Jobs for the crew of the tank Pz.III. Medium tank Pz Kpfw III and its modifications German tank t 3 modifications

In 1934, the Armament Service of the Army (Heereswaffenamt) issued an order for a combat vehicle with a 37-mm cannon, which received the designation ZB (Zugfuhrerwagen - company commander's vehicle). Of the four firms participating in the competition, only one - Daimler-Benz - received an order for the production of an experimental batch of 10 cars. In 1936, these tanks were transferred for military trials under the army designation Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.A (or Pz.IIIA). They clearly bore the stamp of the influence of W. Christie's designs - five large-diameter road wheels.

The second experimental batch of 12 Model B units had a completely different undercarriage with 8 small road wheels, reminiscent of the Pz.IV. On the next 15 experimental Ausf.C tanks, the undercarriage was similar, but the suspension was noticeably improved. It should be emphasized that all other combat characteristics on the mentioned modifications, in principle, remained unchanged.

This cannot be said about the tanks of the D series (50 units), the frontal and side armor of which was increased to 30 mm, while the mass of the tank reached 19.5 tons, and the pressure on the ground increased from 0.77 to 0.96 kg / cm2 .

In 1938, the factories of three companies at once - Daimler-Benz, Henschel and MAN - began production of the first mass modification - Ausf.E. 96 tanks of this model received a running gear with six rubber-coated road wheels and a torsion bar suspension with hydraulic shock absorbers, which was not subjected to significant changes in the future. The combat weight of the tank was 19.5 tons. The crew consisted of 5 people. This number of crew members, starting with the Pz.III, became standard on all subsequent German medium and heavy tanks. Thus, already from the mid-1930s, the Germans achieved a functional separation of duties of crew members. Their opponents came to this much later - only by 1943-1944.

The Pz.IIIE was armed with a 37 mm cannon with a barrel length of 46.5 calibers and three MG 34 machine guns (ammunition load 131 rounds and 4500 rounds). Maybach HL120TR 12-cylinder carbureted engine with 300 hp. at 3000 rpm allowed the tank to reach a maximum speed of 40 km/h on the highway; the cruising range at the same time was 165 km and 95 km on the ground.

The layout of the tank was traditional for the Germans - with a front-mounted transmission, which reduced the length and increased the height of the vehicle, simplified the design of control drives and their maintenance. In addition, prerequisites were created for increasing the dimensions of the fighting compartment. Characteristic for the hull of this tank, as, indeed, for all German tanks of that period, was the equal strength of the armor plates on all main planes and the abundance of hatches. Until the summer of 1943, the Germans preferred the convenience of access to the units to the strength of the hull.

The transmission deserves a positive assessment, which was characterized by a large number of gears in the gearbox with a small number of gears: one gear per gear. The rigidity of the box, in addition to the ribs in the crankcase, was provided by a “shaftless” gear mounting system. In order to facilitate control and increase the average speed of movement, equalizers and servo mechanisms were used.

Pz.III Ausf.D. Poland, September 1939. Theoretically, the driver and gunner-radio operator could use access hatches to the transmission units to get into the tank. However, it is quite obvious that in a combat situation it was almost impossible to do this.

The width of the track chains - 360 mm - was chosen mainly based on road traffic conditions, significantly limiting off-road patency. However, the latter in the conditions of the Western European theater of operations still had to be found.

The next modification was the Pz.IIIF (440 units produced), which had minor design improvements, including a new type of commander's cupola.

600 tanks of the G series received the 50-mm KwK 38 tank gun with a barrel length of 42 calibers, developed by Krupp in 1938, as the main armament. At the same time, the re-equipment of previously produced tanks of models E and F with a new artillery system began. The ammunition load of the new gun consisted of 99 rounds, 3750 rounds were intended for two MG 34 machine guns. After re-equipment, the mass of the tank increased to 20.3 tons.

The H variant received an improved turret, a new commander's cupola, and later - additional 30 mm frontal armor and a new 400 mm track. From October 1940 to April 1941, 310 Ausf.H tanks were produced.

Tanks Pz.III Ausf.G of the 5th tank regiment of the 5th light division before being sent to North Africa. 1941

Pz.III Ausf.J was protected by even thicker armor. Among the minor improvements, the most significant was the new type of machine gun mounting. The first 1549 Ausf.J tanks were still armed with a 50 mm KwK 38 cannon with a 42 caliber barrel. Beginning in January 1942, the new 50 mm KwK 39 cannon with a barrel length of 60 calibers began to be installed on Ausf.J tanks for the first time. Such guns received 1067 tanks of this modification.

Front-line experience forced us to move on to the next modification - L, in which the forehead of the hull and the forehead of the turret were protected by additional 20-mm armor plates. The tanks also received a modernized mask mount, which simultaneously acted as a counterweight to the 50-mm gun. The mass of the tank increased to 22.7 tons. From June to December 1942, 653 (according to other sources - 703) tanks of the L modification were manufactured.

Pz.III Ausf.J from the 6th tank regiment of the 3rd tank division. Eastern front, winter 1941.

On the M variant, a 1350-kg “eastern” caterpillar appeared. With it, the width of the car increased to 3266 mm. From March 1943, these tanks were produced with bulwarks - 5-mm steel sheets that protected the vehicle from HEAT shells. The initial order was 1000 units, but the low effectiveness of 50-mm guns in the fight against Soviet tanks forced the Armament Service of the Wehrmacht ground forces to reduce the order to 250 vehicles. Another 165 already finished chassis were converted into StuGIII assault guns, and another 100 into Pz.III (Fl) flamethrower tanks.

The absence of tungsten in the Reich reduced the effectiveness of the long-barreled 50-mm cannon (its sub-caliber projectile with a tungsten core, which had an initial speed of 1190 m / s, pierced 94-mm armor at a distance of 500 m); therefore, it was decided to re-equip some of the tanks with a “short” 75-mm KwK 37 cannon with a barrel length of 24 calibers - to use them as assault ones. 450 vehicles of the L series were re-equipped, later another 215 tanks of the M series. The frontal armor of the towers on these vehicles was increased to 57 mm, while the mass of the tower was 2.45 tons. These tanks - Ausf.N - became the latest modification of the Pz.III, mass-produced.

In addition to combat, the so-called linear tanks, 5 types of command tanks were produced with a total number of 435 units. 262 tanks were converted into artillery fire control vehicles. A special order - 100 Pz.III Ausf.M with flamethrowers - was completed by Wegmann in Kassel. For a flamethrower with a range of up to 60 m, 1000 liters of fire mixture were required. The tanks were intended for Stalingrad, but they got to the front only at the beginning of July 1943 - near Kursk.

At the end of the summer of 1940, 168 F, G and H tanks were converted for underwater movement and were to be used during landings on the English coast. The immersion depth was 15 m; fresh air was supplied by a hose 18 m long and 20 cm in diameter. In the spring of 1941, experiments were continued with a 3.5-m pipe - a “snorkel”. From the Pz.III and Pz.IV underwater tanks and the Pz.II amphibious tanks, the 18th tank regiment was formed, deployed in 1941 into a brigade, and then into the 18th tank division. Part of the Tauchpanzer III vehicles entered service with the 6th Tank Regiment of the 3rd Tank Division. These units were trained at the Milovitsy training ground in the protectorate of the Czech Republic and Moravia.

Since July 1944, Pz.III was also used as an ARV. At the same time, a square cabin was installed in place of the tower. In addition, small batches of vehicles for the transport of ammunition and engineering were produced. There were prototypes of a minesweeper tank and options for converting it into a railcar.

Pz.III Ausf.J during unloading from the railway platform. Eastern Front, 1942. On the right wing of the vehicle is the tactical badge of the 24th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht.

It should be noted that a significant number of the tank turrets released as a result of the conversion were installed as firing points at various fortifications, in particular on the Atlantic Wall and in Italy on the Ready Line. In 1944 alone, 110 towers were used for these purposes.

The production of Pz.III was discontinued in 1943, after the production of about 6 thousand tanks. In the future, only the production of self-propelled guns based on it continued.

Pz.III Ausf.N during testing at the NIBTPolygon in Kubinka near Moscow. 1946

It must be said that all German tanks created in the prewar years had a rather monotonous fate. Like the Pz.IV, the first "troikas" formally entered the army in 1938. But by no means in combat units! New vehicles were concentrated in the Panzerwaffe training centers, staffed by the most experienced tank instructors. During the whole of 1938, in essence, military tests took place, during which it became clear, in particular, the unreliability and futility of the chassis of the first modifications.

A number of foreign and domestic sources indicate the participation of Pz.III in the Anschluss of Austria in March and the occupation of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia in October 1938. However, their presence in the units of the 1st and 2nd Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions participating in these operations is not confirmed by German sources. It is possible that the Pz.III tanks were brought there a little later in order to demonstrate German military power. In any case, the first 10 Pz.III tanks were transferred to combat units in the spring of 1939 and could only really participate in the occupation of the Czech Republic and Moravia in March of this year.

