15. Human losses of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War One of the most speculative questions in the falsification of the history of the Second World War is the question of the USSR's human losses incurred during its course. Through the media, people are hammered in that the USSR won the war "by flooding the enemy with corpses

Stalin's Decisive Role in the Great Patriotic War Throughout the war, and especially during the most difficult first year, Stalin's courage, determination and competence inspired the entire Soviet people. In hours of despair, Stalin embodied faith in final victory. November 7

It was subdivided into military (battalion, regimental, divisional, corps, and in 1943 and army) and artillery of the VGK reserve. The artillery was armed with cannons, howitzers, mortars, combat vehicles (installations) of rockets. The battalion and regimental artillery of the Red Army until 1943 was represented by pre-war models, while the Wehrmacht increased the effectiveness of its already more powerful infantry artillery. So, at the end of 1941, a cumulative projectile was added to the ammunition load of a German light infantry gun, which in 1942 was replaced by a more powerful one.

In 1943, simultaneously in the Soviet Union and Germany, regimental guns were created on an almost identical carriage, the design of which was borrowed from the 37-mm anti-tank gun (in the USSR and in most cases in Germany, when creating both guns, a carriage from a 45-mm anti-tank gun was used guns of the 1937 model). The new Soviet regimental 76-millimeter gun model 1943 (OB-25) was much lighter than the old regimental gun.

Compared to its predecessor, it significantly benefited in mobility and fire maneuvering capabilities, as well as in the fight against tanks due to the presence of HEAT shells in the ammunition load. However, she was inferior in maximum range and accuracy of fire. In the Wehrmacht, the 75 mm le 1G18 gun was replaced in production by the new 1G37 gun. The new Soviet and German guns had similar tactical and technical characteristics, but the barrel of the Soviet gun did not have a muzzle brake, which caused increased loads on the carriage during firing, and the Germans used a powerful slotted muzzle brake. The 75 mm 1G37 was equipped with a semi-automatic wedge breech, while the OB-25 used the old piston breech of the 1927 model regimental gun. Modern researchers of military weapons give both positive and negative ratings of the combat qualities of the 76 mm 1943 regimental gun.

In particular, it points to the weak ballistics of the gun, the vertical guidance angle insufficient for conducting mounted fire, the low rate of fire of the gun, and other shortcomings. In 1944, the Krupp company developed an even more advanced 75-mm 1G42 infantry gun, which had an increased elevation angle, which made it possible to increase the firing range. In the same year, an attempt was made in the Soviet Union to create a 76-mm regimental gun with a wedge bolt, but this gun was not put into service. At the beginning of 1945, a smooth-bore infantry gun was tested in Nazi Germany, but German designers did not manage to advance further than prototypes. In the battles of World War II, the infantry suffered the greatest losses from mortar fire.

However, in the pre-war years, the attitude of military specialists of the armies of many countries of the world towards them was rather restrained. The dominant view was that mortars were cheap and readily available for mass production as a surrogate for guns. In the prewar years, mortars were included in the artillery armament system, and by the beginning of the war, the troops received 82-mm and 120-mm mortars of a very successful design. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, mortars were repeatedly modernized. The 82-mm battalion mortar of the 1941 model, developed at the Special Design Bureau of V.N. Shamarin, had an eccentric mechanism built into the breech of the barrel, which made it possible to increase the safety of the mortar unloading process. The bipedal carriage of the 82-mm battalion mortar of the 1943 model was a rigid frame with coulters welded to it, which, when fired, deepened into the ground and ensured high stability of the mortar.

In the 120-mm regimental mortar of the 1943 model, under the leadership of A. A. Kotov, the design of the barrel built into the breech and the firing mechanism was simplified, a double-loading fuse, improved shock absorbers and a swinging sight were installed. Unlike the Red Army, the Wehrmacht considered the mortar only as an infantry one. In this regard, it was envisaged the presence of 50-mm mortars in an infantry company and 81-mm mortars in a machine-gun company of an infantry battalion. Developed before the war, 105-mm mortars were intended for chemical warfare as part of the “smoke troops” and were not used in the infantry. The 120-mm German mortar (GR-42) was structurally made as an exact copy of the Soviet 120-mm mortar of the 1938 model (the design documentation captured in Kharkov was used). The performance characteristics of Soviet and German mortars were approximately the same. It should be noted that the German troops used their mortar weapons tactically competently, sometimes inflicting very tangible losses on the Soviet troops. The reaction to this was the decision of the GKO, which led to a significant increase in the production of mortars, their supply to the troops and the improvement of methods of combat use.

By the beginning of the war, the Red Army had a completely modern divisional artillery system, the main models of which later became: 76.2-mm guns of the 1939 model (F-22USV), the 1942 model (ZIS-Z), 122-mm howitzers of the model 1938 (M-30). The achievement of design ideas in the design bureau of V. G. Grabin was the development of the 76.2-mm ZIS-3 divisional gun, recognized for its power, design perfection, external lightness and even, in the words of some experts, grace as the best gun of World War II. Factory tests of this gun were started in 1940 and completed in early 1941. When creating the gun, the idea of ​​imposing the barrel of the F-22 USV gun equipped with a muzzle brake on the carriage of a 57-mm anti-tank gun was used. The new gun ensured the solution of the entire range of tasks of divisional artillery: the destruction of manpower and armored vehicles, the suppression and destruction of infantry and artillery fire weapons, the destruction of long-term firing points, and so on. However, on the eve of the war, this gun was not accepted into service, since the development was carried out without an official order from the GAU, and the 76-mm caliber divisional artillery was considered unpromising.

At the beginning of the war, V. G. Grabin, in agreement with the management of plant No. 92, at his own peril and risk, launched the ZIS-3 into mass production. In the battles of 1941, the ZIS-3 proved its advantage over the F-22 USV, which was distinguished by the difficulty of aiming at the target, had a large mass and significant recoil force. This allowed V. G. Grabin to personally present it to I. V. Stalin and obtain official permission for production. As a result, the ZIS-3 was put into service under the name "76.2-mm Soviet divisional and anti-tank gun of the 1942 model." ZIS-3 became the main artillery system of the Soviet divisional artillery. In terms of firing efficiency, it surpassed the German 75-mm gun. When a high-explosive fragmentation grenade exploded, 870 lethal fragments were formed with a radius of continuous destruction of 15 m (the German projectile produced 765 fragments with a radius of continuous destruction of 11.5 m).

At a distance of 500 m at a meeting angle of 90 degrees, the armor-piercing projectile of the gun pierced armor 70 mm thick 164 . The main advantage of the ZIS-3 over similar guns from foreign countries was its unpretentiousness. Like the T-34 tank, the ZIS-3 gun, although since 1943 its combat capabilities no longer fully met the requirements, became one of the symbols of the achievements of domestic industry during the Great Patriotic War. In the second half of 1944, a new 85-mm D-44 divisional gun, which was designed at the Design Bureau of F. F. Petrov to replace the 76-mm ZIS-3 gun, passed state tests.

Switching to a larger caliber was on the agenda as Germany got new heavy tanks with thick armor. However, the need for subsequent improvements did not allow this gun to participate in the war. The D-44 gun was distinguished by the compact placement of guidance mechanisms, the low height of the line of fire and the ability to be transported by mechanical traction at a speed of up to 60 km / h. The time for transferring the gun from traveling to combat and back did not exceed one minute. The maximum firing range of a high-explosive fragmentation projectile was 15,820 m. In Nazi Germany, ammunition for divisional howitzers received advanced development. So, since 1942, cumulative shells were introduced into the ammunition load of the 150-mm howitzer sFH-18, which hit the armor of Soviet heavy tanks at a distance of up to 1500 m. Rheinmetall and Krupp firms in 1941-1944. released improved active-reactive 150-mm Rgr-19/40 shells, providing a firing range of up to 19 km, but their accuracy of fire and the strength of the shells left much to be desired. By the end of the war, high-explosive fragmentation feathered shells (wing mines) were developed for the 150-mm howitzer.

The Red Army received cumulative ammunition with a significant delay. With the restoration of the corps control link, a practical need arose to have a corps howitzer with high maneuverability, a powerful projectile and a firing range that ensures counter-battery combat. This problem was solved by the creation of a 152-mm howitzer model 1943 (D-1) 166 . It fully met the requirements of the Red Army in terms of mobility, power and firing range. The D-1 could fire the entire range of 152mm howitzer shells. According to N. N. Voronov: “Compared to the previous howitzer of the same caliber, it had solid advantages. In connection with the transition of the Red Army to large offensive operations, new offensive weapons were required. This is exactly what the new, lightweight 152-mm howitzer, well received by the troops, turned out to be. The lightweight D-1 howitzer was a very reliable weapon, had high firing accuracy and good survivability.

The D-1 howitzer, at least, was not inferior in its characteristics to the best world examples of guns of this class. A comparative analysis of similar guns shows that the German heavy field howitzer of 150 mm caliber sFH-18, surpassing the D-1 in maximum firing range by almost a kilometer (13,325 m), was too heavy for its class (almost 2 tons heavier than the D-1 ) 168 . The more advanced sFH-36 howitzer (firing range and weight corresponded to the D-1 indicators) was not possible for the Germans to put on stream. The Czech 150-mm howitzer K4, in the German version - sFH-37 (t), the 149-mm Italian howitzer of the Ansaldo company and the 155-mm American howitzer M1, having a greater firing range than the D-1, were much inferior to it in mobility due to the large weight. French and British howitzers of this class were inferior to the D-1 both in terms of firing range and mass. In 1943, the troops received the best 160-mm mortar in the world at that time with breech-loading and an inseparable gun carriage.

Giving an assessment of this mortar after the war, Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov wrote: “Among the novelties was also a 160-mm mortar, a powerful offensive weapon with a firing range of 5150 meters, with a mine weighing 40.5 kilograms, which has a powerful high-explosive action. The weight of the mortar in combat position was only about a ton. This weapon turned out to be indispensable in breaking through the enemy's defenses, for destroying his wood-and-earth structures. When new mortars were first massively used on one of the fronts, they made a huge moral impact on the enemy. The shots of these mortars are deaf, the mine takes off very high along a steep trajectory, and then falls almost vertically. At the very first explosions of such mines, the Nazis decided that ours was bombing them, and began to give air raid signals. Other countries did not have such powerful and maneuverable weapons.

Throughout the war in Germany, they tried to develop experimental samples of 150, 210, 305 and even 420-mm mortars, but until the end of the war, none of them left the design stage. Similar attempts in the United States also failed. At the beginning of the war, in connection with the failures of the Red Army, personnel and material losses, the army and the country were faced with the most difficult tasks to ensure the effectiveness of the combat use of artillery in conditions of difficult defensive battles and operations. Great hopes in increasing the effectiveness of fire from closed firing positions were placed on rocket artillery, the birth of which in the Red Army was announced by the first salvo of the BM-13 battery at the enemy near Orsha on July 14, 1941. The high efficiency of rocket artillery was noted by the Chief of the General Staff, General G.K. Zhukov.

In his report to I.V. Stalin in September 1941. he wrote: “Rockets by their actions produced continuous devastation. I examined the areas where the shelling was carried out, and saw the complete destruction of the defensive structures. Ushakovo - the enemy's main defense center - was completely destroyed as a result of volleys of rockets, and the shelters were littered and broken. Parts of rocket artillery were organizationally part of the artillery of the RVGK and were called guards mortar. They were armed with BM-8 and BM-13 rocket systems. The multi-charge nature of rocket launchers determined their high fire performance, the possibility of simultaneously hitting targets over large areas. Volley fire provided surprise, a high material and moral effect on the enemy.

In fascist Germany, rocket artillery appeared as a result of a search for effective means of setting up smoke interference. The first installations, equipped with 150-mm rockets, received the name "Nebelwerfer" (smoke-shooting device). This mortar consisted of six barrels mounted on a modified carriage of a 37 mm PaK-35/36 gun. In 1942, ten-barreled self-propelled rocket launchers appeared, mounted on half-track tractors, 150-mm Panzerwerfer 42. By the beginning of the war, the Germans also had 280-mm and 380-mm mines, the launchers for which were the simplest tubular barrels or wooden frames (Packkiste), used as stationary installations to create a fire shaft or by engineering assault groups to destroy houses and other wells. protected objects.

The rockets used to fire from the Soviet and German launchers were fundamentally different from each other: the Soviet shells were stabilized in flight by the tail, and the German shells were turbojet, that is, they were stabilized in flight by rotation around the longitudinal axis. The tail plumage greatly simplified the design of the projectiles and made it possible to manufacture them on relatively simple technological equipment, and for the manufacture of turbojet projectiles, precision machine tools and highly skilled labor were needed. During the war years, this was one of the main factors holding back the development of German rocket artillery. Another difference between the Soviet and German rocket launchers was a different approach to the choice of the base chassis. In the USSR, rocket artillery launchers were considered as a means of conducting maneuverable combat operations.

Such requirements were met by self-propelled installations, which made it possible to carry out a wide maneuver with units of rocket artillery and quickly concentrate them on the most important directions for hitting the enemy with massive fire. In the USSR, cheap trucks were used as chassis, and in Germany, a light wheeled carriage from an anti-tank gun or a scarce chassis of a half-track armored personnel carrier. The latter immediately ruled out the possibility of mass production of self-propelled launchers, since armored personnel carriers were in dire need of their main consumers - the armored forces of the Wehrmacht. Rocket shells were used by the Germans already on June 22 near Brest, but until the end of the war they did not manage to find the structures of military formations and establish forms and methods that would ensure combat effectiveness comparable to Soviet ones. The BM-13 multiple rocket launchers combined multiple charges, rate of fire and a significant mass of a salvo with self-propelled and high mobility.

