American Lend Lease tanks in the USSR. The best and worst Lend-Lease weapons, according to Soviet fighters. Tactical and technical data tank M3 "Lee"

The issue of Lend-Lease, as one would expect, has become sharply ideologized since the time of "perestroika": they began to praise the West in general and Lend-Lease in particular; articles appeared promoting thoughts about the invaluable help of the allies.

However, the reality, if we turn to historical facts, looks somewhat different. Frankly speaking, only one fact is enough: although the USSR fulfilled the main task, incurring gigantic losses, England received three times the amount of goods under Lend-Lease from the USA. Also, do not forget that at the same time as Lend-Lease, US firms were completely supplying themselves to the Reich, because business is above all! The distribution of deliveries by years is also extremely important: in the most difficult years for the USSR, 1941 and 1942, deliveries were carried out only partially from the promised volume, they became regular only in 1943, when it became clear that the Union had turned the tide of the war.

The issue of lend-lease is voluminous, it cannot be analyzed in one article. Let's look at just one aspect: the supply of tanks, how useful were they for the Victory?

Yuri Nersesov, Lend-Lease on Two Fronts:

“...maybe, with the general insignificance of the volume of overseas assistance, did it play a decisive role precisely in the 41st, when the Germans stood at the gates of Moscow? Well, let's take a look at the arms delivery statistics for this year. From June 22 to December 31, the Red Army received ... 648 tanks ... Taking into account the weapons available on June 22, 1941 ... the percentage is reduced to completely insignificant numbers (respectively ... 2.32% ...). It will not be enough, especially when you consider that a fair part of the equipment sent, such as, in particular, 115 out of 466 British-made tanks, did not reach the front in the first year of the war

... the Americans promised to send 600 tanks in 1941 ... they sent ... a total of 182 ... The same story continued in 1942. If the Soviet industry then produced ... 24.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns ... then under Lend-Lease in January-October, these types of weapons were received ... 2703 ... pieces. After that (at the height of the battles for Stalingrad and the Caucasus!) Supplies were significantly reduced. After the defeat of the PQ-17 convoy, which we will discuss below, the Allies slowed down until September 2, then sent the next PQ-18 caravan with a creak, and then covered the shop right up to December 15.

Lend-lease goods were delivered in such a way that the Soviet Union's own resources were depleted as much as possible, while delays in deliveries "accidentally coincided" with the moments when supplies were most needed. When the USSR under the leadership of Stalin began to win, supplies improved.

In the book of Marshal Zhukov "Memories and Reflections" there are such words about Lend-Lease:

“To the total number of weapons with which the Soviet people equipped their army during the war years, Lend-Lease deliveries amounted to an average of 4 percent. Consequently, there is no need to talk about the decisive role of supplies. As for the tanks and planes that the British and American governments supplied us, let's face it, they were not popular with our tank crews and pilots.

Everything is clear with the quantity and timeliness of deliveries; let's look at the equipment that was supplied under Lend-Lease. The question, of course, is the most extensive, so we will only briefly review armored vehicles as an example.

What technique was required? Let's briefly recall what we had.

Most of the Soviet tanks were light, equipped with 45 mm guns, which could hit medium German tanks only at distances up to 300 meters, while they themselves had 10-13 mm bulletproof armor, which was clearly insufficient for combat operations. However, the BT-7, for example, with the indicated shortcomings, had a speed of up to 72 km / h, so it still had to be hit, and in the conditions “tanks do not fight tanks”, the benefits of it were obvious.

The average three-turret T-28 had a 76.2 mm cannon (and four machine guns), according to the experience of the Finnish War, they were additionally shielded with armor sheets, bringing the total armor to 50-60 mm. This, however, increased the mass and somewhat reduced the speed, initially equal to 43 km / h. Unfortunately, these machines were lost in significant numbers in the first months of the war, and for the most part due to technical malfunctions. Nevertheless, the tank could fight with all the tanks that the Germans had at the beginning of the war.

The USSR also had tanks that were ahead of world tank building: the heavy KV-1 and KV-2, and, of course, the famous medium T-34. True, the later modification of the T-34-85 was recognized as the best tank of the Second World War, on which the 85-mm ZIS-S-53 gun was installed, which made it possible to shoot Tigers, Panthers and other menageries, and were also liquidated design flaws identified during the operation of the first releases (problems with transmission, visibility, etc.). Of course, there were not enough modern cars and they were dispersed, but they created problems for the invaders.

Guderian's memoirs, October 8, after the meeting of the 4th German Panzer Division with the Katukov armored brigade:

“Especially disappointing were the reports we received about the actions of Russian tanks, and most importantly, about their new tactics. Our anti-tank weapons of that time could successfully operate against T-34 tanks only under especially favorable conditions. For example, our T-IV tank with its short-barreled 75-mm cannon was able to destroy the T-34 tank from the rear, hitting its engine through the blinds. It took a lot of skill to do that."

So, what did the USSR need in terms of armored vehicles? There were a lot of light tanks and their own, while in the conditions of that war for effective use, they had to have high speed. There was an obvious need for medium and heavy tanks with good performance. What did they supply us under Lend-Lease?

Note: it is clear that the supplied tanks had many modifications that will not be considered in the review material, which is this article. Accordingly, the photos may also be from another modification.

The first delivery was 20 British tanks (the US made Lend-Lease deliveries to the UK, and they supplied us with their tanks - there is no logic from a military point of view, but this is business!).

The first model is "Matilda II". The so-called "infantry tank": a 27-ton vehicle has 78 mm armor. That is, at the beginning of the war, the Germans could break through such a tank only from an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, but it crawled at a speed of up to 24 km / h. It is clear why "infantry"? Because he does not overtake the fleeing infantry.

Armament: 40-mm cannon (to which the corresponding high-explosive fragmentation shells were not supplied, which is typical). If "Matilda" would be quick, like BT-7, then this would be normal. But this is clearly not about this tank. A total of 916 tanks arrived, the last serious combat use was in the summer of 1942.


It is significant: when the USSR in the spring of 1943 refused to accept the Matilda, in the UK itself these tanks were already absent in combat units, as they were outdated.

The second tank is Valentine. Also "infantry": 25 km / h, a 40-mm gun (later, in 1943, the British developed a modification with a 75-mm gun) - and with the same problem with shells. At the same time, the Valentine was lighter, only 16 tons, which was due to thinner, although still solid 60-65 mm armor.


Bottom line: of course, it's better than nothing; but no more.

Heavy tanks from the UK began to arrive only in the summer of 1942: Mk. IV Churchill. Protected by solid 77-175-mm armor, the 40-ton tank had only a 57-mm cannon and developed a speed of up to ... up to 25 km / h.

Perhaps it is better to go straight to the American tanks without comment.

Light tank MZ "General Stuart" - the most massive light tank of World War II. With an American touch! Under Lend-Lease, modifications of the MZ and MZA1 were received. Weight - 13 tons, armor 25-45 mm, armament - 37 mm cannon, also equipped with three (or five, depending on modification) 7.62 mm Browning machine guns. True, unlike the English, they traveled at speeds up to 50 km / h.


In total, the USSR received 1232 Stuart Generals. A fairly mobile tank that can quickly deliver its almost useless cannon to the right place. There is no firepower, and our light tanks will be faster.

The medium tank MZ "Lee", named after another general, despite the fact that it was developed in 1941, was designed by a fan of multi-storey tanks. Its weight is 29 tons, armor 22-50 mm, armament: 75 mm and 37 mm guns, as well as three Browning machine guns. At the same time (seen in the photo) a 75 mm gun is located in a sponson on the starboard side of the tank. Speed ​​- 40 km / h.


Soviet tankers, forced to use this masterpiece, called it BM-6 (“mass grave for six”) or VG-7 (“certain death of seven”) - the crew could consist of 6 or 7 people. "Lee" was a very good product for specific conditions: in North Africa, he showed himself very well: he slowly drove into a prepared caponier and let's shoot at the natives from cannons of choice. A mobile pillbox, almost invulnerable to an enemy of this rank. But in the conditions of the Soviet-German front, in tank breakthroughs and counterattacks, when tanks often fight tanks, sheds have a hard time.

A total of 976 vehicles were received. Despite all the oddities, the 75-mm gun is a useful thing in battle, and in 1942 the "Lee" dealt with German tanks quite successfully. However, in 1942, the PzIV was upgraded, Tigers and Panthers began to appear, and the combat value of the M3 Lee came to naught. It is significant that they stopped producing it at the end of the same 1942, which means that the Red Army was used as a tester and recognized the tank as unsuitable for modern warfare.

The most massive foreign tank in the Red Army was the American M4 General Sherman. The first cars arrived at the end of 1942, but the main deliveries were made in 1944, which is significant.

The USSR supplied modifications M4A2 (with a 75-mm cannon) and M4A2 (76)W (with a 76-mm cannon), plus one heavy machine gun and two conventional ones. Weight: 31-33 tons, armor 38-51 mm, speed - up to 40 km / h.


In short, this is a pretty good tank to start a war. If compared with the T-34 of the first modifications, then the armor is a little thicker, the speed is lower, the power of the weapons is almost the same, plus a useful heavy machine gun. However, over time, with the development of both anti-tank weapons and the German and Russian tanks themselves, the M4A2 quickly became obsolete. By the way, rubberized tracks of the first modifications should be especially noted. Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Tank Forces Alexander Mikhailovich Ovcharov said (quote from D. Ibragimov, "Confrontation"):

“I fought ... on the English Matilda and Valentine, the American M4A2. The first fell to its side on any slope, the second burned from being hit by even a 50-mm projectile.

The American tank was somewhat better. He had almost the same data as the T-34. He also had good armor - viscous. When hit by an enemy blank, the armor did not give fragments and did not hit the crew. But this car was designed for combat operations on paved roads. Rubber was pressed into its caterpillar tracks. On the march, the column of cars did not create much noise, and it was possible to get very close to the enemy unnoticed if the march was made on asphalt or paving stones. But as soon as you get off the road and try to climb a small hillock, especially after rain, these Shermans become helpless, slip on the ground and slide down.

But our "thirty-four" could overcome any steep at an angle of even 45 degrees. It favorably differed from foreign cars of the same class. Our car has left a good memory of itself for posterity.”

We have to agree that the Shermans were the best tanks supplied under Lend-Lease. However, as already mentioned, the delivery schedule is a separate issue. Here are some handy pivot tables:



In 1942, as many as 36 units were received, in 1943 - another 469. The rest, more than three thousand, - in 1944 and 1945, when they would have done without them, the industry in the Urals had already started working at full capacity. Tanks of modification M4A2 (76) W HVSS in the amount of 183 units were delivered only in May-June 1945, and, of course, they did not take any part in the hostilities in Europe. Similarly, the “second front” opened in earnest only when it became clear that if the Russians were not urgently helped, then they would liberate all of Europe without anyone's help.

The fact that more advanced modifications of the Sherman (M4A3E8 and Sherman Fairfly) were not supplied to the USSR is not surprising. But the fact that the M4A2 was supplied under Lend-Lease to Great Britain is very indicative, and in an amount greater than to Russia - 17181 tanks. Despite the fact that the British did not really fight with the Reich tanks, as you know. In return, the British crown graciously sent us instead of the Shermans, which were very much in demand at the beginning of the war, the Matildas and Valentines described above.

So, we can draw two conclusions.

Firstly, the supply of tanks under Lend-Lease was useful to some extent. We used these tanks in addition to domestic ones. However, they did not bring a significant contribution to the Victory, since mostly obsolete models were supplied, in insufficient quantities and even when the urgent need had disappeared.

