Battle of Kursk in WoT. Military equipment in the Battle of Kursk. Wehrmacht tanks

Tank counterattack. A still from the movie Liberation: Arc of Fire. 1968

Silence over the Prokhorovsky field. Only from time to time a bell bell is heard, calling parishioners to worship in the church of Peter and Paul, which was built with public donations in memory of the soldiers who died on the Kursk Bulge.
Gertsovka, Cherkasskoye, Lukhanino, Luchki, Yakovlevo, Belenikhino, Mikhailovka, Melehovo… These names now hardly say anything to the younger generation. And 70 years ago, a terrible battle was in full swing here, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest oncoming tank battle unfolded. Everything that could burn was on fire, everything was covered with dust, fumes and smoke from burning tanks, villages, forests and grain fields. The earth was scorched to such an extent that not a single blade of grass remained on it. Here the Soviet guardsmen and the elite of the Wehrmacht, the SS Panzer Divisions, met head-on.
Before the Prokhorovka tank battle, there were fierce clashes between the tank forces of both sides in the zone of the 13th Army of the Central Front, in which up to 1000 tanks took part in the most critical moments.
But tank battles in the Voronezh Front took on the largest scale. Here, in the first days of the battle, the forces of the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps of the Germans clashed with three corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd and 5th Guards separate tank corps.
"WE'LL HAVE LUNCH IN KURSK!"
The fighting on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge actually began on July 4, when the German units made an attempt to shoot down the outposts in the zone of the 6th Guards Army.
But the main events unfolded early in the morning on July 5, when the Germans delivered the first massive blow with their tank formations in the direction of Oboyan.
On the morning of July 5, the commander of the Adolf Hitler division, Obergruppenführer Josef Dietrich, drove up to his Tigers, and some officer shouted to him: “We will have lunch in Kursk!”
But the SS did not have to have lunch or dinner in Kursk. Only by the end of the day on July 5 did they manage to break through the defensive zone of the 6th Army. The exhausted soldiers of the German assault battalions took refuge in the captured trenches to refresh themselves with dry rations and get some sleep.
On the right flank of Army Group South, the Kempf task force crossed the river. Seversky Donets and struck at the 7th Guards Army.
Gunner "Tiger" of the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks of the 3rd tank corps Gerhard Niemann: "Another anti-tank gun is 40 meters ahead of us. The gun crew flees in panic, except for one person. He takes aim and fires. A terrible blow to the fighting compartment. The driver maneuvers, maneuver - and another gun is crushed by our tracks. And again a terrible blow, this time to the stern of the tank. Our engine sneezes, but nevertheless continues to work.
On July 6 and 7, the 1st Panzer Army took the main blow. In a few hours of battle, as they say, only numbers remained from its 538th and 1008th anti-tank regiments. On July 7, the Germans launched a concentric attack in the direction of Oboyan. Only in the section between Syrtsev and Yakovlev on a five-six-kilometer front, the commander of the 4th German tank army, Goth, deployed up to 400 tanks, supporting their offensive with a massive strike of aviation and artillery.
The commander of the troops of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Mikhail Katukov: “We got out of the gap and climbed a small hillock, where a command post was equipped. Was half fourth day. But it seemed to come solar eclipse. The sun was hidden behind clouds of dust. And ahead, in the twilight, bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared and caterpillars clanged. As soon as enemy tanks approached our positions, they were met by dense artillery and tank fire. Leaving wrecked and burning vehicles on the battlefield, the enemy rolled back and again went on the attack.
By the end of July 8, the Soviet troops, after heavy defensive battles, withdrew to the second army line of defense.
300 KM MARCH
The decision to strengthen the Voronezh Front was made on July 6, despite stormy protests from the commander of the Steppe Front, I.S. Konev. Stalin ordered the advancement of the 5th Guards Tank Army to the rear of the troops of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, as well as the strengthening of the Voronezh Front by the 2nd Tank Corps.
The 5th Guards Tank Army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns, including T-34-501 medium tanks and T-70-261 light tanks. On the night of July 6-7, the army moved to the front line. The march was carried out around the clock under the cover of aviation of the 2nd Air Army.
Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Pavel Rotmistrov: “Already at 8 o’clock in the morning it became hot, and clouds of dust rose into the sky. By noon the dust had thickly covered the roadside bushes, the wheat fields, the tanks and trucks, and the dark red disk of the sun was barely visible through the gray dust curtain. Tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors (pulled guns), infantry armored vehicles and trucks moved forward in an endless stream. The faces of the soldiers were covered with dust and soot from the exhaust pipes. The heat was unbearable. The soldiers were tormented by thirst, and their tunics, soaked with sweat, stuck to their bodies. It was especially hard on the march for the driver-mechanics. The crews of the tanks tried to make their task as easy as possible. Every now and then someone replaced the drivers, and on short halts they were allowed to sleep.
Aviation of the 2nd Air Army covered the 5th Guards Tank Army on the march so reliably that German intelligence failed to detect its arrival. Having traveled 200 km, the army arrived in the area southwest of Stary Oskol on the morning of 8 July. Then, having put the material part in order, the army corps again made a 100-kilometer throw and by the end of July 9, strictly at the appointed time, concentrated in the area of ​​​​Bobryshev, Vesely, Aleksandrovsky.
MANSTEIN CHANGES THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT
On the morning of July 8, an even more fierce struggle flared up in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The main feature of the struggle that day was that the Soviet troops, repelling the massive attacks of the enemy, themselves began to deliver strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 4th German Panzer Army.
As in previous days, the most fierce fighting flared up in the area of ​​the Simferopol-Moscow highway, where units of the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, reinforced separate companies and battalions of "Tigers" and "Ferdinands". Units of the 1st Panzer Army again took the brunt of the enemy's strikes. In this direction, the enemy simultaneously deployed up to 400 tanks, and fierce battles continued here all day.
Intense fighting also continued in the Korochansky direction, where by the end of the day the Kempf army group broke through in a narrow wedge in the Melekhov area.
The commander of the 19th German Panzer Division, Lieutenant-General Gustav Schmidt: “Despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, and the fact that entire sections of trenches and trenches were burned by flamethrower tanks, we were unable to dislodge the group that had settled there from the northern part of the defensive line enemy force up to a battalion. The Russians sat down in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and put up fanatical resistance.
On the morning of July 9, a German strike force of several hundred tanks, with massive air support, resumed the offensive on a 10-kilometer stretch. By the end of the day, she broke through to the third line of defense. And in the Korochan direction, the enemy broke into the second line of defense.
Nevertheless, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies in the Oboyan direction forced the command of Army Group South to change the direction of the main attack, moving it from the Simferopol-Moscow highway east to the Prokhorovka area. This movement of the main attack, in addition to the fact that several days of fierce fighting on the highway did not give the Germans the desired results, was also determined by the nature of the terrain. From the Prokhorovka area, a wide strip of heights stretches in a northwestern direction, which dominate the surrounding area and are convenient for the operations of large tank masses.
The general plan of the command of the Army Group "South" was the complex application of three strong blows, which were supposed to lead to the encirclement and destruction of two groups of Soviet troops and to the opening of offensive routes to Kursk.
To develop success, it was supposed to bring fresh forces into the battle - the 24th Panzer Corps as part of the SS Viking Division and the 17th Panzer Division, which on July 10 were urgently transferred from the Donbass to Kharkov. The start of the attack on Kursk from the north and from the south was scheduled by the German command for the morning of July 11.
In turn, the command of the Voronezh Front, having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, decided to prepare and conduct a counteroffensive in order to encircle and defeat enemy groups advancing in the Oboyan and Prokhorov directions. Formations of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army were concentrated against the main grouping of SS Panzer divisions in the Prokhorovka direction. The start of the general counter-offensive was scheduled for the morning of 12 July.
On July 11, all three German groups of E. Manstein went on the offensive, and later than all, clearly expecting the attention of the Soviet command to be diverted to other directions, the main group launched an offensive in the Prokhorovka direction - the tank divisions of the 2nd SS corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser, who was awarded the highest Award of the Third Reich "Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross".
By the end of the day large group tanks of the SS division "Reich" managed to break into the village of Storozhevoe, endangering the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To eliminate this threat, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was thrown. Fierce oncoming tank battles continued throughout the night. As a result, the main strike force of the 4th German Tank Army, having launched an offensive on a front of only about 8 km, reached the approaches to Prokhorovka in a narrow strip and was forced to suspend the offensive, occupying the line from which the 5th Guards Tank Army planned to launch its counteroffensive.
Even less success was achieved by the second strike group - the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland", 3 and 11 Panzer Divisions. Our troops successfully repelled their attacks.
However, north-east of Belgorod, where the Kempf army group was advancing, a threatening situation arose. The 6th and 7th tank divisions of the enemy broke through to the north in a narrow wedge. Their forward units were only 18 km from the main grouping of SS Panzer divisions, which were advancing southwest of Prokhorovka.
To eliminate the breakthrough of German tanks against the Kempf army group, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army was thrown: two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and one brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
In addition, the Soviet command decided to launch the planned counteroffensive two hours earlier, although the preparations for the counteroffensive were not yet completed. However, the situation forced us to act immediately and decisively. Any delay was beneficial only to the enemy.
PROKHOROVKA
At 08:30 on July 12, Soviet strike groups launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the German 4th Panzer Army. However, due to the German breakthrough to Prokhorovka, the diversion of significant forces of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies to eliminate the threat to their rear and the postponement of the start of the counteroffensive, the Soviet troops went on the attack without artillery and air support. As the English historian Robin Cross writes: “The artillery preparation schedules were torn to shreds and rewritten again.”
Manstein threw all available forces to repulse the attacks of the Soviet troops, because he clearly understood that the success of the offensive of the Soviet troops could lead to the complete defeat of the entire strike force of the German Army Group South. A fierce struggle flared up on a huge front with a total length of more than 200 km.
The most fierce fighting during July 12 flared up on the so-called Prokhorov bridgehead. From the north it was limited by the river. Psel, and from the south - a railway embankment near the village of Belenikhino. This strip of terrain, up to 7 km along the front and up to 8 km in depth, was captured by the enemy as a result of a tense struggle during July 11. The main enemy grouping as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 320 tanks and assault guns, including several dozen vehicles of the Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand types, deployed and operated on the bridgehead. It was against this grouping that the Soviet command dealt its main blow with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army.
The battlefield was clearly visible from Rotmistrov's observation post.
Pavel Rotmistrov: “A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops with a head-on attack, literally piercing the enemy’s battle formation with a swift through attack. The Nazis obviously did not expect to meet such a large mass of our combat vehicles and their decisive attack. Management in the advanced units and subunits of the enemy was clearly violated. His "Tigers" and "Panthers", deprived of their fire advantage in close combat, which they used at the beginning of the offensive in a collision with our other tank formations, were now successfully hit by Soviet T-34 and even T-70 tanks from short distances. The battlefield was swirling with smoke and dust, the earth trembled from powerful explosions. The tanks jumped on each other and, having grappled, could no longer disperse, fought to the death until one of them burst into flames with a torch or stopped with broken tracks. But the wrecked tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.
West of Prokhorovka along the left bank of the Psel River, units of the 18th Panzer Corps went on the offensive. His tank brigades upset the battle formations of the advancing tank units enemy, stopped them and themselves began to move forward.
Evgeny Shkurdalov, deputy commander of the tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps: “I only saw what was, so to speak, within the limits of my tank battalion. Ahead of us was the 170th tank brigade. With great speed, she wedged into the location of German tanks, heavy ones, which were in the first wave, and the German tanks pierced our tanks. The tanks went very close to each other, and therefore they fired literally at point-blank range, they simply shot each other. This brigade burned down in just five minutes - sixty-five cars.
Wilhelm Res, radio operator of the commander's tank of the Adolf Hitler Panzer Division: “Russian tanks were rushing at full throttle. In our area, they were prevented by an anti-tank ditch. At full speed, they flew into this ditch, due to their speed they overcame three or four meters in it, but then, as it were, froze in a slightly inclined position with a cannon pulled up. Literally for a moment! Taking advantage of this, many of our tank commanders fired directly at point-blank range.
Yevgeny Shkurdalov: “I knocked out the first tank when I was moving along the landing on the railroad, and literally at a distance of a hundred meters I saw the Tiger tank, which was standing sideways to me and firing at our tanks. Apparently, he knocked out quite a few of our cars, as the cars came sideways towards him, and he fired at the sides of our cars. I took aim with a sub-caliber projectile, fired. The tank caught fire. I fired another shot, the tank caught fire even more. The crew jumped out, but somehow I was not up to it. I bypassed this tank, then knocked out a T-III tank and a Panther. When I knocked out the Panther, there was some, you know, a feeling of delight that you see, I did such a heroic deed.
The 29th Tank Corps, with the support of units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division, launched a counteroffensive along the railway and highway southwest of Prokhorovka. As noted in the corps combat log, the attack began without artillery treatment of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover. This made it possible for the enemy to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb its tank and infantry units with impunity, which led to heavy losses and a decrease in the rate of attack, and this, in turn, made it possible for the enemy to conduct effective artillery and tank fire from a place.
Wilhelm Res: “Suddenly, one T-34 broke through and moved straight towards us. Our first radio operator began to give shells to me one by one, so that I would put them in the cannon. At this time, our commander upstairs kept shouting: “Shot! Shot!" - because the tank was moving closer. And only after the fourth - "Shot" I heard: "Thank God!"
Then, after some time, we determined that the T-34 had stopped just eight meters from us! At the top of the tower, he had, as if stamped, 5-centimeter holes, located at the same distance from each other, as if they were measured with a compass. Battle formations sides are mixed. Our tankers successfully hit the enemy at close range, but they themselves suffered heavy losses.
From the documents of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: “The T-34 tank of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Captain Skripkin, crashed into the Tigers and knocked out two enemy tanks before an 88-mm shell hit the tower of his T -34, and the other pierced the side armor. The Soviet tank caught fire, and the wounded Skripkin was pulled out of the wrecked car by his driver Sergeant Nikolaev and radio operator Zyryanov. They took cover in a funnel, but still one of the "Tigers" noticed them and moved towards them. Then Nikolaev and his loader Chernov again jumped into the burning car, started it and sent it straight at the Tiger. Both tanks exploded on impact.
The blow of Soviet armor, new tanks with a full set of ammunition thoroughly shook the exhausted Hauser divisions, and the German offensive stopped.
From the report of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the RSs we have took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour.
As a result of the counter-offensive of the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of Prokhorovka, the offensive of the SS Panzer divisions "Dead Head", "Adolf Hitler" to the northeast was thwarted, these divisions suffered such losses, after which they could no longer launch a serious offensive.
Parts of the SS Panzer Division "Reich" also suffered heavy losses from attacks by units of the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which launched a counteroffensive south of Prokhorovka.
In the breakthrough area of ​​the Kempf army group south and southeast of Prokhorovka, a fierce struggle also continued throughout the day on July 12, as a result of which the attack of the Kempf army group to the north was stopped by tankmen of the 5th Guards Tank and units of the 69th Army .
LOSSES AND RESULTS
On the night of July 13, Rotmistrov took Marshal Georgy Zhukov, a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, to the headquarters of the 29th Tank Corps. On the way, Zhukov stopped the car several times to personally inspect the sites of recent battles. In one place, he got out of the car and looked for a long time at the burned-out Panther, rammed by the T-70 tank. A few tens of meters away stood the Tiger and T-34 locked in a deadly embrace. “That's what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, taking off his cap.
Data on the losses of the parties, in particular tanks, differ radically in different sources. Manstein, in his book Lost Victories, writes that in total, during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost 1,800 tanks. The collection “Secrecy Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts” refers to 1,600 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns disabled during the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge.
A very remarkable attempt to calculate German losses in tanks was made by the English historian Robin Cross in his book The Citadel. Battle of Kursk. If we shift its diagram into a table, we will get the following picture: (the number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Panzer Army in the period July 4-17, 1943, see the table).
Kross' data differs from the data from Soviet sources, which can be quite understandable to a certain extent. So, it is known that on the evening of July 6, Vatutin reported to Stalin that during the fierce battles that lasted all day, 322 enemy tanks were destroyed (at Kross - 244).
But there are also quite incomprehensible discrepancies in the figures. For example, an aerial photograph taken on July 7 at 13.15, only in the area of ​​​​Syrtsev, Krasnaya Polyana along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, where the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland" from the 48th Panzer Corps was advancing, recorded 200 burning enemy tanks. According to Kross, on July 7, 48 TC lost only three tanks (?!).
Or another fact. As Soviet sources testify, as a result of bombing and assault attacks on the concentrated enemy troops (TD SS "Great Germany" and 11th TD), on the morning of July 9, many fires broke out throughout the area in the area of ​​the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. It was burning German tanks, self-propelled guns, cars, motorcycles, tanks, fuel and ammunition depots. According to Kross, there were no casualties in the German 4th Panzer Army on July 9, although, as he himself writes, on July 9 it fought hard, overcoming fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. But it was precisely by the evening of July 9 that Manstein decided to abandon the offensive against Oboyan and began to look for other ways to break through to Kursk from the south.
The same can be said about the Kross data for 10 and 11 July, according to which there were no casualties in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is also surprising, since it was during these days that the divisions of this corps delivered the main blow and, after fierce fighting, were able to break through to Prokhorovka. And it was on July 11 that the Hero of the Soviet Union Guards Sergeant M.F. Borisov, who destroyed seven German tanks.
After the archival documents were opened, it became possible to more accurately assess Soviet losses in the tank battle near Prokhorovka. According to the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps for July 12, out of 212 tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the battle, 150 vehicles (more than 70%) were lost by the end of the day, of which 117 (55%) were irretrievably lost. According to combat report No. 38 of the commander of the 18th tank corps dated 07/13/43, the losses of the corps amounted to 55 tanks, or 30% of their initial strength. Thus, you can get a more or less accurate figure of the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army in the battle of Prokhorovka against the SS divisions "Adolf Hitler" and "Totenkopf" - over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
As for German losses near Prokhorovka, there is an absolutely fantastic disparity in numbers.
According to Soviet sources, when the battles near Kursk died down and the broken military equipment began to be removed from the battlefields, more than 400 broken and burnt German tanks were counted in a small area of ​​the area southwest of Prokhorovka, where on July 12 an oncoming tank battle unfolded. Rotmistrov, in his memoirs, claimed that on July 12, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand people were killed.
But in the late 1990s, the German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser published sensational data he obtained after studying German archives. According to these data, the Germans lost four tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka. After additional research, he came to the conclusion that in fact the losses were even less - three tanks.
Documentary evidence refutes these absurd conclusions. So, in the combat log of the 29th Panzer Corps, it is said that the losses of the enemy amounted to 68 tanks, among other things (it is interesting to note that this coincides with Kross's data). In a combat report from the headquarters of the 33rd Guards Corps to the commander of the 5th Guards Army dated July 13, 1943, it is said that the 97th Guards Rifle Division destroyed 47 tanks over the past day. Further, it is reported that during the night of July 12, the enemy took out his wrecked tanks, the number of which exceeds 200 vehicles. Several dozens of destroyed enemy tanks were chalked up to the 18th Panzer Corps.
We can agree with Kross's statement that the losses of tanks are generally difficult to calculate, since the disabled vehicles were repaired and again went into battle. In addition, enemy losses are usually always exaggerated. Nevertheless, with a high degree of probability it can be assumed that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps lost at least over 100 tanks in the battle near Prokhorovka (excluding the losses of the SS Panzer Division "Reich" operating south of Prokhorovka). In total, according to Kross, the losses of the 4th German Panzer Army from July 4 to 14 amounted to about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 916, which were counted by the start of Operation Citadel. This almost coincides with the data of the German historian Engelmann, who, citing Manstein's report, claims that between July 5 and 13, the German 4th Panzer Army lost 612 armored vehicles. The losses of the 3rd German Panzer Corps by July 15 amounted to 240 tanks out of 310 available.
The total losses of the parties in the oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, taking into account the actions of the Soviet troops against the 4th German tank army and the Kempf army group, are estimated as follows. 500 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost on the Soviet side, and 300 on the German side. Kross claims that after the Battle of Prokhorov, Hauser's sappers blew up wrecked German equipment that could not be repaired and stood in no man's land. After August 1, so many faulty equipment accumulated in German repair shops in Kharkov and Bogodukhov that it had to be sent even to Kyiv for repairs.
Of course, the German Army Group South suffered the biggest losses in the first seven days of fighting, even before the battle of Prokhorovka. But the main significance of the Prokhorov battle lies not even in the damage that was inflicted on the German tank formations, but in the fact that the Soviet soldiers dealt a severe blow and managed to stop the SS tank divisions rushing to Kursk. This undermined the morale of the elite of the German tank forces, after which they finally lost faith in the victory of German weapons.

