Lieutenant Sergei Kravchenko 131st brigade fate. The mystery of the death of the Maykop brigade. Desperate decisions, desperate measures

15 years ago, the "New Year's assault" on Grozny ended. And in these battles, the Russian army suffered the biggest losses since the end of the Great Patriotic War. One of the mysteries of these battles was the dramatic fate of the 131st motorized rifle brigade, stationed before this war in Maykop. In this article, we will try to deal with the myths that have developed around these events. We will try, based on facts, to present our version of the actions of the Sever group and about 2 days of fighting: December 31, 1994-January 1, 1995, the most difficult two days in the recent history of the Russian army.

THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE STORM - the capture of the "Presidential Palace of Dudaev" (the former Republican Committee of the CHIASSR) went to the group "North". The general command of the North group was carried out by Major General K.B. Pulikovsky. The number of personnel of the units is not clear for certain, most likely, it differs from the official one in a smaller direction, but since. there are no other data at the moment, we will take the official data from the site "chechnya.genstab.ru" as a basis. In total, the group consisted of 4097 people, 82 tanks, 211 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 64 guns and mortars. The group included the 131st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMBR), the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (GvMSP) and the 276th GvMSP, as well as attached and auxiliary units and units of the Internal Troops. The consolidated detachment of the 131st brigade under the command of Colonel I. Savin consisted of 1469 personnel, 42 BMP-2s, 26 T-72A tanks and 16 artillery pieces. The 81st regiment under the command of Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev consisted of 1331 people (including 157 officers, it is characteristic that 66 officers in the platoon-company link and had only a military department of a civilian university behind them), 96 infantry fighting vehicles, 31 tanks (T-80BV and several T-80Bs) and 24 artillery pieces (self-propelled guns "Gvozdika"). The 276th regiment under the command of Colonel A. Bunin consisted of 1297 people, 73 BMP-1s, 31 tanks (T-72B1) and 24 artillery pieces (it must be said that at one time as many as 120 BMPs were attributed to the brigade, but the refutation of this is below).

By December 31, the units were at the following points:

131st brigade - 1 battalion on the southern slopes of the Tersky ridge in the area 3 km north of Sadovoye, 2 battalions concentrated in the MTF area 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky;

81st regiment - from 12/27/94, 3 km south of the lane. Kolodezny with the main forces, since the morning of December 28, 1994, 1.5 km north of Grozny;

276th regiment - on the northern slopes of the Tersky Range.

At least 400 people entered Grozny from the 276th regiment, 426 people entered the city from the 81st regiment, including a tank battalion. From the brigade - 446, including the "help column".

On December 30, at a meeting, the units received orders. The brigade was to advance on the morning of the 31st to the area of ​​the old airfield and take up defense there. The 81st regiment's primary task was to occupy the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky intersection by 16:00, the next task was to block the building of the Republican Committee and occupy the station. The 276th regiment was to take up positions on the outskirts of Sadovoye on the 31st until further notice.

The introduction of troops into the city, scheduled for the 31st, was unexpected for everyone, because. not all parts have yet been replenished with people, not all have properly coordinated.

Be that as it may, but on the morning of the 31st, the units began to move. The Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky crossroads was already occupied by 11 a.m., the second battalion could not pass through the Rodina state farm due to heavy fire from the militants and was ordered by General Pulikovsky to turn back and proceed to the next task, which was done after the artillery had processed the houses of the Ippodromny microdistrict, from where dense fire of militants. At the same time, the 131st brigade completed the task and took up positions on the outskirts of the city, moving on to equipping the defense area. But unexpectedly, she withdrew and went with one battalion to the station, and the second to the market. The regiment reached the square. Ordzhonikidze, where a traffic jam had formed, leaving one company to cover.

But soon the commander of the regiment, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, ordered the chief of staff of the regiment, Burlakov, to bring everything that could be pulled out to the station. While the regiment was moving towards Ordzhonikidze Square, they were overtaken by the equipment of the 131st brigade. As a result, both the regiment and the brigade reached the station almost simultaneously, where the regiment occupied the freight station, and the first battalion of the brigade - the station, the second rolled back to the freight station after being attacked by militants. After occupying the defense, the brigade and regiment at the station were attacked. The attacks continued until the very exit of the units from the station. Part of the equipment was burned, part was damaged, but fought as long as there was ammunition. Losses at this point were small. But the situation worsened sharply because other units did not fulfill their tasks.

The units of Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin that came out to the hospital were very few in number, because. part of the forces were forced to leave at checkpoints along the route of movement, the Internal Troops did not approach. On New Year's Eve, one battalion of the 276th regiment began to change the 33rd regiment at checkpoints. The assembled column has arrived. But having lost a lot of equipment, she could only go to the freight station. It became clear that the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment needed to leave the city, but the brigade's exit turned out to be unsuccessful: the column was ambushed at the motor depot. Two infantry fighting vehicles were lost, most of the wounded died with them, the brigade commander died, when the main part of the regiment left, the battalion commander Perepelkin and the commander of the third company Prokhorenko were killed. The total losses at the end of January 2 were:

In the 131st brigade, 142 people were lost alone, how many were wounded, missing - there are no exact data (according to other sources, 167 people died, including the brigade commander Colonel A. Savin, deputy brigade commanders for armament and educational work, in addition, 60 soldiers and sergeants died, 72 people were missing). Those. out of 446 people who entered the city, 289 remained in the ranks, or 65%;

In the 81st regiment (possibly for the entire period of hostilities): 134 killed, 160 wounded, 56 missing, according to the report of the chief of staff of the regiment Burlakov, 56 people died (of which 8 officers), 146 were wounded (of which 31 officer, 6 warrant officers), 28 people were missing (of which 2 officers), 87 people were sick (of which 8 officers and 3 warrant officers) - these data are more accurate. According to official data, on January 10, the regiment lost 63 servicemen killed, 75 missing, 135 wounded;

In the 276th regiment: at least 42 people were killed, at least 2 of them were missing, there are no data on the wounded.