Secondly, the purpose of the Lend-Lease deliveries was not to help the USSR in the fight against the invaders, but the usual gesheft, which is clearly shown by the specifics of the delivery schedules. Additionally, this is proved by the fact that the same England, the United States quickly wrote off a significant part of the Lend-Lease debt back in 1946, and when the USSR requested similar conditions, it was refused. Negotiations ended only in 1972 (payments completed in 2006).

Note just in case: the article was written on the specific issue of "tanks and lend-lease". This does not mean that there was a similar situation for all types of goods. Of course, they also made a gesheft, but, say, the supply of aluminum was really very important, and cars also played an important role. The stew under the soldier’s name “second front” also helped a lot, but this name indicates precisely that it would be better if the second front was opened militarily immediately, and not when it came time to cling to the Victory of the USSR and share influence in Europe. So there is no need to be led to the campaign "without Lend-Lease, we would not have won." Now, by the way, Western propaganda has already formed an opinion in their countries that the United States is the main winner in World War II.

The myth about the supersignificance of Lend-Lease (no one denies its usefulness, we are talking about “no way without it”) and a sincere desire to help - this is precisely enemy propaganda, we must not forget about it. It was on these supplies that the US economy overcame a protracted crisis - but that's another story.

View in full: http://politrussia.com/istoriya/naskolko-byli-polezny-569/

(20 cars) were delivered to Arkhangelsk by PQ-1 caravan on October 11, 1941. At the same time, to improve the selection and supply of armored vehicles necessary for the needs of the Red Army, three officers of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army arrived in London. They were sent to the central tank depot at Chilville. Together with military experts from other regions, tankers became part of the Engineering Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, which was headed by Captain 1st Rank Solovyov. A similar group of military specialists was sent to the United States, where they arrived in January 1942.

The MK.P Matilda II and MK.III Valentine I tanks sent to the USSR, in accordance with the British concept, belonged to the infantry class and therefore were slow-moving, but well armored.

The infantry tank "Matilda I" was adopted by the British on the eve of the Second World War. This 27-ton vehicle was protected by 78 mm armor, which was not penetrated by any German tank or anti-tank gun (with the exception of 88 mm anti-aircraft guns), and was armed with a 40 mm gun or 76 mm howitzer. The engine was a twin diesel engine LES or Leyland with a total power of 174 or 190 hp, which allowed the tank to reach speeds of up to 25 km / h.

In total, until August 1943, 2987 Matildas were produced in the UK, of which 1084 were sent, and 916 arrived in the USSR (the rest died on the way).


English tank bridge layer "Valentine" (Valentine-Bridgelayer) is being tested at the NIBT training ground of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army. Kubinka, 1944

MK.1P "Valentine" (according to the documents of the Red Army "Valentine" or "Valentine") was developed by Vickers in 1938. Like the Matilda, it belonged to infantry tanks, but in terms of mass -16 tons, it was rather light. True, at the same time, the thickness of the Valentine's armor was 60-65 mm, and the armament (depending on the modification) consisted of a 40-mm, 57-mm or 75-mm gun. On Valentine I, an ABS carburetor engine of 135 hp was used, replaced in subsequent modifications by AEC and GMC diesel engines with a power of 131, 138 and 165 hp. The maximum speed of the tank was 34 km/h.
"Valentines" were produced from 1940 until the beginning of 1945 in 11 modifications, which differed mainly in armament and engine type. A total of 8275 tanks were manufactured by three British and two Canadian firms (6855 in England and 1420 in Canada). 2,394 British and 1,388 Canadian Valentines (a total of 3,782 units) were sent to the Soviet Union, of which 3,332 reached Russia. In the USSR, "Valentines" of seven modifications were supplied:
"Valentine II" - with a 40-mm cannon, an AEC diesel engine with an HP 131 power. and an additional external fuel tank;
"Valentine 111" - with a triple tower and a crew of four;
"Valentine IV" - "Valentine II" with a GMC diesel engine of 138 hp;
"Valentine V" - "Valentine III" with a GMC diesel engine of 138 hp;
"Valentine VII" - a Canadian version of the "Valentine IV" with a one-piece frontal hull and a coaxial 7.62-mm Browning machine gun (instead of the 7.92-mm BESA machine gun installed on English-made Valentines);
"Valentine IX" - "Valentine V" with a 57-mm cannon with a barrel length of 42 calibers, mounted in a two-man turret without a coaxial machine gun;
"Valentine X" - "Valentine IX" with a 57-mm cannon with a barrel length of 50 calibers, coaxial with a machine gun, and a 165 hp GMC engine.
In addition to the main modifications of "Valentine", in 1944 the Red Army received the MK.II1 "Valentine-bridge layer" (Valcntine-Bridgelayer) - according to the Soviet terminology "MK.ZM".
Perhaps the Canadian version of "Valentine" (modification VII) was even more reliable and technically more advanced than its English predecessor.
Canadian "Valentines" were supplied to the Red Army from 1942 to 1944, with the bulk of the deliveries occurring in 1943.
Another machine with which the supply of allied weapons to the USSR began should be considered the English armored personnel carrier "Universal" (according to Soviet terminology MK.I "Universal", or U-1, or "Bren"). This light tracked vehicle weighing about 3.5 tons was the most massive armored personnel carrier of the Second World War. From 1935 to 1945, 89595 cars of this class were produced in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the USA, of which 2008 (English and Canadian production) ended up in the USSR. The Universal armored personnel carrier was armed with Bren machine guns and the Boys anti-tank rifle, the armor thickness was 7-11 mm. Ford engine with 85 hp allowed a 3.5-ton vehicle with a crew of two and three or four paratroopers to reach speeds of up to 50 km / h.
In the first year of the supply chain, the Red Army received 361 MK.P Matilda and MK.III Valentine tanks, as well as 330 Universal armored personnel carriers. True, only a few of this number were used in battles in 1941, so the role of British armored vehicles in the battles near Moscow was more than modest.
It should be noted that the designation system for British armored vehicles was quite complex and cumbersome. First, the index assigned to the tank by the Ministry of War (MK.II, MK.Sh, MK.IV, etc.) was indicated, then the name of the vehicle ("Valentine", "Matilda", "Churchill", etc.) came, and its modification was indicated (in Roman numerals). Thus, the full designation of the tank could look like this: MK.Sh "Valentine IX", MK.IV "Churchill III", etc. To avoid confusion in this book, we will use the designations of English tanks adopted in the Red Army during the war years: the name with the modification, for example "Valentine IV", "Valentine IX", etc., or without indication, for example MK.IV "Churchill", MK.SH "Valentine", MK.II "Matilda", etc.
In January 1942, 20 out of 177 produced tanks MK.VII "Tetrarch" (Soviet designation "Vickers VII" or MK.VII) were delivered to the USSR. These were light reconnaissance vehicles, weighing 7.6 tons, armed with a 40-mm cannon and a 7.92-mm BESA machine gun and protected by Yu ... 16-mm armor. 165 - a powerful Meadows MAT carburetor engine allowed the tank to reach a speed of 64 km / h. Most likely, the supply of this type of tank was due to interest in the results of its use on the Soviet-German front.
From the summer of 1942, heavy British MK tanks began to arrive in the Soviet Union in small batches. IV Churchill. They were produced in Great Britain from the summer of 1941 until the end of the Second World War in 16 modifications. Only two came to the USSR, differing in the way the turrets were made: Churchill III with a welded turret and Churchill IV with a cast turret (in Soviet documents, these modifications did not differ in any way, and all tanks were designated MK.IV, MK.IV " Churchill" or simply "Churchill"). Protected by 77...175-mm armor, the 40-ton tank had a 350-horsepower Bedford carburetor engine and developed a speed of up to 25 km/h. The Churchill's armament consisted of a 57 mm cannon and two BESA machine guns. Starting in the autumn of 1942, these vehicles were sent to equip heavy breakthrough tank regiments. Of the 5640 issued and 344 sent to the USSR, only 253 "Churchill III and IV" hit.
From the beginning of 1942, the United States joined the organization of Lend-Lease deliveries on a grand scale, which began to send to our country tanks MZ "General Stuart" (in Soviet terminology, MZ light, or MZl) and MZ "General Lee" (in Soviet terminology, MZ medium, or MZs).
MZ "Stuart" was the most massive light tank of the Second World War. From 1941 to 1944, two American firms manufactured 13,859 machines of three modifications. The USSR received modifications of the MZ and MZA1, which differed in the shape of the turret, the method of manufacturing the hull and the number of machine guns. These were 13-ton vehicles protected by 13...45 mm armor and armed with a 37 mm cannon and three (on MZA1) - five (on MZ) 7.62 mm Browning machine guns. 250 hp Continental carbureted engine (or a Guiberson diesel with 210 hp) accelerated tanks up to 50 km/h. In 1942-1943, 340 MZ and 1336 MZA1 were sent to the USSR, and 1232 tanks were sent (including 211 diesel ones).

MZ "Lee", developed in 1941, was a rather archaic design with a three-tiered arrangement of weapons. The production of these three-meter monsters unfolded at the factories of five companies, where in 1941-1942 6258 tanks of six modifications were produced, differing mainly in manufacturing technology and engine type. In the USSR, MZ modification vehicles were mainly supplied, weighing 29 tons, having 22-50 mm armor and armament consisting of 75-mm and 37-mm guns and three Browning machine guns. 340 hp Continental R-975-EC2 radial carbureted engine. (or Guiberson diesel) accelerated this car to 42 km / h.
In 1942-1943, 1386 MZs tanks were sent from the USA to our country, and 976 vehicles were received, which were actively used in the battles of 1942-1943.

American medium tank M2A1


Also, judging by Soviet documents, along with the first batches of American MZ medium tanks in 1942, several of its “predecessors” - M2A1 tanks (Soviet designation M2 medium) came to the USSR. With a mass of 17.2 tons, the M2 tank was armed with a 37 mm cannon in the turret and six 7.62 mm Browning machine guns in the hull. M2A1 had 32 mm thick armor, 400 hp engine. allowed him to accelerate to 42 km / h. In the United States, only 94 of these tanks were made, which were used in the American army only for training purposes.
However, the M4 "General Sherman" of American production became the most massive foreign tank in the Red Army. The first vehicles arrived in the USSR at the end of 1942, but the peak of deliveries occurred in 1944, when 2345 M4A2 tanks were sent to our country, which accounted for more than 2/3 of all deliveries of foreign armored vehicles that year. And in total in the USA from February 1942 to August 1945, 49234 Shermans of 13 modifications were manufactured. In the USSR, modifications were supplied M4A2 (with a 75-mm gun) and M4A2 (76) W (with a 76-mm gun) with a GMC diesel engine with an HP 375 power. The mass of the tanks was (depending on armament) 31-33 tons, armor - 50 ... 100 mm, speed - up to 40 km / h.
During the war years, 10960 M4A2 tanks were manufactured at American enterprises, 4063 vehicles were sent to the USSR (1990 with a 75-mm gun, 2073 with a 76-mm gun), and 3664 vehicles were received by military acceptance, including a small amount of M4A2 76 (W ) HVSS with a new horizontal suspension in June 1945, which participated in the war with Japan.
In addition to the linear ones, the Red Army received 127 repair tanks M31 (Soviet designation T-2), made on the basis of the MZ medium, on which the main armament was dismantled and crane equipment and a winch were installed.
In 1944, 52 M10 self-propelled artillery mounts were received from the USA, which were sent to form two self-propelled artillery regiments. Built on the basis of the M4A2 tank, the self-propelled guns had 25 ... 57 mm armor and were armed with a powerful 76.2 mm cannon in a rotating turret open from above. GMC diesel with 375 hp allowed a self-propelled gun weighing 29.5 tons to reach a speed of 48 km / h.