They became an effective means of fighting tanks, as well as in the destruction of strong defensive and other engineering structures. It should be noted that not a single army that took part in World War II created similar structures for the mass use of rockets. In 1943, the unified (normalized) BM-13N launcher was put into service. At the same time, it was possible to provide an increase in the speed of vertical aiming by 2 times, the firing sector - by 20%, to reduce the effort on the handles of the guidance mechanisms by 1.5-2 times, to increase the survivability and operational reliability of the combat installation. The tactical mobility of rocket artillery units armed with BM-13N installations was increased by the use of the powerful American Studebaker 6 × 6 truck as a base for the launcher. At the end of 1943, at the Kompressor plant, the design team of A. N. Vasilyev began to develop a launcher for firing M-13-DD extended-range and improved M-13UK projectiles, which rotated at the time of launch and on the trajectory. Despite a slight decrease in the flight range of these projectiles (up to 7.9 km), their dispersion area was significantly reduced, which led to a threefold increase in the density of fire compared to the M-13 projectiles.

In 1943, Ya. B. Zel'dovich, who at that time headed the laboratory of the Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was instructed to look into cases of anomalous operation of jet engines. As a result, a theory of combustion of solid propellant charges in a rocket chamber appeared, which put the development of rocket technology on a deeply scientific basis. In the United States, similar work was carried out only in 1949. During the offensive operations of the Red Army, the need for a rocket with a powerful high-explosive action to destroy defensive structures was revealed. The need for rapid and reliable suppression of enemy defense units with salvo fire required an increase in the maneuverability of M-31 units and formations and better accuracy of shells in salvos. The development in 1944 of 132-mm and 300-mm projectiles with increased accuracy provided a further increase in the density of fire, respectively, by 3-6 times. With the adoption of the BM-31-12 combat vehicle in 1944, the problems of fire maneuver and the mobility of units that used M-31 rockets (300 mm caliber and 92.5 kg weight) from special frame machines were solved.

The development and deployment of mass production of the M-2 artillery tractor, which provided heavy artillery with a speed of 20–30 km/h, contributed to an increase in the maneuverability of artillery through the use of domestic vehicles. The time to prepare a division salvo was reduced from 1.5–2 hours to 10–15 minutes. During the war, work was constantly carried out to increase the firing range and increase accuracy. In 1944, a new combat vehicle BM-13-CH 174 was developed for firing M-13-DD shells.

This self-propelled launcher was equipped with 10 guides, each of which, in turn, consisted of four spiral rods. When moving along spiral (screw) guides, feathered rockets received rotation at a low angular velocity. When firing from the BM-13-SN, the accuracy of the M-13-DD shells increased by 1.5 times, and the M-13UK - by 1.1 times compared with firing from the BM-13N launcher. In the spring of 1945, tests of the BM-8-SN installation were carried out, which showed an increase in the accuracy of firing of M-8 shells by 4–11 times. However, with the end of the war, the M-8 shells were discontinued, and the BM-8-CH launcher was never put into service. In the prewar years, only two countries in the world - Germany and the USSR - had real achievements in the field of creating missile weapons. During the war years, in the field of creating long-range missile systems of the ground-to-ground class, Germany occupied a leading position.

The achievement of German rocket scientists was the creation of long-range missile systems of the V-1 (FZC-76) projectile and the V-2 (A-4) guided missile, which were not used on the eastern front, but were used to strike at England and port facilities in Western Europe in the period from June 1944 until March 1945. Missile launches were carried out both from equipped stationary and field launch positions, and from complexes. The V-1 projectile weighing 750-1000 kg with a firing range of 240 km (later increased to 400 km) is the most famous aircraft equipped with a pulsed air-jet engine (PUVRD). “This projectile went on its first test flight in December 1942, and its attractive sides immediately became visible.” The projectile control system was an autopilot that kept the projectile on the course and altitude specified at the start during the entire flight. Another "retaliatory weapon" was the V-2 (V-2, A4) ground-to-ground ballistic missile with a liquid-propellant rocket engine and a maximum firing range of more than 300 km.

To aim the V-2 rocket at the target, radio control, autonomous control, automatic control without radio control, but with a displacement integrator (quer integrator), which determined the lateral drift of the rocket by double integration of lateral drift accelerations, were used separately and in combination with each other. The first combat launch took place on September 8, 1944. The missiles had low hit accuracy and low reliability, while the V-2 became the first object to make a suborbital space flight.

Soviet cruise missiles can be fired from the summer of 1944, when V.N. Chelomei completed the preliminary design of an aircraft projectile with its D-3 pulsating jet engine, called 10X 178. His unmanned projectile was developed on the basis of the German V-1 rocket. The first launch was carried out from the Pe-8 aircraft carrier on March 20, 1945, but the test results were not impressive. The shortcomings of the inertial guidance system led to large dispersion, and V.N. Chelomey's cruise missile never entered service. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet artillery of high power was withdrawn to the rear and entered into hostilities at the end of 1942. Artillery of high and special power played a special role in breaking through the fortified defenses on the Karelian Isthmus, during the capture of such fortress cities as Poznan, Koenigsberg , Berlin, as well as in street fights in other settlements. So, during the assault on Koenigsberg, 203-mm howitzers, destroying the two-meter walls of the forts, fired with powerful direct-fire concrete-piercing shells, although the firing rules did not provide for high-powered guns of such use. The role of artillery was especially great in organizing anti-tank defense and destroying enemy tanks. Since the beginning of the war, the main anti-tank gun was the 45-mm cannon of the 1937 model. However, its low combat qualities, with an increase in the thickness of the armor of German tanks, necessitated the creation of a weapon of higher power while maintaining high maneuverability. The task of increasing the armor penetration of the 45-mm anti-tank gun was solved by lengthening the barrel and using a new shot, in which the projectile and cartridge case remained unchanged, and the weight of the powder charge was increased. This made it possible to increase the pressure in the bore and increase the muzzle velocity of the projectile from 760 to 870 m/s.

In turn, an increase in the initial velocity of the projectile ensured an increase in armor penetration at an encounter angle of 90 degrees at a distance of 500 m to 61 mm, and at a distance of 1000 m - up to 51 mm 179 , which allowed the 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1942 model M-42 to fight all the medium tanks of the Wehrmacht in 1942. The main anti-tank gun of the Wehrmacht was the 50-mm anti-tank gun PaK-38, in terms of armor penetration it approximately corresponded to the 45-mm cannon of the 1942 model, but could not hit Soviet medium and heavy tanks. Only with the advent of the 75-mm anti-tank PaK-40 in 1942 did the German infantry receive a more or less acceptable means of fighting Soviet tanks. Among the German medium-caliber anti-tank guns, the 76.2 mm PaK-36(g) 181 should be noted. It was created by the method of deep modernization of the captured Soviet divisional gun F-22.

3a by increasing the volume of the barrel chamber and the charge of gunpowder, the German designers managed to achieve armor penetration of 120-158 mm. This gun literally saved the German infantry at the initial stage of the war, when the 37-mm and 50-mm anti-tank guns of the Wehrmacht were powerless in front of Soviet medium and heavy tanks. In 1941–1942 Soviet gunsmiths developed and put into service a 76-mm cumulative projectile 182. In 1942, NII-24 created cumulative shells for 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers, ensuring a successful fight against all armored targets, including the latest German Tiger tanks. The adoption in 1943 of a sub-caliber projectile for 45, 57, 76-mm guns played a significant role in the competition between projectile and armor. The presence of these shells in the ammunition load ensured a successful fight against enemy heavy tanks. Soviet ZIS-2 shells BR-271P and BR-271N pierced armor with a thickness of 145 mm and 155 mm, respectively. As the legendary artillery designer V. G. Grabin recalled: “In the spring of 1943, when the Nazi army used thick-armored Tiger and Panther tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns ... only the ZIS-2 could resist the new German tanks” 183. With the adoption by the Red Army and the Wehrmacht of heavy tanks of the new generation, both opposing sides developed more powerful anti-tank guns: the Soviet 100-mm BS-3 184 and the German 88-mm PaK-43 / 41 and 128-mm PaK-44 / PaK- 80.

These guns confidently penetrated armor 160-200 mm thick, however, due to their large mass, they had low tactical mobility. The BS-3 was distinguished from the previously developed domestic systems by a torsion bar suspension, a hydropneumatic balancing mechanism and a carriage made according to the inverted support triangle scheme. The choice of a torsion bar suspension and a hydropneumatic balancing mechanism was due to the requirements for lightness and compactness of the units, and a change in the carriage layout significantly reduced the load on the beds when firing at maximum angles of rotation of the upper machine. The new scheme also simplified the equipment of the combat position. Special mention deserves the experience of the Germans using the 88-mm anti-aircraft gun Flak-18 (Flak-37) as an anti-tank weapon.

Despite its large dimensions and low mobility, the gun was successfully used to fight Soviet tanks due to the high initial velocity (820 m/s) of a high-explosive fragmentation projectile weighing 9.24 kg. The German army used recoilless guns quite successfully 187 . Compact, lightweight, equipped with fragmentation and armor-piercing grenades and shrapnel projectiles, they were used for fire support of paratroopers and mountain shooters. The infantry refused to use dynamo-reactive guns because of their operational and combat inconveniences. The attitude towards recoilless rifles in the German army changed dramatically after the creation of HEAT shells for them. Light guns with such shells were recognized as an extremely effective means of fighting tanks.

The production of the LG 40 light recoilless gun continued until the end of the war. With the outbreak of hostilities, the weakness of the Soviet military anti-aircraft artillery was revealed. In order to increase the effectiveness of air defense at the beginning of the war, the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1939 model underwent significant modernization aimed at increasing its combat and improving operational characteristics. In 1943, under the leadership of N.I. Kostin, a twin 25-mm anti-aircraft gun was developed, which was a combination of two machine guns with recoil devices from a 25-mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1940 model 72-K, a sight, a guidance mechanism, a machine tool and a wagon from 37-mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1939 model, with a rotary mechanism from the 37-mm naval anti-aircraft gun 70-K.

However, this gun did not find wide application due to the insufficient accuracy of the sight, the high opacity of the shot, and the unreliable operation of machine guns. Other models of anti-aircraft artillery guns were developed and tested, but for various reasons they were not put into service, but this created a scientific and technical groundwork for creating anti-aircraft artillery of the future. In the third period of the Great Patriotic War, small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery significantly reduced its effectiveness with an increase in the survivability of enemy aircraft. The main medium-caliber gun throughout the war was the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun. As battle experience showed, 85-mm anti-aircraft guns could be successfully used for direct fire at ground targets.

The high initial velocity of the projectile, the speed of firing, and the possibility of all-round horizontal fire ensured success for anti-aircraft artillery in the fight against enemy tanks. In 1944, a more powerful 85 mm anti-aircraft gun (KS-1) appeared. It was obtained by imposing a new barrel on the carriage of an 85-mm anti-aircraft gun 52-K model 1939. The new anti-aircraft gun was equipped with PUAZO-4A anti-aircraft artillery fire control devices, its vertical range reached 12 km. The disadvantages of the KS-1 were low stability during firing and a large effort on the flywheel of the lifting mechanism, so its refinement continued until the end of the war. In 1944, the TsAKB, under the leadership of V. G. Grabin, began the development of a new 57-mm S-60 automatic anti-aircraft gun, which was never put into production until the end of the war. Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (ZSU) became the achievement of German industry. The first German ZSU-38 with a 20-mm anti-aircraft gun was made on the basis of a light Czechoslovak tank on the TNHP-S chassis of the Skoda company (manufactured since 1943 in Czechoslovakia, a total of 141 installations were produced).

ZSU "Virbelvild" was produced on the basis of the T-IV tank with a quad 20-mm automatic installation FlaK-38 (106 installations were produced). The same design solutions were used when installing the 37mm machine gun. The development of anti-aircraft artillery during the war went along the path of modernizing anti-aircraft systems that were in production, creating new guns and ammunition that ensured high initial projectile velocities and high rates of aircraft firing. At the same time, the means of reconnaissance of air targets and anti-aircraft fire control were improved. As a result of the modernization of the guns, the firing range increased to a height of 14-15 thousand meters, and the accuracy of hitting targets increased. In general, it should be emphasized that the contribution of artillery to the victory is enormous. Moreover, about 40% of the artillery systems that were in service with the Red Army and used in combat operations were designed and mastered by industry during the war.

Domestic artillery stood the test of the war, however, there was a qualitative lag in the field of optical instruments for various purposes, communications and control equipment, as well as traction. When creating weapons, innovative activities were actively carried out. Thus, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences N. G. Chetaev ensured an increase in the accuracy of firing of guns by solving a complex mathematical problem of optimizing the steepness of cutting gun barrels; Academician A. N. Kolmogorov gave a mathematical definition of the optimal dispersion of artillery shells; professor, later academician L. F. Vereshchagin, based on research on ultra-high pressures, led the work on creating an installation that made it possible to auto-frettage (strengthen) mortar and gun barrels not only of small and medium, but also of large caliber, which had not been possible before be implemented neither in our nor in foreign practice. The new method provided an increase in the service life and range of guns and mortars.

It is especially important that the accumulated scientific, technical and production potential and the quality of management made it possible to continuously improve artillery weapons and expand their production, taking into account the accumulated experience in combat use and understanding the needs of the front. It can be noted the prompt response of Soviet design thought. As soon as insufficient armor penetration of the 45-mm anti-tank gun was discovered, it was promptly modernized, and the troops received a 45-mm gun of the 1942 model, providing the much-needed level of armor penetration of 50 mm at a firing range of up to 1 km.

The low effectiveness of the 76-mm divisional gun of the 1939 model in the fight against tanks led to its replacement with the 76-mm gun of the 1942 model, the iconic ZIS-3. The reaction to the appearance of heavy German tanks on the battlefield was the adoption of a 57-mm anti-tank gun of the 1943 model, the shells of which pierced armor 120–150 mm thick, and from the summer of 1944, the most effective anti-tank gun of its time began to enter the troops - 100-mm gun BS-3, providing armor penetration up to 162 mm. At the same time, a promising 85-mm divisional gun was created. The introduction of the corps unit in the army was accompanied by the timely creation of the 152-mm corps howitzer of the 1943 model. mortars, and in 1943 the troops received the best 160-mm mortar in the world at that time with breech-loading and an inseparable gun carriage.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In 12 vols. T. 7. Economy and weapons
war. - M.: Kuchkovo field, 2013. - 864 p., 20 p. ill., ill.

