Will there be a place for nuclear weapons in Belarus? Free News Nuclear weapons in Belarus: no secrets? Does Belarus have nuclear weapons?

On March 23, having taken part in the local elections, Alexander Lukashenko talked to journalists for a long time. Among other things, he said that the events in the Crimea are pushing small states to create nuclear weapons.

Abandoned storage of nuclear charges on the territory of the long-range aviation airfield (Brest region), Virtual.brest.by

“This disgraceful document [Budapest Memorandum on Nuclear Safety Assurances - "NN".] I had to sign in the presence of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, Clinton was then, and Boris Yeltsin. When the great svyatomyas were withdrawn from us without any preconditions, they gave away nuclear weapons, the most modern ones, for free. And then Ukraine and Kazakhstan did it. Then three states - Russia, the USA and Great Britain - guaranteed our economic, political, military, territorial integrity and so on,” Lukashenka said.

“It is dangerous that some states have already abandoned these agreements. Ukraine has announced that it is withdrawing from this agreement. Thus, the hands are freed, especially for threshold states that are about to be ready to produce nuclear weapons. And the consequences could be even worse. This is where a bad precedent is being created,” Lukashenka stressed.

We discussed with Stanislav Shushkevich, the former head of Belarus and the head of the Department of Nuclear Physics at Belarusian State University, whether Belarus can produce nuclear weapons on its territory.

Stanislav Shushkevich: Fortunately, Belarus cannot create its own atomic weapons. More precisely, maybe, but if he turns the country into North Korea. Just keep in mind that we have three times fewer people than in the DPRK. The Soviet Union also did not leave us the technology to obtain substances for atomic weapons. But the most important thing is that there is nothing worse than the presence of atomic weapons on our territory.

NN: Why?

US: Belarus was a hostage.

Russia has turned us into a kind of barrier. If we had kept the weapons, Belarus would have become a target for a nuclear strike in any conflict. After all, Belarus would threaten the whole world.

What we had would be absolutely enough to erase Europe from the map of the world. I consider it my greatest achievement that we have withdrawn weapons from the territory of Belarus. We would have perished as a nation if we had weapons left. It can be revived, excuse me, only with such a mind as Lukashenka's. Fortunately, God did not give horns to a vigorous cow. We could not have defended ourselves with these weapons. Much sooner than in Crimea, Russian troops would come to us in order to isolate weapons from the "terrorists" of the nationalists.

"NN": Is it very expensive to produce your own nuclear weapons?

US: It is expensive to keep it in such a state that it remains just a weapon. It rots like mushrooms if it is not "salted" and not looked after. It is necessary to carry out preventive work, they are very expensive. But we do not have Russian petrodollars. The USSR at one time presented many technologies to North Korea, and they, actually starving the country, produced these weapons. We will not starve - we are in Europe. It would be necessary to build uranium enrichment plants, it is necessary to buy the same uranium ...

"NN": Do we have relevant specialists?

US: Yes there is. And I think they would be capable of building nuclear weapons. But that means destroying our people for such dubious purposes. But even for Ukraine it would not be as dangerous as for Belarus. Indeed, in Ukraine, weapons were stored in mines, while in our country they were stored on the surface.

"NN": There is uranium in Ukraine, but can it produce weapons?

US: There are reasonable, normal politicians in Ukraine. They will never agree to have nuclear weapons. The entire - mind you - the entire Union created nuclear weapons. But Ukraine is smaller than the Union. By the way, there are also international agreements, according to which both Ukraine and Belarus have pledged to be non-nuclear states.

"NN": A few years ago there was information that in Sosny, near Minsk, highly enriched uranium is stored, from which it is possible to make nuclear weapons. This is true?

