Ludwig is the author of the work Logico-Philosophical Treatise. From the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" to "Philosophical Investigations" (L. Wittgenstein). The world is a collection of Facts, but not of Things

The true spiritual father of neopositivism was L. Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Born from in Austria. An engineer by education. He studied the theory of aircraft engines and propellers. The mathematical aspect of these studies drew his attention to pure mathematics and to the philosophy of mathematics. He became acquainted with the work of Frege and Russell on mathematical logic. As a result, Wittgenstein went to Cambridge and in 1912-1913. worked with Russell.

Russell in his memoirs tells that Wittgenstein often came to his house in the evenings and, without saying a word, walked around the room in front of him for hours. Russell also relates how Wittgenstein once asked him if Russell considered him capable of philosophy. Russell asked me to write something to him. When Wittgenstein brought him what he had written, Russell, after reading the first sentence, gave an affirmative answer to his question. He does not say what the phrase was. But it is possible that this was the beginning of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus": "The world is everything that takes place."

During World War I, Wittgenstein served in the Austrian army and was eventually taken prisoner. In captivity, he apparently completed the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, published in Germany in 1921, in England in 1922, here in 1958. After his release from captivity, Wittgenstein worked as a teacher at a school, had some contacts with Schlick, visited England. In 1929 he finally moved to Cambridge. In 1939 he succeeded Moore as professor of philosophy. During the Second World War he worked in the London Hospital, in 1947 he retired. In 1951 he died.

Wittgenstein was a peculiar person. He was fond of the ideas of L. Tolstoy, tried to live in accordance with his teachings. Career issues, life success did not interest him. He was a very honest and direct person, sometimes to the point of harshness. He always went about in a shirt with an unbuttoned collar, talked little with his colleagues (he never dined with them in the dining room). He was said to look more like the high priest of some secret sect than a professor at Cambridge. In 1935 he came to the Soviet Union.

Wittgenstein said that he would not mind staying to work in the Soviet Union, but, fortunately, he did not receive an invitation and went back.

The emergence of logical positivism was greatly influenced by the Tractatus Logichesko-Philosophicus. T. Hill in the book "Modern Theories of Knowledge" says that "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has had an incomparable influence on the entire philosophical literature of the last three decades" (24, 466).

This is a very difficult, albeit small, book, written in the form of aphorisms. It is necessary to get acquainted with at least excerpts from it. But it's not easy! In it, no matter what the phrase is, at best, a problem, and at worst, a mystery.

For, as Aiken says: "Wittgenstein is one of the most controversial figures in modern philosophy" (53, 485). His treatise is full of contradictions. Some have already been pointed out by B. Russell in the "Introduction".

Wittgenstein builds, first of all, a pluralistic picture of the world. The world, according to Wittgenstein, has an atomic structure and consists of facts.

"The world is everything that takes place" (5, 1). "The world is a collection of facts, not things" (5, 1.1). This means that connections are inherent in the world. Further, it follows that "the world falls apart into facts" (4, 1.2).

It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein does not define the concept of "fact" in any way. Fact is everything that happens, that takes place. But what exactly is taking place? Wittgenstein does not specify this, and uncertainty and obscurity remain at the very foundation of his philosophy.

The only thing that can be said about the fact is what Russell has already said, namely that the fact makes the proposition true. The fact is thus something, so to speak, subsidiary to the proposition as something primary.

This means that when we want to know whether a given sentence is true or false, we must find the fact that the sentence is talking about. If there is such a fact in the world, the sentence is true; if not, it is false. On this reasoning, in fact, logical atomism is built.

Everything seems to be clear. But here difficulties arise: “All people are mortal” - is there such a fact?

“There are no unicorns” - it turns out that this is a negative fact, and they are not provided for in the Treatise, because it turns out that a fact is something that does not take place.

But that is not all. If we talk about science, it has long been established that a fact, or rather, a scientific fact, is called not anything horrible, that is, far from everything that “takes place”. The fact is established as a result of the selection and selection of certain aspects of reality, the selection is purposeful, carried out on the basis of certain theoretical guidelines. Facts do not lie in the street like cobblestones or logs. One author wittily remarked that for a chess player a chessboard with a certain position of pieces is, of course, a certain fact. But you can, say, spill coffee on the board and on the chess pieces, but you cannot spill coffee on a fact. One can only say that a fact is something happening or taking place in the human world, that is, a world open to man, bearing a certain human imprint.

According to Wittgenstein, the facts are independent of each other, and therefore "any fact may or may not take place, and everything else remains the same" (5, 1.21). Consequently, all connections, all relations between facts are purely external.

There is no need to delve into the structure of the world as depicted by Wittgenstein. It is only worth noting that, like Russell, an atomic fact is not something indivisible.

But more importantly, Wittgenstein's interest is not so much in the world itself, but in language and its relation to the world of those facts that make propositions true. Wittgenstein states that "the world is determined by facts and by the fact that they are all facts" (5, 1.11). Facts are everything that is said in sentences. From this point of view, the nature of the fact is indifferent.

But do sentences speak only of facts? Of course not. However, this is what Wittgenstein is characterized by. assumption. Wittgenstein starts from this fundamental assumption, which is in fact arbitrary and untrue. It only shows the dependence of his picture of the world on a certain system of logic.

What is the relation of propositions to facts? According to Russell, the structure of logic, as the skeleton of an ideal language, should be the same as the structure of the world. Wittgenstein brings this idea to the end. He believes that the proposal is nothing more than image, or an image, or a logical photograph of a fact. “A sentence must have exactly as many different parts as there are in the state of affairs it represents” (5, 4.04).

And each part of the sentence must correspond to a part of the "state of things", and they must be in exactly the same relation to each other.

According to Wittgenstein, “there must be something identical in the image and in the displayed, so that the first can be the image of the second at all” (5, 2.161). This identity is the structure of the sentence and the fact. Wittgenstein wrote: “A gramophone record, a musical thought, a score, sound waves - all this stands to each other in the same internal figurative relationship that exists between language and the world. All of them have a common logical structure. (Like in a fairy tale about two young men, their horses and their lilies. They are all the same in a certain sense) ”(5, 4.014).

And then we read: “A sentence is an image of reality, because I know the state of affairs represented by it, if I understand the given sentence. And I understand the sentence without having to explain its meaning to me” (5, 4.021). Why is this possible? Because the sentence itself shows its meaning. The sentence shows how things are if it is true. And it He speaks that this is the case. To understand a proposition is to know what takes place when it is true.

For the same, "to know whether an image is true or false, we must compare it with reality." From the image itself it is impossible to know whether it is true or false, for there is no a priori true image. The operation of comparison is all the more possible because, according to Wittgenstein, “there must be exactly as many different parts in a sentence as there are in the state of affairs that it represents” (5, 4.04).

This situation can be visualized by the example of a sentence that often appears in the works of neo-positivists: "The cat is on the rug." The image of the state of affairs he described shows all three elements of the sentence: the rug, the cat, and its position on the rug.

Such, according to Wittgenstein, is the relation of language to the world, to reality. There is no doubt that Wittgenstein made a very interesting attempt to analyze the relation of language to the world about which language speaks. For the question he wanted to answer was how is it that what we say about the world turns out to be true?

But this attempt still ended in failure. First, the doctrine of atomic facts was a completely artificial doctrine, invented ad hoc in order to bring an ontological basis under a certain logical system. The corresponding words of Russell have already been cited above. And here is what Wittgenstein himself says: “My work moved from the foundations of logic to the foundations of the world” (82, 79).

Secondly, the recognition of a linguistic expression or sentence as a direct depiction of reality, its image in the most direct sense of the word, simplifies the actual process of cognition so much that it cannot in any way serve as an adequate description of it.

One could argue as follows: logic and its language were formed under the influence of the structure of reality and reflect its structure. Therefore, knowing the structure of the language, we can descend from it to the structure of the world.

But this would be possible if we had a guarantee that the logic (in this case the logic of Principia Mathematica) has an absolute value. But it's not. The logic of "Principia Mathematica" is one of the possible logical systems, nothing more. There can be many logics, but there is only one world. In this case, this is a kind of aberration of the consciousness of Russell, who created this system, and Wittgenstein, who accepted it.

From our usual point of view, the problem of cognition is the problem of the relation of consciousness, first of all, to material reality, it is the theoretical relation of the subject to the object. Cognition, carried out, of course, with the help of language, linguistic signs, is an ideal reproduction of objective reality, its reconstruction at the conceptual level. Knowledge is ideal, although it is acquired, fixed and expressed through material signs.

Wittgenstein's position is different. With him, the process of cognition, insofar as one can speak of it, unfolds on one level, namely, on the level of "neutral monism."

Wittgenstein's thought and proposition essentially coincide, for both are the logical image of a fact. At the same time, this image itself is also a fact along with others. An image is a fact that depicts another fact.

All infinitely diverse reality is reduced by Wittgenstein to a set of atomic facts, as if spread out on a single plane. Parallel to it is a plane filled with elementary sentences, the structure of which exactly depicts the structure of facts. (We digress now even from the fact that in reality Wittgenstein's structure of facts is only a projection of the structure of sentences.)

This is an extremely simplified model. It does not correspond to the actual process of cognition. It depicts the subject of knowledge one-sidedly, reducing it to atomic facts. It sets an absolute limit to which knowledge in the form of these facts can reach. It presents the process of cognition and its structure in a simplified way, as it ignores its extreme complexity: hypotheses, creation of models, use of mathematical apparatus, etc.

This is a tribute to a certain mental tradition, striving for the maximum simplification of the richness of the actual relations of the world and knowledge, preserving the conviction that all complex relations can be reduced to the simplest and most elementary. This is not only an idea of ​​Wittgenstein and Russell, it has been characteristic of all scientific thinking in general for many centuries. Only gradually did science become convinced of the impracticability of this ideal, of the extreme complexity of reality, and consequently of its knowledge, of the fallacy of any reductionism.

True, the desire for simplicity has been preserved in the form of a kind of regulative idea. Of many more or less equivalent hypotheses or types of evidence, the scientist will always choose and accept the simplest. But this simplicity is not absolute, but relative, it is simplicity in complexity.

As for the positivism with which we are now dealing, simplicity was not a methodological principle for him, but the expression of a certain philosophical attitude. Mach formulated it as the principle of economy of thought. It boiled down to the elimination of everything not directly given in sensory experience and to leaving only what is given in it, and only sensations and their change were considered such data.

The positivist philosophy in this case has lagged behind the development of science because of its adherence to its anti-metaphysical dogma. In the case of Wittgenstein, this lag was repeated, since the extremely complex relation of thought to reality was reduced to a simplified picture of the representation in the language of its atomic structure, that is, atomic facts.

Nevertheless, it was one of the first attempts to understand the philosophical content of the relationship of language to the world, to facts.

The failure of his concept soon became apparent to Wittgenstein himself, and he abandoned it. The views of the later Wittgenstein come from a very different understanding of language. However, we cannot yet part with the Treatise. It contains a number of extremely important ideas that had a huge impact on the development of logical positivism.

From what we already know, it follows that the only purpose of language, according to Wittgenstein, is to assert or deny facts. Language is meant to talk about facts, and only about facts. Any other use of language is illegal, for nothing else can be expressed or expressed in language. In particular, language is unsuitable for talking about itself. And this means that, firstly, although the language has something in common or identical with the world about which it speaks, this general cannot be expressed. Sentences can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it - the logical form.

“In order to be able to depict a logical form, we would have to be able to put ourselves together with sentences outside logic, that is, outside the world” (5, 4.12).

Wittgenstein speaks, of course, about the language of science, although he does not specifically stipulate this. However, if we consider the language of science to be the language, then this will not save us from the need to solve one difficult problem. The point is that if language can only talk about facts, then what about the sentences of logic and mathematics? A V Ā. 2+2=4 etc. These statements are not about facts, and they cannot be reduced to atomic propositions. At the same time, it is clear that these proposals state something.

What are these proposals? Here Wittgenstein approaches one of the most difficult questions in the theory of knowledge, a question that worried Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and Husserl. It is about the nature of so-called self-evident truths. No one doubts that 2x2 = 4, or that A V Ā, that is, that today is October 7th or today is not October 7th. But what makes these sentences obvious truths? Why don't we doubt them? What is their nature, and therefore the nature of all logic and mathematics?

Descartes believed that we perceive them with such clarity and distinctness that there is no possibility of doubt. Kant believed that they are synthetic judgments a priori. They are possible due to the fact that we have a priori forms of sensibility: space and time.

Husserl thought that the provisions of logic are eternal, absolute, ideal truths, their truth is seen directly in the act of intellectual contemplation or intuition (ideation).

Wittgenstein, who had first of all to establish the logical-linguistic status of such sentences, took a different path. He proposed a very radical, bold and innovative solution to the problem. He declared that the sentences of logic and mathematics are absolutely true, since they say nothing, depict nothing, express no thought. Strictly speaking, they are not even suggestions. According to Wittgenstein, these are tautologies (5, 6.1).

Wittgenstein divides linguistic expressions into three types: sentences - they are true if they correspond to reality; tautologies are always true, e.g. ( a+b) 2 =a 2 + 2ab+b 2; contradictions are never true.

Tautology and contradiction - not images of reality. They do not depict any possible state of affairs, since the first admits any possible state of affairs, while the second does not allow any. But, according to Wittgenstein, "what the image depicts is its meaning." And since tautology, like contradiction, does not represent anything, "tautology and contradiction do not make sense" (5, 4.461). As we would say now, tautologies (that is, sentences of logic and mathematics) do not carry any information about the world.

"I don't know, for example, anything about the weather if I know that it's raining or that it's not raining" (5, 4.461). A V Ā. This does not mean, according to Wittgenstein, that tautology is generally meaningless, it is only part of the symbolism necessary to translate one sentence into another.

Wittgenstein expressed these thoughts in the Treatise in a very fragmentary way, but they were developed in detail by the leaders of the Vienna Circle and constituted one of the fundamental dogmas of logical positivism.

But sometimes Wittgenstein says something else. After all, for him the logical structure of language is identical to the logical structure of the world. Therefore, although the sentences of logic and mathematics are empty, although they say nothing about the world, nevertheless they show us something by their very form.

This is the difference between what the sentence He speaks, and the fact that it shows, is very important for Wittgenstein. “The logic of the world, which the sentences of logic show in tautologies, mathematics shows in equations” (5, 6.22).

This thought of Wittgenstein was rejected by the logical positivists.

But how are we to understand Wittgenstein's remark that the sentences of logic show the logic of the world? Let's take this tautology: "It's raining or it's not raining" or A or not - A. So, this tautology, according to Wittgenstein, reveals to us the structure of the world. This structure is such that alternatives.

Let's take the mathematical expression 2 + 2 = 4. This expression indicates the discreteness of the world, the existence of various sets, parts in it. The world of Parmenides is not like that. It represents absolute unity.

This is the case with the propositions of logic and mathematics. But besides them, and besides statements about facts, there are also philosophical propositions. How to be with them? Here Wittgenstein is no less radical. Since these sentences do not speak of facts and are not tautologies, most of them are meaningless.

“Most of the suggestions and questions made about philosophical problems are not false, but meaningless. Therefore, we cannot answer such questions at all, we can only establish their meaninglessness. Most of the questions and suggestions of philosophers stem from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language” (5, 4.0031). Therefore, if philosophy wants to have any right to exist, it must be nothing but a "critique of language" (5, 4.0031).

According to Wittgenstein, this means that "philosophy not is one of the natural sciences” (5, 4.111).

“The goal of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.

Philosophy is not a theory, but an activity.

Philosophical work consists essentially of elucidation.

The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions" but a clarification of propositions.

Philosophy must clarify and strictly delimit thoughts, which without this are, as it were, dark and vague ”(5. 4.112). This understanding of philosophy has generally been adopted by the logical positivists.

The above words of Wittgenstein contain not only the concept of philosophy, but also a whole worldview concept. It assumes that the only form of communication between a person and the natural and social world around him is language. A person is connected with the world in other ways, practical (when he plows, sows, produces, consumes, etc.), emotionally, when he experiences some feelings in relation to other people and things, strong-willed, etc. But his theoretical, intellectual relation to the world is exhausted by the linguistic relation, or even there is a linguistic relation. In other words, the picture of the world that a person creates in his mind or in his representation is determined by the language, its structure, its structure and features.

In this sense, the world human is the world of his language. At one time, the neo-Kantians of the Marburg school taught that the world, as science understands it, is constituted in judgment. In Wittgenstein we find an echo of this idea, but with an emphasis not on the act of thinking, but on the act of speaking, speech, on the linguistic act. The world is constituted in a speech act.