Artillery during WWII Part I

M. Zenkevich

Soviet artillery was created during the years of the civil war and went through two stages in its pre-war development. Between 1927 and 1930 the modernization of the artillery weapons inherited from the tsarist army was carried out, as a result of which the main tactical and technical characteristics of the guns were significantly improved in accordance with the new requirements, and this was done without great expense on the basis of the existing weapons. Thanks to the modernization of artillery weapons, the firing range of artillery has increased by an average of one and a half times. The increase in firing range was achieved by lengthening the barrels, increasing the charges, increasing the elevation angle and improving the shape of the projectiles.

The increase in the power of the shot also required some alteration of the gun carriages. In the carriage of a 76-mm gun mod. In 1902, a balancing mechanism was introduced, muzzle brakes were installed on the 107 mm and 152 mm guns. For all the guns, a single sight of the 1930 model was adopted. After the modernization, the guns received new names: 76-mm gun of the 1902/30 model, 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 etc. Of the new types of artillery developed during this period, the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 The beginning of the second stage in the development of Soviet artillery dates back to the beginning of the 1930s, when, as a result of the accelerated development of heavy industry, it became possible to begin a complete re-equipment of artillery with new models.

On May 22, 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR adopted the system of artillery weapons developed by the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) for 1929-32. It was an important policy document for the development of Soviet artillery. It provided for the creation of anti-tank, battalion, regimental, divisional, corps and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as artillery of the High Command Reserve (RGK). The system was adjusted for each five-year plan and was the basis for the development of new tools. In accordance with it, in 1930, a 37-mm anti-tank gun was adopted. The carriage of this gun had sliding beds, which provided a horizontal firing angle of up to 60 ° without moving the bed. In 1932, a 45-mm anti-tank gun, also on a carriage with sliding beds, was put into service. In 1937, the 45-mm gun was improved: semi-automatic was introduced into the wedge gate, suspension was used, ballistic qualities were improved. Great work was carried out to re-equip divisional, corps and army artillery, as well as artillery of high power.

As a divisional gun, a 76-mm gun mod. 1939 with a semi-automatic wedge breech. The carriage of this gun had a rotating upper machine, high-speed lifting and turning mechanisms, sliding beds. The undercarriage with suspension and rubber weights on wheels allowed transportation speeds of up to 35-40 km / h. In 1938, the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938. According to its tactical and technical data, this gun far surpassed all foreign models of this type. The 107-mm cannon mod. 1940 and 152 mm howitzer mod. 1938

The composition of the army artillery included: 122-mm gun mod. 1931/37 and 152 mm howitzer mod. 1937 The first sample of the 122 mm gun was developed in 1931. The 122 mm gun mod. 1931/37 was obtained by imposing the barrel of a 122-mm gun mod. 1931 on a new carriage arr. 1937, adopted as a single carriage for a 122 mm gun and a 152 mm howitzer. For all guns of divisional and corps artillery, a sight was adopted, independent of the gun, which made it possible to simultaneously load and aim the gun at the target. The problem of creating high-capacity Soviet artillery was also successfully resolved.

In the period from 1931 to 1939. accepted for service: 203-mm howitzer mod. 1931, 152 mm gun mod. 1935, 280 mm mortar mod. 1939, 210 mm gun mod. 1939 and 305 mm howitzer mod. 1939 Carriages for 152 mm guns, 203 mm howitzers and 280 mm mortars are of the same type, on caterpillar tracks. In the stowed position, the guns consisted of two wagons - a barrel and a gun carriage. In parallel with the development of the materiel of artillery, important measures were also taken to improve ammunition.

Soviet designers developed the most advanced long-range projectiles in form, as well as new types of armor-piercing projectiles. All shells were equipped with fuses and tubes of domestic production. It should be noted that the development of Soviet artillery was affected by such a widespread idea abroad at that time as universalism. It was about creating the so-called universal or semi-universal guns, which could be both field and anti-aircraft. For all the attractiveness of this idea, its implementation led to the creation of overly complex, heavy and expensive guns with low combat qualities. Therefore, after the creation and testing of a number of samples of such guns in the summer of 1935, a meeting of artillery designers was held with the participation of members of the government, at which the inconsistency and harmfulness of universalism were revealed and the need for specialization of artillery according to its combat purpose and types was pointed out. The idea of ​​replacing artillery with aircraft and tanks did not find support in the USSR either.

For example, the German army followed this path, placing the main emphasis on aviation, tanks and mortars. Speaking in 1937 in the Kremlin, I.V. Stalin said: “The success of the war is decided not only by aviation. For the success of the war, an exceptionally valuable branch of the army is artillery. I would like our artillery to show that it is first class.”

This line on the creation of powerful artillery was strictly implemented, which was reflected, for example, in a sharp increase in the number of guns for all purposes. If on January 1, 1934 there were 17,000 guns in the Red Army, then on January 1, 1939 their number was 55,790, and on June 22, 1941, 67355 (without 50-mm mortars, of which there were 24158). In the prewar years, along with the rearmament of rifled artillery, extensive work was carried out to create mortars.

The first Soviet mortars were created back in the early 1930s, but some leaders of the Red Army considered them as a kind of "surrogate" for artillery, of interest only to the armies of underdeveloped states. However, after the mortars proved their high efficiency during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-40, their mass introduction into the troops began. The Red Army received 50-mm company and 82-mm battalion mortars, 107-mm mining and 120-mm regimental mortars. In total, from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, over 40 thousand mortars were delivered to the Red Army. After the start of the war, along with the solution of tasks to increase the supply of artillery and mortar weapons to the front, design bureaus and industrial enterprises developed and introduced into production new artillery systems. In 1942, the 76.2-mm divisional gun mod. 1941 (ZIS-3), the design of which, with high combat performance, fully met the requirements of mass production. To combat enemy tanks in 1943, a 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun was developed on the carriage of a 76.2-mm gun mod. 1942

A little later, an even more powerful 100-mm cannon mod. 1944. Since 1943, 152-mm corps howitzers and 160-mm mortars began to enter the troops, which became an indispensable means of breaking through enemy defenses. In total, during the war years, the industry produced 482.2 thousand guns.

351.8 thousand mortars were manufactured (4.5 times more than in Germany, and 1.7 times more than in the USA and the countries of the British Empire). In the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army also widely used rocket artillery. The beginning of its use can be considered the formation in June 1941 of the First Separate Battery, which had seven BM-13 installations. By December 1, 1941, there were already 7 regiments and 52 separate divisions in the field rocket artillery, and at the end of the war, the Red Army had 7 divisions, 11 brigades, 114 regiments and 38 separate rocket artillery divisions, for the armament of which more than 10 thousand .multiple self-propelled launchers and more than 12 million rockets.

volley "Katyusha"

ZIS-3 76-MM GUN 1942 SAMPLE

A few weeks after the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow on January 5, 1942, the ZIS-3, the famous 76-mm divisional gun, received the go-ahead.

“As a rule, we received tactical and technical requirements for the development of new guns from the Main Artillery Directorate,” says the well-known designer of artillery systems V. Grabin. But some guns were also developed on our own initiative. This was the case with the divisional 76-mm gun ZIS-3 .

Caliber 76 mm - 3 inches - from the beginning of our century was considered the classic caliber of a divisional gun. Cannon powerful enough to engage enemy manpower from closed positions, suppress mortar and artillery batteries and other fire weapons. A cannon that is mobile enough to move across the battlefield by the combat crew and accompany the advancing units not only with fire, but also with wheels, crushing bunkers and bunkers with direct fire. Experience of the First World War. showed that when the trench defense is saturated with fire weapons, the advancing units need battalion and regimental close combat artillery. And the appearance of tanks required the creation of special anti-tank artillery.

Equipping the Red Army with military equipment has always been at the center of attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. On July 15, 1929, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made a historic decision to create new military equipment, including artillery. fulfilling the program outlined by the party, Soviet designers were working on the creation of both close combat artillery and anti-tank artillery (37 and 45-mm guns). But when by the end of the 30s there was a gap between the capabilities of these anti-tank guns and the armor of tanks, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) developed a tactical and technical task for a 76-mm divisional gun capable of fighting against tanks.

Solving this problem, a team of designers, headed by V. Grabin, in 1936 created a 76-mm F-22 divisional gun. Three years later, the F-22 USV was adopted. In 1940, the same team developed a 57 mm anti-tank gun. And finally, in 1941, having placed a 76-mm barrel on the improved carriage of this gun, the designers (A. Khvorostin, V. Norkin, K. Renne, V. Meshchaninov, P. Ivanov, V. Zemtsov, etc.) created the famous ZIS -3, - which was highly appreciated not only by our allies, but also by opponents.

... "The opinion that the ZIS-3 is the best 76-mm gun of the Second World War is absolutely justified," said the German professor Wolf, the former head of the artillery structures department at Krupp. "It can be said without any exaggeration that this is one of the most brilliant structures in the history of cannon artillery.

ZIS-3 was the last and most advanced 76-mm divisional gun. Further development of this class of guns required a transition to a larger caliber. What is the secret of the success of the ZIS-3? What, so to speak, is the "highlight" of its design?

V. Grabin answers these questions: "In lightness, reliability, convenience of combat work of the calculation, manufacturability and cheapness." And indeed, not containing any fundamentally new components and solutions that would not be known in world practice, the ZIS-3 is an example of a successful design and technical formation, an optimal combination of qualities. In ZIS-3, all non-working metal has been removed; for the first time in domestic serial 76-mm divisional guns, a muzzle brake was used, which reduced the length of the recoil, reduced the weight of the recoil parts and lightened the gun carriage; riveted beds were replaced by lighter tubular ones. The leaf springs in the suspension device were replaced by lighter and more reliable spring ones: A carriage with sliding beds was used, which sharply increases the angle of horizontal fire. For the first time, a monoblock barrel was used for such a caliber. But the main advantage of the ZIS-3 is its high manufacturability.

The design team headed by V. Grabin paid special attention to this quality of guns. Working on the method of accelerated design of artillery pieces, in which design and technological issues are solved in parallel, engineers systematically reduced the number of required parts from sample to sample. So, the F-22 had 2080 parts, the F-22 USV - 1057, and the ZIS-3 - only 719. Accordingly, the number of machine hours required to manufacture one gun also decreased. In 1936 this value was 2034 hours, in 1939 - 1300, in 1942 - 1029 and in 1944 - 475! It is thanks to the high manufacturability of the ZIS-3 that it went down in history as the world's first gun put into mass production and conveyor assembly. By the end of 1942, only one plant was producing up to 120 guns per day - before the war, this was its monthly program.

ZIS-3 in tow T-70M

Another important result achieved when working according to the accelerated design method is wide unification - the use of the same parts, assemblies, mechanisms and assemblies in different samples. It was the unification that made it possible for one plant to produce tens of thousands of guns for various purposes - tank, anti-tank and divisional. But it is symbolic that the 100,000th gun of the 92nd plant was precisely the ZIS-3 - the most massive gun of the Great Patriotic War.

A-19 122-MM GUN 1931/1937 MODEL

“In January 1943, our troops had already broken through the blockade and fought stubborn battles to expand the breakthrough at the famous Sinyavinsky Heights,” recalls Marshal of Artillery G. Odintsov, the former commander of the artillery of the Leningrad Front: “The firing positions of one of the batteries of the 267th Corps Artillery Regiment were in a swampy area, disguised by thick bushes. Hearing ahead the roar of a tank engine, the senior on the battery, having no doubt that the tank was ours, and fearing that he would crush the cannon, decided to warn the driver. But, standing on the gun carriage, he saw that a huge, unfamiliar tank with a cross on the turret is moving right at the gun ... The shot was fired from some 50 m. ran without even having time to turn off the engine.Then our tankers pulled out the enemy vehicles.

A serviceable "tiger" passed through the streets of besieged Leningrad, and then both tanks became exhibits of a "trophy exhibition" in the Moscow Gorky Park of Culture and Leisure. So the 122-mm corps gun helped to capture intact one of the first "tigers" that appeared at the front, and helped the personnel of the Soviet Army to find out the vulnerabilities of the "tigers".

The First World War showed what a high price France, England and Russia had to pay for neglecting heavy artillery. Counting on mobile warfare, these countries relied on light, highly mobile artillery, believing that heavy guns were unsuitable for swift marches. And already during the war, they were forced to catch up with Germany and, making up for lost time, urgently create heavy guns. Nevertheless, at the end of the war, the United States and England considered corps artillery to be completely unnecessary, while France and Germany were satisfied with the modernized corps guns of the end of the First World War.

The situation was quite different in our country. In May 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic approved the system of artillery weapons for 1929-1932, and in June 1930, the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to accelerate the development of industry in every possible way, and primarily defense industry. The industrialization of the country has become a solid basis for the production of modern military equipment. In 1931, in pursuance of the approved weapons system, a 122-mm A-19 gun was manufactured at the artillery plant No. 172. This gun was intended for counter-battery combat, for disrupting the control of enemy troops, suppressing his rear, preventing the approach of reserves, the supply of ammunition, food, etc.

"The design of this gun, says Major General of the Engineering and Technical Service N. Komarov, was entrusted to the design bureau of the All-Union Gun Arsenal Association. The working group headed by S. Shukalov included S. Ananiev, V. Drozdov, G. Vodohlebov, B Markov, S. Rykovskov, N. Torbin and I. The project was done quickly and the drawings were immediately sent to the 172nd plant for the manufacture of a prototype. plant capabilities.

In terms of projectile power and firing range, the gun surpassed all foreign guns of this class. True, she came out somewhat heavier than them, but the large weight did not affect her fighting qualities, since she was designed for mechanical traction.

