Philosophy of Science P. Feyerabend. Paul Feyerabend and methods of irrational thinking Feyerabend called his philosophical position

The formation of postmodern methodological consciousness in the second half of the twentieth century. led to a certain methodological, disciplinary, worldview anarchism, which was recorded in the works of many researchers, such as Tulmin, Feyerabend, Lakatos. Thus, in his work Against Methodological Coercion, Feyerabend emphasized that “there is no idea, no matter how outdated and absurd it may be, which is not capable of improving our knowledge. The whole history of thought is condensed into science and used to improve every single theory. A scientist interested in obtaining the maximum empirical content and wishing to understand as many aspects of his theory as possible will adopt a pluralistic methodology and will compare theories with each other, and not with "experience", "data" or "facts". The alternatives needed to sustain the discussion, he may well borrow from the past. In fact, they can be taken from wherever one can find: from ancient myths and modern prejudices, from the works of specialists and morbid fantasies. The whole history of a certain field of science is used to improve its most modern and most "progressive" state. The boundaries between the history of science, its philosophy and science itself, as well as between science and non-science, are disappearing.” The essence of his program: in the work "Against methodological coercion". The development of science according to Feyerabend: 1) such development is carried out through struggle and mutual criticism. 2) At the same time, scientists should be guided by two strategies: the “principle of proliferation” (reproduction) - it is necessary to create theories that are alternative to the generally accepted ones, since there is no other way to withstand competition; "principle of sustainability" - one must defend one's positions, making the most of their strengths and not succumb to difficulties. 3) The meaning of all terms, both empirical and theoretical, they are still theoretically dependent. Therefore, the choice of language for describing observations depended on pragmatic preference. 4) Successive theories have neither a common terminological nor an empirical basis. Scientific theories are therefore considered incommensurable, i.e. they cannot contradict each other. 5) Mutual criticism of different theoretical positions cannot be based on logical arguments. 6) Philosophy does not deny rationality as such. 7) One of the elements of the new rationality can be "methodological anarchism", the basis of which is a deep knowledge of the history of science, the ability to form and select methodology options and offer competition to the scientific tradition. 8) The subject of science should be the principle "everything that contributes to success is suitable." 9) Align rationalist values ​​with humanism (freedom of the spirit). 10) Scientists have the right to propagate their ideas. 11) Science, which is characterized by rational chauvinism, should be deprived of the support of the state and society. Feyerabend (1924-1994) - American philosopher and methodologist of science, representative of the philosophy of postpositivism, who put forward the concept of "epistemological anarchism". Her starting point was the thesis about the "theoretical loading" of facts, from which he concludes that the apparent superiority of one theory can only be caused by the language familiar to us, and by no means its objective merits. Theories are "incommensurable" among themselves, and the empirical method cannot provide an independent basis for choice. Rational choice between theories is a fairy tale invented by scientists. In fact, everything depends on such factors as the social status of the scientist, his worldview, passions, interests. Absolutizing both the moment of dependence of facts on theory, and the importance of socio-cultural factors for the development of science. Feyerabend argues that there is not and cannot be a universal method of cognition, and the dominance of one, most often old, theory is dogmatism, harmful to science and society as a whole. The only principle that ensures the development of science is "proliferation", i.e. multiplication of mutually incompatible theories, or, in other words, the principle "everything is permissible." Another consequence of the "incommensurability" of theories, according to Feyerabend, is the impossibility of assessing qualitative changes in science. Defending the anti-cumulative concept of scientific knowledge, he proves that there is no scientific progress, and knowledge is not a movement towards the truth, it is only "an ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives." Feyerabend's next step was to blur the line between myth, religion, science, and art. Since any hypothesis is good for something, then science is not a universal cognitive tool and cannot claim an exclusive place in culture. Ultimately, science, truth, reason, justice for Feyrabend turn out to be synonymous with instruments of domination, and pluralism and archaism in knowledge are identified with intellectual freedom. A classic example of the situation described by Feyerabend is the difference between the definitions of a molecule in chemistry (the carrier of the chemical identity of a substance) and physics (the owner of the molecular spectrum). The approach of physics and chemistry to the description of a number of complex physical and chemical processes is also different. However, for example, the definitions of mass, energy, volume are identical in both sciences, as well as thermodynamics. Therefore, the idea put forward by the philosopher seems too categorical. Science appears as a process of reproduction of theories and allows the coexistence of many equal types of knowledge. Feyerabend denied the existence of a universal method of cognition. The criteria of rationality are not absolute, they are relative, and there are no such criteria that would be acceptable everywhere and always. Counterinduction is the requirement to introduce and develop hypotheses that are inconsistent with widely accepted theories or widely established facts. This principle, being elevated by Feyerabend to the rank of a methodological maxim, gave rise to the so-called theory of "epistemological anarchism". If Kuhn asserted the relativity of scientific knowledge and the principles of scientific rationality, linking them with the scientific community, then Feyerabend replaced the scientific community with a separate individual: a scientist should not follow any norms, but investigate facts and events himself, not succumbing to the pressure of any ideas and theories. . The scientist's reliance on traditions, norms, paradigms, his commitment to certain topics is not yet a guarantee of the objectivity and truth of the theory accepted by the subject - it is necessary to fully support scientific interest and tolerance for other points of view. According to Feyerabend, the standards of scientific thinking have a greater force of material influence than metaphysical force, because the scientist is in many cases compelled to adapt to them. In addition to methodological aspects, Feyerabend, for the first time in modern philosophy of science, pays considerable attention to the interaction of scientific knowledge and non-scientific factors, the latter having independent value. He emphasizes that the foundations of science lie not only in the sphere of knowledge itself, but also in culture in general. Scientific knowledge takes place in a broad context of cultural, ideological and political traditions. As a result, the nature of the theories put forward is determined not only by the empirical basis, but also by a number of subjective factors: the traditions of the society in which the scientist was born and raised, his tastes, aesthetic views, and the opinion of his colleagues. Taking into account the sociological conditionality of theoretical concepts, Feyerabend's relativism takes on a radical character. The apparent success of the theory, he argues, can in no way be regarded as a sign of truth and conformity with nature. Moreover, the absence of significant difficulties is highly likely the result of a reduction in empirical content due to the elimination of development alternatives and the facts that could be discovered with their help. In other words, the success achieved may be due to the transformation of the theory in the course of its evolution into a rigid ideology, successful not because of agreement with the facts - but because the facts were chosen so that they could not be verified, and some were completely eliminated. Such "success" is entirely artificial. From certain positions, Feyerabend's "epistemological anarchism" can be interpreted as "arbitrariness of ideas", irrationalism. Indeed, he paid insufficient attention to the justification of the continuity of knowledge, the factors leading to the real-life sustainability of the development of science. However, one gets the impression that his sharp criticism can also be caused by the fact that in describing real science he often turned out to be ruthlessly right. Looking at modern science "from the inside", it is necessary to recognize its undoubted merit as the rejection of the archaizing ideals of classical science, the proclamation of the principles so necessary for modern science: pluralism, tolerance, the right to creative search for every scientist, and not just a selected scientific elite - principles that are ignored can lead - and in some directions already leads - scientific knowledge to stagnation.

