk was the last major battle, where heavy KV-1 tanks were used in massive quantities. The 203rd Separate Heavy Tank Regiment of the 18th Tank Corps (which included ordinary KV-1s, but there are claims that there were assault KV-2s), which was at the disposal of the Voronezh Front, was used only sporadically and had a significant impact on the course of the battle did not provide. At the same time, the neighboring 15th and 36th Guards Tank Troops, which were armed with British infantry tanks "Churchill", took an active part in the famous battle near Prokhorovka, although losing almost all of their vehicles. As a result, the 15th regiment moved to the KV-1s, and the 36th regiment was again replenished with British tanks. In total, the Central Front had 70 tanks of this type, and there were 105 of them on the Voronezh Front.

Even before the end of the Battle of Kursk, heavy tanks were used during the breakthrough of the so-called “Mius Front” in July-August 1943. As part of the 1st Guards Tank Regiment KV-1s, they participated in attacking enemy strongholds, as a result of which, on the very first day of the offensive operations, 10 tanks were lost (2 burned down, 2 were hit and 6 were blown up by mines).

The last guards tank regiment on the KV-1s was formed in January 1944, but already in the autumn the obsolete tanks were transferred to secondary sectors of the front, and the "guardsmen" moved to more powerful IS-2s. Nevertheless, KV-1s fought until the very end of the war. As part of the 1452nd sap (self-propelled artillery regiment), they took part in the liberation of the Crimea, but due to heavy fighting, none of the five tanks of this type reached the final stage of the operation. The surviving KV-1s of other tank units then fought in Poland and Germany, where they took the last battle in the spring of 1945.

The largest number of KV tanks, as expected, was in the Leningrad direction. Close proximity to the manufacturing plant made it possible to quickly repair failed vehicles, while most of the tanks stationed in the western and southern OVOs were idle waiting for spare parts.

Already during the war, in July 1941, a tank training center was created at the Kirov Plant, in which classes were held directly in the shops with the involvement of cadets in the assembly of tanks. On August 6, a tank company of 10 vehicles was formed from the first training team, which was then transferred to the 86th battalion.
By August, the Leningrad Front had become the undisputed leader in terms of the number of heavy tanks, since its units received almost all the CVs produced by the LKZ.

It was here that the first meeting of heavy tanks of different generations took place. We are talking, of course, about the appearance of the Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" tanks, which in the fall of 1942 arrived at the disposal of the 502nd heavy tank battalion. In one of the battles, which took place on February 12, 1943, three "tigers" knocked out and burned ten KV-1s without their own losses. It was perhaps difficult to find more effective proof of the KV's non-compliance with the requirements for a heavy tank.

On the Leningrad Front, the KV was last used in the summer of 1944. By the beginning of the Vyborg operation (June 10), the front had the 26th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, equipped with both Soviet heavy tanks and British Churchills. By the way, the KV-1s tanks were transferred to this unit from other regiments, re-equipped with IS-2s, and were listed above the staff. This regiment fought hard battles for Vyborg from June 18 to June 20, retaining 32 KV-1s and 6 Churchills by the time the city was liberated. It should be noted that the 26th Guards Otpp had a chance to fight against captured T-26s and T-34s, which were the main tanks of the Finnish army.

In September 1944, the 82nd detachment (11 KV-1s and 10 Churchills), which was part of the 8th Army, participated in the liberation of Talin and the islands of the Moonsund Archipelago, where the Red Army completed the use of British heavy tanks.

Much less known are the exploits of Soviet tanks that fought in encirclement on the Crimean peninsula. For example, on February 27, 1942, in one of the sections of the Crimean Front, the infantry, with the support of several KVs that remained in service in the 229th separate tank battalion, once again tried to recapture the high-rise 69.4 dominating the terrain from the Germans. During the next attack, only one KV of the company commander, Lieutenant Timofeev, managed to reach the German trenches. The tank's caterpillar was smashed by a nearby shell explosion, but the crew decided not to leave the damaged vehicle. Over the next five days, the gunner-radio operator Chirkov made his way to his own several times and brought back provisions and ammunition. The infantry tried to break through to the besieged "fortress", which the Germans could not completely destroy, but each time the Soviet soldiers had to retreat under heavy enemy fire. In turn, the Germans, realizing the futility of trying to bombard the tank with grenades, decided to take a desperate step - douse the KV with gasoline and set it on fire. However, this "operation" ended in failure. In the meantime, after receiving reinforcements and regrouping forces, the Soviet troops managed to take the hill on March 16th. A significant role in this was played by the reports of the KV crew, who managed to reveal the location of most enemy firing points. Among other things, the stationary tank successfully supported infantrymen with fire, destroying three bunkers, two machine-gun nests and incapacitating up to 60 German soldiers. In total, the tankers spent a little less than 17 days in the besieged KV.

In addition to supplies military equipment in the USSR, the allies were actively interested in the use of Soviet technology in battles on the Eastern Front. Special attention was given to the medium tank T-34 and the heavy KV-1, but in the first months of the war it was not possible to obtain at least one sample of each type. Only in the middle of 1942 did the Soviet side, within the framework of international cooperation, provide the Americans with one KV-1 and T-34 model 1941 each. Lebedev, lieutenant of the tank engineering service, reported the following.

On the merits of the report of the engineer of the tank department of the Soviet procurement commission in the USA, Comrade Prishchepenko, about his conversation with Robert Pollak, I report:

1. One sample of the KV-1 and T-34 tanks was sent to the USA through Arkhangelsk at the end of August 1942.

2. The KV-1 tank was manufactured at the Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk, and the T-34 tank was manufactured at plant No. 183 in Nizhny Tagil.

3. Tanks were assembled under special supervision and were tested more extensively and thoroughly than is usually done for mass-produced tanks.

4. In terms of their design, the tanks did not differ in any way from the serial tanks of the 1942 release.

5. In July 1942, before sending the tanks to the USA, the armored department of the GBTU KA sent comrade Krutikov to transfer to General Faymoyvill drawings of tanks, instructions and manuals for tanks and engines, as well as lists of the main design changes made to the design of tanks produced in 1942 compared to the types described in instructions and manuals.

6. Since General Faymonville proposed to send all these materials to America by plane, then, therefore, they should have been received there before the arrival of the tanks.
Since then, we have never received any requests for additional instructions and clarifications.

7. Our instructions are much more complete than the American and English instructions. At the same time, our manuals give all the information on adjusting individual mechanisms and servicing tanks.