In addition to tanks, armored personnel carriers and various vehicles based on them arrived in the USSR from the USA in large quantities.
American wheeled armored personnel carriers were represented in the Red Army by the White Scout Car MZA1 (in Soviet documents it is referred to as an "armored personnel carrier", armored vehicle, or "semi-armored vehicle" MZA1, or "Scout"). The Scout was perfectly adapted for reconnaissance purposes. With a mass of 5.6 tons, the vehicle had an armor thickness of up to 12.7 mm and could carry 8 people (2 crew, 6 troops). A 110-horsepower carburetor engine allowed the armored personnel carrier to reach speeds of up to 105 km / h. The regular armament of the Scout included 12.7 mm heavy-caliber and 7.62 mm Browning machine guns, not counting the personal crew. In the Red Army, Scout armored personnel carriers were used as part of reconnaissance companies of tank and mechanized brigades, motorcycle battalions of corps subordination and in separate motorcycle regiments of tank armies. During the war years, 20,894 Scout vehicles were built in the United States, of which 3,034 fell into the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army.
American half-tracked armored personnel carriers M2, MZ, M9 entered the units subordinate to the GBTU in small quantities (118 units in total), since the bulk of these vehicles - 1082 pieces were sent to artillery (mainly to fighter anti-tank), where they were used for towing 76 ... 100 mm guns.
In tank formations, these armored personnel carriers, capable of carrying from 10 to 13 people, were turned into command vehicles for brigades, corps, and armies. 16-mm armor, a 147 hp engine, which allowed the vehicle to reach speeds of up to 72 km / h, and the presence of an awning allowed the headquarters or operational group of a mechanized unit to control the battle with satisfactory comfort. The defensive armament of the M2 consisted of two Browning machine guns and was identical to the wheeled Scout.



Repair and evacuation tank M31 based on the MZ "Lee" on trials in Kubinka.


On the basis of half-tracked armored personnel carriers of the M2-M9 family, various self-propelled guns were manufactured, which were also supplied to our country.
The T-48 self-propelled guns (Soviet designation SU-57) were a 57-mm cannon installed in the fighting compartment of the American MZ half-track armored personnel carrier. Initially, the order for this design was issued by Great Britain, but then, due to the relative weakness of weapons and the uncertainty with tactical use, some of the vehicles were transferred to the USSR. SU-57 in the amount of 650 pieces entered service with light self-propelled artillery brigades (sabr), as well as divisional and battery-by-battery - into separate armored reconnaissance companies and motorcycle battalions (regiments).
The anti-aircraft control system M15 was a half-track armored personnel carrier MZ with a combined machine gun and cannon armament mounted on it, consisting of a 37-mm M1A2 cannon and two Browning M2 machine guns with a caliber of 12.7 mm. This formidable weapon, capable of destroying not only low-flying air targets, but also lightly armored targets, was supplied to the USSR in small quantities. Of the 2332 M15 ZSUs produced in the USA, only 100 vehicles were in the tank units of the Red Army.

The M17 anti-aircraft gun was armed with four 12.7-mm Browning M2 machine guns in an aircraft rotating mount mounted on the basis of the M5 armored personnel carrier. All 1000 anti-aircraft control systems Ml7, made in the USA, were delivered to the Soviet Union.
All ZSU delivered from the United States were used as part of the mechanized and tank troops of the Red Army. They, along with Soviet towed guns, were equipped with individual anti-aircraft regiments, battalions and companies of corps and tank armies. For example, in January 1945, the 7th Guards Tank Corps included the 287th anti-aircraft artillery regiment, consisting of 16 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and ten ZSU M17.
A 13-ton heavy armored M5 high-speed tractor stands apart among the armored vehicles delivered under Lend-Lease. Built on the basis of the undercarriage of the MZ General Stuart light tank, the tractor had a 235 hp Continental R6572 engine. and was able to tow guns up to 155 mm in caliber, while simultaneously carrying 8-9 people at a speed of 56 km / h. The cabin was open type, with a canvas roof. The driver and the calculation of the guns were located in front of the car. Of the 5290 vehicles produced by International Harvester, 200 M5s hit the USSR in 1944-1945, which were sent exclusively to the artillery units of the RGK, where they were used to tow 122 and 152-mm hull guns.
In addition to combat vehicles, various repair and recovery equipment was supplied to the Red Army throughout the entire period of the war. Along with the already mentioned repair and recovery tank M31, the Red Army received wheeled English Scammel tractors in two modifications and American vehicles RE028XS, Diamond T-980.
The heavy emergency tractor Scammel was developed for the British army in the variants of a tank towing vehicle (Scammell TRMU / 30) and an evacuation vehicle (Scammell PIONEER SV / 2S). Diesel Gardner GL 102 HP it allowed using a trailer to tow cargo up to 30 tons on paved roads. However, during the fighting in North Africa, Scammel TRMU / 30 even 42-ton Churchills were brought to the front line. A powerful winch-crane was installed on the evacuation PIONEER SV / 2S for repair work.
Deliveries of Scammel to our country began in 1942 and were extremely limited. However, in Great Britain itself, during the entire period of the war, 548 Scammell TRMU / 30 and 768 Scammell SV / 2S were produced, so several dozen of these tractors delivered to the Red Army were an impressive figure compared to the total production. Prior to the start of mass American deliveries, these machines were distributed along the fronts literally by the piece. So, on the Leningrad front, only one Scammell tractor was subordinate to the front evacuator (the rest of the equipment was Soviet-made), etc.
The American REO transporter with a special trailer was designed to transport tanks and self-propelled guns weighing up to 20 tons on paved roads and on dry dirt roads. The design of the trailer made it possible to load and unload equipment under its own power; when transporting faulty tanks, loading onto the trailer was carried out by a winch. The RE028XS transporter had a Cummings HB-600 six-cylinder water-cooled diesel engine with a capacity of 150 hp. For the safety of transporting tanks and self-propelled guns, there was a set of fasteners (chains, pads, extensions, etc.). During 1943-1944, the Red Army received 190 of these vehicles, however, due to the general trend of increasing the weight of tanks, a tractor capable of towing heavier vehicles was required. They became the new American ballast tractor Diamond T-980. The transporter consisted of a three-axle 8-ton tractor and a three-axle wheeled 45-ton trailer Roger Trailer. It could be used to transport cargo weighing up to 45 tons on dry dirt roads and paved roads. The Diamond T-980 transporter was equipped with a powerful engine-driven winch for the convenience of unloading and loading tanks. In addition, the design of the trailer made it possible to load serviceable tanks under its own power. The power of the Hercules DFXE engine reached 200 hp, which ensured the transportation of cargo on a trailer at a speed of 26 km / h. From 1943 to 1945, 295 Diamond T-980 tractors were received. These vehicles were placed at the disposal of the front and army evacuators. So, as part of the 1st Guards Tank Army there was the 67th evakorota, in which, in addition to the Voroshilov and Kominterns, as of January 1945, there were 2 T-980s. Usually, no more than two vehicles were allocated to the army evacuation equipment. On August 5, 1945, to ensure the evacuation of armored vehicles of units and formations prepared for an attack on Japanese troops in Manchuria, the 1st armored repair and evacuation center was created, from which mixed evacuation groups were allocated to meet army needs. The 1st Red Banner Army received 3 T-34 tractors and 2 T-980 Diamonds, while the 5th Army received 6 T-34s and 2 Diamonds. By the end of the war, the reports of the repair and evacuation services were full of proposals to increase the number of tractors to 4-5 pieces per army.
In the Red Army, wheeled tractors with trailers for transporting tanks to the front line were used extremely rarely. Due to their relative scarcity and the availability of winches, Scammell, REO, Diamond tractors were primarily needed for the rapid evacuation of heavy armored vehicles, especially from areas with swampy terrain.

Tanks T-2 (M31) in a pair tow a heavy KV-1. Polygon NIBT, winter 1942-43.


Since the end of 1943, American and Canadian-made automobile repair shops began to arrive in the Soviet Union in large quantities.
The full fleet of American workshops consisted of up to ten different repair units and was essentially a field tank repair plant. It consisted of the following machines:
1. Mechanical workshop M16A (on the Studebacker US-6 chassis).
2. Mechanical workshop М16В (on US-6 chassis).
3. Locksmith and mechanical workshop M8A (on US-6 chassis).
4. Forging and welding workshop M12 (on US-6 chassis).
5. Electrical repair shop M18 (on US-6 chassis).
6. Workshop for the repair of weapons M7 (on the US-6 chassis).
7. Tool shop (on the StudebekkerUS-6 chassis).
8. Warehouse machines M14 (on US-6 chassis).
9. 10-ton Ml or M1A1 crane (on the WARD LaFRANCE 1000 M1A1 chassis, less often on the KENWORTH 570 Ml chassis).
10. Repair tank M31 (T-2).
The full fleet of Canadian workshops was smaller than the American one and consisted of the following machines:
1 Mechanical workshop A3 (on US-made GMC - 353 chassis).
2. Mechanical workshop D3 (on the American-made GMC-353 chassis).
3. Mobile charging station (CCD) OFP-3 (on a Canadian-made Ford C298QF/F60L chassis).
4. Electric welding workshop KL-3 (on a Canadian-made Ford F15A chassis).
5. Electrical repair shop (on the US-made GMC - 353 chassis).
6. Power plant for 9 kW on a trailer.
The American and Canadian parks were completed, mainly, by the repair units of the army and front-line subordination (mobile tank repair plants, separate repair and restoration battalions, etc.). This made it possible to carry out not only medium, but also major repairs of armored vehicles, while Soviet equipment of this type was designed mainly for current repairs.
A separate forging and welding workshop was also supplied to the USSR (on the chassis of the American GMC Chevrolet 7107 or Chevrolet Canadian production), which was used to staff repair units directly to tank units. In total, in 1944-1945, 1590 field-repair shops of all types were delivered to the USSR from Canada (the authors do not have data on the number of American workshops).

ZSU M15A1, Kubinka, 1944


Thus, for the entire period of the war, the USSR received not only combat vehicles and spare parts for them, but also modern foreign-made repair equipment, which ensured the entire cycle of competent operation of the Red Army tank fleet, both domestic and foreign.
In conclusion, it should be noted that one of the problems in assessing the volume of Lend-Lease deliveries is the counting system. In most domestic and foreign works devoted to this topic, the authors operate with Western data, which exceed the Soviet ones by 3-4 hundreds of units. This is due, firstly, to the loss of part of the tanks during transportation by Northern convoys (especially in 1942-1943), and secondly, to the fact that the applications of the Soviet Union for one or another type of equipment were often mistaken for shipment data. Therefore, different authors have completely different quantitative data.

In addition, most domestic archival materials relating to Lend-Lease are still inaccessible to most researchers. Therefore, it is not yet possible to estimate the actual volumes of deliveries.
The tables given here are compiled according to the admission committees of the GBTU of the Red Army and seem to the authors to be the closest to the truth (tables 3, 4 and 5).
Table 3. Deliveries of armored vehicles to the USSR from Great Britain and Canada from 1941 to 1945 (according to the selection committees of the GBTU KA)


1 Of these, 27 are from Canada. Of these, all 16 are from Canada.
2 From 1943 to 1945, English cruiser tanks "Cromwell" (six pieces), converted into mine sweepers "Shermans" under the name "Sherman-Crab" (three pieces), flamethrower machines "Churchill-Crocodile" were delivered to the USSR from Great Britain for informational purposes. "(five pieces), AES and Daimler armored vehicles (one copy each), a flamethrower version of the Universal armored personnel carrier called the Wasp, as well as Canadian Bombardier snowmobiles (six pieces).

