Rapprochement of Talleyrand and Fouche. Talleyrand: the secret war against the Emperor Talleyrand and Fouche

The reputation of both Tylerand, who “sold everyone who bought him,” and Joseph Fouche, who made his way from, it would seem, the most left of the Jacobins to a millionaire, awarded by Napoleon the title of Duke of Otranto, Minister of Police of the Empire and the restored Bourbons, was firmly established. And it is unlikely that anyone will be able to shake it, although attempts of this kind are made from time to time in the historical literature. But the question of the correctness of the assessment of the historical meaning of their activities is not as simple as it might initially seem. One might think that with their unenviable reputation, Talleyrand and Fouche somehow deviated sharply from the "norm" of the behavior of the then politicians. Was it really so? After all, there is no doubt that adherence to principles was by no means the quality that allowed not only to safely survive during the numerous swings of the political pendulum to the right and left, but also to maintain fairly high positions and power under successive regimes. Revolutionaries who survived 9 Thermidor and did not allow themselves to be drawn into the orgy of acquisition and looting under the Directory, who did not want to put up with 18 Brumaire, were expected by the guillotine, exile to Cayenne, where tropical fever (“yellow guillotine”) raged, prisons, at best, complete removal from political life. No one managed to save position and influence and preserve principles. With regard to Lazar Carno, who claimed this, Engels ironically remarked: “Where has it been seen that an honest man manages to hold on in spite of Thermidor, Fryuktidor, Brumer, etc.”1. If measured by these standards, then Talleyrand and Fouche were distinguished from their colleagues only by their greater strength of mind, greater foresight, dexterity and shamelessness, greater ability to benefit from political changes, to make themselves necessary for each new regime. And among all these qualities, the main thing, of course, was the state mind and its obligatory property - vision beyond today, in a word, political insight, which did not cease to be such at all because it was entirely put at the service of personal egoistic benefits. For all their outward differences, both the arrogant representative of one of the most noble aristocratic families of France, and the sly police bloodhound, who came from the very bottom of the bourgeoisie, were surprisingly similar in the main, and because of this they hated each other. Talleyrand, alluding to Fouche's attempts to expand the curiosity of the police beyond the proper, remarked:
- The Minister of Police is a person who first intervenes in what concerns him, and then in what does not concern him.
Hearing the remark that Fouche despises people, the prince said in passing:
- Undoubtedly, this man studied himself well.
Fouche did not remain in debt:
- There is a place in the Temple prison in order to place Talleyrand there at the right moment.
And suddenly, at the height of Napoleon's Spanish campaign, the enemies reconciled (through the mediation of their mutual friend d "Hautrives). The latent opposition of Talleyrand and Fouche to Napoleon, which united these highest and most capable dignitaries of the empire as allies, was dictated by their political foresight. It was not generated by any disgrace of the emperor (which was the result, and not the cause of the secret machinations of his most intelligent and shrewd ministers), nor their personal hostility towards him.Fouche and Talleyrand could neither seriously count on gaining from the fall of the emperor, nor claim the first place in All their actions ultimately boiled down to one thing - to obtain guarantees for themselves in the event of the fall of Napoleon, which he himself made probable because of his unrestrained policy of conquest, which became, as it were, an inevitable companion of his personal dictatorship. mind to understand - the worst prospect for both Talleyrand and Fouche was rest avration of the Bourbons, no matter how much these former active participants in the revolution flirted with the royalist emissaries. In this respect, both of them were representatives of a fairly broad, albeit amorphous, group, which included both the upper and middle links of the Napoleonic administration. This group believed that any regime that could replace the empire should be in a certain continuity with the revolution in order to guarantee the inviolability of the new bourgeois order and, of course, a place in the political life of those who personified these orders. As a result, a purely selfish interest imperiously dictated to people like Talleyrand and Fouche the search for an alternative to the Napoleonic regime that would better satisfy the thirst for stability in bourgeois France. And greater stability could be achieved if the new regime would abandon the adventurous foreign policy, could establish peace, preserving what really could be retained for a long time from the conquests of previous years. “I cannot,” Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand in September 1806, “have an ally with any of the great powers of Europe.”2
Talleyrand understood that Napoleon's victories only narrowed the possibilities of French diplomacy to play on the contradictions between the great powers. When news came of the defeat of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstedt, a significant phrase escaped from the lips of the imperial minister: "They do not deserve any regret, but Europe is dying with them." If until 1806, Talley-ran saw a danger to the political stability of France in the possible death of Napoleon on the battlefield or at the hands of an assassin, then from that time on, Napoleon himself with his unrestrained plans for conquest appears to be the main threat to the prince. Fouche, the newly-minted Duke of Otrante, came to the same conclusions. One can agree with one of his latest (and generally apologetic) biographers when he writes about the Napoleonic Minister of Police: “He realized that France badly needed peace to consolidate the great gains received as a result of the French Revolution”3. Talleyrand, earlier and better than others, was able to discern what were the interests of the new, bourgeois France and defended them when .. when they corresponded to his personal interests. They coincided, of course, far from always, but still quite often. Prince Talleyrand understood that neglecting the interests of the bourgeoisie, even if it was beneficial at the moment, could turn out to be a big loss in the future. Therefore, he always sought to find a solution in which his personal interests coincided with French interests, as they were understood by the new rising class.
In March 1805, Talleyrand, in the presence of the emperor, delivered a speech in the Senate on the forthcoming proclamation of Napoleon as king of Italy. In this speech, the prince expressed his disagreement with the comparisons often made then of Napoleon with Charlemagne and Alexander the Great: “Empty and deceptive analogies! Charlemagne was a conqueror, not a founder of a state... Alexander, constantly pushing the limits of his conquests, prepared only a bloody funeral for himself.” On the contrary, Napoleon, according to Talleyrand, "seeks only to establish in France the ideas of order, and in Europe - the ideas of peace." Addressing the emperor directly, Taleiran proclaimed: “For France and Italy, you are dear as a legislator and defender of their rights and power. Europe honors in you the guardian of its interests...”4. In the event of a war with the Third Coalition, the direct cause of which was the annexation of Genoa to France and the formation of the Kingdom of Italy - in contradiction with the Amiens and Luneville treaties, Talleyrand declared in the Senate on September 23, 1805: the emperor sees himself forced to repel "unjust aggression, which he vainly tried to prevent. At the same time, even on the eve of Austerlitz (at least Talleyrand claimed so in 1807), he offered Napoleon such a “moderate” program: the establishment of “religion, morality and order in France”, peaceful relations with England, strengthening the eastern borders by creating the Confederation of the Rhine , the transformation of Italy into a state independent of Austria and France, the creation of Poland as a barrier against tsarist Russia. And even after Austerlitz, Talleyrand persistently recommended to Napoleon reconciliation with Austria, the conclusion of a close alliance with her. The prince did not approve of the cruelty of the terms of the Treaty of Pressburg. He joked: “All the time I have to negotiate not with Europe, but with Bonaparte!”
In the autumn of 1808, returning to Paris after the Erfurt meeting of the two emperors - Napoleon and Alexander I - Talleyrand made it clear to the Austrian ambassador K. Metternich that it was in the interests of France itself that the powers opposing Napoleon unite and put a limit to his insatiable ambition. The prince explained that the cause of Napoleon was no longer the cause of France, that Europe could only be saved by a close alliance between Austria and Russia. Arriving in Vienna in 1809 after a break with France, Metternich literally reproduced the words dictated to him by Talleyrand: “France has not waged war since the Peace of Luneville (1801 - Auth.). They are led by Napoleon, using French resources. (Almost simultaneously, Talleyrand wrote to Napoleon: “Your Majesty was absent for thirty days and added six victories to the amazing history of his previous campaigns ... Your glory, sovereign, is our pride, but our very existence depends on your life.”) On the eve of the campaign In 1812, Talleyrand summed up: "Napoleon preferred to have his adventures named after him, rather than his century"6.
The die was finally cast. In March 1814, Talleyrand and the Prince Primate of the Confederation of the Rhine, Karl Dahlberg, who acted with him, sent their agent Baron de Vitrolles through Switzerland to the Allied camp. And as proof that Vitrolles is who he claims to be, Dahlberg told him the names of two Viennese ladies, whose favor he shared with the tsarist diplomat Nesselrode. The password was convincing. And Talleyrand's advice, conveyed through Vitrolles, was to no longer negotiate with Napoleon, to march straight on Paris and restore the Bourbon dynasty to the throne of France. The last part of the recommendation, of course, by no means can be considered a model of political insight, but at that moment it seemed to the prince the most appropriate for his personal benefits and careerist calculations. Already after the abdication, while on the Elbe, Napoleon once remarked:
- If I hanged two - Talleyrand and Fouche - then I would still remain on the throne.
Oh, poor Napoleon! - Talleyrand ironically commented on this tirade. “Instead of hanging me, he should have heeded my advice. Napoleon himself was the chief traitor.