The number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German tank army on July 4-17, 1943
the date	The number of tanks in the 2nd SS TC	The number of tanks in the 48th TC	Total	Tank losses in the 2nd SS TC	Losses of tanks in the 48th TC	Total	Notes
04.07	470	446	916	39	–	39	48th shopping mall -?
05.07	431	453	884	21	–	21	48th shopping mall -?
06.07	410	455	865	110	134	244
07.07	300	321	621	2	3	5
08.07	308	318	626	30	95	125
09.07	278	223	501	–	–	–	?
10.07	292	227	519	–	6	6	2nd TC SS -?
11.07	309	221	530	–	33	33	2nd TC SS -?
12.07	320	188	508	68	–	68	48th shopping mall -?
13.07	252	253	505	–	36	36	2nd TC SS -?
14.07	271	217	488	11	9	20
15.07	260	206	466	–	–	–	?
16.07	298	232	530	–	–	?
17.07	312	279	591	there is no data	there is no data	–
Total tanks lost in the 4th Panzer Army			280	316	596

4.7.2018 1870 Views

Commanders!

Turns 75 this summer Battle of Kursk- one of the most important episodes of the Second World War. In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose tank battles took place near Prokhorovka.

To properly celebrate this date, the developers have prepared a large-scale 50-day gaming event. And we already have the first details, which we will tell you about!

Where, what and how

From July 5, 09:00 (MSK) to August 24, 09:00 (MSK) daily combat missions will appear in the game - a new task every day. For each completed task, you will receive a reward. The value of the rewards will grow as the event progresses, and a truly excellent trophy will be waiting for you in the final.

The more tasks you complete, the more prizes you will receive.

Three major awards

Premium tank V T-34 shielded in a unique style. A limited series of such machines was produced in 1943, not long before the start of the Battle of Kursk.

Special styles dedicated to the Battle of Kursk that can be applied to any vehicle in your Garage.

Both award styles are historical. This means that they will be displayed to all players.

A medal that can be obtained for participating in a game event.

Choose your path tanker!

From the Soviet Union, certain vehicles took part in the Battle of Kursk. So those who play on historical vehicles will have no small advantage.

• II T-60
• III T-70
• III M3 light
• V T-34
• V T-34 shielded
• V KV-1S
• V Churchill III
• V SU-85
• VII SU-152

Although the list of tasks remains unchanged throughout the event, the developers offer you, dear player, a choice of one of two ways - depending on the equipment you have.

• North direction- for those who have any Tier IV and above vehicles, except for the historical one. The tasks here will be more difficult.
• South direction- for those who have a suitable historical vehicle from the list above in their Garage. Tasks will be easier here.

When entering a battle, the game will automatically choose a direction depending on the vehicle - and so on for each combat mission.

And a couple more words about awards

• Rewards for tasks will be the same regardless of the direction you choose.
• After a task for one direction is completed, a similar task for another direction will become unavailable.
• And most importantly, the tasks can be "mixed", performing one part of the tasks in the southern direction, and the other part in the northern direction.

In addition to daily rewards, for each completed task, you will receive one point - and so on up to 50 points. The prize pool will be divided into seven stages, and each step forward will provide a reward many times better than the previous one.

5 points

• Commemorative medal for participation in the event.
• 1 day premium account.
• 5 large repair kits.
• 5 Large First Aid Kits.

10 points

• Reinforced pickup drives.
• 5 automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 large repair kits.
• 5 Large First Aid Kits.

15 points

• Illuminated optics.
• 5 automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 large repair kits.
• 5 Large First Aid Kits.

20 points

• Large caliber gun rammer.
• 5 automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 large repair kits.
• 5 Large First Aid Kits.

30 points

• Tank T-34E with 100% crew and unique style.
• Slot in the Hangar.
• 5 automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 large repair kits.
• 5 Large First Aid Kits.

40 points

• 7 days of premium account.
• 5 automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 large repair kits.
• 5 Large First Aid Kits.

50 points

• A style that can be applied to any car.
• 5 automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 large repair kits.
• 5 Large First Aid Kits.

Pay attention!

• V T-34 shielded in historical style you will get for 30 completed missions.
• A unique historical style that can be applied to any car, you will receive for completing all the tasks.

If there is no particular desire to complete tasks in order to get a tank, it can be purchased in the Premium Shop.

And a note at the end

Every day a new combat mission will be waiting for you, and you should try to complete them all - after all, your maximum reward depends on it.

It is very important to understand that if you do not complete the task, you will not be able to receive a reward for it later, in any way.

All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments

Moscow City Branch

Military Historical Club

M.KOLOMIETS, M.Svirin

with the participation of O. BARONOV, D. NEDOGONOV

AT Your attention is invited to an illustrated edition dedicated to the fighting on the Kursk Bulge. Compiling the publication, the authors did not set themselves the goal of giving a comprehensive description of the course of hostilities in the summer of 1943. They used as primary sources mainly domestic documents of those years: combat logs, combat and loss reports provided by various military formations, and protocols of work commissions engaged in July-August 1943 in the study of new models of German military equipment. The publication deals mainly with the actions of anti-tank artillery and armored forces and does not consider the actions of aviation and infantry formations.

P after the end of the winter 1942-43. the offensive of the Red Army and the counterattack of the German operational group "Kempf" The Eastern Front in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe cities of Orel-Kursk-Belgorod took on bizarre shapes. In the Orel region, the front line went into the location of the Soviet troops in an arc, and in the Kursk region, on the contrary, it formed a depression in a westerly direction. This characteristic configuration of the front prompted the German command to plan the spring-summer campaign of 1943, in which the stake was placed on the encirclement of Soviet troops near Kursk.

Unit of 150-mm self-propelled guns on the chassis of the French tractor "Lorrain" before the battles.

Oryol direction. June 1943

The plans of the German command

H Despite the defeat at Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus, the Wehrmacht was still quite capable of advancing, delivering fast and powerful blows, which was demonstrated by the battles of the spring of 1943 near Kharkov. However, under the prevailing conditions, the Germans could no longer conduct a large-scale offensive on a wide front, as in previous summer campaigns. Some representatives of the German generals proposed to start a positional war, actively developing the occupied territories. But Hitler did not want to give up the initiative to the Soviet command. He wanted to inflict a powerful blow on the enemy at least on one of the sectors of the front, so that a decisive success with insignificant losses of his own would allow him to dictate his will to the defenders in future campaigns. The Kursk ledge, saturated with Soviet troops, was the best suited for such an offensive. The German plan for the spring-summer campaign of 1943 was as follows: deliver powerful blows in the direction of Kursk from the north and south under the base of the ledge, encircle the main forces of the two Soviet fronts (Central and Voronezh) and destroy them.

The conclusion about the possibility of destroying Soviet troops with small own losses followed from the experience of summer operations in 1941-42. and to a large extent was based on an underestimation of the capabilities of the Red Army. After successful battles near Kharkov, the German high command decided that the crisis on the Eastern Front had already passed and that success in the course of the summer offensive near Kursk was beyond doubt. On April 15, 1943, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6 on the preparation of the Kursk operation, called the "Citadel", and the study of the subsequent large-scale offensive to the east and southeast, which received the code name "Operation Panther".

Before coming. "Mapder III" and panzergrenadiers at the starting position. July, 1943

"Tigers" of the 505th battalion on the march.

Due to the exposure of neighboring sectors of the Eastern Front and the transfer of all operational reserves to the disposal of Army Groups "Center" and "South", three mobile strike groups were formed. The 9th Army was located south of Orel, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were located in the Belgorod region. The number of troops employed in Operation Citadel was seven army and five tank corps, which included 34 infantry, 14 tank, 2 motorized divisions, as well as 3 separate battalions heavy tanks and 8 divisions of assault guns, which accounted for more than 17 percent of infantry, up to 70 percent of tank and up to 30 percent of motorized divisions of the total number of German troops on the Eastern Front.

It was originally planned to start offensive operations on May 10-15, but later this period was postponed to June, then to July due to the unavailability of Army Group South (some authors believe that this period was postponed due to the unavailability of the Panther tanks, however, according to Manstein's reports, on May 1, 1943, he had a shortage of personnel in his units, reaching 11-18%.

Deutsch tank PzKpfw IV Ausf G in ambush. District of Belgorod, June 1943

"Ferdinand" of the 653rd tank destroyer battalion before the battles.

The presence of tanks and assault guns in other units of the ground forces

Besides: StuG 111 and Stug 40 assault guns in assault battalions and anti-tank companies of infantry divisions -
455: assault 105-mm howitzers - 98, assault infantry guns StulG 33 in the 23rd tank division - 12. 150-mm self-propelled guns "Hummel" - 55 and more than 160 anti-tank self-propelled guns "Marder". For the rest of the ACS, exact data is not available.

The plans of the Soviet command

G The main feature of the Battle of Kursk, which distinguishes it from other operations of the Second World War, was that it was here, for the first time in two years since the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, that the Soviet command correctly determined the direction of the main strategic offensive of the German troops and managed to prepare in advance for it.

In the course of analyzing the situation that developed on the Central and Voronezh fronts in the spring of 1943, based on information transmitted by British intelligence, as well as short-term strategic games in the General Staff in April 1943, it was assumed that it was the floor of Kursk that the German command would try to take revenge for the Stalingrad "boiler".

During the discussion of plans to counter the German offensive, the staff of the General Staff and members of the Headquarters proposed two options for the summer campaign of 1943. One was to inflict a powerful preemptive strike on the German troops even before the start of the offensive, defeat them in deployment positions, and then go into a decisive offensive by the forces of five fronts in order to quickly reach the Dnieper.

The second provided for a meeting of the advancing German troops with a defense in depth prepared in advance, equipped with large quantity artillery in order to exhaust their forces in defensive battles and then go on the offensive with the fresh forces of three fronts.

The most ardent supporters of the first version of the campaign were the commander of the Voronezh Front N. Vatutin and a member of the military council of the front N. Khrushchev, who asked for the strengthening of their front with one combined arms and one tank armies in order to go on the offensive by the end of May. Their plan was supported by the Stavka representative A. Vasilevsky.

The second option was supported by the command of the Central Front, who rightly believed that a preemptive strike would be accompanied by heavy losses of Soviet troops, and the reserves accumulated by the German troops could be used to prevent the development of our offensive and deliver powerful counterattacks during it.

The problem was resolved when the supporters of the second option were supported by G. Zhukov, who called the first scenario "a new version of the summer of 1942", when German troops not only repulsed the premature Soviet offensive, but were able to surround the bulk of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space for an attack on Stalingrad. I. Stalin, apparently convinced by such a clear argumentation, took the side of a defensive strategy.

203-mm B-4 howitzers of the breakthrough artillery corps in positions.

The presence of tank and artillery weapons in some armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts

Notes:
* - there is no division into medium and light tanks, however, in the 13th amia there were at least 10 T-60 tanks and approx. 50 T-70 tanks
** - including 25 SU-152s, 32 SU-122s, 18 SU-76s and 16 SU-76s on captured chassis
*** - including 24 SU-122, 33 SU-76 on domestic and captured chassis
**** - including medium tanks M-3 "General Lee"
For the Voronezh Front, the data are rather contradictory, since the front-line reports submitted by the chief of logistics and the commander differ significantly. According to the summary of the chief of logistics, another 89 light T-60 and T-70), as well as 202 medium tanks (T-34 and M-3), should be added to the indicated number.

Preparing for battle

P The forthcoming battles posed a number of most difficult tasks for the command of the Red Army. Firstly, the German troops spent in 1942-43. reorganization and re-equipment with new models of military equipment, which provided them with a certain qualitative advantage. Secondly, the transfer of fresh forces from Germany and France to the Eastern Front and the total mobilization carried out allowed the German command to concentrate a large number of military formations in this sector. And, finally, the lack of experience in the Red Army in conducting successful offensive operations against a strong enemy made the Battle of Kursk one of the most significant events of the Second World War.

Despite the numerical superiority of domestic tanks, they were qualitatively inferior to German combat vehicles. The newly formed tank armies turned out to be cumbersome and difficult to manage formations. A significant part of the Soviet tanks were light vehicles, and if we take into account the often extremely poor quality of crew training, it becomes clear how difficult the task awaited our tankers when they met with the Germans.

Somewhat better was the position in the artillery. The basis of the material part of the anti-tank regiments of the Central and Voronezh fronts was the 76-mm divisional guns F-22USV, ZIS-22-USV and ZIS-3. Two artillery regiments were armed with more powerful 76-mm guns mod. 1936 (F-22), deployed from Far East, and one regiment - 107 mm M-60 guns. The total number of 76-mm guns in anti-tank artillery regiments was almost twice the number of 45-mm guns.

True, if in the initial period of the war the 76-mm divisional gun could be successfully used against any German tank at all ranges of actual fire, now the situation has become more complicated. The new heavy German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", modernized medium tanks and assault guns expected on the battlefields were practically invulnerable in the frontal part at a distance of over 400 m, and there was no time to develop new artillery systems.

Preparation of the firing point by the crew of the anti-tank gun of Sergeant Tursunkhodzhiev. The picture shows a 76.2 mm F-22 mod. 1936 one of the IPTAP reserve of the High Command. Oryol direction, July 1943

By order of the State Defense Committee (GOKO) in the spring of 1943, the production of 57-mm anti-tank (ZIS-2) and tank (ZIS-4M) guns was resumed, which was stopped in the fall of 1941 due to high complexity. However, by the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, they did not have time to get to the front. The first artillery regiment, armed with 57-mm ZIS-2 guns, arrived on the Central Front only on July 27, 1943, and on Voronezh even later. In August 1943, the T-34 and KV-1s tanks also arrived at the front, armed with ZIS-4M guns, which were called "tank-fighter". In May-June 1943, it was planned to resume the production of 107-mm M-60 guns, but for the needs of anti-tank defense, they turned out to be excessively heavy and expensive. In the summer of 1943, the TsAKB was developing the 100-mm S-3 anti-tank gun, but it was still far from being put into service. Improved in 1942 45-mm battalion anti-tank gun was adopted in the winter of 1943 under the symbol M-42 for service instead of the 45-mm gun mod. 1937, but its use did not give a noticeable advantage, since it could only be considered effective enough when using a sub-caliber projectile against the side armor of German tanks from short distances.

The task of increasing the armor penetration of domestic anti-tank artillery by the summer of 1943 was reduced mainly to the modernization of existing armor-piercing ammunition for 76-mm divisional and tank guns. So, in March 1943, a 76-mm sub-caliber projectile was mastered in mass production, penetrating armor up to 96-84 mm thick at a distance of 500-1000 m. However, the volume of production of sub-caliber shells in 1943 was extremely insignificant due to the lack of tungsten and molybdenum, which were mined in the Caucasus. The shells were issued to the commanders of the guns of anti-tank regiments
(IPTAP) to the account, and the loss of at least one projectile was punished quite severely - up to demolition. In addition to sub-caliber, in 1943, armor-piercing shells of a new type with localizers (BR-350B) were also introduced into the ammunition load of 76-mm guns, which increased the armor penetration of the gun at a distance of 500 m by 6-9 mm and had a more durable body.

Heavy tank KV-1s of the guards of Lieutenant Kostin of the heavy tank regiment of the breakthrough of the 5th Guards Tank Army before the battles. July, 1943

Tested in the fall of 1942, cumulative 76-mm and 122-mm shells (called "armor-piercing") began to enter the troops in April-May 1943. They could penetrate armor up to 92 and 130 mm thick, respectively, but due to the imperfection of fuses, they cannot was used in long-barreled divisional and tank guns (most often the projectile exploded in the gun barrel). Therefore, they were included only in the ammunition of regimental, mountain guns and howitzers. For arming the infantry, the production of hand-held anti-tank cumulative grenades with a stabilizer was started, and for anti-tank rifles (PTR) and heavy machine guns DShK introduced new armor-piercing bullets with a carbide core containing tungsten carbide.

Specially for the summer campaign of 1943, in May, the People's Commissariat of Armaments (NKV) was issued a large overplanned order for armor-piercing (and semi-armor-piercing) shells for guns that were not previously considered anti-tank: 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as 122-mm and 152-mm long-range cannons and cannon-howitzers. The NKV enterprises also received an additional order for Molotov cocktails KS and easel high-explosive flamethrowers FOG.

76-mm divisional gun mod. 1939/41 ZIS-22 (F-22 USV), one of the main Soviet anti-tank weapons in the summer of 1943

In the artillery workshops of the 13th Army in May 1943, 28 "portable jet guns" were manufactured, which were separate rails from the Katyusha, mounted on a light tripod.

All available light artillery weapons (caliber from 37 to 76 mm) were aimed at fighting tanks. Heavy cannon-howitzer batteries, heavy mortars, and Katyusha rocket-propelled mortar units also learned to repel tank subframes. For them, temporary memos and instructions for firing at moving armored targets were specially issued. Anti-aircraft batteries armed with 85-mm cannons were transferred to the reserve of the fronts to cover especially important areas from tank attacks. It was forbidden to fire on aircraft with batteries allocated for anti-tank missile defense.

The rich trophies captured during the Battle of Stalingrad were also preparing to meet the former owners with fire. At least four artillery regiments received captured materiel: 75 mm PaK 40 guns (instead of 76 mm USV and ZIS-3) and 50 mm RaK 38 guns (instead of 45 mm guns). Two anti-tank artillery regiments, transferred to the fronts for reinforcement from the Stavka reserve, were armed with captured 88-mm FlaK 18 / FlaK 36 anti-aircraft guns.

But not only the material part occupied the minds of the national command. To no lesser extent, this also affected (in the first, and, apparently, in last time) issues of organization and thorough combat training of personnel.

First, the staff of the main anti-tank defense unit, the anti-tank artillery regiment (IPTAP), which consisted of five four-gun batteries, was finally approved. The larger unit - the brigade (IPTABr) - included three regiments and, accordingly, fifteen batteries. Such consolidation of anti-tank units made it possible to counteract large numbers of enemy tanks and at the same time maintain an artillery reserve for operational fire maneuver. In addition, the fronts also included anti-tank brigades of a combined arms type, which were armed with one light artillery regiment and up to two battalions of anti-tank rifles.

