Formation in Europe of a new system of international relations. European System of International Relations: Basic Components and Sources of Dynamics

From September 1, 1814 to June 9, 1815, a congress was held in Vienna
press with the participation of 216 delegates from all European countries. Here
gathered the flower of European aristocracy and diplomacy. On the
against the background of magnificent receptions, balls and festivities, there was a tense
work on documents designed to change the political
which map of the continent in accordance with the results of the war and you
work the new principles of international relations. key
important role during the Congress of Vienna was played by representatives
Russia, led by Alexander I, the British delegation under
the leadership of Keslrie, and then Wellington, an Austrian can-
Zler Metternich (formally, Austria was represented by the emperor himself)
Franz I), Prussian diplomats led by Hardenberg,
as well as representing France Talleyrand.

At the initiative of Talleyrand, the work of the congress was based on
the principle of legitimism is false - the recognition of exceptional
the rights of those ruling houses and dynasties that exist
wali in Europe before the start of the revolutionary wars. In interpret-
Metternich’s conception, the principle of legitimism became more pronounced
to a pronounced ideological and legal character - speech
was about the preservation of the "eternal", "sanctified by history" legitimate
of the law of monarchs and estates, as the most important basis of the general
natural order and tranquility. But in reality, re-
decisions of the Congress of Vienna were subordinated to the desire to clearly
delimit the spheres of influence of the great powers in the formation
a stable and, if possible, balanced political
maps of the continent.

Based on the principle of legitimism, the congress participants
stood up for the preservation of the fragmentation of Germany. Wherein,
at the suggestion of Metternich, it was decided to create a Germans-
cue union of 38 small German states, as well as
Austria and Prussia. The Sejm was supposed to manage this union,
the seat of which was chosen Frankfurt am May-
not. The most acute disagreements between the participants of the Congress
sa caused the Polish-Saxon question. Prussia calculated
la annex Saxony and most Polish lands
to your territory. Alexander I was ready to support the re-
dacha of Saxony to the Prussians, but saw the Polish lands as part of
ve Russian Empire as the Duchy of Warsaw. Austria,
as well as France and England tried to counteract the
leniya of Russia and Prussia. Talleyrand obtained Metter-
niha and Kesselrey conclude an alliance of England, Austria and France
against Prussia and Russia. January 3, 1815, was signed by Thai
a new agreement under which the three powers were obliged not to
let any redistributions of existing gra-
prostrate, including preventing Saxony from joining
Prussia, on whatever terms. Has been achieved
the same agreement on joint military action in case
violent attempts to change borders.

In the midst of the discussions of the Congress of Vienna in France,
walked coup d'état. Landed on the coast with
a small group of dedicated soldiers and officers, Napoleon
March 19, 1815 triumphantly entered Paris. Trying to contribute
split into a coalition, he handed over to Alexander I the text of a secret
th agreement of three powers. However, the threat of recovery
Leonov's empire was stronger. Without interrupting work
Congress, the Allies formed a new - already the seventh
account - the anti-French coalition. It included An-
glia, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Austria, Spain, Portugal-
Leah, Holland.

percussion military force coalitions represented 110,000
the Anglo-Dutch army of Wellington, advancing from
Brussels. Its left flank was supported by 117,000 Prussians.
Blucher's army, and the right - 210,000 Austrian
army of Schwarzenberg. As a strategic reserve for
The Riviera was preparing a 75,000-strong Austro-Italian army
Frimont, and in the central Rhine region - 150 thousand
Nay Russian army of Barclay de Tolly. Napoleon managed to
the army is only about 280 thousand soldiers. His only chance
was the defeat of the English and Prussian troops even before the end
niya redeployment of Russians and Austrians. June 16 in the battle
at Ligny, Napoleon managed to defeat Blue
dick, but the lack of forces prevented the pursuit of the Prussians and
them complete destruction. With the army of Wellington, the French met
huddled near Waterloo on 18 June. Napoleon had in this battle
72 thousand people against 70 thousand from the enemy. Franz-
PS fought desperately, but the unexpected appearance on the battlefield
the Prussian corps allowed Wellington to win the battle
nie. Soon Napoleon was forced to abdicate again.
table. July 6-8, the Allies entered Paris and restored
power of the Bourbons.