8. Therefore, the claims of the Americans, which were expressed by Robert Pollack in an interview with Comrade Prishchepenko, that some parts in the KV tank differ from those described in the instructions, are not solid, since this was also made known by reporting the list changes.

9. The fact that the KV and T-34 tanks were supplied with R-9 radios, and not 71TK-3 (obsolete radios that were discontinued) was also reported to the Americans in the lists of changes.

10. Unlike the Americans and the British, we gave tanks a significant amount of spare parts and assemblies.
At their request, they sent them an additional main clutch of the KV tank.

11. How they managed to spoil the onboard clutches of the KV tank is not clear to us. These are very strong machine components and very rarely fail. They probably violated their regulation in the most rude way.

All these unfounded claims are due to the fact that the American command refused the technical assistance of our tank engineers who are in America and, moreover, so far has not asked us about the maintenance of our tanks.”

We must pay tribute to the Americans - they tested the technique "with special predilection", trying to "squeeze" literally everything possible out of the tank. This, in part, justifies their attitude towards Soviet vehicles, which were considered absolutely unsuitable for use in the American army, which was especially true for such quality as comfort. On the other hand, when testing their own tanks, the attitude towards technology was more “humane”. The Soviet side drew its own conclusions from the report received from the United States. At a meeting held on October 25, 1943, devoted to the assessment of the KV-1 and T-34 tanks by the Americans, the following was noted about the first:

- an indication of the insufficient initial speed of the ZiS-5 cannon is considered correct, as a result - armor penetration is worse than that of American guns of a similar caliber;

- the DT machine gun needs to be replaced with a more durable and rapid-fire one;

- no anti-aircraft weapons (American tanks have all);

- the KV suspension is much better than the T-34 torsion bar suspension, the design of which is outdated and was practically unsuitable for use on a tank weighing almost 30 tons;

- the V-2 engine is not a tank engine, both in terms of its dimensions and the reliability of its individual mechanisms (water pump) and service life as a whole;

- the assessment of transmissions of the Soviet design is correct, the lag in this area is most striking;

- an indication of the difficulty of controlling the machine correctly;

- side clutches, as a mechanism for turning tanks, are outdated;

- indication of a large number of adjustments is correct and requires attention from the NKTP and BTU.

In accordance with these comments, the commission drew conclusions about the need to improve the quality of Soviet tanks, but something else was more interesting. As it turned out, the Americans liked the Soviet sights TMF and TP-4, and this despite the fact that their optics needed to be improved. In terms of armor thickness, the KV-1 surpassed all serial American tanks, therefore, its security was noticeably better. In particular, the description of the KV-1 prepared by the US Army Training Department stated the following:

“... The tank's very strong armor allows it to withstand any enemy artillery fire, except for direct hits from large-caliber guns, and this tank is very difficult to disable.

Even when disabled, this tank can maintain heavy fire until reinforcements drive the Germans back…”

The general assessment of the KV-1 among American specialists was satisfactory, but do not forget that this tank was created according to the terms of reference issued in 1938, and tests in the USA were carried out at the end of 1942, when “tigers” and “ panthers” and the requirements for heavy tanks were completely different.

There is no reliable information about the use of the KV-1 on the enemy side. As expected, the Germans got the most heavy tanks. Basically, these were technically faulty or wrecked vehicles, however, part of the KV was in a completely combat-ready condition and was abandoned due to lack of fuel and ammunition. None individual divisions none of them were completed, and all the captured KVs that were able to be put into operation were initially transferred to combat units, sending several tanks to Germany for comprehensive tests. In the German army, they received the designation Pz.Kpfw.KV I 753 (r).
Part of the KV-1 was later upgraded with German optics and commander's cupolas. At least one tank was experimentally equipped with a 75mm 7.5cm KwK 40 gun.

Captured tanks were used not only in training units. Judging by the German photographs, the former Soviet KV-1s took a very active part in the battles from the autumn of 1941 to the winter of 1942. They probably continued to operate until the engine resource ran out or the tank did not fail due to combat damage or serious technical problems. Although most of the KV-1 was still used in the rear for training tank crews and as a means of security.

According to OKN documents, the number of captured KVs by March 1, 1943 was reduced to 2 units, and by December 30, 1944, not a single tank of this type officially remained. In reality, there were several dozen of them, since the documents took into account the cars in the “on the go” state.

The only Finnish armored brigade also had several KVs. Two of them were captured in the summer-autumn battles of 1941, repaired and put back into service. By June 9, 1944, when the brigade was thrown into battle on the Karelian Isthmus, it included only one heavy tank with additional armor. It has not yet been possible to find information about its combat operation, but this machine continued to be used in the Finnish army until 1954.

A few more KV-1s became trophies of the Hungarian and Slovak armies, but so far there is no information about their further fate.

Sources:
VN Shunkov "Red Army". AST\Harvest. 2003
M. Baryatinsky "Soviet tanks in battle." YAUZA \ EXMO. Moscow. 2007
A. Isaev, V Goncharov, I. Koshkin, S. Fedoseev and others. “Tank strike. Soviet tanks in battles 1942-1943. YAUZA \ EXMO. Moscow. 2007
V. Beshanov "Tank pogrom of 1941". AST\Harvest. Moscow\Minsk. 2000.
M.V. Kolomiets “History of KV tanks” (part 1)
M.V. Kolomiets “History of KV tanks” (part 2)
tankarchives.blogspot.com.by: More on tank bunkers
History of one KV tank
Kolomiets M., Moshchansky I. "KV-1S" (M-Hobby, No. 5 for 1999)
Tank battle near the village of Mokry Log
Mechanized Corps of the Red Army

PERFORMANCE AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HEAVY TANKS
KV-1 and KV-1s