US: Only Lukashenka could say that. Don't repeat his tales. I, unfortunately, even today do not have the right to give out certain secrets. But from the available highly radioactive garbage, which is stored not far from those very Pines, nothing worthwhile can be done. I once called Yeltsin with a proposal to give this garbage to Russia, which has technologies for processing such substances. But it turned out to be unprofitable for Russia. We continue to preserve these radioactive substances, they are stored normally, they do not threaten anyone. With the existing Belarusian technologies, they cannot even be a hint of raw materials for nuclear weapons.

"NN": So this is still highly enriched uranium, right?

US: There was an IRT-2000 reactor in Belarus, it operated in Sosny. Today there is no reactor. Where did he go? He was not taken out. Waste remains. I cannot say where they are, what they are, it is dangerous to disclose such information. Even with good technology, this is not enough for nuclear weapons.

"NN": And does the nuclear power plant open the way for the creation of its own nuclear weapons?

US: Any nuclear power plant can serve to obtain materials that, after certain processing, can become the basis for nuclear weapons. There is an international organization, the IAEA, which monitors this. As of today, there is still no project on which the Ostrovets nuclear power plant will be built - I can tell you this for sure, because my former students work there.

There are many problems with the nuclear power plant near Astravets. The winds from there blow towards Minsk. This place was chosen to threaten a neighbor, but we will threaten ourselves.

"NN": Returning to the words of Lukashenka: will European states now begin to produce their own nuclear weapons?

US: They don't need it. NATO has nuclear weapons. France, Great Britain have. Maybe it's good that the Germans don't have it. In Europe, a balance has been formed. NATO is run by well-mannered people who never threaten with nuclear weapons. If the world takes the path of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, then this will be the best option.

Nuclear weapon

A type of weapon of mass destruction, the action of which is based on the use of the energy of radioactive decay. It was first used in 1945 by the United States against Japan. The main damaging factors of nuclear weapons: shock wave, penetrating radiation, electromagnetic pulse, light radiation. The use of nuclear weapons causes severe radioactive contamination of the area. Artillery shells, aerial bombs, and rockets can serve as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons.

"Nuclear Club"

The conditional name of a group of so-called nuclear powers - states that have carried out the development, production and testing of nuclear weapons. According to official data, the following countries currently possess nuclear weapons (according to the year of the first nuclear test): USA (since 1945), Russia (successor of the Soviet Union, 1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), China (1964), India (1974), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006). Israel is also believed to have nuclear weapons.

Stanislav Shushkevich

Born in 1934 in Minsk. Physicist, statesman, first leader of independent Belarus, one of the three participants in the signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreement, which legally sealed the collapse of the USSR. Corresponding member of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus (1991). Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (1970), Professor (1972). Honored Worker of Science and Technology of Belarus (1982).

Belarus has threatened the West with a possible withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to official Minsk, the United States and Great Britain, by applying economic sanctions against Belarus, violated their obligations towards the country. That is why Minsk may cease to comply with these conditions. This, at least, was stated by the Belarusian delegation in Geneva at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference.

The Belarusian side emphasized that it was very important for it that the tripartite security guarantees provided in accordance with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in connection with Belarus' voluntary renunciation of the right to possess nuclear weapons work. "Three states - Great Britain, Russia and the United States - have undertaken to respect the independence and sovereignty of Belarus, including not to use measures of economic coercion," the Belarusian delegates stressed. And if there are sanctions, then Western partners encroach on the independence of Belarus.

“A reasonable question arises why, despite the fixed and repeatedly confirmed commitments, some nuclear powers in practice ignore them, continuing to apply economic and political pressure. was registered with the UN as an international treaty in November 2012. Violation of accepted legal obligations is an unacceptable norm of behavior of states from the point of view of international law," the Belarusian side stressed.

The irritation of the official Minsk is understandable. The US and the EU apply a whole range of political and economic sanctions to Belarus. Currently, the "black list" of the EU includes 243 individuals and 32 companies that support the "Lukashenko regime." The number of those on the "black list" of the United States is unknown, but it is possible that it is even higher. We are talking about budget-forming companies - such as Belspetsexport, Belneftekhim, Belaruskali. They sell their products mainly in foreign countries. This means that sanctions are a direct blow to the country's budget.