June 9, 1815, a few days before the Battle of Waterloo,
representatives of Russia, Austria, Spain, France, Great Britain
Britain, Portugal, Prussia and Sweden signed the
final General Act of the Congress of Vienna. Franc-
The nation lost all its conquests. Belgium and Holland
were merged into the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Togo included Luxembourg. The Vienna Treaty legalized the creation
of the German Union. The Rhine was annexed to Prussia
sky area, Westphalia and Swedish Pomerania. Switzerland
“eternal neutrality” was guaranteed, and the boundaries of its race
extended by the provinces on the right bank of the Rhine. Norway
gia, which was dependent on Denmark, transferring
lass of Sweden. The Kingdom of Sardinia was restored,
which again included Savoy and Nice, 81 T8.KZh6 Ge-
Well, I. Lombardy and Venice became part of Austria, and the dukes
tva Parma, Tuscany and Modena came under power
various representatives of the House of Habsburg. secular power
the pope was restored, and the boundaries of the papal state
The states were expanded to include Ravenna, Ferrara and Bologna.
England received the Ionian Islands and Malta, as well as
consolidated the captured Dutch colonies in Asia.
Polish lands with Warsaw were annexed to Russia. On the
this territory the Kingdom (kingdom) of Poland was created,
bound by dynastic union with Russia. In addition, for Ros-
earlier acquisitions were recognized as this - Finland
and Bessarabia.

The General Act of the Congress of Vienna contained special
ty, which concerned the relationship between the European
mi countries. Established rules for the collection of duties and su-
revenues from the border and international rivers of the Meuse,
Rhine and Scheldt. The principles of free court were determined
walking. The appendix to the General Act spoke of the
banning the slave trade. In Vienna also was also achieved
agreement on the unification of the diplomatic service. Us-
There were three classes of diplomatic agents. To the first
mu included ambassadors and papal legates (nuncios), the second -
envoys, to the third - chargé d'affaires. Has been defined
and a unified procedure for the reception of diplomats. All these innovations
(“Vienna Regulations”) included in the annex to the General
act of Congress, have become a norm of international law and
entered into diplomatic practice for a long time.

The decisions of the Congress of Vienna formalized the principles of a new
system of international relations based on the ideas of
political balance, collective diplomacy and legitimacy
mysma. The Vienna system did not lead to the elimination of contradictory
whose among the great powers, but contributed to the accession
in Europe relative calm and stability. From the creation
with the Holy Alliance at the end of 1815, she received a bright
ideological and even ethical substantiation. But,
in general, this political construction was very contrary to
those turbulent and social processes that developed in
European society. The rise of national liberation
and revolutionary movements doomed the Vienna system to everything
new crises and conflicts.

Vienna international system
relations (1815-1870)

Having defeated Napoleonic France, the leaders of the leading European states came to the conclusion that the best option for solving the problems facing post-war Europe would be to convene a pan-European congress, where all problems could be discussed and a consensus version of a post-war settlement could be worked out. In the spring of 1814, Russia was the first to propose the idea of ​​a congress, but the allies tried to delay its beginning until autumn.

The conference opened on the first of October 1814 and continued until July 1815.

In the course of difficult discussions, it was possible to agree on the general principles on which the new model of international relations was built.

Firstly, it was necessary to create a barrier around France, which would allow in case of any complications to isolate it.

Thirdly, it was decided that members of the anti-French coalition should be compensated for their participation in the fight against Napoleon.

Fourthly, the principle of legitimism was put in the basis of interstate relations.

On the basis of these general principles, concrete questions of post-war settlement were decided.

On July 9, the “Final Act” of the Congress of Vienna was signed, consisting of 121 articles and 17 annexes, the essence of which was as follows.

France was stripped of all conquered territories, and its borders returned to those that existed in 1790. In France, the Bourbon dynasty was restored and the allied troops remained for a while.