Secondly, in all artillery units, fighters were selected who had achieved success in the fight against new German tanks (not only the Tiger and Panther were new; many gunners until the summer of 1943 did not meet with new modifications of the PzKpfw IV and StuG assault guns 40), and were placed as commanders of guns and platoons in newly formed units. At the same time, the crews that were defeated in battles with German tanks, on the contrary, were withdrawn to rear units. For two months (May-June), a real hunt for "cannon snipers" was conducted among the artillery units of the fronts. These gunners were invited to the IPTAP and IPTABr, which, by order of the Headquarters, in May 1943 increased their pay and rations. For additional training of IPTAP gunners, in addition to practical ones, up to 16 combat armor-piercing shells were also allocated.

The forces of training units made models of the Tigers from captured medium tanks, welding additional armor plates on the frontal part of the hull and turret. Many gunners, practicing shooting at moving mock-ups (dummy models were towed on long cables behind artillery tractors or tanks), achieved the highest skill, managing to hit the gun barrel, commander's cupola or mechanic's viewing device from a 45-mm or 76-mm cannon. a tank driver moving at a speed of 10-15 km / h (this was the actual speed of the tank in battle). The crews of howitzers and large-caliber guns (122-152 mm) also underwent mandatory training in firing at moving targets.

Engineering support of defense lines

To At the beginning of July 1943, the Kursk ledge was defended by the next grouping of Soviet troops. The right front of the ledge, 308 km long, was occupied by the troops of the Central Front (front commander - K. Rokossovsky). In the first echelon, the front had five combined arms armies (48th, 13th, 70th, 65th and 60th), the 2nd tank army, as well as the 9th and 19th tank corps were located in the reserve. The left front, 244 km long, was occupied by the troops of the Voronezh Front (front commander - N. Vatutin), having in the first echelon the 38th, 40th, 6th Guards and 7th Guards armies, and in the second echelon - the 69th Army and 35 th Guards Rifle Corps. The front reserve consisted of the 1st Tank Army, as well as the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps.

In the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, the Steppe Front (front commander I. Konev) was defending, consisting of six combined arms, one tank army, as well as four tank and two mechanized corps. The defense of the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge differed sharply from that in the battle of Moscow and Stalingrad. It was deliberate, prepared in advance and carried out in conditions of some superiority in forces over the German troops. When organizing the defense, the experience accumulated by Moscow and Stalingrad was taken into account, especially in terms of engineering and barrage measures.

In the armies of the first echelon of fronts, three defensive lines were created: the main army line of defense, a second line of defense 6-12 km from it, and a rear defensive line, located 20-30 km from the first. In certain especially critical areas, these belts were strengthened by intermediate lines of defense. In addition, the forces of the fronts also organized three additional front-line defensive lines.

Thus, on the alleged directions of the main enemy attacks, each front had 6 lines of defense with a separation depth of up to 110 km on the Central Front and up to 85 km on the Voronezh Front.

The volume of work carried out by the engineering services of the fronts was colossal. Only in the location of the Central Front in April-June, up to 5,000 km of trenches and communications were dug, more than 300 km of wire obstacles were installed (of which about 30 km were electrified), more than 400,000 mines and land mines were installed, over 60 km of gouges, up to 80 km of anti-tank ditches.

To enlarge - click on the image

The system of engineering barriers in the main defensive zone included anti-tank ditches, gouges and scarps, tank traps, surprises, land mines and minefields. On the Voronezh Front, for the first time, explosive mines (MOF) were used, which were a box with incendiary bottles, in the center of which a saber, a grenade or an anti-personnel mine was placed. From such land mines, several barrier fields were created, which proved to be very effective both against infantry and against light and medium tanks.

In addition, in order to carry out the operational laying of mines directly in front of the advancing tanks (in those years called “impudent mining”), special mobile barrage detachments (PZO) were organized as part of an engineering assault sapper company, reinforced by a platoon of anti-tank rifles and / or a machine-gun platoon on cargo off-road vehicles or captured armored personnel carriers.

The main line of defense was divided into battalion areas (up to 2.5 km along the front and up to 1 km in depth) and anti-tank strongholds, covered by a network of engineering barriers. Two or three battalion districts formed a regimental sector (up to 5 km along the front and up to 4 km in depth). Anti-tank strongholds (formed by artillery of rifle regiments and divisions) were located mainly in battalion defense areas. The advantage of the northern sector of defense was that all anti-tank strongholds located in the sector of rifle regiments, by order of the front commander K. Rokossovsky, were united into anti-tank areas, commandants of which were appointed commanders of rifle regiments. This facilitated the process of interaction between artillery and rifle units when repulsing enemy attacks. On the southern front, by order of the representative of the Headquarters A. Vasilevsky, this was prohibited, and anti-tank strongholds often had no idea about the state of affairs in neighboring defense sectors, being, in essence, left to themselves.

By the beginning of the fighting, the troops occupied four defensive lines - entirely the first (main) line of defense and most of the second, and in the directions of a probable enemy strike, also the rear army line and the first front line.

To enlarge - click on the image

All the armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts were significantly reinforced with RVGK artillery. The command of the Central Front had at its disposal, in addition to 41 artillery regiments of rifle divisions, also 77 artillery regiments of the RVGK, not counting anti-aircraft and field rocket artillery, i.e. a total of 118 artillery and mortar regiments. The anti-tank artillery of the RVGK was represented by ten separate IPTAP and three IPTABr (three regiments each). In addition, the front included three combined-arms anti-tank brigades and three light artillery brigades (three light artillery regiments each), which were also transferred to anti-tank defense. Taking into account the latter, the entire anti-tank artillery of the RVGK of the front consisted of 31 regiments.

The Voronezh Front included, in addition to 35 artillery regiments of rifle divisions, also 83 reinforcement artillery regiments, i.e. also 118 artillery and mortar regiments, of which there were a total of 46 anti-tank regiments.

The anti-tank regiments were almost completely equipped with materiel and personnel (in terms of the number of guns - up to 93%, in terms of personnel - up to 92%). There was not enough means of traction and vehicles (especially on the Voronezh front). The number of motors per gun ranged from 1.5 to 2.9 (with the prescribed number - 3.5). Cars with a carrying capacity from 1.5 to 5 tons (GAZ, ZIS and American trucks) were most widely represented, and tractors of the STZ-5 (Nati) type (up to half of the prescribed number) and off-road cars of the Willys type "and GAZ-67 (up to 60% of the prescribed amount).

On the northern face, the troops of the 13th Army received the greatest means of artillery reinforcement as they were located in the most threatened direction. On the southern front, reinforcements were distributed between the 6th Guards and 7th Guards armies.

On both fronts, special artillery and anti-tank reserves were created. In addition to regular anti-tank guns, they also included battalions and companies of armor-piercers, as well as anti-aircraft guns of 76 and 85 mm caliber removed from air defense. In order to somehow compensate for the weakening of air defense, the Headquarters handed over to the command of the fronts additional units of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 12.7-mm machine guns. Anti-aircraft guns, transferred to the category of anti-tank guns, were installed for the most part in pre-equipped positions near the tank-dangerous directions of the near rear of the front. It was forbidden to fire on aircraft from these batteries, and their ammunition load consisted of armor-piercing shells for more than 60%.

Sergeant Filippov's ZIS-22 gun crew is preparing to meet German tanks.

Heavy 203-mm B-4 howitzer of the breakthrough artillery corps in position under a camouflage net. Oryol direction, July 1943

A camouflaged Soviet medium tank in ambush on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri.

Defensive battles on the northern face

2 On July 1943, the commands of the Central and Voronezh fronts received a special telegram from the Headquarters, which stated that the start of the German offensive should be expected between July 3 and 6. On the night of July 5, reconnaissance of the 15th Infantry Division of the 13th Army encountered a group of German sappers who were making passages in minefields. In the ensuing skirmish, one of them was taken prisoner and showed that the German offensive should begin on July 5 at 3 o'clock in the morning. The commander of the Central Front, K. Rokossovsky, decided to preempt the German offensive by conducting artillery and air counter-training. At 02:20, a 30-minute artillery counter-preparation was carried out in the zone of the 13th and 48th armies, in which 588 guns and mortars were involved, as well as two regiments of field rocket artillery. During the shelling, the German artillery responded very sluggishly, a large number of powerful explosions were noted behind the front line. At 04:30 the counter-preparation was repeated.

The air strike on both fronts failed due to its unsatisfactory preparation. By the time our bombers took off, all German planes were in the air, and the bombing strike fell mostly on empty or half-empty airfields.

At 05:30, the German infantry, supported by tanks, attacked the entire defense zone of the 13th Army. The enemy exerted especially strong pressure on the right flank of the army - in the Maloarkhangelskoye area. Mobile barrage fire (PZO) stopped the infantry, and tanks and assault guns hit the minefields. The attack was repulsed. After 7 hours 30 minutes, the Germans changed the direction of the main attack and launched an offensive on the left flank of the 13th Army.

Until 10:30 a.m., the German troops could not get close to the positions of the Soviet infantry, and only after overcoming the minefields did they break into Podolyan. Units of our 15th and 81st divisions were partially surrounded, but successfully repulsed the attacks of the German motorized infantry. According to various reports, during July 5, the Germans lost from 48 to 62 tanks and assault guns in minefields and from Soviet artillery fire.

On the night of July 6, the command of the Central Front carried out a maneuver with artillery reserves and, following the order of the General Staff, prepared a counterattack against the German troops that had broken through.

The artillery breakthrough corps of General N. Ignatov, a mortar brigade, two regiments of rocket launchers, two regiments of self-propelled artillery, two tank corps (16th and 19th), a rifle corps and three rifle divisions were involved in the counterattack. Infantry and tanks of the 16th. struck on the morning of July 6 on a front up to 34 km wide. The enemy artillery was silent, suppressed by the fire of the breakthrough artillery corps, but the tanks of the 107th tank brigade, having pushed the German troops in the direction of Butyrka by 1-2 km, came under a sudden fire from German tanks and self-propelled guns buried in the ground. In a short time, the brigade lost 46 tanks, and the remaining 4 retreated to their infantry. The commander of the 16th, seeing this situation, ordered the 164th tank brigade, moving in a ledge after the 107th brigade, to stop the attack and retreat to its original position. The 19th, because, having spent too much time preparing a counterattack, was ready for it only in the afternoon and therefore did not go on the offensive. The counterattack did not achieve the main goal - the restoration of the former line of defense.

"Tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion are moving towards the front line. July 1943

A column of French cars of one of the motorized units of the German troops. Orlovskoe example, July 1943

Command tank PzKpfw IV Ausf F in combat. Orlovskoye for example.

The radio relay station of the Army Group "Center" maintains contact with the headquarters of the 9th Army. July 1943

After the transition of our troops to the defense, the Germans resumed their offensive against Olkhovatka. From 170 to 230 tanks and self-propelled guns were thrown here. Positions of the 17th Guards. corps lines were reinforced here by the i-th guards. an artillery division, one IPTAP and a tank regiment, and the Soviet tanks standing on the defensive were dug into the ground.

Fierce fighting took place here. The Germans quickly regrouped and delivered short powerful blows by tank groups, between attacks on the heads of the infantrymen of the 17th Guards. pages of the corps were bombed by German dive bombers. By 16 o'clock, the Soviet infantry retreated to their original positions, and the 19th, because. received an order to conduct a counterattack against the exposed flank of the German group. Having begun the strike at 1700 hours, our tank corps was met with dense fire from German anti-tank and self-propelled guns and suffered heavy losses. However, the German attack on Olkhovatka was stopped.

Artillerymen of the 13th Army are firing at enemy assault guns. July 1943

German tanks of the 2nd Panzer Division on the offensive. July 1943

To enlarge - click on the image

Armor-piercers change their firing position. July 1943

Tanks T-70 and T-34 of the 2nd Panzer Army move forward for a counterattack. July 1943

Tank reserves move to the front. The picture shows American medium tanks "General Lee", supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease. July 1943

German gunners reflect the attack of Soviet tanks. July 1943

Anti-tank self-propelled guns -Mapder III "covers the advance of German tanks.

Loss of materiel of the 2nd Panzer Army in defensive battles

Note: The general list of losses does not include the losses of attached units and subunits, including three tank regiments armed with Lend-Lease tanks.

Defense c. Ponyri

P After failures on the flanks of the 13th Army, the Germans concentrated their efforts on taking the Ponyri station, which occupied a very important strategic position, covering the Orel-Kursk railway.

The station was well prepared for defense. She was surrounded by guided and unguided minefields, in which a significant number of captured aerial bombs and large-caliber shells were installed, converted into high-explosive land mines. The defense was strengthened by tanks buried in the ground and a large number of anti-tank artillery (13th IPTABr and 46th light artillery brigade).

Against the village "1st Ponyri" On July 6, the Germans threw up to 170 tanks and self-propelled guns (including up to 40 "Tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion) and infantry of the 86th and 292nd divisions. Having broken through the defenses of the 81st page of the division, the German troops captured the 1st Ponyri and quickly moved south to the second defense line in the area of ​​the 2nd Ponyri and st. Ponyri. Until the end of the day, they tried three times to break into the station, but were repulsed. The counterattack carried out by the forces of the 16th and 19th tank corps turned out to be inconsistent and did not reach the goal (repulse the "1st Ponyri"). However, the day for the regrouping of forces was won.

On July 7, the Germans could no longer advance on a wide front and threw all their forces against the defense center of the Ponyri station. At about 8 o'clock in the morning, up to 40 German heavy tanks (according to the classification that existed in the Red Army, German medium tanks PzKpfw IV Ausf H were considered heavy), supported by heavy assault guns, advanced to the defense zone and opened fire on the positions of Soviet troops. At the same time, the "2nd Ponyri" were attacked from the air by German dive bombers. After about half an hour, the Tiger tanks began to approach the forward trenches, covering the medium tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry. Heavy assault guns with fire from a place on the discovered firing points supported the offensive. The dense PZO of large-caliber artillery and the "impudent mining", carried out by units of engineering assault brigades with the support of divisional guns, forced the German tanks five times to retreat to their original position.

However, at 10 am two battalions German infantry with medium tanks and assault guns, they managed to break into the northwestern outskirts of the "2 Ponyri". The reserve of the commander of the 307th division, brought into battle, consisting of two infantry battalions and a tank brigade, with the support of artillery, made it possible to destroy the group that had broken through and restore the situation. After 11 o'clock the Germans launched an attack on Ponyri from the northeast. By 3 p.m. they had taken possession of the May 1 state farm and came close to the station. However, all attempts to break into the territory of the village and the station were unsuccessful. July 7 was a critical day on the Northern Front, when the Germans had great tactical successes.

Heavy assault guns "Ferdinand" before the attack of Art. Ponyri. July 1943

On the morning of July 8, German troops, supported by 25 medium tanks, 15 Tiger heavy tanks and up to 20 Ferdinand assault guns, again attacked the northern outskirts of St. Ponyri. When the attack was repulsed by the fire of the 1180th and 1188th IPTAP, 22 tanks were hit, including 5 Tiger tanks. Two Tiger tanks were set on fire with bottles of KS thrown by infantrymen Kuliev and Prokhorov from the 1019th joint venture.

In the afternoon, German troops again tried to break through bypassing Art. Ponyri - through the agricultural "May 1". However, here the attack was repulsed by the efforts of the 1180th IPTAP and the 768th LAP, supported by infantry and a battery of "portable jet guns". On the battlefield, the Germans left 11 burned-out and 5 wrecked medium tanks, as well as 4 wrecked assault guns and several armored vehicles. Moreover, according to the reports of the infantry command and artillery reconnaissance, 3 German combat vehicles fell to the share of "jet guns". The next two days will not bring anything new to the disposition of troops in the area of ​​​​st. Ponyri. On July 9, the Germans put together an operational strike group of 45 Tiger heavy tanks of the 505th heavy tank battalion (according to other sources - 40 Tiger tanks), the 654th battalion of Ferdinand heavy assault guns, as well as the 216th division of 150 -mm assault tanks and a division of 75-mm and 105-mm assault guns. The command of the group (according to the testimony of the prisoners) was carried out by Major Kal (commander of the 505th battalion of heavy tanks). Directly behind the group were medium tanks and motorized infantry in armored personnel carriers. Two hours after the start of the battle, the group broke through the agricultural "May 1st" to the village. Burnt. In these battles, the German troops used a new tactical formation, when the line of Ferdinand assault guns moved in the forefront of the strike group (rolls in two echelons), followed by the Tigers, covering the assault guns and medium tanks. But at the village Burnt, our artillerymen and infantrymen let the German tanks and self-propelled guns into a pre-prepared artillery fire bag, formed by the 768th, 697th and 546th LAP and the 1180th IPTAP, supported by long-range artillery fire and rocket mortars. Having found themselves on the floor with powerful concentrated artillery fire from different directions, having also hit a powerful minefield (most of the field was mined by captured aerial bombs or land mines containing 10-50 kg of toll buried in the ground) and subjected to raids by Petlyakov dive bombers, German tanks stopped. Eighteen combat vehicles were hit. Some of the tanks left on the battlefield turned out to be serviceable, and six of them were evacuated at night by Soviet repairmen, after which they were transferred to the disposal of the 19th. to replenish the lost materiel.

The attack was repeated the next day. But even now the German troops failed to break through to Art. Ponyri. A large role in repelling the offensive was played by the PZO, supplied by a special-purpose artillery division (203-mm howitzers and 152-mm howitzers-cannons). By noon, the Germans withdrew, leaving seven more tanks and two assault guns on the battlefield. On July 12-13, the Germans carried out an operation to evacuate their wrecked tanks from the battlefield. The evacuation was covered by the 654th division of assault guns "Ferdinand". The operation was generally successful, but the number of Ferdinands left on the battlefield with damaged mines and artillery fire undercarriage increased to 17. The counterattack of our infantrymen with the support of a battalion of T-34 tanks and a battalion of T-70 (from the composition of the 3 deployed here) pushed back the German troops that had approached the outskirts of Ponyri. At the same time, the Germans did not have time to evacuate the damaged heavy Ferdinands, some of which were set on fire by their own crews, and some by our infantrymen, who used bottles of KS against the crews of vehicles that offered resistance. Only one Ferdinand received a hole in the side near the brake drum, although it was fired upon by seven T-34 tanks from all directions. In total, after the fighting in the area of ​​​​st. Ponyri - 21 Ferdinand assault guns remained with a damaged undercarriage, a significant part of which were set on fire by their crews or advancing infantrymen. Our tankers, who supported the infantry counterattack, suffered heavy losses not only from the fire of German assault guns, but also because, approaching the enemy, a company of T-70 tanks and several T-34s mistakenly fell into their own minefield. It was the last day when the German troops came close to the outskirts of Art. Ponyri.

German artillery is shelling the positions of the Soviet troops. July-August 1943.

Assault guns "Ferdinand", lined on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri. July 1943

The battlefield after the counterattack of the owls. troops in the area of Ponyri - pos. Burnt. On this field, German assault guns "Ferdinand" and a company of Soviet tanks T-34 / T-70 were blown up by the action of Soviet land mines. July 9-13, 1943

German tank PzKpfw IV and armored personnel carrier SdKfz 251, lined up on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri. July 15, 1943

Special Purpose Artillery Division Gen. Ignatiev when repelling the German offensive at st. Ponyri. July, 1943

"Ferdinand", lined with artillery near the village. Burnt. The gun mantlet was damaged, the starboard roller and drive wheel were broken.

Broken by a direct hit from a heavy shell, the Bryummber assault tank. Outskirts of st. Ponyri 15 July 1943

Tanks of the 3rd Regiment of the 2nd Panzer Division, knocked out on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri. July 12-15, 1943

The wrecked PzBefWg III Ausf H is a command vehicle with a dummy gun and a telescopic antenna.

