What is the Perimeter system and how does it work. Nuclear system "Perimeter". The "dead hand" or "perimeter" system launches the apocalypse. Perimeter system command rocket

And in the event of a massive attack, it is able to make a decision on an adequate retaliatory strike on its own, without the participation (or with minimal participation) of a person. The existence of such a system is sometimes called immoral, but in fact it is the only deterrent that gives real guarantees that a potential adversary will abandon the concept of a crushing preventive strike.

According to Vladimir Yarynich, one of the developers of the system, the system also served as insurance against making a hasty decision by the country's top leadership on the basis of unverified information. Having received a signal from the missile attack warning system, the first persons of the state could activate the Perimeter system and calmly await the development of events, while being fully confident that even the destruction of everyone who has the authority to issue a command for a retaliatory attack will not be able to prevent the strike retribution. Thus, the possibility of making a decision on a retaliatory strike in the event of a false alarm was completely excluded.

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✪ System "Perimeter" - "Dead Hand" USSR / System "Perimeter" "Dead Hand"

✪ "Heavenly Shield of Russia" Russia 1 - 13.03.2014

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How the system works

After the order received from the highest levels of control of the Strategic Missile Forces to a special command post, the command missile 15P011 with a special warhead 15B99 is launched, which in flight transmits launch commands to all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces that have the appropriate receivers.

Composite Components

Command posts of the system

Apparently, they are structures similar to the standard missile bunkers of the Strategic Missile Forces. They contain the control equipment and communication systems necessary to ensure the operation of the system. Presumably integrated with the command missile launchers, however, most likely they are spaced quite a distance to ensure better survivability of the system.

command missiles

The only widely known component of the complex. They are part of the 15P011 command missile complex and have the index 15A11, developed by Yuzhnoye Design Bureau based on 15A16 missiles (MR UR-100U). Equipped with a special warhead 15B99, containing a radio command system developed by OKB LPI, designed to guarantee the delivery of combat orders from the central command post to all command posts and launchers under the influence of nuclear explosions and active electronic countermeasures, when the warhead is flying in the passive section of the trajectory. The technical operation of the missiles is identical to the operation of the base rocket 15A16. Launcher 15P716 - mine, automated, highly protected, type OS, most likely - modernized PU OS-84. The possibility of basing missiles in other types of launch silos is not ruled out.

The development of a command missile was started by the TTT of the Ministry of Defense in 1974. Flight design tests were carried out at NIIP-5 (Baikonur) from 1979 to 1986. A total of 7 launches were carried out (of which 6 were successful and 1 was partially successful). The mass of the warhead 15B99 is 1412 kg.

Receiving devices

They ensure the receipt of orders and codes by the components of the nuclear triad from command missiles in flight. They are equipped with all launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces, all SSBNs and strategic bombers. Presumably, the receiving devices are hardware-connected to the control and launch equipment, providing autonomous execution of the launch order.

Autonomous command and control system

The mythical component of the system is a key element of the Doomsday Machine, the existence of which there is no reliable information. Some supporters of the existence of such a system believe that this is a complex expert system, equipped with many communication systems and sensors that control the combat situation. This system presumably monitors the presence and intensity of communications on the air at military frequencies, the receipt of telemetry signals from the Strategic Missile Forces posts, the level of radiation on the surface and in the vicinity, the regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation at key coordinates, coinciding with sources of short-term seismic disturbances in the earth's crust (which corresponds to the pattern of multiple ground-based nuclear strikes), and, possibly, the presence of living people on the command post. Based on the correlation of these factors, the system probably makes the final decision on the need for a retaliatory strike.

Another proposed variant of the system's operation is that upon receiving information about the first signs of a missile attack, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief puts the system into combat mode. After that, if within a certain time the command post of the system does not receive a signal to stop the combat algorithm, then command missiles are launched.

In an informal interview with Wired magazine, one of the developers of the system, Vladimir Yarynich, reports the following information about the algorithm of the Perimeter system:

It was designed to lie dormant until a high-ranking official activates it in a crisis. Then she would start monitoring a network of sensors - seismic, radiation, atmospheric pressure - for signs of nuclear explosions. Before launching a retaliatory strike, the system would have to check four "ifs": if the system was activated, it would first try to determine if a nuclear weapon had been used on Soviet territory. If this turned out to be true, the system would check the presence of communication with the General Staff. If there was communication, the system would automatically shut down after some time - from 15 minutes to an hour - passed without further signs of attack, assuming that officials capable of ordering a counterattack were still alive. But if there had been no communication, Perimeter would have decided that Doomsday had arrived, and immediately transferred the right to decide on the launch to anyone who at that moment would be deep in a protected bunker, bypassing the usual multiple instances. Original text (English) It was designed to lie semi-dormant until switched on by a high official in a crisis. Then it would begin monitoring a network of seismic, radiation, and air pressure sensors for signs of nuclear explosions. Before launching any retaliatory strike, the system had to check off four if/then propositions: If it was turned on, then it would try to determine that a nuclear weapon had hit Soviet soil. If it seemed that one had, the system would check to see if any communication links to the war room of the Soviet General Staff remained. If they did, and if some amount of time-likely ranging from 15 minutes to an hour-passed without further indications of attack, the machine would assume officials were still living who could order the counterattack and shut down. But if the line to the General Staff went dead, then Perimeter would infer that apocalypse had arrived. It would immediately transfer launch authority to whoever was manning the system at that moment deep inside a protected bunker-bypassing layers and layers of normal command authority .

doomsday machine

Arguments against the possibility of implementing the Doomsday Machine in the Perimeter system

Opponents of the possibility of the existence of the Doomsday Machine system give the following arguments:

History of the system

After ground testing of the technical solutions of the missile system in 1979, flight design tests of the command missile began. For this, two experimental mine launchers were built at the test site. In addition, a special command post was created, equipped with new, unique combat control equipment to ensure remote control and launch of a command missile. Flight tests of the rocket were carried out under the leadership of the State Commission, headed by Lieutenant General V.V. Korobushin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces. The first launch of a rocket with an experimental transmitter model was successfully carried out on December 26, 1979. During the tests, the developed complex algorithms for interfacing all the systems participating in the tests, the possibility of providing the missile with a given flight path and the operation of all service warhead systems in the normal mode were tested, the correctness of the adopted technical solutions was confirmed.

A total of 10 missiles were made for flight tests. During the tests of the system, real launches of various types of ICBMs from combat facilities were carried out according to orders transmitted by the 15A11 command missile during the flight. To do this, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and receiving devices of the Perimeter system were installed. Later, all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces underwent similar modifications. In total, during flight design tests, six launches were recognized as successful, and one was partially successful. In connection with the successful progress of the tests and the fulfillment of the tasks set, the State Commission considered it possible to be satisfied with seven launches instead of the planned ten. Simultaneously with the flight tests of the rocket, ground tests of the performance of the entire complex under impact conditions were carried out. The tests were carried out at the test site, in the laboratories of VNIIEF  (Arzamas-16), as well as at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. The checks carried out confirmed the operability of the equipment at levels of impact of damaging factors nuclear explosion exceeding those specified by the terms of reference of the Ministry Defence USSR. In addition, during the tests, a government decree set the task of expanding the functions of the complex, bringing combat orders not only to the objects of the Strategic Missile Forces, but also for SSBNs, long-range and maritime missile-carrying aircraft at airfields and in the air, and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy . Flight design tests of the command rocket were completed in March 1982, and in January 1985 the Perimeter complex was put on combat duty.