Thus, all the problems that arise in a person in the process of his theoretical attitude to the world are linguistic problems that require a linguistic solution. This means that all problems arise as a result of the fact that a person says something about the world, and only when he talks about it. And since he can speak correctly, in accordance with the nature of his language, and incorrectly, that is, in violation of his nature, difficulties, confusion, insoluble paradoxes, etc., may arise. etc. But the existing language is very imperfect, and this imperfection is also a source of confusion. So at this stage Wittgenstein thinks.

We already know that language, according to Wittgenstein, must represent facts. This is his purpose, vocation, function. All particular sciences use language for this purpose and as a result receive a set of true sentences that reflect the relevant facts. But, as already mentioned, language, due to its imperfection, does not always use clear, precisely defined expressions.

In addition, language expresses our thoughts, and thoughts are often confused, and sentences, statements expressing them, turn out to be unclear. Sometimes we ask ourselves questions that, by the very nature of language, cannot be answered and are therefore wrong to ask. The task of real philosophy is to bring clarity to our thoughts and proposals, to make our questions and answers understandable. Then many difficult problems of philosophy will either fall away or be resolved in a rather simple way.

The fact is that Wittgenstein believes that all the difficulties of philosophers, all the confusion into which they fall, which is inextricably linked with any discussion of philosophical problems, is due to the fact that philosophers are trying to express in language what is generally impossible to say by means of language. For language, by its very structure and nature, is designed to talk about facts. When we talk about facts, our statements, even if they are false, always remain clear and understandable. (One might say that this is the positivist principle in Wittgenstein's philosophy.)

But the philosopher does not speak of facts with which his statements could be compared in order to understand their meaning. For meaning is what the image - the sentence - depicts. But when a philosopher speaks, for example, about the absolute, he uses verbal signs without relating them to any facts. Everything he says remains unclear and incomprehensible, because one cannot speak of what he wants to say, one cannot even think it.

Hence the function of philosophy is also that:

“It must put a boundary to the conceivable and thus the unthinkable.

It must limit the unthinkable from within through the thinkable” (5, 4.114).

“It will mean what cannot be said, clearly showing what can be said” (5, 4.115).

Everything that can be said must be clearly said” (5.4.116).

Well, and about that, "about which it is impossible to speak, about that one should be silent" (5, 7).

Wittgenstein is sure that one cannot talk about philosophical problems in their traditional sense. Therefore, he states: “The correct method of philosophy would be to say nothing but what can be said, therefore, except the propositions of the natural sciences, that is, that which has nothing to do with philosophy, and then always, when one or wants to say something metaphysical, to show him that he did not give any meaning to some signs in his sentences. This method would be unsatisfactory for another: he did not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy, but it would be the only strictly correct method ”(5, 6.53).

Wittgenstein is not original here. He gives a paraphrase of a well-known passage from Hume: “Let us take, for example, some book on theology or on school mathematics and ask: does it contain any abstract reasoning about quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experiential reasoning about facts and existence? No. So throw it into the fire, for there can be nothing in it but sophistry and delusions” (26, 195).

These statements of Wittgenstein and the conclusion he came to gave reason to many of his critics, including Marxist ones, to portray Wittgenstein as an enemy of philosophy, as a person who denied philosophy and set as his goal its destruction. This, of course, is not true.

Wittgenstein was deeply philosophical in nature. And philosophy was for him the main content of life and activity. But he came to philosophy from technology and mathematics. His ideal was precision, certainty, unambiguity. He wanted to get the same rigorous results in philosophy as in the exact sciences. He tried to find a way to put philosophy on the ground of science. He did not tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty. In the logical analysis proposed by Russell, he saw a possible way to get rid of philosophical confusion. He concretized the idea of ​​logical analysis in the sense that he turned it into an analysis of language. This was a new field of philosophical inquiry, perhaps rediscovered by Wittgenstein. And like any philosopher blazing new paths, he absolutized the path he discovered, the significance of the method he proposed.

He was consistent and went to the end. He expressed many interesting ideas in the form of aphorisms. Despite the exaggerations contained in them, they played an important role, serving as an impetus for the development of philosophical thought.

But Wittgenstein was well aware that the logical atomism developed by him and Russell, even if we assume that it depicts the logical structure of the world, cannot satisfy a thinking person. Philosophical problems arose not because some eccentrics got confused in the rules of grammar and started talking nonsense. Their formulation was caused by much deeper human needs, and these problems have their own very real content. Wittgenstein understands this, as does Russell. But, having bound himself hand and foot with the formalistic doctrine he has adopted, he sees no other way to express these problems than by turning ... to mastic. Mystical, according to Wittgenstein. it is something that cannot be expressed, expressed in language, and therefore cannot be thought. The mystical are questions about the world, about life, about its meaning. All these things, Wittgenstein believes, cannot be talked about. And perhaps that is why “people who, after long doubts, have become clear about the meaning of life, still cannot say what this meaning is” (5, 6.521).

This sounds paradoxical, but from Wittgenstein's point of view it is clear enough. Wittgenstein proceeds from an attempt to achieve rigor and precision of thinking, using purely formal methods for this. Wittgenstein understands that philosophical problems are not trifles. But he knows that for thousands of years people could not agree on even a minimal number of problems in philosophy.

The logical analysis proposed by Russell and the analysis of language proposed by Wittgenstein had as their goal the elimination of arbitrariness in philosophical reasoning, the deliverance of philosophy from obscure concepts, from vague expressions. These scientists, like Moore, wanted to encourage philosophers to think about what they were saying, to be aware of the meaning of their statements.

They wanted to introduce at least some element of scientific rigor and precision into philosophy, they wanted to single out in it those parts, aspects or aspects where a philosopher can find a common language with scientists, where he can speak a language that is understandable to a scientist and convincing for him. Wittgenstein believed that by engaging himself in clarifying the propositions of traditional philosophy, the philosopher could accomplish this task. But he understood that the philosophical problem is wider than what the concept he proposed could cover.

Take, for example, the question of the meaning of life. This is one of the deepest problems of philosophy. But precision, rigor and clarity are hardly possible here. Wittgenstein argues that what can be said can be clearly said. Here, in this matter, clarity is unattainable, and therefore it is impossible to say anything on this subject at all. All these things can be experienced, felt, but nothing can be said about them. This includes the whole field of ethics. So, “there is, of course, something inexpressible. It shows itself; it is mystical” (5, 6.522).

But if philosophical questions are inexpressible in language, if nothing can be said about them, then how could Wittgenstein himself write the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? This is its main contradiction. Russell remarks, not without malice, that "in the end, Mr. Wittgenstein managed to say quite a lot about what cannot be said" (83, 22).

R. Carnap also notes that “he (Wittgenstein) seems inconsistent in his actions. He tells us that philosophical propositions cannot be formulated and that what cannot be spoken about must be kept silent; and then, instead of being silent, he writes a whole philosophical book” (31, 37).

This once again shows that the reasoning of philosophers should not always be taken literally, but cum grano salis. The philosopher usually separates himself, that is, makes an exception for himself from his own conception. He tries, as it were, to stand outside the world and look at it from the side, as a god could do.

Scientists usually do the same. But the scientist strives for objective knowledge of the world, in which his own presence does not change anything. True, modern science must take into account the presence and influence of the device with which the experiment and observation are carried out. But it also seeks to separate those processes that are caused by the influence of the device from the object's own characteristics.

The philosopher, however, cannot exclude himself from his philosophy. Hence the inconsistency that Wittgenstein admits. If philosophical propositions are meaningless, then this must also apply to the philosophical statements of Wittgenstein himself. And by the way, Wittgenstein courageously accepts this inevitable conclusion. He admits that his reasoning is meaningless. But he tries to save the day by stating that they don't claim anything, they only aim to help the person understand what's what, and once that's done, they can be dropped.

Wittgenstein says "My proposals are explained by the fact that the one who understands me finally understands their meaninglessness if he climbed with their help - on them - above them (he must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he climb up it).

He must overcome these suggestions, only then will he see the world correctly” (5, 6.54). But what constitutes this correct vision of the world, Wittgenstein, of course, does not explain. Because you can't talk about it...

It is obvious that all of Wittgenstein's logical atomism, his conception of an ideal language that depicts the facts accurately, proved to be insufficient, to put it simply, unsatisfactory. This does not mean at all that the creation of the Logico-Philosophical Treatise was a waste of time and effort. We see here a typical example of how philosophical doctrines are created. In essence, philosophy is the study of the various logical possibilities that open up at every stage of the path of knowledge. So here Wittgenstein adopts the postulate or assumption that language directly depicts facts. And he draws all the conclusions from this assumption, without stopping at the most paradoxical conclusions.

And we see the result to which he comes. It turns out that this concept is one-sided, incomplete, insufficient to understand the process of cognition in general, philosophical in particular.

But that's not all. Wittgenstein has one more important idea, which follows naturally from his whole conception and, perhaps, even underlies it. This is the idea that for a person the boundaries of his language mean the boundaries of his world. The fact is that for Wittgenstein the primary, initial reality is language. True, Wittgenstein also speaks of the world of facts that are represented by language.

But we see that the entire atomic structure of the world is constructed artificially in the image and likeness of the language, its logical structure. The purpose of atomic facts is quite official: they are called upon to substantiate the truth of atomic propositions. And it is no coincidence that Wittgenstein often “compares reality with a proposition” (5, 4.05), and not vice versa. With him "the sentence has a meaning independent of the facts" (5, 4.061). Or “if the elementary proposition is true, then the atomic fact exists; if the elementary proposition is false, then the atomic fact does not exist” (5, 4.25).

“After all, the truth or falsity of each sentence changes something in the general structure of the world” (5, 5.5262).

In the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" there is a tendency to merge, to identify the language with the world. After all, according to Wittgenstein, “logic fills the world; the boundaries of the world are also its boundaries” (5, 5.61). He also says: "The fact that the sentences of logic are tautologies shows the formal - logical properties of the language, the world" (5, 6.12). Consequently, language is not only a means for talking about the world, but in a certain sense the world itself, its very content.

If, say, for the Machians the world was what we feel, if for the neo-Kantians the world is what we think about it, then we can say that for Wittgenstein the world is what we say about it. This idea was accepted by the logical positivists 17 .

In Wittgenstein this position even passes into solipsism. For it turns out that language is my language. The fact that “the world is my world is manifested in the fact that the boundaries of language ... mean the boundaries of my world” (5, 5.62). And further, "the subject does not belong to the world, but it is the boundary of the world" (5, 5.632). The I enters into philosophy thanks to the fact that “the world is my world” (5, 5.641).

Wittgenstein also says that "at death the world does not change, but ceases" (5, 6.431). And finally, “what solipsism really implies is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but only shows itself” (5, 5.62).

It should be noted here that when we say that some doctrine gravitates towards solipsism, this does not mean at all that the given philosopher, say, Wittgenstein, denies the existence of stars, other people, etc., that is, that he is metaphysical solipsist that he is convinced that he alone exists.

Subjective idealism is a technical term of philosophy, and it means that in solving philosophical problems, the philosopher starts from the subject, and not from the objective world. This means that, considering the problems of the theory of knowledge or trying to draw a picture of the world, he does not proceed from objective reality as such. He does not deny the existence of the external world, but he does not draw any conclusions from its recognition. He considers the picture of the world he creates not as a reflection of this world, but only as a free creation of the spirit.

Recognizing the existence of reality, he tries to build it from complexes of sensations, present it as a logical construction, and so on. Analyzing the cognitive process, the cognitive relation of the subject to the object, he ignores the object and its impact on the subject, trying to describe the process of cognition only from the subjective side.

In this case, Wittgenstein, and after him the neopositivists, are locked within the boundaries of language as the only directly accessible reality. The world appears to them only as the empirical content of what we say about it. Its structure is determined by the structure of language, and if we can somehow recognize the world as independent of our will, of our language, then only as something inexpressible, mystical.

The inconsistency of Wittgenstein's Treatise is explained not only by the author's personal inconsistency, but by his inability to make ends meet. It is explained by the fundamental impracticability of the task set by him. Wittgenstein tried to finally resolve all philosophical questions. This idea was nothing new, since the vast majority of philosophers tried to do the same. What was new was the means of solving this problem. These means were largely formal. Wittgenstein tried, as it were, to formalize the process of philosophizing, to determine exactly what and how she can do. At the same time, it turned out that he himself had to do something that, according to the strict meaning of his words, cannot be done, which he himself categorically forbade.

It turned out further that the philosophical problem of language does not fit within the framework, within the limits by which he limited the sphere of competence of philosophy. Therefore, he constantly had to cross the boundaries of formalization, to expand the field of philosophy beyond the permitted limits.

The solipsistic conclusions reached by Wittgenstein's logical atomism were one of the reasons why the doctrine of logical atomism was rejected by the logical positivists. Another reason for his failure was due to a change in the way he looked at logic.

Logical atomism was created in relation to the logic of Principia Mathematica, which in the second decade seemed to be the most modern logical system. But already in the 1920s it became clear that this logic was by no means the only possible one.

Although Russell tried to defend logical atomism, this doctrine could not survive. In the end, Wittgenstein himself abandoned it. But the main ideas of his treatise - minus the logical atomism - served as the source of the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle.

1 The world is everything that happens.

1.1 The world is a totality of facts, not objects.

1.11 The world is defined by facts and what it is all facts.

1.12 For the totality of facts determines everything that happens, as well as everything that does not happen.

1.13 The world is facts in a logical space.

1.2 The world is subdivided into facts.

1.21 Something may or may not happen, and everything else will be the same.

2 What is happening, a fact, is the existence of co-existence.

2.01 Co-existence - connection of objects (objects, things).

2.011 It is essential for an object that it must be a possible component of some kind of co-existence.

2.012 There is nothing accidental in logic: if an object maybe appear in a certain co-existence, then the possibility of this co-existence is already inherent in it.

2.0121 <…>Just as spatial objects are generally unthinkable outside of space, temporal objects outside of time, so no one an object is inconceivable outside the possibility of its combinations with others.

If you can imagine an object in the context of co-existence, then imagine it outside opportunities this context is not possible.<…>

2.0123 If an object is known, then all the possibilities of its occurrence in co-existences are also known.<…>

2.0124 If all objects are given, then so are all possible events.

2.013 Each object exists, as it were, in the space of possible co-beings. It is possible to imagine this space as empty, but it is impossible to imagine an object outside this space.

2.0131 <…>A spot in the field of view need not be red, but it must have some color - it is included, so to speak, in the color space. The tone must have some height, tangible object - some hardness, etc.<…>

2.02331 Either the object has only its inherent properties that other objects do not have, then by description it can be directly distinguished from other objects and referred to; or there are a number of objects with common properties inherent in them all, then it is generally impossible to point to one of them.

After all, if an object is not distinguished by anything, you cannot single it out, otherwise it would already have been highlighted.<…>

2.026 Only the presence of objects can give the world a stable form.

2.027 The enduring, the enduring, and the object are one and the same.

2.0271 Object - stable, preserved; configuration - changing, unstable.

2.0272 The configuration of objects constitutes an event.

2.03 In co-existence, objects are linked to each other, like links in a chain.

2.031 In co-existence, objects relate to each other in a certain way.

2.032 The way of interconnection of objects in co-existence is the structure of co-existence.

2.033 Form - the possibility of structure.

2.034 The structure of the fact is formed from the structures of events.

2.04 The world is the totality of existing co-beings.

2.05 The totality of existing co-beings also determines which co-beings do not exist.

2.06 Reality - the existence and non-existence of co-beings.

(We also call the existence of co-existence a positive fact, non-existence a negative fact.)

2.061 Co-beings are independent of each other.

2.062 From the existence or non-existence of one event, one cannot conclude the existence or non-existence of another.

2.063 The world is reality in all its scope.

2.1 We create pictures of facts for ourselves.

2.11 The picture represents a certain situation in the logical space, represents the existence and non-existence of co-beings.

2.12 A picture is a model of reality.

2.13 Objects in the picture correspond to the elements of the picture.

2.131 Objects are represented in the picture by elements of the picture.

2.14 What holds the picture together is that its elements relate to each other in a certain way.

2.141 The picture is a fact.

2.15 A certain ratio of elements in the picture is the idea that things are related to each other in this way. Let's call this connection of the elements of the picture its structure, and the possibility of such a structure - the form of the image inherent in this picture.

2.151 The form of an image is the possibility that things are related to each other in the same way as the elements of a picture.

2.1511 So the picture is connected with reality; she touches her.<…>

2.181 If the form of the image is a logical form, then the picture is called a logical picture.

2.182 Every picture is and logical picture. (On the contrary, not every picture is, for example, spatial).

2.19 A logical picture is capable of depicting the world.<…>

2.21 The picture corresponds or does not correspond to reality; it is true or false, true or false.

2.22 Through its pictorial form, a picture depicts what it depicts, regardless of its truth or falsity.

2.221 What a picture depicts is its meaning.

2.222 Its truth or falsity consists in the correspondence or non-correspondence of its meaning to reality.

2.223 To know whether a picture is true or false, it must be compared with reality.

2.224 It is impossible to know from the picture itself whether it is true or false.

2.225 There is no a priori true picture.

3 Thought is a logical picture of a fact.

3.001 "Co-existence is conceivable" means: "We are able to imagine this or that picture of it."