The A-19 differed from the old artillery systems in several innovations. The high initial velocity of the projectile increased the length of the barrel, and this, in turn, gave rise to difficulties in vertical aiming and in transporting the gun. To unload the lifting mechanism and facilitate the work of the gunner, we used a balancing mechanism; and in order to protect the critical components and mechanisms of the gun from shock loads during transportation, the attachment mechanism in the stowed way: before the campaign, the barrel was separated from the recoil devices, pulled back along the cradle and fastened with stoppers to the carriage. recoil devices allowed the mechanism of mutual closure. For the first time on guns of such a large caliber, sliding beds and a rotating upper machine were used, which ensured an increase in the angle of horizontal fire; suspension and metal wheels with a rubber tire rim, which made it possible to transport the gun along the highway at speeds up to 20 km / h " .

After extensive testing of the prototype, the A-19 was adopted by the Red Army. In 1933, the barrel of a 152-mm gun of the 1910/1930 model was placed on the carriage of this gun, and the 152-mm gun of the 1910/1934 model was put into service, but work on improving the single carriage continued. And in 1937, two corps guns on a unified carriage were adopted by the Red Army - a 122-mm cannon of the 1931/1937 model and a 152-mm howitzer - a cannon of the 1937 model. In this carriage, the lifting and balancing mechanisms are divided into two independent units, the elevation angle is increased to 65 °, a normalized sight with an independent aiming line is installed.

The 122-mm gun gave the Germans a lot of bitter minutes. There was not a single artillery preparation in which these wonderful guns would not take part. With their fire, they crushed the armor of the Nazi "Ferdinands" and "Panthers". It is no coincidence that this gun was used to create the famous ISU-122 self-propelled gun. And it is no coincidence that this gun on April 20, 1945 was one of the first to open fire on fascist Berlin.

122 mm gun model 1931/1937

B-4 203-MM HOWitzER 1931 MODEL

Shooting direct fire from high-powered howitzers of the artillery of the reserve of the main command (ARGC) is not provided for by any shooting rules. But it was precisely for such shooting that the commander of the battery of 203-mm howitzers of the guard, Captain I. Vedmedenko, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On the night of June 9, 1944, on one of the sectors of the Leningrad Front, to the sound of a firefight that drowned out the roar of engines, tractors dragged two huge massive tracked guns to the front line. When everything calmed down, only 1200 m separated the camouflaged guns from the target - a giant pillbox. Reinforced concrete walls two meters thick; three floors going underground; armored dome; approaches covered by the fire of flank bunkers - this structure was not without reason considered the main node of enemy resistance. And as soon as dawn broke, Vedmedenko's howitzers opened fire. For two hours, 100-kilogram concrete-piercing shells destroyed two-meter walls, until finally the enemy fortress ceased to exist ...

“For the first time, our gunners began to shoot direct fire at concrete fortifications from high-powered ARGC howitzers in battles with the White Finns in the winter of 1939/1940,” says Marshal of Artillery N. Yakovlev. “And this method of suppressing pillboxes was born not within the walls of headquarters, not in academies, but on the front line among the soldiers and officers who directly serve these wonderful weapons."

In 1914, the mobile war, which the generals counted on, lasted only a few months, after which it took on a positional character. It was then that the field artillery of the warring powers began to rapidly increase the number of howitzers - guns that, unlike cannons, were capable of hitting horizontal targets: destroying field fortifications and firing at troops hiding behind terrain folds.

Howitzer; as a rule, conducts mounted fire. The damaging effect of a projectile is determined not so much by its kinetic energy at the target, but by the amount of explosive contained in it. The muzzle velocity of the projectile, which is lower than that of a cannon, makes it possible to reduce the pressure of powder gases and shorten the barrel. As a result, the wall thickness decreases, the recoil force decreases and the gun carriage becomes lighter. As a result, the howitzer turns out to be two to three times lighter than a cannon of the same caliber. Another important advantage of the howitzer is that, by changing the amount of charge, it is possible to obtain a beam of trajectories at a constant elevation angle. True, the variable charge requires separate charging, which reduces the rate of fire, but this disadvantage is more than offset by the advantages. In the armies of the leading powers, by the end of the war, howitzers accounted for 40-50% of the entire artillery park.

But the trend towards the construction of powerful field-type defensive structures and a dense network of long-term firing points urgently required heavy guns with increased range, high projectile power and fire weight. In 1931, following the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Soviet designers created a domestic high-powered B-4 howitzer. It began to be designed at the Artkom Design Bureau in 1927, where the work was headed by F. Lender. After his death, the project was transferred to the Bolshevik plant, where Magdesiev was the chief designer, and Gavrilov, Torbin and others were among the designers.

B-4 - a 203-mm howitzer of the 1931 model - was intended to destroy especially strong concrete, reinforced concrete and armored structures, to combat large-caliber or enemy artillery sheltered by strong structures, and to suppress distant targets.

In order to speed up the equipping of the Red Army with a new weapon, production was organized simultaneously at two factories. Working drawings in the process of development were changed at each plant, adapting to technological capabilities. As a result, almost two different howitzers began to enter service. In 1937, unified drawings were worked out not by changing the design, but by arranging individual parts and assemblies that had already been tested in production and operation. The only innovation was the installation on a caterpillar track. allowing shooting directly from the ground Without special platforms.

The B-4 carriage became the basis for a whole family of high-power guns. In 1939, the 152 mm Br-19 gun and the 280 mm Br-5 mortar completed a number of intermediate designs. These works were carried out by a team of designers. plant "Barricade" under the leadership of the Hero of Socialist Labor I. Ivanov.

Thus, the creation of a complex of high-powered ground guns on a single carriage was completed: guns, howitzers, and mortars. The tools were transported by tractors. To do this, the guns were disassembled into two parts: the barrel was removed from the gun carriage and placed on a special gun cart, and the gun carriage, connected to the limber, made up the gun cart.

Of all this complex, the B-4 howitzer was most widely used. The combination of a powerful projectile with a high elevation angle and a variable charge, giving 10 initial speeds, determined her brilliant fighting qualities. At any horizontal targets at a distance of 5 to 18 km, the howitzer could fire along the trajectory of the most favorable steepness.

B-4 justified the hopes placed on it. Starting its combat path on the Karelian Isthmus in 1939, it passed through the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, participated in all major artillery preparations, storming fortresses and large cities.

203 mm howitzer model 1931

ML-20 152-MM HOWitzer-Gun Model 1937

“When they ask me what type of artillery fire makes the highest demands on the art of personnel,” says Marshal of Artillery G. Odintsov, “I answer: counter-battery combat. It, as a rule, is conducted at long ranges and usually results in a duel with the enemy, who fires back, threatening the shooter.The greatest chance to win a duel is with someone who has higher skill, more precisely a weapon, a more powerful projectile.

The experience of the fronts showed that the 152-mm howitzer-gun of the 1937 model ML-20 turned out to be the best Soviet weapon for counter-battery combat.

The history of the creation of the ML-20 dates back to 1932, when a group of designers of the All-Union Gun and Arsenal Association - V. Grabin, N. Komarov and V. Drozdov - proposed to create a powerful 152-mm corps gun by imposing the barrel of a 152-mm Schneider siege gun on a gun carriage 122 mm A-19 guns. Calculations have shown that such an idea when installing a muzzle brake that takes away part of the recoil energy is real. Tests of a prototype confirmed the validity of the admitted technical risk, and the hull 152-mm gun of the 1910/34 model was put into service. In the mid-30s, it was decided to modernize this gun. The modernization work was headed by a young designer F. Petrov. Having studied the features of the gun carriage of the A-19 gun, he identified the main drawbacks of this gun: the lack of suspension at the front end limited the speed of movement; the lifting and balancing mechanism was difficult to fine-tune and provided an insufficiently high vertical pickup speed; it took a lot of energy and time to transfer the barrel from traveling to combat position and back; a cradle with recoil devices was difficult to manufacture.

Having re-developed a cast upper machine, dividing the combined lifting and balancing mechanism into two independent ones - a sectoral lifting and balancing mechanism, designing a front with suspension, a sight with an independent aiming line and a cradle with a cast trunnion clip instead of a forged one, the designers created, for the first time in world practice, an intermediate type tool with properties and guns and howitzers. The elevation angle, increased to 65 °, and 13 variable charges made it possible to obtain a gun that, like a howitzer, has hinged trajectories and, like a cannon, high initial projectile velocities.

A. Bulashev, S. Gurenko, M. Burnyshev, A. Ilyin and many others took an active part in the development and creation of the howitzer-gun.

"The ML-20, developed by us in 1.5 months, was submitted for state tests after the very first 10 shots fired at the factory firing range," recalls the winner of the Lenin and State Prizes, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General of the Engineering and Technical Service, Dr. Technical Sciences F. Petrov. These tests were completed at the beginning of 1937, the gun was put into service and put into mass production in the same year. At first everything went well, but suddenly the barrel of one, then another, then the third howitzer guns small angles of elevation began to "give a candle" - spontaneously lift up to the maximum angle. It turned out that for a number of reasons the worm gear was not self-braking enough. For us, and especially for me, this phenomenon caused a lot of trouble, until after weary days and sleepless nights, quite enough was found simple solution.We proposed in the threaded cover that secures the worm in the crankcase, to put a spring with a small adjustable gap tinned steel disc. At the moment of the shot, the end part of the worm comes into contact with the disk, which, creating a lot of additional friction, prevents the worm from turning.

What a relief I felt when, having found such a solution and quickly sketching out sketches, I introduced him to the director and chief engineer of the plant, as well as the head of the military acceptance. All of them ended up in the assembly shop that night, which, however, happened quite often, especially when it came to fulfilling defense orders in a short time. Immediately, the order was given to prepare the details of the device by morning.

When developing this tool, we paid special attention to improving manufacturability and reducing costs. It was with the production of howitzer-guns in artillery technology that steel shaped castings began to be widely used. Many components - upper and lower machines, hinged and trunk parts of the beds, wheel hubs - were made of cheap carbon steels.

Originally intended for "reliable action against artillery, headquarters, institutions and field-type installations", the 152-mm howitzer-cannon turned out to be a much more flexible, powerful and effective weapon than previously thought. The combat experience of the battles of the Great Patriotic War continuously expanded the range of tasks assigned to this wonderful weapon. And in the "Service Manual", published at the end of the war, the ML-20 was prescribed to fight enemy artillery, suppress long-range targets, destroy pillboxes and powerful bunkers, fight tanks and armored trains, and even destroy balloons.

During the Great Patriotic War, the 152-mm howitzer-gun of the 1937 model invariably participated in all major artillery preparations, in counter-battery combat, and in the assault on fortified areas. But a particularly honorable role fell to this gun in the destruction of heavy fascist tanks. A heavy projectile, fired at a high initial velocity, easily ripped off the "tiger" turret from the shoulder strap. There were battles when these towers literally flew in the air with gun barrels dangling limply. And it is no coincidence that the ML-20 became the basis of the famous ISU-152.

But perhaps the most significant recognition of the excellent qualities of this weapon should be considered the fact that the ML-20 was in service with Soviet artillery not only during the Great Patriotic War, but also in the post-war years.

BS-3 100-MM FIELD GUN SAMPLE 1944

“In the spring of 1943, when Hitler’s “tigers”, “panthers”, and “Ferdinands” began to appear on the battlefields in large numbers,” recalls the famous artillery designer V. Grabin, “in a note addressed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I proposed, along with the resumption of production 57 mm anti-tank gun ZIS-2, create a new weapon - a 100 mm anti-tank gun with a powerful projectile.

Why did we settle for the new 100 mm caliber for ground artillery, and not the already existing 85 and 107 mm guns? The choice was not accidental. We believed that a gun was needed, the muzzle energy of which would be one and a half times greater than that of the 107-mm gun of the 1940 model. And 100-mm guns have long been successfully used in the fleet, a unitary cartridge was developed for them, while the 107-mm gun had separate loading. The presence of a shot mastered in production played a decisive role, since it takes a very long time to work it out. We didn't have much time...

We could not borrow the design of the naval gun: it is too bulky and heavy. Requirements for high power, mobility, lightness, compactness, high rate of fire led to a number of innovations. First of all, a high-performance muzzle brake was needed. The previously used slotted brake had an efficiency of 25-30%. For the 100-mm gun, it was necessary to develop a design for a two-chamber brake with an efficiency of 60%. To increase the rate of fire, a wedge semi-automatic shutter was used. The layout of the gun was entrusted to the lead designer A. Khvorostin."

The contours of the gun began to take shape on whatman paper during the May holidays of 1943. In a few days, the creative groundwork was realized, formed on the basis of long reflections, painful searches, studying combat experience and analyzing the best artillery designs in the world. The barrel and the semi-automatic shutter were designed by I. Griban, the recoil devices and the hydropneumatic balancing mechanism - by F. Kaleganov, the cradle of the cast structure - by B. Lasman, the equal-strength upper machine V. Shishkin. It was hard to decide the issue with the choice of wheels. The design bureau usually used the automobile wheels of GAZ-AA and ZIS-5 trucks for guns, but they were not suitable for the new gun. The next car was a five-ton YaAZ, however, its wheel turned out to be too heavy and large. Then the idea was born to put twin wheels from GAZ-AA, which made it possible to fit into the given weight and dimensions.

A month later, the working drawings were sent to production, and five months later, the first prototype of the famous BS-3 came out of the gates of the plant - a gun designed to fight tanks and other motorized means, to fight artillery, to suppress distant targets, to destroy infantry and manpower, enemy forces.

"Three design features distinguish the BS-3 from previously developed domestic systems," says State Prize winner A. Khvorostin. the requirements of lightness and compactness of the units, and changing the layout of the gun carriage significantly reduced the load on the frame when firing at the maximum angles of rotation of the upper machine.If in the usual schemes of the gun carriage, each frame was calculated for 2/3 of the recoil force of the gun, then in the new scheme, the force acting on the frame at any angle of horizontal guidance, did not exceed 1/2 of the recoil force.In addition, the new scheme simplified the equipment of a combat position.