Losses of equipment amounted to:

The 131st brigade lost, according to A. Sapronov, 15 tanks and 47 infantry fighting vehicles, military journalist Viktor Litovkin gives other figures: “20 out of 26 tanks were lost, 18 out of 120 infantry fighting vehicles were evacuated from Grozny, all 6 Tunguskas were destroyed”;

81st regiment - 23 tanks, 32 - BMP-2, 4 - armored personnel carriers, 2 tractors - 2, 1 "Tunguska" 1 MTLB;

276th Regiment - at least 15 BMP-1s, at least 5 T-72B1 tanks.

SEVERAL VERSIONS OF what happened to the 131st Brigade and the 81st Regiment were put forward, the versions were both official and journalistic, but mostly with a negative connotation discrediting the personnel of the units. Here are some of them: “The brigade missed the right turn and went to the station, where, without reconnaissance, they became columns along the streets”, “The columns stood along the streets and froze. The brigade commander did not organize security, did not take up defense, did not conduct reconnaissance. The brigade just stood and seemed to be waiting for the time when, finally, the “Chechs” would come to their senses and begin to burn it. Dudayev sent reconnaissance three times (!!!) to clarify the actions of the Russians, and three times the reconnaissance reported that the Russian columns were standing on Pervomaiskaya and Station Station without movement, without guards, and that part of the soldiers and officers were wandering around the neighborhood in search of working shops ( New Year is just around the corner! And then Maskhadov ordered to collect all the grenade launchers who were in the city and pull them to the station, “the brigade entered the city under fire”, “Savin died in captivity, he was shot”, “everyone was drunk”, etc.

Let's try to deal with these myths and tell how things really were.

Initially, the role of commander of the forces introduced into the city was assigned to General Lev Rokhlin. Here is how Lev Yakovlevich himself describes it (quote from the book “The Life and Death of a General”): “Before the storming of the city,” says Rokhlin, “I decided to clarify my tasks. Based on the positions we occupied, I believed that the Eastern Group, which I was offered to command, should be headed by another general. And it is expedient to appoint me to command the Northern grouping. On this subject, I had a conversation with Kvashnin. He appointed General Staskov to command the Eastern Group. "And who will command the North?" - I ask. Kvashnin replies: “I. We will set up a forward command post in Tolstoy-Yurt. You know what a powerful group this is: T-80 tanks, BMP-3. (Then there were almost no such people in the troops.) "-" And what is my task? - I ask. "Go to the palace, occupy it, and we will come." I say: “Have you watched the speech of the Minister of Defense on television? He said that the city is not attacked by tanks.” This task was taken from me. But I insist: “What is my task anyway?” - “You will be in reserve,” they answer. “You will cover the left flank of the main group.” And they set a route. After this conversation with Rokhlin, Kvashnin began to give orders to units directly. So, the 81st regiment was given the task of blocking the Reskom, while the tasks were brought to the units at the very last moment.

Secrecy was held by Colonel-General Anatoly Kvashnin in a separate line, apparently, it was some kind of Kvashnin's "know-how", everything was hidden, and the task was set directly in the direction of movement of the units, the trouble is that the units acted independently, separately, prepared for one thing, but were forced to do something completely different. Inconsistency, lack of interconnection - this is another distinguishing feature of this operation. Apparently, the whole operation was based on the belief that there would be no resistance. It only says that the leadership of the operation was out of touch with reality.

Until December 30, the commanders of units and battalions did not know either about their routes or about the tasks in the city. No documents were processed. Until the last moment, the officers of the 81st regiment believed that the task of the day was the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky crossroads. Before the regiment entered the city, its command was asked how long it would take to bring it to combat readiness? The command reported: at least two weeks and replenishment of people, because. the regiment is now "bare armour". To solve the problem with the lack of people, the 81st regiment was promised 196 reinforcements for the landing of infantry fighting vehicles, as well as 2 regiments of the Internal Troops to clean up the quarters passed by the regiment.

After a meeting on December 30, Colonel General Kvashnin ordered an officer to be sent for replenishment, but due to bad weather, people could not be delivered on time. Then it was proposed to take two battalions of explosives as a landing force, the commander of the regiment Martynychev was sent for them, but the command of the Internal Troops did not give up the battalions. That is why it turned out that the 81st regiment went to the city of Grozny with "bare armor", having at best 2 people in the infantry fighting vehicle, and often not having it at all!

At the same time, the regiment received a strange order: one battalion had to, bypassing Resk, go to the station, and then behind its back the second battalion had to block Resk, that is, without securing the occupation of one line, it was necessary to go to the next, which contradicts the charter, methods . In fact, this separated the first battalion from the main forces of the regiment. Why the station was needed, one can only guess - apparently, this is also part of the "know-how".

The regiment commander Yaroslavtsev recalls these days in the following way: “I ... worked with the battalion commanders, but we didn’t have time to outline, of course, it’s supposed to, not only to the company, you need to go down to the platoon to show where to get what. But due to the fact that like this - go ahead, come on, the first battalion ... take the station and surround, take possession of it, and the second battalion advance and surround Dudayev's palace ... they didn’t paint where and what, the battalion commander himself made the decision where to send, according to the situation. ... The immediate task was to reach the crossroads ... Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky, then the next one - the station, the other - Dudayev's palace. ... but it was not described in detail, because there was no time, nothing, but in theory, each platoon needs to be painted where it should be, where to go, until what time and what to do. As far as I understood, the commanders thought like this: with bare armor and surround, stand, point the barrels there, and partially, for example, if there is no one there, with infantry, report that he is surrounded ... And then they will say - we will bring up some kind of negotiation group, or there are scouts, and they will go forward!