An Austrian philosopher who specialized in the philosophy of science, who served as professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, where he worked for three decades, from 1958 to 1989.

He traveled a lot, lived for some time in England (England), the United States (United States), New Zealand (New Zealand), Italy (Italy), Germany (Germany), and finally settled in Switzerland (Switzerland). His most important works include Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, published in 1975; "Science in a Free Society" (Science in a Free Society) 1978; and Farewell to Reason, a collection of articles published in 1987. Feyerabend became famous for his supposedly anarchist approach to science and his denial of the existence of universal methodological rules. He is considered a key figure in the philosophy of science, which influenced the development of this discipline, as well as in the sociology of scientific knowledge.

Paul Feyerabend was born on January 13, 1924 in Vienna. Due to World War I and terrible inflation, his parents waited a long time before they could afford to have their first and only child. When he was born, his mother was almost 40 years old. During his school years, he acquired the habit of constant reading, became interested in theater and took singing lessons.

In March 1938, Austria became part of the German Reich. Feyerabend's parents welcomed the Anschluss, while he himself described his attitude towards the Nazis as naive and emotional. He was not an ardent supporter of them, but he did not treat the atrocities that he saw during the war with indignation. When he graduated from high school in April 1942, Paul was drafted into the Imperial Labor Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst). After completing basic training in the city of Pirmasens in the west of Germany (Pirmasens, Germany), he ended up in a unit located near the French Brest (Brest). After a short vacation, he volunteered for the army and graduated from officer school, hoping that by the time graduation took place, the war would be over. However, Feyerabend was wrong. While he was studying in Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), his mother committed suicide.

In December 1943, he, a newly minted officer, was sent to the northern line of the Eastern Front, earned the Iron Cross

and the rank of lieutenant. During the retreat of the German army (and the offensive of the Soviet army), Feyerabend received three bullet wounds in the stomach and arm, and one of the bullets hit the spine. As a result, he walked with a cane for the rest of his life and often experienced severe pain (despite his physical handicap, he was married four times). He spent the rest of the war in a clinic in Apolda and studied singing in nearby Weimar.

When the war ended, Feyerabend found temporary work at the theater in Apolda, where he wrote plays for the theater, being influenced by Bertolt Brecht (Bertold Brecht) and even received an offer from Brecht to become his assistant at the Berlin State Opera (Berlin State Opera), but refused .

He took several courses at the Weimar Academy (Weimar Academy) and returned to Vienna to study history and sociology, however, disappointed, he switched to physics, and then to philosophy. Feyerabend received a British Council scholarship in 1951 and went to England the following year to study at the London School of Economics. Feyerabend then returned to Vienna and participated in various projects: he worked on the translation of the book by his supervisor Karl Popper (Karl Popper) "The Open Society and its Enemies" (The Open Society and Its Enemies), developed a report on the development of the humanities in Austria and wrote several articles for the encyclopedia.

In 1955, Feyerabend received his first academic position at the University of Bristol, where he lectured on the philosophy of science. In 1958, he moved to California (California) and received American citizenship. He later taught at Berkeley, Auckland, Sussex, Yale, London, Berlin and Zurich, but always returned to California until, finally, in October 1989, moved first to Italy and then to Switzerland. He retired in 1991 but continued to publish his work frequently and wrote his autobiography. By the end of his life, Feyerabend was diagnosed with a brain tumor, and on February 11, 1994, at the age of 70, he died at the Genolier Clinic, on the shores of Lake Geneva.

Post-positivist philosophy of science (P. Feyerabend, S. Toulmin).