Many enterprises and organizations of various ministries and departments took part in the creation of the complex. The main ones are: the Experimental Design Bureau at the Kalinin LPI (Impulse Design Bureau, V.I. Melnik), NPO AP (N.A. Pilyugin), KBSM (A.F. Utkin), TsKBEM (B.R. Aksyutin), MNIIRS (A. P. Bilenko), (B. Ya. Osipov), Central Design Bureau “Geophysics” (G. F. Ignatiev), (E. B. Volkov).

System operation and current status

After being put on combat duty, the complex worked and was periodically used during command and staff exercises. The 15P011 command missile system with the 15A11 missile (based on the MR UR-100) was on combat duty until June 1995, when, under the START-1 agreement, the complex was removed from combat duty. According to other sources, this happened on September 1, 1995, when the 510th Missile Regiment, armed with command missiles, was taken off duty and disbanded in the 7th Missile Division (vypolzovo village). This event coincided in time with the completion of the withdrawal of the MR UR-100 missiles from the Strategic Missile Forces and the process of re-equipping the 7th RD with the Topol mobile ground missile system that began in December 1994.

There is also evidence that earlier the Perimeter system, along with 15A11 missiles, included command missiles based on the Pioneer IRBM. Such a mobile complex with "pioneer" command missiles was called "Gorn". Complex index - 15P656, missiles - 15ZH56. It is known about at least one unit of the Strategic Missile Forces, which was armed with the Gorn complex - the 249th missile regiment, stationed in the city of Polotsk, Vitebsk region of the 32nd missile division (Postavy), from March-April From 1986 to 1988 he was on combat duty with a mobile complex of command missiles.

Organizations involved in the production of components and maintenance of the complex are experiencing funding difficulties. There is a high turnover of staff, resulting in a drop in the qualifications of staff. Despite this, the leadership of the Russian Federation has repeatedly assured foreign states that there is no risk of accidental or unauthorized missile launches.

In the Western press, the system was given the name "Dead Hand" (dead hand) .

Notes

1. Dr. Bruce G. Blair Preface to C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation
2. Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS) - United States Nuclear Forces (indefinite) . Archived from the original on March 3, 2012.
3. http://epizodsspace.testpilot.ru/bibl/kb-ujn/09.html (unavailable link - story , copy)
4. Rockets and spacecraft of the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau / Ed. S. N. Konyukhova. - Dnepropetrovsk: ColorGraph LLC, 2001. - S. 47-48.
5. Dr. Strangelove"s "Doomsday Machine": It"s Real, NPR (September 26, 2009). Archived from the original on April 25, 2017. Retrieved 28 April 2017. "...So now, we need to bypass all the traditional layers of command authority, and suddenly, the ability to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike is given to some junior official in a bunker."
6. Part II. To missile systems that have no analogues (1972-1990) //

The Perimeter system (URV Strategic Missile Forces index: 15E601) is a complex for automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike, created in the USSR at the height of the Cold War.

"Our strategic nuclear forces (SNF) are configured in such a way as to threaten Russian nuclear and economic facilities. Even at the moment when we are negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin, we keep his Kremlin office at gunpoint. This is the truth of life" - Joseph Cirincione ( Joseph Cirincione is director of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 2001

The Perimeter system (URV Strategic Missile Forces index: 15E601) is a complex for automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike, created in the USSR at the height of the Cold War. Designed to guarantee the launch of silo ICBMs and SLBMs in the event that, as a result of a devastating nuclear strike on the territory of the USSR, all the command units of the Strategic Missile Forces capable of issuing an order for a retaliatory strike are destroyed.

The system is a backup communication system used in the event of the destruction of the Kazbek command system and the combat control systems of the Strategic Missile Forces, Navy and Air Force.

The Perimeter system, with its main Dead Hand component, was put into service in 1983. The first information about it became known in the West only in the early 1990s, when some of the developers of this system moved there. On October 8, 1993, The New York Times published an article by its columnist Bruce Blair, "The Russian Doomsday Machine", in which for the first time information about the control system of the Russian missile forces appeared in the open press.

At the same time, for the first time, she reported the top-secret name - "Perimeter", and a new concept entered the English language - "dead hand" ("dead hand"). Some in the West called the Perimeter system immoral, but at the same time, even its most vehement critics were forced to admit that it is, in fact, the only deterrent that gives real guarantees that a potential adversary will refuse to launch a preventive nuclear strike .

Possible operating principle

There is no reliable information about the 15E601 Perimeter system, however, according to indirect data, it can be assumed that this is a complex expert system equipped with many communication systems and sensors. Probably, the system has the following principle of operation.

"Perimeter" is on constant combat duty, it receives data from tracking systems, including from early warning radars about a missile attack. Apparently, the system has its own independent command posts, in no way (outwardly) indistinguishable from many similar points of the Strategic Missile Forces. According to some reports, there are 4 such points, they are spaced a long distance and duplicate each other's functions.

At these points, the most important and most secret component of the "Perimeter" operates - an autonomous control and command system. It is believed that this is a complex software package created on the basis of artificial intelligence. Receiving data, she is able to draw conclusions about the fact of a massive nuclear attack.

The system tracks:

The presence and intensity of negotiations on the air on military frequencies,

Information from the Missile Attack Warning System (SPRN),

Receiving telemetry signals from the posts of the Strategic Missile Forces,

The level of radiation on the surface and in the vicinity,

The regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation along key coordinates, coinciding with the sources of short-term seismic disturbances in the earth's crust (which corresponds to the pattern of multiple ground-based nuclear strikes),

Presence of live people at the checkpoint, etc.

In peacetime, "Perimeter" is in a calm state - one might say, "dozes" - without ceasing, however, to analyze the incoming information. When switching to combat mode or receiving an alarm signal from early warning systems, strategic missile forces and other systems, monitoring of the sensor network is launched to detect signs of nuclear explosions.

If the "situation is ripe", the system itself is transferred to a state of full combat readiness. Before running the retaliatory strike algorithm, the Perimeter checks for four conditions. First, whether there was a nuclear attack. Then the presence of communication with the General Staff is checked - if there is a connection, the system is turned off.

If the General Staff does not answer, "Perimeter" requests "Kazbek" (known thanks to the subscriber complex "Cheget" or "nuclear suitcase"). If they are silent there too, artificial intelligence transfers the right to make a decision to any person in the command bunker. And only after that it starts to work.