Louis XVIII (engraving by Audouin from drawing by Gros, 1815).

But the peculiar frankness of this predatory hero Balzac was by no means characteristic of everyone. And even those of the bourgeois politicians who did their best to imitate Talleyrand as an unattainable model, did not stop vilifying him behind his eyes, watching how this maestro of cunning and the most cynical comedian brilliantly plays a completely new role for him on the world stage. Of course, it was his direct adversaries, the diplomats of the feudal-absolutist powers, whom he made it his top priority to fool, who were most angry at his placid impudence. These diplomats saw that in Vienna he deftly snatched their own weapons from them before they came to their senses, and now beats them with this weapon, demanding in the name of the “principle of legitimism” and in the name of respect for the “legitimate” dynasty that returned to France, that not only French territory remained untouched, but that Central Europe also returned completely to its pre-revolutionary state and that therefore the "legitimate" Saxon king would remain with all his old possessions, which were claimed by Prussia.

Talleyrand's opponents were most outraged that he, who at one time sold the legitimate monarchy so quickly, served the revolution, served Napoleon, shot the Duke of Enghien only for his "legitimate" origin, destroyed and trampled under Napoleon © with his seven diplomatic decorations and speeches any semblance of an international rights, any concept of "legitimate" or other rights, - now with the most serene look, with the clearest forehead, he declared (for example, to the Russian delegate at the Vienna Congress, Karl Vasilyevich Nesselrod): "You are talking to me about a deal - I cannot make deals . I am happy that I cannot be as free in my actions as you are. You are guided by your interests, your will: as for me, I am obliged to follow principles, and principles do not enter into transactions” (les principes ne transigent pas). His opponents could not believe their ears when they heard that such harsh speeches and impartial morality were read to them by the same Prince Talleyrand, who - as the already mentioned newspaper Le Nain jaune wrote about him around the same time - spent his whole life selling all those who bought it. Neither Nesselrode, nor the Prussian delegate Humboldt, nor Alexander knew yet that even in those very days of the Congress of Vienna, when Talleyrand gave them harsh lessons in moral behavior, fidelity to principles and religiously unswerving service to legitimism and legality, he received a bribe from the Saxon king five million francs in gold, from the Duke of Baden - one million; they also did not know that subsequently they would all read in the memoirs of Chateaubriand that for ardent defense in the name of legitimism of the rights of the Neapolitan Bourbons to the throne of the Two Sicilies, Talleyrand then, in Vienna, received six million from the pretender Ferdinand IV (according to other testimony, three million seven hundred thousand) and for the convenience of transferring money was even so kind and helpful that he sent his personal secretary Perret to Ferdinand.

But even here he acted in the matter of taking bribes exactly the same way as under Napoleon. He did not do for bribes those things that would go against the interests of France, or, more broadly, with the main diplomatic goals to which he aspired. But along the way, he received money from those who were personally interested in Talleyrand achieving these goals as soon as possible and as fully as possible. So, France, for example, was directly interested in Prussia not seizing the possessions of the Saxon king, and Talleyrand defended Saxony. But since the Saxon king was much more interested in this than France, this king, in order to arouse the greatest activity in Talleyrand, gave him, for his part, five millions. And Talleyrand took them. And, of course, he took it with such restrained and graceful grandeur, which was always characteristic of him, with which once, in 1807, he accepted a bribe from the same Saxon king in order to convince Napoleon not to take the Sistine Madonna and others from the Dresden Gallery, as a matter of misfortune , which attracted the emperor's paintings.