	KV-1 arr. 1941	KV-1s arr. 1942
COMBAT WEIGHT	47000 kg	42500 kg
CREW, pers.	5
DIMENSIONS
Length, mm	6675	6900
Width, mm	3320	3250
Height, mm	2710	2640
Clearance, mm	450	450
WEAPONS	one 76.2 mm ZiS-5 or F-34 cannon and three 7.62 mm DT machine guns (forward, coaxial with a cannon and rear turret)	one 76.2 mm ZiS-5 cannon and three 7.62 mm DT machine guns (forward, coaxial with a cannon and rear turret)
AMMUNITION	90-114 shots and 2772 rounds	111 shots and 3000 rounds
AIMING DEVICES	telescopic sight - TOD-6 periscope sight - PT-6 commander's panorama - PT-1
BOOKING	forehead of the hull (top) - 40-75 mm hull roof - 30-40 mm hull side - 75 mm hull feed (top) - 40 mm hull feed (bottom) - 75 mm gun mask - 90 mm forehead of the welded tower - 75 mm forehead cast tower - 95 mm turret side - 75 mm turret feed - 75 mm tower roof - 40 mm bottom - 30-40 mm	forehead of the hull (top) - 40-75 mm hull roof - 30 mm hull side - 60 mm hull feed (top) - 40 mm hull feed (bottom) - 75 mm gun mask - 82 mm tower forehead - 75 mm turret side - 75 mm turret feed - 75 mm tower roof - 40 mm bottom - 30 mm
ENGINE	diesel, 12-cylinder, V-2K, 600 hp
TRANSMISSION	mechanical type: multi-plate main and side clutches of dry friction, 5-speed gearbox	mechanical type: multi-plate main and side friction clutches of dry friction, demultiplier, 10-speed gearbox
CHASSIS	(on one side) 6 double main rollers with individual torsion bar suspension, 3 supporting rollers, front drive and rear guide wheels, large-section caterpillar with steel tracks
SPEED	35 km/h on the highway 10-15 km / h along the country road	42 km/h on the highway 10-15 km / h along the country road
HIGHWAY RANGE	150-225 km on the highway 90-180 km in terrain	1250 km on the highway up to 180 km in terrain
OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME
Climb angle, deg.	36°
Wall height, m	0,80
Ford depth, m	1,60
Ditch width, m	2,00
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION	radio station 71TK-3 or R-9

HISTORY OF CREATION

Heavy tank KV-1 in the exposition of the military museum at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in the USA.

The history of the KV heavy tank is not quite common. Unlike most other combat vehicles, including the same age as the KV - T-34, designed by order of the military, this tank was developed exclusively on its own initiative. Here is how it was…

In August 1938, the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution "On the system of tank weapons." This document contained a requirement in less than a year - by July 1939 - to develop new models of tanks in which weapons, armor, speed and maneuverability would develop in a comprehensive manner and fully meet the conditions of a future war. The Leningrad factories - Kirovsky and No. 185 named after them - were connected to the creation of heavy tanks. S. M. Kirov. The first developed the SMK tank, the second - the T-100 (see "Armored Collection" No. 1 for 2002). Until August 1938, the factories, having no contracts for the production of new machines, carried out only preliminary design. Work began in full swing only after the adoption of the above-mentioned resolution, since it determined the tactical and technical requirements and set the production time (according to the QMS - by May 1, 1939).

In October 1938, a group of students from the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army arrived at SKB-2 of the Kirov Plant to work on their graduation project. As the topic of the diploma, they were instructed to develop a draft design of a vehicle with one turret, but within the framework of the TTT for the SMK tank.

The general design management was headed by SKB-2 engineers L. E. Sychev and A. S. Ermolaev. Separate works were supervised by Slutsman (control drives), K. E. Kuzmin (hull), N. F. Shashmurin (transmission), S. V. Fedorenko (weapons). Responsibilities were distributed between graduate students as follows: B.P. Pavlov and V.K. Sinozersky were engaged in the general layout and armament, G.A. Turchaninov, servo drives and the motor group, L.N. Pereverzev, planetary transmission - S. M. Krasavin and Shpuntov.

The latter, by the way, even had to engage in a kind of industrial espionage in the design process. The fact is that in the course of work on the planetary transmission, it turned out that SKB-2 does not have any source materials for design. Therefore, in November 1938, Krasavin and Shpuntov were sent to the NIBTPolygon in Kubinka, where the Czechoslovak S-II-a (LT-35) tank was being tested at that time.

With the help of the landfill command and a dedicated group of workers, they secretly got acquainted with the combat vehicle while it was parked in the park at night (during the day it was tested with a Czech crew). As a result, when designing a heavy tank, the S-II-a planetary transmission scheme was partially borrowed - a six-speed gearbox with reverse.

On December 9, 1938, at a meeting of the Defense Committee, the design of the SMK tank was considered, which was approved for production in a two-turret version. It was supposed to build two copies for testing. But the head of SKB-2, Zh. Ya. Kotin, and the director of the Kirov Plant, I. M. Zaltsman, who were present at this meeting, proposed to design and manufacture a single-turret heavy tank instead of the second copy of the SMK. After a comprehensive discussion, they decided to "design and manufacture a single-turret heavy tank, corresponding in terms of tactical and technical characteristics to the double-turret SMK tank."

A prototype of the SMK heavy tank.

The tactical and technical requirements for the new machine and permission for its manufacture were approved by the decision of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 45ss of February 27, 1939.

Compared to the SMK, the new tank was supposed to increase the thickness of the armor on the sides and rear of the hull and turret by reducing the overall length of the vehicle. The design of the power plant was supposed to be carried out for two types of engines - gasoline M-17F with a power of 660 hp. and a V-2F diesel engine with a power of 580 hp. The gearbox was also developed in two versions - planetary and conventional. The armament of the new combat vehicle, despite the presence of only one turret, was supposed to be like that of the SMK tank: 76-mm and 45-mm guns, two DT machine guns and a large-caliber DK.

The design of the tank, which received the name KV ("Klim Voroshilov"), the Kirov Plant began on February 1, 1939, without waiting for the approval of the TTT. N. L. Dukhov was appointed the lead designer of the project. In addition to him, the group included design engineers E. P. Dedov, V. A. Kozlovsky, P. S. Tarapatin, V. I. Torotko, A. S. Shneidman. Dukhov's group completed the technical project within a month, making extensive use of design solutions for the hull, turret, armament, suspension, and much more from what was included in the graduation project of VAMM students, who, after defending their diploma in March 1939, were sent to work in SKB- 2, where they took an active part in the design of the HF.

In general, the new tank turned out to be shorter than the SMK by 2 m and lower by 0.5 m. According to preliminary calculations, its mass was to be 47 tons, that is, 8 tons less than that of the SMK.

The first prototype of the KV tank before being sent to the NIBTPoligon. September 1939.

The hull of the tank was developed with the participation of the oldest designer of the Kirov Plant K. E. Kuzmin and design engineer S. V. Mitskevich. The hull was planned to be welded. In the most critical places, the welds were reinforced with goujons.