Command missiles 15A11 are released from the mines. Created on the basis of the MR UR-100 intercontinental missiles (launch weight 71 tons, flight range up to 11 thousand km, two stages, liquid-propellant engine), they carry a special warhead. In itself, it is harmless: it is a radio engineering system developed at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic. These missiles, rising high into the atmosphere, flying over the territory of the country, broadcast launch codes for all nuclear missile weapons.

Another proposed variant of the system's operation - when receiving information about the first signs of a missile attack from the early warning system, the first persons of the state could put the system into combat mode. After that, if within a certain time the CP of the system does not receive a signal to stop the combat algorithm, then the procedure for delivering a retaliatory nuclear strike is initialized. Thus, the possibility of making a decision on a retaliatory strike in the event of a false alarm was completely excluded and it was guaranteed that even the destruction of all those who had the authority to issue a command to conduct launches would not be able to prevent a nuclear retaliatory strike.

About the Perimeter missile

In the early 1970s, the capabilities of electronic suppression by the enemy of the combat control systems of the Strategic Missile Forces increased significantly. The task of guaranteed communication of combat orders from the highest levels of command to command posts and individual launchers of strategic missiles has become topical. To solve it, it was proposed to use (in addition to the existing communication channels) a special command missile equipped with a powerful radio transmitter, which, after launch, would give commands to launch all missiles on combat duty.

In December 1975 in Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, a draft design of a command missile based on the MR-UR100 ICBM was completed. The control system that ensured the flight of the warhead along a trajectory with a peak at an altitude of about 4000 km was subjected to refinement. at a range of 4500 km. Later, the MR-UR-100 UTTKh missile was used, which received the index 15A11.

The rocket was equipped with a special warhead (SGM), which had the index 15B99, which included a radio engineering system developed by the OKB LPI. The SHS during the flight had to have a certain orientation in space, for which an orientation and stabilization system using compressed gas was developed.

At the same time, the experience of developing engines for the Mayak SPG was used, which significantly reduced the cost and development time. The manufacture of SGCh 15B99 was organized at NPO Strela in Orenburg.

In 1979 flight design tests (LKI) of the command rocket began. At NIIP-5, on sites 176 and 181, two experimental mine launchers were put into operation. In addition, a command post was created at site 71, equipped with newly developed combat control equipment. The first launch of the 15A11 rocket with the equivalent of a transmitter was successfully carried out on December 26, 1979. 10 missiles were assigned for flight tests.

In connection with the successful launches and the fulfillment of the assigned tasks, the State Commission considered it possible to be satisfied with seven launches. During the tests of the "Perimeter" system, real launches of 15A14, 15A16, 15A35 missiles were carried out from combat facilities according to orders transmitted by the SSG 15B99 in flight. Previously, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and new receiving devices were installed (subsequently, all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces underwent these modifications).

Along with flight tests, a ground test of the complex's performance under the influence of damaging factors of a nuclear explosion was carried out. The tests carried out confirmed the operability of the SU and SGS equipment under the influence of a nuclear explosion. During flight tests, a government decree set the task of placing the receiving devices of the Perimeter system on missile submarines, on long-range bombers at air force and navy control points.

LCTs of the command rocket were completed in March 1982. Total launches during LCI: successful - 6, partially successful - 1. In January 1985. the missile was put on combat duty in the silo "OS" 15P716. Under the START-1 agreement in June 1995. The command missile complex was removed from combat duty.

There is also evidence that earlier the Perimeter system, along with 15A11 missiles, included command missiles based on the Pioneer IRBM. Such a mobile complex with "pioneer" command missiles was called "Gorn". Complex index - 15P656, missiles - 15ZH56. It is known about at least one division of the Strategic Missile Forces, which was armed with the Gorn complex - the 249th missile regiment, stationed in the city of Polotsk, Vitebsk region of the 32nd missile division (Postavy), from March-April 1986 to 1988 was on combat duty with a mobile complex of command missiles.

In December 1990, in the 8th Missile Division (Yurya), a regiment (commander - Colonel S.I. Arzamastsev) took up combat duty with a modernized command missile system, called "Perimeter-RTs", which includes a command missile , created on the basis of the RT-2PM Topol ICBM.

The START I Treaty expired on December 5, 2009. By this time, the war had already passed on 08.08.08 and Russia had completely lost its illusions about the friendliness of the West. It's time to think about protecting your country and citizens. It is not known for certain, however, according to a number of signs, it can be assumed that the "Perimeter" and "Perimeter-RTs" escaped the fate of being cut and these complexes were again put on combat duty.

Year 2012. Russia has updated the "doomsday" system - New communications satellite will improve performance

On November 15, 2012(!) Russian Aerospace Defense Forces (VKO) successfully launched the Meridian communications satellite into orbit, which will support the regular operation of the Unified Satellite Communications System (ESSS) of the Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defense explained to Izvestia why the current launch from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in the Arkhangelsk region is remarkable.

This is a network of communication nodes, transmitting stations and computer terminals that provide stable, noise-proof and closed communication with any part of the globe. It is they who give the signal for the combat use of all strategic nuclear forces,” the interlocutor said.

According to him, the system remains the most guarded secret of Russia, and a special department is responsible for its work in the Ministry of Defense. The source declined to say on what principles the signal is given to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic bombers and submarines with nuclear missiles, which make up the nuclear triad.

"Meridian" (index GUKOS - 14F112) - a series of Russian dual-purpose communications satellites developed by JSC "ISS" by order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Status: In operation

Total built - 7
Total launched - 7
In working order - 4
Accidents in orbit - 1
Lost - 2
First launch - 12/24/2006
Last run - 10/30/2014

Year 2015. "Dead hand" of the future - Russia announced the development of nuclear forces as the main priority of 2015

Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, said that the main priority for the development of the country's Armed Forces next year would be the development of strategic nuclear forces. Experts note that the military should focus not on creating new missiles, but on improving the Dead Hand automatic control system, as well as on creating high-precision non-nuclear weapons.

"The main priority (for 2015), of course, is the state and development of strategic nuclear forces," General Valery Gerasimov said in an interview with RIA Novosti. Earlier, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the military would purchase more than 50 intercontinental strategic missiles in 2015, and two Borey project strategic missile carriers armed with 20 Bulava intercontinental missiles would take up combat duty. At the same time, four new regiments will be formed in the Strategic Missile Forces - 12 missiles (presumably Yars) in each.

According to retired captain of the first rank Konstantin Sivkov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, the priority of developing nuclear forces means developing the entire complex that ensures the production and use of nuclear weapons.

“We are talking about maintaining the required level of combat readiness of strategic nuclear forces. This means that the combat strength of Russia's strategic nuclear forces and their command and control system must ensure the use of a guaranteed retaliatory strike that inflicts damage unacceptable to the enemy in any situation. And this is a whole range of measures,” Sivkov says.

To do this, there is a complex for the automatic launch of nuclear missiles in the event of a strike on the territory of Russia. It was created back in the USSR and received the name "Dead Hand" in the West.