Thanks to all these innovations, the BS-3 stood out for its extremely high metal utilization rate. This means that in its design it was possible to achieve the most perfect combination of power and mobility."

The BS-3 was tested by a commission chaired by General Panikhin - representative: commander of artillery of the Soviet Army. According to V. Grabin, one of the most interesting moments was the shooting at the Tiger tank. A cross was drawn on the turret of the tank with chalk. The gunner received the initial data and fired a shot from 1500 m. Approaching the tank, everyone was convinced that the shell almost hit the cross and pierced the armor. After that, the tests continued according to a given program, and the commission recommended the gun for service.

Tests of the BS-Z prompted a new method of dealing with heavy tanks. Somehow, at the training ground, a shot was fired at a captured "Ferdinand" from a distance of 1500 m. And although, as expected, the projectile did not penetrate the 200-mm frontal armor of the self-propelled gun, its gun and control system failed. The BS-Z was able to effectively deal with enemy tanks and self-propelled guns at distances exceeding the range of a direct shot. In this case, as experience has shown, the crew of enemy vehicles were hit by fragments of armor that broke off from the hull due to the enormous overvoltages that occur in the metal at the moment the projectile hits the armor. The manpower that the projectile retained at these ranges was sufficient to bend, mangle the armor.

In August 1944, when the BS-Z began to arrive at the front, the war was already nearing its end, so the experience of combat use of this weapon is limited. Nevertheless, the BS-3 rightfully occupies an honorable place among the guns of the Great Patriotic War, because it contained ideas that were widely used in artillery designs of the post-war period.

M-30 122-MM HOWitzER MODEL 1938

“W-wah! A gray cloud shot up on the enemy side. The fifth shell hit the dugout where ammunition was stored. smoke, and a huge explosion shook the surroundings "- this is how P. Kudinov, a former artilleryman and participant in the war, describes the everyday combat work of the M-30 of the famous 122-mm divisional howitzer of the 1938 model in the book" Howitzers Fire.

Before the First World War in the artillery of the Western powers for divisional howitzers, a caliber of 105 mm was adopted. Russian artillery thought went its own way: the army was armed with 122-mm divisional howitzers of the 1910 model. The experience of combat operations has shown that a projectile of this caliber, while having the most advantageous fragmentation action, at the same time gives a minimally satisfactory high-explosive action. However, at the end of the 1920s, the 122-mm howitzer of the 1910 model did not meet the views of experts on the nature of the future war: it had insufficient range, rate of fire and mobility.

According to the new "Artillery Armament System for 1929-1932", approved by the Revolutionary Military Council in May 1929, it was planned to create a 122-mm howitzer with a weight in the stowed position of 2200 kg, a firing range of 11-12 km and a combat rate of fire of 6 rounds per minute. Since the sample developed according to these requirements turned out to be too heavy, the modernized 122-mm howitzer of the 1910/30 model was retained in service. And some experts began to lean towards the idea of ​​abandoning the 122-mm caliber and adopting 105-mm howitzers.

“In March 1937, at a meeting in the Kremlin,” recalls the Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General of the Engineering and Technical Service F. Petrov, “I spoke about the reality of creating a 122-mm howitzer and, answering numerous questions, gave out what is being said, bills of exchange. My optimism was fueled by what I thought was then a great success of our team in creating the 152-mm howitzer - the ML-20 cannon. The meeting outlined a plant (unfortunately, not the one where I worked), which was to develop a prototype. Feeling great responsibility for everything I said at a meeting in the Kremlin, I invited the management of my factory to take the initiative in developing a 122-mm howitzer.For this purpose, a small group of designers was organized.The first estimates, which used the schemes of existing guns, showed that the task was really difficult But the perseverance and enthusiasm of the designers - S. Dernov, A. Ilyin, N. Dobrovolsky, A. Chernykh, V. Burylov, A. Drozdov and N. Kostrulin - took their toll: New in 1937, two projects were defended: developed by the team of V. Sidorenko and ours. Our project has been approved.

According to tactical and technical data, primarily in terms of maneuverability and flexibility of fire - the ability to quickly transfer fire from one target to another - our howitzer fully met the requirements of the GAU. According to the most important characteristic - muzzle energy - it exceeded the howitzer of the 1910/30 model by more than two times. Advantageously, our gun also differed from the 105-mm divisional howitzers of the armies of the capitalist countries.

The estimated weight of the gun is about 2200 kg: 450 kg less than the howitzer developed by the team of V. Sidorenko. By the end of 1938, all tests were completed and the gun was put into service under the name 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model.

The combat wheels were for the first time equipped with an automobile-type marching brake. The transition from traveling to combat took no more than 1-1.5 minutes. When the beds were extended, the springs were automatically turned off, and the beds themselves were automatically fixed in the extended position. In the stowed position, the barrel was fixed without disconnecting from the rods of the recoil devices and without pulling. To simplify and reduce the cost of production in a howitzer, parts and assemblies of existing artillery systems were widely used. So, for example, the shutter was taken from a standard howitzer of the 1910/30 model, the sight from a 152-mm howitzer - a cannon of the 1937 model, the wheels - from a divisional 76-mm cannon of the 1936 model, etc. Many parts were made by casting and stamping. That is why the M-30 was one of the most simple and inexpensive domestic artillery systems.

A curious fact testifies to the great survivability of this howitzer. Once, during the war, it became known at the plant that the troops had a gun that had fired 18,000 rounds. The factory offered to exchange this copy for a new one. And after a thorough factory inspection, it turned out that the howitzer had not lost its qualities and was suitable for further combat use. This conclusion was unexpectedly confirmed: during the formation of the next echelon, as a sin, a shortage of one gun was discovered. And with the consent of the military acceptance, the unique howitzer again went to the front as a newly made gun.

M-30 on direct fire

The experience of the war showed that the M-30 brilliantly performed all the tasks that were assigned to it. She destroyed and suppressed the manpower of the enemy as in open areas. and located in field-type shelters, destroyed and suppressed infantry firepower, destroyed field-type structures and fought artillery and. enemy mortars.

But most clearly, the advantages of the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model were manifested in the fact that its capabilities turned out to be wider than prescribed by the leadership of the service. -In the days of the heroic defense of Moscow, howitzers fired directly at Nazi tanks. Later, the experience was consolidated by the creation of a cumulative projectile for the M-30 and an additional item in the service manual: "The howitzer can be used to fight tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts and other armored vehicles of the enemy."

See the continuation on the website: WWII - Weapons of Victory - WWII Artillery Part II

EXPERIENCE TEACHES GUNNERS

At the beginning of the Civil War, artillery was used in combat in the old way, as they were used to using it at the end of the First World War. In connection with the new forms of warfare, it was necessary to use artillery in a completely new way. The old tactics of artillery were replaced by the tactics of flexible maneuver and decisive concentration of artillery in the direction of the main attack of the troops.
The following examples speak of how old obsolete traditions were broken in the combat use of artillery. In October 1918, the 70,000-strong White Guard army of General Krasnov, armed and equipped by the Germans, surrounded Tsaritsyn and pressed the heroic defenders of the city to the banks of the Volga. The number of Soviet troops defending Tsaritsyn did not exceed 50 thousand people. The supply of shells and cartridges from the defenders of the city was coming to an end, and the lines of communication with Moscow and the Caucasus were cut off by the Whites. The situation was difficult. On October 16, the White Guards occupied the Voroponovo station, located just 10 kilometers west of the city, and continued to move forward, showering Red Army units with shells. Due to the lack of shells and rifle cartridges, the heroic defenders of Tsaritsyn increasingly had to fight back with bayonets and checkers. By the end of the day on October 16, the front was already 7 kilometers from the city. In the evening, our observers noticed that new military units arrived to help the Whites. As it turned out later, a White Guard officer brigade of about a thousand people approached the front.
The critical moment has come. Tsaritsyn was in mortal danger.
At this difficult moment, Comrade Stalin, who personally led the defense of Tsaritsyn on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, mobilized all forces and means to repel the enemy. Almost all artillery pieces and ammunition were concentrated in the central sector of the front against the Voroponovo station.
There were about 200 guns on the front stretching 40 kilometers. Almost all of them were now converging on the central sector of the front. Batteries stood only a few dozen steps from one another, preparing to repel the attack of the Whites.
At dawn, the white artillery opened fire, and soon their infantry also went on the attack. In full dress uniform, chain after chain, column after column, the officer regiments marched. An officer brigade was ahead, followed by the regiments of General Krasnov. The White Guards counted on the fact that the Red Army soldiers would not stand it, that the mere sight of a mass of armed men steadily moving forward would demoralize them. The artillery of the Red Army was silent: it was waiting for the prearranged signal. Here are the advanced lines of the Whites half a kilometer from our infantry ... Already only 400 meters remain ... Every second one could expect that the lines of the White Guards would change their fast pace to a swift run and go over to the attack. At that moment, a signal was given: 4 high bursts of shrapnel - 4 bright white smoke clouds hanging in the clear morning sky. And after that, the whole steppe rumbled. The sounds of shots and explosions of shells merged into a continuous continuous rumble. Each battery fired at the sector of the front assigned to it, and all together created a solid wall of fire. The shells were bursting in the very thick of the advancing enemy columns. Having suffered heavy losses, the Whites lay down. They were stopped, but not yet defeated. At this time, an armored train approached from the north along the ring railway line; on the right and left flanks of the front section, trucks converted into armored vehicles and armed with machine guns burst forward; the batteries shifted their fire deep into the location of the Whites in order to cut off the escape routes of their advanced units. The Red Infantry went on the counterattack. She moved forward quickly. And as the artillery carried the fire farther and farther, a still smoking battlefield opened up before the eyes of the observers, littered with the corpses of the White Guards and plowed up with shells. The half-destroyed White Guard regiments retreated in disarray to the south and west, dispersed across the steppe. The ring of siege was broken. Red Tsaritsyn was saved. In 1919, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Stalin led the defeat of the White Guard troops of General Yudenich, who were rushing towards Petrograd. The situation of the Soviet troops was complicated by the fact that a counter-revolutionary rebellion was raised in the rear of the Red Army at the forts Krasnaya Gorka and Gray Horse. It was impossible to take well-armed forts by storm, advancing only from land with the support of small artillery. Comrade Stalin proposed to attack the rebellious forts with a combined strike from land and sea, using the powerful artillery of the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Comrade Stalin's plan was approved and put into practice. The suppression of the rebellious forts was carried out brilliantly. The rebellious forts, which could not withstand the powerful blows of naval artillery, were taken by the Red Army units and detachments of Baltic sailors and St. Petersburg workers. Yudenich's army was defeated and its remnants were driven back to Estonia. Artillery provided powerful support to the infantry on the Southern Front, when troops under the leadership of M.V. Frunze stormed Perekop. The artillery of the First Cavalry Army also acted boldly and decisively, showing examples of skillful interaction with cavalry and high maneuverability on the battlefield. The study of the experience of past wars helped our Party and the Soviet Government to correctly map out further steps along the path of development of Soviet artillery and clearly define the tasks that artillery must solve in battle. The re-equipment of artillery with new types of guns that followed in 1937 and 1938 contributed to a significant increase in its power. The force of the crushing blows of Soviet artillery was soon experienced by the enemies of our Motherland, who dared to encroach on the inviolability of the borders of the country of the Soviets. In the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 and in the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939/40, our artillery provided powerful support to infantry and tanks, hit the enemy’s manpower, destroyed his military equipment and destroyed his powerful engineering structures.

THE REAR HELP THE FRONT

In some battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery fired more shells in one day of battle than the Russian army used during the entire war with Japan in 1904-1905.
How many defense factories were needed, how fast they had to work in order to produce such a huge amount of guns and ammunition. How skillfully and accurately the transport had to work in order to uninterruptedly transfer countless guns and shells to the battlefields!
And the Soviet people coped with all these difficult tasks, inspired by their love for the Motherland, for the Communist Party, for their Government.
Soviet factories during the war produced huge quantities of guns and ammunition. Back in 1942, our industry in just one month produced much more guns of all calibers than the Russian army had at the beginning of the First World War.

Thanks to the heroic labor of the Soviet people, the Soviet Army received a steady stream of first-class artillery weapons, which in the capable hands of our artillerymen became the decisive force that ensured the defeat of Nazi Germany and the victorious end of the war. During the war, our domestic industry increased its output from month to month and supplied the Soviet Army with tanks and aircraft, ammunition and equipment in increasing quantities.
The artillery industry annually produced up to 120,000 guns of all calibers, up to 450,000 light and heavy machine guns, over 3 million rifles, and about 2 million machine guns. In 1944 alone, 7,400,000,000 cartridges were produced.
Soviet people, selflessly working in the rear, helped the Soviet Army to defend the freedom and independence of our Motherland and saved the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement.
The victory of our country in the Great Patriotic War speaks of the vitality of the Soviet social system, of the invincibility of the cause for which, under the leadership of our Party, the Soviet people fought in the Great October Socialist Revolution.
The great strength of the leadership of the Communist Party ensured the Soviet people a complete victory over a strong and treacherous enemy in the most difficult of all wars that mankind has ever had to wage.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party appeared before all the peoples of the Soviet Union as the inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the fascist invaders. The organizational work of the Party united and directed to a common goal all the efforts of the Soviet people, subordinating all forces and means to the cause of defeating the enemy. During the war, the Party has become even more closely related to the people, has become even more closely connected with the broad masses of the working people.

SOVIET ARTILLERY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
We have already said that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, our army had first-class artillery, which in all respects was superior to the artillery of any foreign army. Soviet artillery personnel were well trained and distinguished by high moral character.
In the initial period of the war, our artillery repulsed the attacks of enemy tanks, which were the main striking force of the fascist German army, with their fire, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, helped our infantry stop the enemy and gain a foothold on advantageous lines.
How did artillery solve its combat missions?
When the Nazi armored hordes attacked our Motherland, they met stubborn resistance and well-aimed fire from Soviet artillery, which took on the brunt of the fight against enemy tanks. Our artillery was the force that helped the Soviet Army to thwart Hitler's plans for the "lightning" defeat of our Motherland.