The return of Napoleon from the island of Elba and the restoration of the empire took Talleyrand completely by surprise. Recently (in May 1933) Ferdinand Bak's fantasy book Le secret de Talleyrand was published in Paris. This "secret" revealed only by Buck is that Talleyrand ... himself arranged Napoleon's flight from Elba. I note this amateurish fantasy book here only as a curiosity to prove that even distant posterity continues to consider Talleyrand capable of the most amazingly cunning plan and dexterous and strong enough to carry out any such project. Needless to say, there is not even a shadow of scientific argumentation in this book.

Wellington (lithograph by Charles Besnier).

Having restored the empire in March 1815, Napoleon let Talleyrand know that he would take him back into service. But Talleyrand remained in Vienna; he did not believe either in the gracious disposition of the emperor (who immediately ordered, upon his widow's accession, to sequester all the property of the prince), nor in the strength of the new Napoleonic reign. The Congress of Vienna closed. Waterloo struck, and the Bourbons, and with them Talleyrand, again returned to France. The circumstances were such that it was not yet possible for Louis XVIII to get rid of Talleyrand, whom he did not like and was afraid of. Not only that: Fouche, Duke of Otrante, about whom it was said that if there were no Talleyrand in the world, he would be the most deceitful and vicious person of all mankind, this same Fouche, by a whole series of clever maneuvers, achieved what he, even for the first time, but still had to be invited to the new cabinet, although Fouche was among those members of the Convention who in 1793 voted for the execution of Louis XVI.

These two men, Talleyrand and Fouche, both former clergymen, both who embraced the revolution in order to make a career for themselves, both ministers of the Directory, both ministers of Napoleon, both received ducal titles from Napoleon, both made millions under Napoleon, both betrayers of Napoleon—and now, together, they also entered the office of the “most Christian” and “legitimate” monarch, the brother of the executed Louis. Fouche and Talleyrand already knew each other well and that is why they wanted to work with each other above all. With a very great similarity of both in the sense of deep contempt for anything other than personal interests, a complete lack of integrity and any restraining principles in the implementation of their plans, they differed in many respects from one another. Fouche was not a very timid ten, and before 9 Thermidor he boldly put his head on the map, organizing an attack on Robespierre in the Convention and overthrowing him. For Talleyrand, such behavior would be completely unthinkable. Fouche acted in Lyon in the era of terror in a way that Talleyrand would never have dared to act, who emigrated precisely because he believed that it was very dangerous to remain in the camp of the “neutrals” in the present, and to be an active fighter against the counter-revolution would become dangerous in the future. Fouche had a good head, after Talleyrand the best that Napoleon had. The emperor knew this, showered both of them with favors, but then put them in disgrace. That is why he often commemorated them together. For example, after abdicating the throne, he expressed regret that he did not have time to hang Talleyrand and Fouche. “I leave this matter to the Bourbons,” the emperor added, according to legend.

However, the Bourbons, willy-nilly, immediately after Waterloo and after their second return in the summer of 1815 to the throne, not only refrained from hanging both dukes, both Benevente and Otrante, but also called them to the government of France. The poet and ideologist of the aristocratic-clerical reaction at that moment, Chateaubriand could not hide his fury at the sight of these two leaders of the revolution and the empire, one of which had the blood of Louis XVI and many others executed in Lyon, and the other - the blood of the Duke of Enghien. Chateaubriand was at court when the lame Talleyrand, arm in arm with Fouche, went into the king's office: “Suddenly the door opens; Silently enters Vice, based on Crime, M. Talleyrand, supported by M. Fouche; the infernal vision slowly passes before me, penetrates into the king's office and disappears there.

This fervently preached idea that the perjurer can "spit" in the face of "humanity" if the end result of his betrayals is of real benefit, brings political capital; this cynical conviction in the primacy of "intellect over morality" in politics is unusually characteristic of the era of the turning point, which transferred power to the hands of the bourgeoisie. And most of all, it is the solemn, popular proclamation of this principle and undisguised admiration for the person in whom the indicated ideal was most fully personified, that is, Prince Talleyrand-Périgord.

Louis XVIII (engraving by Audouin from drawing by Gros, 1815).

