What is the difference between US nuclear weapons and Russian ones? Pistol at the temple. How the United States deployed nuclear weapons near the borders of Russia The United States is preparing for a nuclear war with Russia

The development of American nuclear forces is determined by the US military policy, which is based on the concept of "possibility of opportunities." This concept proceeds from the fact that in the 21st century there will be many different threats and conflicts against the United States, uncertain in time, intensity and direction. Therefore, the United States will concentrate its attention in the military field on how to fight, and not on who and when will be the enemy. Accordingly, the US armed forces are faced with the task of having the power to not only withstand a wide range of military threats and military means that any potential adversary may have, but also guarantee the achievement of victory in any military conflicts. Proceeding from this goal, the United States is taking measures to maintain long-term combat readiness of its nuclear forces and improve them. The United States is the only nuclear power that has nuclear weapons on foreign soil.

Currently, two branches of the US armed forces have nuclear weapons - the Air Force (Air Force) and the Navy (Navy).

The Air Force is armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Minuteman-3 with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs), heavy bombers (TB) B-52N and B-2A with long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and free-range nuclear bombs. fall, as well as tactical aircraft F-15E and F-16C, -D with nuclear bombs.

The Navy is armed with Trident-2 submarines with Trident-2 D5 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) ​​equipped with MIRVs and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

To equip these carriers in the US nuclear arsenal, there are nuclear munitions (NWs) produced in the 1970-1980s of the last century and updated (renewed) in the process of sorting in the late 1990s - early 2000s:

- four types of warheads of multiple warheads: for ICBMs - Mk-12A (with a W78 nuclear charge) and Mk-21 (with a W87 nuclear charge), for SLBMs - Mk-4 (with a W76 nuclear charge) and its upgraded version Mk-4A (with nuclear charge W76-1) and Mk-5 (with nuclear charge W88);
- two types of warheads of strategic air-launched cruise missiles - AGM-86B and AGM-129 with a nuclear charge W80-1 and one type of sea-based non-strategic cruise missiles "Tomahawk" with YaZ W80-0 (land-based missile launchers BGM-109G were eliminated under the Treaty INF, their YAZ W84 are on conservation);
- two types of strategic air bombs - B61 (modifications -7, -11) and B83 (modifications -1, -0) and one type of tactical bombs - B61 (modifications -3, -4, -10).

The Mk-12 warheads with YaZ W62, which were in the active arsenal, were completely disposed of in mid-August 2010.

All of these nuclear warheads belong to the first and second generation, with the exception of the V61-11 aerial bomb, which some experts consider as third generation nuclear warheads due to its increased ability to penetrate the ground.

The modern US nuclear arsenal, according to the state of readiness for the use of nuclear warheads included in it, is divided into categories:

The first category is nuclear warheads installed on operationally deployed carriers (ballistic missiles and bombers or located at weapons storage facilities of air bases where bombers are based). Such nuclear warheads are called "operationally deployed".

The second category is nuclear warheads that are in the "operational storage" mode. They are kept ready for installation on carriers and, if necessary, can be installed (returned) on missiles and aircraft. According to American terminology, these nuclear warheads are classified as "operational reserve" and are intended for "operational additional deployment." In essence, they can be considered as "return potential".

The fourth category is reserve nuclear warheads put into the "long-term storage" mode. They are stored (mostly in military warehouses) assembled, but do not contain components with a limited service life - the tritium-containing assemblies and neutron generators have been removed from them. Therefore, the transfer of these nuclear warheads to the "active arsenal" is possible, but requires a significant investment of time. They are intended to replace nuclear warheads of an active arsenal (similar, of similar types) in the event that mass failures (defects) are suddenly found in them, this is a kind of "safety stock".

The US nuclear arsenal does not include decommissioned but not yet dismantled nuclear warheads (their storage and disposal is carried out at the Pantex plant), as well as components of dismantled nuclear warheads (primary nuclear initiators, elements of the second cascade of thermonuclear charges, etc.).

An analysis of openly published data on the types of nuclear warheads of nuclear warheads that are part of the modern US nuclear arsenal shows that nuclear weapons B61, B83, W80, W87 are classified by US specialists as binary thermonuclear charges (TN), nuclear weapons W76 - as binary charges with gas (thermonuclear ) amplification (BF), and W88 as a binary standard thermonuclear charge (TS). At the same time, the nuclear weapons of aviation bombs and cruise missiles are classified as charges of variable power (V), and the nuclear weapons of ballistic missile warheads can be classified as a set of nuclear weapons of the same type with different yields (DV).

American scientific and technical sources give the following possible ways to change power:

- dosing of the deuterium-tritium mixture when it is supplied to the primary unit;
- change in the release time (in relation to the time process of fissile material compression) and the duration of the neutron pulse from an external source (neutron generator);
- mechanical blocking of X-ray radiation from the primary node to the compartment of the secondary node (in fact, the exclusion of the secondary node from the process of a nuclear explosion).

The charges of all types of air bombs (B61, B83), cruise missiles (W80, W84) and some warheads (with charges W87, W76-1) use explosives that have low sensitivity and resistance to high temperatures. In nuclear weapons of other types (W76, W78 and W88), due to the need to ensure a small mass and dimensions of their nuclear weapons while maintaining a sufficiently high power, explosives continue to be used, which have a higher detonation velocity and explosion energy.

At present, the US nuclear warhead uses a fairly large number of systems, instruments and devices of various types that ensure their safety and exclude unauthorized use during autonomous operation and as part of a carrier (complex) in the event of various kinds of emergencies that can occur with aircraft, underwater boats, ballistic and cruise missiles, air bombs equipped with nuclear warheads, as well as with autonomous nuclear warheads during their storage, maintenance and transportation.

These include mechanical safety and arming devices (MSAD), code blocking devices (PAL).

Since the early 1960s, several modifications of the PAL system have been developed and widely used in the United States, with the letters A, B, C, D, F, which have different functionality and design.

To enter codes in PAL installed inside the nuclear warhead, special electronic consoles are used. PAL cases have increased protection against mechanical impacts and are located in the nuclear warhead in such a way as to make it difficult to access them.

In some nuclear warheads, for example, with nuclear warheads W80, in addition to the KBU, a code switching system is installed that allows cocking and (or) switching the power of nuclear weapons on command from the aircraft in flight.

Aircraft monitoring and control systems (AMAC) are used in nuclear bombs, including equipment installed in the aircraft (with the exception of the B-1 bomber), capable of monitoring and controlling systems and components that ensure the safety, protection and detonation of nuclear warheads. With the help of AMAC systems, the command to fire the CCU (PAL), starting with the PAL B modification, can be given from the aircraft just before the bomb is dropped.