Tags:

During the Cold War, both sides carried out the development of highly effective means of electronic suppression of enemy combat control systems. Therefore, it was extremely necessary to create a system that would be guaranteed to bring combat orders issued by the highest levels of command (the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces) to the command posts and launchers of strategic missiles that were on alert. There was also the possibility of defeating command posts, in the event of an enemy launching a first nuclear strike. In the process of design work, the idea arose to use a special rocket with a powerful radio transmitter as a backup communication channel. It could be launched in case of suppression of the controls. This missile would be able to issue launch commands to all missiles on combat duty on the territory of the USSR.

The main purpose of the 15E601 "Perimeter" system was to control a retaliatory nuclear strike and guaranteed delivery of combat orders to individual command posts, launchers, strategic aircraft on combat duty, in case it was impossible to use existing communication lines.

The system used a complex system of sensors to measure seismic activity, air pressure and radiation. This was to make it possible to determine whether a nuclear strike had taken place, in order to ensure the possibility of a nuclear retaliatory strike without the use of a "red button". In the event of the disappearance of communication with the VZU and the establishment of the fact of an attack, the procedure for launching missiles would be put into action, which would allow the USSR to strike back after its own destruction.

The autonomous command and control system being developed was supposed to have the ability to analyze changes in the world military and political situation in order to evaluate the commands that were received over a certain period of time. Based on this, it was concluded that something went wrong in the world. If the system believed that its time had come, then the missile launch preparation procedure was initiated.

At the same time, active hostilities should not have begun in peacetime, even in the absence of communications or the departure of the entire combat crew from the BSP or command posts. The system should have had additional parameters blocking its operation. Along with the extreme operation algorithm described above, the system also had intermediate modes.

The development of a special command system was entrusted to Yuzhnoye Design Bureau. On August 30, 1974, the government of the USSR signed the corresponding decree N695-227.

Later, the government set another task - to expand the set of functions that the command missile complex solved in order to bring combat orders to strategic missile boats, air force, navy and strategic missile forces command posts, naval and long-range missile-carrying aircraft.

It was originally planned that the MR-UR100 (15A15) missile would become the base one, but later it was replaced by the MR-UR100 UTTKh (15A16) missile. After finalizing the control system, she was assigned the index 15A11.

In December 1975, a draft design of the control rocket was presented. A special warhead with the index 15B99 was installed on it, which included an original radio engineering system developed by the LPI Design Bureau. To provide the necessary conditions for functioning, the head part needed a constant orientation in space.

To aim the missile in azimuth, a fully autonomous system with an automatic gyrocompass and a quantum optical gyrometer was used. This system could calculate the primary azimuth for the base direction in the process of putting the missile on combat duty, store it during combat duty, even in the event of a nuclear impact on the launcher.

On December 26, 1979, the first successful launch of a command rocket with an equivalent transmitter installed took place. Complex algorithms for pairing all the nodes of the system that took part in the launch were tested, as well as checking the ability of the 15B99 warhead to adhere to a given flight trajectory - the top of the trajectory was at an altitude of about 4000 m with a flight range of 4500 km.

In the course of various tests of the Perimeter system, real launches of various missiles took place, which were in service with the Strategic Missile Forces, with the help of orders transmitted by the SSG 15B99. On the launchers of these missiles, additional antennas and receiving devices were installed. Subsequently, these improvements affected all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces.

Ground checks were carried out on the territory of the test site of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, the nuclear test site Novaya Zemlya and in the testing laboratories of VNIIEF in the city of Arzamas. Here they checked the performance of the entire complex under the influence of the damaging factors of a nuclear strike. As a result of testing, the operability of the hardware complex of the control system and the SGCh was confirmed with a nuclear impact exceeding that specified in the TTT MO.

All work on the command rocket was completed by March 1982. And in January 1985, the complex took up combat duty. After that, command and staff exercises were periodically held, in which the 15E601 Perimeter system participated.

In November 1984, the 15A11 command rocket was launched. After the 15B99 warhead entered the passive section of the trajectory, a command was given to launch the 15A14 rocket (R-36M, RS-20A, SS-18 "Satan") from the territory of the NIIP-5 test site at the Baikonur Cosmodrome. The launch took place in the normal mode: after working out all the rocket stages, a hit on the target was recorded on the calculated square on the territory of the Kamchatka Kura test site.

In December 1990, a modernized system took up combat duty, which worked until June 1995. The complex was removed from combat duty under the signed START-1 agreement.

It was a backup communication system, which was used in case it was impossible to use the Kazbek command system, as well as the combat control systems of the Navy, Air Force and Strategic Missile Forces.

It should be noted that there is no reliable information about the Perimeter system in open sources, but indirect information suggests that it was a complex expert system, consisting of many sensors and communication systems. Apparently, the principle of its operation was as follows.

During combat duty, the system receives various data from tracking systems. It includes both stationary and mobile control centers that ensure the operation of the main component of the Perimeter system - an autonomous control and command system - a complex software system created on the basis of artificial intelligence that uses many sensors and communication systems to control the situation.

In peacetime, all the main nodes are put into standby mode to monitor the situation and process the data coming from the measuring posts.

In the event of transmission of data from early warning systems indicating a missile strike and the threat of an attack using a nuclear weapon, the Perimeter complex is switched to combat mode, starting to monitor the operational situation.

The system monitors military frequencies, recording the presence and intensity of conversations, monitors data from early warning systems, receives telemetry signals from Strategic Missile Forces posts, and monitors the radiation level on the surface. In addition, point sources of powerful electromagnetic and ionizing radiation are monitored at given coordinates, coinciding with seismic disturbances, which indicates multiple ground-based nuclear strikes.

Apparently, after processing all these data, the final decision is made on the need to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike.

Another variant of work - after receiving data on a missile attack from the early warning system, the system is transferred to combat mode by the first persons of the state. If after that there is no signal to stop the combat algorithm, then the initialization of the retaliatory strike procedure begins. Thus, it is possible to completely eliminate the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike in the event of a false alarm. In addition, even after the destruction of all persons with the authority to conduct launches, the possibility of a retaliatory strike remains.

If the fact of a massive nuclear strike is confirmed with the required reliability by sensor components, and the system has no connection with the main command centers of the Strategic Missile Forces, then Perimeter can initiate a retaliatory nuclear strike even bypassing Kazbek, a system that many know by its most noticeable node - "nuclear suitcase" or subscriber complex "Cheget".

After the system receives an order from the VZU of the Strategic Missile Forces, or after the command of the autonomous control and command complex, the launch of command missiles with a special warhead is initiated, which can transmit launch codes to all carriers of strategic nuclear weapons on combat duty.

At all command posts of missile divisions and regiments, special RBU receivers of the Perimeter system are installed, which allow you to receive signals from the warheads of command missiles. Stationary central command posts of the Air Force and the Navy were equipped with 15E646-10 equipment of the Perimeter system for the same purposes. After receiving the signals, they were transmitted further through special communication channels.