But the peculiar frankness of this predatory hero Balzac was by no means characteristic of everyone. And even those of the bourgeois politicians who did their best to imitate Talleyrand as an unattainable model, did not stop vilifying him behind his eyes, watching how this maestro of cunning and the most cynical comedian brilliantly plays a completely new role for him on the world stage. Of course, it was his direct adversaries, the diplomats of the feudal-absolutist powers, whom he made it his top priority to fool, who were most angry at his placid impudence. These diplomats saw that in Vienna he deftly snatched their own weapons from them before they came to their senses, and now beats them with this weapon, demanding in the name of the “principle of legitimism” and in the name of respect for the “legitimate” dynasty that returned to France, that not only French territory remained untouched, but that Central Europe also returned completely to its pre-revolutionary state and that therefore the "legitimate" Saxon king would remain with all his old possessions, which were claimed by Prussia.
Talleyrand's opponents were most outraged that he, who at one time sold the legitimate monarchy so quickly, served the revolution, served Napoleon, shot the Duke of Enghien only for his "legitimate" origin, destroyed and trampled under Napoleon © with his seven diplomatic decorations and speeches any semblance of an international rights, any concept of "legitimate" or other rights, - now with the most serene look, with the clearest forehead, he declared (for example, to the Russian delegate at the Vienna Congress, Karl Vasilyevich Nesselrod): "You are talking to me about a deal - I cannot make deals . I am happy that I cannot be as free in my actions as you are. You are guided by your interests, your will: as for me, I am obliged to follow principles, and principles do not enter into transactions” (les principes ne transigent pas). His opponents could not believe their ears when they heard that such harsh speeches and impartial morality were read to them by the same Prince Talleyrand, who - as the already mentioned newspaper Le Nain jaune wrote about him around the same time - spent his whole life selling all those who bought it. Neither Nesselrode, nor the Prussian delegate Humboldt, nor Alexander knew yet that even in those very days of the Congress of Vienna, when Talleyrand gave them harsh lessons in moral behavior, fidelity to principles and religiously unswerving service to legitimism and legality, he received a bribe from the Saxon king five million francs in gold, from the Duke of Baden - one million; they also did not know that subsequently they would all read in the memoirs of Chateaubriand that for ardent defense in the name of legitimism of the rights of the Neapolitan Bourbons to the throne of the Two Sicilies, Talleyrand then, in Vienna, received six million from the pretender Ferdinand IV (according to other testimony, three million seven hundred thousand) and for the convenience of transferring money was even so kind and helpful that he sent his personal secretary Perret to Ferdinand.
But even here he acted in the matter of taking bribes exactly the same way as under Napoleon. He did not do for bribes those things that would go against the interests of France, or, more broadly, with the main diplomatic goals to which he aspired. But along the way, he received money from those who were personally interested in Talleyrand achieving these goals as soon as possible and as fully as possible. So, France, for example, was directly interested in Prussia not seizing the possessions of the Saxon king, and Talleyrand defended Saxony. But since the Saxon king was much more interested in this than France, this king, in order to arouse the greatest activity in Talleyrand, gave him, for his part, five millions. And Talleyrand took them. And, of course, he took it with such restrained and graceful grandeur, which was always characteristic of him, with which once, in 1807, he accepted a bribe from the same Saxon king in order to convince Napoleon not to take the Sistine Madonna and others from the Dresden Gallery, as a matter of misfortune , which attracted the emperor's paintings.
The return of Napoleon from the island of Elba and the restoration of the empire took Talleyrand completely by surprise. Recently (in May 1933) Ferdinand Bak's fantasy book Le secret de Talleyrand was published in Paris. This "secret" revealed only by Buck is that Talleyrand ... himself arranged Napoleon's flight from Elba. I note this amateurish fantasy book here only as a curiosity to prove that even distant posterity continues to consider Talleyrand capable of the most amazingly cunning plan and dexterous and strong enough to carry out any such project. Needless to say, there is not even a shadow of scientific argumentation in this book.

Having restored the empire in March 1815, Napoleon let Talleyrand know that he would take him back into service. But Talleyrand remained in Vienna; he did not believe either in the gracious disposition of the emperor (who immediately ordered, upon his widow's accession, to sequester all the property of the prince), nor in the strength of the new Napoleonic reign. The Congress of Vienna closed. Waterloo struck, and the Bourbons, and with them Talleyrand, again returned to France. The circumstances were such that it was not yet possible for Louis XVIII to get rid of Talleyrand, whom he did not like and was afraid of. Not only that: Fouche, Duke of Otrante, about whom it was said that if there were no Talleyrand in the world, he would be the most deceitful and vicious person of all mankind, this same Fouche, by a whole series of clever maneuvers, achieved what he, even for the first time, but still had to be invited to the new cabinet, although Fouche was among those members of the Convention who in 1793 voted for the execution of Louis XVI.
These two men, Talleyrand and Fouche, both former clergymen, both who embraced the revolution in order to make a career for themselves, both ministers of the Directory, both ministers of Napoleon, both received ducal titles from Napoleon, both made millions under Napoleon, both betrayers of Napoleon—and now, together, they also entered the office of the “most Christian” and “legitimate” monarch, the brother of the executed Louis. Fouche and Talleyrand already knew each other well and that is why they wanted to work with each other above all. With a very great similarity of both in the sense of deep contempt for anything other than personal interests, a complete lack of integrity and any restraining principles in the implementation of their plans, they differed in many respects from one another. Fouche was not a very timid ten, and before 9 Thermidor he boldly put his head on the map, organizing an attack on Robespierre in the Convention and overthrowing him. For Talleyrand, such behavior would be completely unthinkable. Fouche acted in Lyon in the era of terror in a way that Talleyrand would never have dared to act, who emigrated precisely because he believed that it was very dangerous to remain in the camp of the “neutrals” in the present, and to be an active fighter against the counter-revolution would become dangerous in the future. Fouche had a good head, after Talleyrand the best that Napoleon had. The emperor knew this, showered both of them with favors, but then put them in disgrace. That is why he often commemorated them together. For example, after abdicating the throne, he expressed regret that he did not have time to hang Talleyrand and Fouche. “I leave this matter to the Bourbons,” the emperor added, according to legend.
However, the Bourbons, willy-nilly, immediately after Waterloo and after their second return in the summer of 1815 to the throne, not only refrained from hanging both dukes, both Benevente and Otrante, but also called them to the government of France. The poet and ideologist of the aristocratic-clerical reaction at that moment, Chateaubriand could not hide his fury at the sight of these two leaders of the revolution and the empire, one of which had the blood of Louis XVI and many others executed in Lyon, and the other - the blood of the Duke of Enghien. Chateaubriand was at court when the lame Talleyrand, arm in arm with Fouche, went into the king's office: “Suddenly the door opens; Silently enters Vice, based on Crime, M. Talleyrand, supported by M. Fouche; the infernal vision slowly passes before me, penetrates into the king's office and disappears there.