The total order for tanks of this type was 2538 units, of which 244 were to be produced in 1939. However, the Armaments Service was only able to accept 24 vehicles. As a result, on September 1, 1939, the Wehrmacht had only 98 of the 120 Pz.IIIs produced by that time and 20-25 command tanks based on it. Only 69 vehicles took direct part in the hostilities against Poland. Most of them were concentrated in the 6th training tank battalion (6 Panzer Lehr Battalion), attached to the 3rd tank division, which was part of the XIX tank corps of General G. Guderian. There were also several vehicles in the 1st Panzer Division.

Unfortunately, there is no information about combat encounters between the Pz.III and Polish tanks. We can only say that the "troika" had better armor protection and maneuverability than the most powerful Polish tank 7TP. Different sources give different numbers of German losses: according to one, they amounted to only 8 Pz.III, according to others, 40 tanks failed, and irretrievable losses amounted to 26 units!

By the beginning of active hostilities in the West - May 10, 1940 - the Panzerwaffe already had 381 Pz.III tanks and 60-70 command tanks. True, only 349 vehicles of this type were in immediate readiness for combat operations.

After the Polish campaign, the Germans brought the number of tank divisions to ten, and although not all of them had a standard structure with two tank regiments, it was not possible to fully equip them with a regular number of all types of tanks. However, the "old" five tank divisions did not differ much from the "new" ones in this regard. A tank regiment was supposed to have 54 Pz.III and Pz.Bg.Wg.III tanks. It is easy to calculate that in ten tank regiments of five divisions there should have been 540 Pz.III. However, this number of tanks was not just physically. Guderian complains about this: “The re-equipment of tank regiments with tanks of the T-III and T-IV types, which was especially important and necessary, proceeded extremely slowly due to the weak production capacity of the industry, as well as as a result of the mothballing of new types of tanks by the high command of the ground forces.” The first reason expressed by the general is indisputable, the second is highly doubtful. The presence of tanks in the troops was quite consistent with the number of vehicles produced by May 1940.

Be that as it may, the Germans had to concentrate scarce medium and heavy tanks in formations operating in the directions of the main attacks. So, in the 1st tank division of the Guderian corps, there were 62 tanks Pz.III and 15 Pz.Bf.Wg.III. The 2nd Panzer Division had 54 Pz.IIIs. Other divisions had a smaller number of combat vehicles of this type.

Pz.III turned out to be quite suitable for fighting French light tanks of all types. Things were much worse when meeting with medium D2 and S35 and heavy B1bis. The German 37 mm guns did not penetrate their armor. Guderian himself took personal impressions from this situation. Here is what he writes, recalling the battle with French tanks south of Juniville on June 10, 1940: “During the tank battle, I tried in vain to knock out the French B tank (B1bis. - Note. ed.); all the shells bounced off the thick armored walls without causing any harm to the tank. Our 37- and 20-mm guns were also not effective against this machine. So we had to bear the losses." As for losses, the Panzerwaffe lost 135 Pz.III tanks in France.

Pz.III Ausf.N, shot down by Soviet artillery in the Sinyavino area. Winter 1943.

Like other types of German tanks, "troikas" took part in the operation in the Balkans in the spring of 1941. In this theater, the main danger for German tanks was not the few Yugoslav and Greek tanks and anti-tank guns, but mountainous, sometimes unpaved roads and bad bridges. Serious clashes, which led to losses, albeit insignificant, occurred between the Germans and the British troops who arrived in Greece in March 1941. The largest battle took place when the Germans broke through the "Metaxas Line" in northern Greece, not far from the city of Ptolemais. Tanks of the 9th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht attacked the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment here. The British A10 cruiser tanks were powerless against the Pz.III, especially the H modification, which had 60 mm frontal armor and 50 mm guns. The situation was saved by the Royal Horse Artillery - 15 German tanks, including several Pz.IIIs, were hit by fire from 25-pounder guns. However, this did not affect the development of events as a whole: on April 28, the personnel of the regiment, leaving all the tanks, left Greece.

Pz.III Ausf.J, shot down in the summer of 1941. The Soviet shell literally broke through the frontal armor of the tower.

In the spring of 1941, the "troikas" had to master another theater of operations - the North African. On March 11, units of the 5th light division of the Wehrmacht, which numbered up to 80 Pz.III, began to unload in Tripoli. Basically, these were G models in tropical design (trop) with reinforced air filters and a cooling system. A couple of months later they were joined by combat vehicles of the 15th Panzer Division. At the time of arrival, the Pz.III was superior to any English tank in Africa, with the exception of the Matilda.

The first major battle in the Libyan desert with the participation of Pz.III was the attack by the forces of the 5th tank regiment of the 5th light division of the British positions near Tobruk on April 30, 1941. The offensive, undertaken by the German tankers after a long aviation training, turned out to be inconclusive. Particularly heavy losses were suffered by the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment. Suffice it to say that 24 Pz.IIIs alone were shot down. True, all the tanks were evacuated from the battlefield and 14 vehicles soon returned to service. It must be said that the commander of the German African Corps, General Rommel, quickly drew conclusions from such failures, and in the future the Germans did not undertake frontal attacks, preferring the tactics of flank strikes and coverage. This was all the more important because by the end of the autumn of 1941, neither the Pz.III nor the Pz.IV had such a decisive superiority over most British tanks as in the spring. During Operation Crusader, for example, in November 1941, the British advanced with 748 tanks, including 213 Matildas and Valentines, 220 Crusaders, 150 older cruiser tanks and 165 American Stuarts. production. The African Corps could only oppose them with 249 German (of which 139 Pz.III) and 146 Italian tanks. At the same time, the armament and armor protection of most British combat vehicles were similar, and sometimes surpassed the German ones. As a result of two-month battles, British troops missed 278 tanks. The losses of the Italo-German troops were comparable - 292 tanks.

The English 8th Army pushed the enemy back almost 800 km and captured the whole of Cyrenaica. But she could not solve her main task - to destroy the forces of Rommel. On January 5, 1942, a convoy arrived in Tripoli, delivering 117 German (mostly Pz.III Ausf.J with a 50-mm cannon in 42 calibers) and 79 Italian tanks. Having received this reinforcement, Rommel went on a decisive offensive on January 21. In two days, the Germans advanced 120–130 km east, while the British were rapidly retreating.

Command tank Pz.Bf.Wg.III Ausf.Dl. Poland, September 1939.

The question is natural: if the Germans had neither quantitative nor qualitative superiority over the enemy, then how can their successes be explained? Here is the answer to this question given in his memoirs by Major General von Mellenthin (at that time he served with the rank of major in Rommel's headquarters): “In my opinion, our victories were determined by three factors: the qualitative superiority of our anti-tank guns, the systematic application of the principle of interaction military branches and - last but not least - our tactical methods. While the British limited the role of their 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns (very powerful guns) to fighting aircraft, we used our 88-mm guns to shoot both tanks and aircraft. In November 1941, we had only thirty-five 88 mm guns, but moving along with our tanks, these guns inflicted huge losses on the British tanks. In addition, our 50-mm anti-tank guns with a high muzzle velocity were significantly superior to the British two-pounder guns, and batteries of these guns always accompanied our tanks in battle. Our field artillery was also trained to interact with tanks. In short, the German Panzer Division was an extremely flexible formation of all branches of the armed forces, always, both in the offensive and in defense, relying on artillery. The British, on the other hand, considered anti-tank guns to be a defensive weapon and failed to properly use their powerful field artillery, which should have been trained to destroy our anti-tank guns.

Everything that von Mellenthin said, especially regarding the interaction of all types of troops with tanks, was also characteristic of another theater of operations - the Eastern Front, which became the most important for the Pz.III, as, indeed, for all other German tanks.

The command tank Pz.Bf.Wg.III Ausf.E and the command and staff armored personnel carrier Sd.Kfz.251 / 3 of the headquarters of the 9th Panzer Division. Eastern Front, 1941.

As of June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 235 Pz.III tanks with 37 mm guns (another 81 vehicles were under repair). There were significantly more tanks with 50 mm guns - 1090! Another 23 vehicles were under re-equipment. During June, the industry was expected to receive another 133 combat vehicles. Of this number, 965 Pz.III tanks were intended directly for the invasion of the Soviet Union, which were distributed more or less evenly among 16 German tank divisions out of 19 participating in the Barbarossa operation (6th, 7th and 8th tank divisions were armed with Czechoslovak-made tanks). So, for example, in the 1st Panzer Division there were 73 Pz.III and 5 command Pz.Bf.Wg.III, in the 4th Panzer Division there were 105 combat vehicles of this type. Moreover, the vast majority of tanks were armed with 50-mm L / 42 cannons.

Since the landing on the shores of foggy Albion did not take place, Tauchpanzer III underwater tanks were also transferred to the east. In the first hours of Operation Barbarossa, these tanks, which were part of the 18th Panzer Division, crossed the Western Bug along the bottom. This is how the German historian Paul Karel describes this extraordinary event for those years: “At 03.15, in the sector of the 18th Panzer Division, 50 batteries of all calibers opened fire to ensure the crossing of the river by underwater tanks. The division commander, General Nering, described the operation as a magnificent spectacle, at the same time rather pointless, since the Russians were smart enough to withdraw their troops from the border areas, leaving only a few units of border guards who fought bravely.