The basis of P. Feyerabend's concept, which he called "epistemological anarchism", is the Principle of Proliferation (reproduction) of THEORIES, which states that scientists should strive to create theories that are incompatible with existing and recognized theories. This principle was put forward by Feyerabend on the basis of the position developed by Popper and Lakatos that when a scientific theory collides with a certain fact, another theory is needed to refute it (giving the fact the value of refuting evidence). The creation of alternative theories, according to Feyerabend, contributes to their mutual criticism and accelerates the development of science. The principle of proliferation is intended to substantiate Feyerabend's pluralism in the methodology of scientific knowledge.

Pluralism In the Methodology of Science - the principle of Feyerabend's methodology, which is a consequence of the principle of proliferation of theories. Feyerabend's combination of pluralism with the thesis of the incommensurability of theories ultimately gives rise to anarchism, the essence of which is that each scientist can invent and develop his own theories, not paying attention to contradictions and criticism. According to Feyerabend, the activity of a scientist is not subject to any rational norms, therefore the development of science is irrational, and science is no different from myth and religion, representing one of the forms of ideology, therefore society should be freed from the "dictatorship of science", science should be separated from the state and science should be given , myth, magic, religion the same rights in public life.

S. Tulmin's concept

The concept of S. Tulmin is briefly characterized by the following concepts:

Scientific theories are based on standards of rationality and understanding. The scientist considers understandable those events or phenomena that correspond to the standards adopted by him. What does not fit into the "matrix of understanding" is considered an anomaly, the elimination of which (ie the improvement of understanding) acts as a stimulus for the evolution of science. The rationality of scientific knowledge, according to Toulmin, is compliance with accepted standards of understanding. The standards of rationality change with the changing scientific theories of a continuous process of selection of conceptual innovations.

S. Tulmin considers the content of theories not as logical systems of statements, but as peculiar populations of concepts. According to Toulmin, the main features of the evolution of science are similar to the Darwinian scheme of biological evolution. The content of conceptual populations (an analogue of biological species) is subject to change, which entails a change in the methods and goals of scientific activity; the emergence of conceptual innovations is balanced by the process of critical selection (analogous to biological mutation and selection). This dual process leads to a noticeable change only under certain conditions (analogous to the survival or extinction of species in the struggle for existence); those conceptual variants that better adapt to the requirements of the intelligent environment are retained.

The diversity of concepts of the philosophy of science developed within the framework of postpositivism has caused many new problems. The result of this was the realization of the hopelessness of creating a generally recognized theory describing the structure and development of science. This circumstance influenced the completion of the next stage in the philosophy of positivism - postpositivism.

13. Post-structuralist "deconstruction" of scientific knowledge

(J. Derrida)

Poststructuralism - this trend is represented by social theorists and sociologists who tried to consider the chaotic essence of the social world as a certain text, interpreting it with the help of tools, primarily semiotics (the science of signs and sign systems), as well as various kinds of left-wing radical theories used in social cognition .

As a result, scientists, showing a truly extraordinary sociological imagination, tried to create innovative theoretical and methodological approaches that allow us to deepen our understanding of the nature of new social trends, about the directions in which the development of human civilization is going.

Jacques Derrida was a French social theorist born in 1930. He taught at the leading universities of France - Sorbonne, Higher Normal School, Higher School of Social Research.

J. Derrida was one of Foucault's students, which predetermined the post-structuralist orientation of his works. In 1966, the scientist proclaimed the advent of the era of post-structuralism and wrote many works on this topic. J. Derrida is the author of about forty books. Among his works: "Something related to grammar", "Scattering", "Monolinguism of the Other", "Ghosts of Marx", "Chorus", "The Force of Law" and others. A number of his works have been translated into Russian: "Essay on the Name" , "Voice and Phenomenon", "Positions", "Letter and Difference", "Passion".

Grammatology: a neodeterministic theory of development Just like M. Foucault, Derrida uses the methodological tools of linguistics to interpret new social realities, giving it a new, special meaning. So, initially grammarology appeared as a linguistic discipline that studies the relationship between written signs and speech sounds.

In Derrida's post-structuralism, grammar is a theory that studies the role of writing in the culture and history of human civilization. At the same time, not any laws are seen in the written language, but, first of all, accidents and instability. Words have different meanings in different contexts. Moreover, writing itself is interpreted not as a forced causality between the letters of the alphabet and the sounds of speech, but as any program that determines the content of processes (a grapheme or a genetic code that determines the development of human qualities, cybernetic programming, etc.). Thus, grammarology acquires a striving towards philosophy and sociology, with an emphasis on the use of empirical analysis of specific scripts.

According to Derrida, it is grammatology, its theoretical and methodological apparatus that makes it possible to show the cultural, spatial and temporal limitations of the logocentrism of Western science, traditional determinism, which justifies the universality of social laws. The scientist believes that logocentrism hindered the development of science, culture, and suppressed intellectual and social freedoms. “What is proclaimed here as the science of writing, grammatology, is by no means a science in the Western sense of the word,” the scientist writes, “after all, to begin with, this is not logocentrism at all, without which Western science simply does not exist. The liberalization of the old world is, in fact, the creation of some new world, which will no longer be a world of logical norms, in which the concepts of sign, word, and writing will be reconsidered.

To justify the rejection of forced causality, the external causality of the development of modern social realities, Derrida uses the metaphor of the "Death of the Author", thereby developing the ideas of his teacher M. Foucault about the death of traditional stability, also expressed metaphorically through the concept of "Death of the subject". The postulate about the death of the Author, in essence, means a denial of the role of external causality in general and the dictatorship of the Creator, who sets the rigid parameters of social life, in particular.