The US nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern nuclear arsenal, use systems that ensure their incapacitation (SWS) in the event of a threat of capture. The first versions of the SVS were devices that were able to disable individual internal components of the nuclear warhead on command from the outside or as a result of direct actions of persons from the personnel serving the nuclear warhead who have the appropriate authority and are located near the nuclear warhead at the moment when it becomes clear that the attackers (terrorists) may gain unauthorized access to it or seize it.

Subsequently, SHS were developed that automatically trigger when unauthorized actions are attempted with a nuclear warhead, first of all, upon penetration into it or penetration into a special “sensitive” container in which a nuclear warhead equipped with SHS is located.

Specific implementations of SHS are known that allow for partial decommissioning of nuclear warheads by an outside command, partial decommissioning using explosive destruction, and a number of others.

To ensure the security and protection against unauthorized actions of the existing US nuclear arsenal, a number of measures are used to ensure detonation safety (Detonator Safing - DS), the use of heat-resistant shells pit (Fire Resistant Pit - FRP), low-sensitivity high-energy explosives (Insensitive High Explosive - IHE), providing increased nuclear explosion safety (Enhanced Nuclear Detonator Safety - ENDS), the use of command disable systems (Command Disable System - CDS), protection devices against unauthorized use (Permissive Action Link - PAL). Nevertheless, the overall level of safety and security of the nuclear arsenal from such actions, according to some American experts, does not yet fully correspond to modern technical capabilities. protection.

In the absence of nuclear tests, the most important task is to ensure control and develop measures to ensure the reliability and safety of nuclear warheads that have been in operation for a long time, which exceeds the originally specified warranty periods. In the United States, this problem is being solved with the help of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which has been operating since 1994. An integral part of this program is the Life Extension Program (LEP), in which nuclear components requiring replacement are reproduced in such a way as to correspond as closely as possible to the original technical characteristics and specifications, and non-nuclear components are upgraded and replace those nuclear warhead components whose warranty periods have expired.

NBP testing for signs of actual or suspected aging is performed by the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign (ESC), which is one of the five companies included in the Engineering Campaign. As part of this company, regular monitoring of nuclear warheads of the arsenal is carried out through a thorough annual examination of 11 nuclear warheads of each type in search of corrosion and other signs of aging. Of the eleven nuclear warheads of the same type selected from the arsenal to study their aging, one is completely disassembled for destructive testing, and the remaining 10 are subjected to non-destructive testing and returned to the arsenal. Using the data obtained as a result of regular monitoring with the help of the SSP program, problems with nuclear warheads are identified, which are eliminated within the framework of the LEP programs. At the same time, the main task is to “increase the duration of existence in the arsenal of nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components by at least 20 years with an ultimate goal of 30 years” in addition to the initial expected service life. These terms are determined based on the analysis of the results of theoretical and experimental studies on the reliability of complex technical systems and aging processes of materials and various types of units and devices, as well as generalization of data obtained in the process of implementing the SSP program for the main units of nuclear warheads by determining the so-called failure function, characterizing the entire set of defects that may arise during the operation of nuclear warheads.

Possible lifetimes of nuclear charges are determined primarily by the lifetimes of plutonium initiators (pits). In the United States, to address the issue of possible life spans of previously produced pits that are stored or operated as part of nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern arsenal, a research methodology has been developed and is being used to assess the change in properties of Pu-239 over time, characterizing the process of its aging. The methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of data obtained during field tests and a study of the properties of Pu-239, which is part of the pits tested under the SSP program, as well as data obtained as a result of experiments on accelerated aging, and computer simulation of processes occurring during aging.

Based on the results of the studies, models of the plutonium aging process were developed, which allow us to assume that nuclear weapons remain operational for 45-60 years from the moment of production of the plutonium used in them.

The work carried out within the framework of the SSP allows the United States to keep the above types of nuclear warheads, developed more than 20 years ago, most of which were subsequently upgraded, in its nuclear arsenal for quite a long time, and to ensure a sufficiently high level of their reliability and safety without nuclear testing. .

TASS-DOSIER /Vladislav Sorokin/. On August 18, 2016, the European online publication Euractiv reported that the United States began to export nuclear weapons based in Turkey to Romania.

The US Department of Defense declined to comment, the Romanian Foreign Ministry categorically denied this information, and the Turkish side did not react to it.

Currently, US nuclear bombs are deployed on the territory of four EU countries - Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as Turkey.

Story

American nuclear weapons (NW) have been stationed in Europe since the mid-1950s. Its possible use in the form of aerial bombs and ammunition for artillery systems and short-range missiles (tactical nuclear weapons) was considered by the leadership of NATO and the United States as an asymmetric response to the event of a large-scale conflict with the countries of the Warsaw Pact, which had an advantage in conventional weapons. In 1954, the corresponding NATO Strategic Concept "Shield and Sword" was adopted.

As a result, tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in the member states of the alliance that were in the path of a likely Soviet offensive: Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. In Turkey, the southern flank of NATO was covered by medium-range missiles (their deployment provoked the Caribbean crisis of 1962), and the possible movement of the Soviet Army and its allies through the Balkans had to be deterred by nuclear forces located in Greece and Italy.

All these countries were given the opportunity to participate in the planning of the use of nuclear weapons, and their military personnel and aviation began to be involved in training in delivering nuclear strikes. The program was called Nuclear sharing - "joint nuclear missions of NATO member countries" (another translation is "sharing of nuclear responsibility").

According to experts, the largest number of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was reached by the beginning of the 1970s. In 1971, the number of charges deployed on the continent was about 7,300. In 1983, in response to the deployment of the Soviet Pioneer medium-range missile system, the United States began to deploy its Pershing-2 medium-range missiles and Tomahawk nuclear-powered cruise missiles. warheads in Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

Since the late 1980s the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was declining: by 1991, the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of medium and short-range missiles of 1987 was implemented. In 2000, according to the directive of US President Clinton, 480 US nuclear bombs remained in Europe and Turkey, while 300 of them were intended for use by the US Air Force, and 180 - for the Air Force of host countries. In 2001, the administration of George W. Bush began the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Great Britain and Greece, and in 2004 the arsenal in Germany was reduced (130 nuclear warheads were withdrawn from the Ramstein base).

Number of bombs and their placement

The United States "does not directly confirm or deny" the presence of its tactical nuclear weapons abroad, while official documents mention the storage of "special weapons" at safe facilities in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey.