At 0445, non-commissioned officer Virshin plunged into the Bug on tank No. 1. The infantrymen watched what was happening with amazement. The water closed over the roof of the tank turret.

“Tankers give in! They play submariners!

Where Virshin's tank was now could be determined by the thin metal pipe sticking out of the river and by the bubbles from the exhaust on the surface, which were carried away by the current.

So, tank after tank, the 1st battalion of the 18th tank regiment, led by the battalion commander Manfred Count Strachwitz, disappeared at the bottom of the river. And then the first of the outlandish "amphibians" crawled out onto the shore. A soft pop, and the barrel of the gun was freed from the rubber plug. The loader lowered the motorcycle camera around the turret. The same was done in other machines. Tower hatches swung open, from which the "captains" appeared. The battalion commander's hand flew up three times, which meant "Tanks, forward!". 80 tanks crossed the river under water. 80 tanks rushed into battle. The appearance of armored vehicles on the coastal bridgehead came in handy, as enemy reconnaissance armored vehicles were approaching. Immediately the advanced tanks received an order:

“Towers for one hour, load with armor-piercing, range 800 meters, on a group of enemy armored vehicles, rapid fire!”

Panzerbeobachtungswagen III advanced artillery observer vehicle. 20th Panzer Division. Eastern front, summer 1943.

The muzzles of the amphibian cannons belched fire. Several armored vehicles caught fire. The rest hastily retreated. The tank fist of the Army Group "Center" rushed in the direction of Minsk and Smolensk.

In the future, there were no such episodes of forcing water barriers, and the Pz.III of the underwater passage was used as ordinary tanks.

I must say that the “troikas” as a whole were an equal opponent of most Soviet tanks, surpassing them in some ways, but inferior in some ways. In terms of three main evaluation parameters - armament, maneuverability and armor protection - the Pz.III was significantly superior only to the T-26. Over the BT-7, the German vehicle had an advantage in armor protection, over the T-28 and KB - in maneuverability. In all three parameters, the "troika" was second only to the T-34. At the same time, the Pz.III had an undeniable superiority over all Soviet tanks in the quantity and quality of observation devices, the quality of sights, the reliability of the engine, transmission and chassis. An important advantage was the absolute division of labor of the crew members, which most Soviet tanks could not boast of. The latter circumstances, in the absence of a pronounced superiority in performance characteristics as a whole, allowed the Pz.III in most cases to emerge victorious from tank duels. However, when meeting with the T-34, and even more so with the KB, it was very difficult to achieve this - good or bad optics, but the German 50-mm cannon could only penetrate their armor from a very short distance - no more than 300 m. It is no coincidence that that for the period from June 1941 to September 1942, only 7.5% of the total number of T-34 tanks destroyed by artillery became victims of the fire of these guns. At the same time, the main burden of the fight against Soviet medium tanks "fell on the shoulders" of anti-tank artillery - 54.3% of T-34 tanks were hit by fire from 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank guns during the indicated period. The fact is that the anti-tank gun was more powerful than the tank gun, its barrel had a length of 56.6 calibers, and the initial velocity of the armor-piercing projectile was 835 m/s. And she had more chances to meet a Soviet tank.

After the turret was dismantled, some of the tanks were converted into Munitionsschlepper III ammunition carriers.

From the foregoing, it follows that the most massive Wehrmacht tank at that time, the Pz.III, which also had the greatest anti-tank capabilities, was in most cases absolutely powerless against the Soviet T-34s and KVs in 1941. If we take into account the lack of quantitative superiority, it becomes clear how, perhaps without knowing or understanding it, Hitler bluffed when attacking the USSR. In any case, on August 4, 1941, at a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group Center, he said to General G. Guderian: “If I knew that the Russians really had such a number of tanks that were given in your book, I would probably did not start this war. (In his book Attention, Tanks!, published in 1937, G. Guderian indicated that at that time there were 10,000 tanks in the USSR, but this figure was objected to by the chief of the general staff, Beck, and censorship. - Note. ed.)

However, back to the Pz.III. In six months of 1941, 660 tanks of this type were irretrievably lost, and in the first two months of 1942, another 338. With the then existing rate of production of armored vehicles in Germany, it was not possible to quickly make up for these losses. Therefore, in the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, a chronic shortage of combat vehicles was constantly maintained.

Throughout 1942, Pz.III remained the main striking force of the Panzerwaffe, including during large-scale offensive operations on the southern flank of the Eastern Front. On August 23, 1942, Pz.III Ausf.J from the 14th Panzer Corps were the first to reach the Volga north of Stalingrad. During the battle of Stalingrad and the battle for the Caucasus, Pz.III suffered the most severe losses. Moreover, "troikas" armed with both types of guns - in 42 and 60 calibers participated in these battles. The use of a long-barreled 50-mm cannon made it possible to push the distance of a firefight, for example, with the T-34, to almost 500 m. In combination with the rather powerful armor protection of the frontal projection of the Pz.III, the chances of both tanks winning were largely equalized. True, the German vehicle could achieve success in battle at such a distance only when using PzGr 40 sub-caliber shells.

In May 1942, the first 19 Ausf.J tanks with 50 mm L/60 guns arrived in North Africa. In English documents, these machines appear as the Panzer III Special. On the eve of the battle at El-Ghazala, Rommel had only 332 tanks, 223 of them were “troikas”. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the American Grant I tanks that appeared at the front were practically invulnerable to the guns of German tanks. The exceptions were Pz.III Ausf.J and Pz.IV Ausf.F2 with long-barreled guns, but Rommel had only 23 of these vehicles. Nevertheless, despite the numerical superiority of the British troops, the Germans again went on the offensive, and by June 11 the entire advanced line of strongholds from El-Gazala to Bir-Hakeim was in their hands. For several days of fighting, the British army lost 550 tanks and 200 guns, the British units began a disorderly retreat to the rear defensive position in Egyptian territory near El Alamein.

Pz.III Ausf.F of the 7th Tank Regiment of the 10th Tank Division. France, May 1940.

Heavy fighting on this line began at the end of August 1942. On the eve of the offensive that Rommel launched at this time, the Afrika Korps had 74 Panzer III Specials. During unsuccessful offensive battles, the Germans suffered heavy losses in equipment, which they could not make up for. By the end of October, only 81 combat-ready tanks remained in the German troops. On October 23, 1029 tanks of General Montgomery's 8th Army went on the offensive. By November 3, the resistance of the German and Italian troops was broken, and they began a rapid retreat, abandoning all heavy equipment. In the 15th Panzer Division, for example, by November 10, there were 1,177 personnel left, 16 guns (of which four were 88 mm) and not a single tank. Leaving Libya, Rommel's army, which received replenishment, in January 1943 was able to stop the British on the border of Tunisia, on the Maret line.

In 1943, a number of Pz.III tanks, mainly L and N modifications, took part in the final battles of the African campaign. In particular, the Ausf.L tanks of the 15th Panzer Division participated in the defeat of American troops in the Kasserine Pass on February 14, 1943. Ausf.N tanks were part of the 501st heavy tank battalion. Their task was to protect the positions of the "tigers" from attacks by enemy infantry. After the surrender of German troops in North Africa on May 12, 1943, all these tanks became Allied trophies.

The main theater of combat use of the Pz.III in 1943 remained the Eastern Front. True, by the middle of the year the main burden of the fight against Soviet tanks was transferred to the Pz.IV with long-barreled 75-mm guns, and the “troikas” increasingly played a supporting role in tank attacks. Nevertheless, they still made up about half of the Wehrmacht's tank fleet on the Eastern Front. By the summer of 1943, the staff of the German tank division included a two-battalion tank regiment. In the first battalion, one company was armed with "triples", in the second - two. In total, the division was supposed to have 66 linear tanks of this type.

The “farewell tour” of the Pz.III was Operation Citadel. The table gives an idea of ​​the presence of Pz.III tanks of various modifications in the tank and motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and SS troops at the beginning of Operation Citadel.

THE PRESENCE OF Pz.III TANKS IN THE GERMAN TANK AND MOTORIZED DIVISIONS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION "CITADEL"

In addition to these tanks, there were 56 more vehicles in the 502nd and 505th heavy tank battalions, the 656th tank destroyer division and other units. According to German data, during July and August 1943, 385 triples were lost. In total, losses during the year amounted to 2719 Pz.III units, of which 178 were returned to service after repairs.

By the end of 1943, due to the cessation of production, the number of Pz.IIIs in the units of the first line was sharply reduced. A significant number of tanks of this type were transferred to various training and reserve units. They also served in secondary theaters of operations, for example, in the Balkans or in Italy. By November 1944, a little more than 200 Pz.III remained in the combat units of the first line: on the Eastern Front - 133, in the West - 35 and in Italy - 49.