Along the way, Belarus reached a new - almost Soviet - level of military integration with Russia. In May, the allies will hold large-scale exercises "West-2013", where they will work out a possible nuclear strike on Warsaw. The exercises will be held in close proximity to the Polish borders. In addition, Russia announced for the first time that it plans to permanently deploy its air regiment with fighter jets in Belarus by 2015. According to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, the start of work on this project is planned for this year: Moscow will place an aviation commandant's office with its neighbors and put the first duty unit of combat fighters on duty. "We intend to continue to consider issues necessary to strengthen the defense capability of our Belarusian colleagues and brothers," Shoigu stressed.

Yury Shevtsov, director of the Minsk Center for European Integration Problems, believes that a landmark event has happened for the Belarusian foreign policy. "To relocate an entire air regiment to Belarus in less than two years is very fast. And this reflects a high degree of military anxiety about NATO or individual NATO countries. Polish games of greatness have always ended badly for Poland," the expert explains. And he adds: “It is unlikely that the opposition to Polish activity regarding Belarus will be limited to one Russian air regiment. At a minimum, the saturation of the Belarusian army with new weapons and equipment will go faster now. will increase exponentially."

Of course, such activity on the part of the official Minsk will inevitably affect the eastern borders of the EU. Poland and Lithuania will begin to rapidly increase military spending. And if for Poland they are unlikely to become too much of an economic burden, then for Lithuania, geopolitical changes will definitely mean additional problems in terms of getting the country out of the economic crisis. Shevtsov also believes that Russia will increase pressure on Lithuania - both economic and informational. "The EU does not compensate Lithuania for these losses. There will still be no war between Russia and NATO, but, here, the losses from the current Polish activity in the east for Lithuania can be quite serious," the political scientist sums up.

Experts consider it quite likely that the threats of the Belarusians will not be empty air shaking, and that the country will respond to the sanctions by withdrawing from the Budapest Memorandum. "The United States has actually already withdrawn from it. Recently there was a statement, it seems, by the US embassy in Belarus that the United States does not consider this Memorandum as a binding document for them," Shevtsov comments.

All this means that Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are about to get a legal basis to return to their nuclear status. And in the end, someone, and Belarus, will definitely be able to count on the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on its territory. Moreover, the Belarusian government already possesses approximately 2.5 tons of nuclear materials, some of which are highly enriched, sufficient, for example, to quickly manufacture a "dirty" atomic "bomb."

In addition, "a number of threshold countries will receive an additional impetus to the creation of nuclear weapons, because they will see the unreliability of security guarantees from the United States. Most likely, Iran will officially try to become the first of these countries," Shevtsov describes the more distant consequences of these changes.

All this, no doubt, plays into the hands of Lukashenka. Stanislav Shushkevich, the author of the Belarusian nuclear disarmament program, says that "Lukashenko will soon begin to blackmail the United States more actively with a return to nuclear status." He will do this in order to achieve the removal of economic sanctions from Belarus. And Old Man can return to him every time he doesn’t like something in the behavior of NATO member countries. Whether Lukashenka will receive nuclear weapons, which he has been dreaming of for a long time, will depend only on Russia in the next few years.

The United States, obviously, will have to somehow respond to this. An attempt to pacify the intractable Lukashenka may turn into new conflicts for NATO member countries. Which is especially unsafe against the backdrop of the growing military power of China and the embittered rhetoric against the West from Russia.

The transfer to Belarus of one or more brigades of the Iskander operational-tactical missile systems, which can be armed with 50 megaton nuclear warheads, will be the cheapest and fastest response to the appearance of a US tank division in Poland.

Nuclear weapons may return to Belarus as a "last resort", says military observer Alexander Alesin .