The receiving devices had a hardware connection with the launch control equipment to ensure the immediate execution of the launch order in a completely autonomous mode, even in the event of the destruction of all personnel.

According to unconfirmed reports, earlier the Perimeter system included command missiles created on the basis of the Pioneer IRBM. Such a mobile complex was named "Gorn". The index of the complex itself is 15P656, and the missiles are 15ZH56. There is evidence of at least one division of the Strategic Missile Forces, which received the Gorn complex into service. It was the 249th missile regiment, which was stationed in Polotsk.

And in December 1990, a regiment of the 8th Missile Division began combat duty, which received a modernized Perimeter-RTs command missile system equipped with a command missile based on the Topol RT-2PM ICBM.

During combat duty, the complex periodically participated in command and staff exercises. Combat duty of the 15P011 command and missile system with the 15A11 missile (based on the MR UR-100) continued until June 1995, when the START-1 agreement was signed.

It is worth noting that the introduction of the 15E601 Perimeter system in 1983 did not go unnoticed by the United States, which has always closely followed missile test launches. On November 13, 1984, during the tests of the 15A11 command missile, American intelligence worked in a tense mode.

The 15A11 command missile was just an intermediate option, which was going to be used only in the event of a loss of communication between command posts and missile units based throughout the country. It was planned that the missile would launch from the territory of the Kapustin Yar test site or from one of the mobile installations, and fly over those parts of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia where the missile units are located, giving them commands to launch.

But in 1984, the Americans did not have all the information about the control system of the Strategic Missile Forces. Some details appeared only in the early 1990s, when one of the developers of the system moved to the West.

On October 8, 1993, the New York Times published an article by columnist Bruce Blair entitled "The Russian Doomsday Machine", which revealed some details about the control system of the Soviet missile forces. It was then that the name of the Perimeter system was first lit up. It was then that the concept of dead hand appeared in the English language - "dead hand", referring to rocket technology.

The system was designed to work in the conditions of damaging factors of nuclear weapons. There was no reliable way to disable it.

According to Vladimir Yarynich, one of the developers of the system, published in Wired magazine, in peacetime their system “dozes”, waiting for a signal to be activated in the event of a crisis. After that, monitoring of a network of sensors - radiation, seismic and atmospheric pressure - is launched to detect signs of nuclear explosions. Before the start of the initiation of a retaliatory strike, the system checked four "ifs". First, it was determined whether there had been a nuclear attack on Soviet territory.

Then the presence of communication with the General Staff was checked. If present, an automatic shutdown occurred, as it was assumed that authorized officials were still alive. But if there was no connection, then the Perimeter system immediately transferred the right to make a decision to launch to anyone who was in the command bunker, bypassing numerous instances.

As a rule, officials of our country do not give any comments about the operation of this system. But in December 2011, Lieutenant General Sergei Karakaev, who is the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, noted that Perimeter still exists and is on combat duty.

According to him, if there is a need for a retaliatory missile strike, the Perimeter system will be able to transmit the necessary signals to the launchers. True, Karakaev emphasized that at the moment the probability of using a nuclear strike by one of the countries is negligible.

It should be noted that in the West such a system was called immoral, but still it is one of the factors that can actually prevent a potential devastating preventive nuclear strike.

Silence after us

The unofficial motto of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces

On August 6, 1945, the atomic bomb "Kid" with a capacity of 21 kilotons of TNT was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Since then, a new era has begun in the history of mankind. And for more than seventy years now we have been constantly living under the fear of a global catastrophe, which can not only wipe out our species from the face of the Earth, but also turn the entire planet into a lifeless radioactive ball.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the world has been on the edge of the abyss many times, and only a miracle has kept us from falling into it. At the same time, it should be recognized that the presence of nuclear weapons has become the most reliable means of deterrence - without it, the Cold War, no doubt, would have rolled into the Third World War ...

And although the era of the Great Confrontation between East and West is long gone, the situation has not changed fundamentally - a full-scale war between the leading nuclear powers is impossible even today, because there will be no winners in it ...

This status quo is maintained not only thanks to the nuclear parity that exists between Russia and the United States, but also to other creepy tools that our country has inherited since the Cold War.

The Perimeter system is the perfect weapon of retaliation

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union developed an unprecedented strategic force control system - "Perimeter". In the West, she received the designation Dead Hand, which means "Dead Hand". In fact, this is a parallel, duplicating system of control of the country's nuclear forces, dispersed, hidden and well protected.

However, even this is not the main thing: the Perimeter system is capable of operating automatically when communication with the country's leadership is lost or the first persons of the state have already turned into radioactive ashes. In this case, the Perimeter system gives the command to launch all the remaining carriers of nuclear weapons and avenges its burnt cities and command posts...

According to the developers of Perimeter, there is no reliable and guaranteed way to disable this system, since it was designed to perform its tasks in the very heat of a nuclear war.

In fact, the "Perimeter" is an ideal retaliation weapon that guarantees the aggressor a retaliatory strike even in the event of a sudden attack. At the same time, it should be noted that the leadership of the country, command posts and communication centers of the Strategic Missile Forces are the highest priority target in the event of a nuclear Armageddon.

The Perimeter system is still in service with the Russian army. Information about the principles of its operation and the main elements is one of the main military secrets of our country, therefore only the most general data are in the public domain. In 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Karakaev, told reporters that the Perimeter system was on alert and capable of performing its functions at any time.

The world learned about the existence of the "Dead Hand" after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the early 90s, from the designers who left for the West. There, this system was immediately dubbed the “Doomsday Machine” and called inhuman. True, at the same time, critics forgot about the American analogue of the Soviet "Perimeter", as well as the fact that, probably, similar systems are operated in the USA today.

For many years, almost nothing was heard about the "Perimeter", but recently the "Dead Hand" began to appear more and more often in the Russian media. Like, only this system does not allow the American hawks to unleash the Third World War. And here, most likely, there is a typical transfer of one's own desires to the opponent. For it seems extremely unlikely that today anyone in the well-fed and prosperous West would want to unleash a large-scale nuclear Armageddon.

History of the Doomsday Machine

Speaking about the control of nuclear weapons, we usually imagine a red button, well, or, at worst, a “nuclear suitcase”. However, at the dawn of the atomic age, immediately after the appearance of the first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), communication between high command and personnel directly carrying out the launch was much simpler. It was based on special packages that had to be opened after receiving the code word. And they transmitted it by conventional radio or wired communication. In the USSR, the first control system for nuclear forces was called "Monolith".

Vladimir Yarynich, one of the developers of Perimeter in the future, and in the 60s an ordinary rocket scientist, described in detail the shortcomings of this system. According to him, during the announcement of the training alert, the officer was so nervous that his hands were trembling, and for a long time he could not open the envelope with scissors. The problem was noticed, and the package was provided with a special fastener. This "know-how" saved as much as 18 seconds ...