3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.<…>

3.03 Illogical is unthinkable, because otherwise it would be necessary to think illogically.

3.031 It was once said that God could create everything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic. - The thing is, it's impossible. to tell, what an “illogical world” would look like.

3.032 It is just as impossible to depict something “contrary to logic” in language as it is to depict a figure in spatial coordinates that contradicts the laws of space, or to indicate the coordinates of a non-existent point.<…>

3.1 In a sentence, a thought is expressed in a sensually perceptible way.<…>

3.12 The sign with which the thought is expressed, I call the sign-sentence. A sentence-sign is a sentence in its projective relation to the world.

3.13 The proposal includes everything that is inherent in the projection, with the exception of the projected itself.

Therefore, the possibility of the projected, and not itself.

Therefore, the sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it.

(The expression "content of a sentence" means the content of a meaningful sentence.)

The sentence contains the form, not the content of its meaning.

3.14 The sign-sentence is composed in such a way that its elements, words, correlate with each other in a certain way.

The offer sign is a fact.

3.141 A sentence is not a mixture of words. - (As a musical theme - not a mixture of sounds).

The offer is internally organized.<…>

3.143 The fact that the sign-sentence is a fact is veiled by the ordinary, written or printed, form of expression.

So, for example, in printed form, a sentence sign, in fact, does not differ from a word.<…>

3.1431 The essence of a sign-sentence becomes much clearer if one imagines as its components not written signs, but spatial objects (say, tables, chairs, books).

In this case, the meaning of the sentence will be expressed by the relative position of these objects.<…>

3.202 Simple signs used in a sentence are called names.

3.203 A name denotes an object. The object is its value ("A" is the same sign as "A").

3.21 The configuration of simple signs in a sentence sign corresponds to the configuration of objects in a certain situation.

3.22 A name in a sentence represents an object.

3.221 Objects can only name. The signs represent them. You can only talk about them express same them it is forbidden. The proposal may not be talking about what there is an object, but only about as he is.<…>

3.251 What a sentence expresses, it expresses in a certain, well-ordered way: the sentence is internally organized.

3.26 The name is not divided by definition into further constituent parts: it is an elementary sign.<…>

3.262 What cannot be expressed in a sign is shown by its use. That signs are swallowed up, their use says.

3.263 The meanings of elementary signs can be explained by explanation. Explanations are sentences containing such signs. Therefore, they can be understood only on the condition that the meanings of these signs are already known.

3.3 Only the sentence makes sense; the name takes on meaning only in the context of the sentence.

3.31 Any part of a sentence that characterizes its meaning, I call an expression (symbol).

(A sentence is itself an expression.)

An expression is everything that is common (essential to meaning) that sentences can have with each other.<…>

3.322 For different ways to designate the fact that two objects are designated by the same sign cannot in any way indicate a common feature of these objects. Because the sign is arbitrary. Consequently, instead of one, two different signs could be chosen, and then what would be left of the common designation?

3.323 It is not uncommon in everyday language that the same word signifies in different ways - hence belongs to different symbols - or that two words denoting differently are externally used in a sentence in the same way.

Thus, the word "is" appears in the language as a linking verb, as a sign of identity and as an expression of existence; the word "exist" is used similarly to the intransitive verb "to go"; the word "identical" - as an adjective; the subject in question may be something, but also something happening.

(In the sentence "Green is green" - where the first word is a proper noun and the last is an adjective - these words not only have different meanings, but are different symbols.)

3.324 Hence the most fundamental substitutions of one for the other (with which all philosophy is full) easily arise.

3.325 To avoid such errors, a sign language should be used, which would be excluded, since it would not use the same signs for different characters and would not use signs with different ways of designation in an apparently identical way.<…>

3.326 In order to recognize a character in a sign, attention must be paid to its meaningful use.

3.327 A sign determines a logical form only together with its logical-syntactic application.<…>

4 Thought is a meaningful sentence.

4.001 The totality of sentences is language.

4.002 Man has the ability to build languages ​​that allow him to express any meaning without having any idea how and what each word means. - Just like people speak without knowing how to generate individual sounds.

Everyday language is part of the human device, and it is no less complex than this device.

People are not able to directly extract the logic of the language from it.

Language disguises thoughts. And so much so that the outer form of clothing does not allow us to judge the form of the thought dressed in it; the fact is that the outer form of clothing was created for completely different purposes, by no means in order to judge the shape of the body by it.

The tacitly accepted conventions that serve to understand everyday language are overly complex.

4.003 Most sentences and questions treated as philosophical are not false, but meaningless. That is why it is generally impossible to give answers to questions of this kind, one can only establish their meaninglessness.

Most of the philosopher's suggestions and questions are rooted in our misunderstanding of the logic of language.

(These are questions of this type, such as: is good more or less identical than beautiful.)

And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are, in fact, not Problems.

4.0031 All philosophy is a "critique of language".<…>

4.01 The proposal is a picture of reality.

A sentence is a model of reality as we imagine it.

4.011 At first glance, a sentence - as it is, for example, printed on paper - does not appear to be a picture of the reality it is talking about. But at first glance, musical writing does not seem to be an image of music, and our phonetic (letter) writing does not seem to be an image of our speech.

And yet these sign languages ​​turn out to be, even in the usual sense of the word, images of what they represent.<…>

4.014 A gramophone record, a musical theme, musical notation, sound waves - all of them are in the same internal relation of reflection that exists between language and the world.

All of them have a common logical structure.<…>

4.0141 There is a general rule by which a musician can reproduce a symphony from its score, a rule that allows it to be reproduced along the lines of the recording and re-created in the score. This is precisely the internal similarity of such, at first glance, such different constructions. And this rule is the law of projection, according to which a symphony is projected in musical notation. This is the rule for translating the language of music into the language of gramophone recording.

4.015 The possibility of all comparisons, all the imagery of our language is based on the logic of the image.

4.016 To understand the essence of the sentence, let us recall the hieroglyphic writing, which tells about the facts through the image.

And from it, without losing what is essential for the image, an alphabetic letter arose.

4.02 This is convinced by the fact that we understand the meaning of the sign-sentence without explaining it to us.

4.021 A sentence is a picture of reality: for, understanding a sentence, I know the possible situation it depicts. And I understand the sentence without having to explain its meaning to me.

4.022 Offer shows your meaning.

Offer shows how it goes if it is true. And it says that this is how it goes.

4.023 A sentence can define reality to such an extent that all that is required to bring it into conformity with it is to say "yes" or "no" and nothing more.

To do this, it is necessary that reality be fully described by him.

A sentence is a description of some kind of co-existence.

If the description of an object characterizes its external properties, then the sentence describes reality according to its internal properties.

The sentence constructs the world with the help of a logical framework, and therefore in the sentence, if it is true, indeed one can see all the logical features of reality.<…>

4.0311 One name represents one thing, another another, and they are connected with each other, so that the whole - like a living picture - conveys some co-existence.

4.0312 The possibility of suggestion is based on the principle of substitution of objects by signs.<…>

4.05 Reality is compared with the proposal.

4.06 A sentence can be true or false only because it is a picture of reality.<…>

4.11 The totality of true sentences is science in its entirety (or the totality of sciences).

4.111 Philosophy is not one of the sciences.

(The word "philosophy" must mean something below or above, but not next to, the sciences.)

4.112 The goal of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.

Philosophy is not a doctrine, but an activity.

Philosophical work essentially consists of explanations.

The result of philosophy is not "philosophical propositions" but the achieved clarity of propositions.

Thoughts, usually as if vague and vague, philosophy is called upon to make clear and distinct.<…>

4.113 Philosophy limits the disputed territory of science.

4.114 It is called upon to define the boundaries of what is conceivable and thus unthinkable.

It must limit the unthinkable from within through the conceivable.

4.115 She makes it clear what cannot be said by clearly presenting what can be said.

4.116 Everything that is generally conceivable can be thought clearly. Anything that can be said can be said clearly.

4.12 A sentence can depict the whole of reality, but is not able to depict what it must have in common with reality in order for it to represent it - a logical form.

In order to be able to depict a logical form, we would have to be able to go beyond the limits of logic, that is, beyond the limits of the world, together with the sentence.

4.121 A sentence is not capable of depicting a logical form, it is reflected in it.

What is reflected in the language, this form cannot represent.

That which expresses myself in the language we cannot be expressed in language.

Offer shows logical form of reality.

It presents it.<…>

4.1212 What maybe be shown not maybe be said.

4.1213 Hence the feeling that controls us is understandable: in the presence of a good sign language, we already have a correct logical understanding.<…>

5.135 From the existence of one situation, one cannot in any way conclude the existence of another, completely different situation.

5.136 There is no causal link that would justify such a conclusion.

5.1361 Infer future events from present events impossible.

Superstition - belief in such a causal relationship.

5.1362 Free will consists in the fact that the actions that will be done later cannot be known now.

It would be possible to know about them only if causality - like the connection of a logical conclusion - was internal need.<…>

5.6 Limits of my language represent the boundaries of my world.

5.61 Logic fills the world; the boundaries of the world are the essence and its boundaries.

Therefore, in logic it is impossible to say: in the world there is this and this, but that is not in it.

This would imply that we are excluding some possibility, which cannot be; otherwise, logic would have to go beyond the limits of the world, if these limits could only be examined from the outside.

We cannot think what we cannot think; it means that we are not able to think, we are not able and to tell.

5.62 This remark gives a clue to the question of how true solipsism is.

That solipsism implies quite right, but it can't be said but it reveals itself.

What the world is mine world, is found in the fact that the boundaries special language (of the language that only I understand) mean the boundaries my peace.

5.621 World and Life are one.

5.63 I am my world. (Microcosm.)

5.631 There is no thinking, representing subject.

If I were to write a book, The World as I Find It, then it should also tell about my body and tell which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This, in fact, is the method of isolation subject, or, rather, showing that the subject in some important sense of the word does not exist at all: for about him alone not could be discussed in this book. -

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world, but represents a certain boundary of the world.

5.633 Where in the world should be discovered metaphysical subject?

You say that the situation here is exactly the same as with the eye and the field of vision. But in reality you not see eyes.

And nothing in line of sight does not allow us to conclude that it is seen by the eye.

5.6331 That is, the coarsened form of the visual field is not as follows:

5.634 This is because no part of our experience is at the same time a priori.

Everything we see could be different.

Anything we can describe at all could be different.

There is no a priori order of things.

5.64 Here it is seen that strictly drawn solipsism coincides with pure realism. The “I” of solipsism shrinks to an unextended point, but the reality associated with it remains.

5.641 Thus, in philosophy, one can indeed, in a certain sense, speak of the "I" non-psychologically.

"I" is introduced into philosophy by the fact that "the world is my world."

The philosophical "I" is not a person, not a human body or a human soul with which psychology deals, but a metaphysical subject, a boundary - and not a part - of the world.<…>

6.124 Logical sentences describe the framework of the world, or rather they depict it. They don't "tell" anything. They assume that names have meaning and elementary sentences have meaning. This is their connection with the world.<…>

6.363 The process of induction consists in what is supposed protozoan a law that needs to be brought into line with our experience.

6.3631 But this process has no logical, but only a psychological justification.

Of course, there is no reason to believe that this simplest case will actually occur.

6.36311 That the sun will rise in the morning - a hypothesis; which means we are not we know whether it will rise or not.

6.37 From the fact that one thing happened, it does not necessarily follow that another must happen. There is only logical need.

6.371 At the basis of the whole modern worldview lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena.

6.372 Thus, they stop before the laws of nature, as before something inviolable, like the ancients before God and Fate.

And in both approaches there is right and wrong. The old one is, of course, clearer, since it recognizes a certain clear limit, while in newer systems one might get the impression that all explained.

6.373 The world is independent of my will.

6.374 Even if everything that we desire happened, it would only be, so to speak, a favor of fate, for between the will and the world there is no logical connection to make it happen. The supposed physical connection in itself is not something to which our will could be directed.

6.375 As there is only logical necessity, so it exists and only logical impossibility.

6.3751 For example, the simultaneous presence of two colors in the same point of the visual field is impossible, moreover, it is logically impossible, because this is excluded by the logical structure of color.<…>

6.41 The meaning of the world must be outside the world. Everything in the world is as it is, and everything happens as it happens; in it has no value - and if it had, it would have no value.

If there is a value that really has a value, it must be outside everything that happens and so-being. For everything that happens and so-being is accidental.

What makes it non-random cannot be found in world, otherwise it would again become random.

It must be out of the world.

6.42 Therefore, proposals of ethics are impossible.

The higher cannot be expressed in sentences.

6.421 It is clear that ethics is not amenable to proposition.

Ethics is transcendental.

(Ethics and aesthetics are one.)

6.422 In laying down an ethical law in the form "you must...", one immediately thinks: what if I don't? It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense. Therefore, the question of consequences action shouldn't matter. - At least these consequences should not be events. For there must be something correct in such a formulation of the question. Indeed, there must be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must be in the act itself.

(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)

6.423 It is impossible to speak of the will as a carrier of the ethical.

Will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.

6.43 If a good or evil will changes the world, then it is only within its power to change the boundaries of the world, and not the facts - not something that can be expressed through language.

In short, the world should then generally become different due to this. It should, as it were, decrease or increase as a whole.

The happy world is different from the unhappy world.

6.431 Just as with death, the world does not change, but ceases.

6.4311 Death is not an event of life. Man does not experience death.

If by eternity we understand not the infinite duration of time, but timelessness, then the one who lives in the present is eternally alive.

Therefore, our life has no end, just as our field of vision has no boundaries.

6.4312 The immortality of the human soul in time, that is, the eternal continuation of its life after death, not only is not confirmed in any way, but does not justify the hopes that have always been placed on it and as an assumption. If I lived forever, would this reveal some secret? Wouldn't this eternal life be just as mysterious then as the present one? Comprehension of the mystery of life in space and time lies outside space and time.

(After all, it is not at all one of the problems of science that is to be solved here.)

6.432 From the point of view of the higher, it is completely indifferent, as the state of affairs in the world. God doesn't show up in the world.

6.4321 Facts are wholly involved only in the formulation of the problem, but not in the process of its solution.

6.44 The mystical is not that as the world is, and what he is.

6.45 Contemplation of the world from the point of view of eternity is the contemplation of it as a whole - a limited whole.

The experience of the world as a limited whole is what is mystical.

6.5 For an answer that cannot be expressed, it is also impossible to express a question.

Secrets does not exist.

If the question can be posed at all, then can and answer.

6.51 Skepticism not irrefutable, but apparently meaningless, as he tries to doubt where it is impossible to ask.

For doubt can only exist where there is a question; the question is only where the answer exists, and the answer is only where something maybe be expressed.

6.52 We feel that even if responses were received to all possible scientific questions, our vital problems would not be affected at all by this. Then, of course, there would be no questions left, but this would be a definite answer.

6.521 We notice the solution of a vital problem by the disappearance of this problem.

(Is this why those who, after long doubts, have become clear about the meaning of life, are still unable to say what this meaning consists of.)

6.522 Indeed, there is the inexpressible. It shows yourself, it is mystical.

6.53 The correct method of philosophy, properly speaking, would be this: to say nothing but what can be said, that is, apart from the propositions of science, hence anything that has nothing to do with philosophy. - And whenever someone would like to say something metaphysical, to prove to him that he did not give meaning to certain signs of his sentences. This method would not bring satisfaction to the interlocutor - he would not feel that he was being taught philosophy - but only such a method would be perfectly correct.

6.54 My suggestions serve as a clarification: the one who understands me, having risen with their help - along them - above them, in the end recognizes that they are meaningless. (He must, so to speak, discard the ladder after he has climbed it.)

He needs to overcome these suggestions, then he will see the world correctly.

7. About what it is impossible to speak, about that one should be silent.

Wittgenstein L. Logico-philosophical treatise. // Wittgenstein L. Philosophical works. PartI. M., 1994. P. 5–73 (translated from German by Kozlova M.S., Aseeva Yu.A.).

EPISTEMOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, Vol. XIV, No. 4

) new edition

"Tractatus Logico-Philosophic" JI. Wittgenstein

I. DOBRONRAVOV, D. LAKHUTI

Currently, the publishing house "Kanon +" is preparing for the release of a new edition of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" by Ludwig Wittgenstein. This book has long been included in the golden fund of logico-philosophical literature; it was first published in Russian in 19581 (37 years after the first publication in German and 36 years later in English). It has been repeatedly reprinted in German, English, and other languages; in 1994, another Russian translation of the Treatise was published, and in 2005, the third one3.

in our opinion, comments are the nature of this edition, which will include four versions of the "Treatise" - a German original, a Russian translation and two English translations, first published, respectively, in 1922 (corrected version - in 1933) and 1961. (corrected version - in 1974) The version of our translation, revised especially for this edition, published in 1958, was chosen as the Russian translation. in this article.