Table 4. Deliveries of armored vehicles from the USA to the USSR from 1941 to 1945 (according to the selection committees of the GBTU KA)


3 In 1943, 12 MZs tanks from among the supplies for 1942 were raised from the bottom of the Arctic Ocean from the side of a sunken transport by the forces of the repair units of the Karelian Front. After the inclusion of 11 MZs in the units of the Karelian Front, the number of tanks of this type delivered to the USSR in 1943 began to be 175 units.
2 In 1942, under the MZ medium brand, several American M2A1 medium tanks were delivered to the USSR.
3 3 data are given only for armored personnel carriers that came under the jurisdiction of GBTU KA. In addition, from 1942 to 1945, 1082 M2, MZ, M9 armored personnel carriers were transferred to the Main Artillery Directorate for use as artillery tractors. Thus, the total number of half-track armored personnel carriers delivered under Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union is 1200 pieces.
For testing and familiarization in 1943-1945, one heavy tank T26 "General Pershing" five light tanks M5, two light tanks M24 "General Chaffee" and five self-propelled guns T-70 were sent from the USA to the USSR.

Table 5. Deliveries to the USSR of wheeled tank transporters from the USA in 1941-1945 (according to the data of the selection committees of the GBTU KA)

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“We got used to the fact that the equipment and weapons that were supplied to us were quite effective for the period of delivery. These were fairly advanced examples. Yes, with flaws, but advanced and often superior or unparalleled in our country.

The hero of our today's story is so contradictory that it causes loud controversy even today. Almost all experts and lovers of military vehicles of the past talk about its unsuccessful design from the very beginning.

No wonder this tank was taken out of production as quickly as it was accepted. By the way, few people know this, but it is this tank that holds the record for the speed of creation. Not a single combat vehicle in the world has been developed and put into service in such a short time.

So, the hero of our story is American medium tank M3 Lee, better known to us as M3s "Lee".

Here it is simply necessary to make a little historical background regarding the Soviet designation of the tank. The American M3 and the Soviet Lend-Lease tank M3s are actually the same vehicle. Just the letter "c" is nothing more than the designation "medium".

There is another aspect that simply needs to be highlighted at the beginning of the material. Among those who study tanks from the Second World War, there is an opinion that another tank, known as the M3 "Grant", American-made, but commissioned by the UK, is nothing more than an exact copy of the M3 "Lee".

Yes, the Grant did copy the Lee, but it had enough differences to be a standalone car. No wonder he received the name of General Ulysses S. Grant, the commander of the northerners during the Civil War.

Recall that General Robert Edward Lee commanded the southerners at the same time. And the American version of the M3 "Lee" is named after this general. A sort of specific Anglo-American humor, the essence of which is not entirely clear to us.

Especially considering that Grant defeated Lee.

By the way, both cars got their name from the British as a gift. In Britain, cars went under different indices.

Similarly, the opinion of some readers about the differences in engines is incorrect. You often hear about Grant diesels and Lee gasoline engines. Alas, the "Grants" had both gasoline and diesel engines. Why and how this happened is not the topic of today's material.

Let's start the story. February 1942. City of Sloboda Kirov region. Here the formation of the 114th tank brigade takes place. Soldiers and officers of the brigade are surprised every day. Scouts and signalmen receive Harley motorcycles. Drivers are outlandish cars "Ford-6", "Chevrolet", "".

But most of all the tankers are surprised. M3s tanks and light M3l tanks come to the brigade completely “not ours” in appearance. 69 new medium tanks not known in the Red Army.

This is how the acquaintance of Soviet soldiers with the new American tank happened. Deliveries of M3s to the USSR began precisely in February 1942..


The first battle M3 "Lee" took in May 1942. Our army attempted an offensive on the Barvenkovsky bridgehead during the second battle for Kharkov. Alas, we remember how this attempt ended. Our troops suffered a severe defeat.

Recall that then we lost 171,000 killed, 100,000 wounded, 240,000 captured. Lost (destroyed, abandoned, captured) 1,240 tanks. The Germans and Romanians then lost 8 thousand killed, 22 thousand wounded, 3 thousand missing.

What did the soldiers and officers of the 114th tank brigade see? Why did the appearance of the cars have such a stunning effect on the tankers?

The fact is that the new car was "three-story". In the literal sense of the word. On the first floor, in a sponson, a 75-mm gun with a horizontal pointing angle of 32 degrees was installed.


The second floor, a turret with circular rotation, is equipped with a 37 mm cannon with a coaxial machine gun. The tower was driven by a hydraulic drive, but if necessary, it can also be rotated mechanically.


But there was also a third floor. True, fortunately, this floor could not boast of a cannon. A machine gun was installed in the commander's cupola, which could be used against both ground and air targets.

The question immediately arises about the most powerful gun. Why is it located in the sponson and not in the tower?

By the way, again we depart for a second from the story. It is necessary to explain the word "sponson" for land readers. The word is naval. So, a sponson is a protrusion above the side (in the navy) or a “growth” on the side of an armored vehicle (for those who are used to leaning on the ground).

So why in a sponsor? The answer is simple. The 37 mm caliber gun ceased to suit tank crews. It no longer performed anti-tank functions. And according to American tradition, the designers did not really think about the problem.

If 37 mm is not enough, then you need to take one that satisfies and that's it. And shove somewhere. So the 75 mm M2 gun was chosen. And then, logically, it is necessary to refine or develop a new machine body and turret. In fact, it is necessary to change the machine itself.

But there was, recall, a war, and the US Army really needed a well-armed medium tank ...

So there was a sponson on the right side of the case. The gun lost a huge part of the firing sector. However, the timing of adoption has not changed.

Why did this happen to this car? Here it is necessary to consider the history of the creation of tank units in the United States. We already wrote that by the beginning of World War II, the Americans did not have tank troops.

The only tank that the Americans had was the extremely unsuccessful M2 (produced in 1939-41). The tank was produced in two versions and a total of 146 vehicles were assembled (52 M2 and 94 M2A1).

It was by copying many of the components of this machine that the designers created the M3. Transmission, power plant, running gear. Many talk about the archaic layout of the M3 tank. Indeed, by the 40s of the 20th century, such an arrangement looks ridiculous.

In general, it was the situation “I blinded him from what was.” And there were very few at the disposal of American designers.

The hull of the M3 tank has a prefabricated structure. Armor plates made of rolled armor were attached to the prefabricated frame with riveting (or bolts). The lower frontal part consists of three separate cast parts, bolted together. This can be seen in the photo.


Rectangular doors were provided for access to the tank along the sides of the hull, the driver got into his seat through a hatch located on the right side of the upper front plate, where his viewing devices were also located.


To the left of the driver's hatch in the lower frontal sheet there was a loophole for installing a coaxial machine gun.

A cast sponson for the 75 mm gun was mounted on the right front of the hull and attached to it with a rivet.


To access the engine compartment in the stern and the bottom there were hatches, and its roof was removable. Air was supplied to the engine through armored boxes mounted above the tracks. They also housed fuel tanks.


A cast cylindrical turret was mounted offset to the left on a ball bearing and equipped with a hydraulic drive. The gun was mounted in a mask, it also housed a machine gun and a periscope sight.

For observation in the sides of the tower there were viewing slots, closed with glass blocks and hinged armored covers.


The cylindrical commander's turret with a machine gun was located on top of the turret with an offset to the left, the turret was rotated manually. Access to the tower was through a double hatch in the roof of the commander's cupola.


Let's look at the potential opponents of the Americans - the Germans. What German car was opposed to the American? The enemy of the M3 was supposed to be the Pz.IV. The German tank was also armed with a 75 mm gun.

If we talk about the design as a whole, then the car had a number of critical flaws. This is a weak reservation. This is the height. This is a completely ugly placement of weapons, which simply "ate" the potential that could be achieved from a vehicle with such weapons.


The Americans quickly realized that the tank was not just crude, but also unpromising. That is why it was problematic to meet the M3 in the American army already in 1944-45. And in terms of the number of these armored vehicles, the Americans are not the first.

A total of 6258 units of this tank of all modifications were produced.. The modifications differed mainly in engines and manufacturing technologies. Of these, 2/3 were transferred under Lend-Lease to the British and the USSR. A small part (about a hundred cars) were transferred to other countries.

Congratulations, we've saved this nightmare for those who needed it more.

The British can rightly call the M3 "Lee" their car. It was in the British army that there was the largest number of these tanks. More than 2 thousand units.

Winston Churchill. Not afraid to stagger along the fronts.

The British were the first to receive this horror and used it in the battles for North Africa. Suddenly (for lack of a better one), "Lee" liked it. It was fast enough, the armor of German tanks made its way through it without any problems, if the car was correctly positioned in relation to the enemy.

Another historical character, Montgomery himself near his personal tank.

True, Lee himself could hardly hold enemy shells, the armor of a medium tank was 37 mm. Despite all the shortcomings, this tank was the only British tank that could withstand German tanks in Africa, even in 1942, during the battles for El Alamein (July-August), they called it "the last Egyptian hope."

1,386 tanks were shipped to the USSR. This is according to American data. According to Soviet data, the USSR received only 976 vehicles. Losses of almost 30% of supplies are still of interest to historians and specialists. The vehicles either sank in the northern seas or got lost in the Iranian deserts.

But be that as it may, this imperfect, archaic, awkward machine in the first period of the war still played its role. When the German tank spearheads rushed into the open spaces of Russia, when our industry did not have time to give the front new and other vehicles, the M3 went into battle. Often the first and last.

Little known fact. These tanks took part in the great tank battle of World War II - the Battle of Kursk. We found a photo of the M3 "Lee", which was killed in this very battle in July 1943. Tank "Alexander Nevsky".

Even in 1944, "Lee" was still fighting in our army. And one, probably the most stubborn, even took part in the defeat of the Japanese in the Far East. Somehow I remember partisans with St. George's crosses for the First World War ...

The tank received the derogatory nicknames of ordinary Soviet tankers, it was called "odoroblom", "kalancha", they used the adjectives "two-story" and "three-story" in relation to it, they assigned ironic indices: VG-7 ("certain death of seven"), BM-7 ( "mass grave for seven") and stuff like that.


Tactical and technical data tank M3 "Lee":

Weight, t: 27.9
Length, mm: 5639
Width, mm: 2718
Height, mm: 3124
Clearance, mm: 432

Armament:
- 75 mm gun M2
- 37 mm gun M5
- 3 (4) 7.62 mm M1919A4 machine guns

Booking: homogeneous steel armor
- case: 51 mm
- board: 38 mm
- feed: 38 mm
- bottom: 13 mm
- tower: 51 mm (forehead), 38 mm (board)
- hull roof-13 mm

Engine types: R-975EC2, GM 6046, Guiberson T-1400 Series 3, Chrysler A-57 Multi-Bank

Highway speed, km/h: 39
Power reserve, km: 193
Crew, people: 7

Lend-Lease: figures and facts

The idea of ​​a system of assistance to countries opposing Nazi Germany, primarily England, by lending them weapons and military materials in exchange for certain political and economic concessions originated in the US Treasury Department in the fall of 1940. Then legal advisers E. Foley and O. Cox found the law of 1892, adopted under President B. Harrison. According to him, the US Secretary of War, "when at his discretion it is in the interests of the state, may lease for a period not exceeding 5 years the property of the army, if the country does not need it." This formed the basis of the Lend-Lease bill, which was submitted to Congress in January 1941. After approval in the House of Representatives and the Senate, it was signed by President F. Roosevelt on March 11, and the bill became law. It authorized the president to lend or lease defense items, if necessary, to any country whose defense he recognizes as vital to the security of the United States. On the same day, the law was extended to England and Greece.

The Lend-Lease Act put an end to the long struggle with the so-called isolationists - supporters of US non-intervention in the world conflict. At first, their positions were quite strong. So, for example, already on September 5, 1939, a law on neutrality was enacted, one of the provisions of which provided for an embargo on the export of weapons to warring countries. Speaking at an extraordinary session of Congress on September 21, President Roosevelt spoke about the disastrous consequences of this law for the United States and the need to lift the embargo. After a bitter debate, Congress rescinded it on November 3. The next day, the president signed a modified neutrality law. Countries that opposed Nazi Germany were able to purchase weapons and military materials from the United States on the terms of "cash and carry" ("pay and carry"), that is, advance payment in cash and export on their own ships.