Particular difficulties were encountered in the design of the engine cooling system. I had to turn to an experienced turbine engineer N. M. Sinev, who was in charge of the turbine SKB-1 at the Kirov Plant. Under his leadership, with the participation of engineers E. P. Dedov, G. A. Mikhailov, A. N. Sterkin, a rather successful design of a finned radiator was created. Its production was organized right there, in the experimental workshop.

It was not easy to provide the necessary traction properties of a heavy tank. Leading designer F. A. Marishkin with a group of engineers, which included N. T. Fedorchuk, A. D. Gladkov, V. A. Kozlovsky, M. I. Kreslavsky, G. A. Turchaninov, managed to create enough working transmission. In the course of designing the most loaded transmission unit - the final drive - A. D. Gladkov, for the first time in domestic tank building, used a planetary gear set, ensuring the compactness of this unit and its reliable operation.

The KV individual torsion bar suspension, which was carried out by the designers G. A. Seregin, N. V. Tseits and L. E. Sychev, was improved compared to the SMK tank. In the process of its development, it was possible to solve a number of complex problems in the selection of the necessary materials and organization technological process production of torsion shafts. If the torsion bars for the SMK tank, for example, were made from forged blanks, then for the KV - by rolling.

Thanks to the wide small-link caterpillar chain, the pressure on the ground of the heavy KV tank was reduced to 0.77 kgf / cm 2, and it was lower than, for example, that of the BT-7 (0.86) and T-35 (0.83) tanks .

The armament group, which included G. N. Moskvin, G. Ya. Andandonsky, F. G. Korobko and A. S. Shneidman, installed a new 76.2-mm L-11 gun on the tank. A 45 mm 20K gun was paired with it. Both guns were installed in a common mask. As additional weapons, a DT machine gun was used, fixed in a ball bearing in the rear of the tower, and an anti-aircraft machine gun DT, mounted on a turret at the base of the turret hatch. The vehicle did not have a course machine gun. The tank's ammunition consisted of 118 76-mm rounds, 50 45-mm rounds and 1008 rounds for machine guns.

Tank KV produced in April 1940 (car No. U-7). Wings of the so-called "aviation" type and protective covers over the air intake windows to the engine attract attention.

In general, the KV tank was reduced in length by two SMK road wheels with one tower.

Considering the high degree of borrowing of components and assemblies from the QMS, the design of the HF went quite quickly - already on April 7, 1939, the technical design and the full-size wooden model were approved by a commission chaired by the deputy head of the ABTU, military engineer 1st rank B. M. Korobkov. In May, the production of units and parts began at the Kirov plant, and the hulls and towers at the Izhora plant.

During the manufacture of the first prototype, technologists and production workers set up the production of new grades of steel for tracks and complex castings of heavily loaded undercarriage parts. The metallurgists of the Izhora plant developed a technology for the production of cast armored turrets and other complex parts, and also proposed a new type of high-tempered chromium-nickel molybdenum armor (instead of high-hardness armor), which had increased resistance to artillery shells.

Tank KV No. U-7. The characteristic features of the machines of the installation batch were the absence of a ball mount for a course machine gun and the presence of a “combat light” headlight on the front hull plate.

On June 5, 1939, ABTU, taking into account the positive experience of operating V-2 diesel engines on BT-7M tanks, set the task for SKB-2 to “install only the V-2 diesel engine in the tank, and refuse to install the M-17 engine.” This machine had other deviations from the approved TTT. So, instead of the planetary gearbox recommended by ABTU, a conventional one was installed. I also had to abandon the DK heavy machine gun - due to the placement of two guns in the turret, there was absolutely no room left for it.

The assembly of the first KV, which received the factory index U-0 (pilot batch, zero sample), was completed on the night of August 31 to September 1. In the morning the tank made its first run through the factory yard. And already on September 5, after the elimination of the discovered minor defects, the prototype KV was sent to Moscow to be shown to members of the government and the command of the Red Army.

The show took place on September 23-25, 1939 at the NIBTP polygon in Kubinka near Moscow in the presence of members of the government commission chaired by People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov. Among the members of the commission were A. I. Mikoyan, N. A. Voznesensky, A. A. Zhdanov, head of the ABTU commander D. G. Pavlov, head of the STC ABTU brigade engineer I. A. Lebedev, head of the testing department of the test site E. A Kulchitsky and others. Director I. M. Zaltsman, chief designer Zh. Ya. Kotin, leading designers A. S. Ermolaev and N. L. Dukhov were invited to the show from the Kirov Plant.

The route along which the experimental vehicles had to go was quite difficult: wide ditches, scarps, counterscarps, steep climbs, slopes, descents. Tanks prepared for testing lined up on the site. Members of the commission went up to the observation tower, and the crews, who had previously stood near the cars, took their places. The roar of starting engines was heard - and the tanks began to advance to the starting line.

The first to enter the test track was a 55-ton double-turreted SMK tank. Waddling and swaying tall towers, he went first to the obstacles - scarp. Overcame. Then it also easily passed the ditch, lingered a little on the funnels ... This car received a not very high score from the commission. Following the QMS, the KV moved. He overcame the ditch much easier and, despite his 47.5 tons, without visible effort, took the next obstacle, then easily passed the funnels, which caused approval and even applause on the observation tower.

The KV driver at this show, P. I. Petrov, recalled:

“On the test track, the SMK tank was ahead of me. First you had to go through an obstacle course. It seemed to me that the QMS, going in front, overcame these obstacles easily, but I had difficulty passing them on the HF: my car is shorter, and at the moment of overcoming the moat and other obstacles, this matters. And the engine also turned out to be unreliable - the regulator worked intermittently. And when we went across the Moscow River, water flooded me through the cracks, but the engine worked, and I managed to get out on the opposite bank in a tank. There, while carrying out the demonstration program, I broke several pine trees with a tank (I still feel sorry for them) and climbed up the mountain with great difficulty. The engine worked at the limit of its capabilities, gear shifting did not always work. He climbed ashore on the side clutches, jerkily. Then he went along the rails and finally went into the forest.

Tank KV No. U-3. Kirov factory, February 1940. A cover is mounted on the gun to protect against bullets and shrapnel from entering the barrel.

In general, the tank made a favorable impression on the leadership. On October 8, 1939, the car returned to Leningrad, and on November 10, after eliminating the shortcomings identified during the demonstration and testing at the NIBT Polygon, the KV was transferred to the range and factory tests. In the course of the latter, until the end of November, the tank covered 485 km (260 km on the highway, 100 km on country roads and 125 km on rough terrain). About 20 different defects were identified, mainly in the design of the transmission and engine.