To date, experts (including those from the Federation of American Scientists, FAS) estimate the number of US nuclear atomic bombs in Europe and Turkey at 150-200. These are B-61 type bombs with a total capacity of 18 megatons. They are located at six air bases: in Germany (Büchel, more than 20 pieces), Italy (Aviano and Gedi, 70-110 pieces), Belgium (Kleine Brogel, 10-20 pieces), the Netherlands (Volkel, 10-20 pieces) and Turkey (Incirlik, 50-90 pieces).

Bombs are in underground storages (more than 80 in total). For their delivery to targets, about 400 aircraft can be used: F-15E fighter-bombers, F-16 multi-role fighters and Tornado GR4 fighter-bombers from the US Air Force, Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. There are three levels of readiness of squadrons to perform combat missions in nuclear equipment (up to 35, 160 and 350 days). Since 2000, NATO has spent more than $80 million maintaining the bomb storage infrastructure at these bases.

Modernization

In September 2015, it became known that the United States would deploy its new bombs of the B61-12 type at the Büchel airbase in Germany. This modification is the first nuclear aerial bomb, which has guidance systems with increased hit accuracy, and its mass production will begin in 2020.

According to Aleksey Arbatov, head of the Center for International Security at the IMEMO RAS, the increased accuracy and variable power of the upgraded bombs may increase the likelihood that the NATO leadership will decide on a limited nuclear war.

Criticism

The deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in the region was accompanied by protests by the local population and pacifist organizations during the Cold War.

Now nuclear experts in the United States (in particular, Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the University of Monterey) are questioning the wisdom of keeping tactical nuclear weapons in Belgium - because of the threat of terrorism and non-compliance with security requirements - and in Turkey - because of the unstable political situation. after the attempted military coup on July 15, 2016

Russian officials have repeatedly said that the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Turkey is a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Donald Trump Doctrine

You may have thought before that America's nuclear arsenal, with its thousands of thermonuclear warheads that could destroy the entire population of the Earth, could convince any adversary not to use theirs against the US.

You were wrong.

The Pentagon expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that American nuclear weapons are inexpediently powerful. It is old, unreliable, and so destructive that perhaps even President Trump would not want to use it if the enemy used smaller nuclear bombs on a hypothetical battlefield.

American military experts and weapons designers decided to create something more suitable for warfare, so that the president would have more options in case of emergency. According to their plan, this will become an even more convincing deterrent for opponents. But it may turn out that such new bombs could increase the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in armed conflict, with catastrophic consequences.

That Trump would be all-in-one for improving America's nuclear arsenal would come as no surprise, given his penchant for boasting about his country's unsurpassed military might. He was overjoyed when, in April 2017, one of his generals ordered the first ever drop on Afghanistan of the most powerful non-nuclear bomb available.

Under current nuclear doctrine, the Obama administration intended the US to use nuclear weapons only "as a last resort" to protect the vital interests of the country or its allies. Then it was forbidden to use it as a political tool to rein in weaker states.

But for Trump, who has already threatened to unleash "fire and fury like the world has never seen" on North Korea, this seems too harsh an approach. He and his advisers seem to want nuclear weapons to be used in conflicts of any severity with great force and brandished like the club of the apocalypse to scare those who disobey.

To improve the US arsenal, two kinds of changes in nuclear policy are required. Changing existing doctrine to remove restrictions on the deployment of such weapons in wartime, and allowing the development and manufacture of new generations of nuclear weapons, including for tactical strikes.

All this will be spelled out in the new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which will be formed by the end of this year or early next.

Until then, its exact content will remain unknown, but even after that, the Americans will have access to an extremely stripped-down version of the document, most of which is secret. However, some of the general provisions of the Review are already clear from the statements of the president and the generals.

And one more obvious fact. The review will remove restrictions on the use of weapons of mass destruction of any kind, regardless of their level of destructiveness, making the most powerful nuclear arsenal on the planet even more formidable.

Let's change the way we look at nuclear weapons

The strategic direction in the new Review is likely to have far-reaching implications. As former National Security Council Director of Arms Control and Nonproliferation John Wolfsthal said in a recent issue of Arms Control, this document will affect "the image of America, the President, and nuclear capability in the eyes of allies and adversaries." More importantly, the review sets the vector for decisions that shape the management, maintenance, and modernization of the nuclear arsenal and influence how Congress views and finances nuclear forces.”

With that in mind, consider the recommendations outlined in the Obama Administration's Review of the Times. It came as the White House sought to restore America's prestige in the world following international condemnation of President Bush's actions in Iraq and just six months after Barack Obama received the Nobel Prize for his intention to ban the use of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation was the priority.

As a result, the use of nuclear weapons was limited in almost any circumstances on any battlefield imaginable. The main purpose of the Review was to reduce "the role of US nuclear weapons in US national security".

As noted in the document, America only once considered the possibility of using nuclear weapons against Soviet tank formations, for example, in a major European conflict. It was assumed that in such a situation the USSR would have an advantage in traditional types of weapons.

In the military-political situation of 2010, of course, little remains of those times, as well as of the Soviet Union. Washington, as noted in the Review, is now the undisputed leader in the traditional understanding of defense. "Accordingly, the United States will continue to strengthen traditional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks."

A nuclear strategy focused solely on deterring a first strike against the United States or its allies is unlikely to require a huge stockpile of weapons. As a result, this approach opened the way for further reductions in the size of the nuclear arsenal and led in 2010 to the signing of a new treaty with Russia that mandated a significant reduction in the number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems for both countries.

Each side was to limit itself to 1,550 warheads and 700 delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

However, this approach has never suited representatives of the defense department and conservative research institutes. Critics of this kind have often pointed to possible changes in Russian military doctrine that would make it more likely to use nuclear weapons in a large-scale war with NATO if Russia's position in the war began to deteriorate.

Such “strategic deterrence,” a phrase that has different meanings for Russia and the West, could lead to the use of low-yield “tactical” nuclear weapons against enemy strongholds if Russian forces in Europe were on the brink of defeat.

To what extent this version corresponds to Russian reality, no one really knows. However, something similar is often associated in the West by those who believe that Obama's nuclear strategy is hopelessly outdated and gives Moscow an excuse to increase the importance of nuclear weapons in its doctrine.

Such complaints were often voiced in the New Administration's Seven Defense Priorities, a December 2016 report by the US Department of Defense Science Council, which is a Pentagon-funded advisory group that reports regularly to the Secretary of Defense. "We are still not sure that if we reduce the importance of nuclear weapons for our state, other countries will do the same."