Arms deliveries from the USA to Great Britain increased sharply after Dunkirk and the capitulation of France. These events coincided with another US election campaign, during which Roosevelt was nominated for the presidency for the third time in a row. The victory in the 1940 elections gave him the opportunity to act more freely. Anglo-American ties continued to expand, but already in 1940 England faced an acute shortage of foreign exchange and gold reserves for further purchases of weapons, military materials and food. During the year of the war, the debt of the British Empire to the United States increased by 1,740 million dollars, that is, almost tripled. Leasing military bases in exchange for arms supplies did not solve the problem. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the American Johnson Act of 1934 blocked the provision of loans to Great Britain until it repaid its previous debts. In December 1940, the British were forced to abandon new contracts with the United States. In the midst of the Battle of Britain, a critical situation developed for the British. This is where the Lend-Lease Bill came into being.

For the first time, Roosevelt publicly outlined his plan for helping England at a press conference on December 17, 1940. At the same time, the president dressed his explanations of the principles of Lend-Lease in a curious, but at the same time very accessible form. “Imagine,” he said, “my neighbor's house is on fire and I have a garden hose 400 to 500 feet away. If he can take my hose and attach it to his pump, then I can help him put out the fire. What am I doing? I don't tell him before this operation: "Neighbour, this hose cost me $15, you need to pay $15 for it." Not! What kind of deal is being made? I don't need $15, I need him to return my hose after the fire is over."

The hearing of the lend-lease bill lasted almost two months. At the request of the President, the debate was opened on January 15, 1941 by Secretary of State K. Hull, who was supposed to oversee the passage of the bill through Congress. The debates were held almost all over the country, thousands of letters, appeals, resolutions and telegrams from various organizations and individuals were sent to Congress. According to the New York Times, over 27 million adult Americans supported the Lend-Lease bill, and no more than 11 million opposed it. According to the Gallup Institute, 70% of members of the US Democratic Party and 61% of Republicans were in favor of Lend-Lease . Despite the fact that the bill was supported by the administration, the majority of Congress and the public opinion of the country, its discussion was accompanied by a fierce political struggle. During the discussion, four significant amendments were made to the bill, which limited the president's powers. First of all, they concerned congressional control over lend-lease appropriations, presidential reporting on the implementation of the law, limiting the term of presidential powers under lend-lease, and prohibiting the escort of merchant ships by ships of the US Navy. These limitations largely explain the problems that have arisen from time to time in the supply chain. These problems of democracy, which were not entirely clear to the Soviet leadership, subsequently led more than once to very difficult situations in relations between the USSR and the allies.

Lend-lease recipient countries had to submit requests for the required supplies, and then coordinate them with representatives of the State Department and a specially created Lend-Lease Office, which ultimately determined the amount and direction of assistance. After that, a bilateral agreement (protocol) was drawn up, called the “Settlement for Mutual Assistance”. It provided for the following system of Lend-Lease settlements:

Materials destroyed during the war or not suitable for further use are not subject to any payment;

Materials left after the war and suitable for civilian needs are paid in whole or in part in the form of a long-term loan;

Military materials remain in the recipient countries, the US government reserves the right to reclaim them;

Equipment not completed by the end of the war, and already finished materials in warehouses in the United States, can be purchased by customer states, and the American government provides a loan to pay for it.

The leadership of the Lend-Lease program was entrusted to a committee under the Cabinet of Ministers, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Ministers of Finance, Defense and the Navy. In reality, the entire responsibility for the implementation of this program was assigned to Harry Hopkins, an adviser and closest friend of President Roosevelt. On May 2, 1941, a special agency for the coordination of foreign aid, the Division of Defense Aid Reports (DDAR), was created, the responsible executor of which was Major General J. Burns, who had proven himself in the Ministry of Defense back in the First World War. Finally, in October 1941, by a special decree, the president transformed the agency into the Office of Lend-Lease Administration (OLLA), headed by the former chairman of the board of directors, Yu.S. Steel Corporation” and Vice President of General Motors Edward R. Stettinius, and his assistant and executive officer is the same J. Burns. With the entry of the United States into the war, in accordance with the new Lend-Lease concept, OLIA acquired a completely finished structure. Joint allied directorates for the distribution of ammunition, raw materials, food were created, headed by headquarters composed of high-ranking officers of various branches of the American and British armies.

The created structure turned out to be so cumbersome that it took more than two months for the application to pass through its corridors. The bureaucratic difficulties that representatives of the procurement commissions of the recipient countries inevitably faced were largely related to the need to agree on technical specifications, develop draft orders and contracts. At the same time, all documents passed through numerous instances. At first, the British faced these problems in full measure. Thus, the British application for 23 thousand aircraft by the end of 1941, having passed through all instances, was in reality only 15% satisfied.

However, not only bureaucratic obstacles stood in the way of deliveries. Sometimes the Americans simply did not have the weapons they requested. So, for example, in March 1941, only 16 tanks, 283 bombers and 223 fighters were manufactured at US factories. The flywheel of military production overseas was only gaining momentum.

Nevertheless, lend-lease earned. From March to December 1941, the British Air Force received 2,400 American aircraft, 100 of them under Lend-Lease. Of the 3,300 tanks produced in the United States during the same period, a quarter was sent to Britain under Lend-Lease, another 200 for cash. In addition, already during the first year of Lend-Lease, Great Britain received over 13 thousand trucks, thousands of tons of food, equipment and materials. Following the United Kingdom, other countries followed. As already mentioned, the next state, the defense of which was recognized as vital for the United States, was Greece. Then there were Yugoslavia, China, Belgium, Norway, Poland, Holland…

On June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union entered World War II. The reaction of the leaders of Great Britain and the United States followed immediately. British Prime Minister W. Churchill, speaking on the radio on the evening of June 22 with an appeal to the British people, said: “No one has been a more stubborn opponent of communism than I have been for the past 25 years. I will not take back any of the words I said, but now all this is receding into the background in the face of unfolding events. The danger that threatens Russia is the danger that threatens us and the United States, just as the cause of every Russian who fights for his hearth and home is the cause of free people and free peoples in all parts of the globe.

On June 23, S. Welles, acting US Secretary of State, made a statement on behalf of the American government. He emphasized that the main danger to the United States and the whole world comes from the Nazi bloc: "Today Hitler's armies are the main danger to the American continent." The next day, President Roosevelt said at a press conference that the United States intended to provide assistance to the Soviet Union, but made the reservation that it was not yet known what form it would take.

US Secretary of War G. Stimson informed F. Roosevelt: he and the US Chiefs of Staff are convinced that "Germany will be involved in Russia for at least one month, maximum - three months."

It must be said that the course of hostilities on the Eastern Front in June-July 1941, on the whole, only confirmed the assessments of British and American politicians and the military, which to a large extent predetermined their military-economic policy towards the USSR. At this stage, London and Washington agreed only to the sale of weapons and other military materials. On August 16, 1941, an agreement was signed between Great Britain and the USSR on providing the USSR with a loan of 10 million pounds sterling (3% per annum) for a period of 5 years. Around the same time, the US State Department announced the extension of the trade agreement that had been in force between the USSR and the US since 1937 for a period of one year. At the same time, the Soviet ambassador in Washington was handed a note on economic assistance to the USSR by the United States, in which it was reported that the United States government was considering in the most friendly way proposals coming from the government, institutions and agents of the USSR on placing orders for goods and materials in the United States, urgently necessary for the needs of the state defense of the Soviet Union, with the aim of facilitating the rapid production and shipment of these goods and materials.

However, in the first months of the war, American deliveries to the Soviet Union were small and were made for cash. In total, by the end of October 1941, weapons and materials worth 41 million dollars were sold to the Soviet Union. These were, according to Roosevelt, "symbolic deliveries" on a "pay and carry" basis.

Meanwhile, events on the Eastern Front took an unexpected turn for London and Washington. “A miracle happened,” writes R. Parkinson. - The Soviet-German campaign lasted for more than six weeks, that is, more than the maximum time that the imperial general staff allotted to it. The Red Army moved from a hasty retreat to a fighting withdrawal. The German hordes suffered huge losses. The Russians will be able to survive even the winter. And this was of great importance: England received a longer respite. Even if Germany finally wins, it will still be so weakened that it will no longer be able to carry out an invasion of the British Isles.

The ruling circles of Great Britain and the USA have become convinced that in the present situation the best and cheapest way to help themselves is to help the Soviet Union. Beginning on September 6, 1941, British supplies to the USSR went on a lend-lease basis, and on November 7, Roosevelt, recognizing the defense of the USSR as vital to the United States, extended the lend-lease law to the Soviet Union.

On September 28, 1941, American and British delegations headed by A. Harriman and Lord W. Beaverbrook, respectively, arrived in Arkhangelsk aboard the British cruiser London. From Arkhangelsk they flew to Moscow, where the tripartite conference on supply issues began its work the next day. On October 1, 1941, the First (Moscow) protocol on military supplies was signed for the period from October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942. Subsequent deliveries had to comply with the quotas established by the Washington (October 6, 1942), London (October 19, 1943) and Ottawa (April 17, 1945) protocols. Moreover, if the first two protocols were tripartite, then Canada also participated in the third and Thursday agreements. Until July 1, 1943, Canadian military supplies were carried out against the obligations of Great Britain, and in some cases the United States.

Regrettably, the supply quotas stipulated by the protocols were not always met. In addition, there were sometimes significant delays in deliveries, which caused reproaches from the Soviet side. How things stood can be judged by the example of the “Information of the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR A.I. Mikoyan on the fulfillment by England and the United States of the obligations assumed at the Moscow Conference of the Three Powers on the supply of weapons, equipment and raw materials to the USSR for October - December 1941". The certificate was compiled on January 9, 1942 and addressed to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov. Excerpts from it give an idea of ​​both the volume and range of deliveries, and the assessment by the Soviet side of their implementation.

“At the same time, I am sending you information about the fulfillment of the obligations assumed at the Moscow Conference of the 3 powers, Great Britain and the USA on the supply of weapons, equipment, raw materials and materials to the USSR for October, November and December 1941 as a whole.

The obligations of the USA at the Moscow Conference on the monthly supply of aircraft for 3 months are 600. In fact, only 204 aircraft have been delivered. Including: fighters - 131 pieces, bombers - 43 pieces, scouts - 30 pieces.

Of the 204 aircraft delivered, 95 were delivered to the Union, 106 are on the way, including 8 arriving on 12.1.1942.

Loaded on ships, but not yet sent - 3 pcs. Thus, the underdelivery of aircraft against the commitments made at the Moscow Conference is 396 aircraft.

Such a large underdelivery of aircraft is due to the fact that between December 13 and 17 the US government withdrew back almost all of the delivered aircraft from among those in US ports at that time. 447 aircraft were recalled out of 457 in ports. The presence of a large number of unshipped aircraft in US ports on December 15, 1941 was due to the fact that 152 Airacobra fighters were delivered to ports without propellers, without weapons and a set of spare parts. In addition, the American authorities did not provide a sufficient number of ships for a long time and, finally, they recalled the delivered aircraft altogether. At the same time, part of the aircraft was unloaded from ships on which they had already been loaded, but the ships did not have time to leave.

Also, the supply of tanks was sharply underfulfilled, the United States, according to the decisions of the Moscow Conference, undertook to deliver 750 tanks in three months.

On October 31, the US government announced a new figure for monthly deliveries of tanks, namely: 166 tanks in October, 207 in November and 300 in December, for a total of 673 tanks.