We could still suppress a small center of resistance, and with organized mass resistance, they began to crush us. At the same time, in the 81st motorized rifle regiment, out of 56 platoon commanders, 49 were graduates of civilian universities, called up for two years. There is no need to talk about the level of their training. Many died in Grozny, sharing the fate of their soldiers.”

Major Rustem Klupov, Assistant Chief of Intelligence of the 131st Brigade: “I didn’t know where we were going, I didn’t know our task. I found out that we were going to the station at the intersection where we met with the 81st regiment, Savin sent me on the radio, maybe he was afraid that they were listening to us, since he had a closed channel, and I had a closed channel did not have. Further, the 1st battalion and the brigade's headquarters advanced along Rabochaya Street to the railway station (approximately 13:00-14:00). An incomplete battalion of the 81st regiment under the control of S. Burlakov is already located here.

Parts of the brigade exactly went to the station and the goods station, so G. Troshev’s conclusions that “the consolidated detachment of the brigade slipped through the desired intersection, got lost and eventually went to the railway station” (see Troshev G. “My War” ) are unfounded. In fact, Colonel Savin fulfilled the task of command exactly. 3 MSR has become a front to the piece of iron, disperses and takes up defense. There was only 1 BMP on the platform. The rest are near the platform, but are hidden either behind stalls or behind buildings. That is, there can be no talk about how they came out somehow carelessly. The equipment was hidden as best they could, but there is actually nowhere to hide it.

I would like to say a separate word about the instructions received by the units before leaving for the city. Units were forbidden to occupy buildings, excluding administrative ones, to break benches, trash cans, etc., to check documents from people they met with weapons, to confiscate weapons, to shoot only as a last resort. What the command was counting on was clear, blind confidence in the absence of resistance from the militants. They learned nothing from the storming of Grozny by the opposition on 26 November.

ALL PARTS MANAGEMENT was carried out by the "come on, come on" method. The commanders who ruled from afar did not know how the situation in the city was developing. To force the troops to move forward, they blamed the commanders: “everyone has already reached the city center and is about to take the palace, and you are marking time ...”. As the commander of the 81st regiment, Colonel Alexander Yaroslavtsev, later testified, to his request regarding the position of the neighbor on the left, the 129th regiment of the Leningrad Military District, he received an answer that the regiment was already on Mayakovsky Street. “This is the pace,” the colonel thought then (“Red Star”, 01/25/1995). It could not have crossed his mind that this was far from the case ... Moreover, the closest neighbor on the left of the 81st regiment was the combined detachment of the 8th corps, and not the 129th regiment, which was advancing from the Khankala region. Although it is on the left, it is very far away. On Mayakovsky Street, judging by the map, this regiment could only be bypassing the city center and passing by the presidential palace. Therefore, it is not clear whether the command of the group did not look at the map at all and did not understand what Colonel Yaroslavtsev was asking about, or the commander of the 81st regiment himself did not know who his closest neighbor was, or, perhaps, the journalists who interviewed Yaroslavtsev , all mixed up?

In any case, this suggests that no one really imagined the picture of what was happening, and the interaction was established in such a way that it misled not only the participants in the battles, but also those who later undertook to study their course ... ".

Misunderstanding of the situation leads to the fact that on the morning of January 1, two mutually exclusive orders are issued one after the other:

“7.15 - combat order of O.G.V. No. … 1.00 h. 1.01.95 map. 50 thousand editions, 1985

The commander ordered:

3/276 SMEs by Z.00 today withdraw to the location of 1/33 SMEs (square on Kruglov St.), where to transfer the commander of the operational group of 8 AK to operational subordination.

Subdivisions of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, 1/81 SMEs from the occupied areas should organize close fire and tactical cooperation between themselves and the units of the combined detachment of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, as they enter the area of ​​the loading area of ​​the Grozny station. Replenishment of materiel is to be carried out from imported stocks and a consolidated detachment.

By 06:00 today, take at your disposal the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 28th Army Corps of the Siberian Military District in the area of ​​the Grozny airfield and subsequently use it to carry out combat missions in the northern and northwestern directions.

In the morning today, after the transfer of the occupied lines of 503 SMEs to 19 Motor Rifle Division, carry out the disarmament or destruction of bandit formations in the area of ​​​​the station, the presidential palace, the intersection of Griboedov St. and Pobedy Avenue by the end of the day with the forces of 131 Omsbr, part of the forces of 81 SMEs. and 81 SMEs to capture the presidential palace.

“01.01.95, resolution (to the head of the operational department of the corps, room 81 SMEs, 206 SMEs; 131 Omsbr).

Execute the order.

81 SMEs block the area near the palace.

131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, after concentrating at the station, advance north to the palace area along the street. Komsomolskaya, 74 omsbr go to the square. Friendship of Peoples on Mayakovsky Street and block the intersection of st. Griboyedov - Pobedy Ave. part of the forces, along Mayakovsky Street. Subdivisions of the 131st Omsbr to operate in a northerly direction along the street. Chernyshevsky to the palace.

Pulikovsky.

These documents very clearly testify to the dramatic conditions in which the command of the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment found themselves, how difficult it was to make decisions in these circumstances and under what psychological pressure they acted.

