On the eve of the Second World War The international situation on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (WWII). Relations with Germany

30.07.2020

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Anatoly Pavlov
retired colonel general, chairman of the Military Intelligence Veterans Council

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On the eve of the war, Soviet military intelligence, despite the difficulties and shortcomings in its work, managed to obtain a sufficient amount of information, which, if properly understood and used, made it possible to draw correct and objective conclusions about the true plans and intentions of Nazi Germany.
Always in threatened and pre-war periods, the work of military intelligence is of utmost importance for the military-political leadership of the country, often being the basis for making responsible decisions. The period before the start of the Great Patriotic War in 1941 was no exception for Soviet military intelligence. The question of the effectiveness of its work in timely warning of the threat of war and possible plans and timing of an attack is of great interest even now.
After the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933, the threat of an attack on the Soviet Union became real. Its danger progressively increased with the creation of the anti-Comintern bloc consisting of Germany, Italy and Japan, the increase in the aggressiveness of Germany, which successively captured almost all the countries of Europe, and Japan in the East, which captured Manchuria, Northeast China and provoked conflicts in the Khalkhin Gol region and Lake Khasan . As is known, this course of events developed thanks to the policy of "appeasement" of the aggressor by, mainly, Britain and France in the hope of directing Germany's aspirations to the USSR. This short-sighted policy was pursued even after they declared war on Germany in 1939, during the so-called "strange" war.
Military intelligence monitored developments and informed the military-political leadership of the country.

Back in the late 1920s, the leadership of the Intelligence Directorate, headed by Ya.K. Berzin reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposals on the development of military intelligence for work in war conditions and recommended that it be expanded in every possible way in the states of potential opponents and countries from whose territory it was possible to conduct their intelligence. It was proposed to place emphasis on illegal intelligence, while at the same time strengthening the positions of intelligence in official institutions. For the logistical and financial support of its work during the war, it was proposed to create a network of commercial enterprises abroad. All proposals were approved and formed the basis for further construction and work of military intelligence.

Around the same time, the Intelligence Directorate developed the fundamental work "Future War". Based on a comprehensive analysis of all the materials received, it provided an assessment and forecast of the development of the military-political situation in the world and regions, the possible development of relations between states and the USSR, assessed the state and probable development of their armed forces and weapons, and prospects for the development of methods of armed struggle. The most important conclusion was made that a future war would begin without a formal announcement, and Germany would be the main link in the anti-Soviet bloc.

After the Nazis came to power in Germany, Hitler's anti-Soviet policy became more and more obvious. At the beginning of 1940, the Intelligence Directorate had data on Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR, and in July 1940, initial data on the decision to go to war were received. Here are some examples.
Report dated 04/08/1940: "The source said that Hitler's sincere desire is to resolve the Russian question by dismembering the Soviet Union into several separate national states."
Report from Bucharest dated September 4, 1940: "A military alliance has been concluded between Hungary and Germany against the USSR. The war against England is no longer relevant."

Report from Paris dated 09/27/1940: "The Germans abandoned the attack on England and the ongoing preparations for it are just a demonstration to hide the transfer of the main forces to the East. There are already 106 divisions there."

It should be noted that back in the mid-30s, by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the directive of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Intelligence Directorate began to vigorously expand the foreign intelligence network and prepare it and the existing residencies for work in wartime. Measures for their technical support were developed and began to be carried out. At the same time, great attention was paid to the selection of heads of foreign apparatuses from among experienced intelligence officers and anti-fascist internationalists associated with the Intelligence Directorate. In the USA, the work was led by P.P. Melkishev, L.A. Sergeev, A.A. Adams, in Germany - I. Shtebe (as part of her group - a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs von Shelia, economist G. Kegel), in Switzerland - C. Rado, in Japan - R. Sorge, in France - L. Trepper, in England - G. Robinson, in Bulgaria - V. Zaimov, in Romania - K. Velkish, in Poland - R. Gernstadt. Dozens of other anti-fascists worked around them on assignments from military intelligence.

Prominent military leaders led the military apparatuses: in Germany - General V.P. Tupikov, in China successively - V.I. Chuikov and P.S. Rybalko, in Spain - Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, in England - commander V.K. Putna.

The successful and effective development and improvement of the combat readiness of the operational and strategic intelligence agencies and the Intelligence Directorate suffered a severe blow in 1937-1939 by Stalin's repressions. More than 600 people were arrested in the Intelligence Directorate and its bodies. Among them - the head of the RU Ya.K. Berzin, and then the four chiefs who replaced him, deputy chiefs of the RU, many heads of departments and employees. The heads of a number of foreign apparatuses also suffered. This blow came at a time when intelligence work and its effectiveness were vital to the country. The repressed were replaced by young employees who had no experience in intelligence work and training, which could not but affect the subsequent activities of military intelligence.