Austria regained Lombardy and got Venice. The Rhineland, Pomerania and Northern Saxony joined Prussia. England expanded its colonial empire to include Tobago, Trinidad, Ceylon, Malta, Guiana and the Cape Colony.

The Polish question was resolved in favor of Russia. On the site of the Duchy of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Poland was formed, to which Alexander I granted a constitution. Russia also recognized earlier acquisitions - Bessarabia and Finland.

Belgium was included in the Netherlands. Schleswig and Holstein retreated to Denmark. The Papal States, the Kingdom of Naples and Switzerland were restored, which was declared a neutral country.

The possessions of the Sardinian kingdom expanded somewhat. The union of Sweden and Norway was sanctioned.

There were no particular contradictions on the German question: all the great powers wanted to consolidate the fragmentation of Germany. The so-called. German Union of 38 independent states. All-German affairs were decided by the German Diet, which included both Prussia and Austria, but the leading role in this formation still belonged to Austria. As conceived by Metternich, the union was to become an obstacle to the expansionist aspirations of France. The Sejm was located in Frankfurt am Main and was chaired by an Austrian. The votes were distributed in such a way that Austria decided everything. Thus, the purpose of the union was not the consolidation of the German people, but, on the contrary, the preservation of its disunity.

In addition to territorial problems, a number of economic and diplomatic issues were considered at the Congress of Vienna. Thus, a decision was made to ban the slave trade (“Declaration on the Prohibition of the Negro Trade” dated February 8, 1815), a convention was signed on the freedom of navigation on European rivers, and an agreement was reached on respect for the property rights of foreign citizens. On March 19, 1815, the "Regulations on the ranks of diplomatic representatives" were signed. It is still in effect and put an end to disputes over diplomatic denominations. Diplomatic ranks were established according to it:

ambassador, papal legate and nuncio;

envoy (since 1818, the rank of resident minister was also introduced); 30 chargé d'affaires.

Also at the congress, Russia tried to raise the issue of relations with Ottoman Empire. Mahmud II was not admitted to either the congress or the Holy Alliance. No one, except Russia, was interested in the position of the Christian peoples in Turkey. In February 1815, Alexander I issued a note on the plight of the Balkans. The Russian emperor proposes to discuss the Balkan question at the congress in Vienna, as well as the question of the brutal treatment of the Ottoman Empire with its Orthodox subjects, and proposed to introduce the right of European states to interfere in the affairs of Turkey. Russian diplomats assumed that this circular would strengthen Russia's position in the Balkans, but the other powers refused to discuss this issue.

As the great powers decided the post-war fate of Europe, events took an unexpected turn. Napoleon fled from the island of Elba, ended up in Paris and restored the French Empire. The 100 days of Napoleon began (March 20 - June 18, 1815). Louis XVIII fled Paris. On June 18, 1815, the Battle of Waterloo took place, where the Anglo-Austro-Prussian army defeated Napoleon, after which the 2nd restoration of the Bourbons took place in France.

A special place at the congress was occupied by the problem associated with the proposal to create the Holy Alliance - an organization of monarchical states to protect Europe from revolutionary ideas.

On September 26, 1815, the agreement on the formation of the Holy Alliance was signed in Paris by Alexander, Franz I and Friedrich Wilhelm III.

Initially, the Holy Alliance was a treaty of mutual assistance between Russia, Prussia and Austria. Other countries were also invited to join the Union. Ultimately, only Turkey and Great Britain did not join the Holy Alliance, as the Prince Regent was bound by constitutional obligations. Nevertheless, England assured Alexander I of its agreement with the principles of the Holy Alliance.

The model of international relations created in Vienna had both strong and weak sides. The Vienna system proved to be quite stable and sustainable. Thanks to it, Europe managed to save Europe from head-on clashes of the great powers for several decades, although military conflicts arose from time to time, but the mechanism developed by the Congress made it possible to resolve disputed issues fairly quickly and without great losses.

On the other hand, the Vienna system poorly took into account the influence of the ideas of the French Revolution on European civilization. The principle of legitimism increasingly came into conflict with the liberal idea, with the growth of national self-consciousness.

The creation of the Holy Alliance did not resolve the contradictions that existed between the leading European states.