As of March 1945, the following number of tanks remained in the troops:

Pz.III L/42 - 216

Pz.III L/60 - 113

Pz.III L/24 – 205

Pz.Beob.Wg.III - 70

Pz.Bf.Wg.IIl - 4

Berge-Pz.III - 130.

Of the line tanks and advanced artillery observer vehicles, 328 units were in the Reserve Army, 105 were used as training ones, and 164 vehicles located in the front units were distributed as follows:

Eastern Front - 16

Western front -

Italy - 58

Denmark/Norway - 90.

The German statistics of the last year of the war ends on April 28, and the numbers of the presence of Pz.III in the troops on this date are almost the same as those given above, which indicates the practical non-participation of the “triples” in the battles of the last days of the war. According to German data, from September 1, 1939 to April 10, 1945, the irretrievable losses of Pz.III tanks amounted to 4706 units.

A few words about the export deliveries of Pz.III, which were very insignificant. In September 1942, Hungary received 10 tanks of the M modification. Another 10-12 vehicles were handed over to the Hungarians in 1944. At the end of 1942, 11 Ausf.N vehicles were delivered to Romania. They were in service with the 1st Romanian Panzer Division "Great Romania" (Romania Mage). In 1943, 10 of these tanks were ordered by Bulgaria, but in the end the Germans delivered Pz.38(t) to it. Slovakia received 7 Ausf.Ns in 1943. Several machines of modifications N and L were in service with the Croatian troops. Turkey planned to purchase 56 L and M variants, but these plans could not be realized. Thus, no more than 50 Pz.III arrived in the armies of the states allied with Germany.

In battles with the Red Army, the Hungarian army most actively used these tanks.

A certain number of captured Pz.IIIs were also used by the Red Army, mainly in 1942-1943. On the chassis of captured tanks, about 200 SU-76I self-propelled artillery mounts were manufactured, which were used in battles with German troops until the end of 1943.

In 1967, in his book Designs and Development of Combat Vehicles, the British tank theorist Richard Ogorkevich outlined a curious theory of the existence of an intermediate class of "light-medium" tanks. In his opinion, the first machine in this class was the Soviet T-26, armed with a 45-mm cannon. In addition, Ogorkevich included the Czechoslovak LT-35 and LT-38 vehicles, the Swedish La-10, the English "cruisers" from Mk I to Mk IV, Soviet tanks of the BT family and, finally, the German Pz.III into this category.

One of 135 Pz.IIIs shot down during the French campaign. Judging by the image of a bison on the side of the turret, this Pz.III Ausf.E belongs to the 7th Panzer Regiment of the 10th Panzer Division. May 1940.

I must say that there is a certain sense in Ogorkevich's theory. Indeed, the performance characteristics of all these combat vehicles are quite close to each other. This is all the more important since these tanks have become adversaries on the battlefield. True, by 1939 their performance characteristics had changed slightly, mainly in the direction of strengthening the armor, but the main thing was preserved - all these combat vehicles, to a greater or lesser extent, were a kind of overgrown light tanks. They seemed to have stepped over the upper bar of the light class, but they did not reach the full-fledged middle class.

Nevertheless, in the 1930s, due to the successful combination of the main parameters of armament and mobility, "light-medium" tanks were considered universal, equally capable of both supporting infantry and performing the functions of cavalry.

Pz.III Ausf.G from the 6th company of the 5th tank regiment in battle. North Africa. 1941

However, infantry escort required movement at the speed of an infantryman, and such vehicles, which had relatively weak armor protection, became easy prey for anti-tank artillery, which was clearly demonstrated in Spain. The second function, which was confirmed already at the very beginning of the Second World War, they also could not perform on their own, they had to be supported or eventually replaced by tanks with more powerful weapons, for example, with a 75-mm cannon, capable of not only hitting enemy vehicles, but also to conduct effective fire with high-explosive fragmentation shells.

The journey to the East has begun! A Pz.III unit of the 11th Panzer Division is advancing deep into Soviet territory. In the background is a burning BT-7. 1941

However, the need to combine "light-medium" tanks with tanks armed with a 75-mm gun came already in the mid-1930s. They only solved this problem in different ways: the British installed parts of their cruiser tanks with 76-mm howitzers instead of 2-pounder guns in the standard turrets, several hundred BT-7A artillery tanks with a 76-mm gun in an enlarged turret were fired in the USSR, while the Germans went along the most cardinal and least simple way to create two tanks.

Indeed, in 1934, four German firms received an order to develop two different tanks under the mottos ZW ("company commander's vehicle") and BW ("battalion commander's vehicle"). It goes without saying that these were only nominal mottos. The specifications for these machines were close. Base weight, for example, 15 and 18 tons, respectively. Significant differences were only in armament: one car had to carry a 37-mm gun, the other - a 75-mm gun. The closeness of the terms of reference ultimately led to the creation of two vehicles that were almost identical in weight, dimensions and armor, but differed in armament and completely different in design - Pz.III and Pz.IV. At the same time, the layout of the second was clearly more successful. In Pz.IV, the lower part of the hull is narrower than in Pz.III, but the Krupp linkers, having expanded the turret box to the middle of the fenders, brought the clear diameter of the turret ring to 1680 mm versus 1520 mm for Pz.III. In addition, due to the more compact and rational layout of the engine compartment, the Pz.IV has a noticeably larger control compartment. The result is obvious: the Pz.III has no landing hatches for the driver and gunner-radio operator. What this can lead to if it is necessary to urgently leave a wrecked tank is clear without explanation. In general, with almost the same overall dimensions, the armored volume of the Pz.III was less than that of the Pz.IV.

Pz.III Ausf.J, shot down by the tank unit of the guards of Colonel Khasin. Southwestern Front, 1942.

It should be emphasized that both machines were created in parallel, each according to its own terms of reference, and there was no competition between them. It is all the more difficult to explain the appearance of such close terms of reference, and the subsequent adoption of both tanks. It would be much more logical to accept one tank, but with two weapons options. Such a decision would entail significantly less costs in the future. It is quite obvious that, having launched into mass production two tanks that were almost identical in all respects, but differed in armament and different in design, the Germans made a mistake. However, we should not forget that we are talking about the years 1934-1937, when it was difficult to guess the path that tank building would take.

Tanks Pz.III Ausf.L in Tunisia. December 1942.

In its own category of "light-medium" tanks, the Pz.III turned out to be the most modern, having inherited the shortcomings characteristic of light tanks to the least extent. After its armor and armament were strengthened, and the mass exceeded 20 tons, which was practically done by the “troika” of a medium tank, the superiority over the former “colleagues” increased even more. It was multiplied many times over by the superiority in tactical methods of using tank units and formations. As a result, the German command in the first two years of the war did not have much reason to worry about the combat qualities of the Pz.III.

Overturned as a result of unsuccessful maneuvering Pz.III Ausf.M from the SS motorized division "Reich". Kursk Bulge, 1943.

The situation completely changed in 1941, when the Germans faced the T-34 on the Eastern Front, and the Grant in Africa. Pz.III also had certain advantages over them. In particular, the T-34 was superior in terms of the number and quality of observation and aiming devices, the convenience of the crew, ease of control and technical reliability. The "Grant" was all right with surveillance devices and reliability, but in design and layout it was inferior to the "troika". However, all these advantages were negated by the main thing: both of these vehicles were designed as part of the promising concept of a "universal" tank, designed to replace both "light-medium" and support tanks. In the USSR, the understanding of the need for such a replacement came as a result of a long path of evolution of "light-medium" tanks. There was no evolution at all in the USA, but the Americans made quick and, most importantly, correct conclusions from someone else's experience. And what about the Germans? Apparently, by the middle of 1941, they fully realized the seriousness of the mistake they had made. On September 6, 1941, a report was presented to Hitler, which substantiated the benefits of the "unification" of Pz.III and Pz.IV. The case was set in motion, and several firms were tasked with developing various options for the Panzerkampfwagen III und IV n.A. (n.A. neue Ausfuhrung - new version).

Pz.III Ausf.N, shot down during Operation Citadel. Judging by the emblems, this vehicle is from the 3rd Tank Regiment of the 2nd Tank Division of the Wehrmacht. Oryol direction, August 1943.

The Krupp firm built two prototypes, which were Pz.III with a new undercarriage intended for Pz.III / IV. The road wheels were staggered, the suspension was torsion bar. Both machines have been tested for a long time at various test sites. Other suspension and chassis options were also worked out. Design and testing led at the beginning of 1942 to the creation of a unified chassis Geschutzwagen III / IV (“gun chassis”), in which road wheels, suspension, support rollers, guide wheels and tracks were borrowed from the Pz.IV Ausf.F tank, and the driving wheels, engine and gearbox - for Pz.III Ausf.J. But the idea of ​​a "single" tank never came to fruition. This project was abandoned in March of 1942, after the Pz.IV Ausf.F was equipped with a 75-mm cannon with a barrel length of 43 calibers, turning the support tank into a "universal" one overnight and without hassle.