For a more successful fight against Nazi tanks, it was necessary to form new anti-tank artillery units. Special anti-tank artillery units were formed, which played a crucial role in defeating enemy tanks.
Bravely defending the prepared lines, the Soviet gunners dealt the enemy blow after blow. Each city approached by the enemy turned into a fortress, on the outskirts of which selected German fascist units perished. The legendary defense of the hero cities: Odessa, Leningrad, Sevastopol, Stalingrad has gone down in history forever.
In all defensive battles, artillery, with its fire, ensured the strength of the defense of our troops. In the defense of Leningrad and Sevastopol, along with hired artillery, coastal and naval artillery successfully operated, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.
Soviet artillery was especially famous in the battles on the outskirts of Moscow, for the capture of which the Nazis sent 51 divisions, including 13 tank and 5 motorized divisions, to defeat the Soviet Army and, having captured Moscow, end the war before the onset of the winter of 1941.

For twenty days in a row, the battle on the outskirts of the capital of our Motherland did not subside for an hour. Artillerymen courageously fought against fascist tanks, tens and hundreds set fire to and knocked out armored vehicles. One of the anti-tank artillery regiments destroyed 186 enemy tanks on the outskirts of Moscow. For the courage shown in battles with the Nazi invaders, for the steadfastness, courage and heroism of the glorious destroyers of enemy tanks, this regiment was transformed into the 1st Guards Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment.

The Soviet troops, having crushed the enemy's strike forces, stopped him "and then, pulling up and concentrating reserves, on December 6, 1941, they launched a counteroffensive. Near Moscow and in other sectors of the enemy front, the enemy was defeated and thrown back far to the west. During these battles, the enemy suffered huge losses. During the first 40 days of our offensive, the Nazis lost only 300,000 soldiers and officers killed, hundreds of tanks, guns and mortars, thousands of vehicles and many other weapons and military equipment.
The defeat of the enemy armies near Moscow was of great importance for the further course of the war. For the first time during the Second World War, the fascist troops were not only stopped, but suffered a complete defeat. As a result of the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi army was dispelled.
Assessing the role of artillery in the defensive battles of the Soviet Army near Moscow and Leningrad, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin wrote in an order dedicated to the celebration of Artillery Day on November 19, 1944: “As you know, artillery was the force that helped the Red Army stop the advance of the enemy at approaches to Leningrad and Moscow.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE NEAR STALINGRAD
At the beginning of the book, we already mentioned what role the Soviet artillery played in the Battle of Stalingrad. The role of our artillery was so great that it is necessary to tell a little more about it.
Having suffered a defeat near Moscow and in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the Nazis hastily began to prepare a new offensive against the Soviet Union. They wanted to break through our defenses, bypass Moscow from the east, cut it off from the Volga and Ural rear, and then strike at Moscow. In this adventuristic plan of the Nazis, the capture of Stalingrad was envisaged. To accomplish this task, the Nazi command concentrated huge forces of infantry, tanks, self-propelled artillery, aviation, and many other military equipment in the Stalingrad direction.
The Nazi command decided to launch an offensive with the expectation of capturing Stalingrad by July 25, and capturing Kuibyshev by August 15 and ending the war in the east by the winter of 1942. The Nazis began to carefully prepare for the offensive. A breakthrough of the front was planned in the direction of Voronezh and Stalingrad.
In developing their plans, the Nazis counted that the American-British imperialists would not come to the aid of the Soviet Union, that they would not land their troops on the coast of France in order to create a second front against Nazi Germany.
Indeed, the American-British imperialists kept delaying the opening of a second front in Europe, they wanted to exhaust and weaken the Soviet Union in such a way that after the war our country would become economically dependent on the United States of America and Britain.
In addition, they expected that a difficult war with the Soviet Union would weaken Nazi Germany; which was the most dangerous competitor of the USA and England in the world market.
On July 24, 1941, in The New York Times, American Senator Truman, who later became President of the United States, wrote: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia wins, then we should help Germany . And thus, let them kill as many as possible."
Violating their allied obligations, the American-British imperialists were secretly negotiating peace with fascist Germany from the Soviet Union.

In the days of heavy Stalingrad battles, the American-British imperialists had about six million idle soldiers under arms and huge masses of military equipment. These forces and means could "provide substantial assistance to the Soviet Army, but in the summer of 1942 the American-British reactionaries raised a fuss in their newspapers that the American and British troops were not prepared for the opening of a second front in Europe.
By this they made it clear to Hitler that he could concentrate all his forces against our army without fear for his rear.
At the same time, the US and British imperialists supplied Hitlerite Germany with the most important military materials through the "neutral" countries.
Thus the US and British monopolists openly and secretly helped Hitlerite Germany in its struggle against the Soviet Union.
Choosing the Stalingrad direction, the Nazis hoped that in the Stalingrad steppes they would be able to make the most extensive use of tank and mechanized troops, quickly complete the capture of Stalingrad and Kuibyshev, and finally defeat the Soviet Army.
But they miscalculated cruelly, they did not take into account the ability of our army to resist for a long time; nor did they foresee the inexhaustible strength of our Soviet people, their unshakable will in striving to destroy the enemy.
The Supreme High Command promptly unraveled the plans of the Nazi command and developed a plan for the defeat of the fascist troops near Stalingrad. The Soviet troops were given the task of exhausting and bleeding the Nazi troops rushing to Stalingrad in stubborn battles, and then encircling them and destroying them. This plan was successfully implemented.

In the battles that unfolded between the bend of the Don and the Volga, our army dealt heavy blows to the Nazi troops, destroying the elite Nazi regiments and divisions and holding back the advance of the Nazi troops. To go the distance from the Don to Stalingrad, the Nazis had to fight bloody battles for about two months. Only in mid-September, the Nazi troops were able to approach the outskirts of the city.

At Stalingrad, the Nazis met resistance and stubbornness of the Soviet troops and workers of Stalingrad enterprises unprecedented in the history of wars.
The enemy threw division after division into battle, but all his attempts to capture the city were shattered against the staunch defense of our troops. The approaches to the city and the ruins of city blocks were littered with the corpses of the Nazis. The enemy's strength was fading. The heroic defenders of Stalingrad smashed the elite Nazi troops and prepared the conditions for their complete defeat.
Soviet artillery played a particularly important role in this battle; it waged a fierce and protracted struggle against the fascist German tank and mechanized troops on the far and near approaches to Stalingrad and delayed their advance. Artillerymen with the fire of their guns blocked the path of the infantry and tanks of the enemy, inflicting huge damage on him in manpower and equipment. By this, the artillery made it possible for our troops to prepare the defense of the city.
Artillery of all calibers took part in the heroic defense of Stalingrad, from small-caliber guns to high-powered guns. Together with ground artillery, our anti-aircraft artillery destroyed the enemy in the air and on the ground.
The interaction of artillery fire with infantry was very well organized. Defensive battles in Stalingrad were very active. Our units continuously counterattacked the enemy and kept him in a tense state, in constant expectation of an attack.
During September - October and the first half of November 1942, the Nazis made an average of 10 attacks per day. The struggle was for every inch of Soviet land, for every quarter, for every house, for every floor of the house. Soviet soldiers, including artillerymen, heroically defended the city. They turned every quarter, street, house into fortresses, which destroyed fresh reserves brought into battle by the Nazi command.
In the same months, the Nazis launched 4 offensive operations that lasted several days; they threw more than ten divisions into battle at the same time, supported by 400-500 tanks.
The German fascist invaders managed to break into the city, but they could not completely capture it.
The defenders of Stalingrad remembered the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - "Stalingrad must not be surrendered to the enemy" - and sought to defend the glorious Soviet stronghold on the Volga at any cost. The soldiers of the Stalingrad Front wrote to Comrade Stalin: “Before our battle flags, before the entire Soviet country, we swear that we will not disgrace the glory of Russian weapons, we will fight to the last opportunity. Under your leadership, our fathers won the Battle of Tsaritsyno, under your leadership we will win now in the great battle of Stalingrad! The defenders of Stalingrad kept this oath with honor.
Thousands of Stalingraders - residents of the city - took part in street battles.
Here is one typical case. The Nazis tried to force the Russian woman to help them bypass the house, which was defended by our machine gunners. This attempt cost the Nazis dearly. The woman led the enemy soldiers into the courtyard under the fire of our shooters and shouted: “Shoot, comrades!” Almost all the Nazis were killed. One of the Nazis, wounded, shot at the woman. When our shooters ran up to her, she said: "Still, I was not mistaken." Glory to the nameless heroine!
The defensive battles of the Soviet Army near Stalingrad were only the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad. Heroically resisting, the defenders of Stalingrad stopped the advance of the Nazis in the Stalingrad direction.

The destructive fire of the Soviet artillery produced enormous devastation in the disposition of the enemy.

During the defensive battle, which lasted from mid-July to November 19, the Nazi armies were bled dry. They lost 182,000 killed and over 500,000 wounded. In addition, our troops knocked out and destroyed 1,450 enemy tanks, 4,000 machine guns, over 2,000 guns and mortars. 1337 aircraft were destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery fire and fighter aircraft. All this affected the morale of the Nazis and made them talk about the "impregnability of the Stalingrad fortress", about the "Volga Verdun", about the "incomprehensible stubbornness of the Russians."
Corporal Walter wrote in a letter home: “Stalingrad is hell on earth, Verdun, Red Yerden with new weapons. We attack daily. If we manage to occupy 20 meters, then in the evening the Russians will push us back.”
But, despite heavy losses, the Nazis decided to hold their positions near Stalingrad during the winter, and in the summer to start the offensive again in order to achieve their crazy goal - to capture Moscow.
Even while fierce battles were going on in the streets of the city, our new units and formations armed with new military equipment capable of defeating the enemy were concentrated in the Stalingrad region.
To defeat the enemy, it was necessary to concentrate a large number of troops and military equipment. Especially much was needed for artillery, the main striking force of the advancing fronts. Artillery was supposed to crack the enemy defenses with its fire and ensure the transition of our troops to the counteroffensive. In the silence of the night, the roar of engines was constantly heard. It was guns, tanks, cars moving towards the front" and there was no end in sight to the long columns of people and equipment. All preparations for the offensive were carried out covertly. Troops approached the front only at night. During the day, they took refuge in settlements and in numerous beams, carefully disguising themselves from airborne observers! enemy. Our troops carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. A lot of work in the preparatory period was done by the Soviet artillery reconnaissance. She identified important targets on which artillery was supposed to bring down her fire. Much attention was paid to the organization of interaction between various branches of the armed forces.
Finally, by mid-November, preparations for the offensive were completed. The task was to surround and completely destroy all the enemy divisions that had broken through to Stalingrad.
To do this, our troops in close cooperation were to break through the front of the Nazis and defeat them in the sector of the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad, and then, with a swift blow of the mobile troops in the direction of the Don, surround the Nazi hordes at Stalingrad and destroy them.
On November 19, 1942, according to the plan developed by the Supreme High Command, the Soviet troops launched a decisive counterattack.

Before the start of the offensive of the infantry and tanks, artillery preparation of an unprecedented force was carried out. Thousands of guns and mortars rained down on the enemy positions a huge number of shells and mines. A sudden powerful fire strike was inflicted on the enemy's centers of resistance on the front line and in the depths of the defense, on his mortars and artillery batteries, on command posts, on reserves. The whole area was, as it were, plowed up by a gigantic plow of war. The surface of the earth was pitted with many craters from explosions of shells, mines and aerial bombs. Entire enemy units ran out of trenches and dugouts and rushed from side to side in a panic, finding no escape. The losses of the Nazis in manpower and equipment were enormous. Despite the fog, which limited visibility, our artillery did an excellent job with its tasks.
Enemy trenches and fortifications were destroyed by massive artillery fire. On the first day of the offensive, artillery from only one front destroyed and suppressed 293 heavy machine guns, 100 artillery and 60 mortar batteries, destroyed 196 dugouts, 126 defensive structures. Artillery fire destroyed a lot of enemy soldiers and officers.
Having broken through the front of the enemy, our troops began to move forward rapidly. Our artillery advanced along with the troops and did not lag behind them.
During the offensive, the Soviet gunners showed great skill in controlling massive fire. They smashed the enemy fortifications and accompanied our attacking infantry, cavalry and tanks with fire.
Thus began the rout of the Nazi army, a rout in which Soviet artillery played an outstanding role.
As a result of a well-organized infantry offensive in cooperation with artillery, tanks and cavalry, on November 23, a 330,000-strong group of selected Nazi troops was surrounded. The history of wars knows no example of the encirclement and complete defeat of such a huge mass of troops armed with the latest technology.
In December 1942, Hitler addressed the encircled troops with a special order - he demanded at all costs to hold positions near Stalingrad.
The Nazi command made desperate attempts to save the encircled troops. To assist them in the areas of Tormosino and Kotelnikovo, the Nazis created two strong groupings of troops, 8 divisions each, which were supposed to break through the ring of Soviet troops around Stalingrad.
In December, our troops defeated both of these enemy groupings and continued to develop the offensive further and further to the west.