In fact, only 182 pieces were delivered. Including: medium - 72 pcs., light - 110 pcs. Of these, 27 pieces were brought to the Union, 139 pieces are on the way, 16 pieces are in ports.

Anti-aircraft guns (90mm) were to be delivered before January 1, 1942 - 10 pcs. In fact, only 4 pieces have been delivered, and all of them are on the way. In addition to the commitments made at the Moscow Conference, the United States delivered: Tommigans submachine guns - 5000 pieces, 81 mm mortars - 30 pieces, 60-inch searchlights. on cars complete with sound pickups - 22 pcs. Ammunition from the United States was supplied in the same way as from England, as a kit for the supplied weapons.

Aerial bombs, in which we are less interested, have been delivered in significant quantities (10,490 pieces). We have given instructions to stop all purchases of aerial bombs. Until now, the United States has not given an answer about the size of the supply of nitroglycerin gunpowder. Of the naval weapons from the United States, only 150 Spur-ri searchlights, complete with sound pickups, arrived. The Americans were required to supply 12,000 telephone sets monthly, and in October - December - 36,000 pieces. Only 5506 units have been delivered, 4416 units are on the way.

Field telephone wire plan for 3 months - 300,000 km. Delivered - 36,000 km. Of these, 8400 km were brought to the USSR. It is on the way - 16,600 km, in the port and in loading - 11,000 km.

The plan for the supply of barbed wire was adopted by the Americans in the amount of 4,000 tons per month, and in three months the supply was to be 12,000 tons. Delivered - 16 844 tons. Of these: brought to the Union - 1997 tons were on January 1, 1942, in transit - 10,042 tons, in the port and in loading - 4805 tons.

According to the plan for October - December, the United States was to supply trucks - 25,600 units. Actually delivered on January 1, 1942 - 9238 units. Of these: brought to the Union - 1565 units, are on the way - 4974 units, including 12.1 arriving in Arkhangelsk - 626, are in ports and in loading - 2699.

In addition, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade purchased before the Conference, that is, before October 1, 1941, and brought into the country 500 Ford trucks. The plan for the supply of reconnaissance vehicles was adopted in the amount of 5,000 units within 9 months, and in three months the delivery was to be 1,665 units. Actually delivered on January 1, 1942 - 1000 pieces. Of these: brought to the Union - 72 pieces, are on the way - 800 pieces, including 12.1.1942 - 80 pieces, in ports and in loading - 128 pieces.

Until now, the exact size of the supply of machine tools from the United States has not been established. At the Moscow conference of the 3 powers, it was considered “desirable to satisfy the Soviet requests (1200 units per month), but certain types or classifications cannot be guaranteed. All machines that can be delivered will be supplied from the UK and the USA.” Since the obligation to supply England has been determined (290 pieces per month), the balance of 910 machines per month should be attributed to the USA, although the American Government has not yet given a specific answer on the delivery of this number of machines before 1. VII. 42 g. Based on this calculation, the size of deliveries for 9 months, falling on the USA, should be 8190 machine tools, and for three months - 2730 pieces.

During October - November, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade placed orders in the USA for various types of machine tools in the amount of 3404 pieces. Placing orders in the USA for machine tools is extremely slow, since their execution is associated with the passage of a number of government agencies, where all sorts of delays occur (slow review of our applications in the Lend-Lease Administration and in other departments, direct sabotage by some officials of ministries, etc.). P.). Delivered by firms in October - December on orders issued both before and after October 1, 1941 - 731 pcs. Of these: brought to the Union - 35 pieces, shipped and on the way to the USSR - 285 pieces, located in ports, in loading and at factories - 411 pieces.

Of the non-ferrous metals, the United States supplied only molybdenum in an amount of 1,000 tons, with a plan of 900 tons. The supply of molybdenum was made according to an order issued before the Moscow conference. There were no deliveries of aluminum, nickel and zinc from the US at all, although there are specific US commitments for these metals. Duralumin, rolled brass, pipes and other copper products (radiator pipes) were supplied. Armor plates for tanks were not supplied at all during October.

The United States has not yet given an answer on the size of supplies of bimetal and magnesium alloys under our application at the Conference. Only 56 tons of ferrosilicon were delivered from the USA, while the delivery plan for 3 months was 900 tons. Nichrome wire was delivered in the amount of 14 tons instead of 60 tons supposed to be delivered during October - December. Significantly less commitments were made for the supply of grinding wheels and electrodes.

Oil products were supposed to be delivered in three months - 60,000 tons. Delivered for the period July - December 1941 - 200,601 tons. However, these deliveries did not take place on account of obligations under the Conference protocol, but in accordance with an earlier agreement with the United States on the supply of 200,000 tons of petroleum products by them. Ethylene glycol was supposed to be supplied 120 tons per month, and in total - 360 tons. In fact, 242 tons have been delivered. The supply of toluene was also underfulfilled. 901 tons were delivered against the plan of 2500 tons. Despite the firm promise written in the decisions of the Conference on the supply of 10,000 tons of finished trinitrotoluene, not a single ton of this product has been delivered so far.

The Maritime Commission obviously disrupts the shipment of goods to the Soviet Union, referring to the lack of steamships, the impossibility of sending steamships to Arkhangelsk in winter, since, in their opinion, the Arkhangelsk port is not able to receive large numbers of steamships. In those cases when certain ships are put under loading, the worst of them are selected.

Some cases should be considered as acts of sabotage. So, for example, on the Fire Rock steamer, which left the New York port on 21/X with military cargo (tanks, vehicles, etc.), there was a leak in the holds for no apparent reason. The ship had to return, unload and stand up for repairs. As a result, the shipment of goods was delayed by 1/2 month.

In the port of New York on the steamer "Ballot", which was under loading on December 25, 1941, a fire broke out, noticed by our duty officer and promptly liquidated. During the investigation, it was established that there was arson; jars of kerosene were found in a number of holds. The steamer Malomak, which left Boston for Arkhangelsk on December 18, 1941 with a load of fighter planes, tanks, motor vehicles, etc., returned to Boston on January 3 due to sabotage by the crew. The steamship Meridian, which left New York for Arkhangelsk on 29/X41, according to the British Admiralty, perished under circumstances that have not yet been clarified.

It should be noted that this kind of "incident" does not occur with British and Soviet ships proceeding from the ports of England. The foregoing allows us to conclude that the aforementioned acts are not separate actions of certain hostile elements, but are the actions of a specific organization. In general, US deliveries are clearly unsatisfactory. Representatives of the American government generously make promises and unceremoniously violate their obligations. Moreover, the disruption of supplies by the Americans is not explained only by the sabotage of individual elements hostile to us. Nor can it be explained by objective difficulties. Our deliveries are interrupted by the Military and Naval Ministries, of course, not without the knowledge of the government. Our repeated reports of all the facts of the disruption to representatives of the American government have not led so far to an improvement in the situation.

Here is a reference. Let us leave the mythical underground organization on the conscience of the Soviet leaders, who everywhere imagined a class enemy. At the same time, it should be noted that the facts of sabotage among the crews of American ships did take place. As for everything else, some comments are needed here.

It follows from the certificate that the bulk of the cargo that arrived in the USSR in October - December 1941 was ordered even before the signing of the Moscow Protocol, which is not surprising. Even if we assume that all agreed figures were transmitted to the United States on the evening of October 1, then minus the transportation time - 11-12 days from the US East Coast to Murmansk (even longer to Arkhangelsk) - the Americans had 18 days left in October to place orders , manufacturing, delivery to ports and loading! It is quite obvious that the document, signed on October 1, originally included a delay in deliveries for October, and partly for November. The Americans could not carry them out simply physically. But after all, the protocol was agreed upon and signed by the Soviet side, which means that the USSR deliberately agreed to these delays. In this regard, Mikoyan's indignation looks simply hypocritical!

As for the recall of aircraft intended for shipment to the USSR, let us pay attention to the dates: December 13 and 17. On December 7, Japanese aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States entered World War II. The recall of aircraft and, by the way, some other Lend-Lease cargo was a reaction to this event. And the reaction is quite understandable. In the end, Lend-Lease was based on the wording "if the country does not need them." In connection with the Japanese aggression, the Americans had to figure out what they needed and what they didn't? By the way, most of the recalled cargoes were then sent to the addressees.

Impressive is the information about the "aircobras" that arrived at the ports of loading "without propellers, without weapons and a set of spare parts." Here it is - the sloppiness of the Americans, and perhaps even worse - the actions of an anti-Soviet organization! Yes, indeed, most likely, the actions of the organization, but only the Soviet one.

The fact is that it was the Soviet representatives abroad who were supposed to play an important role in organizing deliveries: employees of embassies, employees of military acceptance. The speed of fulfillment of applications, the completeness and quality of the supplied weapons and materials largely depended on them. Let's try to figure out how things were with this issue.

Already in October, for example, a group of 14 military specialists was sent to London. Before the rest, aviation specialists arrived: first of all, the Red Army needed airplanes. The rest began to arrive only in November (note - in November!). All of them became part of the Engineering Department at the Soviet trade mission in London. Only in London it turned out that almost none of the arrivals knew English!

Acquaintance with the British military system and technology, learning the language took about two months. As a result, Soviet specialists were able, more or less fully, to begin their duties only starting from 1942! Throughout 1941, deliveries to the Soviet Union from Great Britain arrived mainly according to British-American bundling standards, with British-American markings and instructions, without transfers, and sometimes to various ports.

An almost similar picture has developed in the United States. Before the war, the Soviet joint-stock company Amtorg (Amtorg Trading Corporation) acted as an intermediary between Soviet foreign trade organizations and American firms. The issues of trade in engineering products, including weapons, were dealt with by the engineering department of the society. Since the volume of such trade was small, it was handled by 3-4 employees. After the outbreak of the war, the situation changed.

The arrival in the United States in July 1941 of a mission headed by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov, marked the beginning of large-scale Soviet-American cooperation. At the expense of the members of the mission, the staff of Amtorg was significantly strengthened. In October 1941, after the signing of the First Protocol, specialists in armored vehicles, aviation, artillery and navy were sent to the United States. However, they arrived in the United States only in January 1942! Therefore, in 1941, Amtorg, like the Soviet trade mission in Great Britain, was simply not able to control the shipment of weapons and military equipment for the USSR.

And such control was extremely necessary, since the production of weapons in the United States had its own characteristics. Thus, American enterprises produced equipment without special equipment and apparatus according to the so-called "government list". In this form, it came to the customer, who equipped it in their own modification centers. It goes without saying that there were no such centers in the USSR. It is not surprising, therefore, that American weapons often arrived in the Soviet Union incomplete. Moreover, there have been cases when military equipment made on the east coast of the United States was sent to Soviet northern ports, while components and spare parts for it, produced somewhere in California, sailed safely to the Far East. So, before blaming the Americans for all the sins, A.I. Mikoyan should have found out if the propellers are being unloaded for the "air cobras" delivered to Arkhangelsk, somewhere in Vladivostok.

However, even after the specialists arrived in the USA, the situation did not improve much, since all of them, as in the case of Great Britain, were selected in a hurry, and almost none of them knew English. I must say that the fact of sending specialists who did not know English to the two largest English-speaking countries of the world is worthy of a humorist's pen. But, alas, all this would be very funny if it were not so sad ...

Not funny either. Of the seven employees of the artillery department created under Amtorg, four were generally poorly versed in artillery! In addition, Moscow did not bother to send an anti-aircraft specialist overseas, and this at a time when almost exclusively anti-aircraft artillery was ordered in the USA!

All these "inconsistencies" over time, of course, were eliminated, and work improved. But this happened a little later - towards the end of 1942. In general, it can be stated that the disruption of deliveries in 1941 - early 1942 in terms of volume, nomenclature and configuration occurred almost exclusively due to the fault of the Soviet side.