1 Wittgenstein L. Logico-philosophical treatise / Per. from German and verified with an authorized English translation by I. Dobronravov and D. Lakhuti. General edition and preface by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.F. Asmus. M.: IL, 1958.

"Wittgenstein L. Philosophical works. Part I. M .: Gnosis, 1994 (parallel German and Russian text) / Translated from German by Kozlova M.S., Aseeva Yu.A. Comments by Kozlova M.S.

3 Wittgenstein L. Selected Works. M.: Territory of the future, 2005.

4 Wittgenstein L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus / With an Introduction by Bertrand Russell. L., Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. First published in this series 1922. Second impression (with a few corrections) 1933.

5 Wittgenstein L. Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung / With new translation by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinnes. L, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1st ed. 1961.

NEW EDITION

"LOGICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT" L. WITGENSHTEIN

At the end of her "Logic-philo-too deep trace left

sophic treatise” (aphorisms 6.52, it is in the philosophy of the 20th century 6.521, 6.53, 6.54) Wittgenstein you- We do not share the opinion of M. Hei-

said the idea that in this book of Redegger, what to philosophize

shens, i.e. exposed as pseudo- only possible in German, well, and,

problems, as devoid of meaning, perhaps even in Greek

all the problems of the traditional filoque"". But although we believe that

Sophia, and that therefore it can be taken from the objective content of thought

throw as unnecessary more flattering - can and should be available

nitsa. by which you are not going to the perceiver, regardless of

descend back. The life of the language, we - like others more or less

this prediction, like many less experienced translators, did not

others, “to the best of our ability, we may not understand that many

mouth ": all (and maybe none) subtle - and therefore no less important

philosophical problems "Treatise" are not new! - shades of thought, including

decided and did not cancel, but to reject the philosophical, extremely difficult

this book and you can’t forget about it - but it happens to be presented on another

6 This idea is attributed to him by many authors - from inveterate anti-Heideggerists, like W.G. Truitt (see, for example, "Questions of Philosophy" No. 3 for 2003, where he refers to the book by G. Redner "Malign Masters" (1997)) or T. Rockmore (Rockmore T. On Hcidegger "s Nazism and Philosophy, 1992 ), to more neutral ones, like B. Babich (Babich V.E. The Ethical Alpha and the Linguistic Omega, Joyful Wisdom // A Journal for Postmodern Ethics. 1994. No. 1. P. 8: “... Heidegger's statement about the impossibility of philosophizing in any language other than German and Greek"), or even sympathizers like Gadamer (see: Heidegger and the Greeks // AvH Magazin. 1990. No. 55. S. 29-38: "Heidegger himself was inspired by the return to the Greek language and even somehow, in a provocative manner inherent in it, called Greek and German the only languages ​​in which it is only convenient to philosophize"), although none of them gives exact references. Of the statements known to us, Heidegger himself is closest to this idea two fit: “Denn diese Sprache ist (auf die Moeglichkeiten des Denkens gesehen) neben der deutschen die maec htigste und geistigste zugleich" (Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen, 1998. S. 43) and “Das bestätigen mir heute immer wieder die Franzosen. Wenn sie zu denken anfangen, sprechen sie deutsch; sie versichern, sie kämmen mit ihrer Sprache nicht durch” (in an interview with the Spiegel magazine: Antwort. Martin Heidegger im Gesprach // Spiegel-Gespräch. 1988. S. 107-108). The impression that one of the participants of the Internet forum on the topic “Metaphysics of Quality” (http://www.moqtalk.org/archivedataymoq_

discuss / 2002% 20-% 202005 / 6737.html, January 3, 2004): “From what I "ve read it seems Martin Heidegger felt philosophizing was impossible unless it * was done using his native German language (with the possible exception of Ф ancient Greek)" ("From what I've read, it seems that for Martin-b Heidegger, philosophizing was impossible except in his native German (with the possible exception of Ancient Greek)").

language. And German is no exception. With all the efforts, one of the authors of this article could not find a satisfactory translation into Russian of the key for Ch.S. Pierce of the concept of "sign" - "A sign is something that stands for something else to someone in some respect" or Hamlet's famous exclamation: "Oh cursed spite!".

We understood our task as translators of the Treatise into Russian and (together with V.N. Sadovsky) compilers of this collection as follows: to give the modern reader interested in the Treatise as one of the works that had the most noticeable influence on the philosophy and logic of the last century , possibly more complete and versatile source material for its independent understanding (including by comparing different language versions). That is why we so readily accepted Sadovsky's idea to publish for the Russian-speaking (and not only Russian-speaking) reader a set of texts of the "Treatise" in the German original, in Russian and two English translations and to give them a reference apparatus (in the form of trilingual indexes).

In connection with this choice, a number of questions arise, which we will try to answer here to the best of our ability.

The inclusion of the German original, apparently, should not raise questions. The decision of the publisher seems to be absolutely correct.

The authors of both English translations of the Treatise should publish it in parallel with the original.

For a book published in Russia, the inclusion of a Russian translation in itself should also not raise questions; questions may be caused by the choice of translation option; more on this below.

But why does the Russian reader need an English translation, and even in two versions? Yes, because the English language, which has a rich - although different from German - philosophical tradition and is quite familiar to the modern educated reader in Russia, can highlight many subtle shades of Wittgenstein's thought, show the possibility of their different perception and thereby deepen them (and everything " Treatise" as a whole) understanding. We should not forget Wittgenstein's opinion that neither the Englishmen Russell and Whitehead, nor the German Frege, the greatest logic-philosophers of that time, understood the basic ideas of the Treatise. In the original version of aphorism 6.2341, it was said: "Russell, Whitehead and Frege did not understand the essence of the mathematical method, that is, working with equations"7. In a letter to Russell dated August 19, 1919, Wittgenstein writes: “I also sent my manuscript to Frege. He wrote to me a week ago, and I saw that he did not understand a word of it. So all my hope is to see you as soon as possible and explain everything to you, because it is very difficult when not a single soul understands you.

Wittgenstein L. Letters to C.K.. Ogden with Comments on the English / Translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Edited with an Introduction by G. H. von Wright and an Appendix of Letters by Frank Plampton Ramsey. Basil Blackwell, Oxford; Routledge and Kegan Paul, L. and Boston, 1973, p. 44.

8 Wittgenstein L. Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore / Edited with an Introduction by G.H. von Wright, assisted by B.F. McGuinness. Basil Blackwell, 1974. P. 71.

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«LOGICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT» If G

L. WITGENSHTEIN

Apparently, his hope did not come true, for on April 9, 1920, he writes to Russell: “Thank you very much for your manuscript9. There are so many things in it that I do not fully agree with - both where you criticize me and where you are simply trying to clarify

my point of view." And on May 6 of the same year, he writes to Russell that he objects to the publication of his Introduction, because “when I saw the German translation of the Introduction, I could not bring myself to agree to place it in my book. All the refinement of your English style has obviously disappeared in the translation, and only superficiality and incomprehension remain.

As you know, in the end Wittgenstein gave Russell the right to do as he saw fit, and the Treatise was published.

with Russell's "Introduction" in English, with all the refinement of his style.

So the publication of two English translations and Russell's "Introduction" can show the reader not only how Wittgenstein was understood, but also how he was not understood - which is also important. In addition, the role that Russell's Introduction played in the further fate of the ideas of the Treatise is large enough to justify its inclusion in the present edition.

Why two English translations? The fact is that both translations, which have already become classical in their own way, have both supporters and opponents. The first translation made by the remarkable logician and mathematician F.P. Ramsey with the active participation of the famous

This is Russell's Introduction to the Treatise.

10 Wittgenstein L. Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore. P. 86.

The question of who owns the first English translation of the Treatise is not an easy one. In an introductory note to his first 1922 edition (and subsequent editions), Ogden, as editor, thanked Ramsey "for his help in translation". In numerous works on the Treatise, this translation is called either the Ogden translation, or the Ogden and Ramsey translation, or the Ramsey and Ogden translation. The main source for answering this question can be the remarks of G.Kh. von Wrsht in the introduction and commentary to his edition of Wittgenstein's letters to Ogden in 1922-1933. (of which the letters of 1922-1923 are related to the translation of the Treatise) and Ramsey to Wittgenstein in 1923-1924. (Wittgenstein, 1973). He writes, in particular: “It seems that the first version (draft) of the translation was made by F.P. Ramsey alone” (Ibid. R. 8). And further: “It should be noted that Wittgenstein, both in his letters (to Ogden) of March 28 and April 23 (1922), and in his remarks on aphorism 5.5542 (Ibid. P. 34) speaks of the “translators” of his book in plural. Since Ogden's letters to Wittgenstein have not survived, we do not know what Ogden told him about the translation of his book. By "translators" Wittgenstein could hardly have understood Ramsey and Ogden, since in an April letter he asks Ogden to convey his thanks to the translators. So the question of whether someone else, whom we can no longer identify, took part in the transfer remains open.<...>It is clear from Wittgenstein's letters that

English linguist Ch.K. Ogden and under the supervision of B. Russell and Wittgenstein himself, some evaluated it as “a masterpiece of written English (masterpiece of written English)”, while others reproached it for “many errors”3 and excessive literalism, and Wittgenstein’s authorial supervision was questioned due to insufficient his (at that time) command of the English language.

This translation is preferred by many (first published in 1961 and repeatedly reprinted, including after 2000) by D.F. Peers" and B.F. McGuinness16, noting "not only their clear and natural English, but also the thoroughness in taking care of the accuracy of the translation"; one could even come across opinions that this translation was not only better than the previous one, but also close to perfection ( what didn't work out: translation

Ramsey and Ogden is still reprinted17). Others do not agree with some of the decisions made in the new translation, compare, for example, criticism by Professor M. Black, author of an extensive commentary on the "Treatise" 8, of the translation of the term "Sachverhalt" chosen by Peers and McGuinness, as well as a critical article by J. Nelson 19, where he, joining Black on the question of the translation of "Sachverhalt", generally comes to the conclusion that if only one of these two translations is left (although he himself considers such a formulation of the question unjustified), then this should be the translation of Ramsey and Ogden.

We cannot refrain from citing one of the thoughts expressed by Nelson in this article, which seems to us applicable not only to the translation of the Treatise. Answering Urmson, critics

Ogden took an active part in the translation” (ibid. p. 9). “The typewritten copy of the translation sent to Wittgenstein in March contains an edit apparently due to Russell. Wittgenstein's remarks (on aphorisms 4.12 and 5.143 in a long letter to Ogden of April 23, 1922) show that he was aware of this" (Ibid. P. 10).

13 See, for example, Lewy C. A Note on the Text of the Tractatus and Mind. 1967. V. LXXVI. No. 303. P. 416-423.

14 See: Urmson J.O. "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus" / The German Text of Ludwig Wittgenstein "s Logik-Philosophishe Abhandlung with a new translation by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961 // Mind. 1963. V. LXXII. No. 286. P. 298-300.

15 The surname Pears is sometimes rendered in Russian as "Piers"; we preferred to keep the English pronunciation kindly communicated to us by the famous English philosopher and logician David Miller, for which we express our gratitude to him.

16 Wittgenstein L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus / Translated by David Pears and Brian McGuinness. Revised ed. 1974. L. and N.Y., Routledge, 2004.

17 Routledge, 1996; Dover, 1999; Barnes and Noble, 2003. Online version available.

18 See: Black M. A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Ithaca, 1966.

14 See: Nelson J. O. Is the Pears-McGuinness Translation of the Tractatus Really Superior to Ogden "s and Ramsey" s? // Philosophical Investigations. 1999. V. 22. No. 2. P. 6a.

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"THE LOGICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT" L, WITGENSHTEIN

forging the translation of Ramsey and Ogden as "too literal to the extent that its syntax is Teutonic rather than English""0, Nelson says that it is not necessary for a good translation to "always translate what is written in a foreign language in the style that is currently generally accepted for those who write in the target language.<...>The current style of writing in English requires simplicity of construction, sentences as simple as oatmeal, the rhythm of spoken language, as evidenced by the "modern" translation of the Bible as opposed to the classical translation of the times of King James.

We, on the one hand, listening to the opinion of Professor Black and not forgetting that Wittgenstein did not consider it necessary to make any serious changes to the text of the first English translation when it was republished in 1933 (when he already knew English quite well, working in Cambridge since 1929), and on the other hand, not considering it possible to neglect the position of those who seem to prefer the translation of Peers and McGuinness, they are inclined to agree with the opinion of Alan Sondheim: “Translations are different; this difference is almost never radical, but it is there nonetheless. There is something left in the German text that both English versions converge on without touching. Sememes are equivalent, but only to a certain extent; almost

are never mutually unambiguous"-". From our point of view, it is this desire on both sides to a common, but separately not achievable goal that makes these translations valuable not as two separate versions, but as a single pair. Therefore, we consider it desirable to publish for enlightened Russian-speaking reader of both options, which are currently relatively difficult for him to access.

As for the Russian translation, it is a revised version of the first Russian translation of the Treatise, carried out in 1956-1957. fifth-year students of the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University I.S. Dobronravov (from German) and D.G. Lahuti (from an authorized English version). For the first of them, this translation was part of a thesis. It was published in 1958 (the circulation, as at that time for other translations of this type, was not indicated) under the general editorship and with a preface by the remarkable Russian philosopher V.F. Asmus, whose lectures both translators were lucky to hear and whose participation was extremely important for the success of our enterprise.

Revising our translation 50 years later, we were, frankly, surprised at how small the necessary revisions were. Our editorial work was reduced mainly to taking back the changes that we had rashly made to the previous translation, but which, according to

Urmson J.O. Op. cit. P. 298.

Nelson J. O. Is the Pears-McGuinness Translation of the Tractatus Really Superior to Ogden's and Ramsey's? // Philosophical Investigations. 1999. V. 22. No. 2. P. 167.

22 Sondheim A. Codeworld // Rhizomes. 2003. Iss. 6 / http://w\vw.rhisomes. net/issue6/sondheim.html

mature reflection turned out to be unnecessary. Of course, there was something to improve, and we simply did not understand some places (though only a few) at that time, but basically, as it seems to us, the translation has withstood, as they say, the test of time.

In Russian, there are two more translations of the "Treatise" - the translation of M.S. Kozlova and Yu.A. Aseev, provided with detailed comments by M.S. Kozlova, which are largely related specifically to the problems of translation, and V. Rudnev’s translation, the beginning of which was published in the Logos magazine Nos. works "Wit-

Genstein, provided with detailed comments. The translation of Kozlova and Aseev was published relatively recently with a circulation of 10 thousand copies and is generally available to the interested reader.

As for Rudnev's translation, its beginning was reviewed in detail by V.A. Surovtsev "". For arguments justifying the decision not to include this translation in this collection, we refer the reader to this review.

We hope that the new edition of the Treatise will be useful to everyone who is interested in the logical and philosophical views of the early Wittgenstein, as well as to those who are interested in the theory and art of translating philosophical texts.

* See: Surovtsev V.A. Divine Ludwig? - Poor Ludwig! // Logos: philosophical journal. 1999. No. 2. (of the same name as the Logos magazine, in which Rudnev's translation was published, http://filosof.historic.ru/books/Tset/GO0/500/g0000278/).

Ludwig Wittgenstein

TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

Dedicated to the memory of my friend David H. Pinsent

Motto: “... for all that is known
and not just heard noise and ringing,
can be summed up in three words.
Kurnberger

FOREWORD

This book, perhaps, will be understood only by those who once already had the thoughts expressed in it, or at least thoughts similar to them. So this is not a textbook. Its purpose would be achieved if at least one of those who read it with understanding will enjoy it.

The book addresses philosophical problems and shows - I believe - that the posing of these problems rests on a misunderstanding of our language. The entire Meaning of the book can be covered approximately in the following words: What can be said at all can be said clearly, but about what cannot be said, one must remain silent. Therefore, the book draws a line between thinking, or rather not thinking, but the manifestation of thoughts. For, in order to draw a boundary to thinking, we would have to be able to think on both sides of this boundary (we should therefore be able to think about what cannot be thought about).

Therefore, the boundary can only be drawn within the language. What lies on the other side of the border will simply be devoid of Meaning.

To what extent my aspirations coincide with the aspirations of other philosophers, it is not for me to judge. Yes, what I have written here has no claims to the novelty of particulars, and I do not cite any sources, since it is completely indifferent to me whether what I was thinking about came to the mind of another.

I wish to mention only the outstanding writings of Frege and the work of my friend Sir Bertrand Russell, which served as the source for much of my book.

If this work has any value, then it lies in two provisions. The first of these is that thoughts are manifested in it, and this value is the greater, the better these thoughts are manifested. Moreover, they do not fall into the eyebrow, but into the eye.