II

In this ministry, in which Talleyrand was chairman of the council of ministers and Fouchet minister of police, the Napoleonic general Gouvion Saint-Cyr became minister of war; There were other similar appointments. Talleyrand clearly saw that the Bourbons could hold on only if, putting aside all their grievances, they accepted the revolution and the empire as an inescapable and huge historical fact and gave up dreams of the old regime. But no less clearly, he soon saw something else: namely, that neither the royal brother and heir Charles, nor the children of this Charles, nor a whole cloud of emigrants who returned to France would agree with such a policy for anything, that they “forgot nothing and nothing learned” (Taleyrand’s famous phrase about the Bourbons, often incorrectly attributed to Alexander I). He saw that a party of furious and irreconcilable noble and clerical reactionaries was gaining the upper hand at court, under the rule of an absurd, unrealizable dream of destroying everything done during the revolution and held by Napoleon, that is, in other words, they want the conversion of the country that has embarked on the path commercial and industrial development, to the country of the feudal-noble monarchy. Talleyrand understood that this dream was completely unfulfillable, that these ultra-royalists could rage as they pleased, but that they should seriously begin to break up the new France, break down institutions, orders, civil and criminal laws left over from the revolution and from Napoleon, even just raise this question openly - perhaps only completely gone crazy. However, he soon began to see that the ultra-royalists really seemed to be going completely crazy - at least they were losing even that little caution that they had shown back in 1814.
The fact is that the sudden return of Napoleon in March 1815, his hundred-day reign and his new overthrow - again carried out not by France, but exclusively by a new invasion of the allied European armies - all these amazing events brought the noble-clerical reaction out of its last balance. . They felt severely offended. How could an unarmed man, amidst the complete calm of the country, land on the southern coast of France and in three weeks, constantly moving towards Paris, without firing a single shot, without shedding a drop of blood, win France back from her "legitimate" king, drive this king abroad, again sit on the throne and again gather a huge army for war with all of Europe? Who was this person? A despot who did not take off his weapons during his entire reign, devastated the country with recruit sets, a usurper who did not take into account anyone and anything in the world, and most importantly, a monarch whose new accession would inevitably cause a new, never-ending war right now with Europe. And at the feet of this man, without any talk, without any attempt at resistance, without even any attempt at persuasion on his part, in March 1815 all of France fell immediately, all the peasantry, the whole army, the whole bourgeoisie.
Not a single hand was raised in defense of the "legitimate" king, in defense of the Bourbon dynasty that returned in 1814. Explain this phenomenon by the fear for the land acquired during the revolution, which fed the peasantry, by those fears of the specter of the resurrection of the noble system, which were experienced not only by the peasantry, but also by the bourgeoisie, in general, explain this amazing incident, these "Hundred Days" by some general and deep For social reasons, the ultra-royalists were not able, and simply did not want to. They attributed everything that happened precisely to excessive weakness, compliance, inappropriate liberalism on the part of the king, in the first year of his reign, from April 1814 to March 1815: if then, they assured, they had time to mercilessly exterminate sedition, such a general and sudden "treason" would have been impossible in March 1815, and Napoleon would have been captured immediately after his landing at Cape Juan. Now, to this disgrace of the expulsion of the Bourbons in March, was added the shame of their return in June, July and August, after Waterloo, and this time really "in the wagons" of the army of Wellington and Blucher. The frenzy of the ultra-royalists knew no bounds. If the king resisted them a little longer, and if they still allowed him to resist, then it was just at the first moment: after all, one had to look around, more surprises could be expected.
That is the only reason why a government with Talleyrand and Fouche at its head became possible. But as more and more armies of the British, Prussians, then Austrians, later Russians poured into France, as the enemy armies, this time for many years, were deployed to occupy entire departments and to fully provide Louis XVIII and his dynasty from new assassination attempts by Napoleon, as well as from any revolutionary attempts whatsoever - extreme reaction resolutely raised its head and screamed for merciless revenge, for the execution of traitors, for the suppression and destruction of everything that was hostile to the old dynasty .
Talleyrand understood what these madnesses would lead to. And he even made some attempts to keep the frenzied. For a long time he opposed the compilation of a proscriptive list of those who contributed to the return and new accession of Napoleon. These persecutions were nonsense, because the whole of France either actively contributed or did not resist the emperor, and in this way also contributed to him. But then Fute came forward. Having guillotined or drowned in the Rhone hundreds and hundreds of Lyons in 1793 for their adherence to the House of Bourbon, then voted the death of Louis XVI at the same time, for years shooting under Napoleon as Minister of Police people accused again of being loyal to the House of Bourbon - Fouche, again a minister police, now, in 1815, ardently insisted on new executions, but this time for insufficient adherence to the House of Bourbon. Fouche hastened to draw up a list of the most, in his opinion, guilty dignitaries, generals and private individuals, primarily helping the second accession of Napoleon.
Talleyrand strongly protested. Fouche's narrow police mind and the furious vindictiveness of the royal court triumphed over the more far-sighted policy of Talleyrand, who understood how the dynasty was ruining itself, getting dirty in the blood of such people as, for example, the famous Marshal Ney, the legendary brave man, the favorite of the whole army, the hero of the Battle of Borodino. Talleyrand managed to save only forty-three people, the remaining fifty-seven remained on Fouche's list. The execution of Marshal Ney took place and, of course, became a most grateful topic for anti-Bourbon agitation in the army and throughout the country.
This was just the beginning. A wave of "white terror" swept through France, especially in the south, as this movement was then (for the first time in history) called. The terrible beatings of revolutionaries and Bonapartists, and at the same time even Protestants (Huguenots), incited by the Catholic clergy, irritated Talleyrand, and he tried to fight them, but he was not destined to stay in power for a long time.