On October 24, Minsk hosted a meeting of the joint board of the defense ministries of Belarus and Russia. The heads of the military departments of the two countries Andrei Ravkov and Sergei Shoigu discussed the implementation of the Plan of joint measures to ensure the military security of the Union State

“The plans of the Polish government to permanently deploy a division of the US Armed Forces on its territory are counterproductive and do not contribute to maintaining stability and strengthening regional security,” Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said. “Under these conditions, we are forced to take retaliatory measures and must be ready to neutralize possible military threats in all directions.”

What could be the Russian response to the appearance of a tank division in Poland? Possible Answers with a Military Expert Alexander Alesin.

Russia is not going to take preventive measures - we are talking about the answer. But the answer will be prompt and adequate to the degree of threat that, according to the Russian Minister of Defense, will arise in this case: the threat of destabilization of the situation in our region. Simply put, if the balance of power changes seriously.

The US tank division, according to various estimates, has up to 300 Bradley tanks with all the means of reinforcement: both multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled artillery mounts. Since the tank division will operate "on the outskirts" of the US Army, then, of course, the division will be provided with everything necessary to conduct independent military operations. A tank division appears to be a rather formidable combat unit numbering no less than 10,000 men.

Russia believes that a tank division may appear on the border with the Russian Federation; however, Belarus has a larger common border with Poland than Russia. Therefore, Belarus can consider the deployment of a tank division in Poland as a threat to itself, as Makei said in Brussels more than a year ago. Recently, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeated the thesis that this would lead to an imbalance, and Belarus would take measures to ensure its security.

What kind of quick and adequate measures are we talking about?

I believe that such a response could be the transfer to Belarus of one or more brigades of Iskander operational-tactical missile systems, which are armed with the Russian ground forces in the Western Military District, and maybe in the Central. At a speed of 70 kilometers per hour with a power reserve of a thousand kilometers, in 12-15 hours, the Iskander complexes from the territory of the Western Military District can arrive on the territory of Belarus on their own and within a few tens of minutes can be prepared for firing. It turns out "cheap and cheerful."

If this is not a temporary raid, but permanent accommodation, then you will need hangars to accommodate military equipment, repair zones are needed, and most importantly, barracks to accommodate personnel. The rest of the infrastructure (an extensive network of paved and unpaved roads) is present in Belarus, which provides ample room for maneuver.

If we assume that the complexes will receive nuclear weapons (the Iskander may be armed with 50 kiloton warheads), then storage facilities for warheads will also be needed; in Soviet times there were such storages, but I suspect that hardly any of them meet modern requirements and are able to accept warheads for storage.

Before Russia takes retaliatory steps (provided that the transfer of the Iskanders will occur after the creation of the base), the preparation of infrastructure for the deployment of operational-tactical complexes "Iskander" could well be discussed at the joint board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and Belarus.

Naturally, at the political level, preparatory work should be carried out to legislate the presence of the Iskanders; preparation of an interstate agreement on the deployment of the Russian military in the form of a military base in Belarus should be carried out.

Q: What status can a military base get? If the Russian base receives extraterritorial status, then it is quite possible that nuclear warheads will also appear here. That is, the military base will be considered the territory of Russia, where it will be possible to deploy nuclear warheads. If the military base is under the jurisdiction of Belarus, then there will be no nuclear weapons there: Belarus is not a nuclear power.

Another option is possible: Belarus and Russia have a joint grouping of ground forces. It is possible to carry out a legal maneuver and temporarily transfer the Russian brigade to the disposal of Belarus; although it will be Russian, for some time it may be on the territory of Belarus at the disposal of the command of the Unified Group of Ground Forces. But then you still have to formalize its presence in Belarus legally.

The transfer of aviation squadrons to Belarus is a complex matter that requires very serious preparation: runways, airfield facilities, and navigation equipment. This is a long process, which will be accompanied by resistance both inside the country and outside. I think this option is unlikely.

Just as difficult is the deployment of a Russian mechanized or tank division in Belarus.