Separately, I want to talk about intelligence:

Regiment commander Yaroslavtsev: “When Kvashnin assigned us the task, he sent us to the GRU colonel to get information about the enemy, but he did not say anything specific. Everything is common. There, northwest of Grozny, southwest of Grozny, there is a grouping of so many. I tell him, wait, which northwest, southeast, I'm drawing a route for you, Bohdan Khmelnitsky, so I'm walking along it, tell me what I can meet there. He answers me, here, according to our data, there are sandbags in the windows, here there may or may not be a stronghold. He didn’t even know if the streets were blocked there or not, so they gave me these fools (UR-77 “Meteorite”) to blow up the barricades, but nothing was blocked there. In short, there was no intelligence, either in terms of the number or location of the militants.”

Maps were a rarity, no one saw the plans of the city at all. For example, Vadim Shibkov, an ensign of the 131st Brigade, a participant in the battles, recalls this: “There was a map, but the scale was 1:50,000 and the old one, from the 70s, it was impossible to correct it and direct it in the city, because of this, the artillery of the brigade beat not very accurate." There were no topographical plans for Grozny in the company-platoon link. The battalion commanders had maps at a scale of 1:50,000. The same was true for the 131st brigade and the 276th regiment.

Because of the maps in Sadovoe, the 276th regiment suffered losses. On the map, the bridge where they were supposed to stop looked large, in fact, no one even noticed this bridge, it was so small, and the BRD moved on, stopping at the next one. Resembling the one on the map, the bridge came under fire.

While the regiment was marching towards Resky and the railway station, the 131st brigade was to take up positions on the outskirts of the city, two kilometers east of Sadovaya, in order to ensure the passage of other troops to the city of Grozny, which was exactly done by 11 o'clock in the morning. There was practically no resistance, only intelligence destroyed the forward patrol of the militants. At 12 noon, on the radio, Lieutenant-General Pulikovsky K. B., commander of the North group at that time, gave the order for the brigade to enter the city of Grozny. The battalions received this order from Colonel Durnev, who came directly to the location of the battalions. At the same time, the brigade did not receive written combat and graphic documents with an order to enter the city of Grozny. After passing through Mayakovsky Street, the corps headquarters unexpectedly gave the brigade the command to take the railway station, which was not originally planned at all.

Who gave the order to the brigade to go to the station?

Lev Rokhlin says (based on the book “The Life and Death of a General”): “Pulikovskiy says that he did not give the command to the 131st brigade to seize the station. The advanced command post of the Northern Group was never deployed. They commanded directly from Mozdok. Therefore, it is difficult to find out who gave the command ... I know that, unlike me, Pulikovsky did not know until the last moment whether he would command anything at all in this operation. After all, Kvashnin himself declared himself the commander of everything and everything. Pulikovsky could not draw up a detailed plan of action and give the necessary orders. Kvashnin decided everything.

In the "Workbook of the operational group of the combat control center of the 8th Guards. AK” the words of the commander are recorded: “Gen. Shevtsov at 16 o’clock was to give them (the brigade and regiment) a task so that they would give the position of the troops around the palace. The general received no information. Three years later, on December 28, 1997, Mikhail Leontiev, host of the TV Center TV program “Actually”, will blame General Leonty Shevtsov for the death of the 131st brigade, who, according to the journalist, gave her that ill-fated order - go to the railway station ... So Pulikovsky's words in the film "Operation without a name" that "I don't know how the brigade ended up at the station" are most likely true.

From the same book ("The Life and Death of a General"):

FROM THE “WORKBOOK OF THE OPERATIONAL GROUP OF THE COMBAT CONTROL CENTER OF THE 8th Guards. AK":

2 SMEs 81 SMEs - around the palace.

1 msb ... (inaudible).

131st brigade - with two battalions takes up defense near the railway. station."

This is the last record of the position of these units on the first day of the assault.

The 131st brigade had no mission,” says Rokhlin. She was in reserve. Who ordered her to seize the railway station - one can only guess.

So who set the tasks and directly developed this "operation"?

IN THE FILM "NEW YEAR'S EVE OF THE 81st REGIMENT", the regiment commander Alexander Yaroslavtsev claimed that Kvashnin personally set the task for him, "drawn and erased the arrows." We find confirmation of this in the above passage from the book:

Rokhlin: And who will command the "Northern" (grouping)?

Kvashnin: I ... "

Later, Kvashnin and Shevtsov would step into the shadows, leaving Pulikovsky to deal with everything. Kvashnin will generally be called a "representative of the General Staff", no written orders given to them were found and he did not bear any responsibility for these events. However, like all the other participants in this story.

FROM THE LETTER OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION YU.I. SKURATOV TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE DUMA G.N.

“In accordance with the State Duma Decree of December 25, 1996 No. 971-11 GD “On Consideration of the Circumstances and Causes of the Mass Death of Russian Federation Military Personnel on the Territory of the Chechen Republic in the Period from December 9, 1994 to September 1, 1996 and Measures to Strengthen Defense the country and the security of the state” I inform you: ... the circumstances of the death of the personnel of the 131st separate motorized rifle brigade (military unit 09332), which stormed the city of Grozny on December 31, 1994 - January 1, 1995, are being checked, during which 25 officers and ensigns, 60 soldiers and sergeants, and 72 servicemen of the brigade were missing.

From the explanations of the participants in these events, the documents seized during the inspection, it follows that at the end of December 1994 in the city of Mozdok, the high command of the RF Ministry of Defense set the general task of liberating the city of Grozny.

Colonel-General A. V. Kvashnin (at that time a representative of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) set the specific task of bringing troops into the city, movement routes and interaction.