However, there was another significant reason that seriously influenced the implementation of the supply plan - transportation.

Cargo in the USSR went along three main routes - the northern, Pacific and trans-Iranian ("Persian Corridor"). In total, 47.1% of them passed through the Far Eastern route, 23.8% through Iran, 22.7% to Arkhangelsk-Murmansk and 2.5% to the ports of the Arctic. In 1945, the Black Sea straits opened, and another 3.9% was delivered to Odessa and other southern coastal cities.

The shortest, but also the most dangerous, was the northern route from British (mostly Scottish) and Icelandic ports to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. For the entire journey of 2 thousand miles along a route up to 200 miles wide, caravans of ships spent 10-12 days. The convenience of using the ice-free port of Murmansk was indisputable. The problem of increasing its throughput by equipping it with additional port equipment with the help of the Americans could be solved fairly quickly. However, this was not the main obstacle. At 10 min. flight from Murmansk based German aircraft, subjecting the city to constant bombardment. At the beginning of the war, the air defense of Murmansk could not cope with the reflection of these raids. In addition, the front line ran 40 km from the city, and the railway connecting it with the country was cut by the enemy.

Therefore, the first convoys were unloaded in Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk). Like Murmansk, both of these ports were connected to the central regions of the country by rail, but at the same time they were freezing, which forced navigation to be interrupted in winter. In addition, their throughput was even less than that of Murmansk. So, the Arkhangelsk port could simultaneously accept for unloading no more than five ships with a draft of up to 5.5 m. The port was not adapted for unloading heavy and bulky cargo, such as tanks and steam locomotives. It had only two floating cranes with a lifting capacity of 25 and 50 tons and six (!) Cars. The processing of Lend-Lease cargo required a radical modernization of the Arkhangelsk port.

The order for its reconstruction was given by Stalin on September 7, 1941. By November 1941, cranes from Leningrad, Mariupol, Murmansk and even Vladivostok were delivered to the port, up to a hundred cars, 15 barges, 6 tugboats were transferred. At his disposal, the head of the port received three paramilitary work columns - three thousand loaders, which was almost four times the port's need for labor in the most intense pre-war navigation. The loading area in Molotovsk was also completely reconstructed. In the shortest possible time, the “outpost section” of Savings turned into a new port with a large number of berths, warehouses and corresponding depths at the berths. Unfortunately, it was not possible to fully test it in 1941 - the cold came very early, and the White Sea stood up, navigation stopped. In 1942, after the Belomorsk-Obozerskaya railway line was put into operation, Murmansk again became the main place of unloading until the end of the war.

There were no less problems with the provision of transportation by transport ships, or, as sailors say, by tonnage. It was assumed that the USSR would receive about 500 thousand tons of cargo every month, the delivery of which required at least 100 modern ships at a speed of at least 9 knots. Referring to the law on neutrality, the United States, until December 1941, actually refused to participate in the transportation. The Soviet Union, based on the tonnage capabilities, could carry no more than 20% of the cargo. As a result, the main burden of transportation in 1941-1942 fell on Great Britain. The British Navy was also entrusted with the security of convoys.

Until the end of 1942, convoys going east were designated PQ, and west - QP, then until the end of the war they were called JW and RA with serial numbers starting with the 51st. In 1941, 7 convoys passed this route, from the trial "Dervish" to PQ-6, and neither the transports nor the escort ships had any losses. But after the defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow, the German command, realizing the importance of the Arctic convoys, threw aviation, surface and submarine forces against them, and the number of dead transports began to grow. Sometimes to catastrophic proportions, as was the case with the infamous PQ-17 ... This was the reason for the repeated cessation of the movement of convoys.

Information about their number, the number of ships in Soviet and British studies is almost identical. According to the latter, in 1941-1945, 40 convoys left for the Arctic ports of the USSR - 811 transports, of which 720 arrived, 58 died, and 33 returned to the ports of departure. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia counted 42 caravans with 813 vessels.

In 1943, when the Allies almost curtailed traffic along the northern route, the importance of the Trans-Iranian increased, the share of deliveries via the Persian Corridor reached a maximum of 33.5%. But this situation was not created immediately.

By the summer of 1941, a very tense situation had developed in Iran. The Nazi leadership planned to turn this country into a springboard for an attack on the USSR. Numerous German agents on the territory of Iran created warehouses of weapons and ammunition. In Tehran, the threat of a pro-German coup d'état was acutely felt. The situation required the development of a unified political line of the allies in relation to Iran. On August 17, 1941, a joint Anglo-Soviet note was handed to the government of Iran, containing a demand for the departure of German specialists from this country. The response of the Iranian side was deemed unacceptable, and on August 25, Soviet and British troops entered Iranian territory. As a result of the introduction of allied troops into Iran, the creation of a channel for the supply of weapons and military materials to the USSR was ensured.

Until the autumn of 1942, the work of ports, railways and roads in Iran and Iraq was organized by the British. But with the increase in the volume of traffic, communications in Iran became a brake on the entire southern route. Dissatisfied with this, the Americans in October 1942 took all communications under their control. The number of American troops in Iran by 1944 increased to 30 thousand people. However, the British were still responsible for the southern regions of Iran (up to Tehran), and the control of the northern part of the country was exercised by the Soviet Union. All this created conditions for a sharp increase in the flow of goods from the ports of the Persian Gulf to the USSR.

The main enterprise for organizing all transport operations was the Iransovtrans association, which existed on the territory of Iran since 1935. By 1943, this organization had changed structurally due to the formation of new departments, services, peripheral offices and agencies and received the name of the Soviet Transport Administration (STU). It consisted of 1,500 people, including 775 Soviet citizens. Many services were headed by officers of the rear of the Red Army, who were specialists in the operation of aircraft and cars, railways and highways, the supply and storage of ammunition, fuels and lubricants, etc. The activities of the STU in Iran were led by the command of the rear of the Red Army. On the territory of the USSR, the rear of the Transcaucasian, North Caucasian and Turkestan military districts, the Caspian military flotilla, the Caspian shipping company, the ports of Baku, Krasnovodsk, Makhachkala, the Transcaucasian and Ashgabat railways, and many highways were included in the transportation of goods.

Along with the reconstruction of ports, the Allies built large aircraft and automobile assembly plants on the shores of the Persian Gulf, organized field warehouses for picking and handling cargo. They also reconstructed the highways and railways they needed, and built airfields.

At four American and two British car assembly plants and several car assembly stations, 191,075 cars were assembled in less than three years, including 184,112 for the Soviet Union. At least three thousand cars were collected and sent to the USSR every month, which were organized into convoys of 40-50 cars and, under armed guard, were driven to the USSR. The columns were commanded by Soviet officers and sergeants. There were not enough drivers, and therefore it was decided to hire drivers from the local population, as well as recruit those who wanted to and teach them how to drive cars. The route south of Tehran was guarded mainly by Indian military units.

Veteran driver P. Demchenko recalled these days in the following way:

“For the rest of my life, I remember those 2,500 kilometers along narrow mountain roads, through steep passes with countless blind turns, through a hot desert shrouded in thick dust that no headlights can penetrate, And everything is at a pace: faster, faster - the front does not waiting, it's even harder there. As soon as we handed over the cars and cargo in Julfa, we immediately went back ...

There were accidents, sabotage, bandit raids. Many of our graves were left on that path. Iranians and Arabs who helped us also died. Not without casualties and the Western allies.

In Andimeshk, Khorramshahr, Bushehr and Shuaiba (Iraq), they organized the loading of imported vehicles with military goods, formed convoys. Thus, 434 thousand tons were transported to the USSR on American trucks, 36 thousand tons on English trucks, 221 thousand tons on Iranian and 1615 thousand tons on Soviet ones. At first, aircraft were assembled in Margil and Shuaiba, and after the creation of an air base in Abadan, two Soviet air regiments, staffed by experienced front-line pilots, were formed for the transfer. Some of the cars were sent disassembled and assembled already in the USSR

After the Allies opened a second front in France, deliveries to the USSR through the Persian Corridor began to wane. In August 1944, only six transport ships arrived in Basra, and one in September. In October, the British car assembly plant in Rafadaye and the aviation assembly center in Shuaiba were closed. In November 1944, the last vehicles were assembled at the largest assembly plant in Andimeshk. The last two ships with cargo for the Soviet Union arrived in December 1944, after which the Soviet Transport Administration was liquidated.

Throughout the war, the Far East route was the largest and calmest. Here, the greatest load fell on our ships - Japan did not fight with the USSR, and they followed almost unhindered to Soviet and American ports, although several were torpedoed by the Japanese. The main port here was Vladivostok, where 15 ocean-going ships could be unloaded at the same time. The main disadvantage of the Far Eastern route was its remoteness from the front. Goods delivered relatively quickly to the USSR were delayed for two or three weeks on the Trans-Siberian Railway, the capacity of which was limited.

The most profitable was the Far Eastern ferry aviation route, along which the aircraft went from Alaska to the front, bypassing the stages of intermediate assembly and disassembly.

The change in the situation on the fronts of Europe and the preparations for the deployment of military operations by the Soviet Union against Japan also led to a redistribution of cargo traffic along the routes. The Far East route came to the fore. From June 1943 to September 1945, over 940 ships passed through it, which transported 7087 thousand tons of cargo. 60% of them were delivered to the USSR at the final stage of the war.

The total amount of allied deliveries to the Soviet Union during the war years amounted to $13.3 billion ($11.36 billion from the United States, $1.693 billion from Great Britain and $200 million from Canada). As for the detailed list of deliveries, the information given in various sources differs significantly. This is explained quite simply: firstly, they either include or do not include cargo that arrived in 1941 for cash and formally did not belong to Lend-Lease, and secondly, the data are given for different dates, then for July, then for September or even December 1945, and in some sources - even at the end of 1944! The author of this book does not have absolutely accurate and complete data either. One can only give a relatively detailed list of Lend-Lease cargoes, compiled on the basis of an analysis of various sources.

So, from the UK it was delivered:

7411 aircraft (according to other sources - 7663);

548 anti-tank guns;

385 anti-aircraft guns;

253 mortars;

3376 anti-tank rifles;

4005 rifles and machine guns;

7041 radio stations;

1648 radars;

55 thousand km of telephone cable;

137,668 magnetic mines;

12 minesweepers;

9 torpedo boats;

£120 million in food, medicine and factory equipment.

Received from the USA:

14,795 aircraft (according to other sources - 14,126);

375,883 trucks;

51,503 jeeps;

8701 tractor;

35,170 motorcycles;

8218 anti-aircraft guns;

131,633 small arms automatic weapons;

12,997 pistols;

345,735 tons of explosives;

1981 locomotive;

11,155 railway wagons and platforms;

38,051 radio stations;

400,711 field telephones;

2 million km of telephone cable;

445 radars;

15,417,000 pairs of soldier's shoes;

1,541,590 blankets;

3.8 million car tires;

2.7 million tons of gasoline;

842 thousand tons of chemical raw materials;

106,893 thousand tons of cotton;

for 1.668 billion dollars of food;

96 merchant ships;

202 torpedo boats;

140 submarine hunters;

77 minesweepers;

28 frigates (patrol ships - according to Soviet terminology);

105 landing craft;

3 icebreakers.

Once again, it must be emphasized that these data are far from complete. The range of deliveries was much wider. It included, for example, leather coats (2520 pieces were delivered under the Second Protocol) and Diplomat horn frames. In the section "Ferrous metals" in 1944-1945, half a million tons of railway fasteners, rails, bandages, locomotive axles and wheels were imported into the USSR. These enumerations can be continued almost indefinitely. Part of the deliveries in the documents is not divided by supplier countries. Thus, for example, it is indicated that during the war years 44,600 metal-cutting machine tools and 103,000 tons of natural rubber were imported to the USSR from Great Britain and the USA.