I think the cheapest, quickest answer (no one will have time to get scared) is the transfer of one or more brigades of the Iskander operational-tactical complexes. Moreover, our neighbors are very sensitive to the deployment of Iskanders in the Kaliningrad region, and even more so in Belarus. And if it becomes possible to provide the Iskanders with nuclear weapons, then, of course, their appearance will be a serious and resonant step.

If, nevertheless, the agreement on shorter and medium-range missiles is destroyed, it is very likely that the Iskanders will receive new ammunition, the range of which exceeds 500 kilometers, which means that they will be able to hit targets not only throughout Poland, but also in a significant part of Europe . The missiles have not been tested because the INF treaty forbids this. But in the event of the denunciation of the treaty, the missiles will be tested, put into production and, it is possible, will become part of the Iskander complex's ammunition load.

- So, de facto, nuclear weapons can return to Belarus?

As a last resort, if the situation escalates to such an extent that some European countries will give permission to host American medium-range missiles. Or the American grouping in Poland will be larger than declared.

As a response to the nuclear shield that the United States is about to deploy over Eastern Europe, Russia may place part of its nuclear facilities on the territory of Belarus. Such a statement was made today by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Belarus Alexander Surikov, specifying, however, that it depends "on the political integration of the two countries." Earlier, Alexander Lukashenko emphasized that he regretted the withdrawal of nuclear facilities from the territory of the republic in the early 90s and that now he would have acted differently.

Russian Ambassador to Belarus Alexander Surikov did not rule out the deployment of new Russian military facilities in Belarus as a response to the deployment by the United States of the Eastern European missile defense system. Moreover, Surikov emphasized that he was talking about "objects related to nuclear weapons," the Interfax news agency reports.

The statement was made by Surikov today. “Everything depends on the level of our political integration,” the ambassador specified, as well as “on the opinions of experts, diplomats and the military: it is necessary, it is possible, when, how.”

The words of the Russian ambassador have already caused a significant stir in the Belarusian media, and a number of politicians (albeit from the category of the former) rushed to comment.

Thus, in an interview with the Belarusian resource “Charter’97”, the former Minister of Defense of the Republic, Pavel Kozlovsky, said that he personally did not understand “what Mr. Surikov is based on.”

“Relations between Russia and Belarus have only been deteriorating lately. There is a clear disintegration. I think that Lukashenka, despite his previous regrets about the withdrawal of nuclear missiles, is not interested in hosting Russian nuclear facilities,” Kozlovsky stressed.

Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Andrei Sannikov commented on the words of the diplomat in even harsher tones: “Ambassador Surikov apparently forgot that he is not somewhere in the Altai Territory, but in independent Belarus. Such statements, firstly, are not characteristic of diplomats, and secondly, they can be regarded as an encroachment on the sovereignty of the state.”

According to Sannikov, the Russian ambassador could hardly have made such a statement without the sanction of the Russian leadership, which means that these statements should be taken very seriously, "up to the revision of the status of Russian military facilities on the territory of Belarus." His country, according to the former deputy minister, "is being dragged into the new confrontation and arms race."

“Russia once again confirms that it is a source of lower security for an independent state, both energy and military,” notes Sannikov, who in the early 90s participated in negotiations on the withdrawal of nuclear facilities from Belarus.

Recall that in 1990-1991, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, on whose territory part of the nuclear weapons of the USSR were located, transferred it to the Russian Federation, and after the signing of the Lisbon Protocol in 1992, they were declared countries without nuclear weapons.

This protocol is an addition to the Soviet-American Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Thus, Russia became the legal successor of the USSR, retained the status of a nuclear power, the seat of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and assumed many common obligations with the union republics, including the payment of debts.

In the future, Alexander Lukashenko expressed regret that all the missiles were removed from the territory of Belarus. Last year, he even suggested the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons if there was an immediate threat to the Union State.

He also stressed that his country once renounced the possession of nuclear weapons without any preconditions. However, if the issue of renunciation of nuclear weapons "would be raised now," he would "not do so."