However, the main drawback of the "Monolith" was clearly not the design of the secret package. The overall speed of the system was unsatisfactory, the security of communication lines also left much to be desired. In addition, with the scheme of work through sealed packages, the given order could no longer be canceled ...

But the weakest link of the "Monolith" was the man who had to directly carry out the order. It turned out that the entire Soviet nuclear power depended on a few officers pressing the "red buttons" in the missile silos. Moreover, they were better than others aware of the consequences of a nuclear war. Everyone could ask themselves a question: if half of the world has already been destroyed, then why incinerate the other?

And it must be said that the prospect of using nuclear weapons horrified not only the rocket scientists. In 1972, the Soviet military presented to Kosygin and Brezhnev their calculations of the consequences of a massive American nuclear strike on the USSR. They were stunning: 80 million dead immediately after the attack, the complete destruction of industry and the armed forces. After reading the report, the Secretary General, who himself had once gone through the war, was shocked. Then a training launch of three ballistic missiles was organized for Brezhnev. Those present at the same time recalled that Leonid Ilyich's hands trembled before pressing the button, and he asked several times whether the rockets were really training ones. Ten years later, Ronald Reagan found himself in a similar situation. The US military took him to a special bunker and showed him a model of a possible nuclear war. The President had not yet had time to finish his coffee when Washington was destroyed. And it took Soviet missiles less than half an hour to completely wipe the United States off the face of the Earth. According to the memoirs of advisers, Reagan was amazed that with one nod of his head he could incinerate tens of millions of people.

The Caribbean crisis clearly showed all the shortcomings of the Monolith, and therefore in 1967 it was replaced by the Signal system, which had greater speed and security. And more importantly, now the given order could be canceled. "Signal" did not use packages; instead, 13 pre-programmed commands were introduced, which were transmitted to direct performers.

Later, the Signal system was modernized several times. Its latest version, "Signal-A", put into service in 1985, allowed the leadership of the Strategic Missile Forces to remotely change the targets of missiles in the mines. This took 10 to 15 seconds. That is, the development of the nuclear weapons control system proceeded by maximizing its automation and reducing the influence of the human factor on its operation. At the same time, the first Soviet "nuclear suitcase" - "Cheget" was created.

In the 70s, the development of a backup system began, which, in addition to insuring the main channel, had to solve another important task - to guarantee the protection of the system from false alarms. It was these works that subsequently led to the emergence of the Perimeter control system.

How "Dead Hand" was created

By the end of the 1960s, the rapid development of electronic warfare jeopardized the transmission of orders from the top leadership of the country and the armed forces to the command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces and individual launchers.

In 1973, the United States put forward the concept of a "decapitating strike", according to which, in the event of a full-scale nuclear conflict with the USSR, the first strike should be delivered at command posts and communication centers using medium and short-range missiles, as well as cruise missiles stationed in Europe. In this case, due to the gain in flight time, the leadership of the Soviet Union would be destroyed even before it decides on a massive retaliatory strike on US territory.

This became a serious challenge for the USSR, which certainly had to be answered. The idea was proposed to use a special command missile to control nuclear forces, in which a powerful radio transmitter was installed instead of a warhead. Its launch was supposed to take place automatically in the event of the destruction of command posts.

Work on the creation of a command rocket was entrusted to the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, they began in 1974, after the relevant government decree. The ICBM UR-100UTTH was taken as the basis. The project was very large-scale - dozens of enterprises, institutes and research centers of the Soviet Union took part in it.

In 1979, flight design tests of the rocket began. In addition, a special command post was built, on which new control equipment was installed. In total, 10 tests of the command missile were carried out, during which, on her orders, real launches of various types of ICBMs were carried out. At the same time, the operation of the complex was tested under the influence of damaging factors of nuclear weapons. Even during the tests, the designers were tasked with expanding the capabilities of the Perimeter so that it could convey orders to missile-carrying submarine cruisers, strategic aircraft, as well as naval and air force command posts.

Flight tests of the rocket were completed in 1982, and in 1985 the system was put into service. The first comprehensive test of the system was carried out during the large-scale exercises "Shield-82".

In 1990, the modernized Perimeter-RTs complex was adopted, in which the command missile was created on the basis of the Topol ICBM.

Until 1995, "Perimeter" was on alert, periodically taking part in various exercises. Then, as part of the obligations under the START-1 agreement, the system was removed from duty. However, it expired in 2009. In 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces Karakaev confirmed to journalists that Perimeter exists and is on alert.

What is the "Perimeter"

We do not know too much about the elements of the Perimeter system, and it is possible that some of the information available is misinformation, specially disseminated to hide the truth. This complex includes:

• command post (or posts);
• rockets to transmit orders;
• receiving devices;
• autonomous control and computer complex.

The command posts of the Perimeter system are probably similar to conventional command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces. They are equipped with communication systems and equipment necessary to launch command missiles. The Grotto object, which is located in the Kosvinsky stone mountain range in the Urals, is most often called such a CP. It is not known how many such sites exist, and how integrated they are with command missile launchers.

The Command Missile is the best-known component of the Perimeter. Initially, it was developed on the basis of the UR-100 ICBM, however, there is information that there were also command missiles based on the Pioneer IRBM, and in the late 80s the Topol was “adapted” for this task. The command rocket has a powerful radio transmitter, through which the command "Launch!" all ballistic missiles that survived the first enemy strike.

receiving devices. They ensure the receipt of an order from a command missile, respectively, all launch silos and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, missile submarines and strategic aircraft should be equipped with them. However, nothing is known about their structure and principles of operation.

The autonomous command system is without a doubt the most mysterious and interesting part of the Perimeter. There is no official or at least some reliable data about her. Many do not believe in its existence at all. The main debate is whether there is a so-called Doomsday Machine - a kind of supercomputer based on artificial intelligence - that is capable of itself, without human intervention, to make a decision on the use of nuclear weapons.

How Dead Hand works

There are two hypotheses regarding the principles of operation of the "Perimeter". According to the first of them, during the period of international aggravation, which theoretically could end in a nuclear war, the head of state - he is also his commander-in-chief - puts the system into combat mode. If before a certain moment the "Perimeter" is not "turned off" again, then it will initiate the launch of command missiles, which, in turn, will launch the scenario of the Third World War.

Such a scheme resembles the work of a bomb with a timer, which can only be turned off by one person.

The second version assumes that Perimeter has some kind of powerful electronic analytical center capable of receiving information, processing it, and then making independent decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, according to this hypothesis, the system has a large number of sensors that collect and transmit information to the analytical center.

By measuring the level of electromagnetic radiation, the radioactive background, seismic activity, fixing the level and intensity of negotiations on military frequencies, as well as analyzing data from SPNR, the system determines whether an enemy nuclear attack has occurred. Also, the presence of communication with the top leadership of the country and the command centers of the Strategic Missile Forces is constantly checked. If the information about a massive nuclear strike is confirmed, but there is no connection with the leadership, then the system itself gives the command to use nuclear weapons.