Thus, showing the fundamental difference between modern and traditional society, Derrida resorts to comparing the role of the Author in traditional and modern theaters. In the first case, the text of the performance represents something “holy, inviolable”. The author determines the meaning of the work. Directors and actors are only, to use Derrida's words, "enslaved interpreters" of the play. The public generally represents passive observers. This is the theological theatre. Another thing in the modern theater (read - society). The author's dictatorship is over. No one - neither God, nor the Author, nor political or intellectual authorities can no longer set the dominant version of the reading and performance of the play (our way of life). The author dies. We all begin to play its role, becoming the creators of our own destiny.

Analogous concerns the structures of society. There are no more "objective laws", no coercive causality, no example that is a model. In the work "Passion" Derrida, arguing in absentia with supporters of traditional determinism, in particular, writes: "What example? This. Surely, by saying "this one" I am already saying more and something else, I am saying something that goes beyond todeti, the givenness of this example. The example itself, as such, transcends its singularity as much as it transcends its identity. That is why there is no example, although only this exists; no doubt I have insisted on this too often, citing various examples. The indicativeness of an example, of course, is never its exemplary.

Thus, only self-reflecting structures remain, subject to unpredictable random fluctuations. The public future is not determined by the past, but is created through “sudden events” and “co-presence” of individual sovereign individuals. However, what has been said does not mean a total denial of linear development with the action of traditional causality.

Just like the supporters of synergetics, post-structuralists consider such development as a special case. “Sovereignty does not deviate from the dialectic,” Derrida notes.

Feyerabend P. Against the method. Essay on the anarchist theory of knowledge.

Introduction

Why, according to Feyerabend, is theoretical anarchism more humane and progressive than its alternatives based on law and order?

Science is essentially an anarchist enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humane and progressive than its law and order alternatives.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that the world we want to explore is a largely unknown entity. Therefore, we must keep our eyes open and not limit ourselves in advance. The second reason is that science education (as it is carried out in our schools) is incompatible with the position of humanism. It comes into conflict with "a careful attitude to individuality, which alone can create a comprehensively developed person." It "cripples as Chinese women cripple their legs, clamping in a vise every part of human nature that stands out in the slightest," and molds man on the basis of that ideal of rationality that has happened to be fashionable in science or in the philosophy of science. The desire to increase freedom, to live a full, real life, and the corresponding desire to reveal the secrets of nature and human existence, consequently lead to the rejection of all universal standards and inert traditions. (Naturally, this also leads to the rejection of a significant part of modern science.)

On what basis does Feyerabend prove that the only principle that does not hinder progress is the principle "everything is permitted"?

The idea of ​​a method containing rigid, immutable and absolutely binding principles of scientific activity faces considerable difficulties when compared with the results of historical research. It turns out that there is no rule - no matter how plausible and epistemologically justified it may seem - that at one time or another would not be violated. It becomes obvious that such violations are not accidental and are not the result of insufficient knowledge or inattention that could have been avoided. On the contrary, we see that they are necessary for the progress of science. Indeed, one of the most remarkable achievements of recent discussions in the history and philosophy of science is the realization of the fact that such events and achievements as the invention of atomism in antiquity, the Copernican revolution, the development of modern atomism (kinetic theory, dispersion theory, stereochemistry, quantum theory) , the gradual construction of a wave theory of light, turned out to be possible only because some thinkers are either conscious decided break the fetters of "obvious" methodological rules, or involuntarily violated them.

The fact that self-interest, violence, propaganda and brainwashing tactics play a much larger role in the development of our knowledge and science than is commonly believed is also clear from the analysis relationship between idea and action. It is assumed that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes and must precede their formulation and social expression. (“Research starts with problems,” says Popper.) At first we have an idea or a problem, and then we act, i.e. we speak, we create or we destroy. However, small children who use words, combine them, play with them before they learn their meaning, which is initially beyond their understanding, act in a completely different way. The initial play activity is an essential prerequisite for the final act of understanding. There are no reasons preventing the functioning of this mechanism in adults. It can be assumed, for example, that idea freedom becomes clear only through those actions that are aimed at its achievement. Creation of some things and complete understanding right idea this thing are usually part of a single process and cannot be separated from one another without stopping this process. The process itself is not directed and cannot be directed by a clearly defined program. as it contains. conditions for the implementation of all possible programs. Rather, this process is directed by some indefinite impulse, some "passion" (Kierkegaard). This passion gives rise to specific behavior, which in turn creates the circumstances and ideas necessary for analyzing and explaining the process itself, presenting it as "rational".

The idea of ​​a hard method or a hard theory of rationality rests on a too naive notion of man and his social environment. If we keep in mind the vast historical material and do not strive to "purify" it for the sake of our lower instincts or by virtue of striving for intellectual security to the degree of clarity, accuracy, "objectivity", "truth", then it turns out that there is only one a principle that can be defended in all circumstances and on all stages of human development Everything is allowed.

What does the principle "everything is permitted" mean and how can it be used in science?

One can develop science by acting counterinductively.