The case began with Fouche. No matter how zealous the minister of police was, the ultra-royalists did not want to forgive him the execution of Louis XVI and all his past. Fouche resorted to a trick that often helped him under Napoleon: he presented the king and his boss, that is, the first minister Talleyrand, with a report in which he tried to scare them with some conspiracies that allegedly existed in the country. But Talleyrand clearly did not believe and did not even hide this from his colleague. It only seemed to Fouche that he saw through Talleyrand, but Talleyrand really saw through the cunning Minister of Police. Talleyrand considered, firstly, the ridiculous and dangerous policy of repression and persecution, which Fouche wished to pursue for the sole purpose of pleasing the ultra-royalists and retaining the ministerial portfolio. Secondly, Talleyrand clearly saw that nothing would come of it anyway, that the ultra-royalists hated too much Fouche, who was covered in the blood of their relatives and friends, and that the office in which Fouche's "regicide" was located could not be stable with full violent revelry. noble reaction and militant clerical agitation. For all these reasons, the Duke of Benevente decidedly wished to get rid of the Duke of Otranto. Quite unexpectedly for himself, Fouche was appointed French envoy to Saxony. He left for Dresden. But, throwing out this ballast, Talleyrand still did not escape the shipwreck. Exactly five days after Fouche's appointment to Dresden, Talleyrand started a long-prepared principled conversation with the king. He wanted to ask the king for freedom of action to fight against the insane excesses of an extremely reactionary party, which clearly undermined any confidence in the dynasty. He ended his speech with an impressive ultimatum: if his majesty denies the ministry his full support "against all", against whom it is needed, then he, Talleyrand, resigns. And suddenly the king gave an unexpected answer to this: "All right, I will appoint another ministry." It happened on September 24, 1815, and this ended the official career of Prince Talleyrand for fifteen years.
For the minister dismissed so suddenly, this was a complete surprise, contrary to everything that he writes in his memoirs, giving his resignation the appearance of some kind of patriotic feat and connecting it for no reason with the attitude of France towards its victors. The point was not that, and Talleyrand, of course, understood better than anyone what the root of events was. Louis XVIII, an old, sick, motionless gout, wanted only one thing: not to go into exile a third time, to die calmly as a king and in the royal palace. He was so clever that he understood the correctness of Talleyrand's views and the danger to the White Terror dynasty and the insane cries and acts of the ultra-reactionary party. But he had to reckon with this party, at least to the extent that he did not irritate it with collaborators like Fouche or Talleyrand.

What was needed was Talleyrand's policy, but not made by Talleyrand's hands. Talleyrand did not want to notice that he himself was hated even more than Fouche, that the majority of ultra-royalists (and the majority in all other parties) willingly repeated the words of Joseph de Maistre: "Of these two people, Talleyrand is more criminal than Fouche." If Fouche was an extra ballast for Talleyrand, then Talleyrand himself was an extra ballast for King Louis XVIII. That is why Fouche had not yet managed to leave for Dresden, when Talleyrand, who removed him, was himself thrown overboard. Upon retirement, he received the court title of Grand Chamberlain, with a salary of one hundred thousand francs in gold a year and with the "duty" to do whatever he liked and live where he pleased. However, under Napoleon he also had this same title (along with all his other titles and titles), and under Napoleon these duties were just as little burdensome and even more generously paid.
Having been freed from the ministry, Talleyrand took up the operation he had long considered, which no one knew about until recent years, more precisely until December 15, 1933, when some secret documents were published in France. On January 12, 1817, Prince Talleyrand, it turns out, wrote the most secret letter to Metternich, Chancellor of the Austrian Empire. He reported that he “carried away” (emport?) at one time from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs part of the original correspondence of Napoleon, starting with the return of the conqueror from Egypt and ending in 1813. So, would you like to buy?
Correspondence began between the seller and the buyer. Talleyrand wrote that Russia, or Prussia, or England would give half a million francs in gold, but he, Talleyrand, loves Austria and, in particular, Metternich. The goods are first-class: "twelve voluminous packages", Napoleon's handwritten signatures! And most importantly, Emperor Franz should not be stingy because there are things unpleasant for Austria, and having bought documents, the Austrian government - as Talleyrand advises - "could either bury them in the depths of its archives or even destroy them." The deal went through, and Talleyrand sold for half a million these archival documents stolen by him personally. He stole them ahead of time, in 1814 and 1815, when he was briefly at the head of the government twice.
But, realizing quite clearly that he is committing real high treason, already connected with direct criminality, theft of state property, Prince Talleyrand prudently demands from Metternich that he, Talleyrand, be provided with shelter in Austria, if, for example, he is befallen in France by any any trouble and he will have to leave the fatherland without loss of time.
Metternich agreed to everything and paid everything in full. And only later, when all this stolen goods were taken out of France (under the guise of Austrian embassy papers not subject to inspection) and arrived in Vienna, the Austrian chancellor could make sure that the seller also partly cheated him: many documents turned out to be not originals at all, but copies, without Napoleon's signature. But in such delicate cases, to whom will you complain? The concealer and the buyer always runs the risk of suffering if the thief and the dealer are prone to craftiness. That was the end of the matter.

III

Talleyrand retired to private life. Enormous wealth, a magnificent castle in Valençay, a magnificent palace in the city, a royal luxury of life - that was what awaited him at the end of his days. Idleness did not bother him very much. He never liked work at all. He gave guidance to his subordinates in the ministry, to his ambassadors, and finally to his ministers when he was first minister. He gave advice to the sovereigns he served - Napoleon, Louis XVIII; did it in intimate conversations face to face. He conducted his diplomatic negotiations and intrigues, sometimes at the dinner table, sometimes at a ball, sometimes during a break in a card game; he achieved the main results precisely under various circumstances of the secular, full of entertainment life that he always led.
But the tart, daily, bureaucratic work was unknown to him and unnecessary. For this, there was a staff of experienced dignitaries and officials subordinate to him, secretaries and directors. Now, in retirement, just as in the years of his disgrace under Napoleon, he carefully watched the political chessboard and the moves of his partners, but for the time being he himself did not take part in the game. And he saw that the Bourbons continued to undermine their position, that the only man among them with a head, Louis XVIII, was exhausted in his unsuccessful struggle against extreme reactionaries, that when the king died, a frivolous old man, Charles d "Artois, who did not only he will not oppose the plans of restoring the old regime, but he himself will willingly take the initiative, because he will not have the intelligence to understand the terrible danger of this hopeless game, this absurd and impossible reversal of history, he will lack even that instinct of self-preservation, which alone hindered his older brother, Louis XVIII, is quite to join the ultra-royalists.
Moving away from active politics, Talleyrand sat down for his memoirs. He wrote five volumes (available in an abridged Russian translation). From a purely biographical point of view, these five volumes are of almost no interest to us. We shall here only say a few words about this work of Talleyrand.
The memoirs of bourgeois leaders, who played a very paramount role, are rarely at all true. This is quite understandable: the author, knowing his historical responsibility, strives to build his story in such a way that the motivation of his own actions is as sublime as possible, and where they can in no way be interpreted in favor of the author, one can try to completely renounce complicity in them. In a word, about many memoirists of this type, one can repeat what Henri Rochefort once said about the memoirs of the first minister of the end of the Second Empire, Emile Olivier: “Olivier lies as if he were still the first minister.” The best of the newest examples of this kind of literature can be found in the nine volumes of memoirs of the late Poincaré (a further dozen and a half were in preparation, judging by the accepted scale and the well-known diligence of the author). All nine volumes of Poincaré are almost a blunder, in essence, a repetition of the patriotic bureaucracy that was printed in the era of several of his ministries and his presidency.