This hypothesis raises a lot of questions and has many opponents. One of the main functions of any system for the use of nuclear weapons is protection against unauthorized operation. Therefore, rocket launches are still carried out manually. This is too serious a matter, and people here don't trust computers too much.

Vladimir Yarynich, already mentioned above, in an interview with Wired journalists, said that the Perimeter system can really determine whether a blow was struck on the territory of the country. Then she tries to contact the General Staff and only if it is impossible to do this she transfers the right to launch a nuclear weapon to anyone who at that moment is nearby in a secret and especially protected bunker. That is, the final decision is still made by a person ...

By the way, Yarynich himself considered "Perimeter" the best insurance against the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a false alarm. Having received information about the massive launch of enemy missiles, the highest person in the state can simply switch the Perimeter to combat mode, knowing that even if the entire leadership of the country is destroyed, the aggressor will not escape retribution.

During the Cold War, the Americans were not even aware of the "Perimeter", which can be called very strange. The Soviet leadership needed to trumpet the existence of such a system, because the mere mention of it would serve as deterrence much better than any new missiles or nuclear-powered missile carriers. Probably, the military was afraid that, having learned about the existence of the system, the Americans would be able to find a weak link in it. One way or another, but the first information about the "Perimeter" began to appear in the Western press only after the collapse of the USSR.

The domestic system "Perimeter", known in the USA and Western Europe as the "Dead Hand", is a complex for automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike. The system was created back in the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. Its main purpose is to guarantee a retaliatory nuclear strike even if the command posts and communication lines of the Strategic Missile Forces are completely destroyed or blocked by the enemy.

With the development of monstrous nuclear power, the principles of global warfare have undergone major changes. Just one missile with a nuclear warhead on board could hit and destroy the command center or bunker, which housed the top leadership of the enemy. Here one should consider, first of all, the doctrine of the United States, the so-called "decapitation blow". It was against such a strike that Soviet engineers and scientists created a system of guaranteed retaliatory nuclear strike. Created during the Cold War, the Perimeter system took up combat duty in January 1985. This is a very complex and large organism, which was dispersed throughout the Soviet territory and constantly kept many parameters and thousands of Soviet warheads under control. At the same time, approximately 200 modern nuclear warheads are enough to destroy a country like the United States.

The development of a guaranteed retaliatory strike system in the USSR was also started because it became clear that in the future the means of electronic warfare would only be continuously improved. There was a threat that over time they would be able to block regular control channels for strategic nuclear forces. In this regard, a reliable backup communication method was needed, which would guarantee the delivery of launch commands to all nuclear missile launchers.

There was an idea to use special command missiles as such a communication channel, which would carry powerful radio transmitting equipment instead of warheads. Flying over the territory of the USSR, such a missile would transmit commands to launch ballistic missiles not only to the command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, but also directly to numerous launchers. On August 30, 1974, by a closed decree of the Soviet government, the development of such a missile was initiated, the task was issued by the Yuzhnoye design bureau in the city of Dnepropetrovsk, this design bureau specialized in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Command missile 15A11 of the Perimeter system

Specialists of Yuzhnoye Design Bureau took the UR-100UTTH ICBM as the basis (according to NATO codification - Spanker, trotter). The warhead specially designed for the command rocket with powerful radio transmitting equipment was designed at the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute, and NPO Strela in Orenburg took up its production. To aim the command missile in azimuth, a fully autonomous system with a quantum optical gyrometer and an automatic gyrocompass was used. She was able to calculate the required direction of flight in the process of putting the command missile on combat duty, these calculations were maintained even in the event of a nuclear impact on the launcher of such a missile. Flight tests of the new rocket started in 1979, the first launch of a rocket with a transmitter was successfully completed on December 26th. The tests carried out proved the successful interaction of all components of the Perimeter system, as well as the ability of the head of the command rocket to maintain a given flight trajectory, the top of the trajectory was at an altitude of 4000 meters with a range of 4500 kilometers.

In November 1984, a command rocket launched from near Polotsk managed to transmit a command to launch a silo launcher in the Baikonur region. The R-36M ICBM (according to the NATO codification SS-18 Satan) taking off from the mine, after working out all the stages, successfully hit the target in a given square at the Kura training ground in Kamchatka. In January 1985, the Perimeter system was put on alert. Since then, this system has been upgraded several times, and now modern ICBMs are used as command missiles.

The command posts of this system, apparently, are structures that are similar to the standard missile bunkers of the Strategic Missile Forces. They are equipped with all the control equipment necessary for operation, as well as communication systems. Presumably, they can be integrated with command missile launchers, but most likely they are spaced far enough in the field to ensure better survivability of the entire system.

The only widely known component of the Perimeter system is the 15P011 command missiles, they have the index 15A11. It is the missiles that are the basis of the system. Unlike other intercontinental ballistic missiles, they should not fly towards the enemy, but over Russia; instead of thermonuclear warheads, they carry powerful transmitters that send the launch command to all available combat ballistic missiles of various bases (they have special command receivers). The system is fully automated, while the human factor in its operation was minimized.

Early warning radar Voronezh-M, photo: vpk-news.ru, Vadim Savitsky

The decision to launch command missiles is made by an autonomous control and command system - a very complex software system based on artificial intelligence. This system receives and analyzes a huge amount of very different information. During combat duty, mobile and stationary control centers on a vast territory constantly evaluate a lot of parameters: radiation level, seismic activity, air temperature and pressure, control military frequencies, fixing the intensity of radio traffic and negotiations, monitor the data of the missile attack warning system (EWS), and also control telemetry from the observation posts of the Strategic Missile Forces. The system monitors point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation, which coincides with seismic disturbances (evidence of nuclear strikes). After analyzing and processing all the incoming data, the Perimeter system is able to autonomously make a decision on delivering a retaliatory nuclear strike against the enemy (of course, the top officials of the Ministry of Defense and the state can also activate the combat mode).

For example, if the system detects multiple point sources of powerful electromagnetic and ionizing radiation and compares them with data on seismic disturbances in the same places, it can come to the conclusion about a massive nuclear strike on the country's territory. In this case, the system will be able to initiate a retaliatory strike even bypassing Kazbek (the famous "nuclear suitcase"). Another option for the development of events is that the Perimeter system receives information from the early warning system about missile launches from the territory of other states, the Russian leadership puts the system into combat mode. If after a certain time there is no command to turn off the system, it will itself start launching ballistic missiles. This solution eliminates the human factor and guarantees a retaliatory strike against the enemy even with the complete destruction of launch crews and the country's top military command and leadership.

According to one of the developers of the Perimeter system, Vladimir Yarynich, it also served as insurance against a hasty decision by the top leadership of the state on a nuclear retaliatory strike based on unverified information. Having received a signal from the early warning system, the first persons of the country could launch the Perimeter system and calmly wait for further developments, while being in absolute confidence that even with the destruction of everyone who has the authority to order a retaliatory attack, the retaliation strike will not succeed prevent. Thus, the possibility of making a decision on a retaliatory nuclear strike in the event of unreliable information and a false alarm was completely excluded.