In turn, the USSR provided the United States with raw material assistance on the basis of "reverse lend-lease" for 2.2 million dollars, which is 2.5 times less than the assistance that the Soviet Union received through the Red Cross.

Negotiations on the Soviet debt for lend-lease have been going on since 1947, and the Americans insisted only on paying for non-military goods (steam locomotives, power plants, machine tools, etc.). Since the Soviet side refused to report the results of the inventory of these cargoes, the Americans considered that there should be $2.6 billion worth of them. At the 1948 negotiations, the Soviet representatives agreed to pay only a small amount and were met with a predictable refusal from the American side. Negotiations in 1949 also came to nothing. In 1951, the Americans twice reduced the amount of the payment, which became equal to 800 million dollars, but the Soviet side agreed to pay only 300 million. According to the Soviet government, the calculation should have been carried out not in accordance with the real debt, but on the basis of a precedent. This precedent was to be the proportions in determining the debt between the United States and Great Britain, which were fixed as early as March 1946.

The negotiations were once again resumed after Stalin's death, so their tone softened somewhat. Along with the previously transferred icebreakers, frigates and several transports, the Soviet Union agreed to return 127 more ships to the US and destroy 90 warships under the supervision of American inspectors. The rest were declared lost, as well as a number of aircraft, tanks and other types of military equipment and weapons. Back in the 1980s, military censorship forbade any mention in publications of any use of lend-lease equipment in the Soviet army after 1946.

An agreement with the USSR on the procedure for repaying lend-lease debts was concluded only in 1972. Under this agreement, the USSR undertook to pay 722 million dollars by 2001, including interest. By July 1973, three payments were made for a total of $48 million, after which the payments were stopped due to the introduction by the American side of discriminatory measures in trade with the USSR (the Jackson-Vanik amendment). In June 1990, during the talks between the presidents of the United States and the USSR, the parties returned to discussing this issue. A new deadline for the final repayment of the debt was set - 2030 - and the amount - 674 million dollars. After the collapse of the USSR, the debt for assistance was re-registered to Russia; as of 2003, Russia owed about 100 million US dollars.

Thus, out of the total volume of American lend-lease deliveries of 11.36 billion dollars, the USSR and then Russia paid 722 million, or about 7%. However, it should be noted that in determining what part of Lend-Lease supplies was eventually paid for by the USSR, it is necessary to take into account the significant inflationary depreciation of the dollar that has occurred since 1945. So, by 1972, when the amount of debt for lend-lease in the amount of 722 million dollars was agreed with the United States, the latter had depreciated by 2.3 times since 1945. However, at that time the Soviet Union paid only 48 million dollars, and an agreement on the payment of the remaining 674 million was reached already in June 1990, when the purchasing power of the dollar was already 7.7 times lower than at the end of 1945. Thus, the actually paid share of Lend-Lease deliveries is several times less than 7%.

The signs and awards of Germany depicted on the covers are DENACIATED, that is, they do not contain images of Nazi symbols.

During the Second World War, battleships lost their leading role at sea to aircraft carriers, and in the post-war years their combat use became completely problematic. However, the US Navy now has 4 ships of this class - they were built back in the early 40s. Moreover, over the past seven to eight years, the battleships have undergone modernization and their service life has been extended for another 20 years.

The Iowa-class battleships are considered to be among the best among the heavy artillery ships in the world. They are characterized by strong artillery and powerful armor protection, high speed and reliability, which, apparently, extended their life span after the end of the war, when all the leading sea The powers were in a hurry to get rid of the battleships. Apparently, the Americans did not have a clear idea about the prospects for the combat use of ships of this class. The battleships were involved in the war against North Korea, periodically withdrawn from the fleet to the reserve, and, finally, in the middle of 1958, they decided to re-equip into attack missile ships, and a little later upgrade again in order to increase the volume of fuel tanks to 16.5 thousand tons, which indicated the intention of the US Navy command and in the future to use battleships in crisis regions far from the coast of the country.

The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945

Their aces were rightfully considered the best in the world.

Their fighters dominated the battlefield.

Their bombers wiped entire cities off the face of the earth.

And the legendary "things" terrified the enemy troops.

The Air Force of the Third Reich - the famed Luftwaffe - was as important a part of the blitzkrieg as the tank forces. The resounding victories of the Wehrmacht would have been impossible in principle without air support and air cover.

Until now, military experts are trying to understand how the country, which was forbidden to have combat aircraft after the First World War, managed not only to build a modern and efficient air force in the shortest possible time, but also to maintain air supremacy for many years, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy. .

This book, published by the British Air Office in 1948, literally "hot on the heels" of the war that had just ended, was the first attempt to comprehend her combat experience. This is a detailed and highly competent analysis of the history, organization and combat operations of the Luftwaffe on all fronts - Eastern, Western, Mediterranean and African. This is a fascinating tale of the meteoric rise and disastrous fall of the Third Reich air force.

I leave it to the reader to draw a conclusion about what it is, the Dutch version of the light cruiser. Perhaps the name “colonial cruiser” is associated with something exotic, like a pleasure yacht armed with harpoons or, at most, with a guard with small-caliber artillery. In fact, the colonial cruisers of the Netherlands were not much inferior to their class counterparts from the fleets of the leading maritime powers. However, in the process of work, more than once I heard that the Dutch, they say, had “non-combat ships”, which did not show themselves in any way. I would like to object to these indisputable "authorities", who with a languid breath recall the battleship Bismarck sunk in the first military campaign and the scarecrow that stuck out the whole war in the Norwegian skerries Tirpitz, that this can be agreed until the recognition of the "non-combat" of the entire Soviet surface fleet, which did not have a single combat contact at a level above the enemy destroyers and performed almost exclusively the tasks of fire support for troops and transport and supply functions. By the way, I'm tired of the abundance of published literature on German technology (not only marine), again and again giving repeatedly chewed, overcooked and "discarded" information. For mercy, gentlemen, Germanophiles, the Germans have already been "sucked" to the buttons on their uniforms, but they were not the only ones who had tanks, ships and planes!

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The idea to post this story I found arose after reading on the branch " "discussion of the merits and demerits of the American medium tank and the M4 Sherman. A bike or not - I don't know, but the story itself seemed funny.

It is well known that in addition to the "thirty-fours", ISs and other Soviet combat vehicles, tanks and other states allied to us took an active part in the liberation of Europe from the Nazis. For example, the British Matildas and American Shermans supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease were quite enough to form brigades and even tank corps, entirely consisting of armored "foreign cars" ...

Bureaucracy is indestructible

Both in peacetime and in wartime, any property, and even more so, the property of a military unit, needs strict accounting and control. We drowned a machine gun in a swamp - and we will write it down; the plane made an unsuccessful landing - we mark this unfortunate case with a tick; the tank burned down - urgently write it off and send an application for a new one, so that the crew, if he managed to get out of another scrape alive, would not sit idle, but could continue to fight the enemy.

It is clear that in difficult field conditions, slips and overlays often occur, which then cause a number of comic or, conversely, regrettable situations. Something similar happened at the end of 1944 in the first battalion of the forty-sixth tank brigade, equipped with US M-4 Shermans, which the Soviet tank crews briefly and lovingly called "Emchi".

At first glance, the situation is rather harmless. One of the battalion Shermans received damage in battle, completely precluding its further operation. Simply put, it turned into an immovable piece of iron, from which enterprising tankers quickly removed everything that could be useful to them in the future. After this procedure, the tank could only be written off. A young but self-confident technician quickly found a six-digit car number engraved on the body, dictated it to the clerk, but ... made a mistake in the last sign, mistaking the eight for a three.

Further, the bureaucratic machine has already begun to work. When drawing up an act for the write-off of military equipment damaged in battles, a whole and unharmed tank, with a number ending in three, was safely written off, and the unfortunate "eight" continued to be listed in the ranks of the first battalion of the glorious forty-sixth brigade.

Interestingly, in the future, no one missed this ill-fated "eight", and as for the decommissioned, but "live" "troika", the commander and deputy chief of the battalion judged sensibly: the battles ahead were still fierce, sooner or later the stray projectile was finally " write off "Emchu" at number three and balance the paper tanks with the real ones.

Time passed, the decommissioned, but “alive” Sherman wore out, its engine began to slowly act up, but the tank came out of the battles safe and sound.

Amazing Order

Closer to the spring of 1945, preparations began for the Vienna Offensive, and new Shermans entered the brigade. It so happened that in the first battalion there were fifteen tanks "just off the assembly line", five - more or less alive and only one, the very accidentally decommissioned "Sherman", by that time frankly already breathing its last. It was then that he began to give the father-commanders a headache.

In March, the brigade received a combat order to concentrate on the western outskirts of Budapest, for which it was necessary to make a forty-kilometer march. On this frankly small segment of the path, the Sherman veteran was forced to stop several times: first, oil flowed from the engine, then problems were discovered in the cooling system ...

The battalion had been resting for a long time, when the "old man" was finally able to hobble to his own. And the next march went even worse. The brigade commander summoned the commander of the battalion, in which the "disabled" was listed, and made him a strict suggestion, which, however, did not speed up the movement of the "elderly" tank, but made the battalion commander think.

Having received a thrashing, the battalion commander, in turn, demanded the crew of the ill-fated tank and, under the strictest secrecy, gave the tankers an unprecedented order: in order not to slow down the actions of the battalion and the entire brigade as a whole, the Sherman M-4 tank, which, due to a misunderstanding, has so far remained in line, must die the death of the brave in the first battle with the enemy. At the same time, the crew is strongly recommended to stay alive in order to get a new Sherman at their disposal in the near future.

Armor conspiracy

A couple of days later, the battalion entered into a fierce battle with the enemy near Lake Balaton. Faithful to the order, the crew of the condemned "Emchi" boldly rushed forward to meet the enemy's anti-tank guns. But ... the offensive bogged down, and the tank again left the battle unharmed. As a result of the insane attack, only part of the armor from the hull was lost, and a hefty dent remained on the turret of the tank, after hitting an enemy shell.

The next day, the battalion moved around the enemy and went deep into the low mountains. The terrain for the advance of the tanks was, to put it mildly, unfavorable: the roads looked terrible, there was no room for maneuver. I had to literally gnaw through the enemy defenses. Consciously or not, on this day the old Sherman at full speed jumped into the minefield. The explosion tore the caterpillar and slightly damaged the roller, but an hour later the tank was back in service.

Soon, Soviet armored units began to develop an offensive to the southwest. The tanks moved along the highway, in front of the huge column was the first tank battalion, in the head of which, in turn, the charmed Sherman moved.

Suddenly, the column was fired from an ambush by the German "Tiger". One of the shells hit the "veteran" and the car began to smoke. In this case, the crew of tank a should try with all their might to put out the fire, but the commander, mindful of the order of the battalion commander, ordered his guys to leave the burning Emcha and move as far as possible. The tankers lay down in the nearest bushes and, without taking their eyes off, followed their own, now it seemed like a doomed "invalid". At this time, the column, having dispersed, bypassed the "Tiger", trying to drive it into the "bag" and destroy it.

The battle was moving away, and the old Sherman, after raising for a few more minutes, suddenly ... went out by itself. The tankers looked at each other in bewilderment and, getting up from the ground, went back to their car. The driver started the engine, the commander silently took his place and the tank, moving relatively silently with rubberized tracks, rushed to catch up with the column.

Of course, I would like this Sherman to reach Berlin, serve until the end of the war and be erected on a pedestal of glory somewhere near Moscow, Budapest or in their homeland - in the United States. But, unfortunately, there are no miracles in the world. Having thoroughly outlived all terms, the old Sherman M-4 was destroyed on March 22, 1945 by the enemy Tiger. The crew of the tank followed the order of their commander.

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