TALEIRAN. I am always cold, Monsieur Fouche. I get cold even in the heat. This is how he was born. ( Looks closely at Fouche.) And then, something in you is so ... chilling.

Pause.

I will increase the salaries of my lackeys. They deserve it.

FOUCHE. Yes, you don't spoil them, Your Grace.

Again, closer, the sounds of "Carmagnola" appear.

Does this song remind you of anything?

TALEIRAN. At that time, Monsieur Fouche, I was in America.

FOUCHE. Of course, I forgot!.. America! They say it is a great country - and with a great future. Someday you must tell me how people live in America.

TALEIRAN. Just like in France, in the countryside. In the village, only without the master. The forests are denser, and the natives are red-colored ... and fierce.

FOUCHE. How are the Parisians now?

TALEIRAND ( with a smile). I think, yes. Doesn't it scare you?

FOUCHE ( slightly noticeable smile, sympathetic tone). Scary, but not as much as you. ( Returns to the table and sits down.) To contain them is difficult, almost impossible.

Talleyrand fills the glasses with champagne, and everyone takes his own, watching the interlocutor. Talleyrand raises his glass.

TALEIRAN. For our friendship!

Fouche raises the glass to his lips, but before drinking, he waits for the owner to drink..

FOUCHE ( drinks and puts the glass on the table). She has become a proverb.

TALEIRAND ( lifting a silver lid on a platter). Now I will prove it to you.

FOUCHE ( admiringly). Goose pate with truffles!

TALEIRAN. Yes, from Périgord... from the land of Talleyrand. ( He cuts off a piece and puts it on a plate, which Fouche hands him.)

FOUCHE. Prince, you know how to live.

TALEIRAND ( imposing itself pate.) Habit, Monsieur Fouche. The ability to live and the ability to die are in our blood.

They eat silently.

How much time do you think we have to dine in peace?

FOUCHE. Cut short.

TALEIRAN. Is it?

FOUCHE. Completely off the mark. An explosion could happen at any moment. I know what it smells like. There will be no ceremony with anyone.

TALEIRAND ( wiping your mouth). Well, let's say two hours. Two hours to pick up power for France.

FOUCHE. Just don't forget, it's not Wellington under your windows, but our mob. They hate us, but now they are waiting for salvation...

TALEIRAN. Which can only come from you and me. We think alike, Monsieur Fouche. If you allow, we will proceed from this.

Pause.

FOUCHE. To come to what?

TALEIRAN. Wherever we come, we have to go together.

FOUCHE ( with mock surprise). Who would have thought that you would need my hand?

TALEIRAN. Just like you my head. ( He runs the edge of his hand along the collar.) Since she survived.

FOUCHE. Indeed, it is high time for us to get along.

Talleyrand takes a knife and cuts the pâté.

TALEIRAN. More pate?

FOUCHE ( holding out a plate). Ah, prince, resistance at your table is futile.

TALEIRAND ( smugly). Look what awaits us! ( He lifts the silver caps one by one.) Asparagus with peas, soft parts of artichokes with green sauce... royal salmon and partridge fillets.

FOUCHE. How can you think of regime change! ( Points to a bottle of champagne.) Yes, even such a bottle of champagne!

TALEIRAN. A gift from the Duke of Wellington.

FOUCHE. You drink it much better than he does. ( Drinks.) I haven't drunk champagne since our victory at Waterloo.

TALEIRAN. What do you think of Wellington?

FOUCHE. In my opinion, the most empty person.

TALEIRAN. He is just full of himself.

FOUCHE. And so boring...

TALEIRAN. Killer. He was lucky that he won at Waterloo. Get yourself some more, Senator. Do not be shy.

Fouche surveys the table with the greedy gaze of a glutton.

FOUCHE. "Do not be shy!" Ah, prince, how wonderful it sounds, especially in politics! So, I'll start... with salmon. ( He puts salmon for himself, sniffs the air with pleasure and begins to eat.) So what were we talking about?

TALEIRAN. Oh Waterloo. The royal lilies are in bloom again. Now they decorate every hat.

FOUCHE. Lilies? Worthless to them. Within a hundred days, they completely withered.

TALEIRAN. I can't agree.

FOUCHE. It would be strange if you agreed.

Pause.

TALEIRAND ( keep eating happily). Either we come to an agreement tonight, or we both disappear from the scene. If we are not imprisoned at all, Mr. Chairman of the Provisional Government.

Fouche continues to eat imperturbably.

You and I have one trump card in our hands, one for two, you know this very well.

Pause.

Do you perhaps have an idea for the future of France?

FOUCHE. And not alone, Mr. former Prime Minister of His Majesty.

TALEIRAN. Not even alone? Interesting to hear!

From above, the sounds of musical instruments are being tuned up on the top floor..

FOUCHE ( surprised and suspicious). What's this?

TALEIRAN. I hired an orchestra. At night they rehearse after they play at the Italian Opera. ( Looks at the clock.) Midnight... just at that time they come.

FOUCHE. Who? Orchestra?

TALEIRAN. One of these days I am receiving General Orlov and Prince Metternich. I decided that if they were met with the music of their countries... it might put them in favor of France.

Pause.

This is a waltz. New dance. He made a splash at the Congress of Vienna.

FOUCHE ( incredulously). Does the orchestra stay overnight at your place?

TALEIRAND ( contemptuously). Ask my lackeys. They will tell you.