Support tank PzKpfw III Ausf N armed with a short-barreled 75 mm gun.

Defensive battles of the 70th army

AT the defense zone of the 70th Army, the most fierce battles unfolded in the area of ​​​​the village. Kutyrki-Warm. Here, the 3rd Fighter Brigade bore the brunt of the blow of the German tank troops. The brigade organized two anti-tank areas in the Kutyrki-Teploye area, each of which had three artillery batteries(76 mm guns and 45 mm guns), one mortar battery (120 mm mortars) and a battalion of anti-tank rifles. During July 6-7, the brigade successfully held back enemy attacks, destroying and knocking out 47 tanks here. Interestingly, the commander of one of the batteries of 45-mm guns, Captain Gorlitsin, positioned his guns behind the reverse slope of the ridge and hit the emerging German tanks in the opening bottom before the tank could respond with aimed fire. Thus, in a day, his battery destroyed and damaged 17 tanks, without losing a single person from their fire. July 8 at 8:30 a group of German tanks and assault guns in the amount of up to 70 pieces. with submachine gunners on armored personnel carriers went to the outskirts of the village. Samodurovka and, with the support of dive bombers, carried out an attack in the direction of Teploe-Molotychi. Until 11:30, the artillerymen of the brigade, despite the heavy losses suffered from air raids (until July 11, 1943, German aviation dominated the air), held their positions, but by 12:30, when the enemy launched a third attack from the Kashar region in the direction Warm, the first and seventh batteries of the brigade were almost completely destroyed, and the German panzergrenadiers managed to occupy Kashara, Kutyrki, Pogoreltsy and Samodurovka. Only on the northern outskirts of Teploe did the sixth battery hold out, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 238.1 the fourth battery and mortars fired, and on the outskirts of Kutyrka, the remnants of the armor-piercing unit, supported by two captured tanks, fired on the German infantrymen who had broken through. Colonel Rukosuev, who commanded this anti-tank area, brought his last reserve into battle - three light batteries of 45-mm cannons and a battalion of anti-tank rifles. The breakthrough was localized.

Panzergrenadiers and anti-tank self-propelled guns "Mapder III" in battle near the village. Kashara.

German six-barrel rocket launchers "Nebelwerfer" in the reflection of the Soviet counterattack.

Sergeant Kruglov's 45-mm gun crew knocked out 3 German tanks in battle. July 1943

Medium tanks MZ at the starting position. Orlovskoye for example. July-August 1943

On July 11, the Germans tried again to strike here with large forces of tanks and motorized infantry. However, now the advantage in the air was with Soviet aircraft, and the strikes of Soviet dive bombers mixed up the battle formation of the tanks deployed to attack. In addition, the advancing troops met not only with the 3rd Fighter Brigade, which had been badly battered the day before, but also with the 1st Fighter-Anti-Tank Brigade and two anti-aircraft divisions deployed to this area (one of the divisions was armed with captured 88-mm Flak anti-aircraft guns eighteen). Within two days, the brigade repelled 17 tank attacks, knocking out and destroying 6 heavy (including 2 Tigers) and 17 light and medium tanks. All in all, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bdefense between us. points Samodurovka, Kashara, Kutyrki. Warm, height 238.1, on a field measuring 2 x 3 km after the fighting, 74 wrecked and burned German tanks, self-propelled guns and other armored vehicles, including four Tigers and two Ferdinands, were found. On July 15, with the permission of the front commander K. Rokossovsky, this field was filmed by newsreels who came from Moscow, and it was after the war that they began to call it “the field near Prokhorovka” (there were no and could not be “Ferdinands” near Prokhorovka, which flicker on the screen “Prokhorovka " field).

The armored ammunition transporter SdKfz 252 follows at the head of the assault gun column.

"Tiger", shot down by the calculation of Sergeant Lunin. Orlovskoye for example. July 1943

Soviet scouts who captured a serviceable PzKpfw III Ausf N and brought it to the location of their troops. July 1943.

Defensive battles on the southern front

4 On July 1943, at 4 p.m., after air and artillery strikes on the outpost positions of the Voronezh Front, German troops with forces up to an infantry division, supported by up to 100 tanks, conducted reconnaissance in force from the Tomarovka area to the north. The battle between the outposts of the Voronezh Front and the reconnaissance units of the Army Group "South" lasted until late at night. Under the cover of battle, the German troops took up their starting position for the offensive. According to the testimony of German prisoners captured in this battle, as well as defectors who surrendered on July 3-4, it became known that the general offensive of the German troops on this sector of the front was scheduled for 2 hours 30 minutes on July 5.

To alleviate the position of the outpost and inflict losses on the German troops at their starting positions, at 22:30 on July 4, the artillery of the Voronezh Front conducted a 5-minute artillery attack on the identified positions German artillery. At 3 o'clock in the morning on July 5, the counter-preparation was carried out in full.

Defensive battles on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge were distinguished by great bitterness and heavy losses on our part. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the nature of the terrain was more conducive to the use of tanks than on the northern face. Secondly, the representative of the Stavka A. Vasilevsky, who was watching the preparation of the defense, forbade the commander of the Voronezh Front, N. Vatutin, to combine anti-tank strongholds into areas and give them to infantry regiments, believing that such a decision would complicate management. And, thirdly, German air supremacy lasted here almost two days longer than on the Central Front.

The German troops delivered the main blow in the defense zone of the 6th Guards Army, along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, simultaneously in two sectors. Up to 400 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in the first section, and up to 300 in the second.

The first attack on the positions of the 6th Guards. army in the direction of Cherkasy began at 6 o'clock on July 5 with a powerful raid by dive bombers. Under the cover of a raid, a motorized infantry regiment went on the attack with the support of 70 tanks. However, he was stopped in the minefields, having been additionally fired upon by heavy artillery. An hour and a half later, the attack was repeated. Now the forces of the attackers have been doubled. In the forefront were German sappers, trying to make passages in the minefields. But the fire of the infantry and artillery of the 67th Infantry Division and this attack was repelled. Under the influence of heavy artillery fire, German tanks were forced to break formation even before they came into fire contact with our troops, and the "impudent mining" carried out by Soviet sappers greatly hampered the maneuver of combat vehicles. In total, the Germans lost 25 medium tanks and assault guns here from mines and heavy artillery fire.

German tanks, supported by assault guns, attack the Soviet defenses. July 1943. The silhouette of a bomber is visible in the air.

To enlarge - click on the image

Tank destroyer "Mapder III" follows the exploded medium tank MZ "Lee".

A column of one of the motorized units of the German troops follows the front. Oboyanskoye, for example, July 1943

Unable to take Cherkasskoye with a frontal attack, the German troops struck in the direction of Butovo. At the same time, several hundred German aircraft attacked Cherkasskoye and Butovo. By noon on July 5, in this area, the Germans managed to wedge into the defense zone of the 6th Guards. army. To restore the breakthrough, the commander of the 6th Guards. army I. Chistyakov brought in an anti-tank reserve - the 496th IPTAP and the 27th IPTABr. At the same time, the front command gave an order to the 6th. advance to the Berezovka area in order to liquidate the emerging dangerous breakthrough of German tanks with a flank attack.

Despite the emerging breakthrough of German tanks, by the end of the day on July 5, the artillerymen managed to restore a precarious balance, however, at the cost of heavy losses of personnel (up to 70%). The reason for this lay in the fact that the infantry units in a number of defense sectors retreated randomly, leaving artillery on direct fire without cover. During the day of continuous fighting in the Cherkasskoe-Korovino area, the enemy lost 13 tanks from IPTAP fire, including 3 heavy Tiger tanks. Our losses in a number of units totaled up to 50% of the personnel and up to 30% of the materiel.

On the night of July 6, a decision was made to strengthen the defensive lines of the 6th Guards. army with two tank corps of the 1st tank army. By the morning of July 6, the 1st Tank Army, with the forces of the 3rd Mechanized and 6th Tank Corps, took up defensive positions at the line intended for it, covering the Oboyan direction. In addition, the 6th Guards. The army was additionally strengthened by the 2nd and 5th Guards. shopping mall, which went to cover the flanks.

The main direction of German attacks the next day was Oboyanskoye. On the morning of July 6, a large column of tanks moved along the road from the Cherkasskoye area. The guns of the 1837th IPTAP, hidden on the flank, opened a sudden fire from a short distance. At the same time, 12 tanks were hit, among which only one Panther remained on the battlefield. It is interesting to note that in these battles Soviet artillerymen used the tactics of the so-called "flirting guns", allocated as bait to lure enemy tanks. "Flirting guns" opened fire on the columns from a long distance, forcing the advancing tanks to deploy in minefields and expose their sides to the batteries standing in ambush.

As a result of the fighting on July 6, the Germans managed to capture Alekseevka, Lukhanino, Olkhovka and Trirechnoye and reach the second defensive line. However, on the Belgorod - Oboyan highway, their advance was stopped.

Attacks of German tanks in the direction of Bol. Beacons also ended in nothing. Having met dense fire from Soviet artillery here, the German tanks turned to the northeast, where, after a long battle with units of the 5th Guards since. they managed to capture Luchki. The 14th IPTABr, advanced from the reserve of the front and deployed at the line of Yakovlevo, Dubrava, played a large role in repelling the German strike, knocking out up to 50 German combat vehicles (the data was confirmed by the report of the trophy team).

The artillerymen of the SS unit support the attack of their infantry with fire. Prokhorovskoe eg.

Soviet T-70 tanks of the "Revolutionary Mongolia" column (112 brigade) move forward to attack.

Tanks PzKpfw IV Ausf H of the Grossdeutchland (Grossdeutschland) division are fighting.

Field Marshal Manstein's headquarters radio operators at work. July 1943

German Panther tanks of the 10th tank brigade, PzKpfw IV Ausf G of the Grossdeutchland division and StuG 40 assault guns in the Oboyan direction. July 9-10, 1943

On July 7, the enemy brought up to 350 tanks into battle and continued attacks in the Oboyan direction from the Bol area. Lighthouses, Red Dubrava. All units of the 1st Tank Army and the 6th Guards entered the battle. army. By the end of the day, the Germans managed to advance in the Bol area. Beacons for 10-12 km. inflicting heavy losses on the 1st Panzer Army. The next day, in this sector, the Germans brought into battle about 400 tanks and self-propelled guns. However, the night before, the command of the 6th Guards. The army transferred the 27th IPTABr to the threatened direction, the task of which was to cover the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. By morning, when the enemy broke through the defenses of the infantry and tank units of the 6th Guards. army and the 1st Panzer Army and, it seemed, went out on an open highway, two “flirting” guns of the regiment opened fire on the column from a distance of 1500-2000 m. The column rebuilt, pushing heavy tanks forward. Up to 40 German bombers appeared over the battlefield. Half an hour later, the fire of the “flirting guns” was suppressed, and when the tanks began to reorganize for further movement, the regiment opened fire on them from three directions from an extremely short distance. Since most of the regiment's guns were on the flank of the column, their fire was very effective. Within 8 minutes, 29 enemy tanks and 7 self-propelled guns were knocked out on the battlefield. The blow was so unexpected that the remaining tanks, not accepting the battle, quickly went towards the forest. Of the damaged tanks, the repairmen of the 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army were able to repair and put into operation 9 combat vehicles.

On July 9, the enemy continued to attack in the Oboyan direction. Tank and motorized infantry attacks were supported by aircraft. The strike groups managed to advance up to 6 km here, but then they ran into well-equipped anti-aircraft artillery positions adapted for anti-tank guns and tanks dug into the ground.

In the following days, the enemy stopped ramming our defenses with a direct blow and began to look for weak spots in it. Such a direction, according to the German command, was Prokhorovskoye, from where it was possible to go to Kursk by a roundabout way. To this end, in the Prokhorovka area, the Germans concentrated a grouping, which included the 3rd since, numbering up to 300 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The infantrymen of the division "Das Reich" help to pull out the stuck "Tiger".

Tankers of the 5th Guards. tank army prepare the tank for battle.

StuG 40 Ausf G assault gun shot down by Captain Vinogradov.

AT On the evening of July 10, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from the Headquarters to conduct a counterattack on large group German troops, accumulated in the Mal. Beacons, Ozerovsky. To conduct a counterattack, the front was reinforced by two armies, the 5th Guards, under the command of A. Zhadov, and the 5th Guards Tank, under the command of P. Rotmistrov, transferred from the Steppe Front. However, the preparation of a counterattack, which began on July 11, was thwarted by the Germans, who themselves delivered two powerful blows to our defense in this sector. One - in the direction of Oboyan, and the second - to Prokhorovka. As a result of sudden strikes, some formations of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies retreated 1-2 km in the direction of Oboyan. A much more serious situation has developed in the Prokhorovsky direction. Due to the sudden withdrawal of some infantry units of the 5th Guards Army and the 2nd Tank Corps, the artillery preparation for a counterattack, which had begun as early as 10 July, was thwarted. Many batteries were left without infantry cover and suffered losses both in deployment positions and on the move. The front was in a very difficult position. German motorized infantry entered the village. Prokhorovka and proceeded to force the Psel River. Only the rapid entry into battle of the 42nd Infantry Division, as well as the transfer of all available artillery to direct fire, made it possible to stop the advance of German tanks.

The next laziness, the 5th Guards. the tank army, reinforced by attached units, was ready to launch an offensive against Luchki and Yakovlevo. P. Rotmistrov chose the line of army deployment to the west and southwest of st. Prokhorovka at the front 15 km. At this time, the German troops, trying to develop their offensive in a northerly direction, struck in the defense zone of the 69th Army. But this attack was more of a distraction. By 5 o'clock in the morning, units of the 81st and 92nd Guards. rifle divisions of the 69th Army were driven back from the defensive line and the Germans managed to capture the villages of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, Vypolzovka. There was a threat to the left flank of the unfolding 5th Guards. tank army, and, by order of the representative of the Stavka A. Vasilevsky, the front commander N. Vatutin gave the order to send the mobile reserve of the 5th Guards. tank army in the defense zone of the 69th army. The reserve group under the command of General Trufanov at 8 o'clock in the morning launched a counteroffensive against the German troops that had broken through.

At 8:30 a.m., the main forces of the German troops, consisting of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkopf tank divisions, which included up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 42 Tiger tanks), went on the offensive in the direction Art. Prokhorovka in the strip of highway and railway. This grouping was supported by all available air forces.

Tanks of the 6th Panzer Division on the way to Prokhorovka.

Flamethrowers before the attack.

Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns SdKfz 6/2 firing at Soviet infantry. July 1943

After a 15-minute artillery preparation, the German group was attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards. tank army. Despite the suddenness of the strike, the masses of Soviet tanks in the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm were met by concentrated fire from anti-tank artillery and assault guns. The 18th tank corps of General Bakharov broke through to the Oktyabrsky state farm at high speed, and, despite heavy losses, captured it. However, the village Andreevka and Vasilievka, he met an enemy tank grouping, and which had 15 Tiger tanks. Trying to break through the German tanks blocking the path, fighting a head-on battle with them, units of the 18th Panzer Corps were able to capture Vasilievka, but as a result of the losses they suffered, they could not develop the offensive and at 18 o'clock went on the defensive.

The 29th Panzer Corps fought for Hill 252.5, where it was met by tanks of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler". Throughout the day, the corps fought a maneuverable battle, but after 16 hours it was pushed back by the approaching tanks of the SS Tottenkopf division and, after dark, went on the defensive.

The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, at 14:30 suddenly collided with the SS Panzer Division Das Reich moving towards it. Due to the fact that the 29th Panzer Corps was stuck in battles at a height of 252.5, the Germans inflicted on the 2nd Guards. the tank corps hit the exposed flank and forced it to withdraw to its original position.

Assault guns withdraw after the battle. Division unknown.

Command tank PzKpfw III Ausf To the SS division "Das Reich" follows the burning medium tanks "General Lee". Presumably, Prokhorovskoye, for example. July 12-13, 1943

Scouts of the 5th Guards. tank army on Ba-64 armored vehicles. Belgorod eg.

2nd Panzer Corps, which provided a junction between the 2nd Guards. tank corps and the 29th tank corps, was able to somewhat push the German units in front of him, but came under fire from assault and anti-tank guns pulled up from the second line, suffered losses and stopped.

By noon on July 12, it became clear to the German command that the frontal attack on Prokhorovka had failed. Then it decided, by forcing the river. Psel, part of the forces to go north of Prokhorovka to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which the 11th Tank Division and the remaining units of the SS Totenkopf Panzer Division (96 tanks, a motorized infantry regiment, up to 200 motorcyclists, supported by two divisions of assault guns) were allocated ). The grouping broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards. rifle division and by 13 o'clock had mastered the height of 226.6.

But on the northern slopes of the height, the Germans stumbled upon stubborn resistance from the 95th Guards. rifle division of Colonel Lyakhov. The division was hastily reinforced with an anti-tank artillery reserve consisting of one IPTAP and two separate divisions of captured guns. Until 18:00, the division successfully defended itself against the advancing tanks. But at 20:00, after a powerful air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and heavy losses of personnel, the division, under the blows of approaching German motorized rifle units, withdrew beyond the village of Polezhaev. Artillery reserves were already deployed here, and the German offensive was stopped.

The 5th Guards Army also failed to fulfill the assigned tasks. Faced with massive fire from German artillery and tanks, the infantry units moved forward a distance of 1-3 km, after which they went on the defensive. In the offensive zones of the 1st Panzer Army, 6th Guards. Army, 69th Army and 7th Guards. Army decisive success also did not happen.

Soviet self-propelled howitzer SU-122 in the area of ​​the Prokhorovsky bridgehead. July 14, 1943.

Repairmen evacuate a downed T-34 under enemy fire. The evacuation is carried out strictly according to the instructions, so that the frontal armor remains facing the enemy.

"Thirty-four" of the plant number 112 "Krasnoye Sormovo", somewhere near Oboyan. Most likely - 1st Panzer Army, July 1943.

Thus, the so-called "tank battle near Prokhorovka" by no means took place on some separate field, as was said before. The operation was carried out on a front with a length of 32-35 km and was a series of separate battles with the use of tanks by both sides. In total, according to the estimates of the command of the Voronezh Front, 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides participated in them. 5th Guards the tank army, which operated in a strip 17-19 km long, together with attached units, by the beginning of the battles, consisted of 680 to 720 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the advancing German group - up to 540 tanks and self-propelled guns. In addition, from the south in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka was attacked by the Kempf group, consisting of the 6th and 19th tank divisions, which had about 180 tanks, which were opposed by 100 Soviet tanks. Only in the battles on July 12, the Germans lost west and southwest of Prokhorovka, according to reports from the front command, about 320 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources - from 190 to 218), the Kempf group - 80 tanks, and the 5th Guards. tank army (excluding the losses of General Trufanov's group) - 328 tanks and self-propelled guns (total losses of materiel of the 5th Guards Tank Army with attached units reached 60%). Despite the large concentration of tanks on both sides, the main losses to tank units were by no means inflicted by enemy tanks, but by enemy anti-tank and assault artillery.

T-34 tanks knocked out during the Soviet counter-offensive near Prokhorovka.

"Panther", lined with a gun ml. Sergeant Egorov at the Prokhorovsky bridgehead.

The counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front did not end with the destruction of the wedged German grouping and therefore, immediately after completion, it was considered a failure, but since it made it possible to disrupt the German offensive bypassing the cities of Oboyan and Kursk, its results were later recognized as a success. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the number of German tanks participating in the battle and their losses, given in the report of the command of the Voronezh Front (commander N. Vatutin, member of the military sonnet - N. Khrushchev), are very different from the reports of unit commanders. From this we can conclude that the scale of the "Prokhorov battle" could be greatly inflated by the front command in order to justify the heavy losses of personnel and materiel during the failed offensive.