The 131st brigade was tasked with concentrating two kilometers east of Sadovaya by December 27, 1994, in order to ensure the passage of other troops to the city of Grozny. Subsequently, the brigade occupied the line along the Neftyanka River and was on it until 11 o'clock on December 31, after which, by radio, Lieutenant General Pulikovsky K. B., who commanded the North group at that time, gave the order to enter the city of Grozny. The brigade received no written combat and graphic documents. After passing along Mayakovsky Street, the corps headquarters ordered the brigade to take the railway station, which was not originally planned.

Having seized the station, the brigade fell into a dense fiery ring of illegal armed formations and suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment.

As can be seen from the audit materials, Pulikovsky had to decide on the thorough preparation of the operation, but this was not fully done, which was one of the reasons for the death of a large number of personnel of the 131st brigade.

The actions of Pulikovsky are seen as signs of a crime under Art. 260-1 at paragraph "c" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, namely, the negligent attitude of an official to the service, which entailed grave consequences.

However, a criminal case cannot be initiated, since on April 19, 1995, the State Duma announced an amnesty in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, and the offense committed by Pulikovsky fell under its action.

I would like to end the article with an excerpt from the same book “The Life and Death of a General”:

“The plan of operation developed by Grachev and Kvashnin became, in fact, a plan for the destruction of the troops,” says General Rokhlin. - Today I can say with full confidence that it was not justified by any operational-tactical calculations. Such a plan has a well-defined name - an adventure. And given that hundreds of people died as a result of its implementation, this is a criminal adventure ... "

Lieutenant Arvid Kalnin, commander of the 4th rv of the 131st brigade, Lieutenant Arvid Kalnin: “Colonel Savin contacted us by radio at about 11 pm and asked us to urgently gather a convoy and come to the rescue. We then stood in the area of ​​the cannery.<...>The column began to be assembled only after four. "1

ZNSh 131st Omsbr, Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Zelensky: "On the first of January at eight in the morning, I gathered all the remnants of the brigade - a special forces group, a reconnaissance company, other units, formed a column, the leadership of which was assumed by the deputy commander of the 131st Omsbr, Colonel [Viktor Pavlovich] Andrievsky."2

The summary column included:

- 131 Omsbr. pp, part 1 of the SSB and logistics units,
- 690 or 691 ooSpN. Total: 8 people3,
– 276 ms. 2nd MSR4, platoon 1 tr5 and 2 "Shilka"6.

According to various estimates, there were at least 40 vehicles in the convoy (or 46 vehicles - 16 combat and 30 wheeled vehicles7):

- BMP rr and 1 msb 131 omsbr,
- 1 KShM 131 omsbr,
- TZM,
- wheeled vehicles ("fuel trucks and "Urals" with ammunition"8),
- 4 tanks T-72B1 276 smp,
- 10 BMP-1 2 MSR 276 MSP,
- 2 ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" 276 ms.

The commander of the 4th rv 131st brigade, senior lieutenant A. Kalnin: "We entered Grozny on January 1, at about nine in the morning."9

9:26 - The brigade commander is negotiating with Colonel Andreevsky, orienting him to the entrance to the city to provide assistance.<...>
10:08 - Colonel Andreevsky entered the city, focused on interaction with the forces of the 19th motorized rifle division (hereinafter - MRD) in combat operations for a breakthrough to the station.
10:23 - "Leska-12" reached the tracks [crossroads of st. Popovich and st. Mayakovsky?].<...>
10:32 - A grenade launcher hit Leska-12 - by.
10:36 - "Caliber-10" warned "Leska-12" that there were grenade launchers on the left, "Leska" saw the 2nd SSB.
10:38 - The enemy fires heavily at Leska-12.
10:43 - "Leska-12" is forced to take up defensive positions, it is surrounded by grenade launchers and shot at close range.
10:50 - "Leska-12" was hit, the column was stopped.10

From the description of the battle: “Having entered the city from the north, it [the column] goes out onto Mayakovsky Street and starts moving along it to the station.<...>From the beginning, the column moved almost without resistance. But before reaching the station 150-200 meters, the first car is knocked out from an ambush [probably at the intersection of st. Popovich and st. Mayakovsky]. The column stops. The fight begins. Chechens are beating from houses along Mayakovsky Street. Colonel Andrievsky gives the command to the first cars to turn around and start moving along Rabochaya Street. "11

The movement of the head of the column on the street. Working

The commander of the 4th rv 131 omsbr, senior lieutenant A. Kalnin: “We walked along Rabochaya street - I saw this name on the wall of the house. We didn’t know where to go. None of the officers even had a map. We walked blindly. I was the commander of the BMP [#018]."12

The commander of the BS 131 Omsbr, Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Nazarov: “When our second column went to help, the streets were already blocked off in the right places. Therefore, our inexperienced driver, meeting some kind of barrier on his way, naturally turned onto a free street. were already fired from mortars, and our equipment was calmly shot. , and we have Lenin, Lermontov or Sovetskaya streets on the map ... We did not have any coordination. We did not know at all what was happening around. "13

The driver of BMP No. 018 rr 131 omsbr private Anatoly Zabolotnev: "We pulled ahead<...>on three machines - 2 infantry fighting vehicles and KShMka. We didn’t get to the station for about a quarter "14. The cars were ambushed at the intersection of Komsomolskaya St. and Rabochaya St. 15.