They exchange a long look.

FOUCHE. The situation is not simple.

Pause.

The Chamber of Deputies proclaimed Napoleon II Emperor...

TALEIRAND ( indignantly). Son of an ogre! This is not serious.

FOUCHE. ... and his mother, Marie Louise, as regent, let me remind you.

Pause.

The salmon is just amazing!

TALEIRAN. They bring it to me from the Rhine, from Strasbourg.

FOUCHE. Just think, they eat boiled beef at Wellington's!

Pause.

I am ready to admit that little Bonaparte cannot be a serious contender, but he is not the only one either. There is also Louis Philippe d'Orleans.

TALEIRAND ( pretending to shudder). Son of a kingslayer! Have mercy...

FOUCHE ( hypocritically). It's all overgrown.

TALEIRAN. Not so overgrown, Monsieur Fouche. The Duke of Orleans will wait for a while. Let's eat closer.

FOUCHE. closer?

TALEIRAN. Yes... quite close.

FOUCHE ( slap myself on the forehead). People! How did I forget? Well, of course, the French people.

Talleyrand's mocking chuckle.

Do not laugh. In the current anarchy, it is the republic, which has come to its senses from extremes and got rid of illusions, that could be the solution.

TALEIRAN. Did you miss the Directory, Monsieur Fouche? ( Looks at the clock. Pause.) Today, July 7, 1815, at half past one in the morning, France is ready to surrender to the first comer - and never before has her government been so provisional. I know that you are its head, Monsieur Fouche, but who, in fact, are you heading? A herd of crazed deputies who will never come to their senses after Waterloo. If a determined man appears tomorrow, they will crawl towards him on their belly. Here it is, the danger: the new Bonaparte, from the bottom, and the worse the devastation, the stronger his power will be.

Pause.

Wouldn't it be wiser to choose the host ourselves - whom we know and who needs us?

FOUCHE ( smiling). For you to head his government again?

TALEIRAND ( raises a glass). But this time you will be with me, Your Excellency.

FOUCHE. Dangerous neighborhood.

TALEIRAN. But I will be right in front of you. You can follow me, Fouche. You will be nearby. It's exciting, you'll see.

FOUCHE. I have no doubt, but if you don't mind, we'll postpone this game for now. There are things more urgent.

Pause.

Let's get back to the Bourbons.

Pause.

I'm afraid people won't accept them anymore.

TALEIRAND ( ironically). Are you afraid... Really?

FOUCHE. I said "I'm afraid"... as if putting myself in your place. When we easily cut off the king's head and the sky did not fall on us for it, it turned out that the king was just an ordinary person. Another restoration of the monarchy in this country, after everything that has been going on here for a quarter of a century - it seems to me that this is a thankless and difficult task.

TALEIRAND ( cyho). Yes, so what?

FOUCHE. And the fact that the monarchy by the grace of God no longer exists. This is just one of the possible options - and unpopular and unviable. The people will have to impose it. But what forces? “There is no more army, and one police force, even the most powerful, will not be enough to put down a general uprising. And then - why hide? “I have no desire, Your Grace, to shoot at the people.

TALEIRAND ( feigning surprise and indignation). But what kind of government wants to shoot at the people, Monsieur Fouche? None! It's just that every government, conscious of its responsibility to the people, is sometimes forced to take measures to disperse the rebels ... in the interests of the people themselves.

In particular, on December 20, 1808, Fouche suddenly showed up in person at a reception at Talleyrand's mansion. No one could believe his own eyes, especially when the two "enemies", "hand in hand, began to walk from one hall to another."

And these were people who back in October 1808 were considered sworn opponents!

The then Austrian ambassador in Paris, Clemens von Metternich, wrote to Vienna that “these people, standing in France in the first row in public opinion and in terms of influence, who only yesterday opposed each other in views and interests, have become close due to circumstances independent of them. themselves."

Yes, they were completely different. Fouche was a typical representative of the "third estate", and Talleyrand was from the aristocrats. Their mutual antipathy quickly grew into mutual contempt, and this, it would seem, should have blocked any rapprochement. But, as the historian Louis Madeleine very rightly notes, “they turned out to be too politicians in the soul, so that their mutual hatred could sound louder than their interests.

It must be said that by the end of 1808 their interests intersected and the opposition to Napoleon became the point of intersection.

Until December 20, 1808, Fouche never crossed the threshold of Talleyrand's house. What suddenly changed their attitude towards each other so dramatically? It is believed that Alexandre Maurice Blanc de Lanotte, Comte d'Hauterive contributed to their first meeting. He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at one time spent several years in the United States, knew Talleyrand very well and was even considered his unspoken "right hand". It was he who organized this meeting. Why? Yes, because Comte d'Hauterive was a smart man, having his own opinion on everything. As early as December 1805, he wrote to Talleyrand that Napoleon "seems to have risen above his own ideas."

If he thought so after Austerlitz, then one can imagine his judgment in 1808...

For example, the following words of d’Hauterive about Napoleon are known: “I don’t see how he can come to peace, except by crushing everyone around.”

First, the Comte d'Hauterive spoke with Fouche, then with Talleyrand. And the meeting took place, since by that time both of these people had already foreseen the collapse of the emperor who had risen too high. Accordingly, it was necessary to prepare in advance for this and decide what to do in the event, for example, of the death of Napoleon in the next war. This became the main basis for their rapprochement. And, by the way, their first confidential contact took place in the salon of the Princess de Vaudemont, who until then received them separately.

The meeting at the reception at Talleyrand's mansion was already very serious, and it greatly disturbed Baron Pasquier, a man who, thanks to his businesslike qualities, would soon become the metropolitan police prefect. Naturally, everything was immediately reported to the emperor.

Was it an open demonstration or a conspiracy? Napoleon didn't know yet. But this topic greatly excited him. At any rate, he is known to have told General Clark, his new Secretary of War, about this time:

I forbid you to contact Talleyrand, as this is g ...! He will stain you.

These very harsh words of Napoleon became known from the "Memoirs" of Louis Victor Léon de Rochechouart.