Of course, I understand that I did not use all the possibilities. Simply because my strength to overcome this task is too small. Others can come and do better. But it seems to me that the truth of the thoughts cited here is immutable and final. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the problems are basically finally solved. And if I am not mistaken in this, then the value of this work now lies, secondly, in the fact that it reveals how little it gives that these problems are solved.

Vienna, 1918
L.V.

Title. "Tractatus Logico-philosohicus".

The title of the “Treatise” as the final version of the text was worked on (several preparatory materials and preliminary versions of the “Treatise” have been preserved: “Notes on Logic” (1913), “Notes Dictated by Moore in Norway (1914), “Notes 1914-1916” (these three texts are published in [ Wittgenstein 1980 ], fragments of the “Notebooks” in Russian were also published in No. 6 of the journal “Logos” for 1995 [ Wittgenstein 1995]) and the so-called “Prototractate”, the manuscript of which was discovered and published by G. Von Wright [ wright 1982 ]; about the history of publication and manuscripts of the treatise, see in detail [ wright 1982; McCuinnes 1989; Monk 1990 ]) changed several times. The work was originally called by Wittgenstein "Der Satz" ("The Proposal"), after the key word for the entire work. The German version of the title "Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung" probably belongs to the first publisher of the Treatise, Wilhelm Ostwald. Tradition holds that the final Latin title was given to the Treatise by J. E. Moore, one of Wittgenstein's Cambridge teachers. This title echoes the Latin names of the fundamental logico-philosophical works of the beginning of the century “Principia Mathematica” by B. Russell-A. N. Whitehead and Moore's Principia Ethica, which in turn led to the Latin titles of Newton's Philosophiae Naturalia Principia Mathematica and Spinoza's Tractatus theologico-politicus (the latter work, according to some historians of philosophy, is associated with " Treatise” not only by title (see, for example, [ Gryaznov 1985])).

dedication. David Pinsent, one of the earliest and closest friends of the young Wittgenstein during his years at Cambridge, left a diary after his death that contains interesting biographical information about Wittgenstein (see [ McCuin nes 1989; Monk 1990 ]. In 1919, Pinsent, being an officer of the British aviation, was killed during an air battle.

Epigraph. Kürnberger Ferdinand (1821-1879) - Austrian writer. In this epigraph, there are two main key themes of the Treatise. Firstly, this is the idea of ​​reproduction, reducibility to a few words of the entire content of the work (see also Wittgenstein's Preface), which, at the level of motivic development, is manifested in the Treatise and in his theory that all logical operations are reducible to one operation of Negation, and to the idea that Propositions are truth functions of Elementary Propositions.

One can even reconstruct these “three words”: ‘speak, clearly, be silent’ (see the Preface and the seventh thesis to the “Treatise”, as well as comments to them).

Secondly, it is the idea of ​​a meaningless, inexpressible essence of life, echoing the famous lines from Shakespeare's "Macbeth": "Life is a story told by an idiot, in which there are many sounds and rage, but there is no sense", eight years after publication of the Treatise, embodied in Faulkner's 1929 novel Sound and Fury. The idea of ​​the unspoken, the inexpressible in language was one of the most important in Wittgenstein's antimetaphysics and ethics. In an oft-quoted passage from a letter to Paul Engelmann, Wittgenstein writes that the Treatise, in his opinion, consists of two parts, one of which is written, and the other - the main one - is not written [ Engelmann 1968 ]. The idea of ​​the inexpressible ethical, as opposed to the empty chatter of ethical philosophers, that is, that which “is heard with noise and ringing” and is full of “sounds and fury”, was expressed by Wittgenstein in the late 1920s in conversations with members of the Vienna Logical Circle (see [ Waismann 1967] ), and embodied in the most complete form in the Lecture on Ethics in 1929 [Wittgenstein 1989].

Foreword. Defining the genre of his research and guiding the reader, Wittgenstein argues that this is a book for the initiated, and not a textbook on logic. Initially, one might assume, Wittgenstein thought primarily of two or three readers—his teachers, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and George Eduard Moore. As you know, Frege, to whom Wittgenstein sent a copy of the Treatise, declared that he did not understand anything there. Russell gave the Treatise an excellent rating in his preface to the 1922 English edition. Moore defined his attitude to the "Treatise" in 1929, when Wittgenstein defended his dissertation at Cambridge. In his recommendation, Moore stated that he considered this piece of genius [ wright1982; Bartley 1994].

The idea of ​​an inadequate understanding of language and an inadequate representation of human thoughts in colloquial language was literally in the air of pre-war Vienna. It was expressed in the philosophical works of Fritz Mautner (once mentioned in the Treatise, albeit in a critical context), journalistic articles by Karl Kraus, poems and plays by Hugo von Hofmannsthal (for details on the Viennese origins of early Wittgenstein's philosophy, see [ Janic-Toolmen 1973 ]).

The idea that the meaning of the whole work can be reduced to a few words (cf. Epigraph and commentary to it) no doubt echoes the preface to Schopenhauer's book "The World as Will and Representation" (the first essay on philosophy, which was read in youth Wittgenstein): “I want to explain here,” writes Schopenhauer, “how a book should be read so that it can be better understood. What she has to say is in one single thought”(Italics mine. - V. R.) [Schopenhauer 1992: 39]. Schopenhauer's influence is clearly visible in the metaphysical fragments of the Notebooks 1914-1916. In the "Treatise" it is obscured by logical and philosophical problems, but in the last theses it again emerges quite clearly, primarily in thoughts about the unity of ethics and aesthetics, and so on.

The last sentences of the preface also overlap with the last theses of the book. Thus, in accordance with the musical understanding of the construction of the “Treatise” (see, for example, [ Findley 1984 ]), all the main themes are set here in brief form, as in an exposition of sonata form.

1. Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist.
The world is all that is the case.
The world is everything that happens to be.

Since the translation of this particular line causes objective difficulties, and remembering that the first line, especially in such a work as "Treatise", should play the role of a representative of the entire text (like the first line in a poem), let's compare our translation with the original, English translation and with previous Russian translations:

The world is everything that takes place [ Wittgenstein 1958]

The world is everything that happens [ Wittgenstein 1994].

Here, in both cases, the phrase sein ist, which is quite equivalently translated in the English expression to be the case, is absent. The translation of the expression Fall ist as “takes place” is inaccurate - the latter in the “Treatise” rather corresponds to the expression gegeben sein, which can be translated as takes place, exists, happens. (For example, 3.25. Es gibt eine and nur eine vollstaendige Analyze der Satzes. There is (sometimes, there is) one, and only one, complete analysis of the Proposition). Es gibt and der Fall ist are not the same thing. In the latter case, the non-necessity of what is the World is emphasized.

‘The world is everything that is Chance’ (literal translation), i.e. everything that takes place due to chance, everything that happens.

The 1994 translation introduces the verb "to occur" here. But this is an unfortunate solution, because in the World of the “Treatise”, strictly speaking, nothing happens, the idea of ​​dynamics is not characteristic of it (cf. 1.21. “They (facts. - V. R.) it may happen to be or not to be, everything else remains the same”). We can say that in the "Treatise" systemic connections completely dominate over connections mediated by time (cf. 5.1361. The belief in the existence of a causal connection is superstition), synchrony dominates diachrony, as in the "Course of General Linguistics" by F. de Saussure (published in 1916), which was for the linguistics of the 20th century what the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” was for the philosophy of the 20th century.

In the semantics of the first statement of the Treatise, I see three aspects: tautological, paradoxical and informative. The tautological lies in the fact that, at first glance, this thesis asserts what is already clear. It is this tautological aspect that was heard most loudly by the translators of the book [ Wittgenstein 1958]: The world is everything that takes place - almost the same as the World is everything that is. And this aspect is really important (and accordingly, this last, purely tautological, or rather, quasi-tautological translation is possible). According to Wittgenstein, nothing logical carries any information, and he may hint at this already in the first line - The world is everything that is (by chance).

The paradox of thesis 1 lies in the fact that what it asserts contradicts the established ideas about the world as something that exists by necessity and stably, such as God created it. Wittgenstein emphasizes the lack of stability and necessity in the World. This is the opposite side of the semantic field of this statement. The world is not-necessary and not-stable because, as will be said below, although at its basis (substance) are simple unchanging Things, they actually occur in changeable and unrelated configurations, States of Things (Sachverhalten). The absence of connections between phenomena in their original form allows us to speak about the absence of a causal relationship between them in time. The connection can only be logical, that is, tautological, non-informative.

Another paradox appears in the combination of the word “everything” (alles), which is used in the “Treatise” as a universal quantifier, with the expression was der Fall ist. Is it to be understood that everything that happens is the opposite of what can happen, or is it the opposite of that which does not happen and cannot happen? We also note that the word “everything” draws this statement to a tautology - the World is everything that is, and was der Fall ist to a contradiction - it turns out that the World is something that may not be the world, if it does not happen to be, that it can become nothing from everything.

The informative (“natural-scientific”) meaning of this thesis can be reconstructed as follows: my initial knowledge of the World comes down to the fact that it seems to be something that happens to be. In general, the meaning of this phrase is espositive. She represents the author's intentions, saying: "Those who think that I will explore the World as something necessary and complete are asked not to worry."

1.1 The World is a collection of Facts, but not of Things.

In this aphorism, Wittgenstein also contradicts common sense, according to which the world is, rather, just a collection of things (see, for example, [ Stenius 1960: 32 ]). Logically, 1.1 follows from 1: if the World is everything that happens to be, then these are Facts rather than Things. According to Wittgenstein, it is not things that really exist, but Things in their combination with other things: these are facts. Generally speaking, common sense can make sure that this view is psychologically quite realistic. Indeed, does this tree exist simply as a tree? Wouldn't it be more correct to say that it exists that this tree grows near my house, that this tree is very old, that this tree is an oak, etc.? It is in the totality of these facts that the tree exists. Just as a word (name) really functions not in a dictionary, but in a sentence (and this is also one of the key theses of the Treatise), so the thing, the denotation of a name, really exists not in the semantic inventory of the world, but in a living fact. But even in the dictionary, the name exists not just, but precisely in the dictionary, and, listing what things exist in the world - trees, tables, spoons, planets, etc. - we set this list in the very fact of its assignment.

1.11 The world is defined by the Facts and due to the fact that they are all Facts.

1.12 For it is the totality of Facts that determines what happens and what does not happen to be.

The world is defined as a world by the fact that all Facts are Facts precisely because it is the Facts that determine what happens to be, and this is the world. That is, the world is determined by what happens to be, the facts. If we consider not the real world, but some small conditional possible world, then, having observed what happens to be in it, we can give a description of the facts, which will be a description of the world. Let us assume that the World is everything that happens to be inside a matchbox. Looking there, we will see that there are, say, 12 good matches and three burnt ones. It is the fact that there are 12 good and three burnt matches in a matchbox that will be the description of the Matchbox World. This description will be exhausted by these facts and by the fact that these are all facts. The fact that there are three burnt matches in the box is no less a fact than the fact that there are 12 good matches. Another question is whether the fact that describes this world is how many matches were in the box before? Let's assume that the World, about which Wittgenstein speaks, is a momentary segment of the world, and then the absence of other matches will not be a Fact. But you can introduce, say, the concept of "yesterday" and "the day before yesterday", and then the Fact will be that yesterday there were so many matches in the box, and the day before yesterday so many. But in general, time is a modal concept, and Wittgenstein carefully avoids modal concepts. Apparently, the day before yesterday, yesterday and today can be considered as different possible worlds (cf. [ Prior 1967 ]) and, in relation to the capabilities of each of them, build a description. In addition, Wittgenstein, as a logician, should not be interested in how exactly to describe this or that world, the very fundamental logical possibility of such a description is important. And the description itself is conceived here as the same purely hypothetical act that has nothing to do with the real description, which, especially when it comes to large worlds, is itself extended in time and during which the World can change an infinite number of times (Laplace's paradox).

1.13 Facts in the logical space make up the World.

We have already partially touched on the concept of logical space in the previous comment. This concept is explained in detail in [ Stenius 1960 ]. Several cubes of different lengths, widths and heights are drawn as a logical space model. The set of these cubes is a model of the logical space. In this logical space, it is a Fact that each cube has a certain length, width and height. If there are 5 cubes, then there are 15 (5 x 3) Facts regarding the length, height and width of each [ Stenius 1960: 39 ]. Now imagine the real World, defined by a huge number of Facts. Let us mentally outline the logical space of this World, i.e. the space within which it makes sense to say that something exists and something does not exist - and this will be the understanding of the World that is contained in the Treatise. The logical space in some sense can coincide with the physical one, or it can be purely speculative, “laboratory”. But at the same time, according to Wittgenstein, any physical - real or speculative - space will at the same time be a logical space, since logic, being a necessary tool for cognition, is more fundamental than physics, geometry, chemistry, biology, etc.

1.2 The world is decomposed into facts.

1.21 They may happen to be or not to be, everything else remains the same.

In the preceding sections, it was important for Wittgenstein to explain the World as a whole, as an aggregate. Now for the first time he divides, divides the World into Facts. Why is it important for him to emphasize this point of separation? You can try to find the answer to this in 1.21. What is it - "everything else" that remains unchanged? And why does the Fact that happened to be have no effect on this stuff? Suppose that there were 17 matches in the matchbox world, and now there are 16. We are inside this world, and we, like Benjamin Compson, do not know who manipulates the matches and the box, but we can only say that one match has disappeared (“gone” ), while “everything else” (all other 16 matches) remains the same. Well, really, according to Wittgenstein, in the World between the Facts there is no dependence? Wittgenstein explains his position in the next section, in the doctrine of atomic States of Things (Sachverhalten).

2 What happens to be, Fact, is that there are certain States of Things.

The concept of Sachverhalten is one of the most important in the Treatise. It means some primitive fact, consisting of logically simple Items (for details, see the commentary to 2.02). This is a logically indivisible elementary fact, that is, a fact whose parts are not facts. Influenced by Russell's preface [ Russell 1980 ] to the first English edition of the "Treatise" in the edition [ Wittgenstein 1958] Sachverhalt is translated as an atomic fact (in the first English edition of Ogden and Ramsey it is also atomic fact, while in the second edition, Pierce and McGuinness translate it as states of affairs; E. Stenius offers a compromise translation - atomic state of affairs) . Newest Russian [ Wittgenstein 1994] gives a translation of "co-existence" which seems fantastically inadequate to us. Firstly, the “Treatise” is alien to diachronism (see commentary on 1); secondly, Wittgenstein is completely uncharacteristic of the Kantian-Heideggerian manipulation of roots, prefixes and hyphens; thirdly, the word “event” in Russian means something axiologically marked, cf. “it became an event for me” (for more details, see [ Rudnev 1993]), while Sachverhalt is something axiologically neutral. We translate Sachverhalt as State of Things, for this seems etymologically closest to the original, and also corresponds to the fact that Sachverhalt is a collection of simple Items, or Essences (Sachen) or Things (Dinge).

Speaking of the simplicity of the State of Things, it should be borne in mind that we are talking primarily about logical simplicity, that is, the fact that parts of the State of Things cannot themselves be the State of Things, but only Things (in turn, the Things included in the State of Things , are also simple, that is, they cannot be divided into parts that are Things (for more details, see the commentary on 2.02)).

2.1 The State of Things is a certain connection of Objects (Entities, Things).

It is considered (see, in particular, [ Finch 1977: VIII]), that there are no synonyms in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”, that is, each word is used in its strict meaning in accordance with the idea of ​​a perfect language developed here, in the “Treatise”, where each sign corresponds to only one meaning. The triad Subject - Essence - Thing (Gegenstand - Sache - Ding) differs, according to G. Finch, as the formal (Subject), phenomenological (Essence) and material (Thing) sides of the object. In accordance with the differences in meanings, these concepts are included in different contexts.

The concept of Gegenstand is everywhere translated by us as a Subject, and not an object, as is customary in all English and Russian translations. The last in German corresponds to the word “Object”.

2.011 It is essential for a Thing that it can be an integral part of the State of Things.

The Thing in itself is not a logical building material for the World, it appears only in the context of the atomic State of Things. Logic does not study words, it studies sentences. Therefore, philosophy must also study not the Things themselves, but the propositions that they take when they are connected with each other - that is, the Facts.

2.012 There is nothing accidental in Logic: If a Thing can occur in a State of Things, then the Possibility of a State of Things must be predetermined in the Thing itself.

Wittgenstein believes that the Thing is "not made" by itself once and for all, that it needs for its final manifestation as a Thing to become part of the State of Things. Generally speaking, this property follows from the very nature of the Thing, since it is impossible to imagine a Thing isolated from the context of other Things and from the context of Facts. If we do not know about the teapot that it is possible to boil water in it (State of Things) and pour it into cups (other Things), then we can say that we do not know what a teapot is. And if it is impossible to boil water in a teapot and it cannot be poured into cups, then the teapot ceases to be a teapot. Hence 2.0121.