According to the report, Russia's strategy involves the use of low-yield tactical nuclear strikes to deter a NATO attack. While many Western analysts doubt the correctness of such claims, the Pentagon's Science Council insists that the United States should develop such weapons and be prepared to use them.

According to the report, Washington needs "a more flexible nuclear weapons system that can, if necessary, launch a rapid and accurate nuclear strike against a limited area of ​​destruction if existing conventional and nuclear weapons options prove ineffective."

This approach is now inspiring the Trump administration to do more in this area, as can be seen in some of the president's Twitter tweets. “The United States must strengthen and expand its nuclear capabilities so that the whole world again remembers the volume of our weapons,” Donald Trump wrote on December 22, 2016.

Although he didn't write specifically (because it was a short tweet), his thought is an accurate reflection of the views of Trump's Science Council and advisers.

Assuming the position of commander in chief, Trump signed a presidential memo instructing the secretary of defense to review the nuclear situation and ensure that "the US nuclear deterrent is modern, reliable, ready to use and can meet the challenges of the 21st century and be convincing in the eyes of allies" .

The details of the Review, which will appear in the Trump era, are not yet known. However, he will certainly undo all of Obama's achievements and put nuclear weapons on a pedestal.

Arsenal expansion

The Trump Review will advance the creation of new nuclear weapons systems that will be major players with an expanded set of strike options. In particular, the administration is believed to be in favor of acquiring "low-yield tactical nuclear weapons" and even more delivery systems, including air- and ground-launched cruise missiles. The justification for this, of course, will be the thesis that ammunition of this kind is necessary to match Russian achievements in this area.

According to internal sources, the development of such tactical ammunition is also being considered, which could, for example, destroy a large port or military base, and not immediately an entire city, as was the case in Hiroshima. As one anonymous government official put it in Politico, "Having this capability is critical."

Another politician added that "when compiling the Review, the military should be asked about what they need to deter enemies" and whether current weapons "will be useful in all scenarios that we envision."
It must be kept in mind that under the Obama administration, plans and initial multimillion-dollar design work to "modernize" America's nuclear arsenal for many decades to come have already been agreed upon. From this perspective, Trump's nuclear era was already in full swing at the time of his inauguration.

And, of course, the United States already possesses several types of nuclear weapons, including the B61 "gravity bomb" and the W80 missile warhead, which can be scaled down to several kilotons.

A typical delivery system would be a weapon used outside the air defense zone - a modern long-range cruise missile that could be carried by the B-2 bomber, its older brother B-52 or the B-21 under development.

A world ready for a nuclear winter

The publication of the new Review will no doubt spark debate about whether a country with a nuclear arsenal sufficient to destroy several Earth-sized planets really needs new nuclear weapons, and whether this will lead to another global arms race.

In November 2017, the Congressional Budget Office released a report showing that the cost of replacing all three branches of the US nuclear triad over 30 years would be at least $1.2 billion, not counting inflation and incremental costs that could push that figure up to $1.7 billion. billion dollars or more.

The problem of the justification of all these new types of weapons and their cosmic cost is extremely relevant today. One thing is certain: any decision to purchase such weapons will mean long-term budget cuts in other sectors - health care, education, infrastructure or the fight against the opioid epidemic.

Yet questions of cost and adequacy are the easiest part of the new nuclear puzzle. It is based on the very idea of ​​"applicability". When Obama insisted that nuclear weapons should never be used on the battlefield, he was talking not only about America, but about all countries. "To end the Cold War mindset," he said in Prague in April 2009, "we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and encourage others to do the same."

If the Trump White House supports a doctrine that would erase the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, turning them into equal instruments of coercion and war, that would make an escalation to total thermonuclear annihilation of the planet the most likely in the last few decades.
For example, there is no doubt that such a stance has prompted other countries with nuclear weapons, including Russia, China, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, to consider using them in future conflicts. It may even encourage countries that do not currently have nuclear weapons to consider building one.

Obama's view of nuclear weapons was fundamentally different from the views of the Cold War, when the possibility of a thermonuclear holocaust between the planet's two superpowers was a daily reality, and millions of people went to anti-nuclear demonstrations.

With the threat of Armageddon gone, the fear of nuclear weapons gradually evaporated and the protests ended. Unfortunately, nuclear weapons themselves and the companies that created them are alive and well. Now that the peaceful period of the post-nuclear era is coming to an end, the zone, the idea of ​​using nuclear weapons, which during the Cold War was hardly even allowed in the mind, may cease to be something special.

Or at least it will, unless once again the citizens of this planet take to the streets to protest against a future in which cities lie in smoldering ruins and millions of people die of hunger and radiation sickness.

Every year, the systems installed here more and more resemble museum exhibits. At the top, more and more international treaties are being concluded, according to which these wells are closed one by one. But every day, the next crews of the US Air Force descend into concrete dungeons in anticipation of something that absolutely should not happen ...

Another day of service The next watch carries suitcases with secret documents, fastened with steel cables to overalls. People will descend into the bunker on a 24-hour watch, taking control of ballistic missiles hidden under the grasslands of Montana. If the fateful order comes, these young Air Force officers will not hesitate to unleash their apocalyptic weapons.

Joe Pappalardo

An inconspicuous ranch about fifteen meters from a bumpy two-lane road southeast of Great Falls, Montana. A primitive one-story building, a chain link fence, a garage set in the outskirts and a basketball backboard right above the driveway.

However, if you look closely, you can notice some funny details - a red-and-white lattice tower of a microwave radio tower rises above the buildings, here is a helicopter landing pad on the front lawn, plus another UHF cone antenna sticking out of the lawn like a white fungus. You might think that some university agricultural laboratory or, say, a weather station has settled here - only a red banner on the fence confuses, notifying that anyone who tries to arbitrarily enter the territory will be met with fire to kill.

Inside the building, the security service scrupulously examines each incoming. The slightest suspicion - and guards with M4 carbines and handcuffs will immediately appear in the room. The massive entrance door moves vertically upwards - so even winter snow drifts will not block it.

After the checkpoint, the interior becomes the same as in a regular barracks. In the center there is something like a wardroom - a TV, sofas with armchairs and several long tables for common meals. Further from the hall exits to the cabins with bunk beds. Standard government-issued posters about stupid talkers and ubiquitous spies are hung on the walls.

The Malmstrom Air Force Missile Base controls 15 launchers and 150 silos. Its entire economy is spread over a territory of 35,000 km 2. The control bunkers were dug deep and spaced so far apart to survive a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union and retain the possibility of a nuclear retaliatory strike. To disable such a system, the warheads must hit each launch position without missing.