Evidence capable of disproving a theory can often only be obtained by means of an alternative inconsistent with the theory: the recommendation (dating back to Newton and still very popular today) to use alternatives only after refutations have already discredited an orthodox theory puts, so to speak, the cart before the horse. Some of the most important formal properties of the theory are also revealed through contrast rather than analysis. Therefore, a scientist who wants to maximize the empirical content of his concepts and understand them as deeply as possible must introduce other concepts, i.e. apply pluralistic methodology. He should compare ideas with other ideas, not with "experience" and try to improve those concepts that have failed in the competition, rather than discard them. Knowledge understood in this way is not a series of consistent theories approaching some ideal concept. It is not a gradual approximation to the truth, but rather an increasing an ocean of mutually incompatible (perhaps even incommensurable) alternatives, in which each separate theory, fairy tale or myth is part of one set, encouraging each other to more thorough development; through this process of competition, they all contribute to the development of our consciousness. In this all-encompassing process, nothing is permanently established and nothing is omitted.

Observational reports, experimental results, "factual" suggestions, or contain in itself theoretical assumptions, or claim their very way of using it. Thus, our habit of saying "this board is brown" when we see it under normal conditions and our senses are not disturbed, and saying "this board looks brown" when there is little light or we doubt our ability to observe, expresses a belief that that there are certain circumstances under which our sense organs are able to perceive the world as it really is, and other equally familiar circumstances under which the sense organs deceive us. This habit expresses the belief that some of our sense impressions are true and others are not. We are also sure that the material medium between the object and our eye has no destructive effect and that the physical entity through which contact is made - light - provides us with a true picture. All these are abstract and highly questionable assumptions that shape our vision of the world, but are not open to direct criticism. Usually we don't even realize their influence until we encounter a completely different cosmology: prejudices are revealed through contrast, not analysis. Material available scientist, including his most magnificent theories and most sophisticated techniques, has exactly the same structure. It contains principles that are unknown to the scientist, and if they are known, they are extremely difficult to verify. (As a result, the theory may come into conflict with the evidence, not because it is incorrect, but because the evidence is flawed.)

So, how can you test something that is used all the time? How can we analyze the terms in which we are accustomed to expressing our simplest and most direct observations, how can we discover their premises? How can we open the world that is supposed in our actions?

The answer is clear: we can't open it from within. We need external standard of criticism, many alternative assumptions, or - since these assumptions will be the most general and fundamental - we need a completely different world, for example, dream world. With its help, we will discover the characteristics of the real world in which we think we live.(and which in reality can only be another world of dreams). Therefore, the first step in our critique of well-known concepts and procedures, the first step in our critique of "facts," must be to try to break this circle. We must create a new conceptual system that eliminates or collides with the most carefully substantiated observations, violates the most plausible theoretical principles, and introduces perceptions that cannot become part of the existing perceptual world. This step is again counterinductive. Therefore, counterinduction is always reasonable and has a chance of success.

In what does Feyerabend see the danger of universally recognized theories for the free development of the individual (on the example of comparing these theories with myth)?

Compatibility condition, according to which new hypotheses must be logically consistent with previously recognized ones theories, is unreasonable because it preserves an older, not a better, theory. Hypotheses that contradict proven theories provide us with evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way. The proliferation of theories is good for science, while their uniformity weakens its critical power. Moreover, uniformity jeopardizes the free development of the individual. .

The "empirical" theory becomes almost indistinguishable from a second-rate myth. To see this, we need only consider one of the myths, such as the myth of witches and demonic possession, which was developed by Catholic ideologues and dominated during the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries. throughout the European continent. This myth is a complex explanatory system, containing a large number of auxiliary hypotheses designed to explain special cases, so it easily receives a high degree of confirmation based on observation. It has been studied for a long time, its contents assimilated through fear, prejudice and ignorance, and also through the efforts of a zealous and fanatical clergy. The ideas of this myth penetrated into the most common modes of expression, infected all ways of thinking and left their mark on many decisions that play a big role in human life. This myth provided models for explaining every possible event—possible for those who accepted it. The main terms of the myth were clearly fixed. The belief in its justice reinforces all the maneuvers used to preserve the myth (including the elimination of opponents). The conceptual apparatus of the theory and the emotions associated with its application, permeating all means of communication, all actions and the whole life of society, ensure the success of such methods as transcendental deduction, analysis of the use of words, phenomenological analysis, in other words, methods that contribute to the further "ossification" of the myth . (This shows, by the way, that all these methods, the use of which has been a characteristic feature of various schools of thought, both old and new, have one thing in common: they tend to save status quo of spiritual life.) The results of observations will also speak in favor of this theory, since they are formulated in terms of it. It seems that the truth has finally been reached. But at the same time, it is clear that all contact with the world was lost, and the stability achieved under the guise of absolute truth is nothing but the result of absolute conformity. Indeed, how can one test or improve a theory if it is constructed in such a way that every conceivable event can be described and explained in terms of its principles? The only one a way of examining such overarching principles may be to compare them with another set of the same general principles, however this path was ruled out from the start. Consequently, the myth has no objective meaning, but continues to exist solely as a result of the efforts of the community of believers in it and their leaders - priests or Nobel laureates. In my opinion, this is the most decisive argument against any method that maintains uniformity, empirical or otherwise. In any case, any such method is a method of deception: it supports ignorant conformism, but speaks of the truth; leads to damage to spiritual abilities, to a weakening of the power of imagination, but speaks of deep understanding; destroys the most valuable gift of youth - the enormous power of imagination, but speaks of learning.

So, the church needs unity of opinion, frightened or selfish victims of some (ancient or modern) myths or weak-willed and voluntary followers of some tyrant. Objective knowledge requires a variety of opinions. And the method that encourages such diversity is the only one compatible with the humanist position.