German T-34 of the Das Reich division, shot down by Sergeant Kurnosov's gun crew. Prokhorovskoe eg. July 14-15, 1943

The best armor-piercers of the 6th Guards. armies that knocked out 7 enemy tanks.

Fighting east of Belgorod

H The battles against the German army group "Kempf" in the defense zone of the 7th Guards Army were less fierce. This direction was not considered the main one, and therefore the organization and density of anti-tank guns per 1 km of the front were lower than on the Belgorod-Kursk one. It was believed that the Northern Donets River and the railway embankment would play a role in the defense of the army line.

On July 5, the Germans deployed three infantry and three tank divisions in the Grafovka, Belgorod sector and, under air cover, began to cross the North. Donets. In the afternoon, their tank units went on the offensive in the Razumnoye, Krutoy Log sector in the eastern and northeastern directions. The anti-tank stronghold located in the Krutoy Log area repulsed two large tank attacks by the end of the day, knocking out 26 tanks (of which 7 were previously blown up by mines and land mines). On July 6, the Germans again advanced in a northeasterly direction. To reinforce the 7th Guards Army, the front command reassigned four rifle divisions to it. The 31st IPTABr and the 114th Guards IPTAP were transferred to her from the army reserve. To cover the junction between the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, the 131st and 132nd separate battalions of anti-tank rifles were involved.

Most plight developed in the Yastrebovo area, where the enemy concentrated up to 70 tanks and struck along the riverbed. Reasonable. The 1849th IPTAP, which approached here, did not have time to turn around before the approach of the German troops, and then the commander of the folder advanced a second battery for a sudden flank attack on moving tanks. Hiding behind the buildings, the battery approached the tank column at a distance of 200-500 m and, with a sudden flank fire, set fire to six and knocked out two tanks. Further, for an hour and a half, the battery repulsed tank attacks, maneuvering between buildings, and withdrew only on the orders of the regiment commander, when the regiment prepared for battle. Until the end of the day, the regiment repulsed four large tank attacks, knocking out 32 tanks and self-propelled guns. The loss of the regiment amounted to 20% of the personnel.

German motorized unit on the offensive in the Belgorod region.

To strengthen the defense, the brigade commander also sent the 1853rd IPTAP to Yastrebovo, which was located in the second echelon behind the 1849th.

On July 7, the Germans brought their artillery here, and after a powerful air raid and artillery preparation (from 9:00 to 12:00), their tanks went on the attack under the cover of a barrage. Now their attack was carried out in two directions - along the river. Reasonable (a group of more than 100 tanks, self-propelled guns and other armored combat vehicles) and a frontal attack from a height of 207.9 in the direction of Myasoedovo (up to 100 tanks). The infantry cover left Yastrebovo, and the artillery regiments were put in a difficult position, as the infiltrated enemy infantry began to bombard the positions of the batteries from the flank and rear. Since the flanks were exposed, the enemy managed to cover two batteries (3rd and 4th), and they had to retreat back by guns, defending themselves both from tanks and then from infantry. Nevertheless, the breakthrough on the left flank was localized by the 1853rd IPTAP, which was stationed in the second echelon. Soon units of the 94th Guards approached. page divisions, and the situation, rocked, was saved. But in the evening, the infantry, which did not have time to gain a foothold, hit the floor with a powerful air strike and, after processing by artillery, left Yastrebovo and Sevryukovo. The 1849th and 1853rd IPTAP, which suffered heavy materiel losses in the morning, could not hold back the German tanks and infantry that rushed after our fleeing infantry, and retreated in battle, taking with them all the damaged guns.

Anti-tank self-propelled guns "Marder-lll" follow the streets of Kharkov.

German anti-aircraft gunners cover the crossing across the Donets. July 1943

From July 8 to 10, the fighting in this area was local in nature, and it seemed that the Germans were exhausted. But on the night of July 11, they launched a surprise attack from the Melehovo region to the north and northwest in order to break through to Prokhorovka. The infantry units of the 9th Guards and 305th Rifle Divisions, which were defending in this direction, did not expect such a powerful blow, withdrew. To cover the exposed section of the front, on the night of July 11-12, the 10th IPTABr was transferred from the Stavka reserve. In addition, the 1510th IPTAP and a separate PTR battalion were involved in this area. These forces, together with the infantry units of the 35th Guards. page of the corps, did not allow the development of an offensive in the direction of art. Prokhorovka. In this area, the Germans managed to break through only to the Sev River. Donets.

The last major offensive operation was carried out by German troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge on July 14-15, when they tried to encircle and destroy our units defending in the Teterevino, Druzhny, Shchelokovo triangle with counter attacks on Shakhovo from the Ozerovsky and Shchelokovo regions.

"Tiger" on the street of Belgorod. July 1943

"Tigers" in the battle for vil. Maksimovka. Belgorod eg.

Soviet scouts in an ambush at the padded self-propelled guns "Marder III".

On the morning of July 14, the German troops, who went on the offensive, managed to surround some units of the 2nd Guards. because and the 69th Army, but the troops not only held on to most of the previously occupied positions, but even constantly counterattacked (2nd Guards since). It was not possible to destroy the encircled grouping until July 15, and by dawn it reached the location of its troops with minimal losses.

The defensive battle lasted two weeks (from July 5 to July 18) and achieved its goal: to stop and bleed the German troops and save their own forces for the offensive.

According to reports and reports on the operation of artillery on the Kursk Bulge, during the period of defensive battles, 1861 enemy combat vehicles (including tanks, self-propelled guns, assault guns, heavy cannon BAs and cannon armored personnel carriers) were hit and destroyed by all types of ground artillery.

Repairmen are restoring a wrecked tank. Field repair team of Lieutenant Schukin. July 1943

Offensive operation in the Oryol direction

O The peculiarity of the offensive near Kursk was that it was carried out on a broad front by large forces of three fronts (Central, Voronezh and Steppe), with the participation of the left wing of the Western and Bryansk fronts.

Geographically, the offensive of the Soviet troops was divided into the Oryol offensive operation (the left wing of the Western, as well as the Central and Bryansk fronts) and the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (the Voronezh and Steppe fronts). The Oryol offensive operation began on July 12, 1943 with a strike from the Western and Bryansk fronts, which were joined on July 15 by the Central. The main defensive zone of the Army Group "Center" on the Oryol ledge had a depth of about 5-7 km. It consisted of strongholds interconnected by a network of trenches and communications. Wire fences in 1-2 rows of wooden stakes were installed in front of the front edge, reinforced in critical directions with wire fences on metal racks or Bruno spirals. There were also anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. On the main directions, a large number of machine-gun armored caps were installed, from which it was possible to conduct a dense crossfire. All settlements were adapted for all-round defense, anti-tank obstacles were set up along the banks of the rivers. However, many engineering structures were not completed, since the Germans did not believe in the possibility of a wide offensive by Soviet troops on this sector of the front.

Soviet infantrymen are mastering the English armored personnel carrier "Universal". Orlovskoye for example. August 1943

To carry out the offensive operation, the General Staff prepared the following strike groups:
- at the northwestern tip of the Orlov ledge, at the confluence of the Zhizdra and Resset rivers (50th Army and 11th Guards Army);
- in the northern part of the ledge, near the city of Volkhov (61st Army and 4th Tank Army);
- in the eastern part of the ledge, east of Orel (3rd Army, 63rd Army and 3rd Guards Tank Army);
- in the southern part, in the area of ​​​​st. Ponyri (13th, 48th, 70th armies and 2nd tank army).

The forces of the advancing fronts were opposed by the German 2nd Panzer Army, 55th, 53rd and 35th Army Corps. According to domestic intelligence, they had (including army reserves) up to 560 tanks and self-propelled guns. In the divisions of the first echelon, there were 230-240 tanks and self-propelled guns. The grouping operating against the Central Front included three tank divisions: the 18th, 9th and 2nd. located in the offensive zone of our 13th Army. There were no German tank units in the offensive zone of the 48th and 70th armies. On the side of the attackers there was an absolute superiority in manpower, artillery, tanks and aircraft. In the main directions, the superiority in infantry was up to 6 times, in artillery up to 5 ... 6 times, in tanks - up to 2.5 ... 3 times. German tank and anti-tank units had been significantly weakened in previous battles and therefore did not put up much resistance. The rapid transition of the Soviet troops from defense to a large-scale offensive did not give the German troops the opportunity to reorganize and complete the repair and restoration work. According to the reports of the advancing units of the 13th Army, all the captured German field repair shops were filled with damaged military equipment.

T-34s equipped with PT-3 minesweepers are moving towards the front. July-August 1943

German anti-tank gun PaK 40 firing at attacking Soviet tanks. Scissors for cutting barbed wire are fixed on the shield of the gun. August 1943

Tank destroyer and assault gun unit on vacation.

Soviet tank 22nd battalion. enters the burning village. Voronezh front.

German tank PzKpfw IV Ausf H, shot down by a Glagolev gun. Orlovskoe example, August 1943

On the morning of July 12, at 05:10, immediately after the rain, the Soviet command undertook aviation and artillery preparation, and at 05:40 the assault on the Oryol ledge from the north and northeast began. By 10:00 the main defensive line of the German troops was broken through in three places, and units of the 4th Panzer Army went into the breakthrough. However, by 16:00, the German command was able to regroup forces and, having withdrawn a number of units from under the station. Ponyri, stop the development of the Soviet offensive. By the evening of the first day of the offensive in the northwest, Soviet troops were able to advance 10-12 km, in the north - up to 7.5 km. In the eastern direction, progress was insignificant.

The next day, the northwestern group was sent to destroy large strongholds in the villages of Staritsa and Ulyanovo. Using a smoke screen and demonstrating an attack with. Staritsa from the north, the advancing units secretly bypassed the settlements and launched a tank attack from the southeast and west. Despite the good provision of settlements, the enemy garrison was completely destroyed. In this battle, the units of the engineering assault search proved to be the best, which skillfully “smoked out” the German firing points in the houses with flamethrowers. At this time in Ulyanovo, the advancing troops with false attacks pulled the entire German garrison to the western outskirts, which made it possible to break into the village on tanks almost unhindered from the side of the village. Staritsa. During the liberation of this important stronghold, the losses on the part of the attackers were small (only ten people were killed).

With the elimination of these centers of resistance, our troops opened the way to the south and southeast. The troops advancing in these directions created a threat to the communications of the Germans between Orel and Bryansk. In two days of fighting, but according to the testimony of prisoners, the German 211th and 293rd infantry divisions were practically destroyed, and the 5th tank division, which suffered heavy losses, was withdrawn to the rear. The defense of the German troops was broken through on a front of 23 km and to a depth of 25 km. However, the German command competently operated with the available reserves, and by July 14, the offensive in this sector was suspended. The fighting took on a positional character.

The troops of the 3rd Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Army, advancing on Orel from the east, successfully crossed several water barriers and, bypassing the pockets of resistance, they tried to break through to Orel on the move. By the time of entering the battle on July 18. 3 Guards the tank army had T-34 tanks - 475, T-70 tanks - 224, guns and mortars - 492. They created a serious danger for the German troops to cut their grouping in half, and therefore anti-tank reserves were introduced against them on the evening of July 19.

Fighters and commanders of engineering and sapper assault brigade who distinguished themselves in the battles for the Eagle.

The pontoon park N-2-P is moving towards the front. Orlovskoye for example.

"Forward, to the Eagle!" Heavy 203-mm B-4 howitzers on the march.

However, since the front was broken through in a wide area, the actions of the German command resembled patching holes in Trishkin's caftan, and were ineffective.

On July 22, the forward units of the 61st Army broke into the Volkhov, improving the position of the troops of the Bryansk Front. At the same time, the troops of the 11th Guards. armies cut the Bolkhov-Orel highway, creating a threat of encirclement to the German Bolkhov group.

At this time, the 63rd Army and units of the 3rd Guards. tank army fought heavy battles with the 3rd tank division of the Germans, transferred from Novo-Sokolniki, and units of the 2nd tank and 36th mechanized divisions, transferred from under Ponyri. Particularly heavy fighting unfolded in the interfluve of Zush, Oleshnya, where the Germans had a well-prepared defensive line, which they tried to occupy with suitable forces. The troops of the 3rd Army on the move seized a bridgehead on the banks of the river. Oleshnya in the Alexandrov area, where the transfer of tanks of the 3rd Guards began. tank army. But south of Aleksandrovka, the offensive was unsuccessful. It was especially difficult to deal with German tanks and assault guns buried in the ground. Nevertheless, by July 19, our troops reached the river. Oleshnya along its entire length. On the night of July 19, along the German line of defense on the river. Oleshnya was dealt a powerful air raid, and in the morning artillery preparation began. At noon, Oleshnya was forced in several places, which created a threat of encirclement of the entire Mnensky group of Germans, and on July 20 they left the city almost without a fight.

On July 15, units of the Central Front also went on the offensive, taking advantage of the withdrawal of part of the German forces from Ponyri. But until July 18, the successes of the Central Front were rather modest. Only on the morning of July 19, the Central Front broke through the German defense line 3-4 km in the direction to the north-west, bypassing Orel. At 11 o'clock, tanks of the 2nd Panzer Army were introduced into the gap.

The crew of the SU-122 receives a combat mission. North of Orel, August 1943

SU-152 of Major Sankovsky, which destroyed 10 German tanks in the first battle. 13th Army, August 1943

It is interesting to note that the artillery pieces handed over to the tank troops for reinforcement were towed by some of the advancing tanks of the 16th Tank Corps. (for which the tanks were equipped with towing hooks), and their calculations were tank landings. The unity of the ammunition of tank and anti-tank guns helped to cope with the problem of the ammunition supply of the guns, and most of the ammunition was brought up by standard tractors (Studebaker, GMC, ZiS-5 cars and the STZ-Nati tractor) and was used by both gunners and and tankers. Such an organization helped to effectively use artillery and tanks in overcoming the enemy's fortified points. But they had little to shoot at tanks. The main targets of Soviet tanks and anti-tank artillery were machine-gun armored caps, anti-tank guns and German self-propelled guns. However, the 3rd TC. the same 2nd Panzer Army used attached anti-tank and light artillery illiterate. The regiments of the Central Brigade were attached to tank brigades, which split them into bag-yards, transferring them to tank battalions. This destroyed the leadership of the brigade, leading to some that the batteries were left to their own devices. Tank battalion commanders demanded that the batteries accompany the tanks under their own power in their combat formations, which led to unreasonably large losses of equipment and personnel of the 2nd IPTABr (trucks in the combat formations of tanks were easy prey for all types of weapons). Yes, and the 3rd shopping mall. suffered heavy losses in the Trosna area, trying to attack the fortified positions of the German grenadiers, reinforced with anti-tank self-propelled guns and assault guns, without reconnaissance and artillery support. The offensive of the Central Front developed slowly. To speed up the advance of the front units and in view of the heavy losses in tanks, on July 24-26, the Stavka transferred the 3rd Guards. tank army from the Bryansk Front to the Central. However, by this time the 3rd Guards. the tank army also suffered heavy losses and therefore could not seriously affect the speed of the front advance. On July 22-24, the most difficult situation was created for the German troops defending near Orel. To the west of the Volkhov, Soviet troops created the greatest threat to the main communications of the German troops. On July 26, a special meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters on the situation of German troops at the Orlovsky bridgehead. As a result of the meeting, it was decided to withdraw all German troops from the Oryol bridgehead to the Hagen line. However, the retreat had to be delayed whenever possible due to the unavailability of the defense line in engineering terms. However, from July 31, the Germans began a systematic withdrawal of their troops from the Oryol bridgehead.

To enlarge - click on the image

In the first days of August, battles began for the suburbs of the city of Orel. On August 4, the 3rd and 63rd armies fought in the eastern suburbs of the city. From the south, Orel was surrounded by mobile formations of the Central Front, which put the defending German troops in a difficult position and forced an urgent withdrawal. By August 5, the fighting in the city had moved to the western outskirts, and on August 6 the city was completely liberated.

At the final stage of the struggle for the Orlovsky bridgehead, the battles unfolded for the city of Karachev, covering the approaches to Bryansk. The battles for Karachev began on August 12. An important role in the course of the offensive was played by engineering units, which restored and cleared the roads destroyed by the German troops during the retreat. By the end of August 14, our troops had broken through the German defenses to the east and northeast of Karachev, and the next day captured the city. With the release of Karachev, the liquidation of the Oryol group was practically completed. By August 17-18, the advancing Soviet troops reached the Hagen line.

With it is read that the offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. As early as July 16, German troops stationed in the area of ​​the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, fearing flank attacks by the Soviet troops, began to retreat to their original positions under the cover of powerful rearguards. But the Soviet troops could not immediately begin the pursuit of the enemy. Only on July 17, parts of the 5th Guards. army and 5th Guards. tank armies were able to shoot down the rearguards and advance 5-6 km. On July 18-19 they were joined by the 6th Guards. army and 1st Panzer Army. The tank units advanced 2-3 km, but the infantry did not follow the tanks. In general, the advance of our troops these days was insignificant. On July 18, all available forces of the Steppe Front under the command of General Konev were to be brought into battle. However, until the end of July 19, the front was engaged in a regrouping of forces. Only on July 20, the troops of the front, consisting of five combined arms armies, managed to advance 5-7 km.

On July 22, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts launched a general offensive and by the end of the next day, having broken through the German barriers, they basically reached the positions that our troops occupied before the start of the German offensive on July 5. However, the further advance of the troops was stopped by German reserves.

The headquarters demanded that the offensive be continued immediately, but its success required a regrouping of forces and replenishment of personnel and materiel. After listening to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters postponed the further offensive by 8 days. In total, by the beginning of the second phase of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts had 50 rifle divisions. 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps and, in addition, 33 tank brigades, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments. Despite the regrouping and replenishment carried out, the tank and artillery units were not fully staffed. The situation was somewhat better near the Voronezh Front, in the zone of which more powerful counterattacks by the German troops were expected. So, the 1st Panzer Army by the beginning of the counteroffensive had T-34 tanks - 412, T-70 - 108, T-60 - 29 (549 in total). 5th Guards the tank army at the same time consisted of 445 tanks of all types and 64 armored vehicles.

Artillerymen of the fighter brigade (combined arms type) pursue the retreating enemy.

The offensive began at dawn on August 3 with a powerful artillery preparation. At 8 am, infantry and breakthrough tanks went on the offensive. The German artillery fire was erratic. Our aviation reigned supreme in the air. By 10 o'clock the advanced units of the 1st Panzer Army had crossed the Vorksla River. In the first half of the day, the infantry units advanced 5-6 km, and the front commander, General Vatutin, brought the main forces of the 1st and 5th Guards into battle. tank armies. By the end of the day, units of the 1st Panzer Army advanced 12 km into the depths of the German defense and approached Tomarovka. Here they met a powerful anti-tank defense and were temporarily stopped. Connections of the 5th Guards. The tank army advanced much further - up to 26 km and reached the Dobraya Volya area.

In a more difficult situation, parts of the Steppe Front advanced north of Belgorod. Lacking such means of reinforcement as Voronezh, his offensive developed more slowly, and by the end of the day, even after the tanks of the 1st mechanized corps were brought into battle, units of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 km.