One of the armored doors in the living area leads to a small side room. Here sits the flight security controller (FSC), a non-commissioned officer, the commander of the security of the launcher. A three-meter chest next to it is packed with M4 and M9 carbines. There is another door in this arsenal, which neither the dispatcher nor the guards should enter in any case, unless an emergency situation requires it. Behind this door is an elevator that goes six floors underground without stopping.

In a calm voice, FSC announces the ciphers for calling the elevator over the phone. The elevator will not rise until all passengers have left it and the front door in the security room is locked. The steel elevator door is opened by hand in much the same way as the blinds are rolled up, which in small shops protect windows and doors at night. Behind it is a small cabin with metal walls.

It will take us less than a minute to descend 22 m underground, but there, at the bottom of the hole, a completely different world will open before us. The elevator door is built into the smoothly curved black wall of the circular hall. Along the wall, breaking its monotony, thick columns of shock absorbers are installed, which should absorb the shock wave if a nuclear warhead explodes somewhere nearby.

Outside the walls of the hall, something rumbled and clanged exactly as the lifting gates of an old castle should clang, after which a massive hatch smoothly leaned outward, 26-year-old Air Force Captain Chad Dieterle is holding on to the metal handle. A good meter and a half thick, this shockproof plug is screen-printed with the letters INDIA. Dieterle, Commander of the Launch Control Center (LCC) India, is now halfway through the 24-hour watch, and this launch position itself was organized here at Malmstrom Air Force Base, back when the parents of this brave Air Force captain went to school.

The mines and the launch control panel, located at a depth of 22 m underground, are guarded around the clock. "Rocket monkeys", as they call themselves, train in a training silo - the same as real rockets. They replace the cables leading to the gyroscopes and on-board computers. These computers are hidden in bulky boxes that protect electronics from radiation.

LCC India is connected by cables to fifty other mines scattered in a 10-kilometer radius. Each silo contains one 18-meter Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

The Air Force command refuses to report the number of warheads on each missile, but it is known that there are no more than three. Each of the heads can destroy all life within a radius of ten kilometers.

Having received the appropriate order, Dieterle and his henchmen in half an hour can send these weapons to any part of the globe. Lurking in silence underground, he turns an inconspicuous ranch, lost in the expanses of Montana, into one of the most strategically important points on the planet.

Small but effective

The US nuclear arsenal—about 2,200 strategic warheads that can be delivered by 94 bombers, 14 submarines, and 450 ballistic missiles—is still the backbone of the entire national security system. Barack Obama never tires of declaring his desire for a world completely free of nuclear weapons, but this does not contradict the fact that his administration in relation to nuclear policy unequivocally postulates: “As long as there are stocks of nuclear weapons in the world, the United States will maintain its nuclear forces in state of full and effective combat readiness.

Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of nuclear warheads in the world has dropped drastically. True, now states such as China, Iran or North Korea are deploying their own nuclear programs and designing their own long-range ballistic missiles. Therefore, despite high-flown rhetoric and even sincere good intentions, America should not yet part with its nuclear weapons, as well as with aircraft, submarines and missiles that could deliver them to the target.

The missile component of the American nuclear triad has been in existence for 50 years, but year after year it finds itself at the center of tense discussions between Moscow and Washington. Last year, the Obama administration signed a new START III treaty with Russia on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms. As a result, the nuclear arsenals of these two countries must be limited to less than 1,550 strategic warheads within a seven-year period. Of the 450 active US missiles, only 30 will remain. In order not to lose the support of the "hawks" and simply skeptical senators, the White House has proposed adding $ 85 billion to modernize the remaining nuclear forces over the next ten years (this amount must be approved at the next meeting of Congress). “I will vote to ratify this treaty … because our president is clearly determined to make sure that the remaining weapons are really effective,” Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander said.

Mine of intercontinental ballistic missile. These mines hide their terrible nature behind a completely inconspicuous appearance. Some trucker will pass by on the highway and not even look back. He will never know that these 30-meter-deep mines hide nuclear weapons, maintained in a state of continuous alert.

Nuclear missile umbrella

So why does the Strategic Missile Force, a symbol of the end of the Cold War, remain at the center of defensive strategy, politics, and diplomacy of the 21st century? If we take three types of delivery vehicles (aircraft, submarines and ballistic missiles), then of them, intercontinental ballistic missiles remain the means of the most prompt response to aggression from the enemy, and indeed the most operational weapon that allows a preemptive strike. Submarines are good because they are almost invisible, nuclear bombers are capable of delivering precision pinpoint strikes, but only intercontinental missiles are always ready to deliver an irresistible nuclear strike anywhere in the world, and they can do it in a matter of minutes.

The American nuclear missile umbrella is now deployed over the whole world. “As representatives of the Air Force, we are convinced that America is obliged to keep at gunpoint and under threat any enemy object, wherever it may be, no matter how serious the protection it may cover, no matter how deep it is hidden,” he said. Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, who just stepped down in January as head of the Global Strike Command, the agency that controls nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles.

The launch positions of strategic missiles represent a major achievement in engineering terms. All these mines were built in the early 1960s, and since then they have been in full combat readiness 99% of the time. More interestingly, the Pentagon built these launch sites for only a few decades. When the MinutemanIII missiles are retired, all silos and launchers at Malmstrom Base will be mothballed and buried for a period of 70 years.

So, the Air Force has the most powerful weapons in the world, and the equipment to control these weapons was created in the space age, and not at all in the 21st century of information technology. Nevertheless, these old launch systems do their job much better than one might think. “Building a system that will stand the test of time and still perform brilliantly,” says Klotz, “is a true triumph of engineering genius. These guys in the 1960s thought through everything to the smallest detail, generously laying in a few redundant levels of reliability.

Thousands of dedicated officers at three air force bases - Malmstrom, base them. F.E. Warren in Wyoming and Mino in North Dakota spare no effort to keep the silo launchers in constant combat readiness.

The Minuteman III was retired in the 1970s with a retirement date set for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the series' lifespan by another decade. In response to this demand, the leadership of the Air Force drew up a schedule for the reorganization of the existing missile bases. A tangible fraction of those billions of dollars that were recently promised by the White House should go towards this.

Norm is perfection

Let's return to the India Launch Control Center, hidden under an inconspicuous ranch. Little has changed inside since the Kennedy administration. Of course, teletype paper printers have given way to digital screens, and upstairs servers provide the underground crew with Internet access, and even live television when the situation is calm. However, the electronics here - hefty blocks inserted into wide metal racks and studded with many shining lights and illuminated buttons - resemble the scenery from the first versions of the Star Trek television series. Something really literally asks for an antique shop. Dieterle, with an embarrassed smile, pulls out of the console a nine-inch floppy disk - an element of the ancient, but still well-functioning Strategic Automatic Command and Control System.