First, the Austro-Russians. Metternich feared both the revolutionary movement and Russia, the latter posing an even greater danger to Austria. The Austrians were also worried about the Franco-Russian alliance. When Charles X became king of France, and Russian emperor Nicholas I, this union has become even closer. Russia was also afraid of the revolutionary movement (the Decembrist uprising and the Polish uprisings) and the strengthening of other participants in the Holy Alliance (including Austria).

Secondly, the position of Prussia was not stable. There, too, they feared the possibility of revolutions and a Franco-Russian alliance, so Prussia began rapprochement with Austria and moving away from Russia.

All members of the union were afraid of Russia, because they believed that it could extend its hegemony to the entire European continent. Thus, contradictions appeared from the first years of the existence of the Holy Alliance and distracted it from its original goals. Subsequent events seriously tested the strength of the Vienna system of international relations.

In 1818, the first congress of the Holy Alliance took place in Aachen. There, France achieved the withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of the country and joined the four victorious powers. Sharp disputes flared up around the issue of joint actions to help Spain in its struggle against the rebellious colonies. France and Austria were ready to help the Spanish king, but a lot depended on the position of England.

Great Britain, although not a signatory to the protocol, has always been on the side of the union, but in recent times it has preferred to follow self-interest. There, the democratic movement for complete reform in Britain was intensifying. The national bourgeoisie demanded universal suffrage. The ruling circles in the person of Lord Castlereagh, Prince Regent George supported the position of the national bourgeoisie. England was not interested in preserving the Spanish colonial empire, because. itself sought to penetrate into Latin America, and to strengthen Austria and France. As a result, England managed to block the decision to help Spain.

The 2nd Congress took place in 1820 in Troppau. At this time, revolutions broke out on the periphery of Europe (Spain, Naples, Piedmont). After a lengthy negotiation process, a protocol was adopted that, in principle, justified intervention in the countries where the revolution was taking place. Based on this document, Austria organized an intervention in the Apennine Peninsula.

At the 3rd congress in Laibach on May 12, 1821, the same questions were discussed. If in the Italian states it was possible to suppress revolutionary uprisings, then in Spain and Portugal the revolutions continued. The situation in these countries became the subject of discussion at the congress at Verona in November 1822. On December 1, the Protocol of Verona was signed, with the exception of England, on the provision of armed assistance to the Spanish monarch. In 1823, French troops invaded Spain and restored the monarchy there.

The special position of Great Britain was as follows: it is impossible to stop the revolutionary wave by repressive measures, it is necessary not to fight the national liberation movement, but, on the contrary, to support it. In accordance with this thesis, England recognized the new Latin American countries and resolutely refused to support the intervention in Spain. A crack appeared in relations between the great powers. But paradoxically, it did not expand, as a new complex problem appeared. In 1821, the Greek uprising against the Ottoman yoke began. The Turks unleashed the most severe repressions on the rebels. The great powers could not ignore the Greek question, although it was quite controversial. On the one hand, the Greeks rebelled against their legitimate monarch and thus violated the principle of legitimism. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire entered a period of crisis and could not control its periphery. The question arose about the division of her inheritance.

In 1823 England recognized the Greeks as a belligerent. Austria opposed, because. regarded the rebels as rebels. Russia's position was twofold. Russia had serious interests in the Balkans, and real state interests were in favor of the Greeks, but ideological dogma was against it.

In the spring of 1826, the new Russian emperor proposed his own interpretation of the Eastern question: the situation in the Balkans, with the exception of Greece, was declared the business of Russia, the Greek question was the business of all powers, on this basis, there was a convergence of the positions of England, France and Russia on the Greek question. In October 1827, a joint squadron at Navarino defeated the Turkish fleet.

In May 1828, the Russian-Turkish war began, which ended with the victory of Russia. In September 1829, the Treaty of Andrianopol was signed. According to it, Serbia, Wallachia and Moldova received autonomy, and Greece became an independent state and was recognized by the European community.

The leading states of Europe understood that the main threat to the stability of the Vienna system came from the Eastern question. However, in 1830 a revolution broke out in France. In the same year, revolutions took place in Belgium and Poland. Despite this, the stability of the Vienna system was preserved.