The commander of the 4th rv 131st brigade, senior lieutenant A. Kalnin: “In the area of ​​​​the station, the column came under massive shelling. Only Savin’s voice was on the air, who corrected the artillerymen who were at the Tolstoy-Yurt base, the crews of all other vehicles did not get in touch so that do not drown out the voice of the brigade commander. There was a continuous battle. "16

1. BMP-2 №015

In the car were:

1. Deputy for armament of the 131st Omsbr Colonel Nikolai Ivanovich Pikha
2. Commander of the RR 131 Omsbr Captain Oleg Petrovich Tyrtyshny17
3. Group commander 690 ooSpN ZKVR Captain Igor Viktorovich Lelyukh
4. commander of department 690 ooSpN ensign Andrey Vasilyevich Zagorsky
5. squad leader 690 ooSpN ensign Alexander Zagorodnev
6. senior intelligence officer 690 ooSpN warrant officer Sergey Gennadievich Pronyaev
7. driver rr 131 omsbr corporal Vladimir Alekseevich Bukin18
8. Petty Officer RR 131 Omsbr Alexander Viktorovich Suslov
9. Sergeant Vladislav Viktorovich Pivovarov, commander of the RR department of the 131st Omsbr
10. junior sergeant rr 131 omsbr Alexander Leonidovich Sidorenko
11. Private RR 131 Omsbr Sumgat Kairolaevich Ospanov

ZKVR rr 131 omsbr lieutenant Sergey Kravchenko: "After literally 15 meters, the first car exploded on a landmine. After that, a grenade launcher hit it from the top floor."19 It happened around 11:37.20

From the description of the battle: "Kravchenko saw how the troops fell from behind, how he managed to jump out of the Tyrtyshny tower. Meanwhile, the sluggish shooting from the attics and upper floors of buildings grew into a real flurry. "Untrained, peaceful" Chechens fought according to all the rules of military science. They set fire to the first and the last combat vehicles, dooming the entire column to death, squeezed in the narrow streets between houses spitting fire. Its density exceeded all expectations. It seemed to the guys sitting under the armor that a large hail had fallen. Bullets and fragments clattered on the armor in tens. the sky was now and then torn apart by crimson jets of grenades flying from above."21

From the description of the battle: "Once at the crossroads, Igor Lelyukh decides to cover the passing column with fire and the retreat from the car of soldiers and officers of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade. Igor took up a firing position and opened fire on the five-story building from which his car was hit. At the corner of the streets Rabochaya and Komsomolskaya Andrei Zagorsky with a machine gun covers his commander from the Chechens firing along Rabochaya Street.The Chechens begin to move towards the intersection along this street.Sergey Pronyaev at the beginning of the battle fired, hiding behind the BMP, ensured the withdrawal of soldiers and officers of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade to the side Alexander Zagorodnev took a position across the street from Andrey Zagorsky and cut off the Chechens, who tried to make their way to the crossroads from the wasteland.<...>Colonel Pikha, deputy commander of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade for weapons, was wounded in the leg while leaving the car. The nearby reconnaissance officer of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, foreman Pivovarov, is helping him and trying to get him out of the shelling. But before reaching the nearest houses, both were killed by machine-gun fire. Captain Tyrtyshny, having made his way with four soldiers to Mayakovsky Street [?], come under fire from militants and accept the battle. At first, the captain fires from a machine gun, and when the cartridges run out, he enters into hand-to-hand combat with the Dudaevites. The brutal militants beat the officer to death. The driver-mechanic Private Bukin V., wounded, was picked up by local residents and died in their arms. He spoke about the last minutes of the battle and gave his military ID. The fate of three more soldiers is unknown. All of them are also from the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade. They are considered missing. Here are their names: Sergeant Major Suslov, Private Sidorenko, Private Ospanov..."22

Some time later, an ammunition rack "detonated" in the BMP23. The entire crew of BMP No. 015 died.

2. BMP-KSh

In the car were:

- Deputy com. 131st Omsbr Colonel Viktor Pavlovich Andrievsky
- Driver of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade Private Kashulin24

- Scout 690 oSpN Sergeant Vladimir Nikolaevich Kozakov

ZKVR rr 131 omsbr lieutenant S. Kravchenko: “Following [behind BMP No. 015] was a car with the deputy brigade commander, Colonel Andrievsky BMP-KSh. She took a left and went along Komsomolskaya Street.<...>Literally 15-20 meters. She was also hit by a grenade."25

Ensign 690 oSpN Yuri Anatolyevich Sozinov: “Our infantry fighting vehicle followed the KaSheeMka. After we passed the intersection, the driver seemed to be not himself. Apparently, he was very scared. I knew that Lieutenant Erofeev and Volodya Kozakov were there, and I thought that we could pull them out. But our mechanic turned sharply to the right and rushed down the small street, wherever his eyes looked, we could not stop him. .." 26

From the description of the battle: "As soon as Colonel Andrievsky's car was hit, it crashed into the corner of a five-story building, which stood to the left of the car. Dmitry Erofeev was wounded. A knee joint was broken by shrapnel. Vladimir Kozakov helped his commander get out of the car and helped the driver Private Kashulin to pull Colonel Andrievsky, who was shell-shocked, out of the burning car. From the side of the circus, a group of militants tried to approach the car, then Dmitry Erofeev and Vladimir Kozakov fought, taking up firing positions - Dmitry at the stern of the car, and Vladimir near the bow. According to a resident one of the houses, the Chechens offered them to surrender several times. All the offers from the Russians were heard only by shots ... But the cartridges were running out. Dmitry was the first to die. Loss of blood and a shot from a grenade launcher did their job. Vladimir fought back to the last. When the cartridges ran out and the Chechens came close, he blew up a grenade."27

There is information about the participation of representatives of the UNA-UNSO in this battle: “The armored personnel carrier of Colonel Andrievsky from the Maykop brigade was hit by guys with tridents on their hats. Andrievsky shot one such lad, the second wounded the colonel himself.”28