It was impossible to apply such a solution to the Pz.III. An indispensable condition for the creation of a "universal" tank was the presence of a long-barreled gun with a caliber of at least 75 mm, which could not be installed in the Pz.III turret without significant alterations in the design of the tank. And with a 50-mm gun, even a 60-caliber gun, the "troika" remained the same "light-medium" tank. But she didn’t have any “colleagues” - opponents. The removal of the Pz.III from production in the summer of 1943 was the only and, I must say, belated release.

As a result, the "universal" "four" was in mass production until the end of the war, the Geschutzwagen III / IV chassis was actively used to create various self-propelled guns ... But what about the "troika"? Alas, the mistake made by the customer when choosing the type of tank devalued the work of designers and manufacturers. In the tank "palette" of the Panzerwaffe, the "troika" turned out to be superfluous.

Having started World War II with the invasion of Poland, Germany had only about a hundred Panzer III tanks, so in the Polish campaign and battles with the French and British armies in the west, this tank was not so noticeable among the mass of more outdated tanks, which at that time were armed with tank troops Germany. But by the beginning of the Wehrmacht's eastern campaign, the Pz.III had already become the main tank of the German army. On June 22, 1941, there were 965 Panzer III tanks on the Soviet borders.

Description

The development of the Panzer III medium tank has been carried out since 1934 by such well-known German concerns as Friedrich Krupp, MAN, Daimler-Benz and Rheinmetal Borsing. Each of the manufacturers presented their tank model. As a result, the military preferred the Daimler-Benz project. The tank was put into production in 1937 and received its final name - "Pz.Kpfw.III". The first modification "Panzer III Ausf.A" had only bulletproof armor - 14.5mm and a 37mm gun. The tank was quickly improved and refined. Modifications A, B, C, D and E were released in small batches. The first large batch (435 units) produced the tank "Panzer III Ausf.F". Most of the F modification tanks were already armed with the 50 mm KwK 38 L/42 cannon. Reinforced frontal armor was now 30mm. The tank continued to be improved, making various design changes, increasing armor and strengthening weapons. So, the frontal armor of the "Panzer III Ausf.H" was already brought up to 60mm. For the late 30s, early 40s, it was a very good anti-shell armor. Work on the tank
continued during the first major victories of the Wehrmacht in the West, and then during the war with the Soviet Union, where the "Panzer III" was already the main tank of the German army. The combat value of the "Pz.III" of the most massive productions can be compared with the Soviet medium tank "T-28" in terms of firepower and armor, since after the Finnish war the 30-mm armor of these Soviet tanks was brought up to 50-80mm. Light tanks of the Red Army, such as the T-26 and BT-7, could fight the Pz.III on equal terms only under very favorable conditions, such as sudden fire from an ambush from a very close range, but as a rule, the trio outnumbered the light Soviet tanks due to the best performance characteristics, primarily armor and guns, as well as thanks to excellent guidance devices, excellent optics and the division of duties of crew members of five people, each of whom did his own thing, while, for example, Soviet crews of three on the "T-26" were overloaded with work. Comfortable working conditions for the crew seriously increased the effectiveness of the Pz.III in combat. And yet, with all its advantages, the troika could not fight absolutely on an equal footing with the new types of Soviet combat vehicles - the T-34 and KV. Only at a very close range was the fire of the "Pz.III" cannon on these tanks effective - a weak gun at that time became the most serious drawback of this excellent combat vehicle. Soviet tanks, on the other hand, had the ability to penetrate Panzer III armor while being at a sufficiently large distance outside the effective zone of destruction of the latter. The only thing that prevented Soviet tankers from fully realizing their advantages in battle was the lack of radio communications, problems with the transmission of the T-34 and especially the KV, as well as poor visibility from the tank. In this, the "troika" had advantages, but these shortcomings on the "T-34" were eliminated during the war, which completely reduced some of the superiority of the "Pz.III" to nothing. The "Panzer III" was assigned the role of the main tank in the Eastern Campaign of 1941, and an unpleasant surprise for the Germans was its poor maneuverability in the conditions of the war against the USSR - too wide caterpillar tracks made it difficult for the tank to move along the Russian impassability. The commander of the third German tank group, Herman Goth, noted that the lack of roads prevented the advance of his tanks, which moved through Belarus to Moscow, almost more than the Soviet armies.
Assessing the latest modifications of the "Panzer III" tank, namely "Ausf.J", "Ausf.L" and "Ausf.M", it is worth saying that in the late 30s, early 40s it would have been just an excellent tank, however at the time of the deployment of truly mass production of these tanks of the latest series, Germany's opponents already also had good armored vehicles that were in no way inferior, and even surpassed the German tank in a number of characteristics. The British could oppose the German Pz.III with their Matilda with 78mm frontal armor, as well as the well-armored Valentine infantry tank. The Soviet Union mass-produced T-34 medium tanks, and the Americans began sending M4 Sherman tanks to their allies under Lend-Lease. The ultimate potential of the Panzer III design was achieved when the L and M modifications were developed. It was not possible to further strengthen the armor and install a more powerful gun on the Troika. The Soviet Union, Britain and the United States continued to improve the characteristics of their combat vehicles and it was no longer possible to hold out the "Panzer III" to their level. By that time, Germany had long ago had a more advanced tank - the "Panzer IV", on which it was finally finally decided to bet after the obvious impossibility of further modernization of the "Panzer III".

By the beginning of active hostilities in the West - May 10, 1940 - the Panzerwaffe already had 381 PzKpfw III tanks and 60 - 70 command tanks. True, only 349 vehicles of this type were in immediate readiness for combat operations.

After the Polish campaign, the Germans brought the number of tank divisions to ten, and although not all of them had a standard structure with two tank regiments, it was not possible to fully equip them with a regular number of all types of tanks. However, the "old" five tank divisions did not differ much from the "new" ones in this regard. A tank regiment was supposed to have 54 PzKpfw III and PzBfWg III tanks. It is easy to calculate that in ten tank regiments of five divisions there should have been 540 PzKpfw III. However, this number of tanks was not just physically. Guderian complains about this: “The re-equipment of tank regiments with tanks of the T-III and T-IV types, which was especially important and necessary, progressed extremely slowly due to the weak production capacity of the industry, as well as as a result of the mothballing of new types of tanks by the high command of the ground forces.”

The first reason stated by the general is indisputable, the second is highly doubtful. The presence of tanks in the troops was quite consistent with the number of vehicles produced by May 1940.

Be that as it may, the Germans had to concentrate scarce medium and heavy tanks in formations operating in the directions of the main attacks. So, in the 1st tank division of the Guderian corps, there were 62 tanks PzKpfw III and 15 PzBfWg .III. The 2nd Panzer Division had 54 PzKpfw IIIs. Other divisions had a smaller number of combat vehicles of this type.

PzKpfw III proved to be quite suitable for fighting French light tanks of all types. Things were much worse when meeting with medium D2 and S35 and heavy B1bis. The German 37 mm guns did not penetrate their armor. Guderian himself took personal impressions from this situation. Here is what he writes, recalling the battle with French tanks south of Juniville on June 10, 1940: “During a tank battle, I tried in vain to knock out the French tank “B” with the fire of a French captured 47-mm anti-tank gun; all the shells bounced off the thick armored walls without causing any harm to the tank. Our 37- and 20-mm guns were also not effective against this machine. So we had to bear the losses."

As for losses, the Panzerwaffe lost 135 PzKpfw III tanks in France.

Like other types of German tanks, "troikas" took part in the operation in the Balkans in the spring of 1941. In this theater, the main danger for German tanks was not the few Yugoslav and Greek tanks and anti-tank guns, but mountainous, sometimes unpaved roads and bad bridges. Serious clashes, which led to losses, albeit insignificant, occurred between the Germans and the British troops who arrived in Greece in March 1941. The largest battle took place when the Germans broke through the Metaxas Line in northern Greece, near the city of Ptolemais. Tanks of the 9th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht attacked the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment here. The British A10 cruiser tanks were powerless against the PzKpfw III, especially the H modification, which had 60 mm frontal armor and 50 mm guns. The situation was saved by the Royal Horse Artillery - 15 German tanks, including several PzKpfw IIIs, were hit by fire from 25-pounder guns. However, this did not affect the development of events as a whole: on April 28, the personnel of the regiment, leaving all the tanks, left Greece.

In the spring of 1941, the "troikas" had to master another theater of operations - the North African one. On March 11, units of the 5th light division of the Wehrmacht began to unload in Tripoli, numbering up to 80 PzKpfw III. Basically, these were G models in tropical design (trop) with reinforced air filters and a cooling system. A couple of months later they were joined by combat vehicles of the 15th Panzer Division. At the time of arrival, the PzKpfw III was superior to any English tank in Africa, with the exception of the Matilda.