So ingloriously ended the attempts of the Nazis to free their encircled armies.
Meanwhile, our troops, who surrounded the main Nazi group near Stalingrad, were preparing to destroy it.
In the last, decisive battle, according to the plan of our Supreme High Command, it was necessary to dismember the encircled enemy troops into parts and then destroy each isolated enemy grouping separately. Artillery was entrusted with the task of paving the way for infantry and tanks through the enemy's fortifications, suppressing and destroying his firepower and manpower.
On January 10, at 08:50, from the point of the commander of the troops of the front, there was a command to begin the offensive. The air shuddered from the thunder of the artillery cannonade, which simultaneously began on the entire front. Squadrons of our bomber and attack aircraft appeared in the sky.
The offensive of our troops was supported by strong artillery fire. Artillery was used in large numbers and provided good fire for the actions of our infantry and tanks.
The sounds of shots and explosions of artillery shells, mines and air bombs merged into a continuous rumble. Losses inflicted on the enemy

the fire of our artillery, mortars and aircraft were very significant. According to the testimonies of the prisoners, "whole battalions knelt down and turned to God with a prayer, asking for mercy and to protect them from the fire of Russian artillery."
Our tanks with landing troops landed on them rushed at the enemy; after them went on the attack infantry units. For two weeks, units of the Soviet Army, advancing from the west, with fierce battles moved east to Stalingrad, and by the end of January 26, 1943, in the Mamaev Kurgan area, they joined with the troops of General Chuikov, advancing from Stalingrad.
The Nazi troops were cut into two parts: the northern one in the area of ​​the tractor factory and the Barrikady plant, and the southern one in the northwestern half of the city.
On January 31, the southern grouping of Nazi troops was finally defeated; On February 1, our troops launched an assault on the northern grouping of enemy troops. After artillery preparation, the enemy defenses were broken through, and the next day our troops defeated this last enemy center of resistance. Our artillery honorably fulfilled the tasks assigned to it. Suffice it to say that in the period from January 10 to February 2, artillery fire

98 tanks were hit and burned, more than 70 batteries were suppressed and destroyed, about 1000 wood-and-earth firing points and over 1500 dugouts were destroyed. Several tens of thousands of fascist invaders died under the explosions of shells and mines.

Our anti-aircraft artillery provided great assistance to the advancing troops. In the battles near Stalingrad, anti-aircraft artillery shot down 223 enemy aircraft and disabled a large number of aircraft.
The front commander reported to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that the destruction of the encircled Stalingrad grouping of enemy troops had ended at 4 pm on February 2, 1943.
The battle of Stalingrad ended with the complete defeat of the 330,000-strong selective Nazi army, which consisted of 22 divisions.

The size of the battle, unprecedented in history, is indicated by the numbers of enemy losses. At the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, 147,200 corpses of the killed Nazis were picked up and buried in the ground. In the period from January 10 to February 2, the troops of the front destroyed about 120,000 and captured 130,000 Nazi soldiers and officers.

In addition, it was captured: guns - 5762, mortars - 1312, machine guns - 12701, tanks - 1666, armored vehicles - 216 and many other property.
Thus ended one of the greatest battles in the history of warfare - the Battle of Stalingrad. In the battles near Stalingrad, the role of artillery in modern warfare was especially clearly revealed as the most formidable weapon, as the main striking force of the Soviet Army. On the example of the Battle of Stalingrad, it became clear on what a large scale it is necessary to use artillery to achieve victory in modern warfare. The Stalingrad victory showed how much the military skill of our soldiers, officers and generals had grown.

The battle of Stalingrad put an end to the offensive of the Nazi troops deep into our country. The mass expulsion of the invaders from the Soviet land began. The word "Stalingrad" has become a symbol of the courage and heroism of the Soviet people. It echoed in the hearts of all honest people of the world and raised them to fight against fascism, to fight for their freedom and independence.

The defeat of the Nazi army at Stalingrad forced imperialist Japan and Turkey, a secret ally of fascist Germany, to refrain from any intention of openly opposing the Soviet Union.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK
Back in January-February 1943, our troops defeated the Nazis in the region of Voronezh and Kursk and pushed the Nazi troops far to the west.
A protrusion formed in the outlines of the front, which protruded deeply into the enemy's disposition. At this turn, the front stabilized, and both belligerents began to prepare for summer hostilities.

The Nazi army intended to once again break through the front of the Soviet Army. With strikes from the north and south, the Nazis wanted to pincer the Kursk grouping of our army in order to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops concentrated in the Kursk region, to capture Kursk on the fifth day of the offensive, and then move on to Moscow.

In order to imagine the scale of this battle, it is enough to say that the Nazi command concentrated in the Kursk direction: over 430 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 3 thousand tanks, including new heavy tanks "Tiger" and self-propelled guns "Ferdi-nand", 6763 guns, 3200 mortars and 1850 aircraft, including about a thousand bombers.
And this plan of the enemy was timely unraveled by the Soviet command. The necessary measures were taken to prevent the Nazi command from carrying out its plans. The troops defending Kursk were prepared both for defense and for the offensive.
The Soviet Army, taking into account its rich experience in the battles near Moscow and Stalingrad, was preparing for decisive battles with the enemy.
Our troops created powerful defenses in the areas of a possible offensive by the Nazis in order to wear down and bleed the enemy in defensive battles, and then go on to a decisive counteroffensive and defeat the enemy.

Artillerymen carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. They studied the experience of past battles, improved their skills, learned to beat the enemy for sure.
On the night of July 5, when the Nazis concentrated large forces in the initial areas for the offensive, our artillery, 10 minutes before the start of the offensive, made a powerful fire attack on the enemy. Several hundred guns suddenly rained their shells on the Nazi positions. The artillery smashed the enemy's infantry, its tank and motorized troops, which were preparing for the offensive, as well as the enemy's batteries, observation and command posts.

The crushing fire of artillery and mortars inflicted huge losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment and lowered the morale of the fascist troops. As a result of a powerful artillery fire raid, the Nazis lost 90 artillery and mortar batteries, 10 warehouses with ammunition and fuel were blown up, 60 observation posts were suppressed, many tanks and other military equipment were knocked out.

A sudden attack by our artillery and mortars upset the battle formations of the infantry and tanks of the enemy. Having suffered heavy losses in artillery, the Nazis were forced to shift part of the tasks of artillery to aviation. Only a few hours later the Nazis recovered from the unexpected blow and were able to launch their offensive.
And when the Nazis nevertheless went on the offensive with large forces of tanks and infantry, they met fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. The famous Battle of Kursk began.
South of Orel and north of Belgorod, battles flared up, unprecedented in their fierceness and in the amount of military equipment used in them. In the northern direction, from the Orel region, the Nazis threw into battle 7 tank, 2 motorized and 11 infantry divisions, and from the Belgorod region - 10 tank, one motorized and 7 infantry divisions, the bulk of which operated along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. Tanks and self-propelled guns were the first to go on the offensive. The infantry moved behind the tanks in armored personnel carriers. Enemy bombers in large groups, wave after wave, covered their advancing troops.

Despite the huge forces, the Nazis were unable to break through our defenses. They were met by strong massed fire from our artillery and defending troops. Enemy tanks took off into the air, exploding in minefields, catching fire from well-aimed shots of artillerymen and armor-piercers. Five times the Nazis rushed to the attack, but to no avail. Fierce fighting continued throughout the day. The enemy failed to achieve major successes. On the Oryol and Belgorod directions, at the cost of heavy losses, the fascist troops only wedged a few kilometers into our location.
On July 11, a fierce tank battle of unprecedented size unfolded again, in which more than 1,500 tanks and large aviation forces participated from both sides. In one day of battle, the enemy lost over 400 tanks and did not advance a meter. Already on the seventh day after the start of the offensive, the northern grouping of troops was stopped, and on the twelfth day, the southern one. By July 13, the Nazis, as a result of huge losses, were forced to stop the offensive on the entire front. The new campaign against Moscow ended in complete failure for the Nazis.
The plan of the Nazi command collapsed. The stable, pre-prepared defense of the Soviet troops turned out to be really insurmountable.
An exceptionally large role in the battles near Kursk was played by our artillery, which took upon itself the brunt of the struggle against the masses of fascist heavy and light tanks, which were trying to make a breach in our defenses. The struggle of Soviet guns with enemy armored vehicles ended in victory for the Soviet gunners. In the first three days of fighting alone, Soviet artillerymen, together with other branches of the armed forces, destroyed 1,539 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns.
Artillerymen steadfastly and courageously fought against enemy tanks and heroic deeds increased the glory of Russian artillery. In some cases, the gunners fired to the last shell, and then switched to hand-to-hand combat. Here is an example of the courageous struggle of “Soviet artillerymen with enemy tanks.
In the battle near Ponyri, a large group of enemy tanks and infantry moved towards Sergeant Sedov's gun. Sergeant Major Sedov, letting the enemy within 200 meters, opened fire on the tanks. He fired from the gun at the most vulnerable places of the tanks, not allowing the enemy to come to his senses. In a short period of time, Sedov knocked out four "tigers" from his gun and destroyed up to 100 enemy soldiers. And when an enemy shell broke the gun, then Sedov and his comrades took anti-tank grenades and continued to fight with fascist tanks.
An invaluable service to the ground troops was provided by anti-aircraft artillery, which acted jointly with them on the battlefield. Anti-aircraft artillery in the battles near Kursk destroyed 660 enemy aircraft.
Having exhausted and bled the elite fascist divisions in the Battle of Kursk, our troops broke through the enemy front and themselves launched a counteroffensive, which then unfolded into a powerful offensive along a front stretching over 800 kilometers. Powerful defensive lines prepared in advance, deeply echeloned and fortified centers of resistance, created by the Nazis for almost two years, were destroyed by our artillery, which operated jointly with other branches of the military.
As a result of the defeat of the Nazi armies near Kursk, the myth of the Nazis was dispelled that "Russians can only advance in winter." Soviet troops proved that in summer they break through enemy defenses and conduct an offensive just as well as in winter.
On August 5, 1943, the Soviet Army, after intense street fighting, captured Orel and Belgorod. On this day, in the capital of our Motherland - Moscow - the first artillery salute sounded in honor of the victory of our troops, who liberated Orel and Belgorod. Since then, every major victory of the Soviet troops began to be celebrated with artillery salutes.
The Battle of Kursk played an important role during the Great Patriotic War. On the significance of the battle of Kursk, the Chairman of the State Defense Committee, I. V. Stalin, said: “If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the German fascist army, then the battle of Kursk put it before a catastrophe.”
After the defeat near Kursk and Kharkov, all the hopes of the Nazis to stay in the east collapsed.
The continuous offensive of the Soviet Army to the west began.
1943 was a turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The major victories of the Soviet troops were not only of great importance for the Soviet-German front, but they also influenced the entire course of the Second World War.
In 1944, the Soviet Army delivered ten crushing blows to the enemy, as a result of which up to 120 divisions of Nazi Germany and its allies were defeated and put out of action. In these decisive battles, the Soviet artillery, as always, honorably performed all the tasks assigned to it.
Having expelled the Nazi troops from the borders of our country, the Soviet Army shifted its combat operations to enemy territory. Soviet troops, advancing to the west, liberated one after another the countries enslaved by Nazi Germany. And only after it became obvious that the crushing blows of the Soviet Army were inevitably fatal and the Soviet Union alone would finish off Nazi Germany and its satellites, the American and British generals were forced to hurry up with the opening of a second front with a delay of two years.
However, despite the existence of a second front in Western Europe, the main forces of the fascist German armies were still on the Soviet-German front. Our army continued to bear the brunt of the war on its shoulders.
The offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1944/45 was one of the largest in the entire war. In terms of the number of troops and military equipment participating in it, in terms of the strength of the blows, this was an offensive unparalleled in the history of wars. Suffice it to say that in just 40 days of our offensive, the Nazis lost: over 1,150,000 soldiers and officers captured and killed, about 3,000 aircraft, more than 4,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, and at least 12,000 guns. With a mighty blow, the artillery broke the enemy defenses on a 1,200-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Carpathians; by the end of January 1945, the Soviet Army cleared the territory between the Vistula and Oder rivers from enemy troops, thwarted the Nazi offensive on the Western Front in the Ardennes and reached the last fortified lines that covered the capital of Nazi Germany - Berlin.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE FOR BERLIN
The battle for Berlin began in the second half of April 1945, when our troops captured bridgeheads on the Oder and Neisse rivers.
The Nazi command understood that the fate of Berlin would be decided on the Oder, therefore, throughout the vast territory from the Oder to Berlin, a system of heavily fortified defensive lines with numerous concrete firing points and other engineering structures was created in advance.
Every inch of land in this area was prepared for defense; the presence of numerous lakes, rivers, canals, a dense network of settlements with stone houses further strengthened the defense.
Berlin and the approaches to it were also turned into a fortified area. On the outskirts of Berlin, the Nazis built an additional three powerful lines of fortifications. Berlin was divided around the circumference into eight sectors of defense, the city center was most heavily fortified.
Barricades, anti-tank barriers and concrete emplacements were built on every street. To defend the approaches to Berlin, the Nazis put up several armies. All special units, military schools and academies were also sent to defend Berlin. Members of the Nazi Party were mobilized to create tank destroyer brigades, which were armed with Faust cartridges (a new jet weapon for fighting tanks). Separate battalions were specially trained for street fighting. In total, in the Berlin direction, the Nazi command concentrated up to half a million troops with a huge amount of combat equipment.
Soviet soldiers were irresistibly striving for Berlin in order to quickly put an end to the fascist beast in its lair.
By order of the command in the artillery units, a struggle began for the honor of firing the first shot at Berlin. In the units, the appeal of the Military Council of the front was read with enthusiasm, which said: “Fighting friends! Comrade Stalin, on behalf of the Motherland and the entire Soviet people, ordered the troops of our front to defeat the enemy on the nearest approaches to Berlin, capture the capital of Germany - Berlin and hoist the banner of Victory over it.
To complete this last battle, such an amount of manpower and military equipment was concentrated that made it possible to break the resistance of the fascist troops in the shortest possible time and capture Berlin. No other operation involved so much artillery as it was concentrated for the attack on Berlin.
The preparation of the offensive was carried out very carefully and secretly,
The Nazis did not know when our offensive would begin.
On April 14, 1945, our artillery suddenly opened powerful hurricane fire along the entire front. The enemy took this as the beginning of the offensive of our troops. But there was no offensive from our side, and the Nazis calmed down, believing that the offensive had failed. In fact, artillery firing was undertaken for reconnaissance purposes.