Thousands of officers at US Air Force bases keep silo launchers on alert. Since 2000, the Pentagon has spent more than $7 billion to modernize this branch of the military. All work was aimed at ensuring that the Minuteman III model safely reached the retirement date, which was set for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the service life of this series for another ten years.

The missiles themselves and the equipment installed at ground level can still be somehow upgraded, but with underground mines and the launch centers themselves, everything is much more complicated. But time does not spare them. It is very difficult to fight corrosion. Any movement of the ground can break the underground communication lines.

The India Launch Control Center is one of 15 centers where missilemen from Malmstrom Air Force Base are on duty. “Take an ordinary house that is already 40 years old,” says Colonel Jeff Frankhouser, commander of the base maintenance team, “and bury it underground. And then think about how you will repair everything there. That's the same situation with us."

This missile base includes 150 nuclear ballistic missiles scattered across 35,000 km2 of launch sites in the mountains, hills and plains of Montana. Due to the large distance between the mines, the USSR could not disable all launch positions and command posts with one massive missile strike, which guaranteed America the possibility of a retaliatory strike.

This elegant doctrine of mutual deterrence implied the mandatory existence of a developed infrastructure. In particular, all these mines and command posts are interconnected by hundreds of thousands of kilometers of underground cables. The fist-thick bundles are woven from hundreds of insulated copper wires and laid in jackets that are pressurized. If the air pressure in the pipe drops, the maintenance team concludes that a crack has formed somewhere in the containment.

The communication system that spreads across the surrounding expanse is a matter of constant concern for the personnel of the Malmstrom base. Every day, hundreds of people - 30 teams at the control panels, 135 maintenance workers and 206 security fighters - go to work, keeping this whole economy in order. Some command posts are three hours away from the base. Heroes offended by fate, who are called Farsiders at the base, yearn in them. Jeeps, trucks and bulky self-propelled units dart around the surrounding roads every day to extract missiles from underground, and the total length of roads at this base is 40,000 km, 6,000 of which are primers improved with gravel.

The mines were built on small plots purchased from the previous owners. You can freely wander along the fence, but you just have to go behind it, and the security service can open fire to kill.

The slogan reigns here: “Our norm is perfection,” and in order to ensure that no one ever forgets about this tough principle, a whole army of controllers looks after the staff. Any mistake may result in suspension from duty until the violator retakes the qualification exam. Such captious control applies to all services of the missile base.

The cook will receive a strict reprimand from the officer for using expired sauce for the salad or not cleaning the hood over the stove in time. And rightly so - food poisoning can undermine the combat readiness of a launch platoon with the same success as an enemy commando team would. Caution to the point of paranoia is a basic principle for all who serve on this base. “At first glance, it may seem that we are playing it safe,” says Colonel Mohammed Khan (until the very end of 2010 he served at the Malmstrom base as commander of the 341st Missile Battalion), “but look at this matter seriously, here we have real nuclear warheads ".

Weekdays of the bunker

To launch a nuclear ballistic missile, one turn of the key is not enough. If an appropriate command arrives at the India launch center, Dieterle and his deputy, Captain Ted Jivler, must verify the encryption sent from the White House with the cipher stored in the center's steel safes.

Then each of them will take their own triangular switch, fixing their eyes on the electronic clock ticking between the blocks of electronic equipment. At a given moment, they must turn the switches from the "ready" position to the "start" position. At the same moment, two rocket men on the other launcher will turn their switches - and only after that the ballistic missile will break free.

Each mine is suitable for only one launch. In the very first seconds, electronic components, ladders, communication cables, safety sensors and sump pumps will burn out or melt in it. Above the hills of Montana, a ring of smoke will rise, ridiculously exactly repeating the outlines of a mine vent. Relying on a column of reactive gases, the rocket will break out into outer space in a matter of minutes. Another half an hour, and the warheads would begin to fall on their targets.

The striking power of the weapons entrusted to these rocket men, and the entire measure of responsibility entrusted to them, is clearly emphasized by the harsh situation in the bunker. In the far corner is a simple mattress, fenced off with a black curtain so that the light does not hit the eyes. “It’s not a great pleasure to wake up in this nook,” says Dieterle.

And it's time for us to return to the world that rocket scientists call "real". Dieterle pulls on the handle of the black shockproof plug until it begins to rotate smoothly. He gives us a reserved smile as we leave, and the door slams shut behind us with a heavy thud. We are going up, and there, below, Dieterle remains and the same as him, in tense eternal expectation.

The new US nuclear doctrine, published in April 2010, declares that “ The main purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack on the US, its allies and partners. This mission will remain so as long as nuclear weapons exist.". United States " will consider the use of nuclear weapons only in emergency circumstances to protect the vital interests of the United States, its allies and partners».

However, the United States are not ready today to endorse a universal policy recognizing that the deterrence of a nuclear attack is the sole function of nuclear weapons". With respect to nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear states that, in Washington's assessment, are not fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), " there remains a small set of additional contingencies in which nuclear weapons can still play the role of deterrence against attack by conventional or chemical and biological weapons against the United States, its allies and partners».

However, it is not disclosed what is meant by the aforementioned unforeseen circumstances. This should be regarded as a serious uncertainty in the US nuclear policy, which cannot but influence the defense policy of other leading states of the world.

To fulfill the tasks assigned to nuclear forces, the United States has a strategic offensive force (SNA) and non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSW). According to US State Department data released on May 3, 2010, the United States nuclear arsenal as of September 30, 2009 consisted of 5,113 nuclear warheads. In addition, several thousand obsolete nuclear warheads, decommissioned, were waiting to be dismantled or destroyed.

1. Strategic offensive forces

The US SNA is a nuclear triad that includes land, sea and aviation components. Each component of the triad has its own advantages, therefore, the new US nuclear doctrine recognizes that "preserving all three components of the triad in the best way will ensure strategic stability at acceptable financial costs and at the same time insure in case of problems with the technical condition and vulnerability of existing forces."

1.1. Ground component

The ground component of the US SNA consists of strategic missile systems equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). ICBM forces have significant advantages over other components of the SNA due to a highly secure control and management system, calculated in a few minutes of combat readiness and relatively low costs for combat and operational training. They can be effectively used in pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes to destroy stationary targets, including highly protected ones.