The first major battle in the Libyan desert with the participation of the PzKpfw III was the attack by the forces of the 5th Tank Regiment of the 5th Light Division of the British positions near Tobruk on April 30, 1941. The offensive, undertaken by the German tankers after a long aviation training, turned out to be inconclusive. Particularly heavy losses were suffered by the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment. Suffice it to say that 24 PzKpfw IIIs alone were shot down. True, all the tanks were evacuated from the battlefield and 14 vehicles soon returned to service. It should be noted that the commander of the German Afrika Korps, General Rommel, quickly drew conclusions from such failures, and in the future the Germans did not undertake frontal attacks, preferring flank strikes and coverage. This was all the more important because by the end of the autumn of 1941, neither the PzKpfw III nor the PzKpfw IV had such a decisive superiority over most British tanks as in the spring. During Operation Crusader, for example, in November 1941, the British advanced with 748 tanks, including 213 Matildas and Valentines, 220 Crusaders, 150 older cruiser tanks and 165 American Stuarts. production. The African Corps could only oppose them with 249 German (of which 139 PzKpfw III) and 146 Italian tanks. At the same time, the armament and armor protection of most British combat vehicles were similar, and sometimes surpassed the German ones. As a result of two months of fighting, British troops missed 278 tanks. The losses of the Italo-German troops were comparable - 292 tanks.

The English 8th Army pushed the enemy back almost 800 km and captured the whole of Cyrenaica. But she could not solve her main task - to destroy Rommel's forces.

On January 5, 1942, a convoy arrived in Tripoli, delivering 117 German (mostly PzKpfw III Ausf J with a 50-mm cannon in 42 calibers) and 79 Italian tanks. Having received this reinforcement, Rommel went on a decisive offensive on January 21. In two days, the Germans advanced 120-130 km east, while the British were rapidly retreating.

The question is natural - if the Germans had neither quantitative nor qualitative superiority over the enemy, then how can their successes be explained? Here is the answer to this question given in his memoirs by Major General von Mellenthin (at that time he served with the rank of major in Rommel's headquarters):

“In my opinion, our victories were determined by three factors: the qualitative superiority of our anti-tank guns, the systematic application of the principle of interaction between military branches and, last but not least, our tactical methods. While the British limited the role of their 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns (very powerful guns) to fighting aircraft, we used our 88-mm guns to shoot both tanks and aircraft. In November 1941, we had only thirty-five 88 mm guns, but moving along with our tanks, these guns inflicted huge losses on the British tanks. In addition, our 50-mm anti-tank guns with a high muzzle velocity were significantly superior to the British two-pounder guns, and batteries of these guns always accompanied our tanks in battle. Our field artillery was also trained to interact with tanks. In short, the German Panzer Division was an extremely flexible formation of all branches of the armed forces, always, both in the offensive and in defense, relying on artillery. The British, on the other hand, considered anti-tank guns to be a defensive weapon and failed to properly use their powerful field artillery, which should have been trained to destroy our anti-tank guns.

Everything that von Mellenthin said, especially regarding the interaction of all types of troops with tanks, was also characteristic of another theater of operations - the Eastern Front, which became the most important for the PzKpfw III, as well as for all other German tanks.

As of June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 235 PzKpfw III tanks with 37 mm guns (another 81 vehicles were under repair). There were significantly more tanks with 50 mm guns - 1090! Another 23 vehicles were under re-equipment. During June, the industry was expected to receive another 133 combat vehicles.

Of this number, 965 PzKpfw III tanks were intended directly for the invasion of the Soviet Union, which were distributed more or less evenly among 16 German tank divisions out of 19 participating in Operation Barbarossa (6th, 7th and 8th tank divisions were armed with Czechoslovak-made tanks). For example, the 1st Panzer Division had 73 PzKpfw IIIs and 5 command PzBfWg IIIs, while the 4th Panzer Division had 105 combat vehicles of this type. Moreover, the vast majority of tanks were armed with 50-mm L / 42 guns.

I must say that the “troikas” as a whole were an equal opponent of most Soviet tanks, in some ways superior to them, but in some ways inferior. In terms of three main evaluation parameters - armament, maneuverability and armor protection - the PzKpfw III was significantly superior only to the T-26. Over the BT-7, the German vehicle had an advantage in armor protection, over the T-28 and KV - in maneuverability. In all three parameters, the "troika" was second only to the T-34. At the same time, the PzKpfw III had an undeniable superiority over all Soviet tanks in the quantity and quality of observation devices, the quality of sights, the reliability of the engine, transmission and chassis. An important advantage was the absolute division of labor of the crew members, which most Soviet tanks could not boast of. The latter circumstances, in the absence of a pronounced superiority in performance characteristics as a whole, allowed the PzKpfw III to emerge victorious in tank duels in most cases. However, when meeting with the T-34, and even more so with the KV, it was very difficult to achieve this - good or bad optics, but the German 50-mm cannon could only penetrate their armor from a very short distance - no more than 300 m. It is no coincidence that that for the period from June 1941 to September 1942, only 7,5% of the total number of T-34 tanks destroyed by artillery became victims of the fire of these guns. At the same time, the main burden of the fight against Soviet medium tanks "fell on the shoulders" of anti-tank artillery - 54.3% of T-34 tanks were hit by fire from 50-mm PaK 38 anti-tank guns during the specified period. The fact is that the anti-tank gun was more powerful than the tank gun, its barrel had a length of 56.6 calibers, and the initial velocity of the armor-piercing projectile was 835 m/s. And she had more chances to meet a Soviet tank.

It follows from the foregoing that the PzKpfw III, the most massive Wehrmacht tank at that time, which also had the greatest anti-tank capabilities, was absolutely powerless against the Soviet T-34s and KVs in 1941. If we take into account the lack of quantitative superiority, it becomes clear how, perhaps without knowing or understanding it, Hitler bluffed when attacking the USSR. In any case, on August 4, 1941, at a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group Center, he said to G. Guderian: “If I knew that the Russians really had such a number of tanks that were given in your book, I probably wouldn’t start this war." (In his book Attention, Tanks!, published in 1937, Guderian pointed out that at that time there were 10,000 tanks in the USSR, but this figure was objected to by the chief of the general staff, Beck, and censorship. ”

However, back to the PzKpfw III. In the six months of 1941, 660 tanks of this type were irretrievably lost, and in the first two months of 1942, another 338. With the then existing rate of production of armored vehicles in Germany, it was not possible to quickly make up for these losses. Therefore, in the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, a chronic shortage of combat vehicles was constantly maintained. Throughout 1942, the PzKpfw III remained the main strike force of the Panzerwaffe, including during large-scale offensive operations on the southern face of the Eastern Front. On August 23, 1942, PzKpfw III Ausf J from the 14th Panzer Corps were the first to reach the Volga north of Stalingrad. During the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus, the PzKpfw III suffered the most severe losses. Moreover, "troikas" armed with both types of guns - 42 and 60 calibers - participated in these battles. The use of a long-barreled 50-mm cannon made it possible to push the distance of a firefight, for example, from the T-34 to almost 500 m. In combination with the rather powerful armor protection of the frontal projection of the PzKpfw III, the chances of both tanks winning were largely equalized. True, the German vehicle could achieve success in battle at such a distance only when using PzGr 40 sub-caliber shells.

In May 1942, the first 19 Ausf J tanks with 50 mm L/60 guns arrived in North Africa. In English documents, these vehicles appear as PzKpfw III Special. On the eve of the battle at El-Gazala, Rommel had only 332 tanks, 223 of them were “troikas”. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the American Grant I tanks that appeared at the front were practically invulnerable to the guns of German tanks. The exceptions were PzKpfw III Ausf J and PzKpfw IV Ausf F2 with long-barreled guns, but Rommel had only 23 such vehicles. Nevertheless, despite the numerical superiority of the British troops, the Germans again went on the offensive, and by June 11 the entire advanced line of strongholds from El-Gazala to Bir-Hakeim was in their hands. For several days of fighting, the British army lost 550 tanks and 200 guns, the British units began a disorderly retreat to the rear defensive position in Egyptian territory near El Alamein.

Heavy fighting on this line began at the end of August 1942. On the eve of the offensive that Rommel launched at this time, the Afrika Korps had 74 PzKpfw III Special. In the course of unsuccessful offensive battles, the Germans suffered heavy losses in equipment, which they could not make up for. By the end of October, only 81 combat-ready tanks remained in the German troops. On October 23, 1029 tanks of General Montgomery's 8th Army went on the offensive. By November 3, the resistance of the German and Italian troops was broken and they began a rapid retreat, abandoning all heavy equipment. In the 15th Panzer Division, for example, by November 10, there were 1,177 personnel left, 16 guns (of which four were 88 mm) and not a single tank. Leaving the whole of Libya, Rommel's army, which received replenishment, in January 1943 was able to stop the British on the border of Tunisia, on the Maret line.

In 1943, a number of PzKpfw III tanks, mainly L and N modifications, took part in the final battles of the African campaign. In particular, the Ausf L tanks of the 15th Panzer Division participated in the defeat of American troops in the Kasserine Pass on February 14, 1943. Ausf N tanks were part of the 501st heavy tank battalion. Their task was to protect the positions of the "Tigers" from attacks by enemy infantry. After the surrender of German troops in North Africa on May 12, 1943, all these tanks became Allied trophies.