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war began. By decision of the military council of the Leningrad Military District, experimental tanks SMK, T-100 and KV were removed from testing and sent to the front to test them in a real combat situation. Of these, they formed a company of heavy tanks and included it in the 91st tank battalion of the 20th heavy tank brigade. At the same time, the crews of the vehicles partly consisted of the military, and partly - from factory specialists.

By this time, it became completely clear that the twin installation of two guns hampered the actions of the crew. Therefore, on the eve of sending the KV to the Karelian Isthmus, a 45-mm cannon was dismantled from it, replacing it with a 7.62-mm DT machine gun. Accordingly, the ammunition load of the vehicle also changed - now it consisted of 116 artillery rounds and 1890 rounds of ammunition.

A rather difficult section of the front was chosen to test the combat qualities of the new vehicles. Tanks advanced to it through Terioki (now Zelenogorsk), then passed Raivola and went to the Boboshino area, which is not far from the Perkiyarvi station (now Kirillovskoye). The enemy position was between Lake Summajärvi and the ice-free Sunasuo swamp. Finnish pillboxes on high-rises were armed with Swedish 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns and machine guns. Before them stood granite gouges. Heavy tanks were to attack these fortifications.

In its first battle on December 18, 1939, the KV performed well. Despite numerous hits, he had no obvious damage to the armor. True, a shot from an anti-tank gun shot through the barrel of a tank gun. In addition, traces of 43 shell hits were counted on the hull. The fuel pump, fixed with two bolts, was disconnected from the concussions. In general, the tank remained quite efficient. The shot gun was replaced the next day with a new one brought from the Kirov factory. Coincidentally, on this very day - December 19, 1939 - in Moscow, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov signed a resolution of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 44Zss, according to which the KV tank was adopted by the Red Army. At the same time, the prototype covered only 550 km, which is negligible to test the reliability of a new combat vehicle. However, it was believed that some of the components and assemblies of the tank (suspension, chassis, transmission elements, etc.) were tested on the SMK tank.

On December 30, 1939, the People's Commissar for Heavy Engineering V. A. Malyshev signed an order that ordered:

"one. Director of the Kirov Plant Comrade. Zaltsman I. M. to organize the production of KV tanks at the Kirov Plant, having previously eliminated all the defects found during testing.

The prototype KV was at the forefront until the beginning of January 1940. True, the tank no longer participated in the battles. On January 2, the car was returned to the factory to be used as a model in the manufacture of an initial batch of 20 units. At the same time, the first four vehicles were to be armed with 152-mm howitzers to fight Finnish pillboxes and destroy anti-tank obstacles. Such was the demand of the Military Council of the North-Western Front.

Tank KV No. U-3. At the stern of the turret, the armor hatch cover for mounting and dismounting the gun is clearly visible.

The project for installing a 152-mm howitzer in a tank was developed jointly by SKB-2 and the artillery experimental design department - AOKO (Plant No. 172 named after Molotov), ​​headed by N. V. Kurin. The leading engineers were N. N. Ilyin and G. N. Rybin. In total, this team consisted of about 20 people. They gave little time for work - only a few days. Therefore, the designers who participated in it were transferred to the barracks and placed on the fourth floor of the plant management. Initially, it was supposed to install a howitzer of the 1909/30 model in the KV tower. However, preference was given to the more powerful and modern M-10 artillery system - the 152-mm howitzer of the 1938 model. To install it in the tank, it was necessary to develop a new tower, which was done in SKB- 2 according to the dimensions issued by the gunners. The height of the tower with the periscope was increased to 1790 mm. The tower had inclined frontal and vertical side plates. The aft part of the tower was made of two armor plates welded at an angle to each other, it was equipped with a hatch for mounting and dismantling the howitzer in the field, which was closed with an armored cover fastened with bolts. At the same time, the new turret (together with the gun, it received the designation MT-1) had the same ring diameter as the turret with the 76-mm gun. It should be noted that the designations KV-1 and KV-2 appeared only in 1941, and before that the names were used: “tanks with a small turret” and “tanks with a large turret”.

The first MT-1 installation was mounted on the very first prototype KV U-0 instead of a turret with a 76-mm gun, the second - on the first tank of the U-1 installation batch. On February 17, both cars left for the Karelian Isthmus. A characteristic feature of the U-1 machine was the presence of a special cover on the muzzle, which protects the bore from bullets and shrapnel. Before the shot, this cover had to be opened with a special thrust, and then closed again. However, at the first shot in the shooting gallery, the cover was torn off, and before being sent to the front, it was dismantled. To protect the howitzer barrel from bullets and shrapnel, special armor rings 10 mm thick were put on it (subsequently, gun barrels of all KV-2 tanks were equipped with such rings).

The U-2 tank with the turret of the U-0 vehicle with a 76-mm gun was sent to the front on February 22, and on the 29th - the U-3 tank with the MT-1 installation. The U-4 tank with MT-1 was ready by March 13, 1940, but they did not have time to send it to combat positions - the Soviet-Finnish war ended.

At the front, all KVs and the prototype of the T-100 tank were reduced to a separate company, attached to the 13th light tank and 20th heavy tank brigades. True, it was not possible to check the KV in a combat situation by shooting at pillboxes: the main line of defense of the Finns had already been broken through. Therefore, the tanks were tested by firing at pillboxes and gouges after the end of hostilities. At the same time, we got good results. Recalling these events, the commander of the KV tank “with a large turret”, junior lieutenant Z.F. Glushak from the 20th tank brigade, said:

“The obstacles on the Mannerheim Line were made thoroughly. Huge granite gouges stood in three rows. To make a passage 6–8 m wide, we needed only five shots of concrete-piercing shells. While we were cracking the gouges, the enemy fired at us continuously. We quickly spotted the pillbox, and then completely destroyed it with two shots. When they left the battle, they counted 48 dents on the armor, but not a single hole.

Mention should be made of two projects based on the KV tank, developed for the needs of the front. The first - object 212 - was a 35-ton tractor for the evacuation of wrecked tanks. Engineer N. V. Khalkiopov was appointed the lead engineer of the project. At the end of February 1940, the project of the tractor and its full-size wooden model were reviewed by representatives of ABTU. But despite the fact that this machine was highly appreciated by the military, the “go-ahead” for its manufacture in metal was never received.

Object 218 was a remote installation for undermining mines with high frequency currents. The current generator and other equipment were supposed to be mounted in the body of the KV-2 tank. Field tests of the generator mounted on the chassis of the T-28 tank took place in February 1940 and showed good results. However, it became clear that the installation needed to be improved.