Why, according to Feyerabend, is it not always necessary to blame the theory because it does not agree with the facts?

No theory ever agrees with all known in its field facts However, one should not always blame her for this. Facts are shaped by old ideologies, and the collision of theory with facts may be an indication of progress and a first attempt to discover principles implicit in familiar notions of observation.

According to D. Hume, theories cannot be derived from facts. And since the requirement to accept only those theories that follow from the facts leaves us with no theories at all, since known to us science can only exist if we drop this requirement and rethink our methodology.

Our results suggest that hardly any theory is completely consistent with facts. The requirement to accept only those theories that are compatible with known and accepted facts again deprives us of any theories. (I repeat: devoid of any theory, since there is not a single theory that would not experience this or that difficulty.) Therefore, the science known to us can exist only if we discard this requirement as well and again revise our methodology, resolving counterinduction along with unfounded hypotheses.

What is Feyerabend's criticism of the positions of critical rationalism (K. Popper) and logical empiricism (R. Carnap)?

Wherever you look, whatever example you take, you see only one thing: the principles of critical rationalism (take falsifications seriously; demand growth in content; avoid ad hoc hypotheses; "be honest" what whatever that means, etc.) and, accordingly, the principles of logical empiricism (be precise; base our theories on measurements; avoid vague and unstable ideas, etc.) give an inadequate understanding of the past development of science and create obstacles to its development in the future. They give an inadequate understanding of science because science is much more "vague" and "irrational" than its methodological depictions. And they serve as an obstacle to its development, since the attempt to make science more "rational" and more accurate destroys it. Therefore, the difference between science and methodology, which is an obvious fact of history, points to the weakness of the latter, and perhaps also to the weakness of the "laws of reason". What appears as "vagueness", "chaoticity" or "opportunism" in comparison with such laws, played a very important role in the development of the very theories that are today considered essential parts of our knowledge of nature. These "deviations" and "mistakes" are the preconditions for progress.. They allow us to survive in the complex and difficult world in which we live; they allow us stay free and happy. Without "chaos" there is no knowledge. Without frequent abandonment of the mind, there is no progress. The ideas that now form the true basis of science exist only because prejudices, arrogance, passion still live - it is they oppose reason and appear as far as possible. From this we must conclude that even in science reason cannot and should not be omnipotent and must sometimes be pushed aside or eliminated in favor of other motives. There is not a single rule that retains its value under all circumstances, and not a single impulse to which one can always appeal.

Now we must remember that this conclusion was obtained given that that the science as we know it today remains unchanged and that the procedures it uses determine its future development as well. If science given, then reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be ruled out. This characteristic of science is strong evidence for an anarchist epistemology. However, science is not sacred. The restrictions it imposes (and there are many such restrictions, although they are not always easy to formulate) are not at all necessary for the creation of coherent and fruitful conceptions of the world. There are myths, there are dogmas of theology, there are metaphysical systems and many other ways of building a worldview. It is clear that a fruitful exchange between science and such "unscientific" worldviews needs anarchism even more than science itself. Thus, anarchism is not only available, but also needed both for the internal progress of science and for the development of culture as a whole.

Explain the main meanings of the concept of Feyerabend's incommensurability.

AT from an example that may give us some indication of the reason why there is no place in B for A-facts: the drawing given may be an intersection of three roads drawn according to the principles of an A-drawing (which is a pictorial list). Once perspective has been introduced (whether as an objective method or as a psychological attitude), it can no longer be viewed in this way. Now, instead of lines on paper, we have the illusion of depth and a three-dimensional panorama, although still quite simple. There is no way to insert an A-drawing into a B-drawing except as part of this illusion.

On the meaning of incommensurability.

First thesis reads: exist incommensurable structures of thinking (actions, perceptions). This is a historical (anthropological) thesis that must be supported by historical (anthropological) evidence.

Second. Incommensurability has an analogue in the field of perception, it enters the history of perception. This forms the content of my second thesis about incommensurability: the individual development of perception and thinking goes through a series of mutually incommensurable stages.

My third thesis suggests that the concepts of scientists, in particular their views on fundamental problems, often diverge from each other as much as the ideologies underlying different cultures.

How does Feyerabend substantiate the idea that "science is much closer to myth than the philosophy of science is willing to admit"?

Why, according to Feyerabend, just as the state was once separated from the church, it should now be separated from science? Justify your agreement or disagreement with the position of the author.

On what basis does Feyerabend call the assertion that only facts, logic and methodology play a decisive role in science a myth (“fairy tale”)?

Why are the results of scientific and technological progress, according to Feyerabend, evidence of the priority of science in the life of society?

Why should science, according to Feyerabend, also be separated from the system of general education?

Science is one of the many forms of thinking humans have developed, and not necessarily the best. It blinds only those who have already made a decision in favor of a certain ideology or do not think at all about the advantages and limitations of science. Since the acceptance or non-acceptance of this or that ideology should be left to the individual himself, it follows from this that the separation of the state from churches must be supplemented by the separation of the state from Sciences- this most modern, most aggressive and most dogmatic religious institution. Such a separation is our only chance to achieve the humanism that we are capable of, but which we have never achieved.