The main theater of combat use of the PzKpfw III in 1943 remained the Eastern Front. True, by the middle of the year the PzKpfw IV with long-barreled 75-mm guns transferred the main burden of the fight against Soviet tanks, and the “troikas” increasingly played a supporting role in tank attacks. However, they still made up about half of the Wehrmacht's tank fleet on the Eastern Front. By the summer of 1943, the staff of the German tank division included a two-battalion tank regiment. In the first battalion, one company was armed with "triples", in the second - two. In total, the division was supposed to have 66 linear tanks of this type. The “farewell tour” of the PzKpfw III was Operation Citadel. An idea of ​​​​the presence of PzKpfw III tanks of various modifications in the tank and motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS by the beginning of Operation Citadel is given by the table:

* Percentage of the total number of cars

In addition to these tanks, there were 56 more vehicles in the heavy tank battalions PzAbt 502 and 505, the 656th tank destroyer regiment and other units. According to German data, during July and August 1943, 385 triples were lost. In total, losses during the year amounted to 2719 PzKpfw III units, of which 178 were returned to service after repairs.

By the end of 1943, due to the cessation of production, the number of PzKpfw III in the units of the first line was sharply reduced. A significant number of tanks of this type were transferred to various training and reserve units. They also served in secondary theaters of operations, for example, in the Balkans or in Italy. By November 1944, a little more than 200 PzKpfw III remained in the combat units of the first line: on the Eastern Front - 133, in the West - 35 and in Italy - 49.

As of March 1945, the following number of tanks remained in the troops: PzKpfw III L / 42 - 216; PzKpfw III L/60 - 113; PzKpfw III L/24 - 205; PzBeobWg III - 70; РzBfWg III - 4; Berge-PzKpfw III - 30. Of the line tanks and advanced artillery observer vehicles, 328 units were in the Reserve Army, 105 were used as training, and 164 vehicles were in the front units. distributed as follows: Eastern Front - 16; Western front - 0; Italy - 58; Denmark/Norway - 90.

The German statistics of the last year of the war ends on April 28, and the figures for the presence of PzKpfw III in the troops on this date are almost the same as those given above, which indicates the practical non-participation of the “troikas” in the battles of the last days of the war. According to German data, from September 1, 1939 to April 10, 1945, the irretrievable losses of PzKpfw III tanks amounted to 4706 units.

Tanks PzKpfw III in the Red Army

The use of captured German tanks in the Red Army began from the first days of World War II. However, there is little information on the use of such equipment in 1941, because the battlefield remained with the enemy. However, descriptions of individual episodes give an idea of ​​the events of those days.

So, on July 7, 1941, during a counterattack by the 7th mechanized corps of the Western Front, a military engineer of the 2nd rank Ryazanov from the 18th tank division broke through behind enemy lines on his T-26 tank. A day later, he again went out to his own, removing two T-26s and one captured PzKpfw III with a damaged gun from the encirclement.

The peak of the use of captured armored vehicles, including PzKpfw III tanks (in Soviet documents of those years, the vehicle was called T-III, this Russified index in the post-war years migrated to all domestic military historical publications), fell on 1942-1943. Already in the spring of 1942, a “Memo on the use of captured German combat and auxiliary vehicles” was published, which briefly described the design and controls of all Wehrmacht tanks. Recommendations were also given on starting the engine, driving and using weapons. At the end of 1942, the "Brief Guide to Using the Captured German T-III Tank" was published. This suggests that the "troika" was a fairly common tank in the Red Army, which is confirmed by archival documents.

In February 1942, at the initiative of Lieutenant S. Bykov, the German PzKpfw III tank was restored in the 121st Tank Brigade of the Southern Front. During the attack on February 20 of the enemy stronghold near the village of Aleksandrovka, Bykov's crew on a captured tank moved ahead of other tanks of the brigade. The Germans, mistaking him for their own, missed deep into their positions. Taking advantage of this, our tankers attacked the enemy from the rear and secured the capture of the village with minimal losses. By the beginning of March, four more PzKpfw IIIs had been repaired in the 121st brigade. Of the five captured vehicles, a tank group was formed, which operated very successfully behind enemy lines in the March battles. To distinguish captured tanks from enemy tanks, they were painted dark gray so that they looked like new, and they also set up a signal with flags - “I am mine”. These tanks were used for quite a long time, in any case, during the fighting in the Kharkov direction in the second half of May 1942, two PzKpfw IIIs were still in operation in the 121st Tank Brigade.

In March 1942, captured medium tanks also appeared on the Volkhov front. In particular, they were armed with the third company of the 107th separate tank battalion of the 8th Army. On April 8, 1942, the battalion tanks (10 captured, one KV and one T-34) supported the attack of our infantry in the Venyaglovo area. During this battle, the PzKpfw III under the command of senior sergeant I. Baryshev, together with the battalion of the 1st separate mountain rifle brigade and the 59th ski battalion, broke into the German rear. For four days, tankers and infantry fought surrounded, hoping that reinforcements would arrive. But help never came, so on April 12, Baryshev's tank went to his own, taking out 23 infantrymen on the armor - all that was left of two battalions.

As of July 5, 1942, the 107th battalion, in addition to domestic and captured tanks of other types, had two РzKpfw III.

On the Western Front, in addition to numerous individual vehicles, there were also entire units equipped with captured materiel. From the spring until the end of 1942, there were two battalions of captured tanks, which are referred to in the documents of the front as "separate tank battalions of the letters" B ". One of them was part of the 31st, the other - the 20th army. On August 1, 1942, the first had nine T-60s and 19 German tanks, mainly PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV, the second - 7 PzKpfw IV, 12 PzKpfw III, two assault guns and 10 Czechoslovak
38(t). Until the beginning of 1943, both battalions actively participated in the battles, supporting the infantry with fire and maneuver.

In the autumn of 1943, the largest formation of captured tanks in the Red Army, the 213th tank brigade, fought as part of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. On November 10, 1943, the brigade had four T-34s, 11 PzKpfw IVs and 35 PzKpfw IIIs!

A significant number of captured tanks were used in the troops of the North Caucasian (Transcaucasian) Front, where the 13th German Panzer Division was defeated during October - November 1942. During the counter-offensive that began, Soviet troops captured a significant amount of enemy armored vehicles. This made it possible to form by the beginning of 1943 several units and subunits equipped with captured combat vehicles. So, for example, the 151st Tank Brigade at the end of March received the 2nd Battalion, fully equipped with captured tanks: three PzKpfw IVs, five PzKpfw IIIs and one PzKpfw II. Together with the brigade, the battalion participated in the fighting as part of the 37th Army. The 266th tank battalion fought in the same area, which, in addition to the Soviet ones, had four PzKpfw III tanks.

The 62nd and 75th separate tank battalions fought in the 56th Army of the North Caucasian Front, which also had various types of captured vehicles in service. As for the PzKpfw III, each battalion had two of these tanks. Nine PzKpfw IIIs were part of the 244th Tank Regiment, which arrived at the North Caucasian Front in July 1943. Moreover, captured tanks fought along with the American M3s and M3l, which were the main armament of the regiment.

Perhaps the last episode of the use of captured PzKpfw III tanks by the Soviet troops in relatively large quantities dates back to the end of the summer of 1943. On August 28, 1943, units of the 44th Army were given a separate company of captured tanks from three PzKpfw IV, 13 PzKpfw III and two "Americans" - M3s and M3l. In the next two days, the company, together with the 130th Infantry Division, captured the village of Varenochka and the city of Taganrog. During the battle, the tankers destroyed 10 vehicles, five firing points, 450 enemy soldiers and officers, captured seven vehicles, three repair aircraft, two tractors, three warehouses, 23 machine guns and 250 prisoners. At the same time, five PzKpfw IIIs were hit (one of them burned down), and three were blown up by mines. The company lost seven men killed and 13 wounded.

Speaking about the use of captured PzKpfw III tanks in the Red Army, one cannot ignore the creation of the SU-76I self-propelled artillery mount on its basis.

The self-propelled gun SU-76I (I - "foreign") was created in the spring of 1943 at the plant number 37 in Sverdlovsk by a design team led by A. Kashtanov. At the same time, the chassis of the PzKpfw III tank remained almost unchanged. The turret and top sheet of the turret box were removed. In their place, a four-sided welded cabin was installed, which was bolted to the hull. The wheelhouse housed a 76-mm S-1 self-propelled gun (a variant of the F-34 gun, intended for arming light self-propelled guns) and an ammunition load of 98 rounds. The crew of the SU-76I consisted of four people. Since the PzKpfw III tank chassis of various modifications were used for conversion into self-propelled guns, self-propelled guns also differed from each other both externally and internally. There were, for example, three transmission options.

The SU-76I received its baptism of fire on the Kursk Bulge. By the beginning of July 1943, the 13th Army of the Central Front had 16 vehicles of this type at its disposal. During the attack on Orel, the front was reinforced by two self-propelled artillery regiments, one of which also had vehicles on captured chassis (16 SU-76I and one RzKpfw III). The Voronezh Front included 33 SU-76Is.