ZNSh 131 Omsbr Lieutenant Colonel S. Zelensky: “At about two o’clock, the deputy brigade commander’s car was shot down. Communication with him was interrupted. location of Russian units."29

According to the commander of the 370th Special Forces, Colonel Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev, (on about 01/17/1995) they “found a BMP-KSh near the building, not far from the circus, and without visible signs of damage. Leaving the circus, they moved to this group of houses.<...>They occupied the houses and proceeded to the next "cleansing". As it turned out, local residents were hiding in the basements of these houses. Among them was the deputy commander of the infamous Maikop brigade with his driver. It was their car that we discovered."30 It is known that Colonel Andrievsky and the driver were rescued "by a local policeman, Yusup Khasanov, who did not hand him over to the militants."31

From the description of the battle: “On January 23, 1995, the commander of the battalion, which included Lelyukh’s group, together with his soldiers found the bodies of the dead guys. “All the dead,” recalls the battalion commander, “were in those places where they met death. Each of them was simply crammed with bullets. " Apparently, the Chechens were afraid of them even after death, since they shot at already dead soldiers. One of the local residents said that after the battle at the crossroads, the militants walked very angry ... In that battle, they lost about 40 people killed."32

3. BMP №018

In the car were:

- early honey. 131st brigade major Vyacheslav Alekseevich Polyakov
- ZKVR rr 131 omsbr lieutenant Sergey Kravchenko
- commander of the 4th rv 131th brigade, senior lieutenant Arvid Kalnin
- driver of the RR 131 omsbr private Anatoly Zabolotnev
- Ensign 690 ooSpN Yuri Anatolyevich Sozinov
- Private 690 ooSpN Alexei Kuznetsov?

ZKVR rr 131 omsbr lieutenant S. Kravchenko: "I was driving the third car. We stopped and the mechanic began to back out. From the third floor of this assignment, a grenade launcher fired at us. We drove back. When I opened the hatch and tried to get out, then from these houses , where it says "Glory to the Soviet railway workers!" Already burned the column.<...>The column stretched for 400, 500 meters. Here, throughout the entire column, when we tried to leave, it was clear that the column was being burned. Grenade launchers sat literally in every window. Each of these buildings located here was literally teeming with militants. Everyone who got out of the car and tried to dismount and take cover in nearby houses was literally shot at point-blank range by snipers and submachine gunners. I just had the impression that wherever you shoot, through which window, you will definitely hit. "33

Private A. Zabolotnev, driver of the RR 131 Omsbr: “We turned around and drove to the rear of the station, from the back side. We drove up to the station, but we couldn’t get out - there was fire from tracers. It’s not clear who was shooting where.”34 It was the intersection of Ave. Ordzhonikidze and st. Popovich.

The commander of the 4th rv 131st brigade, senior lieutenant A. Kalnin: “We found ourselves in some square. Ahead is a construction site, to the right and left are residential buildings. There was a lot of equipment here, most of the cars were on fire. A traffic jam formed - neither forward nor backward. We were lucky, the driver was cool - he was spinning all the time, otherwise they would have hit us. Now I understand that we were literally a stone's throw from the station, but then we didn't know that. We just spun in one place and shot at everything side. After some time, we saw a passage and rushed there - several cars. We hit the front from a grenade launcher. "35

The commander of the 4th rv 131 omsbr, senior lieutenant A. Kalnin: "Our BMP No. 018 began to move away from the main building of the railway station to the station Sortirovochnaya. We drove along the railway tracks. Of the entire column, only 2 cars went in this direction. I recognized Valera's car board number 236. We briefly went on the air. Valera spoke with Savin, who instructed him to go to the courtyard of the sorting station. The militants fired continuously. We went into the courtyard, there were 2 infantry fighting vehicles of our brigade and 2 tanks of the Samara regiment, completely without ammunition . We put the cars in an invulnerable place under the cover of buildings. "36

According to Lieutenant S. Kravchenko, ZKVR rr 131 Omsbr, one infantry fighting vehicle and two tanks broke through Popovich Street to the freight station.37 Probably, Kravchenko did not count his car.

12:40 - Two BMPs approached the 2nd SSB.
12:55 - Near the station, according to the report of the brigade commander, the technique of "Sultan" [whose call sign?] passed - they went to the right.38