The idea that science can and should develop according to fixed and universal rules is both unrealistic and harmful. It is unrealistic, because it comes from a simplified understanding of human abilities and the circumstances that accompany or cause their development. And it is harmful, because the attempt to give force to these rules must cause an increase in our professional qualifications at the expense of our humanity. In addition, this idea is capable of harming science itself, because it neglects the complexity of the physical and historical conditions that affect scientific change. It makes our science less flexible and more dogmatic: every methodological rule is associated with certain cosmological assumptions, so by using the rule we take it for granted that the corresponding assumptions are correct. Naive falsificationism is sure that the laws of nature lie on the surface, and are not hidden under the thickness of various obstacles. Empiricism takes it for granted that sensory experience gives a much better picture of the world than pure thinking. Those who rely on logical evidence have no doubt that the inventions of Reason produce much more significant results than the unbridled play of our passions. Such assumptions are quite acceptable and, perhaps, even true. However, sometimes you should check them. Trying to put them to the test means that we stop using the methodology associated with them, start developing science in other ways and see what happens. All methodological prescriptions have their limits, and the only "rule" that remains is the rule "everything is permitted."

modern science suppresses their opponents, not convinces them. Science works with strength, and not by arguments (this is true, in particular, for the former colonies, in which the science and religion of brotherly love were planted as a matter of course, without discussion with the local population). Today we understand that rationalism, being connected with science, cannot give us any help in the dispute between science and myth. Science and myth overlap in many ways, the differences we see are often local phenomena that can always turn into similarities, really fundamental differences are most often due to difference goals, rather than methods to achieve the same "rational" result (for example, "progress", increase in content or "growth").

In order to show the remarkable resemblance between myth and science, I will briefly refer to an interesting article by R. Gorton entitled "African Traditional Thinking and Western Science." According to him, the central ideas of the myth are considered sacred, and their safety is taken care of. "There is almost never an admission that one does not know something", and events "which pose a serious challenge to the recognized classification" are "taboo". Fundamental beliefs are protected by this reaction, as well as by the mechanism of "secondary refinements", which, in our view, are a series of ad hoc hypotheses. On the other hand, science is characterized by "substantial skepticism"; "when failures become numerous and constant, the defense of the theory inevitably turns into an attack on it." This is possible due to the "openness" of scientific activity, due to the pluralism of ideas. It is easy to see that Gorton read Popper carefully. An analysis of science itself leads to a completely different picture.

Paul (Paul) Feyerabend is an American philosopher of Austrian origin, the creator of the direction in modern philosophy of science, called "methodological anarchism". The early period of his work is characterized by a philosophical position, quite close to Popper's philosophy. Like Popper, he criticizes deductive cumulativeism, the translatability of the language of one theory into the language of another. Feyerabend identifies two main principles of deductive cumulativeism: 1) principle of deducibility stating that an earlier theory can be deduced from a later theory, 2) value invariance principle, according to which the meanings of expressions of an earlier theory are preserved in the language of a later theory.

Criticizing the first position of deductive cumulativeism, Popper notes that the compatibility of earlier and later theory should follow from this principle, while in the real history of science theories may be incompatible. For example, in Aristotle's physics there was a so-called theory impetus- the residual force that continues to act on the body after the throw. It is this force that provides the movement of the body after the throw. In the physics of Galileo-Newton, which replaced the physics of Aristotle, after a throw on the body, the force does not act, and the body continues its movement by inertia. So, in the physics of Aristotle, the statement is provable: "A force acts on the body after the throw." In Newtonian physics, the opposite statement is provable: "A force does not act on a body after a throw." These two positions mutually negate each other, making the theories containing them incompatible. But incompatible theories cannot be deduced from each other. Let us note, however, that if we look at this problem more deeply, then the difference will turn out to be not so intransigent as Feyerabend imagines. The fact is that in Aristotle's physics force is proportional to speed, and in Newton's physics it is acceleration. Therefore, here one word "strength" refers to two different things. If we designate them in different terms, for example, the Aristotelian force - as "A-force", the Newtonian - as "H-force", then, more precisely, it should be said that in Aristotle's physics the proposition "A-force acts on the body after the throw force", and in Newton's physics - the position "H-force does not act on the body after the throw". With this clarification, these two provisions cease to be incompatible. Moreover, the first statement can be preserved in Newtonian physics if the A-force is translated in this physics as H-momentum (Newtonian momentum). Then it is simultaneously true that after the throw the body has an H-momentum and no H-force - both positions turn out to be compatible. Although, of course, they are not combined as simply as it was assumed by deductive cumulativeism.

Objecting to the second principle - the principle of meaning invariance - Feirabend argues that the meaning of a term is by and large a function of the whole theory as a whole, so a change in theory will have to lead to a change in the meanings of all its expressions. For example, the same process, carrying a suitcase, would mean, from the point of view of Aristotle's physics, overcoming the tendency of the suitcase to its natural place, located in the center of the Earth. In Newtonian physics, this is overcoming the force of the gravitational interaction between the suitcase and the Earth. Finally, in Einstein's general theory of relativity, carrying a suitcase represents overcoming the curvature of space-time near the Earth's surface. Feyerabend is inclined to consider all these meanings of one process as completely different, not correlated with each other. Let us also note here that it is possible to harmonize all these meanings, exposing them as different representations of the same thing. For example, the natural place of the suitcase in Newton's physics can be considered its state with the minimum potential energy, which is just achieved in the direction of the force of gravitational interaction. In the general theory of relativity, the concept of force also does not disappear, but only turns out to be a manifestation of the curvature of space-time.