And yet, with the remaining forces, intelligence continued to track the actions of Germany and its allies, as well as the unseemly maneuvers of the Anglo-French bloc and a number of other countries.

At the same time, work continued to expand and strengthen foreign devices and the network of their sources. In early 1939, General I.I. Proskurov reported that only from June 1939 to May 1940, the intelligence network covered 32 countries, and the number of residencies in them was increased to 116. By the beginning of the war, there were already residencies in 45 countries. They worked most effectively in the USA, England, Germany, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Romania, Belgium, Turkey, and France.

Only from June 1940 to June 1941, military intelligence transmitted more than 300 specific messages (cipher telegrams, intelligence reports, intelligence reports) indicating Germany's active preparations for war with the USSR. The most important of them were reported directly to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, the People's Commissar for Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. From the end of 1939, the most important messages were transmitted to the western military districts.

Taking into account intelligence information, on September 18, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks / Stalin and Molotov the document "On the Fundamentals of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East for 1940-1941", which gave a clear analysis the military-political situation, the state of the armed forces of potential adversaries and their operational plans. It stated that "the Soviet Union needs to be ready to fight on two fronts: in the West against Germany, supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland, and in the East against Japan. The main most powerful enemy is Germany."

Important predictive reports of military intelligence, of course, coincided with the reports of other departments (NKVD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.). Therefore, the Soviet leadership took appropriate measures: already in 1940, the growth of defense industry output increased by 33% compared to 1939. It was decided to increase the size of the army, 42 new military schools were created by 1939, and at the end of 1938 the process of rehabilitation of the illegally repressed began. It was decided to increase the production of new tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces and many other decisions were made aimed at strengthening the military potential. However, the country was not ready for war, and repression, which destroyed part of the intellectual elite, played a significant role in this. Hence, in particular, the attempt to postpone the war at least until 1942 by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany. This fixed idea took possession of Stalin and his entourage. A vain calculation on the political decency of Hitler and his retinue!

Fear of reprisals prevented dissidents from expressing their views. The consequences were very serious: the necessary measures were not taken to bring the armed forces to the appropriate degree of mobilization and combat readiness. Unfortunately, this also affected military intelligence: having alarming information about the actions of the Germans, it began to carry out relevant activities only in March 1941 and, of course, did not manage to complete them before the start of the war.

The development of events after 1939 became more and more dramatic. All sources and apparatuses of military intelligence consistently reported on the practical implementation of the provisions of the "Plan Barbarossa", the transfer of German troops to the borders of the USSR, the creation of strike groups, the equipment of the theater, negotiations between the leaders of the countries of the anti-Soviet bloc, the timing of the attack, etc.
Here are some examples of reports:

At the end of February 1941, "Alta" (I. Shtebe) reported from Berlin that according to the data received by "Aryan" (Shelia): "Preparation for the war against the USSR has already gone far ... Three army groups are being formed under the command of Bock, Runstedt and von Leeba. The army group "Koenigsberg" will advance on Petersburg, the army group "Warsaw" - in the direction of Moscow, the army group "Poznan" - on Kyiv. The term of the offensive should be considered May 20." A little later, it was clarified that the attack on the USSR was postponed to June 22-25 "due to the slow progress of the operation in the Balkans."

December 28, 1940 a report from Japan from R. Sorge: "The Germans intend to occupy the territory of the USSR along the Kharkov-Moscow-Leningrad line." April 17, 1941: "The German General Staff has completely completed preparations for an attack on the USSR. The war will be short in time and can begin at any moment." Report on May 30, 1941: "Berlin informed Ambassador Otto that the war with the USSR would begin in the second half of June. The main blow would be delivered by the left flank."

Similar alarming information came from the western military districts.

In other words, in 1940 - the first half of 1941, the Intelligence Directorate had a sufficient amount of specific and reliable data on:

- adoption by the German government of a decision to launch a war against the USSR;

- political goals and strategic plan of the German command;

- specific activities carried out by the Germans at all stages of preparation for war;

- forces and means intended for war, and methods of deploying war;

- groupings and combat composition of troops deployed near the borders of the USSR;

- the specific timing of the attack on the USSR, up to June 21, when our source at the German embassy in Moscow (G. Kegel) said that the attack and the war would begin at 3-4 am on June 22.