The attack was scheduled for another day.
The beginning of the general offensive against Berlin was announced by a salvo of a huge mass of artillery and mortars. On the night of April 15-16, a blow of unprecedented force was suddenly dealt to the enemy's defensive lines.
After artillery and aviation preparation, the Soviet infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns went on the attack. The rapid offensive of our troops was supported by artillery fire and air bombing strikes.
Our attack turned out to be unexpected, stunning for the enemy. Our tanks quickly crushed the advanced positions and broke into the enemy defense zone. Destroying trenches, breaking barriers, destroying the enemy and his firepower, Soviet tanks and infantry advanced rapidly. The Nazis did not expect such a powerful blow, their resistance was quickly broken. The defeated Nazi divisions began to retreat to Berlin. Parts of the Soviet Army pursued the enemy on the heels and on April 20 approached the capital of Germany.
At 11 o'clock on April 20, the division commander, Major Zyukin, was the first to open fire on the lair of the fascist beast - Berlin. Artillery

the fire kept growing - following the batteries of Major Zyukin, other batteries entered the battle. The closer our troops approached Berlin, the more the resistance of the Nazis increased.
After five days of fierce fighting, our troops surrounded Berlin, and on April 21, the assault on the city itself began.
Our warriors met with pre-prepared defenses. The Nazis blocked the streets with numerous blockages and barricades. Groups of multi-storey buildings were turned into powerful strongholds with many firing points. Soviet troops had to knock out the enemy from every street, from every building. Fierce fights took place on the stairs of multi-storey buildings, in basements, on roofs. From building to building, from quarter to quarter, our infantrymen, artillerymen, mortarmen, tankers, sappers, and signalmen were advancing with a fight.
In these difficult conditions, our gunners brilliantly coped with the tasks assigned to them. Rolling out their guns for direct fire, they destroyed enemy firing points, destroyed their defenses and cleared the way for infantry and tanks. Brave Soviet artillerymen, under enemy fire, rolled their guns on their hands through dilapidated barricades and rubble.
Our artillery helped the infantry and tanks to cross the river Spree and canals, of which there are a lot in the city. Having suppressed the enemy's defenses on the opposite bank, artillery ensured the capture of coastal quarters.
So, clearing quarter after quarter, our troops, supported by artillery fire, made their way to the city center, to the Reichstag building.
Before the assault on the Reichstag, the last short artillery preparation was carried out, after which our infantry rushed to the attack and broke into the building. The battle for the capture of the Reichstag lasted several hours.
At 2:20 p.m. on April 30, 1945, the Reichstag was taken. The banner of the Victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was hoisted over Berlin.
At 3 pm on May 2, 1945, the Berlin garrison unconditionally surrendered to the victorious Soviet troops.
With their crushing blows, Soviet artillery contributed to the final defeat of the Nazi troops defending Berlin.
41,000 artillery pieces and mortars took part in the battle for Berlin, firing a huge number of shells and mines with a total weight of over 26,000 tons.
In the bloody battles for Berlin, which lasted sixteen days, about 150,000 Nazi soldiers and officers were killed; over 300,000 Nazis were taken prisoner by Soviet troops. (475)
The greatest offensive in history of the heroic Soviet Army ended in the complete defeat of the fascists and brought the peoples of Europe liberation from the terrible tyranny of Hitlerism.
* * *
The victorious Battle of Berlin ended the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany. To commemorate the victory over Nazi Germany on May 9, 1945, on Victory Day, the capital of our Motherland saluted the valiant troops of the Soviet Army with thirty artillery volleys from a thousand guns.
However, there was another threat of an attack on our Motherland - from imperialist Japan, which for decades provoked military clashes in the Far East.
On the borders with the Soviet Union, Japan concentrated its best, selected troops - the 1.5 million Kwantung Army, which relied on numerous field and long-term defensive fortifications.
In order to eliminate this last hotbed of war and secure the Soviet Far East from the threat of a military attack, it was necessary to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army and force Japan to unconditional surrender.
Three months after the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Army, true to its allied duty, began military operations against the Japanese Kwantung Army.
On the night of August 9, 1945, the Soviet Army, the ships of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla dealt crushing blows to the enemy. The defeat of the Japanese army began.
Despite the difficult conditions, the fighting of our troops was distinguished by great swiftness. The retreating Japanese units did not have time to prepare for battle, as they were already overtaken by shells of Soviet artillerymen.
Thanks to such swiftness and high mobility, Soviet artillery, along with infantry and tanks, in a short time fought through the whole of Manchuria and ended its military campaign on the shores of the Yellow Sea.
By their combat actions, the Soviet artillery contributed significantly to the defeat of the Japanese army.
On September 2, 1945, militaristic Japan recognized itself as defeated and surrendered unconditionally.
The military war of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany in the West and against the Japanese militarists in the Far East was victoriously completed.
Having won the Second World War, the Soviet people defended the freedom and independence of our Motherland and saved the peoples of Europe from the threat of fascist enslavement.
The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was the victory of the new Soviet social and state system, the victory of our Armed Forces.
Everything that is told in this book shows how diverse and responsible the combat work of gunners is, how much knowledge they must have in order to successfully cope with their work.
“To be a good artilleryman,” said Comrade Voroshilov, “especially an artillery commander, means to be a comprehensively educated person. Perhaps not a single type of weapon requires such a discipline of mind, will and knowledge from the commander and fighter as artillery.
On the battlefield, gunners must be proactive, bold and courageous; the fate of the battle very often depends on their courage and heroism.
The Great Patriotic War showed that all these qualities are fully possessed by the gunners of our glorious Soviet Army who are selflessly devoted to their Motherland.
Having such a cadre of artillerymen, our artillery, armed with the most advanced artillery equipment, together with other branches of the armed forces, will ensure the victory of the Soviet Army over any enemy, if he dares to interfere with the peaceful and victorious movement of the Soviet people towards their great goal - communism.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have always shown and continue to show tireless concern for the defense capability of our Motherland. The 19th Congress of the Communist Party, outlining the majestic program for building communism in the USSR, set before the Communist Party the task of strengthening in every possible way the active defense of the Soviet Motherland against the aggressive actions of its enemies.
Our people, defending the cause of peace with all means, can boldly rely on their Soviet Army and its main striking fire force, artillery.

Introduction

Despite the fundamental transformations that have taken place in the development of means of destruction, all types of weapons and military equipment, the progress of modern artillery weapons and the theory of the combat use of rocket troops and artillery is unthinkable without a deep study and use of the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Soviet artillery played an exceptionally important role in the Great Patriotic War and became the main firepower of the Ground Forces. She was the backbone of the defense of the Soviet Army and was the force that helped stop the enemy. In the battle near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the fascist army was dispelled. Formidable fighting qualities were demonstrated by Soviet artillery in the great battle on the Volga. In the battles near Kursk, artillery played a decisive role with its fire in creating a turning point in the course of hostilities, and then ensured the advance of our troops.

The strategic offensive of the Soviet Army after the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk continued until the very end of the Great Patriotic War. Each operation of our troops began under the thunder of artillery cannonade of hundreds and thousands of guns and developed with continuous artillery escort. In defense, anti-tank artillery was the main one. It accounts for over 70% of the destroyed enemy tanks. Respect for artillery was so great that since 1940 it was called the "god of war".

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery increased quantitatively by 5 times. The Soviet Union surpassed Germany in the production of guns and mortars by 2 and 5 times, respectively, the USA - by 1.3 and 3.2 times, England - by 4.2 and 4 times. During the war, our industry provided the front with 775.6 million shells and mines, which made it possible to inflict crushing fire strikes on the enemy. The power of artillery, mass heroism and the military skill of Soviet artillerymen together ensured victory in this difficult war.

The paper considers the development of ground artillery during the Great Patriotic War.

The development of artillery on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War

Development of the material part of artillery

During the years of the pre-war five-year plans, various design bureaus carried out work to modernize the existing equipment of artillery, which was aimed at increasing the firing range, increasing the rate of fire, increasing the angles of fire, increasing the power of ammunition, etc. At the same time, new systems were being developed.

The first new weapon of our Soviet artillery was the 76-mm regimental gun of the 1927 model. And although the gun was heavy and had an insufficient horizontal angle of fire, it remained the best regimental gun of that time.

In the 1930s, 37 mm and 45 mm anti-tank guns were adopted. The latter was a powerful means of dealing with all types of tanks of that time.

A major achievement of Soviet scientists and Soviet industry was the creation of a 76-mm gun mod. 1939 (USV), 122-mm howitzers mod. 1938 (M-30), 152 mm howitzer-cannon 1937 (ML-20), 203 mm howitzer mod. 1931 (B-4) (Figures 1, 2).

The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 1.

In the prewar years, mortars were recreated. The number of mortars in the Red Army increased sharply after the military conflict with Finland, where the fighting showed the high effectiveness of these weapons.

Table 1 - The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War

So, if during the whole of 1939 1678 82-mm battalion mortars were produced, then from January to April 1940 they were released 5322. At the beginning of the war, mortars of caliber 37 mm, 50 mm, 82 mm, 107 mm were in service and 120 mm.

The first work on the creation of self-propelled artillery began in the 1920s at the Commission for Special Artillery Experiments, the most complete research and experiments unfolded in the 1930s. Some samples were tested in a combat situation on the Karelian Isthmus, but for a number of reasons, none of the self-propelled artillery mounts was put into service.

Much attention was paid to the creation and development of jet weapons. By the beginning of 1941, an experimental batch of BM-13 combat units was manufactured, in February they switched to their factory production, and already on June 21, 1941, a decision was made to develop all-round multiple launch rocket systems and to immediately deploy their mass production.

Thus, thanks to the care on the part of the party and the government, the Red Army entered the Great Patriotic War, having, in the main, modern artillery materiel. A number of guns fully met the requirements of wartime, some of them were in service until the end of the war. But combat practice required the presence of new types of artillery, ammunition, instruments and means of propulsion.

By the end of the war, in ground artillery, the share of anti-tank guns was 14%, for firing from closed firing positions - 86%. In artillery for firing from closed firing positions, guns accounted for 36%, mortars - 61% (excluding 50-mm mortars), BM RA - 3%.

The main anti-tank gun of the Soviet Army in the first period of the war is a 45-mm cannon mod. 1937 (Figure 3)

The modernization of this gun in 1942 further increased its anti-tank capabilities. In 1943, a new system entered service - a 57-mm anti-tank gun of the 1942 model ZIS-2. During the Second World War, not a single army in the world had an anti-tank gun whose combat characteristics would exceed those of the ZIS-2.

To improve the armor of enemy tanks, Soviet designers responded with the creation of a 100-mm field gun of the 1944 model BS-3. The gun had high ballistic data, combined the qualities of an anti-tank and hull gun (firing range of 20 km). The gun was distinguished by the originality of the design of the nodes and their layout.

In 1943, to replace the regimental 76-mm cannon mod. In 1927, a new system arrived, which was distinguished by ease of production and higher maneuverability. By imposing a 76-mm barrel on a carriage of a 45-mm gun mod. In 1942, a regimental 76-mm cannon mod. 1943 (ob-25).

Starting in 1942, the divisional artillery was put into service, instead of the 76-mm cannon mod. 1939 (USV), a new 76-mm gun mod. 1942 ZIS-3. It became not only the best, but also the most massive gun of the Second World War - the artillery of the Red Army received over 48 thousand of these guns. The rate of fire of the ZIS-3 was 25 rounds per minute, and the firing range was 13 km. If necessary, the gun could be controlled by one person. Many gunners from the ZIS-3 crews became Heroes of the Soviet Union for single-handed fights with several enemy tanks.

With the restoration in 1943 of the corps control link, it became necessary to have a corps howitzer. Along with the modernization of the samples created in the pre-war period, a hull 152-mm howitzer of the 1943 model D-1 was developed. This gun was also created by imposing the barrel of a 152-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-10) on the carriage of a 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-30) with the introduction of a number of design changes. The main performance characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War, are shown in Table 2.

On the basis of pre-war developments and experience in the use of rockets in pre-war conflicts, the development of rocket artillery continued. Dozens of types of unguided missiles and launchers were used in the Great Patriotic War. The best known are BM-8, BM 13 (Figure 4). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for M-31 shells on the Studebaker chassis - BM-31-12 was put into service.

The main direction of improving rockets during the war was to improve accuracy, as well as to increase the weight of the warhead and the range of the projectile. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 3.

Table 2 - The main performance characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War

During the war, the number of mortars increased by almost six times. This is due to the high combat qualities and the ability to ensure their mass production at a lower cost. The 82-mm battalion and 107-mm mountain pack mortars (1943) underwent modernization. 37-mm and 50-mm mortars did not receive further development and were withdrawn from service. 120-mm regimental mortar mod. 1938 in 1943 (Figure 5) was also upgraded. The result was a system that to this day, with minor improvements in combat formation. In 1944, a 160-mm mortar was adopted. The design feature of the mortar was that it had an inseparable wheeled carriage and was loaded from the breech.

Table 3 - The main performance characteristics of rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

Self-propelled artillery received its development, in essence, only during the war years. At the end of 1942, the SU-76 light self-propelled gun was put into service, based on the T-70 tank, equipped with a 76-mm ZIS-3 gun. The gun was located in an armored wheelhouse open at the top and rear. It was first used in combat in January 1943 and was successfully used until the end of the war.

At the end of 1942, the production of self-propelled guns SU-122 began on the basis of the T-34, from August 1943 the medium SU-85 entered the fight against enemy tanks, which at the end of 1944 was replaced by the new SU-100.

Heavy installations such as ISU-122 and ISU-152, which were nicknamed "St. John's Wort", were created in 1944 on the basis of the heavy tank IS-2. There are cases when ISU-152 shells tore down towers from heavy enemy tanks. These self-propelled guns were used to escort all types of tanks and infantry in battle, successfully fought against heavy tanks and self-propelled guns of the enemy, and were also used to destroy other defensive structures, showing excellent combat qualities during the assault on the forts of Koenigsberg and during street fighting in Berlin.

Since 1943, self-propelled artillery was withdrawn from the subordination of the Commander of Artillery of the Red Army and subordinated to the Commander of Armored and Mechanized Troops, in combat use it was equated with tanks and is not considered further in this work.