The international political development of Europe in the last two decades demonstrates a very stable dynamics, both of an intra-regional nature and of the system of international relations as a whole. Moreover, European development leads to an adjustment of the very structure of the modern world system.
The dynamics of European political and economic processes, due to a number of circumstances, which primarily include the maximum maturity of the European system and most of its regional and subregional components, is not momentary, but strategic.
The interconnected logic of various trends in European development has been clearly traced since the very beginning of the 1990s, where the Charter of Paris can be taken as a conditional starting point for new Europe.
The stage of European development that began two decades ago organically accumulated the changes that took place in several of the most important dimensions of the continental order. The evolution of these dimensions, which ultimately led to the overcoming of their original characteristics, is the essence of the dynamics of the European system.
Yalta-Potsdam, or historical and legal dimension. Exactly at geographical areas and functional areas of the greatest localization of the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam over the past twenty years, the most significant changes have taken place. Breakdown of "border" agreements as a result of the unification of Germany, the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia; the erosion of the already decorative phenomenon of European neutrality associated with the early post-war period; the beginning of convergence, and then the self-liquidation of one of the two socio-economic systems - all this led to the marginalization of the original Yalta-Potsdam dimension already by the beginning of the 1990s.
Let's make a reservation that the Yalta-Potsdam dimension brought at least three elements to the treasury of European politics, which are preserved to this day. Often it is they who are understood as those values ​​that Russia supposedly does not share, although miraculously she accepted Active participation in their formation.
The first is the inevitability of punishing the military aggressor, including through positive collusion of the most powerful participants in the system, and the rejection of large-scale military operations in Europe. That is why the bombings of Belgrade or the events of 2008 in Transcaucasia caused such a serious outcry.
Second, Yalta gave birth to Helsinki and the pan-European process, one of key elements which was voluntary consent former winners that have reached a dead end of bipolar confrontation, on the democratization of the system of multilateral relations in Europe. Democracy, insofar as it is possible, outside the nation-state has become a characteristic feature of the European system. Many European institutions are representative in form and often in essence.
Thirdly, the international legal doctrine and the historical and political logic of the Yalta-Potsdam establishments became guarantors of stability even for those borders that they did not directly affect. This concerns, first of all, the state-territorial delimitation in the post-Soviet space, the borders between the former proto-sovereign formations that were part of the Soviet state.
The next background dimension at the time of the adoption of the Charter of Paris existed as one of the successful paradigms, but had a much greater variability of alternatives competing with it. It's about about Western European (at that time) integration, which later became one of the central and even dominant directions of all-continental development. Compared to today, the then European Communities of twelve countries look like a geopolitical dwarf.
At the same time, it was the Communities that were the very phenomenon that emphasized the special identity of the European system in world economic relations. It is the existence of the EU that has made possible appearance the phenomenon of centro-force relations in the Western world and pluralistic multipolarity in the post-confrontational world.
Over the past two decades, political ambitions European Union have gone beyond the original geographical and conceptual limits, thanks to both their own efforts and a friendly international context.
The third dimension of the European situation is connected with US policy in Europe and Euro-Atlantic relations, the core element of which was, and to some extent still is, NATO. The maturity of the European system, coupled with the more or less regular manifestations of the opposition of European partner-competitors; liquidation of the European theater as the main arena of potential military confrontation; involvement in new geographical and functional spheres of world politics and economics - all this reduced the role of the United States on the continent. This trend has strengthened in subsequent years. Deviations from it in the form of ad hoc interference in European affairs (attempts to Americanize the elites of small post-socialist countries, Kosovo, “color revolutions”, missile defense) cannot be underestimated. However, they cannot be compared with the level of extremely close and attentive US guardianship over European politics, which was typical for several post-war European decades. Without equating the United States and NATO, it can be stated that, to a large extent, precisely because of the change in US policy, the loss of a clear NATO identity and the permanent search for the Alliance's place in modern world have become so obvious.
The institutional landscape of modern Europe, especially "big" Europe, which includes part of geographic Asia, is extremely mosaic, absorbs multidirectional trends, as well as causes many proposals for their systematization. One such proposal was the well-known Russian initiative on a new European security architecture.