On August 4 and 5, the main efforts of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were aimed at eliminating the Tomarovsky and Belgorod corners of resistance. On the morning of August 5, units of the 6th Guards. armies began fighting for Tomarovka and by evening cleared it of German troops. The enemy actively counterattacked in groups of 20-40 tanks with the support of assault guns and motorized infantry, but to no avail. By the morning of August 6, the Tomarovsk resistance center was cleared of German troops. The mobile group of the Voronezh Front at that time advanced 30-50 km deep into the enemy defenses, creating a threat of encirclement for the defending troops.

On August 5, the troops of the Voronezh Front started fighting for Belgorod. Troops of the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Having crossed the Northern Donets, the troops of the 7th Guards came to the eastern outskirts. army, and from the west Belgorod was bypassed by mobile units of the 1st mechanized corps. By 18 o'clock the city was completely cleared of German troops, a large amount of abandoned German equipment and ammunition was captured.

The liberation of Belgorod and the destruction of the Tomarovsky center of resistance allowed the advancing mobile groups of the Voronezh Front as part of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies to enter the operational space. By the end of the third day of the offensive, it became clear that the pace of the offensive of the Soviet troops on the southern front was much higher than the floor of Orlom. But for the successful offensive of the Steppe Front, he did not have enough tanks. By the end of the day, at the request of the command of the Steppe Front and a representative of the Headquarters, 35 thousand people, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KV-lc tanks were allocated to the front for replenishment. In addition, the front was reinforced by two engineering brigades and four regiments of self-propelled artillery.

Grenadier after the battle. August 1943

On the night of August 7, Soviet troops attacked the German resistance center in Borisovka and took it by noon the next day. In the evening our troops took Grayvoron. Here intelligence reported that a large column of German troops was moving towards the city. The artillery commander of the 27th Army ordered that all available artillery weapons be brought forward to destroy the column. Over 30 large-caliber guns and a battalion of rocket-propelled mortars suddenly opened fire on the column, while new guns were hastily installed in positions and included in the firing. The blow was so unexpected that many german cars were thrown perfectly serviceable. In total, more than 60 guns of caliber from 76 to 152 mm and about 20 rocket launchers took part in the shelling. More than five hundred corpses, as well as up to 50 tanks and assault guns, were left by German troops. According to the testimony of the prisoners, these were the remnants of the 255th, 332nd, 57th infantry and part of the 19th tank division. During the fighting on August 7, the Borisov grouping of German troops ceased to exist.

On August 8, the right-flank 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to the Steppe Front, and on August 9 also the 5th Guards. tank army. The main direction of the Steppe Front's offensive was now bypassing the Kharkov grouping of German troops. At the same time, the 1st Panzer Army received an order to cut the main railway and highway roads leading from Kharkov to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozova.

By the end of August 10, the 1st Panzer Army managed to capture the Kharkov-Poltava railway, but further its advance to the south was stopped. Nevertheless, Soviet troops approached Kharkov at a distance of 8-11 km, threatening the communications of the Kharkov defensive grouping of German troops.

StuG 40 assault gun, knocked out by Golovnev's gun. Akhtyrka region.

Soviet self-propelled guns SU-122 in the attack on Kharkov. August 1943.

Anti-tank gun RaK 40 on a trailer near the RSO tractor, left after shelling near Bogodukhov.

Tanks T-34 with infantry landing in the attack on Kharkov.

In order to somehow improve the situation, on August 11, German troops launched a counterattack in the Bogodukhovsky direction on parts of the 1st Panzer Army with a hastily assembled group, which included the 3rd Panzer Division and parts of the SS Panzer Divisions Totenkopf, Das Reich and Viking. This blow significantly slowed down the pace of the offensive not only of the Voronezh, but also of the Steppe Front, since the latter had to take part of the units to form an operational reserve. By August 12, in the Valkovsky direction south of Bogodukhov, the Germans were constantly attacking with tank and motorized infantry units, but they could not achieve decisive success. How they failed to recapture the Kharkiv-Poltava railway. To reinforce the 1st Tank Army, which by August 12 consisted of only 134 tanks (instead of 600), the battered 5th Guards was also transferred to the Bogodukhovskoye direction. tank army, which included 115 serviceable tanks. On August 13, during the fighting, the German squadron managed to penetrate somewhat into the junction between the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards. tank army. The anti-tank artillery of both armies ceased to exist, and the commander of the Voronezh Front, Gen. Vatutin decided to bring into battle the reserves of the 6th Guards. army and all reinforcement artillery, which deployed south of Bogodukhov.

On August 14, the intensity of German tank attacks subsided, while units of the 6th Guards. armies made significant progress, advancing 4-7 km. But the next day, the German troops, having regrouped their forces, broke through the defense line of the 6th Panzer Corps and went to the rear of the 6th Guards. army, which was forced to withdraw to the north and go on the defensive. The next day, the Germans tried to build on their success in the band of the 6th Guards. army, but all their efforts ended in nothing. During the Bogodukhov operation against enemy tanks, the Petlyakov dive bombers performed especially well, and at the same time, the insufficient effectiveness of the Ilyushin attack aircraft was noted (by the way, the same results were noted during defensive battles on the northern face).

The crew is trying to level the overturned tank PzKpfw III Ausf M. SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".

German troops retreat across the Donets River. August 1943

T-34 tanks knocked out in the Akhtyrka area.

Soviet troops are moving towards Kharkov.

The Steppe Front had the task of destroying the Kharkov defensive center and liberating Kharkov. Front commander I. Konev, having received intelligence about the defensive installations of German troops in the Kharkov region, decided to destroy, if possible, the German grouping on the outskirts of the city and prevent the withdrawal of German tank troops into the city limits. On August 11, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive bypass of the city and began its assault. But only the next day, after the introduction of all artillery reserves, it was possible to wedge a little into it. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the 5th Guards. the tank army was involved in repulsing the German snowcock in the Bogodukhov area. There were not enough tanks, but thanks to the actions of artillery, on August 13, the 53rd, 57th, 69th and 7th Guards. armies broke through the outer defensive contour and approached the suburbs.

Between August 13-17, Soviet troops started fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov. The fighting did not stop at night. The Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. So, in some regiments of the 7th Guards. Army on August 17, there were no more than 600 people. The 1st mechanized corps had only 44 tanks (less than the number of a tank brigade), more than half were light. But the defending side also suffered heavy losses. According to the reports of the prisoners, in some companies of the units of the Kempf group defending in Kharkov, there were 30 ... 40 people left.

German gunners fire from the IeFH 18 howitzer at the advancing Soviet troops. Kharkov direction, August 1943

Studebakers with ZIS-3 anti-tank guns on a trailer follow the advancing troops. Kharkov direction.

A Churchill heavy tank of the 49th Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment of the 5th Tank Army follows a wrecked eight-wheeled armored car SdKfz 232. On the side of the tank turret there is an inscription "For Radyanska Ukraine". Kharkov direction, July-August 1943.

Scheme of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation.

To enlarge - click on the image

On August 18, German troops made another attempt to stop the troops of the Voronezh Front, striking north of Akhtyrka on the flank of the 27th Army. The strike force involved the Grossdeutchland motorized division, deployed from near Bryansk. 10th Motorized Division, parts of the 11th and 19th Panzer Divisions and two independent heavy tank battalions. The grouping consisted of about 16 thousand soldiers, 400 tanks, about 260 guns. The grouping was opposed by units of the 27th Army, consisting of approx. 15 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks and up to 180 guns. To repel a counterattack, up to 100 tanks and 700 guns could be brought in from neighboring sectors. However, the command of the 27th Army was late in assessing the timing of the offensive of the Akhtyr group of German troops, and therefore the transfer of reinforcements began already during the German counteroffensive that had begun.

On the morning of August 18, the Germans carried out a strong artillery preparation and launched an offensive against the positions of the 166th division. Until 10 o'clock the division's artillery successfully repulsed the attacks of German tanks, but after 11 o'clock, when the Germans brought up to 200 tanks into battle, the division's artillery was put out of action, and the front was broken through. By 1300, the Germans had broken through to the headquarters of the division, and by the end of the day they had advanced in a narrow wedge to a depth of 24 km in a southeasterly direction. To localize the strike, the 4th Guards were introduced. tank corps and units of the 5th Guards. tank corps, which attacked the group that had broken through to the flank and rear.

The long-range 152-mm Br-2 gun is preparing to open fire on the retreating German troops.

German gunners reflect the attack of the Soviet troops.
Despite the fact that the strike of the Akhtyrskaya grouping was stopped, it greatly slowed down the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and complicated the operation to encircle the Kharkov grouping of German troops. It was only on August 21-25 that the Akhtyrskaya corps was destroyed and the city was liberated.

Soviet artillery enters Kharkov.

Tank T-34 on the outskirts of Kharkov.

"Panther", lined by the calculation of Guards. senior sergeant Parfenov on the outskirts of Kharkov.

At a time when the troops of the Voronezh Front were fighting in the Bogodukhov area, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached Kharkov. On August 18, the troops of the 53rd Army began fighting for a heavily fortified forest area on the northwestern outskirts of the city. The Germans turned it into a fortified area, stuffed with machine-gun emplacements and anti-tank guns. All attempts by the army to break through the massif into the city were repulsed. Only with the onset of darkness, having advanced all the artillery to open positions, did the Soviet troops succeed in knocking the defenders from their positions, and by the morning of August 19 they reached the Uda River and in some places began crossing.

Due to the fact that most of the retreat routes of the German grouping from Kharkov were cut off, and the threat of complete encirclement loomed over the group itself, in the afternoon of August 22, the Germans began to withdraw their units from the city limits. However, all attempts by the Soviet troops to break into the city ran into dense artillery and machine-gun fire from the units left in the rearguard. In order to prevent the German troops from withdrawing combat-ready units and serviceable equipment, the commander of the Steppe Front ordered a night assault. Huge masses of troops were concentrated in a small area adjacent to the city, and at 2 am on August 23 they began the assault.

"Tame" "Panther" on the street of the liberated Kharkov. August-September 1943

Total losses of tank armies during offensive operations

Note: The first digit - tanks and self-propelled guns of all brands, in brackets - T-34

Irretrievable losses amounted to T-34 tanks - up to 31%, for T-70 tanks - up to 43% of the total losses. The sign "~" marks very contradictory data obtained indirectly.

The units of the 69th Army were the first to break into the city, followed by units of the 7th Guards Army. The Germans retreated, hiding behind strong rearguards, reinforced tanks and assault guns. At 0430 hours, the 183rd division reached Dzerzhinsky Square, and by dawn the city was largely liberated. But only in the afternoon ended the fighting on its outskirts, where the streets were clogged with equipment and weapons abandoned during the retreat. In the evening of the same day, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov, but the fighting continued for another week to destroy the remnants of the Kharkov defensive group. On August 30, the inhabitants of Kharkov celebrated the complete liberation of the city. The Battle of Kursk is over.

CONCLUSION

To The battle of Ur was the first battle of the Second World War, in which masses of tanks took part on both sides. The attackers tried to use them according to the traditional scheme - to break through defensive lines in narrow areas and further develop the offensive. The defenders also relied on the experience of 1941-42. and initially used their tanks to carry out counterattacks designed to restore the difficult situation in certain sectors of the front.

However, this use of tank units was not justified, since both sides underestimated the increased power of the anti-tank defense of their opponents. For the German troops, the high density of Soviet artillery and the good engineering preparation of the defense line turned out to be unexpected. The Soviet command, on the other hand, did not expect the high maneuverability of the German anti-tank units, which quickly regrouped and met the counterattacking Soviet tanks with well-aimed ambush fire even in the conditions of their own offensive. As practice showed during the Battle of Kursk, the Germans achieved the best results using tanks in the manner of self-propelled guns, firing at the positions of the Soviet troops from a long distance, while infantry units stormed them. The defenders, on the other hand, achieved better results, also using tanks "in a self-propelled way", firing from tanks dug into the ground.

Despite the high concentration of tanks in the armies of both sides, anti-tank and self-propelled artillery still remained the main enemy of armored combat vehicles. The total role of aviation, infantry and tanks in the fight against them was small - less than 25% of the total number of those shot down and destroyed.

Nevertheless, it was the Battle of Kursk that became the event that prompted the development by both sides of new tactics for the use of tanks and self-propelled guns in the offensive and defense.

Battle of Kursk
	Central Russia, Eastern Ukraine
	Red Army victory
Commanders
Georgy Zhukov	Erich von Manstein
Nikolai Vatutin	Gunther Hans von Kluge
Ivan Konev	Walter Model
Konstantin Rokossovsky	Herman Goth
Side forces
By the beginning of the operation, 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve, 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve, 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve, 2172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve reserve	According to Soviet data - approx. 900 thousand people, According to him. data - 780 thousand people. 2758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair), approx. 10 thousand guns, approx. 2050 aircraft
Defensive phase: Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all) Irrevocable - 70,330 Sanitary - 107,517 Operation "Kutuzov": Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front Irrevocable - 112,529 Sanitary - 317 361 Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front Irrevocable - 71 611 Sanitary - 183 955 General in the Battle of the Kursk Salient: Irrevocable - 189 652 Sanitary - 406 743 In the Battle of Kursk in general ~ 254 470 killed, captured, missing missing 608,833 wounded and sick 153,000 small arms 6,064 tanks and self-propelled guns 5,245 guns and mortars 1,626 combat aircraft	According to German sources, 103,600 were killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433,933 wounded. According to Soviet sources, 500 thousand total losses in the Kursk salient. 1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet less than 1696 aircraft

Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943, also known as Battle of Kursk) in terms of its scale, involved forces and means, tension, results and military-political consequences, is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle "Operation Citadel".

After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war went over to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.

Preparing for battle

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). During April-June 1943, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties were preparing for the summer campaign.

Plans and forces of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging strikes from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The shock groups were to link up in the Kursk region, surrounding the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name "Citadel". According to the German general Friedrich Fangor (German. Friedrich Fangohr), at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Goth: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyansky direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of Soviet troops.

For the operation, the Germans concentrated a grouping of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 were tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 divisions of assault guns, total strength, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people. The command of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Panzer, 2nd and 9th Armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th Panzer Army, the 24th Panzer Corps and Operational Group "Kempf" (commander - General German Goth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

To carry out the operation in the Kursk region, several elite SS Panzer divisions were advanced:

• 1st Division Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler"
• 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
• 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (Dead Head)

The troops received a number of new equipment:

• 134 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks (another 14 command tanks)
• 190 Pz.Kpfw.V "Panther" (11 more - evacuation (without guns) and command)
• 90 assault guns Sd.Kfz. 184 Ferdinand (45 each in sPzJgAbt 653 and sPzJgAbt 654)
• only 348 relatively new tanks and self-propelled guns ("Tiger" was used several times in 1942 and early 1943).

At the same time, however, a significant number of frankly outdated tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the German units: 384 units (Pz.III, Pz.II, even Pz.I). Also during the Battle of Kursk, the German Sd.Kfz.302 telewagons were used for the first time.

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, wear down the enemy troops and inflict defeat on them, inflicting counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. To this end, a defense in depth was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average density of mining in the direction of the expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.

The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with the different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as the difference in the methods of accounting and classification of military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is associated with the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources
Source	Personnel (thousand)		Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns		Guns and (sometimes) mortars		Aircraft
						about 10000	2172 or 2900 (including Po-2 and far)
Krivosheev 2001
Glantz, House				2696 or 2928
Mueller Gill.				2540 or 2758
Zett, Frankson			5128 +2688 "rate reserve" total over 8000

The role of intelligence

From the beginning of 1943, the intercepts of secret communications from the Nazi High Command and Hitler's secret directives increasingly referred to Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, on March 27 he was informed in general details by Stalin about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the Plan of Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command, which was endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by Hitler, translated from German, fell on Stalin’s desk, who signed it only three days later. This data was obtained by a scout who worked under the name "Werther". The real name of this man is still unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luci agent operating in Switzerland, Rudolf Rössler. There is an alternative suggestion that Werther is the personal photographer of Adolf Hitler.

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from the intelligence agencies of the fronts of the Kursk direction, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk salient:

Although the exact text of The Citadel lay on Stalin's desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before german plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command, and the general details about the existence of such a plan were known to them at least eight days before.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time, counter-barrage preparation was carried out by the forces of two fronts with the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. An unsuccessful air raid was also carried out by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the Kharkov and Belgorod enemy air hubs.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning our time, the Germans also inflicted bombing and artillery strikes on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was inflicted in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having not achieved success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they could not break through the Soviet defenses. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the German 9th Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main blows of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky.

Operation "Citadel" - the general offensive of the German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K. K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N. F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk by counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk ledge, as well as the defeat of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station). Main blow from southern directions were applied by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Herman Goth, 48th TC and 2nd SS TC) with the support of the army group "Kempf" (W. Kempf).

At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (commander: O. von Knobelsdorf, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the strongest unit of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 Panzer divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Grossdeutschland", 10 tank brigade and 911 det. division of assault guns, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka-Butovo area in the direction of Cherkasskoe-Yakovlevo-Oboyan. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area, 48 TC would connect with units of the 2nd SS TD (thus surrounding units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and 67 Guards Rifle Division), change units of the 2nd SS TD, after which it was supposed to use units of the SS division against the operational reserves of the Red Army in the area of ​​Art. Prokhorovka, and 48 shopping mall was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.

To accomplish the task, the units of the 48th TC on the first day of the offensive (Day "X") needed to crack the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and the 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoye and carry out a breakthrough with armored units in towards the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th shopping mall determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, part 48 of shopping mall. should have reached the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet units and formations, the courage and stamina they showed, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, the Wehrmacht's plans in this direction were "significantly adjusted" - 48 shopping mall did not reach Oboyan.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow rate of advance of the 48th mk on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the terrain by the Soviet units (starting from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of assault aircraft on the accumulated front engineering obstacles to enemy tanks, competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the lane of the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the lane of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the combat formations of battalions of the 196th Guards Rifle Division .sp (Colonel V. I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassky, timely maneuver by divisional (245 otp, 1440 sap) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 oiptabr colonel N. D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces 245 otp ( lieutenant colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks M3) and 1440 glanders (lieutenant colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the outposts in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 battalions. 199th guards regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers' barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of 48 TC (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11 TD and 332 RD before the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day "X-1", however, the resistance of the combat guard was not completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors affected both the speed of concentration of units in their original positions before the main attack, and their advancement during the offensive itself.

Also, the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units affected the pace of the corps' offensive. In particular, the Great Germany division (W. Heierlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and 10 tank brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 command tanks Pz.V) under the current conditions battles turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (especially great difficulties were caused by overcoming the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkassky), came under a combined attack by Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments 33 from Pabr (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer corps), and could not deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the turn Korovino - Cherkasskoye for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that overcame anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own fire weapons. So, for example, the battle group of the 3rd Battalion of the Fusiliers Regiment, which was at the forefront of the strike of the VG division, at the time of the first attack, found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division could not actually bring them into battle for a long time.

The result of the resulting congestion on the advance routes was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th tank corps in firing positions, which affected the results of the artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th TC became a hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of the higher authorities. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative effect - all divisions of the corps were put into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, 1943, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of 48 mk on the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: active operations of sapper-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and an overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the initiative actions of units 11 TD (I. Mikl) and 911 TD. division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and access to the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy by a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of the German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer of 1943. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself in the fight against both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptap were armed with 45 mm guns, the power of 76 mm Soviet field and American tanks th guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards. And, but also in the second line of defense of the 1st tank army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied behind it).