2.0121 It would seem as if it were a matter of chance if for a Thing that could exist for itself, some later Situation would suit it.

If Things can meet in the State of Things, then the Possibility of this must already be inherent in them.

(Something Logical cannot be only-possible. Logic appeals to every Possibility, and all Possibilities are its facts.)

Just as we cannot think about spatial Objects outside of space, so we cannot think about any Object outside the Possibility of its connection with other Objects.

If I can think of the Object in its conjunction with the State of Things, then I cannot think of it outside the Possibility of this conjunction.

Wittgenstein seems to be setting up a thought experiment, imagining a certain Object for itself, the same teapot, about which it is later accidentally discovered that water can be boiled in it and poured into cups. Wittgenstein considers this position to be uncharacteristic of the Thing. Things must contain the possibility that they can occur in the corresponding States of Things. And it is clear that the kettle must be something metal or ceramic, but in no case wooden, so that water can be boiled in it, and there must be something in its shape that would allow water to be poured into cups.

2.0122 A Thing is independent, since it can occur in all possible Situations, but this Form of independence is a Form of being bound by the state of Things, that is, a Form of non-independence. (It is impossible to imagine words occurring in two different ways: alone and as part of a proposition.)

Here, for the first time, Wittgenstein gives the Thing a certain status of independence, which he immediately takes away. This is the imaginary independence that the word in the dictionary has. But the position of a word in the dictionary is only one of the ways in which it exists. The word "teapot" in the explanatory dictionary is not isolated, it is used, albeit in a peculiar, but still proposition, which says: "The word teapot means this and that." And the fact that the teapot means this and that is the “State of Things” into which the Thing has fallen, demonstrating its imaginary independence.

In this section, for the first time, the most important terms of the “Treatise” - Situation (Sachlage) and Proposition (Satz) are found together. The situation is something between the State of Things and the Fact. In contrast to the State of Things, the Situation is complex, which makes it related to the Fact. But unlike the Fact, which is existing, the Situation is only possible - and this, in turn, makes it related to the State of Things. So, the Situation is a possible correlate of the Fact in the possible World of the States of Things, which can be connected into a kind of Fact (which Wittgenstein calls the Situation), but not yet actualized, not becoming part of the real World.

2.0123 If I know the Object, I thereby know the Possibility of its occurrence in the State of Things.

(Each such Possibility must be in the very nature of the Thing.)

It is impossible that some new Possibility will be found in the future.

It is clear that if we know what a teapot is, in particular, it is possible to boil water in it and pour it into cups, then it is impossible that later it will turn out that one can shoot from a teapot or put it under the head as a pillow. The logical nature of the kettle precludes these new possibilities.

2.01231 In order to know any Object, I must know not so much its external as its internal properties.

Internal properties, according to Wittgenstein, are those without which the Object cannot exist (4.1223). Therefore, in order to know the kettle, it is important to know not just what metal it is made of, but that this metal will not melt at a temperature lower than the boiling point of water. Hence 2.0124.

2.0124 When all Objects are given, all possible States of Things are thereby given.

By setting all the objects in some small, limited possible world, for example, a kettle, water, cups, we thereby set all the possible States of Things associated with these Things. And this basically applies to all Things. Together with the Objects in the World, potentially everything that can happen to them is given. Hence 2.013.

2.013 Each Thing exists as if in the space of possible States of Things. I can think of this space as empty, but not of the Thing outside of space.

One can imagine how water is poured into a kettle, how water boils in it, how water is poured from it into cups. One can imagine a space without a teapot, but one cannot imagine a teapot outside of those possible States of Things that can “happen” with it. Any Thing - be it a kettle, a rake or a "Treatise" - ceases to be a Thing outside the space of possible (for it) States of Things.

2.0131 A Spatial Item must be located in infinite space. (A spatial point is an argument place.)

A spot in the field of view may, though not necessarily, be red, but it must have some color: it has a color space around it, so to speak. The musical tone must have some height, the object of tactile sensation - some kind of hardness.

The "space of possible states of things" is naturally limited by our five senses. Accordingly, Wittgenstein considers the situation when the Object is perceived by some one of the senses. In this case, the Object is “obliged” to reveal a property corresponding to the sense organ by which it is perceived. If the Object is perceived by sight, it must be "of some color" (cf. this with the statement 2.0232 and its commentary); if it is perceived by the ear, it must have some pitch; if the Object is felt, it must be hard or soft, liquid or prickly, etc. It follows that for Wittgenstein the Object is something phenomenological, and not just formal (as Henry Finch believes [ Finch 1971 ]) and that in a certain sense, therefore, Thing (Gegenstand) and Thing (Ding) can be considered synonymous.

2.014 Items contain the Possibility of all Situations.

This thesis is a generalization of the previous ones. Incorporation in Objects not only of all States of Things (Sachverhalten), but also of all Situations (Sachlage), that is, possible non-elementary States of Things, allows us to present the Object as a kind of prototype of a cybernetic device with a program of all possible actions embedded in it, including in this case interactions with other items. The teapot includes not only the ability to heat water in it and pour it into cups, but also the ability to be porcelain, Chinese, with a whistle, the ability to be broken if it is made of clay, or melted if it is metal. It is as if we take all the Items, write down in their structure the possible States of Things and Situations that can happen to them, and launch them all together. After that, they begin to live their lives. However, in order for the Items to function, and for us to know about it, it is necessary that there is a regular feedback between the Items and our knowledge of them. The semiotic part of the Treatise interprets this - the doctrine of Form, Picture, Structure, Elementary Proposition.

2.0141 The possibility of their occurrence in the State of Things is their Form.

Here we are talking, apparently, about the Logical Form of the Subject, and not about its material-spatial form. Let's take an example. Verbs in most languages ​​with a developed subject-object paradigm have the concept of valency, which is nothing more than an expression of the possibility of a verb to enter into grammatical-semantic relations (which are called control) with certain names (actants). The valence of the verb can be equal to 0, 1, 2, 3, etc. So, the verb has zero valence dusk, for it cannot be controlled by any name. Valency of the verb read is equal to one, since it can only control the accusative unprepositional. Verb beat is divalent - it governs the accusative and instrumental cases ( beat can be someone (or something) and something). The logical Form of an Object as an expression of the Possibility of its occurrence in certain States of Things is something similar to the syntactic valence of a verb. So, for example, the Logical Form of the teapot includes the Possibility of its entry into such States of Things as the kettle is boiling or the kettle is on the stove. But, strictly speaking, the teapot is not an example of a simple Item (strictly speaking, there are no such examples at all, see comment to 2.02.). Let's take a simpler object than a teapot - a cast metal ball. The most essential element of its form is that it is absolutely round, spherical, and this enables it to enter into the State of Things. the ball is rolling. But emptiness or fullness is not the Logical Form of the ball, does not define it as a ball. A ball can be both hollow and non-hollow, both heavy and light, just like any other Object that has some mass and occupies some place in space.

The logical Form of an Object provides it with the opportunity to meet not only in the States of Things, but also to combine with other Objects in certain Situations. For this it is necessary that the Logical Forms of objects be correlative. So, the Logical Form of water includes the fact that it is liquid, that is, the ability to take the geometric form of such an Object, the Logical Form of which includes a “cavity”. Correlation of Objects in the atomic State of Things and in a complex Situation corresponds to the ratio of Names in the Elementary Proposition and in the complex Proposition. This, in a nutshell, is the essence of Wittgenstein's “picture” theory, about which see below for more details.

2.02 The subject matter is simple.

The simplicity of the Subject is one of the most difficult problems in the exegesis of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The fact is that Wittgenstein never gives an example of a simple Subject in the Treatise. Norman Malcolm recalls how, in 1949, Wittgenstein visited him in America and they began to read the Treatise together. “I asked Wittgenstein if he ever thought, when he wrote the Treatise, about any example of a “simple object” (translated by M. Dmitrovskaya. - V. R.). He replied that at that time he considered himself a logician, and since he was a logician, it was not his task to decide whether this or that thing was simple or complex, since it was purely empirical material! It was clear that he regarded his former views as absurd” [ Malcolm 1994: 85-86]. Let us leave his last judgment on the conscience of the memoirist, especially since in his later book [ Malcolm 1986 ] he takes a much closer look at the relationship between the views of early and late Wittgenstein. One way or another, it is necessary to understand what constitutes Wittgenstein's simple Subject, since this is one of the key concepts of the Treatise. It must be said that the researchers of the Treatise do not have a unified point of view on this matter (for the most meaningful and subtle analysis of this problem, see the article [ Copi 1966 ]; cf. also [ Keatt 1966 ]). We adopt here the point of view on the simplicity of Wittgenstein's Subjects, which is held by Eric Stenius [ Stenius 1960 ]. According to this point of view, the simplicity of Wittgenstein's Subjects means primarily logical (and not physical, chemical, biological, geometric) simplicity. Simple in the logical sense is such an Item, the parts of which are not Items. Compare this with the concept of a prime number in arithmetic. Its characteristic is the impossibility of dividing without a remainder by integers other than itself and one. In this sense, a prime number is not necessarily a small number. A prime number can be 3, maybe 19, or maybe 1397. The last circumstance is very important, because then, for example, the Moon or Leo Tolstoy can be considered a simple object in a logical sense. If we divide the Moon or Tolstoy into parts, then in the logical sense these parts will not be independent objects (the Moon and Tolstoy). Although, of course, the logical understanding of simplicity is also relative. And if the human body can be considered a logically simple object, then, on the other hand, a part of this body, for example, a hand, is rather a logically complex object, since it consists of a palm and fingers.

From a purely logical point of view, a simple Object must satisfy the requirement of unity. personalities, that is, it must be an individual object, an individual. Therefore, most of the time th, interpreting the "Treatise", philosophers give as examples of models of simple objects tov planet [ Stenius 1960 ] or proper names - Socrates, Plato [ Russell 1980, Ans com be 1960 ]. A simple Object corresponds to a simple name, first of all, a proper name. (More on this will be discussed in the discussion of the naming problem.)

Finally, we should note the point of view of Stenius, according to which Wittgenstein understands simple Objects not only as individual objects, but also as predicates [ Stenius 1960: 61-62 ]. Indeed, only by adhering to this view, one can at least somehow imagine what Wittgenstein understands by the States of Things, which consist of simple Objects, and only of them. If by simple Objects one understands something whose expression in language is nouns, then it is very difficult, if not impossible, to model even one Wittgensteinian State of Things in any European language. All European languages, including Russian, have a predicate as the central grammatical idea of ​​a sentence, expressed either by some verbal or nominal form, or by a connective. Moreover, if there is no link in one of the forms of the sentence, then it is easily restored in another form [ Haspaditch 1971]. So, for example, in such “nominative” sentences as Winter. Quiet. horror., the link is restored in the past (or future) tense: It was winter. It was quiet. (It) was (such) horror. Accordingly, in European languages, the link is preserved in the present tense. Therefore, to say that the State of Things, expressed by proper names, is a combination of simple individual objects, means not to take into account the obvious reality of language. No combination of objects is possible without predicates either in the language or in the World of Facts (that is, something predicative). state of affairs The earth is round consists of two items: Earth and be round. (It's hard to say, really, whether the value be round simple in a logical sense, and thus whether this example is a good example of an atomic State of Things.)

The idea of ​​building a language consisting of simple semantic elements was partly implemented by A. Vezhbitskaya, who built a system of a finite (and very small) number of initial words (semantic primitives), from which all other words are further built [ Wiersbicka 1971, 1980 ].

2.0201 Every statement about complexes allows itself to be decomposed into a statement about its components and Propositions that describe those components.

The first part of this section is clear. The logically complex sentence “Socrates is wise and mortal” “allows itself to be decomposed” into two simple ones: “Socrates is wise” and “Socrates is mortal”. Next, it is necessary to explain how a statement differs from a Proposition. Affirmation is one of the functions of a Proposition. It asserts the truth or falsity of what is said in the descriptive part of the Proposition.

The statement describes possible States of Things and Situations, the statement labels them as true or false.

2.021 The substance of the World is built from objects. Therefore, they cannot be complex.

The substance of the World is its non-predicative part, which remains unchanged with all its changes. Suppose a, b, c and d are simple Items: they are indivisible and immutable. From them the States of Things are formed, from which the factual predicative part of the World is formed. Let us suppose that in one State of Things, a is connected to b, and in another, a to c. In all configurations of objects in the States of Things and Situations, only the Objects themselves remain unchanged due to their simplicity, atomicity. Whatever direction the World develops, only configurations change. The unchanging substance, which remains common in all directions of development (in all possible worlds), gives stability to the World. And the basis of this substance is, naturally, unchanging atomic simple Objects. They retain their identity in all possible worlds.

The doctrine of substance is one of the clearest signs that the logical-ontological picture of the “Treatise” belongs to atomism, for which one of the most fundamental principles is the one according to which, in order for something to change, something must remain unchanged ( cm. [ Fogelin 1976 ]).

(Perhaps, it was this doctrine that was the deep initial premise for the theory of “hard designators” by S. Kripke, according to which there are such signs in the language that retain their meaning in all possible worlds [ kripke 1980 ]).

2.0211 If the World had no substance, then the presence of Meaning in one Proposition would depend on whether another Proposition is true or false.

This section seems to be understood only in the context of the fact that the most important characteristic of Objects and Elementary Propositions (as Wittgenstein writes in 2.061) is their independence from each other, that is, the impossibility of inferring one from the other. (See also comment to 2.061.) Let us imagine that there are no simple atomic Items and elementary States of Things, but only complex objects (complexes) and complex states of affairs (Situations). Such a picture would lead to contradiction. Complexes (which are now ex hypothesis indecomposable into simple Objects - after all, we have agreed that simple Objects do not exist) depend on each other. For example, from "If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal", follows "Socrates is a man, and Socrates is mortal" (both Propositions are complex). The meaning of the Proposition “Socrates is a man, and Socrates is mortal” (= Socrates is a mortal man) would depend solely on the truth and falsity of the Proposition “If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal”. And if we could not single out simple Objects and elementary Propositions (after all, we proceeded from the assumption that the World has no substance, which just consists of simple Objects), then we will never know either that Socrates is a man, or that it is mortal, since we will have to refer in a circle to new and new propositions, drawing in their truth and falsity a justification for the meaning of the Proposition being explained. Therefore, the requirement of simplicity of initial concepts is universal. It was this idea of ​​a vicious circle of explaining one word through another in explanatory dictionaries, based on the ideas of Leibniz and Wittgenstein, that A. Wierzbicka successfully fought when building her theory of lingua mentalis [ Wiersbicka 1971, 1980 ].

2.0212 Then it would be impossible to construct a True or false Picture of the World).

It is clear that since we, based on 2.0212, would not know which Propositions are true and which are not, we could not construct such a Picture of the World, about which we would know whether it is true or false. What we could build would be the construction of infinite virtual pictures of the world that do not coincide with the real Picture of the World. In the 20th century, however, the idea of ​​building pictures of the world in the virtual sense was firmly established. The realization of the impossibility of constructing a true Picture of the World due to the loss of logical constants (it was not for nothing that Wittgenstein did not give a single example of a simple Subject) was compensated by the realization of the usefulness of building many models of possible worlds, or virtual realities, where “incompleteness was compensated by stereoscopicity” [ Lotman 1978a].

The term "picture of the world" and partly synonymous with it the term "model of the world" is widely used in modern semiotics and structural anthropology, but apparently goes back not to Wittgenstein, but to L. Weisgerber, who used this term (Weltbild), independently of Wittgenstein (cm. [ Weisgerber 1950 ]).

2.0202 Obviously, no matter how different the imaginary world is from the real one, they must have something in common - some Form - with the Real World.

2.023 This immutable Form is just built from Subjects.

2.0231 The Substance of the World can determine only the Form, but not the material properties. Because the latter are depicted only with the help of Propositions or are built from configurations of Objects.

If we assume that Wittgenstein understands by the “imaginary world” something fundamental, close to the concept of a possible world, correlated with the real [ Kripke 1979, Hintikka 1980], it is clear that what is common between the imaginary and the real world must be sought in unchanging substantial Objects that reveal their Logical Form. For example, let the Proposition “Socrates is wise” be false in some possible world. That is, the proposition “It is not true that Socrates is wise” will be true there. Then these two fragments of the worlds will have the Logical Form of Objects in common Socrates and be wise, namely, that, in principle, the logical valence of the concept of Socrates will include the possibility of being both wise, and not wise, and the logical valence of the concept of being wise will include the possibility of relating or not relating to Socrates.