Rule of four if

According to Vladimir Yarynich, he does not know a reliable way that could disable the system. The Perimeter control and command system, all of its sensors and command missiles are designed to work under the conditions of a real enemy nuclear attack. In peacetime, the system is in a calm state, it can be said to be in a “sleep”, without ceasing to analyze a huge array of incoming information and data. When the system is switched to combat mode or in case of receiving an alarm signal from early warning systems, strategic missile forces and other systems, monitoring of the network of sensors is started, which should detect signs of nuclear explosions.

Launch of the Topol-M ICBM

Before running the algorithm, which assumes that the "Perimeter" strikes back, the system checks for the presence of 4 conditions, this is the "four if rule". Firstly, it is checked whether a nuclear attack has actually occurred, a system of sensors analyzes the situation for nuclear explosions on the territory of the country. After that, it is checked by the presence of communication with the General Staff, if there is a connection, the system turns off after a while. If the General Staff does not answer in any way, "Perimeter" requests "Kazbek". If there is no answer here either, artificial intelligence transfers the right to decide on a retaliatory strike to any person in the command bunkers. Only after checking all these conditions, the system begins to operate itself.

American analogue of "Perimeter"

During the Cold War, the Americans created an analogue of the Russian system "Perimeter", their backup system was called "Operation Looking Glass" (Operation Through the Looking Glass or simply Through the Looking Glass). It was put into effect on February 3, 1961. The system was based on special aircraft - air command posts of the US Strategic Air Command, which were deployed on the basis of eleven Boeing EC-135C aircraft. These machines were continuously in the air for 24 hours a day. Their combat duty lasted 29 years from 1961 to June 24, 1990. The planes flew in shifts to various areas over the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The operators working on board these aircraft controlled the situation and duplicated the control system of the American strategic nuclear forces. In the event of the destruction of ground centers or their incapacitation in any other way, they could duplicate commands for a retaliatory nuclear strike. On June 24, 1990, continuous combat duty was terminated, while the aircraft remained in a state of constant combat readiness.

In 1998, the Boeing EC-135C was replaced by the new Boeing E-6 Mercury aircraft - control and communications aircraft created by the Boeing Corporation on the basis of the Boeing 707-320 passenger aircraft. This machine is designed to provide a backup communication system with nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the US Navy, and the aircraft can also be used as an air command post of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). From 1989 to 1992, the US military received 16 of these aircraft. In 1997-2003, they all underwent modernization and today they are operated in the E-6B version. The crew of each such aircraft consists of 5 people, in addition to them, there are 17 more operators on board (22 people in total).

Boeing E-6Mercury

Currently, these aircraft are flying to meet the needs of the US Department of Defense in the Pacific and Atlantic zones. On board the aircraft there is an impressive set of electronic equipment necessary for operation: an automated ICBM launch control complex; onboard multi-channel terminal of the Milstar satellite communication system, which provides communication in the millimeter, centimeter and decimeter ranges; high-power ultra-long-wave range complex designed for communication with strategic nuclear submarines; 3 radio stations of decimeter and meter range; 3 VHF radio stations, 5 HF radio stations; automated control and communication system of the VHF band; emergency tracking equipment. To provide communications with strategic submarines and carriers of ballistic missiles in the ultra-long-wave range, special towed antennas are used, which can be launched from the aircraft fuselage directly in flight.

Operation of the Perimeter system and its current status

After being put on combat duty, the Perimeter system worked and was periodically used as part of command and staff exercises. At the same time, the 15P011 command missile system with the 15A11 missile (based on the UR-100 ICBM) was on combat duty until mid-1995, when it was removed from combat duty under the signed START-1 agreement. According to Wired magazine, which is published in the UK and the US, the Perimeter system is operational and ready to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike in the event of an attack, an article was published in 2009. In December 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Karakaev, noted in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda that the Perimeter system still exists and is on alert.

Will "Perimeter" protect against the concept of a global non-nuclear strike

The development of promising systems of instant global non-nuclear strike, which the US military is working on, is able to destroy the existing balance of power in the world and ensure Washington's strategic dominance on the world stage. A representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense spoke about this during a Russian-Chinese briefing on missile defense issues, which took place on the sidelines of the first committee of the UN General Assembly. The concept of a rapid global strike assumes that the American army is able to launch a disarming strike on any country and anywhere on the planet within one hour, using its non-nuclear weapons. In this case, cruise and ballistic missiles in non-nuclear equipment can become the main means of delivering warheads.

Tomahawk rocket launch from US ship

AiF journalist Vladimir Kozhemyakin asked Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), how much an American instant global non-nuclear strike threatens Russia. According to Pukhov, the threat of such a strike is very significant. With all the Russian successes with Caliber, our country is only taking the first steps in this direction. “How many of these Calibers can we launch in one salvo? Let's say a few dozen pieces, and the Americans - a few thousand "Tomahawks". Imagine for a second that 5,000 American cruise missiles are flying towards Russia, skirting the terrain, and we don’t even see them,” the specialist noted.

All Russian early warning stations detect only ballistic targets: missiles that are analogues of the Russian Topol-M, Sineva, Bulava, etc. ICBMs. We can track the missiles that will rise into the sky from the mines located on American soil. At the same time, if the Pentagon gives the command to launch cruise missiles from its submarines and ships located around Russia, then they will be able to completely wipe out a number of strategic objects of paramount importance from the face of the earth: including the top political leadership, command and control headquarters.

At the moment, we are almost defenseless against such a blow. Of course, in the Russian Federation there exists and operates a system of dual redundancy, known as the "Perimeter". It guarantees the possibility of delivering a retaliatory nuclear strike against the enemy under any circumstances. It is no coincidence that in the United States it was called the "Dead Hand". The system will be able to ensure the launch of ballistic missiles even with the complete destruction of communication lines and command posts of the Russian strategic nuclear forces. The United States will still be struck in retaliation. At the same time, the very presence of the "Perimeter" does not solve the problem of our vulnerability to "instantaneous global non-nuclear strike."

In this regard, the work of the Americans on such a concept, of course, causes concern. But the Americans are not suicidal: as long as they realize that there is at least a ten percent chance that Russia will be able to respond, their "global strike" will not take place. And our country is able to answer only with nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is necessary to take all necessary countermeasures. Russia must be able to see the launch of American cruise missiles and respond adequately with non-nuclear deterrents without starting a nuclear war. But so far, Russia has no such funds. With the ongoing economic crisis and declining funding for the armed forces, the country can save on many things, but not on our nuclear deterrent. In our security system, they are given absolute priority.

Information sources:
https://rg.ru/2014/01/22/perimeter-site.html
https://ria.ru/analytics/20170821/1500527559.html
http://www.aif.ru/politics/world/myortvaya_ruka_protiv_globalnogo_udara_chto_zashchitit_ot_novogo_oruzhiya_ssha
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