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

1 Gantimurova T. Memoirs of eyewitnesses // United newspaper. 2004. No. 22. December. (http://www.ob-gaz.ru/022/022_gant.htm)
2 Ogryzko V. How I want to hear the silence // Unknown wars of the twentieth century. M., 2003. S. 326.
3 Zikov T. Scouts! On the attack?
4 Remember and bow down. Yekaterinburg, 2000, p. 447.
5 Remember and bow down. Yekaterinburg, 2000, p. 166.
6 Belousov Y. Commander of the happy "Shilka" // Red Star. 2001. February 23. (http://www.redstar.ru/2001/02/23_02/kavkaz33.html)
7 Zikov T. Scouts! On the attack?
8 Dubovtseva S. Hell on New Year's Eve // ​​VashaGazeta.ru. 2004. December 25. (http://www.vashagazeta.ru/news.php?id=6993)
9 Gantimurova T. Memoirs of eyewitnesses // United newspaper. 2004. No. 22. December. (http://www.ob-gaz.ru/022/022_gant.htm)
10 Overchuk A. Defeat // Moskovsky Komsomolets. 1995. January 28. C. 2.
11 Dementiev I. Fights without rules // Book of Memory. Volume 4. Maykop, 2002. S. 1087.
12 Gantimurova T. Memoirs of eyewitnesses // United newspaper. 2004. No. 22. December. (http://www.ob-gaz.ru/022/022_gant.htm)
13 Maksimov V., Maslov I. Chronicle of the death of the 131st Maykop brigade // Novaya Gazeta. 1997. December 29. (http://www.allrus.info/APL.php?h=/data/pressa/15/nv291297/nv7ct011.txt)
14 Film "60 hours of the Maikop brigade". 1995.
15 Filming of the General Staff. 1995. February 5. (http://vanda-va.livejournal.com/71856.html)
16 Book of Memory. Volume 4. Maykop, 2002. S. 621.
17 Filming of the General Staff. 1995. February 5. (http://vanda-va.livejournal.com/71856.html)
18 Book of Memory. Volume 4. Maykop, 2002. S. 389.
19 Filming of the General Staff. 1995. February 5. (http://vanda-va.livejournal.com/71856.html)
20 Overchuk A. Defeat // Moskovsky Komsomolets. 1995. January 28. C. 2.
21 Agafonov A. Breakthrough // Book of Memory. Volume 4. Maykop, 2002. S. 1091.
22 Dementiev I. Fights without rules // Book of Memory. Volume 4. Maykop, 2002. S. 1087.
23 Zikov T. Scouts! On the attack?
24 Book of Memory. Volume 4. Maikop, 2002. S. 1088.
25 Filming of the General Staff. 1995. February 5. (http://vanda-va.livejournal.com/71856.html)
26 Book of Memory. Volume 4. Maikop, 2002. S. 1088.
27 Book of Memory. Volume 4. Maikop, 2002. S. 1088.
28 Tyutyunik S. 12 bullets from a Chechen clip. M., 2005. S. 54.
29 Ogryzko V. How I want to hear the silence // Unknown wars of the twentieth century. M., 2003. S. 326.
30 Sergeev E. The beginning of the Chechen company was striking in its confusion // Kozlov S. et al. Spetsnaz GRU - 2. M., 2002. S. 360-361.
31 Dubovtseva S. Hell on New Year's Eve // ​​VashaGazeta.ru. 2004. December 25. (http://www.vashagazeta.ru/news.php?id=6993)
32 Book of Memory. Volume 4. Maikop, 2002. S. 1088.
33 Filming of the General Staff. 1995. February 5. (http://vanda-va.livejournal.com/71856.html)
34 Film "60 hours of the Maikop brigade". 1995.
35 Gantimurova T. Memoirs of eyewitnesses // United newspaper. 2004. No. 22. December. (http://www.ob-gaz.ru/022/022_gant.htm)
36 Book of Memory. Volume 4. Maykop, 2002. S. 621.
37 Filming of the General Staff. 1995. February 5. (http://vanda-va.livejournal.com/71856.html)
38 Overchuk A. Defeat // Moskovsky Komsomolets. 1995. January 28. C. 2.

Mikhail Nazarov (Nazar) lived and was born in Nizhny Tagil on December 29, 1976. His classmate Natalya Trushkova (Nizhny Tagil), lived in the same yard and she said that he lived with his mother, was very kind, never quarreled with anyone. sent to Chechnya in military unit 25846 Yurga Kemerovo region mechanic. Yuri Selivanov, his colleague said: Another mechanic came with Mikha, they dared to call him whatever I don’t remember, but his dad, as he said, was an authority in Shadrinsk, though with him he did not live, but when he grew up he began to warm him with money. Driven by the name of Andros, like Andros. They were seconded to 276 SMEs, and from Novosibirsk by cargo board to Mozdok, from there by MI-8 helicopter to the regiment in Chechnya, it was November 27, 1995, sending + road. Board 4 hours. Minus 4 local time. He met his birthday on war. In Chechnya, he never became a mechanic. We got into the 1st baht of the 3rd company. There was such an ensign in the baht, epaulettes ...

What did they do with Chechen snipers (women) in the war.
As you know, in the first and second Chechen companies, mostly mercenaries took part, but sometimes there were female mercenaries who fought exclusively by killing with sniper rifles. And when they caught the so-called snipers, they did this to them, it was a war and cruel.
For example:
"Typhoon" special forces, said that in the well in the courtyard of the headquarters, especially militant staff colonels drowned a sniper.
The Marines chopped them up with sapper shovels. Here is a video where the Marine says:

Wolves in white pantyhose. Seventeen-year-old biathlete Lolita.

I will kill you slowly because I love you. I'll shoot you in the leg first, I promise to aim for the kneecap. Then a hand. Then eggs. Don't be afraid, I'm a candidate for master of sports. I will not miss, - the voice of the sniper Masha sounded clearly on the radio, as if she was lying somewhere very close, and not hiding hundreds of meters from here.

A 17-year-old biathlete who arrived in …

- Sergey get up, we are in captivity.

What other captivity? What are you driving? - The contractor Sergei Buzenkov with difficulty opened his eyes and the barrel of a machine gun buried in his face. Its owner, a bearded Chechen in ranger gear, unequivocally twitched the bolt.

It was a black Chechen night on March 8, 1996. Ahead was almost certain death, and behind - a distant peaceful life, unsweetened and stupid.

After serving urgently in the construction battalion, Sergei Buzenkov returned to his native village, but no one needed his hands as a tractor driver. He squandered half a year, tearing off covens here and there, but he could not get rich. There was nowhere for the poor peasant to go, so he had to go to the military enlistment office, to ask again for his native Russian army.

At the beginning of February 1996, he was sent to the 166th Tver Motorized Rifle Brigade, and on the 13th he ended up in Chechnya, among several dozen like him who decided to solve their peaceful problems with the help of war.

“The brigade stood at Shali,” Sergey began his story, “we were put on the lists ...