The substance cannot determine the material or external properties of the Objects, since the latter are not necessarily inherent in them, therefore they are expressed in (non-elementary) Propositions and, therefore, do not belong to the substantial structure of the World. For example, the fact that Socrates had a beard is his material property and is not included in his Logical Form, since the presence of a beard does not correlate with the internal qualities of a person. The presence of a beard in Socrates is, rather, a Fact, an important characteristic of his external appearance, but it is not essentially inherent in Socrates. The beard of Socrates is one of those phenomena that happens or does not happen to be, it is from the world of changeable Facts, and not the unchanging substance of the World.

2.0232 Speaking casually: Objects are colorless.

This statement by Wittgenstein, which seems so paradoxical, is easily explained. From a physiological (optical) point of view, all colors, except for the “simple” ones - red, blue and yellow - are considered complexes. But why isn't even a "red Item" simple? Color is, in principle, a complex relationship between an analyzer that perceives an object and a material property of the object. Therefore, strictly speaking, color is not an objective characteristic of an object. A color-blind person can see a red rose as green all his life. The physiological complexity of the phenomenon of color mediates anthropological and ethnographic differences in its perception. As you know, most primitive peoples can distinguish only a few colors, for example, red, black and white [ Berlin- Cay 1969 ]. But Wittgenstein probably has in mind not only this, although, in all probability, he is based on this. A simple Object is conceived outside of complex color perception. Color is not included in the logical structure of the Subject, being a complex predicate. “This rose is red” is not an elementary State of Things: according to Wittgenstein, it is rather a Situation, because the color of the rose depends on which system of colors we choose, independence from other States of Things is the most important characteristic of the State of Things. Red means not only non-white and non-black, but also non-green, non-yellow, and non-combinations of these. In this sense, even a simple red spot is not an Object - it can be decomposed into negative components - non-white, non-green, etc. Thus, the possession or non-possession of color is not included in the logical structure of the Object. The world of the Treatise is, so to speak, black and white. But to say that this thing is darker than this is also not to make a statement about simple Objects. And if we have only black and white Items, then these are no longer colors, but some other properties of the Items. In this sense, if there are only black and white (intensely dark/intensely light) objects in the world, as, for example, in the world of chess, then this characteristic is no longer a color characteristic, but a characteristic of belonging to one of the opposite systems. The white pawn differs from the black pawn not in color, but in the fact that it belongs to one of the opponents who plays “white”. Black and white becomes an expression of the presence or absence of some abstract quality, rather than color. Suppose we can consider all true statements to be white and all false statements to be black, or vice versa. But even in this case, the concept of a black pawn will be a complex, and black and white will remain predicates, that is, they will characterize not Objects, but States of Things and Situations (for details, see also [ Rudnev 1995a]).

2.0233 Two Items of the same Logical Form differ from each other - in addition to their external properties - in that they are different Items.

Suppose there are two logically simple Objects, for example, two absolutely identical metal balls. Having the same Logical Form, that is, the same possibility of entering the State of Things, they, nevertheless, must differ from each other in some way. After all, if they were no different from each other, then it would be one ball, not two. They differ from each other in that they are two different balls of the same shape. So, for example, two absolutely identical numbers differ from each other, say 234 and 234. The fact that two identical objects can be confused indicates that these are two different objects, since one object cannot be confused with itself.

2.02331 Either the Thing has a property that no other Object has, then one can simply distinguish it from others by means of a description, and then point to it; or a set of Objects have properties that are common to all of them - and then it is generally impossible to point to any of them.

For if the Thing is not selected by anything, I cannot select it - because then it would have already been selected.

This section, judging by its index, should have specified the previous one, but it seems to contradict the previous one. It was said there that two Subjects of the same Logical Form differ from each other, but here, that if many subjects have common properties, then it is impossible to single out any of them. Let's try to understand what's going on here. In this section, for the first time, a still hidden polemic arises with Russell's logical concept, in particular with his theory of descriptions, and with Jones's theory of ostensive definition. By certain descriptions Russell calls expressions whose meanings are names, for example, “the author of Waverley” is a description of the name Walter Scott; “pupil of Plato” and “teacher of Alexander the Great” are descriptions of Aristotle. But in the case of simpler objects, in order to distinguish one object from others, a certain description may not be enough.

Suppose we have four balls a, b, C, D, where balls a and b have the property of being “small” (or the ratio “less than”), and balls C and D have the property of being “large” (or the ratio "more than"). Let the balls be arranged as follows:

Then each ball will be in a certain spatial relation to the others. Thus, ball C will be to the left of balls a, b, and D; ball a - to the right of ball C and to the left of balls b and D, etc.

Suppose we need to select one of these balls, for example b. We will be able to describe it with a certain description: ball b is “a small ball to the right of another small ball and to the left of a big ball”. In principle, such a description will be sufficient to distinguish ball b from other balls. But if there are many balls, for example

and we need to select ball a - the third small one to the right of the large ones and the second one to the left of the large ones, then this description is so cumbersome that it's easier to just point at the ball a with your finger and say: “I mean exactly this ball.” This will be the ostensive definition.

But if all Items have common properties, then it is impossible to point to them. Suppose there are five identical balls a, b, c, d, e, located in a circle, which, moreover, rotates quickly enough:

so that we can say that the balls occupy the same position. Then it is impossible to choose one of them and describe it.

2.024 Substance is something that exists independently of what happens to be.

“What happens to be” - Facts (1). Since the substance exists independently of the Facts, it is clear that it consists of something opposite to the Facts, namely, of simple Objects. Thus, the substance of the World is a collection of simple objects and predicates. Their main property is that they determine not only the existing, but also the possible state of affairs. Suppose, for example, that there are three balls - one large A and two small b and c. They can be located in one-dimensional space in three ways:

We will say that (1) - (3) is a set of possible worlds M, which has three elements - atomic objects A, b and c; the simple property of Q being (or not being) large, and the ratio of P being to the left or right of other marbles.

(1), (2) and (3) are possible States of Things. According to (1), b is small and is to the left of A and c. According to (2), b is small and to the left of c and A. According to (3), A is large and to the left of b and c. A, b and c are immutable Items that have a certain property Q and relation P to other Items. The States of Things are the configuration of these things, the potential facts: therefore they are changeable. Which way the events in the World M ((A, b, c) (Q, P)) will go is a matter of chance, since the atomic configurations are independent of each other.

2.025 She is Form and content.

That substance is Form is clear. After all, the Logical Form is the Possibility to form certain structures. So, the Form of the substance of the World M ((A, b, c) (Q, P)), that is, that it has three elements that have the property Q and the relation P between them. What will be the content of this substance? That this property is a magnitude, and this relation is the relation of being on the right or on the left.

2.0251 Space, time and color (possession of color) are Forms of Objects.

This section seems to contradict the thesis stated in 2.0232, which states that the Item is colorless. If not for the addition about color, then the commented section would be a variation on the theme of Kant's position that space and time are a priori categories of sensibility. Still, it is not entirely clear that Wittgenstein also conceives of time as the Form of an Object, because below, in 2.0271, the Object is spoken of as something immutable. So, the object is colorless (2.3.0232), and the color is one of its forms (2.0251). The subject is immutable (2.0271) and time is one of its forms. Can time be the Form of an Object, if the object, existing in time, nevertheless does not change in it? After all, Form is the Possibility of something that is connected with the Fact, the possibility of actualization. Most likely, Wittgenstein understands the very concept of time, which is not one of the key ones in the Treatise, not in the spirit of his contemporary physical theories (for example, not in the spirit of his teacher Boltzmann, the founder of static thermodynamics), but, rather, in exactly this way, as time was understood in the time of Kant, as something non-physical, internal, inherent in an object from within and immanently, as Husserl and Bergson understood it, as a purely immanent mental duration without entropy changes. If we understand time in this way, then there is no contradiction. As for the contradiction associated with color, it seems that this can be understood in such a way that the speculative Object is colorless, while color is one of the possible forms of its phenomenological manifestation as a physical object. In this case, the contradiction seems to be removed as well.

2.026 Only if there are Objects, the World can be given an unchanging Form.

The demand for simple Objects is not a purely ontological requirement for a guarantee of the immutability and stability of the World: for the World to be stable, some logical atoms are needed. Rather, this section contains a certain creative, cosmogonic aspect. If you want to build the World in such a way that something in it remains unchanged, then set simple Items as its foundation.

2.027 Immutable, Existing and Object are one and the same.

Here, first of all, attention is drawn to the word Existing (das Bestehende), which is identified with the Object. Existing is that which exists as a substance (and not accidents), that is, that which is constant and unchanging, and not that which happens to be, but happens not to be, that is, Existing is opposed to Fact.

2.0271 Subject - constancy, being; configuration - change, instability.

Existing, therefore, is a stable substantive state of the Object. An unstable existence is an accidental existence of the Fact.

2.0272 The State of Things is built from the configuration of Items.

2.03 In the State of Things, Objects are connected like links in a chain.

2.031 In the State of Things, Objects are in a certain relation to each other.

The meaning of 2.0272 is clear from all the previous. A State of Things, say a R b, is constructed from a configuration consisting of atomic Items a and b, and the relation R between them. But here 2.03 seems to be somewhat contradictory to 2.031. The chain links are connected directly. And it seems that the elements of the State of Things are something logically monotonous. How are the chain links related to each other? Does this metaphor (about the links of the chain) fit such, for example, the State of Things as a R b, where a is a small link, b is a large link, and R is the connection between them?

And if the Items are isolated? Let's say the State of Things is a configuration of balls a, b and c, which are located at an equal distance from each other:

It cannot be said that the balls are not related to each other in a certain way, especially if the distance between them is fixed. But to say that the balls are connected, “like links in a chain,” would be inappropriate in this case.

2.06 This existence and non-existence of the States of Things is the Reality. We also call the existence of States of Things a positive Fact, and non-existence a negative Fact.

The concept of Reality (Wirklichkeit) is not synonymous with the concept of World (Welt) in the conceptual system of the Treatise. The main difference between Reality and the World is that Reality determines both existing and non-existent States of Things, while the World is a collection of only existing States of Things (for details, see [ Finch 1977 ]). Wittgenstein's concept of Reality is more complex and ambiguous than the concept of the World. Reality is something more subjectively colored than the World, therefore it admits fiction (as a kind of sphere of the possible) in the form of one of its incarnations. The world does not allow such a correlate. Neither fiction nor even the absence of the world can be opposed to the world. The world either exists or it doesn't. Reality is both there and not at the same time. It defines everything potential that may or may not become existing. Reality is closely related to such concepts as fiction, existence and denial, to the analysis of which we will return. Looking ahead, we can say that, according to Henry Finch, the difference between Reality and the World in the Treatise corresponds to the difference in it between the Meaning and Meaning of the Proposition [ Finch 1977 ]. One can know the Meaning of a Proposition without knowing its Truth-Value, that is, without knowing whether it is true or false. Knowing the Meaning of the Proposition and at the same time not knowing its Meaning, we know the Reality that corresponds to this sense, but we do not know whether those Facts exist that depict this fragment of Reality, that is, whether they are part of the World.

2.032 The way in which Things are put together in a State of Things is the Structure of that State of Things.

2.033 Form - Possibility of Structure.

In the case of a R b The Structure of the State of Things is that the elements are “linked like links in a chain”. In case (a, b, c) (when the balls are equally spaced apart) the State of Things Structure reduces to a fixed distance between the balls.

2.034 The Structure of Fact is determined by the Structure of States of Things.

Since the Facts consist of one or more States of Things, it is clear that the structure of the former is mediated by the structure of the latter. Suppose there are two States of Things. One of them is that the three balls are at a fixed equal distance from each other (a, b, c), and the second is that there is a chain of three linked links (a’ b’ c’). Then in general (a, b, c) (a’ b’ c’) will be a non-atomic complex Fact. The structure of this fact will be mediated by the Structure of the States of Things included in it, in the sense that the structure of the Fact cannot but contain what is present in the Structure of the States of Things that compose it.

2.04 The totality of all existing States of Things is the World.

In a certain sense, this is a direct paraphrase of section 1.1, since the totality of all existing States of Things is the same as the totality of Facts, for the Fact, according to E. Stenius, is the existing States of Things. However, according to the laws of motivated deployment, since between 1.1 and 2.04 so much information was given about what the State of Things is, then the last statement about the World against the background of this information does not sound like a tautology at all, there is something new in it. Thus, in sonata form, the theme sounds differently in the exposition and in the elaboration.

2.05 The totality of all States of Things also determines which of them do not exist.

States of Things belong to the realm of the possible, not of the real. The World as a totality of beings, as a real World, accepting only the existing atomic States of Things, thereby delimits them from non-existent ones. So, for example, if in the World the State of Things p exists, then this thereby means that its negation not-p does not exist.

2.061 The States of Things are independent of each other.

2.062 From the existence or non-existence of some States of Things, one cannot judge the existence or non-existence of others.

The independence of the States of Things from each other and their non-derivation from each other follow from the logical simplicity of their constituent elements - the Objects. Suppose there are three balls a, b, c and a relation R between them. Let's assume that in the world M there are three combinations of balls, that is, three States of Things: 1) a R b; 2) a R c; 3) b R c. All these three States of Things are independent. Neither of them follows from the other. Combining one with the other in the structure of the Fact, these States of Things will continue to maintain independence from each other. Thus, our three States of Things, combined, can give seven Facts (plus an eighth “negative Fact”):

I.
II.
III.
IV.
v.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

The first fact is the conjunction of all three States of Things, the second fact is the conjunction of the first and the second; the third - the first and third; fourth - second and third. The fifth, sixth and seventh realize any one of the States of Things. The eighth does not implement any.

A conjunction, a constellation, is the only possible connection between independent States of Things that form facts.

2.063 The total Reality is the World.

This section is somewhat bewildering as contradicting 2.06, according to which Reality is rather broader in scope than the World, because Reality includes both existing and non-existent States of Things. Here it turns out that the concept of the World is wider in scope than the Reality. It also turns out that, in accordance with the last section, the World includes non-existent Facts and States of Things that are included in the Aggregate Reality. We do not know how to explain this contradiction.

2.1 We create Fact Pictures for ourselves.

Here, in fact, a new topic begins, the presentation of the “picture theory of language”, that is, we will no longer talk about the sphere of reality, ontology, but about the sphere of signs. Here one of the most important terms for the "Treatise" is introduced - das Bild - Picture. In the book [ Wittgenstein 1958 ] this term is certainly unsuccessfully translated as “image”, although “image theory” sounds more coherent than “picture theory”. But the word "image" completely misrepresents what Wittgenstein is talking about here. He speaks precisely about the picture, perhaps even about the Picture. There is a legend about how Wittgenstein came up with the idea that language is a Picture of Reality. He sat in a trench and looked at a magazine. Suddenly, he saw a comic strip depicting a car accident in sequence. This was the impetus for the creation of the famous “picture theory”. The authors of the book "Wittgenstein's Vienna" [ Janik- Toolmen 1973 ] believe that the concept of Bild is so close to the concept of the model of Heinrich Graetz, whose book "Principles of Mechanics" played a large role in shaping Wittgenstein's worldview and to which he refers in the Treatise, which, in their opinion, das Bild should be translated as "model": We create models of Facts for ourselves. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein himself shares these terms. In 2.12 he says: A painting is a model of reality.

2.11 Pictures depict Situations in the Logical space, that is, in the Space of existence or non-existence of the States of Things.

2.12 A picture is a model of Reality.

For Wittgenstein, the Picture is not the sign of the Name, but of the Fact and the Situation. That is, in a word, for Wittgenstein, a Picture is almost always a Proposition. Being an image not only of an existing Fact, but also of a possible Situation, the Picture depicts not only the real, but also the imaginary. A sculpture of Venus, a drawing of a dog in a zoology textbook, an illustration of a fairy tale - all these are paintings, like a bust of Shelley, and a photograph depicting a real historical event, and a map of England [ Stenius 1960: 88 ], but the former depict the fictitious, and the latter - the real one.

2.13 In the Picture, the Items correspond to the elements of the Picture.

2.131 Elements of the Picture replace Objects in the Picture.

2.14 The essence of the Picture is that its elements are connected to each other in a certain way.

From these sections it follows that the Picture in the Wittgensteinian sense has the property of isomorphism in relation to what it depicts. Its elements correspond to the Objects, and they are interconnected in a certain way, just as the Objects are connected in the State of Things and the State of Things in the Situation. Here, for the first time, the leitmotif of isomorphism between the structure of the World and the structure of language, which determines the entire composition of the Treatise as a whole, sounds in full force.