According to expert estimates, at the end of 2010, the ICBM forces had 550 silo launchers at three missile bases(silo), of which for the Minuteman-3 ICBM - 50, for the Minuteman-3M ICBM - 300, for the Minuteman-3S ICBM - 150 and for the MX ICBM - 50 (all silos are protected by shock wave 70–140 kg / cm 2):

Currently, ICBM forces are subordinate to the US Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), created in August 2009.

All Minuteman ICBMs- three-stage solid-propellant rockets. Each of them has from one to three nuclear warheads.

ICBM "Minuteman-3" began to be deployed in 1970. It was equipped with Mk-12 nuclear warheads (W62 warhead with a capacity of 170 kt). The maximum firing range is up to 13,000 km.

ICBM "Minuteman-3M" began to be deployed in 1979. Equipped with Mk-12A nuclear warheads (warhead W78 with a capacity of 335 kt). The maximum firing range is up to 13,000 km.

ICBM "Minuteman-3S" began to be deployed in 2006. It is equipped with one Mk-21 nuclear warhead (W87 warhead with a capacity of 300 kt). The maximum firing range is up to 13,000 km.

ICBM "MX"- three-stage solid-propellant rocket. It began to be deployed in 1986. It was equipped with ten Mk-21 nuclear warheads. The maximum firing range is up to 9,000 km.

According to expert estimates, at the time of entry into force of the START-3 Treaty (Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms) On February 5, 2011, the ground component of the US SNA had about 450 deployed ICBMs with approximately 560 warheads.

1.2. Marine component

The maritime component of the US SNA consists of nuclear submarines equipped with intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Their well-established name is SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) and SLBMs (submarine ballistic missiles). SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are the most survivable component of the US SNA. according to estimates to date, in the short and medium term there will be no real threat to the survivability of American SSBNs».

According to expert estimates, at the end of 2010, the naval component of the US strategic nuclear forces included 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, of which 6 SSBNs were based on the Atlantic coast (Naval Base Kingsbay, Georgia) and 8 SSBNs were based on the Pacific Coast (Naval Base Kitsan, Washington). Each SSBN is equipped with 24 Trident-2 SLBMs.

SLBM "Trident-2" (D-5)- three-stage solid-propellant rocket. It began to be deployed in 1990. It is equipped with either Mk-4 nuclear warheads and their modification Mk-4A (W76 warhead with a capacity of 100 kt), or Mk-5 nuclear warheads (W88 warhead with a capacity of 475 kt). Standard equipment - 8 warheads, actual - 4 warheads. The maximum firing range is over 7,400 km.

According to expert estimates, at the time of entry into force of the START-3 Treaty, the naval component of the US SNA included up to 240 deployed SLBMs with approximately 1,000 warheads.

1.3. Aviation component

The aviation component of the US SNA consists of strategic, or heavy, bombers capable of solving nuclear problems. Their advantage over ICBMs and SLBMs, according to the new US nuclear doctrine, is that they " can be defiantly deployed in the regions to warn potential adversaries in crisis situations about strengthening nuclear deterrence and to reaffirm American commitments to allies and partners to ensure their security».

All strategic bombers have the status of "dual mission": they can strike with both nuclear and conventional weapons. According to expert estimates, at the end of 2010, the aviation component of the US SNS at five air bases on the continental United States had approximately 230 bombers of three types - B-52H, B-1B and B-2A (of which more than 50 units were in stock reserve ).

Currently, strategic air forces, like ICBM forces, are subordinate to the US Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC).

Strategic bomber V-52N- turboprop subsonic aircraft. It began to be deployed in 1961. Currently, only long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) AGM-86B and AGM-129A are intended for its nuclear equipment. The maximum flight range is up to 16,000 km.

Strategic bomber B-1B- jet supersonic aircraft. It began to be deployed in 1985. Currently, it is intended to perform non-nuclear tasks, but has not yet been withdrawn from the count of strategic nuclear weapons carriers under the START-3 Treaty, since the relevant procedures provided for by this Treaty have not been completed. The maximum flight range is up to 11,000 km (with one in-flight refueling).

- jet subsonic aircraft. It began to be deployed in 1994. At present, only B61 bombs (modifications 7 and 11) of variable power (from 0.3 to 345 kt) and B83 (with a capacity of several megatons) are intended for its nuclear equipment. The maximum flight range is up to 11,000 km.

ALCM AGM-86V- subsonic air-launched cruise missile. It began to be deployed in 1981. It is equipped with a W80-1 warhead of variable power (from 3 to 200 kt). The maximum firing range is up to 2,600 km.

ALCM AGM-129A- subsonic cruise missile. It began to be deployed in 1991. It is equipped with the same warhead as the AGM-86В missile. The maximum firing range is up to 4,400 km.

According to expert estimates, at the time of entry into force of the START-3 Treaty, there were about 200 deployed bombers in the aviation component of the US SNA, for which the same number of nuclear warheads were counted (according to the rules of the START-3 Treaty, one warhead is conditionally counted for each deployed strategic bomber, since in their day-to-day activities, they all do not have nuclear weapons on board).

1.4. Combat command of strategic offensive forces

The combat control system (SBU) of the US SNA is a combination of the main and reserve systems, including the main and reserve stationary and mobile (air and ground) controls, complexes of communications and automated data processing. The SBU provides automated collection, processing and transmission of data on the situation, the development of orders, plans and calculations, bringing them to the executors and monitoring their implementation.

Main combat control system It is designed for the timely response of the SNA to a tactical warning of the start of a nuclear missile attack on the United States. Its main organs are the stationary main and reserve command centers of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces, the command and reserve command centers of the Joint Strategic Command of the US Armed Forces, the command posts of the air armies, missile and aviation wings.

It is believed that with any options for unleashing a nuclear war, the combat crews of these command posts will be able to organize measures to increase the combat readiness of the SNA and transmit an order to start their combat use.

Reserve system of combat control and communications in an emergency combines a number of systems, the main of which are the reserve control systems of the US armed forces using air and ground mobile command posts.

1.5. Prospects for the development of strategic offensive forces

The current US SNA development program does not provide for the construction of new ICBMs, SSBNs and strategic bombers in the foreseeable future. At the same time, by reducing the overall reserve of strategic nuclear weapons in the implementation of the START-3 Treaty, “ The United States will retain the ability to “reload” a certain amount of nuclear weapons as a technical safety net against any future problems with delivery systems and warheads, as well as in the event of a significant deterioration in the security situation.". Thus, the so-called "return potential" is formed by "de-arming" ICBMs and reducing the number of warheads on SLBMs by half.

As follows from the report of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, presented to the US Congress in May 2010, after the implementation of the START-3 Treaty (February 2018), the US SNA will have 420 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, 14 SSBNs of the Ohio with 240 Trident-2 SLBMs and up to 60 B-52H and B-2A bombers.