In a series of European security institutions, the OSCE still occupies nominally the first place. This is partly a tribute to tradition, and partly the result of the activation of this direction, the manifestation of which was, first of all, the Corfu process and the summit in Astana. The OSCE faces two fundamental tasks. The first is internal consolidation. The second is an essential renewal of the content of traditional "baskets". Thus, if the humanitarian “basket” demonstrates enviable dynamics, then the problems falling into the first and second “baskets” run into the procedural and legal inefficiency of the OSCE and often the lack of political will of the leading players in the European system.
At the same time, such issues as conflict regulation, peace building, and the problems of the emergence of new state or quasi-state entities in the post-Soviet space are connected with these areas.
The third "basket" largely contains the potential associated with economic security, its energy segment. In other words, the OSCE from an organization with de facto curtailed functions, if desired, can turn into a full-fledged dialogue mechanism on its own. a wide range plots.
Regardless of subjective desires, it is the OSCE that remains the structure of the most complete European participation.
The Atlantic dimension of European politics, of which NATO is a symbol, has been showing increasing pragmatism and a tendency to self-criticism in relation to extensive enlargement, including to the “new Eastern Europe". This was also confirmed by the adoption of the Alliance's new strategic concept and the Russia-NATO summit in Lisbon.
In the meantime, the application for a de facto expansion of NATO's responsibility is facing an extremely difficult situation in Afghanistan and throughout the political arena at the junction of Central and South Asia. NATO's activity in other segments of the "big" Middle East is limited by the difference in approaches and the real interest of the member countries of the Alliance. The complexes and prejudices that have accumulated over decades hinder the Alliance's interaction both with Russia and with other significant regional actors, including institutional ones - the SCO, the CSTO.
Improving the overall political climate so far has little added value in the practical dimension of relations between Russia and the Alliance. Obvious, but constantly put aside "for later" topics here are the issues of the European missile defense segment, conventional weapons and the armed forces, an agreed understanding of military-strategic threats, the legal registration of the mutual interests of the Alliance and post-Soviet security structures.
The logic of the development of the European Union, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty position the EU in a completely different way in the new security architecture. Already, the activities of the EU almost completely fill the niche of "soft security". The activity of the EU provokes discussions about security in the Common Neighborhood/Eastern Partnership area and the nature of relations with Russia.
It is in relations with the European Union that Russia and its CIS neighbors may be able to find consensus on the energy aspects of security, on the movement of citizens, and issues related to the reliability and, at the same time, transparency of borders will be resolved. Russia's accession to the WTO actually brought our country closer to the scenario of the economic functioning of the European Union.
Most EU states do not feel the need to abandon a system of stability and security based solely on the growing potential of the European Union in the field of foreign policy and defense and on the traditional resources of NATO. However, it must be remembered that modern "big" Europe is wider than the western part of the continent. In case of dissatisfaction of countries, for one reason or another, not associated with the EU and NATO, with the parameters of the current situation, it is necessary to look for options for mutual adaptation of interests and institutions.
The European security system, which does not have a comprehensive character, becomes a palliative, which tends to provoke political tension when trying to solve real problems with its help both in its own geographical area and in neighboring regions - in the Greater Middle East or South Asia.
It is in this regard that the Europeans are faced with the task of a kind of gathering, creating an "intermodal" scheme of institutions of a large European space. This scheme should include various regional and sub-regional structures (from the "classic" European and Euro-Atlantic structures - the EU, the CoE, NATO to the "big" CIS, the EurAsEC/Customs Union, the CSTO) with the necessary support for niche structures such as the BSEC, the CBSS, long-term contact mechanisms.
Obviously, one can only dream of complete institutional harmony, but some revision and coordination of actions, at least, can lead to a reduction in the cross-waste of time, diplomatic and material resources.
The understanding of European stability and security has traditionally included issues of military security, control over arms and armed forces. It seems to many that this is a problem of yesterday. But an unresolved problem has a chance to "shoot" at the most inopportune moment. This is precisely the situation with the CFE Treaty. Paradoxically, on a continent that is still the most militarized, and at the level of the highest technological standards, for more than a decade there have been no modern rules for regulating military activities.
Additional elements of the stability of the European system are various stable, both bilateral and multilateral configurations of interstate relations. These include traditional axes: Moscow-Paris, Moscow-Berlin, Moscow-Rome. Apparently, the dialogue channel Moscow-Warsaw was starting to work. The Franco-German tandem and the slightly less stable Franco-British tandem are traditional, which have generated a significant number of initiatives in the field European integration, foreign policy and security of the EU. Once having its own integration prospects, the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) has become a mechanism for coordinating the interests of the CEE countries, and the Weimar Triangle (Poland, Germany, France) helps to coordinate the positions of the Franco-German motor of Europe with largest country Of Eastern Europe.