2.141 Picture is Fact.

The picture not only depicts the Facts, but is itself a Fact. This means, firstly, that the Picture is not an Object. Secondly, it may mean that the picture can become the object of the image (denotation) of another picture. Thus, a picture of Raphael photographed on film is a Fact whose Picture is the image on film. But a photograph is also a Fact, since it exists in the world of Facts along with other Facts, that is, it happens or does not happen to be, it consists of elements that are analogues of the States of Things and fall into configurations of analogues of Objects inside the Picture. Here it may seem that such an understanding of the Picture leads to an infinite regression. Painting Pictures, Painting Pictures Pictures, etc. At the beginning of the 20th century, Russell proposed a theory of types to solve such paradoxes, which Wittgenstein criticizes in the Treatise, opposing to it the idea of ​​the opposition of what can be said (Sagen), to what can be shown (Zeigen). (For more on this, see the comments on 3.331-3.333.) One way or another, the idea of ​​a Picture depicting a Picture was extremely relevant for the 20th century (see [ Dunne 1920, 1930, Rudnev 1992]), and not only in philosophy, but also in culture and art - the idea of ​​the text in the text (see [ Text within text 1981]). Wittgenstein sidesteps this problem in large part because his World Picture seeks to retain the post-positivist metaphor of nineteenth-century metaphysics (on Wittgenstein's conservatism, see [ Nyiri 1982 ,Rudnev 1998]), according to which the World, no matter how complex it may be, is one.

2.15 From the fact that the elements of the Picture are connected to each other in a certain way, it is clear that, therefore, the Things are connected to each other.

This connection of the elements of the Picture is called its Structure, and the Possibility of this Structure is called the Display Form.

Just as when describing the State of Things, Wittgenstein, when describing a Picture, singles out the Structure in the Picture and the Logical Form (Display Form) as the Possibility of this Structure. It is due to the fact that inside the Picture its elements are interconnected in the same way as Things in the State of Things are interconnected, the Picture has the ability to display the State of Things.

2.151 The form of display is the Possibility that Things are connected to each other like the elements of a Picture.

2.1511 This is how the Picture relates to Reality: on a tangent to it.

2.1512 She is the measure applied to Reality.

2.15121 Only the extreme points of its scale are in contact with the bases of the measured Object.

These provisions can be clarified if we present a map of the area in the form of a Picture and draw a projection from it onto the area:

Points a, b, c and d on the map will be located isomorphically to points A, B, C and D on the ground. Wittgenstein, however, offers a slightly different metaphor for the Picture - a measuring device, a ruler:

To measure reality with a ruler, it is necessary that the ruler and reality touch only at the edges. Wittgenstein further elaborates on these points by referring to the projection method in 3.1011-3.14.

2.1513 In accordance with this understanding, it is assumed that the relation of display also belongs to the Picture, and this makes it a Picture.

2.1514 The essence of the mapping relationship is to identify the elements of the Picture and the corresponding Entities.

2.1515 This identifying device is something like the sense organs of the Picture, with which the Picture comes into contact with Reality.

What Essences does the Picture represent? If the Picture is Wittgenstein's most fundamental Elementary Proposition, which is the Picture of the atomic State of Things, then the Essences to which the elements of the Picture are related are simple Objects. If a Picture is a complex Proposition, then these entities are complex things that make up Facts and Situations.

The notion that the display relation is akin to the sense organs, that is, the language reflects reality, just as the sense organs do, already conceals in itself, in a folded form, the understanding that this display may be inadequate. Wed 4.002. Speech disguises thought. And further.

2.16 To be a Picture, a Fact must have something in common with what is depicted.

2.161 There must be something identical in the Picture and in what it depicts, so that one could be the Picture of the other at all.

2.17 That something that the Picture must have in common with Reality in order to be able to depict it in one way or another - rightly or wrongly - is the Display Form.

When describing the relationship between Picture and Reality, Wittgenstein uses three verbs, respectively:

portray	reflect	display

According to Stenius, the first two words are synonymous and refer to imaginary denotations - the Picture can depict and reflect, first of all, the State of Things and the Situation (cf. also [ Black 1966: 74-75 ]). The concept of Abbildung refers to the real World, only the Real Fact can display the Picture. In our translation, we followed the instructions of E. Stenius.

According to Wittgenstein, no matter how abstract the Picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts. So if the proposal I am studying the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” is a Picture of the Fact that I am studying the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”, then both the fact and the sentence must have something in common and even identical. This is the Display Form - the possibility of a Logical Structure linking the Elements of the Picture and the elements of the Fact. What is the Display Form of the Fact that I am studying the “Treatise”? The fact that there is a certain object a (I) and a certain object b (“Treatise”) and the relation R “to study”, which is asymmetric and non-transitive. Both Picture and Fact have this Structure in common: a R b.

2.171 A picture can depict any Reality, the Form of which it has.

The Spatial Picture is all spatial, color - all color.

This position should not, apparently, be understood in an absolute sense. For example, the sound waves of a musical melody (sound Picture) can be translated into graphic lines of the score (spatial Picture). Wittgenstein himself writes about this more than once below.

2.172 However, a Picture cannot display its Display Form. She shows up in her.

This is one of the most key, difficult to understand and controversial sections of the Treatise. The mystical leitmotif of this work begins with it, the motive of silence, of that which cannot be said. It has been said before that a Picture can be a picture of a Picture, and so on ad infinitum. The fact that, according to Wittgenstein, the Picture cannot reflect its Display Form, that is, explicitly declare itself that it is arranged in such and such a way, and this can only manifest itself in the structure of the Picture, removes the need to resolve the paradox of the picture. in the picture. Thus, a painting cannot say to itself: “I am made up of two objects and an asymmetric relationship between them.” This will not be an expression of the idea of ​​the Display Form of that Picture, it will be another Picture, speaking of the first, but equal to the first and having its own form of display, inexpressible in words. Hence Wittgenstein's criticism and rejection of Russell's type theory, who solved the paradoxes of set theory such as the liar paradox "I am now lying" by introducing several hierarchies of languages ​​(for more details, see comments below on 3.331-3.333). According to Wittgenstein, the very Form of displaying the statement “I am lying now” clearly indicates its meaninglessness, and therefore there is no need to introduce a hierarchy of statements. The correlation of the subject, expressed by the personal pronoun of the first person and the verb in the present tense, indicating the work of the action, itself indicates the meaninglessness of the combination “I am lying now”. (Compare the analysis of the combination “I am sleeping” by N. Malcolm [ Malcolm 1993] and analysis of illocutionary suicide by Z. Vendler [ Vendler 1985]).

2.173 The Painting depicts its Object from the outside (its point of view is its Form of representation), so the Painting depicts its Object correctly or incorrectly.

As already mentioned, the Display Form is available only for Pictures depicting real Facts. In this case, it is simply about the object of the image. Therefore, here Wittgenstein introduces a new concept - the Form of the image (Form der Darstellung). Each Picture must have a Picture Form, since every Picture depicts something, be it a real Fact or a possible situation.

2.174 But a Picture cannot go beyond its Form of representation.

In other words, the Picture cannot depict what is not visible from its Standpunkt, what is not included in its Image Form. If we photograph a certain scene where, suppose, people are sitting and talking, then we will not be able to reproduce their conversation from the photograph. If we record their conversation on tape, then we will not be able to restore the gestures and views of the speakers. Camera and tape recorder cannot go beyond their Picture Form.

2.18 The fact that any Picture, regardless of what Form it is, must have in common with Reality, so that it can depict it at all - truthfully or falsely - this is the Logical Form, that is, the Form of Reality.

A picture can be spatial, sound, color, but it always has a certain Logical Form. That is, a Picture can have any structure, but it must have some kind of structure. And the Picture may not depict fragments of the real World, but it must depict some world, some reality. So, if we exposed the film, then we get the Picture not of the Reality (which would have been obtained if we had not exposed the film), but the Picture of the exposed film.

2.181 A picture whose display form is a logical form is called a logical picture.

Here, it seems, lies a contradiction with the previous section, from which it follows that the Logical Form is necessarily inherent in any Picture. Perhaps this should be understood not so strictly mathematically. The fact that if the Display Form is a Logical Form, then the Picture is a Logical Picture does not mean that they may not match. After all, already in the next section it is said that any Picture is at the same time a Logical Picture. It is important here that we are talking about the ability to perform the function of the Logical Picture - to display the World (2.19). Any Logical Picture can display the World. But in fact, any Picture is at the same time a Logical Picture. Therefore, any Picture can display the World. It is only necessary that she, so to speak, make an effort towards this.

Let's say we have a portrait of a person painted by an unknown artist. We do not know who exactly this portrait depicts and whether it depicts any particular person at all. This Painting is in the form of a display. But does it have a Logical Form? We can attribute a Logical Form to it, for example, if it is proved that this picture is a portrait of a certain person, and this will be proved by examination. Until then, this picture will express only a possible State of Things, and not an actual one, it will have a Logical Form only ex potentia.

2.19 Logical Picture can display the World.

First of all, it means that the Logical Picture is a Proposition that can reflect the World, being true or false (the possibility of truth or falsity constitutes the Logical Form of the Proposition).

2.2 The picture has a common Logical Display Form with the displayed one.

When we establish whose portrait a painting is, we do so by establishing the identity of the Logical Display Form. Semantically, the essence of this procedure is that we establish that the portrait is similar to the original. The syntactic side of the matter lies in the fact that we intuitively establish the identity or very close similarity of certain proportions of the face of the prototype (perhaps depicted in another picture or photograph) with the face depicted in the picture.

2.201 A picture depicts Reality by representing the Possibility of existence and non-existence of States of Things.

2.202 The picture depicts some possible Situations in the Logical space.

2.203 A picture contains the Possibility of the Situation it depicts.

A picture can depict a "simple possible Fact" - a State of Things - and a "complex possible Fact" - a Situation. This very act of depiction shows that this State of Things or this Situation may or may not become an actual Fact (what happens to be). For example, if a teapot is drawn on the box, then this may mean that there is a teapot there. But if there is no teapot in the box, this does not mean that the Picture was wrong. The painting does not state that the teapot is necessarily in the box at the moment, but it states that it is the teapot box, so it is in principle quite possible that the teapot could be in it, which would be semiotic, so to speak. legitimately.

But what does it mean that the Picture contains the Possibility of the Situation it depicts? Of course, the Picture on the box of the teapot says that there might be a teapot here, in which case it contains the Possibility of the Situation according to which the teapot is in the box. And it is possible that it also contains the possibility that there is no teapot in the box. But let's imagine that someone put 13 Chinese prints on silk into a teapot box. Does the painting on the box contain the possibility of having 13 Chinese prints in the box? The picture on the box, depicting a teapot, says that this is a teapot box, but in principle it is possible that anything could be placed here that can fit here according to purely spatial parameters. Thus, the Picture depicting a teapot on a teapot box also contains the impossibility that the box contains an anti-tank grenade launcher, a lamppost 10 meters long, and anything that exceeds the dimensions of the box.

2.21 The picture corresponds or does not correspond to Reality, it is correct or incorrect, true or false.

2.22 The picture depicts what it depicts, regardless of whether it is true or false, through the Form of display.

A picture of a teapot on a teapot box containing 13 Chinese silk prints is a false painting if one reads it as "There is a teapot inside this box at the moment." But what is depicted in the picture - its Meaning - a teapot - does not depend on the correlation of the picture with Reality (on its Meaning, reference). Let's say there's a no-travel sign on the road. The fact that this sign is placed here incorrectly or illegally does not negate the fact that the Meaning of the Sign is that passage is prohibited, although in fact it was not prohibited by anyone here.

2.221 What the Picture depicts is its Meaning.

The distinction between Meaning (Sinn) and Meaning (Bedeutung) belongs to G. Frege [ Frege 1997], one of Wittgenstein's immediate predecessors and teachers. Frege understood meaning as a way of realizing meaning in a sign. As far as the sentence is concerned, the meaning, according to Frege, is the possibility of the sentence to be true or false, and the meaning is the proposition expressed in the sentence. It is this proposition that is what the picture depicts, and that whether it be true or false, that is, from the Truth-Value.

2.222 In accordance or non-correspondence of its Meaning of Reality lies its Truth or Falsehood.

It should be remembered here that Wittgenstein's concept of Reality means a kind of bipolar environment, where both existing and possible States of Things and Situations are equally present [ Finch 1977 ]. Getting into this environment, correlating with it, the Meaning of the Proposition seems to begin to deviate first to one pole, then to the other, depending on whether the Proposition is true or false.

2.223 To know whether a Picture is true or false, we must relate it to Reality.

The latter procedure is not always possible. It is called verification and is one of the most important principles of the philosophical school that inherited many of the ideas of the Treatise - the Vienna Circle. The Viennese believed that in order for the principle of verificationism to work, it is necessary to reduce all sentences to the so-called protocol sentences, that is, such sentences that describe directly visible and perceptible reality (see, for example, [ Schlick 1993]). Such reductionism subsequently turned out to be unproductive, often simply impossible. It turned out that almost most of the sentences of the language could not be checked for truth or falsity, which indicated the inadequacy of the verificationist principle. The idea of ​​banishing sentences from speech activity, the truth or falsity of which cannot be verified, for example, ideological slogans: “Communism is the youth of the world”, “Imperialism is decaying capitalism”, turned out to be unpromising. In the 1920s and 1930s, when totalitarian ideology began to take over the world, analytic philosophy began to call for tolerance towards language, that is, not for the fight against incorrect statements, but for a careful study of them as the only reality of language. Wittgenstein came to this in the 1940s.

2.224 It is not possible to know from the Picture alone whether it is true or false.

Logical, a priori true Propositions of the type A = A, which are true without correlating them with reality, based only on their logical-semantic structure (L-true, as R. Carnap calls them [ Carnap 1959]), Wittgenstein did not consider Propositions and, accordingly, Pictures, since, in his opinion, they are Tautologies, do not carry any information about the World and are not a reflection of Reality (for details on this, see comments to 4.46-4.4661).

2.225 What would have beenaprioriA picture would be nothing.

As Wittgenstein later said in the 1932 Cambridge Lectures, it cannot be said that the portrait resembles the original, having only the portrait [ Wittgenstein 1994: 232].

(continued in #3 for 1999)

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1.1. The world is a collection of facts, not objects.

1.11. The world is determined by facts and by the fact that they are all facts.

1.12. The totality of facts determines everything that takes place, as well as everything that does not take place.

1.13. The world is facts in logical space.

1.2. The world is divided into facts.

1.21. Every fact may or may not take place, and the rest will remain unchanged.

2. What takes place - a fact - is a set of positions.

2.01. The position is determined by the links between objects (objects, things).

2.011. For objects it is important that they are possible elements of positions.

2.012. There are no accidents in logic: if something can be embodied in a position, the possibility of the emergence of a position must initially be present in this something.

2.0121. If it turns out that the situation includes an object that already exists in itself, this may seem like an accident.

If objects (phenomena) are capable of being embodied in positions, this possibility must be present in them from the very beginning.

(Nothing in the realm of logic is simply possible. Logic operates on all possibilities, and all possibilities are its facts.)

We cannot imagine spatial objects outside of space or temporal objects outside of time; in the same way one cannot imagine an object deprived of the possibility of being combined with others.

And if I can imagine objects combined in positions, then I cannot imagine them outside the possibility of this combination.

2.0122. Objects are independent insofar as they are able to be embodied in all possible positions, but this form of independence is also a form of connection with positions, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear both in themselves and in judgments at the same time.)

2.0123. If I know an object, then all its possible incarnations in positions are also known.

(Each of these possibilities is part of the nature of the object.)

New opportunities cannot arise retroactively.

2.01231. If I seek to know an object, I do not need to know its external properties, but I must know all its internal properties.

2.0124. If all objects are given, then all possible positions are given.

2.013. Each object and each phenomenon is in itself in the space of possible positions. I can imagine this space as empty, but I am unable to imagine an object outside this space.

2.0131. The spatial object must be in infinite space. (A point in space is an argument place.)

A spot in the field of view need not be red, but it must have a color, since it is, so to speak, surrounded by a color space. The tone must have a certain pitch, the tangible objects must have a certain hardness, and so on.

2.014. Objects contain the possibilities of all situations.

2.0141. The possibility of incarnation in position is the form of the object.

2.02. Objects are simple.

2.0201. Any statement about collections can be decomposed into statements about the elements of collections and judgments that describe collections in their entirety.

2.021. Objects form the substance of the world. That's why they can't be compound.

2.0211. If the world has no substance, then the meaningfulness of a judgment depends on the truth of another judgment.

2.0212. In this case, we cannot draw a picture of the world (either true or false).

2.022. It is obvious that the imaginary world, however different from the real one, must have something in common with the latter - a form.

2.023. Objects are what constitute this immutable form.

2.0231. The substance of the world is able to determine only the form, but not the material properties. For it is only through judgments that material properties manifest—only through the configuration of objects.

2.0232. In a sense, objects are colorless.

2.0233. If two objects have the same logical form, the only difference between them, outside of external properties, is that they are different.

2.02331. Or an object (phenomenon) has properties that all others lack, in which case we can rely entirely on the description to distinguish it from the rest; or, on the other hand, several objects (phenomena) are endowed with common properties, and in this case it is not possible to distinguish them.