Only after overcoming in the second half of the day the main mass of tanks of anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassky, having repelled a number of counterattacks of the Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11 TD were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00 division commander A. I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassky, as well as to the center of the village. During the withdrawal of units of 196 Guards Rifles, minefields were set up. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers of the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassky). A little later, the 3rd TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th TC of the Wehrmacht was the wedging into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating east in parallel with 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. BUT.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was crushed around midnight on July 5th. However, the German units were able to establish full control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division, not possessing large tank formations (they had only 39 American M3 tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245 otp and 1440 sap) were held for about a day in the area of ​​​​the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoe five enemy divisions (of which three are armored). In the battle on July 5, 1943, in the area of ​​​​Cherkassky, the fighters and commanders of the 196th and 199th guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments 67 guards. divisions. The competent and truly heroic actions of the fighters and commanders of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up the army reserves to the place where the units of the 48th TC were wedged in at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this sector in the following days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoye actually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts, it was a “lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoye on July 5, 1943, one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops, is unfortunately one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, 4 TA wedged into the defense of 6 Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the area of ​​​​offensive 48 TC (near the village of Cherkasskoe) and 12-13 km in the area of ​​​​2 TC SS (in the area of ​​​​Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second the line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - on July 5 did not complete the task of the day, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the advancing 4th tank army. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Dead Head TD, to cover his right flank against the 375th Rifle Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly proved themselves in the battles of July 5 .

On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd SS TC (334 tanks) were determined: for the Dead Head TD (brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th rifle division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Lipovy Donets, for TD "Leibstandarte" (brigadeführer T. Vish, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and "Das Reich" (brigadeführer V. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village. Yakovlevo and exit to the line of the bend of the river Psel - with. Teterevino.

At about 09:00 on July 6, 1943, after a powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and 55 MP six-barreled mortars) with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps moved into offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by 154 and 156 guards sp. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify the command and control posts of the regiments of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and launch a fire raid on them, which led to the disorganization of communications and command and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division repelled enemy attacks without communication with the higher command, since the work of communication officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle.

The initial success of the attack of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the regiments of the divisions, artillery and aviation - the advanced units of the divisions, the main ramming force of which was the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end a few hundred meters from the trenches.

By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments were knocked out of their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; the left-flank 158th Guards Rifle Regiment, having bent its right flank, generally continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments was carried out mixed with tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy and was associated with heavy losses (in particular, in 156 Guards Rifle Regiment out of 1685 people on July 7, about 200 people remained in the ranks, that is, the regiment was actually destroyed) . The general leadership of the retreating battalions was practically absent, the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments went to the positions of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the suitable 5th Guards Rifle Division from the reserve. Stalingrad tank corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M.N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel A.M. Shchekal) fought hard battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the advance of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich combat groups in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the artillerymen managed to keep most their heavy weapons. A fleeting but fierce battle flared up for the village of Luchki, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich the 464th guards artillery division and 460th guards managed to deploy. mortar battalion 6 guards msbr 5 guards. Stk (at the same time, due to insufficient provision of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).

At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After that, up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front, there were actually no units of the 6th Guards in front of the Das Reich combat group. armies capable of holding back its offensive: the main forces of the anti-tank artillery of the army (namely, 14, 27 and 28 oiptabr) were located to the west - on Oboyanskoye Highway and in the offensive zone of 48 TC, which, according to the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main German strikes (which was not entirely true - the strikes of both German tank corps 4 TA were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the strike of the TD "Das Reich" artillery from the 6th Guards. And by this point, it just wasn't.

The offensive of the Leibstandarte TD in the Oboyan direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of the Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of Soviet artillery in its offensive area (the regiments of Major Kosachev's 28th Oiptabr were active), timely strikes of the 1st Guards. brigade (colonel V. M. Gorelov) and 49 brigade (lieutenant colonel A. F. Burda) from the 3 mechanized corps 1 TA M. E. Katukov, as well as the presence of a well-fortified village of Yakovlevo in its offensive zone, in street battles in which for some time bogged down the main forces of the division, including its tank regiment.

Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS TC had basically completed the first part of the general offensive plan - the left flank of the 6th Guards. A was crushed, and a little later with the capture of s. Yakovlevo, on the part of the 2nd shopping mall of the SS, conditions were prepared for their replacement with units of the 48th shopping mall. The advanced units of the 2nd SS TC were ready to begin to fulfill one of the general goals of the Citadel operation - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of ​​​​st. Prokhorovka. However, Herman Goth (commander of 4 TA) failed to fully fulfill the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of 48 TC (O. von Knobelsdorf), who faced the skillful defense of Katukov's army that entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to surround some regiments of the 67th and 52nd guards divisions of the 6th guards in the afternoon. And in the interfluve of the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa (with a total strength of about a rifle division), however, having stumbled upon the rigid defense of the brigades of 3 microns (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) on the second line of defense, the corps divisions could not capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and go to the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of parts 2 shopping mall SS. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the combat group of the tank regiment of the 3rd tank regiment (F. Westkhoven), which gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tankers and artillerymen of the 22nd tank brigade (Colonel N. G. Vennichev), which was part of the 6th tank regiment (Major General A D. Hetman) 1 TA.

Nevertheless, the success achieved by the divisions "Leibstandarte", and in particular "Das Reich", forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakov on the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin, by his order, transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad shopping mall (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV Churchill) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34s and 17 are Mk.IV Churchills) under the command of the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division with the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Division. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 TC SS with the forces of 2 Guards. TTK (straight through the battle formations of 375 rifle divisions). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I. M. Chistyakov puts the commander of the 5th Guards. Stk Major General A. G. Kravchenko tasked with withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strongholds) of the main part of the corps (two of the three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and the application by these forces of a counterattack on the flank of the Leibstandarte TD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture with. Luchki tanks of the division "Das Reich", and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the implementation of this order. However, under the threat of arrests and execution, they were forced to proceed with its implementation. The attack of the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery means of the 5th Guards. Stk did not have, and the order did not leave time to link the actions of the corps with neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on level ground and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich TD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After that, pulling up the anti-tank artillery and organizing flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich TD between 17 and 19 hours managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenap (Major Savchenko) and 464 guards artillery that had withdrawn from the village of Luchki .division and 460 guards. mortar battalion of the 6th guards msbr. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich TD actually managed to surround most of the 5th Guards. Stk between s. Luchki and Kalinin farm, after which, building on success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka, tried to seize the Belenikhino junction. However, thanks to the initiative actions of the commander and battalion commanders of the 20 brigade (lieutenant colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) of the 5th Guards, which remained outside the encirclement ring. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various parts of the corps that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of Das Reich, and even force the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without communication with the headquarters of the corps, on the night of July 7, the encircled units of the 5th Guards. Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and connected with parts of the 20 brigade. During July 6, 1943, units of the 5th Guards. Stk for combat reasons, 119 tanks were irretrievably lost, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unexplained reasons, and 19 were sent for repair. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 exceeded even the losses of the 29th Tank Corps during the attack on July 12 near the Oktyabrsky temporary storage warehouse).

After the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, continuing to develop success in the northern direction, another detachment of the Das Reich tank regiment, using the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of army defense occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V. D. Kryuchenkon) , near the Teterevino farm, and for a short time wedged into the defense of the 285th joint venture of the 183rd rifle division, however, due to a clear lack of strength, having lost several tanks, he was forced to retreat. The exit of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front already on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

The offensive of the “Dead Head” TD did not receive significant development during July 6 due to the stubborn resistance of units of the 375th rifle division, as well as the counterattack of the 2nd guards carried out in the afternoon on its sector. Tatsinsky tank corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 tanks), which took place simultaneously with the counterattack of the 2nd Guards. Stk, and demanded the involvement of all the reserves of this SS division and even some parts of the Das Reich TD. However, to inflict losses on the Tatsinsky Corps even approximately commensurate with the losses of the 5th Guards. The Germans did not succeed in the Stk, even despite the fact that during the counterattack the corps had to cross the Lipovy Donets River twice, and some of its units were surrounded for a short time. Losses of the 2nd Guards. TTK for July 6 amounted to: 17 tanks burned out and 11 lined, that is, the corps remained fully combat-ready.

Thus, during July 6, formations of 4 TA managed to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank, inflicted significant losses on the troops of 6 Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, of the two tank corps transferred to it - one). As a result of the loss of control of units of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the 5th Guards Division. Stk, at the junction of 1 TA and 5 Guards. Stk formed a section not occupied by Soviet troops, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug up 1 TA brigades, using his experience in defensive battles near Orel in 1941.

However, all the successes of the 2nd SS TC, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be translated into a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of the Kempf AG, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG "Kempf" still could not provide the right flank of the 4th TA, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. TTK supported by the still combat-ready 375 sd. Also significant to the further course of events was the loss of the Germans in armored vehicles. So, for example, in the tank regiment of the TD "Great Germany" 48 mk, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were listed as incapacitated (Soviet troops disabled 59 out of 112 vehicles, including 12 "Tigers" out of 14 available), and in 10 tank brigade to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, less ambitious tasks were set for the 4th TA corps than on July 6 - expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the flanks of the army.

The commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, O. von Knobelsdorf, on the evening of July 6 summed up the results of the day's battle:

Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet one, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored attack. Due to the loss of combat capability and the failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, the overall operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of the Soviet defense in the area of ​​​​the breakthrough of the German 4th TA was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. And I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of 1 TA M. E. Katukov. The main frame of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Panzer Army.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest (or one of the largest) in the history of the oncoming tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area.

According to data from Soviet sources, from the German side, about 700 tanks and assault guns participated in the battle, according to V. Zamulin - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 "Tigers") and self-propelled guns.

On the Soviet side, the 5th Panzer Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, participated in the battle. After a massive air strike was launched, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day.

Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12: the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and high. 252.2 resembled the surf - four tank brigades of the Red Army, three SAP batteries, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves against the defense of the SS grenadier regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, they retreated. This went on for almost five hours, until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering enormous losses in the process.

From the memoirs of a participant in the battle, Untersturmführer Gurs, commander of a motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd grp:

During the battle, a lot of tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of order. The high level of casualties in the 32nd brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of total number), commander tank platoon(61%), company (100%) and battalion (50%). Very high losses were suffered by the command link and in the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade, many commanders of companies and platoons were killed and seriously injured. His commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, failed (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital).

Grigory Penezhko, a participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st brigade, later Hero of the Soviet Union, recalled the condition of a person in those terrible conditions:

... Heavy pictures remained in my memory ... There was such a roar that the membranes pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron ... From point-blank shots, turrets turned, twisted guns, armor burst, tanks exploded. From shots into gas tanks, the tanks instantly flared up. hatches opened and tank crews tried to get out. I saw a young lieutenant, half burnt, hanging from his armour. Wounded, he could not get out of the hatch. And so he died. There was no one around to help him. We lost the sense of time, we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cockpit of the tank. One thought, one desire - while alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols, grabbed them hand-to-hand. I remember the captain, who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of a wrecked German "tiger" and hit the hatch with his machine gun in order to "smoke out" the Nazis from there. I remember how bravely the commander of the tank company Chertorizhsky acted. He knocked out the enemy "Tiger", but he himself was shot down. Jumping out of the car, the tankers put out the fire. And went to fight again

By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, the German troops could not move forward in any significant way, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by the tactical mistakes of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers on July 5-12, Manstein's troops were forced, having trampled on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin the withdrawal of troops from the captured "bridgehead". During the battle there was a turning point. The Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, threw back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers are being questioned. For example, according to the calculations of G. A. Oleinikov, more than 300 German tanks could not take part in the battle. According to the research of A. Tomzov, referring to the data of the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 tanks Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS TC on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf Division.

At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks.

According to the memoirs of Major General of the Wehrmacht F. W. von Mellenthin, in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part - up to 240 vehicles in total, including including four "tigers". It was not supposed to meet a serious enemy, according to the German command, TA Rotmistrova was drawn into the battle against the “Dead Head” division (in fact, one corps) and a counter attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks was a complete surprise.

However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command “overslept” the enemy and the TA attack with attached corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but pursued the goal of going into the rear of the SS tank corps, for which its “Dead Head” division was taken.

The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to reorganize for battle, the Soviet tankers had to do this already under fire.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed the losses of their front to be 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers of the German command are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.

According to Soviet data, only in the Kursk defensive operation from July 5 to July 23, 1943, the Germans lost 70,000 killed, 3,095 tanks and self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft and over 5,000 vehicles.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

According to Ivan Bagramyan, the Sicilian operation did not affect the Battle of Kursk in any way, since the Germans were transferring forces from west to east, so "the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk facilitated the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy."

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov)

On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Panzer and 9th German armies in the area of ​​the city of Orel. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Orlovsky bridgehead and began to withdraw to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5, at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol. According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis were destroyed in the Oryol operation.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev)

On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railroad on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were not successful.

On August 5, the first salute in the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The victory near Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front was stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for an offensive on the Dnieper.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, later wrote:

According to Guderian,

Differences in loss estimates

The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. M. Samsonov, speak of more than 500 thousand killed, wounded and captured, 1500 tanks and over 3700 aircraft.

However, German archival data show that in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). In particular, based on 10-day reports of their own losses, the Germans lost:

Total total losses of enemy troops that took part in the attack on the Kursk salient for the entire period 01-31.7.43.: 83545 . Therefore, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943 the Germans lost 130,429 people killed. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, 420 thousand Nazis were exterminated (which is 3.2 times more than Overmans), and 38,600 were taken prisoner.

In addition, according to German documents, the Luftwaffe lost 1696 aircraft on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even the Soviet military reports on German losses were not considered true. Soviet commanders during the war years. So, the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Malinin wrote to the lower headquarters:

In works of art

• Liberation (movie epic)

• "Battle for Kursk" BattleofKursk, German Die Deutsche Wochenshau) - video chronicle (1943)
• "Tanks! Battle of Kursk" Tanks!The Battle of Kursk) is a 1999 documentary film produced by Cromwell Productions.
• "War of the Generals. Kursk" (eng. GeneralsatWar) is a documentary by Keith Barker, 2009
• "Kursk Bulge" is a documentary film shot by V. Artemenko.
• Panzerkampf composition by Sabaton

The Battle of Kursk, in terms of its scale, military and political significance, is rightfully considered one of the key battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. The battle on the Kursk Bulge finally established the power of the Red Army and completely broke the morale of the Wehrmacht forces. After it, the German army completely lost its offensive potential.

The Battle of Kursk, or as it is also called in Russian historiography - the Battle of the Kursk Bulge - is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5-August 23).

Historians call the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk the two most significant victories of the Red Army against the forces of the Wehrmacht, which completely turned the tide of hostilities.

In this article, we will learn the date of the Battle of Kursk and its role and significance during the war, as well as its causes, course and results.

The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk can hardly be overestimated. If it were not for the exploits of the Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans were able to seize the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, moving again to Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army defeated most of the combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and he lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, as they were already depleted.

In honor of the victory, August 23 forever became the Day of Russian Military Glory. In addition, the largest and bloodiest tank battle in history took place during the battles, as well as a huge amount of aircraft and other types of equipment.

The Battle of Kursk is also called the Battle of the Fiery Arc - all because of the crucial importance of this operation and the bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.

The Battle of Stalingrad, which took place earlier than the Battle of Kursk, completely destroyed the plans of the Germans regarding the rapid capture of the USSR. According to the Barbarossa plan and the blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell swoop even before winter. Now the Soviet Union gathered its strength and was able to seriously challenge the Wehrmacht.

During the Battle of Kursk on July 5-August 23, 1943, according to historians, at least 200 thousand soldiers died, more than half a million were wounded. At the same time, it is important to note that many historians consider these figures to be underestimated and the losses of the parties in the Battle of Kursk may be much more significant. Mostly foreign historians speak about the bias of these data.

Intelligence service

Played a huge role in the victory over Germany Soviet intelligence, who was able to learn about the so-called Operation Citadel. Soviet intelligence officers began to receive messages about this operation as early as the beginning of 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was placed on the table of the Soviet leader, which contained complete information about the operation - the date of its implementation, the tactics and strategy of the German army. It was hard to imagine what would happen if intelligence did not do its job. Probably, the Germans would still have managed to break through the Russian defenses, since the preparations for Operation Citadel were serious - they were preparing for it no worse than for Operation Barbarossa.

At the moment, historians are not sure exactly who delivered this crucial knowledge to Stalin. It is believed that this information was obtained by one of the British intelligence officers John Cancross, as well as a member of the so-called "Cambridge Five" (a group of British intelligence officers that was recruited by the USSR in the early 1930s and worked for two governments at once).

There is also an opinion that the intelligence officers of the Dora group, namely the Hungarian intelligence officer Sandor Rado, transmitted information about the plans of the German command.

Some historians believe that all the information about the operation "Citadel" was transferred to Moscow by one of the most famous scouts during the Second World War - Rudolf Ressler, who at that time was in Switzerland.

Significant support for the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to hack the German Lorenz cipher machine, which transmitted messages between members of the top leadership of the Third Reich. The first step was to intercept plans for a summer offensive in the Kursk and Belgorod region, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.

Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future battlefield, he already knew how the strategic offensive of the German army would go. However, there is no confirmation of his words - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the offensive operation "Citadel" and was able to adequately prepare for it, so as not to leave the Germans a chance to win.

Preparing for battle

At the beginning of 1943, offensive actions were carried out by the German and Soviet armies, which led to the formation of a ledge in the center of the Soviet-German front, reaching a depth of 150 kilometers. This ledge was called the "Kursk Bulge". In April, it became clear to both sides that one of the key battles that could decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front would soon begin over this ledge.

There was no consensus in the German headquarters. For a long time, Hitler could not work out an exact strategy for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were opposed to the offensive at the moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it began right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army could prepare for it. The rest either believed that it was time to go on the defensive, or to launch an offensive in the summer.

Despite the fact that the most experienced commander of the Reich (Manshetein) was against it, Hitler nevertheless agreed to launch an offensive in early July 1943.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943 is the Union's chance to consolidate the initiative after the victory at Stalingrad, and therefore the preparation of the operation was treated with a previously unprecedented seriousness.

The state of affairs at the headquarters of the USSR was much better. Stalin was aware of the plans of the Germans, he had a numerical advantage in infantry, tanks, guns and aircraft. Knowing how and when the Germans would advance, the Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications to meet them and set up minefields to repel the attack, and then go on the counteroffensive. A huge role in the successful defense was played by the experience of Soviet military leaders, who, in two years of hostilities, were still able to work out the tactics and strategy of warfare of the best military leaders of the Reich. The fate of Operation Citadel was sealed before it even began.

Plans and forces of the parties

The German command planned to conduct a major offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge under the name (code name) "Citadel". In order to destroy the Soviet defense, the Germans decided to inflict descending strikes from the north (the region of the city of Orel) and from the south (the region of the city of Belgorod). Having broken the enemy defenses, the Germans were to unite in the area of ​​the city of Kursk, thus taking the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts into a complete encirclement. In addition, the German tank units were supposed to turn east - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the armored reserves of the Red Army so that they could not come to the aid of the main forces and help them get out of the encirclement. Such tactics were not at all new for German generals. Their tank flanking attacks worked for four. Using such tactics, they were able to conquer almost all of Europe and inflict many crushing defeats on the Red Army in 1941-1942.

To carry out Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated in Eastern Ukraine, on the territory of Belarus and Russia, 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people. Of these, 18 divisions were armored and motorized. Such a large number of panzer divisions was common for the Germans. The forces of the Wehrmacht have always used lightning-fast attacks of tank units in order not to give the enemy even a chance to group up and fight back. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in the capture of France, which surrendered before it could fight.