However, he also noted that “now there is no need to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the first strike zone” and “there are enough necessary weapons in the Russian Federation, which, in which case, can be used in Belarus.”

All these words were said by Alexander Lukashenko in June 2006, that is, before relations between the union republics became noticeably more complicated due to the “oil and gas war”.

The collapse of the Soviet Union suddenly turned Belarus into a nuclear power. But the warheads located on the territory our country, fact officially controlled by Moscow. The last rocket left Belarus on November 26, 1996. This event was preceded by long and difficult negotiations with Russia and the West.

Nuclear button stays in Russia

Belarus in Soviet times was an outpost of the Soviet army, aimed at the West - the country had a lot of weapons. Even ex-Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich, who can hardly be suspected of criticizing the Soviet order, stated in his memoirs: in terms of the number of tanks per capita, the BSSR was the most militarized in the world. There was also enough nuclear weapons in Belarus, which appeared in the country in the 1960s. As of 1989, there were about 1180 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads on the territory of the BSSR. Four missile divisions were responsible for their maintenance, which were based near Pruzhany, Mozyr, Postavy and Lida. The territories near the bases resembled a desert that stretched for tens of kilometers. But the nuclear weapons control system was located in Moscow, which means that the Belarusians became hostages of the all-union leadership.

After Chernobyl, society was seriously opposed to the atom, which no longer seemed peaceful to anyone. Therefore, in adopted on July 27, 1990, it was stated: "The Belarusian SSR aims to make its territory a nuclear-free zone, and the republic a neutral state." This desire met with sympathy from abroad: things were moving towards the collapse of the USSR, and America was interested in keeping the composition of the "nuclear club" unchanged. According to Petr Kravchenko(in 1990-1994 - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the BSSR, and then of the Republic of Belarus), already in September 1991, meeting with US Secretary of State James Baker, he talked about the non-nuclear status of the republic.

The implementation of these plans became possible only after Belovezhskaya Pushcha. The leaders of the republics understood the risks of losing control over the "nuclear button", therefore, in the agreement on the creation of the CIS on December 8, 1991, it was guaranteed that the members of the Commonwealth "ensure unified control over nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation."

Subsequent agreements adopted at the turn of 1991-1992 determined the temporary status of nuclear weapons, which by the time of the collapse of the USSR were located on the territory of four republics: Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. To control nuclear weapons, a joint command of strategic forces was created, which was to be headed by Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, who had previously been the Minister of Defense of the USSR. Ukraine and Belarus were to abandon the warheads stationed on their territories and join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Until that time, the decision on its application was to be made by the President of Russia "in agreement with the leaders of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in consultation with the heads of other member states of the Commonwealth." Tactical nuclear weapons were to be taken to Russia and dismantled there under joint control. All four countries were supposed to jointly develop a policy in the field of nuclear weapons.

The situation was ambiguous. At first glance, the parties declared universal control over weapons. On the other hand, Russia continued to play first fiddle: in 1993, the Chicago Tribune claimed: “In practice, this means that only Yeltsin knows the code to control their [missiles] launch, but it is assumed that he will not order the launch without the consent of Ukraine , Kazakhstan and Belarus". Of course, this situation was not very encouraging.

Belarus and Ukraine: different strategies

The question remained how much compensation countries would receive for giving up nuclear weapons. Position Stanislav Shushkevich was simple: get rid of the missiles as soon as possible. As the ex-speaker later said, “Belarus was actually a hostage of Russia. There were so many nuclear weapons on its surface that it was possible to destroy the whole of Europe. I considered this a very dangerous thing, and as soon as we signed the Belovezhskaya Accords, I said: we will withdraw nuclear weapons without preconditions, compensation, and we will do it immediately, because it threatens the death of the Belarusian nation, Belarus.”