The layout and scheme of operation of the minesweeper tank equipment object 218 (left and bottom).

The design of the "218th" went on until the summer of 1941, but after the start of the Great Patriotic War, it was discontinued.

The remaining six machines of the pilot batch (U-5 - U-10) were manufactured in April - May 1940. All of them had turrets with 76 mm guns. By this time, the initial annual plan for the production of KV - 50 tanks - had been sharply increased. Starting from July and until the end of the year, the plant was supposed to produce 230 KV tanks, of which 130 with a "small tower" and 100 with a "large tower". The ABTU of the Red Army, concerned that the tank did not pass field tests, and many flaws were found in previously released vehicles, proposed to conduct full-scale tests of the KV. So, two cars - U-4 and U-7 in June arrived at the training ground in Kubinka near Moscow for testing. However, then testing was entrusted to the Kirov Plant, and both cars were returned back. On June 10, 1940, factory tests of the U-1 tank began in the Leningrad region, during which the vehicle covered 2648 km. In the second half of July, the U-21 tank with a 152-mm howitzer was tested, and in August, the U-7 tank with a 76-mm gun. Mileage U-21 and U-7 amounted to 1631 and 2050 km, respectively. As a result, the KV tanks were found to have significant shortcomings in the transmission, running gear and engine.

Tank U-7 with the first sample of the "lowered" turret before testing. September 1940.

Especially a lot of shortcomings turned out to be in the design of the transmission, in particular, in the gearbox, the reliability of which left much to be desired. During the tests, increased wear of the gear teeth and their breakage were observed, there were difficulties in shifting gears during the movement. In addition, it turned out that during a long movement of the tank in fourth gear, it and the second gear associated with it failed. To eliminate this defect, starting from the 31st machine, a special lock was introduced into the gearbox design.

In addition, the unreliability of the turret swivel mechanism was noted, the design of which was mainly borrowed from the swivel mechanism of the large turret of the T-28 tank weighing about 3 tons. The mass of the KV-1 tower was 7 tons, KV-2 - 12 tons, in addition, the towers became more unbalanced. As a result, problems arose associated with large efforts on the handles of manual mechanisms, the power of electric motors for turning the towers, as well as with the speed and smoothness of aiming the guns. So, when the KV tanks were moving along the slopes, turning the KV-1 turret to the side was almost impossible, not to mention the KV-2 turret.

Based on the test results of the U-1, U-21 and U-7 tanks, the Kirov Plant was given a list of changes that needed to be made to the design of the KV. However, the plant was in no hurry to eliminate the identified shortcomings.

Serial tank KV-2. Autumn 1940.

On August 12, 1940, a military engineer of the 3rd rank Kalivoda, a military engineer of the 3rd rank Kalivoda, outraged by this, sent a letter to the Commissar of State Control L. Z. Mekhlis, which, in particular, said:

“I think that the KV machine is underdeveloped and requires urgent and serious alterations. Most of the alterations cannot be carried out in the process of wide production, which is already in full swing at the Kirov plant. Such a situation will delay the development of the machine in production for at least 1.5–2 years and will introduce great confusion, unnecessary costs and will not give the slightest saving in time. The quality of the manufactured car will be low within 1.5–2 years. It would be more expedient to reduce the program by the end of 1940 to 5-8 machines per month and transfer all factory forces to finalize the machine. At present, the main forces are thrown into the execution of the program, and very little is thought about the quality of the machine. I think that in this moment it is impossible to call the car combat-ready because of the above defects. You can send it to the army only as training, not combat.”

Serial tank KV-1 produced in October - December 1940 in the yard of the Kirov Plant.

Serial tank KV-1. Rubberized support rollers, typical for pre-war tanks, are clearly visible.

The issues raised in this letter were so serious that the People's Commissariat of State Control sent a special commission to the Kirov Plant, which worked at the plant from October 1 to October 10, 1940 and basically confirmed the conclusions of the military representative. On November 1, L. Z. Mekhlis sent a letter directly to I. V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov:

Serial KV-1 tank produced in 1941 with F-32 gun. Judging by the rectangular additional tanks on the fenders, this machine was made after the start of the war.

KV-1 military release in 1941. The armor on the front of the hull is clearly visible.

Judging by this letter, a paradoxical situation arose: the plant, in an effort to fulfill the plan, presented tanks that were practically incapable of combat to military acceptance, and the military, who were well aware of this, accepted them. No corrective action was taken. SKB-2 was enthusiastically engaged in the design of new supertanks KV-3, KV-4, KV-5, KV-220 and others. Already in the summer of 1940, the issue of developing tanks with more powerful armor and weapons than the KV was discussed. The Kirov Plant was ordered to produce such tanks as early as November 1940. Was it there before the improvement of serial HF?

True, in November, a “large lowered turret” for the KV-2 tank was put into production, which differed from the previous one in smaller dimensions, weight and relative ease of production. At the same time, a reinforced swivel mechanism design and a new ammunition rack for artillery rounds and machine gun discs were introduced on all KV tanks. However, the engine and gearbox have not changed.

In total, by the end of 1940, the Kirov Plant manufactured 139 KV-1 and 104 KV-2 (24 of them with the MT-1 installation), thus fulfilling the planned target.

The production plan for 1941 provided for the production of 1200 KV tanks. Of these, at the Kirov Plant - 1000 (400 KV-1, 100 KV-2 and 500 KV-3) and 200 KV-1 - at ChTZ. In the future, it was supposed to leave the production of only KV-3 at the Kirov Plant, and transfer KV-1 and KV-2 to ChTZ.

Such an extensive production plan required a radical restructuring and expansion of the production base. At the Kirov Plant, new special tank shops were put into operation - the assembly SB-2 and the delivery SD-2. The MX-2 shop, which was the main one in tank production, was rebuilt. The procurement workshops were also expanded - foundries, forges, thermal, cold stamping and others. In February, by order of the People's Commissar of Heavy Engineering A. Efremov, the nearby Molotov Mechanical Plant was transferred to the Kirov Plant.

The main innovation of the vehicles manufactured in 1941, in comparison with the tanks manufactured in 1940, was their armament with a 76-mm F-32 gun instead of the L-11. The L-11 gun, developed in the artillery design bureau of the Kirov Plant, had a number of design flaws, and its installation in tanks was considered only as a temporary measure. The F-32 gun, created in the Design Bureau of Plant No. 92 (Gorky) under the direction of V. G. Grabin, differed from the L-11 in its ease of manufacture and reliability in operation. The Kirov Plant was supposed to produce a batch of 30 F-32 guns in the first half of 1940 and expand the gross production of these systems from August 1, 1940.