The decisive role in European foreign policy belonged to five states; France, England, Russia, Austria and Prussia. The main sphere of struggle between these powers is the fragmented Italy and Germany, Poland and the countries of the Balkan Peninsula, which were under the rule of Turkey.

During the XVIII century. The main conflicts between the European powers were the struggle of England and France for maritime and colonial hegemony, Austria and Prussia - for predominance in Germany, Russia - for access to the Baltic and Black Seas, which confronted it primarily with Sweden and the Ottoman Empire.

North War. Even in the XVI-XVII centuries. Russia tried to take control of the Baltic coast. Its main opponent was Sweden, whose territory included Livonia, Finland and Estonia, as well as the former Russian possessions - the Izhora lands and Karelia. Preparing for war, Peter I in 1699 concluded an alliance with Denmark, Saxony and Poland, and in 1700 signed a truce with Turkey and declared war on Sweden. In 1700, the Northern War began, which lasted until 1721.

Peter I moved the 35,000th army to the Swedish fortress of Narva, but its siege dragged on. The Swedish army was led by King Charles XII (1697-1718), a young and skillful commander. In November 1700, the Russian army was defeated near Narva. Charles XII, believing that Russia was finished, moved to Poland to defeat Russia's ally, the Saxon elector and, simultaneously from 1697, the Polish king Augustus II (1670-1733).

However, Peter I did not accept defeat and began to reorganize the army. Since 1702, the military initiative passed into the hands of Peter I. By the spring of 1703, the Russian army had liberated the entire basin of the river. Neva and went to the shores of the Baltic Sea.

At this time, the Swedes captured Warsaw and Krakow. In 1704, the Polish Sejm deposed August II and proclaimed Stanisław I Leszczynski (1677-1766) king. In 1704-1706. the Swedes inflicted a number of defeats on the Saxon, Polish and Russian troops and forced Poland out of the war (Treaty of Altranstadt 1706).

Russia was left alone with Sweden, the search for allies did not lead to anything. The Swedes made an attempt to recapture the Izhora lands, but failed. The main forces of Charles XII concentrated in Ukraine, he intended to move them to Moscow. In April 1709, the Swedes laid siege to Poltava. June 27 (July 8) happened Poltava battle. The Swedish army was defeated.

Charles XII fled to Turkey with the remnants of his army. There was a turning point in the war. The Northern Alliance was renewed, to which Prussia joined. On March 31, 1710, Russia and Sweden signed in The Hague an obligation not to conduct hostilities in Swedish possessions in Germany, England and Holland insisted on this. In the same year, Livonia and Estonia were occupied, Russian troops captured Vyborg, Kexholm and Vilmanstrand - the exit from the Gulf of Finland was free.

In 1712-1714. Russia's allies, with its support, won a number of victories in the European theater of operations. In 1713-1714. Russia occupied part of Finland. On July 27 (August 7), 1714, the Russian galley fleet defeated the Swedish one at Cape Gangut. On land, the Russian army reached Lulea.

In 1718 Charles XII died in Norway. In 1719, Russia transferred hostilities to the territory of Sweden, human and financial resources which were exhausted. In January 1720, Sweden concluded an alliance with England and peace with Prussia, and in June with Denmark. In May 1720, an English squadron entered the Baltic Sea, but its attempts to attack Revel were unsuccessful. In 1720, the Russian fleet won a victory near Grengam Island. On August 30 (September 10), a peace treaty with Sweden was signed in Nystadt.