The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht were Field Marshal von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Manstein (Army Group South). The strike forces were commanded by Field Marshal Model, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were commanded by General Herman Goth.

The German army before the start of the battle received the long-awaited tank reserves. Hitler sent more than 100 heavy Tiger tanks, almost 200 Panther tanks (first used at the Battle of Kursk) and less than a hundred Ferdinand or Elefant (Elephant) tank destroyers to the Eastern Front.

"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" - were one of the most powerful tanks during the Second World War. Neither the Allies nor the USSR at that time had tanks that could boast such firepower and armor. If the "Tigers" Soviet soldiers have already seen and learned to fight against them, then the "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" caused a lot of problems on the battlefield.

The Panthers are medium tanks that are slightly less armored than the Tigers and were armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 42 cannon. These guns had an excellent rate of fire and fired over long distances with great accuracy.

"Ferdinand" is a heavy self-propelled anti-tank installation (PT-ACS), which was one of the most famous during the Second World War. Despite the fact that its numbers were small, it offered serious resistance to the tanks of the USSR, as it possessed at that time almost the best armor and firepower. During the Battle of Kursk, the Ferdinands showed their power, perfectly withstanding hits from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery hits. However, his the main problem consisted in a small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore the tank destroyer was highly vulnerable to infantry, which could get close to it and blow them up. It was simply impossible to destroy these tanks with head-on shots. The weak points were on the sides, where they later learned to shoot with sub-caliber shells. The weakest point in the defense of the tank is the weak chassis, which was disabled, and then the stationary tank was captured.

In total, Manstein and Kluge received less than 350 new tanks at their disposal, which was catastrophically insufficient, given the number of Soviet armored forces. It is also worth highlighting that approximately 500 tanks used during the Battle of Kursk were obsolete models. These are the Pz.II and Pz.III tanks, which were already irrelevant at that time.

During the Battle of Kursk, the 2nd Panzer Army included elite Panzerwaffe tank units, including the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "DasReich" and the famous 3rd Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (she or "Death's Head").

The Germans had a modest number of aircraft to support infantry and tanks - about 2,500 thousand units. In terms of guns and mortars, the German army was more than twice as inferior to the Soviet one, and some sources point to a threefold advantage of the USSR in guns and mortars.

The Soviet command realized its mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time they built a powerful defensive line that could hold off the massive offensive of the German armored forces. According to the plans of the command, the Red Army was to wear down the enemy with defensive battles, and then launch a counteroffensive at the most disadvantageous moment for the enemy.

During the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the Central Front was one of the most talented and productive army generals, Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops took on the task of defending the northern front of the Kursk salient. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Bulge was General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin, a native of the Voronezh Region, on whose shoulders the task of defending the southern front of the ledge fell. Marshals of the USSR Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky were in charge of coordinating the actions of the Red Army.

The ratio of the number of troops was far from on the side of Germany. According to estimates, the Central and Voronezh fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including units of the troops of the Steppe Front (Steppe Military District). The number of Wehrmacht fighters did not exceed 900 thousand people. In terms of the number of tanks, Germany was less than two times inferior to 2.5 thousand versus less than 5 thousand. As a result, the balance of power before the Battle of Kursk looked like this: 2:1 in favor of the USSR. The historian of the Great Patriotic War Alexei Isaev says that the size of the Red Army during the battle is overestimated. His point of view is subject to great criticism, since he does not take into account the troops of the Steppe Front (the number of soldiers of the Steppe Front who participated in the operations totaled more than 500 thousand people).

Kursk defensive operation

Before giving a full description of the events on the Kursk Bulge, it is important to show a map of actions in order to make it easier to navigate the information. Battle of Kursk on the map:

This picture shows the scheme of the Battle of Kursk. The map of the Battle of Kursk can clearly show how combat formations acted during the battle. On the map of the Battle of Kursk, you will also see symbols that will help you assimilate the information.

The Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was strong and the Germans were soon waiting for resistance, which the Wehrmacht had not received in the entire history of its existence. On the day that the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet army brought a huge amount of artillery to the front to give a response artillery barrage that the Germans would not expect.

The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (defensive stage) was planned for the morning of July 5 - the offensive was to take place immediately from the northern and southern fronts. Before the tank attack, the Germans carried out large-scale bombardments, to which the Soviet army responded in kind. At this point, the German command (namely Field Marshal Manstein) began to realize that the Russians had learned about Operation Citadel and were able to prepare the defense. Manstein repeatedly told Hitler that this offensive at the moment no longer made sense. He believed that it was necessary to carefully prepare the defense and try first to repulse the Red Army and only then think about counterattacks.

Start - Arc of Fire

On the northern front, the offensive began at six o'clock in the morning. The Germans attacked a little west of the Cherkasy direction. The first tank attacks ended in failure for the Germans. A solid defense led to heavy losses in the German armored units. And yet the enemy managed to break through 10 kilometers deep. On the southern front, the offensive began at three o'clock in the morning. The main blows fell on the settlements of Oboyan and Korochi.

The Germans could not break through the defenses of the Soviet troops, as they were carefully prepared for battle. Even the elite panzer divisions of the Wehrmacht were hardly moving forward. As soon as it became clear that the German forces could not break through on the northern and southern fronts, the command decided that it was necessary to strike in the direction of Prokhorov.

On July 11, fierce fighting began near the village of Prokhorovka, which escalated into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk outnumbered the German ones, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. July 13-23 - The Germans are still trying to carry out offensive attacks, which end in failure. On July 23, the enemy completely exhausted his offensive potential and decided to go on the defensive.

tank battle

It is difficult to say how many tanks were involved on both sides, since the data from various sources differ. If we take the average data, then the number of tanks of the USSR reached about 1 thousand vehicles. Whereas the Germans had about 700 tanks.

The tank battle (battle) during the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge took place on July 12, 1943. Enemy attacks on Prokhorovka began immediately from the western and southern directions. Four panzer divisions were advancing in the west and about 300 more tanks were heading in from the south.

The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops gained an advantage, as the rising sun shone on the Germans directly into the viewing devices of the tanks. The battle formations of the parties mixed up quite quickly, and already a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to make out where whose tanks were.

The Germans found themselves in a very difficult position, since the main strength of their tanks was in long-range guns, which were useless in close combat, and the tanks themselves were very slow, while in this situation much was decided by maneuverability. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) armies of the Germans were defeated near Kursk. The Russian tanks, on the contrary, gained an advantage, as they had a chance to target the weak spots of heavily armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (especially the famous T-34s).

However, the Germans nevertheless gave a serious rebuff from their anti-tank guns, which undermined the morale of the Russian tankers - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks did not have time and could not form orders.

While the bulk of the tank troops were tied up in battle, the Germans decided to use the Kempf tank group, which was advancing on the left flank of the Soviet troops. To repel this attack, the tank reserves of the Red Army had to be used. In the southern direction, by 14.00, Soviet troops began to push the German tank units, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening, the battlefield was already far behind the Soviet tank units and the battle was won.

Tank losses on both sides during the battle near Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation looked like this:

• about 250 Soviet tanks;
• 70 German tanks.

The above figures are irretrievable losses. The number of damaged tanks was much larger. For example, the Germans after the battle of Prokhorovka had only 1/10 fully combat-ready vehicles.

The battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle that took place in just one day. But the largest battle took place two years earlier also between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front near Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4,500 tanks collided with each other. The Soviet Union had 3700 pieces of equipment, while the Germans had only 800 units.

Despite such a numerical advantage of the tank units of the Union, there was not a single chance of victory. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the quality of the German tanks was much higher - they were armed with new models with good anti-tank armor and weapons. Secondly, in Soviet military thought at that time there was a principle that "tanks do not fight tanks." Most of the tanks in the USSR at that time had only bulletproof armor and could not penetrate the thick German armor themselves. That is why the first largest tank battle was a catastrophic failure for the USSR.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 23, 1943 with the complete victory of the Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht forces. As a result of bloody battles, the German army was exhausted and drained of blood, a significant number of tanks were either destroyed or partially lost their combat effectiveness. The German tanks participating in the battle near Prokhorovka were almost completely disabled, destroyed or fell into the hands of the enemy.

The ratio of losses during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 4.95:1. The Soviet army lost five times as many soldiers, while the German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were wounded, as well as destroyed tank forces, which significantly undermined the combat power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

As a result of the defensive operation, the Soviet troops reached the line, which they occupied before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans went on the defensive.

During the Battle of Kursk there was a radical change. After the Germans exhausted their offensive capabilities, the Red Army counteroffensive began on the Kursk Bulge. From July 17 to July 23, the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation was carried out by Soviet troops.

The operation was carried out by the Southwestern Front of the Red Army. Its key goal was to pin down the Donbas grouping of the enemy so that the enemy could not transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk salient. Despite the fact that the enemy threw his almost best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the South-Western Front still managed to capture bridgeheads and with powerful blows pin down and surround the Donbass group of Germans. Thus, the Southwestern Front significantly helped in the defense of the Kursk Bulge.

Miusskaya offensive operation

From July 17 to August 2, 1943, the Mius offensive operation was also carried out. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to pull the fresh reserves of the Germans from the Kursk Bulge to the Donbass and defeat the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To repel the attack in the Donbass, the Germans had to transfer significant aviation and tank units to defend the city. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops failed to break through the German defenses near the Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

The offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk continued successfully for the Red Army. The next important battles on the Kursk Bulge took place near Orel and Kharkov - the offensive operations were called "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev".

The offensive operation "Kutuzov" began on July 12, 1943 in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel, where two German armies opposed the Soviet troops. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans were unable to hold bridgeheads on July 26, they retreated. Already on August 5, the city of Orel was liberated by the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943, for the first time in the entire period of hostilities with Germany, that a small parade with fireworks took place in the capital of the USSR. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of Orel was an extremely important task for the Red Army, which it successfully coped with.

Offensive operation "Rumyantsev"

The next main event of the Battle of Kursk during its offensive phase began on August 3, 1943 on the southern face of the arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was called "Rumyantsev". The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts.

Already two days after the start of the operation - on August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And two days later, the forces of the Red Army liberated the city of Bogodukhov. During the offensive on August 11, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway communication line of the Germans. Despite all the counterattacks of the German army, the forces of the Red Army continued to advance. As a result of fierce fighting on August 23, the city of Kharkov was recaptured.

The battle for the Kursk Bulge was already won by the Soviet troops at that moment. This was understood by the German command, but Hitler gave a clear order to "stand to the last."

The Mginskaya offensive operation began on July 22 and continued until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR were as follows: to finally thwart the plan of the German offensive against Leningrad, prevent the enemy from transferring forces to the west and completely destroy the 18th Wehrmacht Army.

The operation began with a powerful artillery strike in the enemy direction. The forces of the parties at the time of the start of the operation on the Kursk Bulge looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks on the side of the Wehrmacht.

Despite strong artillery preparation, the German army put up fierce resistance. Although the forces of the Red Army managed to immediately capture the first echelon of the enemy's defense, they could not advance further.

In early August 1943, having received fresh reserves, the Red Army again began to attack German positions. Thanks to the numerical superiority and powerful mortar fire, the soldiers of the USSR managed to capture the enemy's defensive fortifications in the village of Porechie. However, the spacecraft again could not advance further - the German defense was too dense.

A fierce battle between the opposing sides during the operation unfolded for Sinyaevo and Sinyaevo Heights, which were captured by Soviet troops several times, and then they passed back to the Germans. The fighting was fierce and both sides suffered heavy losses. The German defense was so strong that the command of the spacecraft decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and go on the defensive. Thus, the Mginskaya offensive operation did not bring final success, although it played an important strategic role. To repel this attack, the Germans had to use the reserves, which were supposed to go to Kursk.

Smolensk offensive operation

Until the Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Kursk 1943 began, it was extremely important for the Headquarters to defeat as many enemy units as possible, which the Wehrmacht could send under the Course to contain the Soviet troops. In order to weaken the enemy's defenses and deprive him of the help of reserves, the Smolensk offensive operation was carried out. The Smolensk direction adjoined the western region of the Kursk salient. The operation was codenamed "Suvorov" and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive was launched by the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, as well as the entire Western Front.

The operation ended in success, as in its course the beginning of the liberation of Belarus was laid. However, most importantly, the commanders of the Battle of Kursk achieved the pinning down of as many as 55 enemy divisions, preventing them from going to Kursk - this significantly increased the chances of the Red Army forces during the counteroffensive near Kursk.

To weaken the positions of the enemy near Kursk, the forces of the Red Army carried out another operation - the Donbas offensive. The parties' plans for the Donbas basin were very serious, because this place served as an important economic center - the Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. There was a huge German grouping in the Donbass, which numbered more than 500 thousand people.

The operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front. On August 16, the Red Army forces met serious resistance on the Mius River, where there was a heavily fortified defensive line. On August 16, the forces of the Southern Front entered the battle, which managed to break through the enemy defenses. Especially in the battles, the 67th showed up from all the regiments. The successful offensive continued and already on August 30, the spacecraft liberated the city of Taganrog.

On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Kursk itself ended, however, the Donbas offensive operation continued - the forces of the spacecraft had to push the enemy across the Dnieper River.

Now important strategic positions were lost for the Germans and the threat of dismemberment and death hung over Army Group South. To prevent this, the leader of the Third Reich nevertheless allowed her to move beyond the Dnieper.

On September 1, all German units in the area began to retreat from the Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and three days later, during the fighting, Stalino was taken or, as the city is now called, Donetsk.

The retreat for the German army was very difficult. The Wehrmacht forces were running out of ammunition for artillery pieces. During the retreat, the German soldiers actively used the tactics of "scorched earth". The Germans killed civilians and burned villages as well as small towns along their path. During the Battle of Kursk in 1943, retreating in cities, the Germans plundered everything that came to hand.

On September 22, the Germans were thrown back across the Dnieper River in the area of ​​​​the cities of Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. After that, the Donbas offensive operation came to an end, ending with the complete success of the Red Army.

All the operations undertaken above led to the fact that the Wehrmacht forces, as a result of the fighting in the Battle of Kursk, were forced to withdraw beyond the Dnieper in order to build new defensive lines. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was the result of the increased courage and fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers, the skill of commanders and the competent use of military equipment.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943, and then the Battle of the Dnieper, finally secured the initiative on the Eastern Front for the USSR. No one else doubted that the victory in the Great Patriotic War would be for the USSR. This was understood by the allies of Germany, who began to gradually abandon the Germans, leaving the Reich even less chance.

Many historians also believe that the Allied offensive on the island of Sicily, which at that moment was occupied mainly by Italian troops, played an important role in the victory over the Germans during the Battle of Kursk.

On July 10, the Allies launched an offensive in Sicily and the Italian troops surrendered to the British and American forces with little or no resistance. This greatly spoiled Hitler's plans, since in order to hold Western Europe he had to transfer part of the troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the position of the Germans near Kursk. Already on July 10, Manstein told Hitler that the offensive near Kursk must be stopped and went into deep defense across the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not be able to defeat the Wehrmacht.

Everyone knows that the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its beginning is associated with the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were also funny (interesting) facts during the Battle of Kursk. One of these cases is associated with the KV-1 tank.

During a tank battle, one of the Soviet KV-1 tanks stalled and the crew ran out of ammunition. He was opposed by two German Pz.IV tanks, which could not penetrate the armor of the KV-1. German tankers tried to get to the Soviet crew by sawing through the armor, but nothing came of it. Then two Pz.IVs decided to drag the KV-1 to their base in order to deal with the tankers there. They hitched up the KV-1 and started towing it. Somewhere in the middle of the way, the KV-1 engine suddenly started up and the Soviet tank dragged two Pz.IVs with it to its base. The German tankers were shocked and simply abandoned their tanks.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

If the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad ended the period of defense of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, then the end of the Battle of Kursk marked a radical turning point in the course of hostilities.

After the report (message) on the victory in the Battle of Kursk came to Stalin's desk, the Secretary General said that this was only the beginning and very soon the Red Army troops would oust the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.

The events after the Battle of Kursk, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. The victories were accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the defense.

The liberation of cities after the Battle of Kursk continued, for example, already in November 1943, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, the city of Kyiv, was liberated.

A very important result of the Battle of Kursk - change in the attitude of the allies towards the USSR. A report to the President of the United States, written in August, said that the USSR now occupies a dominant position in World War II. There is proof of this. If Germany allocated only two divisions for the defense of Sicily from the combined troops of Great Britain and the United States, then on the Eastern Front the USSR attracted the attention of two hundred German divisions.

The United States was very worried about the successes of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the USSR continued to pursue such success, the opening of a "second front" would be unnecessary and the United States would then not be able to influence the fate of Europe without benefit to itself. Therefore, the opening of a "second front" should follow as soon as possible while US assistance was needed at all.

The failure of Operation Citadel led to the disruption of further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which were already prepared for execution. The victory near Kursk would allow developing an offensive against Leningrad, and after that the Germans went to occupy Sweden.

The result of the Battle of Kursk was the undermining of Germany's authority among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front made it possible for the Americans and the British to deploy in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat of Germany, the leader of fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini, broke off agreements with Germany and left the war. Thus, Hitler lost his true ally.

Success, of course, had to be paid dearly. The losses of the USSR in the Battle of Kursk were huge, as, indeed, were the German ones. The balance of power has already been shown above - now it's worth looking at the losses in the Battle of Kursk.

In fact, it is rather difficult to establish the exact number of deaths, since data from different sources vary greatly. Many historians take average figures - these are 200 thousand dead and three times as many wounded. The least optimistic data speaks of more than 800 thousand dead on both sides and the same number of wounded. The parties also lost a huge number of tanks and equipment. Aviation in the Battle of Kursk played almost a key role and the loss of aircraft amounted to about 4 thousand units on both sides. At the same time, aviation losses are the only ones where the Red Army lost no more than the German one - each lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like this 5:1 or 4:1 according to different sources. Based on the characteristics of the Battle of Kursk, we can conclude that the effectiveness Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war, it was in no way inferior to the German ones, while at the beginning of hostilities the situation was radically different.

Soviet soldiers near Kursk showed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were even celebrated abroad, especially by American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army was also noted by the German generals, including Manshein, who was considered the best commander of the Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards "For participation in the Battle of Kursk."

Another interesting fact is that children also participated in the Battle of Kursk. Of course, they did not fight on the front lines, but they provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle, with the help of children, hundreds of kilometers of railways were built, which were necessary for the rapid transportation of military and supplies.

Finally, it is important to fix all the data. Date of the end and beginning of the Battle of Kursk: July 5 and August 23, 1943.

Key dates of the Battle of Kursk:

• July 5 - 23, 1943 - Kursk strategic defensive operation;
• July 23 - August 23, 1943 - Kursk strategic offensive operation;
• July 12, 1943 - a bloody tank battle near Prokhorovka;
• July 17 - 27, 1943 - Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation;
• July 17 - August 2, 1943 - Miusskaya offensive operation;
• July 12 - August 18, 1943 - Oryol strategic offensive operation "Kutuzov";
• August 3 - 23, 1943 - Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation "Rumyantsev";
• July 22 - August 23, 1943 - Mginskaya offensive operation;
• August 7 - October 2, 1943 - Smolensk offensive operation;
• August 13 - September 22, 1943 - Donbass offensive operation.

Results of the Battle of the Fiery Arc:

• a radical turn of events during the Great Patriotic War and World War II;
• complete fiasco of the German campaign to seize the USSR;
• the Nazis lost confidence in the invincibility of the German army, which lowered the morale of the soldiers and led to conflicts in the ranks of the command.