One of the KV tanks of the installation batch with an experimental model of the 76-mm F-27 gun. Gorky, spring 1941.

But the plant did not comply with this decision, continuing to defend its L-11 gun, trying to improve and simplify its design. In April, the Kirovites enlisted the support of V. A. Malyshev, who, in a letter to the chairman of the Defense Committee, spoke positively about the L-11, but everything was in vain. In May 1940, the head of the ABTU D. G. Pavlov reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks:

"As a result of testing the F-32 and L-11, it was established that the F-32 in a tank has a number of advantages over the L-11."

According to the plan, the Kirov Plant was supposed to manufacture and hand over 130 F-32 guns by the end of the year. However, in 1940, only 50 guns were made, and they began to be installed in the KV in January 1941.

It should be noted that already in 1940, many military men criticized the KV for insufficiently powerful weapons. After all, the same L-11 guns were installed on the heavy KV-1 and medium T-34. And after the F-34 guns were installed on the T-34 from the beginning of 1941, the armament of the KV-1 became weaker than that of a medium tank!

New powerful 85-mm and 95-mm tank guns began to be developed in the summer of 1940 at the Design Bureau of Plant No. 92. In the autumn of the same year, they were tested in the turret of the T-28 tank. At the end of 1940, the same design bureau designed the 76 mm F-27 tank gun, which had the ballistics of a 76 mm 3K anti-aircraft gun (muzzle velocity 813 m/s). The F-27 gun was successfully tested, however, in connection with the deployment of work on the KV-3 tank, all work on this artillery system was stopped.

Tank KV-1 with F-32 gun and armored screens on the turret. Leningrad Front, 1941.

In addition to the modernization of artillery weapons, the work plan for 1941 provided for the improvement of the design of a number of components and assemblies of the KV. In the documents of the Kirov Plant, this project is referred to as object 222. It was a KV-1 tank with 90 mm hull and turret armor, a commander's turret, a new driver's viewing device and a turret rotation mechanism, a planetary gearbox, a 10-R radio station and other upgraded units. Some of these new products were installed and tested in the standard hull of the KV-1 tank at the end of April 1941. The launch of the production of new units was supposed in May - August. But already on May 25, the chief engineer of the Kirov Plant reported to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Engineering that “in connection with the transition of tank production ... to a new type of KV-3 vehicle, we ask you to exclude the following from the defense work plan proposed by you for 1941, related to the KV tank, which after three months is removed from the production of our factory:

1. commander's observation turret with all-round visibility;

2. viewing device for the driver of the KV tank with a horizontal view of 120 ° and a vertical view of 250 °, with mechanical snow removal;

3. The rotary mechanism of the turret of the KV tank, which provides rotation of the turret from the motor when the tank rolls up to 20 ° and rotation by hand with a force of no more than 10 kg. Turret rotation speed - 2 rpm (when rotating from the motor);

4. planetary transmission in the existing dimensions of the tank with a warranty period of up to 3000 km.

Thus, a month before the start of the war, all work related to eliminating the shortcomings of the KV tanks was curtailed without even starting. This is how the KV-3 supertank, which failed and, by and large, was completely unnecessary for the Red Army, "moved" the much-needed modernization of serial KVs.

Tank KV-1 with 76-mm gun F-34 on trials. February 1941.

As for the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, back in June 1940, the Kirov Plant was supposed to transfer one KV tank and technical documentation for it, and by August - all technological documentation. In addition, the Kirovites were obliged to provide assistance by specialists, as well as to organize the production of armored hulls at plant No. 78 in Chelyabinsk. All this was completed only by the beginning of October, and therefore the production of KV at ChTZ was not launched until the end of 1940. The first experimental assembly of the KV tank at ChTZ was carried out on December 31 of the same year. At the same time, the construction of a special tank workshop began, which they did not have time to complete before the start of the war. Largely for this reason, by June 1, 1941, ChTZ produced only 25 KV tanks. In total, by the efforts of two plants, 423 KV-1 tanks and 213 KV-2 tanks were produced by this date (46 of them with a “big tower”).

Already four days after the German attack on the USSR, on June 26, 1941, order No. 25Zss was issued by the People's Commissariat of Heavy Engineering, which stated:

Increase the production of tanks and put into effect the mobilization plan for the 2nd half of 1941.

Release KV tanks with a screen. The front plates of the hull and turret of the KV tank are subject to shielding. The thickness of the screen for the front plate of the tank hull is 25 mm, the thickness of the screen for the front plate of the turret is 90–100 mm.

It is allowed to make changes in the drawings to reduce labor intensity, without reducing the combat qualities of the tank ...

From July 1, preparations for the production of the KV-3 at the Kirov plant will be removed and transferred to Chelyabinsk at ChTZ, where a team of designers, technologists, documentation, materials and a tank sample will be sent.

Transfer the Kirov Plant, in accordance with the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, from the People's Commissariat for Heavy Engineering to the People's Commissariat for Medium Engineering as of July 1, 1941.

Tank KV-1, 1941 issue. This machine was manufactured at ChTZ, which can be judged, for example, by two cylindrical fuel tanks on the fender.

On July 1, production of the KV-2 tank ceased; in the same month, reinforced road wheels and a simplified turret for the KV-1 went into production. The design of the latter was revised, some of the bent parts were replaced with straight ones, and the overall length of the tower was also reduced. Stamped road wheels were replaced with cast ones, and road wheels with internal shock absorption due to an acute shortage of rubber were replaced with solid ones. Torsion shafts were made from rolled blanks. The abolition of forging in the production of torsion shafts made it possible to increase their output by 4–5 times on the existing equipment.

To staff SKB-2 with engineers, the directorate of the Kirov Plant transferred to its structure SKB-1 specialists (80 people in total), who had been designing gas turbines before the war. All this made it possible to solve many problems much faster than in peacetime, and by mid-July to bring the production of KV tanks to 10 vehicles per day.

In July 1941, deliveries of the V-2K diesel engine from the Kharkov Motor Plant No. 75, which had begun evacuation to the Urals, ceased. Within three days, the designers of SKB-2 worked out the possibility of installing M-17T carburetor engines in the KV-1 tanks, which were available in the warehouses of the Leningrad Front. In the MX-2 machine assembly shop, a prototype tank was made, which successfully passed factory tests. In September 1941, 37 tanks with carburetor engines were produced at the LKZ.