Feyerabend, as we see, is inclined to sharpen various kinds of formulations, to bring them to extremes and paradoxicality. Gradually, his philosophy develops, becomes more independent and acquires a peculiar character, which in many respects marks the result of the development of postpositivism. The most paradoxical here seems to be his famous principle “anything goes” (“everything goes”), the “principle of permissiveness”, which finally rejects the idea of ​​a demarcation criterion and asserts that scientific knowledge, by and large, does not fundamentally differ from non-scientific knowledge. Science is the same religion, but arranged in its own way, with its own dogma and intolerance for the other, its claim to power from the caste of scientists. Feyerabend even calls for the separation of science from the state, as was once done with religion.

Sometimes such a position of the American philosopher is presented too simplistic, which, perhaps, Feyerabend himself repeatedly gave rise to. We would like to note here a very important positive meaning of the position of methodological anarchism, which, unfortunately, is not always mentioned in textbooks.

Within the framework of the philosophy of "methodological anarchism", Feyerabend returns to the philosophy of science that wonderful idea that science can never be fully known, and no model of science can ever exhaust a living, developing science. And this means that any scientific method, any model of scientific knowledge will always reveal some of its limitations, beyond which this method and model will be contrary to science. Each method and model has, as it were, its own modelability interval, which we have already written about in the chapter devoted to the modeling method. The model is adequate only within this interval and ceases to be such outside of it. Therefore, all models of science conditionally scientific– they are scientific only under the condition of the interval of modeling. By themselves, the models of science generally lie on the other side of science and non-science. Therefore, something else is needed to make them scientific. Such something is the “movement of the whole”, which can only be felt by a living scientist and who is only able to determine whether this or that model is adequate to this whole at a given moment and under given conditions, or not. Science is a form of integral Life, and only this integral life, dividing within itself into a living scientist and living knowledge, is capable of producing Science. Feyerabend returns to us a sense of the mystical infinity of scientific knowledge and scientific activity, which both raises science to the heights of Life and compares it with other forms of mysticism, including reducing it to the shortcomings of any human mythology.

Trying to consistently carry out his position, Feyerabend considers all the models of science one by one and tries to show them. non-simulation interval, i.e. find a system of conditions under which the model ceases to be such. This can be done either by showing the inconsistencies of the model, or by showing the applicability of an alternative model. In this, the method of anarchism is quite reminiscent of total methodological skepticism. For each thesis, he is looking for his antithesis.

Feyerabend opposes the scientist's aim to preserve and develop one theory proliferation principle scientific theories, expressed in the call to multiply more and more different theories. This principle has also found its justification in the history of science. For example, during the development of quantum mechanics, new theories were so different from the ideas of classical physics that Niels Bohr put forward their “sufficient insanity” as one of the criteria for new theories. In addition, a more diverse range of theories can make it possible to quickly select the most adequate one for describing the facts.

Feyerabend contrasts Popper's principle of falsifiability with the "principle of strength (conservation)", which requires the scientist to develop a theory without paying attention to the difficulties that it encounters. Scientists often show great perseverance in defending their theories, despite the pressure of criticism, and sometimes in the end such an attitude allows the preservation of still “vulnerable” sprouts of new knowledge, which reveals its resistance to counterexamples only at a fairly mature stage of its development. To grow a strong tree, you must first preserve its weak seed.

Criticizing Kuhn's position, Feyerabend objects to his absolute separation of normal science and the scientific revolution. From his point of view, the elements of these two states of scientific knowledge are constantly present in its evolution.

Objecting to the stereotype of the separation of ordinary language and the language of science, Feyerabend proposes to look at ordinary language as some kind of peculiar theory, which can also be overcome by some subsequent theory. To some extent, this process seems to take place in the evolution of ordinary language itself, which more and more assimilates various theoretical constructions.

Nor is the relation of incompatibility between scientific theories always true. Incompatibility is a kind of relationship between theories, at the same time, theories can be so different that any relationship between them can be lost at all, as between different paradigms in Kuhn's philosophy of science. And incommensurable, incomparable, theories are compatible - so, on the one hand, Feyerabend objects to Popper, questioning the relation of falsification.

Induction can be countered by the principle that Feyerabend calls "counterinduction". It is expressed in the requirement to develop hypotheses that are incompatible with firmly established facts and well-founded theories. Well, apparently, it is necessary to admit that this kind of attitude of a scientist can be fruitful if the old theories and facts are too dogmatized and hinder the emergence of new knowledge.

Many philosophers of science, such as Popper, had a negative attitude towards the use of so-called ad hoc hypotheses (“on the occasion”), i.e. hypotheses temporarily created to explain only some particular case and having a very narrow explanatory and predictive potential beyond this case. Feyerabend finds justification for this methodology as well, asserting, not without reason, that any new theory begins in the form of various ad hoc hypotheses, which can only later be replaced by more solid projects.

Ultimately, Feyerabend argues, everything can contribute to the development of science as a form of culture, including even lies and deception could play a positive role here. “Anything goes” - “everything will go” into the crucible of life, everything can serve as fuel for it. And here, in Feyerabend, there is already a hint of blurring of all boundaries, the loss of any certainty. The abyss of chaos and nonexistence opens up. Feyerabend begins to deny the very possibility of true knowledge, and the phenomenon of science loses its meaning. Post-positivism exhausts itself with its own denial - if there is no science, then its philosophy is not needed, including the philosophy of post-positivism.