As a result of the military victory, Russia gained access to the Baltic Sea and thus solved one of the most important tasks of its foreign policy. On October 11 (October 22), 1721, the Senate and the Holy Synod confer on Peter I the titles of "Father of the Fatherland, Emperor of All Russia" and "Great", and Russia becomes an empire.

Between the "Glorious English" of 1688 and the Great French revolutions about 35 years of war between France and England. War for Spanish inheritance(1701-1714), War of the Polish Succession (1733-1738), War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), Seven Years' War (1756-1763). Moreover, other states were drawn into the orbit of these wars.

• Succession Wars
• Seven Years' War
• Russian-Turkish war 1768-1774
• Foreign policy of Catherine II in the 80s.

The beginning of the formation of a new system of international relations in Europe began after the end of cold war(the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the reunification of Germany in 1990).

The main dilemmas of the formation of a new Europe:

1. The unification of Germany and the removal of the last formal restrictions on its sovereignty contributed to the revival in a number of countries of fears about the possible claims of Germany to a dominant role in Europe. The CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe declared the end of the era of confrontation and division of Europe

2. For centuries, Russia's relations with Europe in the conceptual and in practical terms characterized as mutual attraction, and mutual repulsion. The gradual integration of Russia into the new system of European and global relations based on partnership.

3. The gap in the levels of socio-economic development between the states of Western and Eastern Europe. Decades of communist domination and a planned economy slowed down the development of CEE, threw it to the sidelines of the world and European economy.

4. After the end of the Cold War, Europe did not avoid the emergence of local and regional conflicts, including armed ones. Mass application forces in former Yugoslavia. Majority contemporary conflicts in Europe has acquired the form of military confrontation in those countries that, by virtue of different reasons did not pass the stage of formation nation states(or nation-states), passed by most European peoples in the XIX century.

5. NATO's military intervention in the conflict in Kosovo (FRY) in March-June 1999 confronted Europe with a number of new problems. The first of these is NATO's claim to the right to intervene without the sanction of the UN Security Council or the OSCE outside the zone of its own responsibility in the event (as happened in the FRY) of gross violations of human rights and national minorities.

6. New security challenges made it possible in the 1990s to talk about non-traditional dimensions of security policy, no longer reducible to the policy of defense, arms limitation and arms control. Security challenges: mass migration of the population; illegal traffic drugs and arms trafficking; internationalized terrorism and organized crime.

35. The end of the "cold war" and the direction of the revision of the system of international relations by the leading Western countries.

November 19-21, 1990 in Paris - a meeting of the heads of state and government of 34 CSCE member states. The Charter of Paris was signed - it stated for the new Europe the end of the era of confrontation and the split of Europe, and the states of the Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Pact) and NATO declared in a joint declaration that they were no longer adversaries.

Building a unified democratic Europe, according to the Charter, was based on:

Ø institutionalization of political dialogue and interaction within the framework of the CSCE;

Ø multilateral reform countries of the East (CMEA, ATS) and West (NATO, EU, WEU);

Ø establishing cooperation between NATO, the EU, the WEU, the Council of Europe, on the one hand, and the states of Eastern Europe- with another;

emergence Yugoslav crisis, the beginning in 1991 of a military confrontation between Serbia and Croatia and Slovenia, which announced their withdrawal from the federation, and since 1992, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ; collapse of the USSR in late 1991 - all this led to reducing the manageability of domestic and international processes in the post-communist space in the absence of effective regional and subregional mechanisms.

Under the new conditions, the institutions of Western European (EU, WEU, Council of Europe) and Euro-Atlantic cooperation (NATO) retained their role today not on the basis of the "rapprochement" of East and West, but as a result of the gradual expansion of Western organizations. The most significant in this regard is the expansion to the East of the EU and NATO. At the same time, the diversity of European processes is not limited to the expansion of these organizations, but leads to the formation of a "concert" of European institutions.