The long-term, $7 billion worth of improvements to the Minuteman-3 ICBM under the Minuteman-3 Life Cycle Extension Program to keep these missiles in service until 2030 are almost over.

As noted in the new US nuclear doctrine, " although there is no need to decide on any follow-up ICBMs in the next few years, exploratory studies on this issue should begin today. In this regard, in 2011-2012. the Department of Defense will begin studies to analyze alternatives. This study will consider a range of different options for developing ICBMs to identify a cost-effective approach that will support further reductions in US nuclear weapons while providing a stable deterrent.».

In 2008, production of a modified version of the Trident-2 D-5 LE (Life Extension) SLBM began. On the whole, by 2012, 108 of these missiles will be purchased for more than $4 billion. Ohio-class SSBNs will be equipped with modified SLBMs for the rest of their service life, which has been extended from 30 to 44 years. The first in the Ohio SSBN series is scheduled to be withdrawn from the fleet in 2027.

Since it takes a long time to design, build, test and deploy new SSBNs, from 2012 the US Navy will begin exploratory research to replace existing SSBNs. Depending on the results of the study, as noted in the new US nuclear doctrine, the feasibility of reducing the number of SSBNs from 14 to 12 units in the future may be considered.

As for the aviation component of the US SNA, the US Air Force is exploring the possibility of creating strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, which should replace the current bombers from 2018. In addition, as proclaimed in the new US nuclear doctrine, " Air Force will evaluate alternatives to inform 2012 budget decisions on whether (and if so, how) to replace existing long-range air-launched cruise missiles that are expiring at the end of the next decade».

In the development of nuclear warheads, the main efforts in the United States in the coming years will be aimed at improving existing nuclear warheads. Started in 2005 by the Department of Energy as part of the RRW (Reliable Replacement Warhead) project, the development of a highly reliable nuclear warhead is now on hold.

As part of the implementation of the non-nuclear prompt global strike strategy, the United States continues to develop technologies for guided warheads and warheads in non-nuclear equipment for ICBMs and SLBMs. This work is carried out under the leadership of the Office of the Minister of Defense (Department of Advanced Studies), which makes it possible to eliminate duplication of research conducted by the branches of the armed forces, spend money more efficiently and, ultimately, accelerate the creation of high-precision combat equipment for strategic ballistic missiles.

Since 2009, a number of demonstration launches of prototypes of intercontinental delivery vehicles being created have been carried out, but so far no significant achievements have been achieved. According to expert estimates, the creation and deployment of high-precision non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs can hardly be expected before 2020.

2. Non-strategic nuclear weapons

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced its arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons. As emphasized in the new US nuclear doctrine, today the United States maintains " only a limited number of forward-based nuclear weapons in Europe, as well as a small number in stockpiles in the United States, ready for global deployment in support of extended deterrence for allies and partners».

As of January 2011, the United States had approximately 500 operational non-strategic nuclear warheads. Among them are 400 V61 free-fall bombs of several modifications with variable yield (from 0.3 to 345 kt) and 100 warheads W80-O of variable yield (from 3 to 200 kt) for long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) (up to 2,600 km) "Tomahawk" (TLAM / N), adopted in 1984

Approximately half of the above air bombs are deployed at six American air bases in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. In addition, some 800 non-strategic nuclear warheads, including 190 W80-O warheads, are inactive in reserve.

Nuclear-certified American F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers, as well as aircraft of US NATO allies, can be used as carriers of nuclear bombs. Among the latter are Belgian and Dutch F-16 aircraft and German and Italian Tornado aircraft.

Nuclear SLCM "Tomahawk" are designed to arm multi-purpose nuclear submarines (NPS) and some types of surface ships. At the beginning of 2011, the US Navy had 320 missiles of this type in service. All of them are stored in the arsenals of naval bases on the continental United States in 24-36 hours ready for loading on nuclear submarines and surface ships, as well as transports of special munitions, including transport aircraft.

As for the prospects for American NSNW, the new US nuclear doctrine concluded that the following measures should be taken:

- it is necessary to keep the “dual-purpose” fighter-bomber (that is, capable of using both conventional and nuclear weapons) in service with the Air Force after replacing the existing F-15 and F-16 aircraft with the F-35 general attack aircraft;

— continue to implement the full Life Extension Program of the B61 nuclear bomb to ensure its compatibility with the F-35 aircraft and improve its operational safety, security from unauthorized access and control of use in order to increase its credibility;

- decommission the nuclear SLCM "Tomahawk" (this system is recognized as redundant in the US nuclear arsenal, besides, it has not been deployed since 1992).

3. Nuclear reductions in the future

The new US nuclear doctrine states that the President of the United States has ordered a review of possible future reductions in US strategic nuclear weapons below the levels established by the START-3 Treaty. It is emphasized that several factors will influence the scale and pace of subsequent reductions in US nuclear arsenals.

Firstly, "any future cuts should strengthen the deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability with Russia and China, and reaffirm US security assurances to allies and partners."

Secondly, “the implementation of the Nuclear Arsenal Readiness Program and the financing of nuclear infrastructure recommended by the US Congress (more than $ 80 billion are provided for this - VE) will allow the United States to abandon the practice of keeping a large number of non-deployed nuclear warheads in reserve in case of technical or geopolitical surprises and thereby significantly reduce the nuclear arsenal.”

Thirdly, "Russia's nuclear forces will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how quickly the United States is willing to further reduce its nuclear forces."

With this in mind, the US administration will seek discussions with Russia on further reductions in nuclear arsenals and increased transparency. It is argued that “this could be achieved through formal agreements and/or through parallel voluntary measures. Subsequent reductions should be larger in scale than provided for by previous bilateral agreements, extending to all nuclear weapons of both states, and not just to deployed strategic nuclear weapons.

Assessing these intentions of Washington, it should be noted that they practically do not take into account Moscow's concerns caused by:

- the deployment of the American global missile defense system, which in the future can weaken the deterrence potential of Russia's strategic nuclear forces;

- the vast superiority of the US and its allies in conventional military forces, which may further increase with the adoption of the developed American systems of long-range precision weapons;

- the unwillingness of the United States to support the draft treaty banning the placement of any types of weapons in outer space, submitted by Russia and China for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 2008.

Without finding mutually acceptable solutions to these problems, Washington is unlikely to be able to persuade Moscow to new negotiations on further reductions in nuclear arsenals.

/V.I. Esin, Ph.D., Leading Researcher, Center for Military Industrial Policy Problems, Institute for the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences, www.rusus.ru/