In late July and early August 1941, due to a heavy overload of the forge shops of the plant and the inability to ensure the production of a sufficient number of forged tracks at the LKZ, work was launched to manufacture and test cast tracks. In October 1941, due to the need to evacuate the forging equipment to the Urals, cast tracks for the KV-1 tank were put into mass production.

Tank KV-1 with a simplified turret, manufactured at the Kirov plant in Leningrad in the autumn of 1941.

In addition to serial production, the plant continued to conduct some experimental work. So, at the end of July, a flamethrower installation was designed in the KV tank. This machine in the documents of the plant passed as KV-6. The engineers of plant No. 174 named after V.I. Voroshilova I. A. Aristov, Elagin and others. The flamethrower on the KV-6 was installed to the right of the driver in the frontal hull sheet in a special armor. The range of the jet reached 40-50 m, the number of shots was 10-12. The KV-6 was tested directly on the front line, which by that time had approached the suburbs of Leningrad. The number of manufactured tanks is unknown, according to various sources, their number ranges from one to several.

Tank KV-1 with a cast turret and hull, produced by plant number 200. Spring 1942.

After the capture of Krasnoye Selo by the Germans German artillery got the opportunity to shell the Kirov plant. Artillery raids were carried out regularly on one or another shop. The enterprise turned into a factory-front, only a few kilometers separated it from the front line of the German troops. For strategic reasons, tank production was transferred to a safer place - on the Vyborg side, to plant No. 371 named after. Stalin, where repairs and restoration of damaged tanks were carried out. Part of the equipment is also transported there, engineers and tank builders are sent, who begin to assemble and repair vehicles. During the repair, part of the KV-1 was equipped with additional armor plates (or, as they were called at that time, screens). Armor plates with a thickness of 25-35 mm were attached to the bonks welded on the sides of the hull and turret with bolts.

The production of tanks in Leningrad is becoming more and more difficult. At the end of September, the Izhora plant stops supplying new armored hulls and turrets, as the front line comes close to the plant's territory. Plant them. Stalin, as the stock of hulls, turrets and engines was used up, he switched only to the repair of combat vehicles. On October 18, the last KV tank was assembled in the city on the Neva. In total, starting from July 1941, 444 KV tanks were manufactured at the LKZ.

After Leningrad found itself in the ring of blockade in early September, a decision was made to speed up the evacuation of the Kirov plant to the Urals. Back in early July, all the design and technological documentation was taken there, and a team of designers and technologists headed by N. L. Dukhov was sent there. People believed that they were going on a business trip to help establish the production of heavy tanks and return. They didn’t even take winter things, thinking that before the fall the enemy would certainly be defeated. During July - August, 12,313 wagons with machine tools, tools and equipment were sent to the Urals. With the last echelons until August 29, when the railway connection with Leningrad was interrupted, 525 machine tools were sent. Later, the export of equipment and workers of the plant was carried out by ships on Lake Ladoga and by aircraft. Until November, at least 11 thousand people were taken out in this way.

Tank KV-1 with a cast turret manufactured by UZTM. Manezhnaya Square in Moscow. January 1942.

Tank KV-1 with installations KRAST-1 (short tank artillery missile system). Chelyabinsk, plant number 100, summer 1942. An 82 mm rocket projectile is visible on the rail mounted on the fender.

By GKO Decree No. 734 of October 4, 1941, the Ural Combine for the Production of Heavy KV Tanks was established as part of the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry, which included ChTZ, UZTM, the Ural Turbine Plant and Plant No. 75 evacuated from Kharkov. By the same decree, ChTZ was renamed Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant (ChKZ). However, the name "Ural Combine for the Production of Heavy KV Tanks" did not take root, and soon the huge plant received the unofficial name "Tankograd".

Assembly shop of the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant, spring 1942. It is clearly seen that tanks with both cast turrets and welded simplified ones are in the process of being assembled. Most machines also have a simplified aft hull.

Thanks to the measures taken in the fall of 1941, a mass production of KV tanks was launched in Chelyabinsk. At the end of October, due to the lack of F-32 guns, the production of which was discontinued at the Kirov plant in Leningrad, tanks began to be armed with the 76-mm ZIS-5 gun. It was a variant of the F-34 gun adapted for installation in the KV. The ZIS-5 differed from the F-34 in the design of the cradle elements and the armored mask.

To expand the production of armored hulls for KV tanks, by a GKO decree of November 13, 1941, on the basis of the workshops of plant No. 78 named after. Ordzhonikidze in Chelyabinsk, an "armor plant was created with the assignment of number 200 to it and the inclusion of heavy tanks in the plant." M. Popov, who previously headed the Izhora plant in Leningrad, was appointed its director. All this made it possible to give the front 110 KV tanks in November, and 213 in December.

In order to save rental and reduce welding work, the tank turrets, after successful shelling tests of prototypes, began to be made cast. The projectile resistance of such towers was lower than that of welded ones. Therefore, the wall thickness of the cast tower was 110 mm, and not 75 mm - as in the welded one. Providing combat vehicles with stamped tracks, which now required hundreds of thousands, faced enormous difficulties - there were not enough hammers of high power. As a result of studying this problem and the tests carried out, it was decided to assemble tracks from two types of tracks - one-piece with ridges and composite - from two halves, which were installed in each track in turn. In the future, it was possible to master the production of cast tracks, which were not inferior in quality to stamped ones. Due to the lack of Ferodo friction material, steel discs were used for the main clutch. Such clutches were not a full-fledged replacement, but, nevertheless, they, however, with some difficulties, ensured the operation of the tank's transmission. After the adoption of measures to organize the production of discs with Ferodo linings, the main clutches again began to be produced with these discs instead of steel ones. During the period of mastering the production of the V-2 diesel engine at ChKZ, in November - December 1941, 130 KV-1 tanks with the M-17 carburetor engine were manufactured.

At the end of 1941, on the basis of the KV-1 tank, SKB-2 developed the KV-8 flamethrower tank, the KV-12 chemical tank, and, together with the UZTM design bureau, the KV-7 self-propelled artillery mount and the KV-9 tank. The KV-8 tank was mass-produced, the KV-12 chemical tank and the KV-7 self-propelled gun remained in prototypes.

Chemical tank KV-12 (object 232). Chelyabinsk, plant number 100, spring 1942. Tanks for poisonous substances mounted on fenders are clearly visible.

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