But other politicians argued that serious compensation could be obtained for the rejection of missiles. “I think the biggest mistake in the early 90s was the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus according to the model that the West imposed on Shushkevich, and Shushkevich on the Supreme Council,” wrote one of the leaders of the Belarusian Popular Front, a deputy of the Supreme Council Sergey Naumchik. - Yes, weapons had to be withdrawn (and the line about non-nuclear weapons in the Declaration of Sovereignty is mine), but - on favorable terms for Belarus (among which, it is possible, visa-free or facilitated entry). But at the end of December 1991 in Alma-Ata, Shushkevich, without consulting with the members of the Belarusian delegation, unconditionally agreed to recognize Russia as the legal successor of the USSR in the UN and the owner of nuclear weapons.

From the memoirs of Petr Kravchenko “Belarus at the crossroads. Notes of a politician and a diplomat”:“We experienced a real shock. It turned out that Shushkevich simply betrayed us! Surrendered the national interests of Belarus, which in one fell swoop lost its main trump card in negotiations with Russia,<…>. Of course, he had no right to make such decisions without consulting with the entire composition of the delegation.<…>The second person who fully realized all the drama of what was happening was my old opponent Zenon Poznyak. He gloomily watched our skirmish and, sighing contritely, dropped the following phrase: “Shushkevich does not care about the state interests of the Motherland!”<…>As part of the Belarusian-Russian agreements, 87 SS-25 missiles were removed from the territory of Belarus. They were dismantled at the Arzamas-3 enterprise. From them turned out<…>uranium, which Russia later sold to the United States. As a result of this deal, Russia received more than ten billion dollars. This is official data, although the Russian opposition press claimed that the price of the deal was several times higher.”

At the same time, Ukraine took a completely different position. In March 1992, the President of this country Leonid Kravchuk stopped the export of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. As the leader of Ukraine stated, “due to the current political instability and confusion, we cannot be sure that the missiles we take out are destroyed and do not fall into unkind hands.<…>Ukraine considers the capacity of the plant for the destruction of nuclear arsenals, located in Russia, insufficient. Therefore, it has the right to have a similar enterprise in its territory.<…>It can also take over the processing of waste from nuclear power plants of the republic.”

Ukraine also proposed that the removal of nuclear weapons from its territory and their destruction be carried out under international control. According to researcher Denis Rafeenko, this policy was explained by the Ukrainian-Russian contradictions over the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. "Under these conditions, the nuclear card was used by the leadership of Ukraine as a response to certain actions of the Russian side."

Whose compensation will be greater?

The Ukrainian position has caused certain problems. On July 30-31, 1991, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) was signed in Moscow. According to the document, the USSR and the USA had to reduce their nuclear arsenals within 7 years. At the same time, each side was supposed to have no more than 6,000 weapons. As noted Denis Rafeenko, “The US view of the events taking place in Ukraine at that time was that if Ukraine failed to ratify the START-1 Treaty, then this treaty would lose its force. The Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation decided to ratify the START-1 Treaty, but not to exchange instruments of ratification until Ukraine accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A compromise had to be found.

As the economies of Ukraine and Belarus struggled, both countries looked to the West and Russia for support. But Ukraine, which has not completely abandoned weapons, used them as an argument, while Belarus acted as a petitioner.

As Piotr Kravchenko recalls, in January 1992 Belarus announced that it would not only fulfill all its obligations, but would also speed up the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the country. This became a trump card in negotiations with the Americans, who in the spring of the same year extended the Nunn-Lugar program to our country. It provided for the allocation of $ 250 million for purposes related to ensuring nuclear safety during the dismantling, redeployment and destruction of nuclear warheads. Belarus received over $100 million. It should be noted that later, in 1993, during the visit of the Belarusian delegation headed by Stanislav Shushkevich to the USA, Belarus received another 59 million.

In parallel, negotiations were going on between the Western countries and the former allied, and now independent republics. On May 23, 1992, the Lisbon Protocol to the START-1 Treaty was signed.