In August - September 1943, the 1901st, 1902nd and 1903rd self-propelled artillery regiments armed with self-propelled guns SU-76I participated in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation.

By the end of 1943, there were almost no such vehicles left in the troops. At the beginning of 1944, all SU-76Is were transferred from combat units to training units, where they were operated until the end of 1945.

Machine evaluation

In 1967, in his book Designs and Development of Combat Vehicles, the British tank theorist Richard Ogorkevich outlined a curious theory of the existence of an intermediate class of "light-medium" tanks. In his opinion, the first machine in this class was the Soviet T-26, armed with a 45-mm cannon. In addition, Ogorkevich included the Czechoslovak vehicles Lt-35 and Lt-38, the Swedish La-10, the English Cruisers from Mk I to Mk IV, Soviet tanks of the BT family and, finally, the German PzKpfw III into this category.

Comparative performance characteristics of "light-medium" tanks
tank/option	Year	Weight, kg	Crew	Frontal armor	Gun caliber	Speed
T-26 mod. 1938	1938	10280	3 people	15 mm	45 mm	30 km/h
BT-7 arr. 1937	1937	13900	3 people	20 mm	45 mm	53 km/h
	1935	13900	3 people	20 mm	45 mm	53 km/h
	1937	11000	4 people	25 mm	37 mm	42 km/h
Cruiser Mk III	1937	14200	4 people	14 mm	42 mm	50 km/h
PzKpfw III A	1937	15400	5 people	14.5mm	37 mm	32 km/h

One need only look at the table to see that Ogorkevich's theory makes some sense. Indeed, the performance characteristics of combat vehicles are quite close to each other. In any case, there is no pronounced superiority in anyone's favor. This is all the more important since these tanks have become adversaries on the battlefield. True, by 1939 their performance characteristics had changed a little, mainly in the direction of strengthening the armor, but the main thing remained - all these combat vehicles, to a greater or lesser extent, were a kind of overgrown light tanks. They seemed to have stepped over the upper bar of the light class, but they did not reach the full-fledged middle class.

Nevertheless, in the 1930s, thanks to a successful combination of the main parameters of armament and mobility, "light-medium" tanks were considered universal, equally capable of both supporting infantry and performing the functions of cavalry.

However, the escort proceeded at the speed of an infantryman, and tanks, which had relatively weak armor protection, became easy prey for anti-tank artillery, which was clearly demonstrated in Spain. The second function, which was confirmed already at the very beginning of World War II, also could not be performed independently, they had to be supported or eventually replaced by tanks with more powerful weapons, for example, with a 75-mm cannon, capable of not only hitting enemy equipment, but and conduct effective fire with high-explosive fragmentation shells.

However, the need to combine "light-medium" tanks with tanks armed with a 75-mm cannon came already in the mid-30s. They only solved this problem in different ways: the British installed parts of their cruiser tanks with 76-mm howitzers instead of 2-pounder guns in the standard turrets, several hundred BT-7A artillery tanks with a 76-mm gun in an enlarged turret were fired in the USSR, while the Germans went along the most cardinal and least simple way to create two tanks.

Indeed, in 1934, four German firms received an order to develop two different tanks under the mottos ZW ("company commander's vehicle") and BW ("battalion commander's vehicle"). It goes without saying that these were only nominal mottos. The specifications for these machines were close. Base weight, for example, 15 and 18 tons, respectively. Significant differences were only in armament: one car had to carry a 37-mm gun, the other - a 75-mm gun. The closeness of the terms of reference eventually led to the creation of two vehicles that were almost identical in weight, dimensions and armor, but differed in armament and completely different in design - PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV.

At the same time, the layout of the second was clearly more successful. It is enough to look at the schemes of armored hulls to be convinced of this. The PzKpfw IV has a narrower lower part of the hull than the PzKpfw III, but the Krupp linkers, having expanded the turret box to the middle of the fenders, brought the clear diameter of the turret ring to 1680 mm versus 1520 mm for the PzKpfw III. In addition, due to the more compact and rational layout of the engine compartment, the PzKpfw IV has a noticeably larger control compartment. The result is obvious: the PzKpfw III does not have landing hatches for the driver and gunner-radio operator. What this can lead to if it is necessary to urgently leave a wrecked tank is clear without explanation. In general, with almost the same overall dimensions, the armored volume of the PzKpfw III was less than that of the PzKpfw IV.

It should be emphasized that both machines were created in parallel, each according to its own terms of reference and there was no competition between them. It is all the more difficult to explain the appearance of such close terms of reference and the subsequent adoption of both tanks. It would be much more logical to accept one tank, but with two weapons options. Such a decision would entail significantly less costs in the future. It is quite obvious that by launching into serial production two almost identical in all parameters, but differing in armament and different in design, the Germans made a mistake. However, we should not forget that we are talking about 1934 - 1937, when it was difficult to guess the path that tank building would take.

In its own category of "light-medium" tanks, the PzKpfw III turned out to be the most modern, inheriting the shortcomings characteristic of light tanks to the least extent. After its armor and armament were strengthened, and the mass exceeded 20 tons, which practically made the “troika” a medium tank, the superiority over the former “colleagues” increased even more. It was multiplied many times over by the superiority in tactical methods of using tank units and formations. As a result, the German command in the first two years of the war did not have much reason to worry about the combat qualities of the PzKpfw III.

The situation completely changed in 1941, when the Germans faced the T-34 on the Eastern Front, and the Grant in Africa. PzKpfw III also had certain advantages over them. In particular, he surpassed the T-34 in terms of the number and quality of observation and aiming devices, the convenience of the crew, ease of control and technical reliability. The "Grant" was all right with surveillance devices and reliability, but in design and layout it was inferior to the "troika". However, all these advantages were negated by the main thing: both of these vehicles were designed as part of the promising concept of a “universal” tank, designed to replace both “light-medium” and support tanks. In the USSR, the understanding of the need for such a replacement came as a result of a long evolution of “light-medium” tanks. There was no evolution at all in the USA, but the Americans made quick and, most importantly, correct conclusions from someone else's experience.

And what about the Germans? Apparently, by the middle of 1941 they fully realized the seriousness of the mistake they had made. On September 6, 1941, a report was presented to Hitler, which substantiated the benefits of the "unification" of PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV. The case was set in motion, and several firms were tasked with developing various options for the Panzerkampfwagen III und IV n.A. (n.A. - neue Ausfuhrung - new performance).

The Krupp firm built two prototypes, which were the PzKpfw III with a new undercarriage intended for the PzKpfw III / IV. The road wheels were staggered, the suspension was torsion bar. Both machines have been tested for a long time at various test sites. Other suspension and chassis options were also worked out. Design and testing led at the beginning of 1942 to the creation of a unified chassis Geschutzwagen III / IV, in which the road wheels, suspension, support rollers, idlers and tracks were borrowed from the PzKpfw IV Ausf F tank, and the drive wheels, engine and gearbox were taken from PzKpfw III Ausf J. But the idea of ​​a "single" tank was buried in March 1942, after the PzKpfw IV Ausf F was equipped with a 75-mm cannon with a barrel length of 43 calibers, overnight and without hassle turning a support tank into a "universal ".

It was impossible to apply such a solution to the PzKpfw III. An indispensable condition for the creation of a "universal" tank was the presence of a long-barreled gun with a caliber of at least 75 mm, which could not be installed in the PzKpfw III turret without significant alterations in the design of the tank. And with a 50-mm gun, even with a length of 60 calibers, the “troika” remained the same “light-medium” tank. But she didn’t have any “colleagues” - opponents. The removal of the PzKpfw III from production in the summer of 1943 was the only and, I must say, belated release.

As a result, the "universal" "four" was in mass production until the end of the war, the Geschutzwagen III / IV chassis was actively used to create various self-propelled guns ... But what about the "troika"? Alas, the mistake made by the customer when choosing the type of tank devalued the work of designers and manufacturers. In the tank "palette" of the Panzerwaffe, the "troika" turned out to be superfluous.

Not so long ago, the restoration of the German Pz.III tank was completed, about the process of which we have a small photo report:. Now let's look inside and look at the jobs of the tank crew.

2. The crew of the PzKpfw III consisted of five people: a driver and a gunner-radio operator who were in the control compartment and a commander, gunner and loader who were located in a three-man turret.

3. At the bottom of the photo, on the left, is the driver's seat, at the bottom right of the gunner-radio operator. A gearbox is installed between them.

4. Place of the driver's mechanic. The viewing slot has an armored shutter with several positions, clearly visible in the photographs from the outside. Side clutches are painted gray, thanks to which the tank turns.

5. The place of the gunner-radio operator.

6. View of the fighting compartment from the driver's seat. The transmission tunnel is painted gray at the bottom, inside of which there is a cardan shaft that transmits engine torque to the gearbox. In the side lockers were laying shells. Triple tower.

7. Gunner's sight. On the right is the breech of the gun with a stamped year of manufacture, 1941.

Photographer: Andrey Moiseenkov.

We express our gratitude to the staff of the Central Museum of armored weapons and equipment for their assistance in photography.