In addition to cipher reports from sources and heads of intelligence apparatuses, intelligence reports, analytical documents were also reported to the military-political leadership of the country. So, on March 20, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate, General F.I. Golikov reported a note "Statements, organizational measures and options for military operations of the German army against the USSR", which summarized the data of all types of intelligence and indicated that the period of May 15 - June 15 could be a possible time for the attack. However, apparently in favor of Stalin's opinion, Golikov concluded that perhaps this was English or German disinformation. Later Marshal G.K. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that the report also outlined the "Plan Barbarossa", but Golikov's conclusions devalued the significance of the report. It is impossible to agree with this. Indeed, after this, on May 9, 1941, the military attache in Germany, General V.I. Tupikov introduced S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov received a detailed report on the plan of possible actions of the German army against the USSR, which actually reiterated the actions of the German armies in accordance with the "Barbarossa Plan" and indicated that the Germans hoped to complete the defeat of the Red Army in 1-1.5 months and reach the meridian of Moscow. In this report, there were no conclusions like Golikov's. In addition, it should be noted that the military-political leadership of the country regularly received all the most important military intelligence reports and, probably, could come to the appropriate conclusions.

Military intelligence fulfilled its tasks in the pre-war period with dignity. As for some other opinions, I would like to remind their authors, in my opinion, the very fair words of V. Lacker (book "The War of Secrets", London, 1985): "Intelligence is a prerequisite for an effective policy and strategy. Without an effective policy, even the most accurate and reliable intelligence will be useless. The decisive factor is the ability to use intelligence."

It is appropriate to give an assessment of the work of Soviet intelligence by the Germans. One of the leaders of the German counterintelligence, Oscar Reilly, wrote in the book "German intelligence during the Second World War": "In the years preceding the Second World War, Soviet intelligence managed to create an extensive, actively working agent network. Thanks to this network, Moscow managed to achieve such results that played an important role in organizing the defense of the Soviet Union. No other country in the world had equal strength and capabilities of the spy organization at that time."

Summing up, we can confidently say that on the eve of the war, Soviet military intelligence, despite the difficulties and shortcomings in its work, managed to obtain a sufficient amount of information, which, if properly understood and used, made it possible to draw correct and objective conclusions about the true plans and intentions of Nazi Germany.
Website "Top Secret"

A global provocation “or who is manipulating us?”

On June 22, 1941, in addition to Hitler's 5 millionth army, more than 1 million soldiers of the allied forces of Germany took part in the invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union.

A global provocation “or who is manipulating us?”

On June 22, 1941, in addition to Hitler's 5 millionth army, more than 1 million soldiers of the allied forces of Germany took part in the invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union.

And he also says:

WAR FOR THE MIND...

Next to the Germans, the troops of Italy, Spain, Albania, France, Holland, Norway, Denmark, the soldiers of the Walandes, the Flemings went to rob and kill. Romania and Hungary fielded the largest number of divisions. There were regiments of Croats and Slovaks. Every second driver of Guderian's tank army was a Czech. The bloody trail in Belarus was left by the Hungarians, and near Stalingrad - by the Croats, near Leningrad - by the Dutch from the SS division "Norland". Already in the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the Austrians stormed the Brest Fortress. We must pay tribute to the Poles, who did not put up their divisions under the flag of Hitler, but traitors were found in Poland - volunteers who fought in the Wehrmacht.

Regrettably, both in Belarus and Ukraine there were traitors to the Motherland, accomplices to the invaders. On January 25, 1942, on the orders of Hitler, the 1st Belarusian SS Grenadier Brigade "Belarus" was formed from among the traitors who fled to Germany. Traitors were later completely destroyed by units of the Red Army.

All evil spirits from almost all over Europe greedily rushed to tear the Soviet land to pieces, to expand their "living space".

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the leading Western countries continued their conciliatory policy of encouraging Hitler's Germany, inciting her to go to war against the USSR. The West initially pursued its goals - to accelerate the military conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, to deflect an irresistible blow to England. W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt, seeking to push Hitler against Stalin, informed Stalin "in a friendly way" about Germany's readiness for war against the Soviets, and Hitler was informed that Stalin was preparing the expansion of communism to the West and an attack on Germany. As a result of such a dual, insidious, provocative policy, the Soviet Union found itself in complete political isolation, facing the threat of a war on two fronts: with Germany in the West and with Japan in the East.

Therefore, the USSR was forced to pursue a policy of appeasement of Germany and make “concessions” to it, and conclude, in addition to the “Non-Aggression Pact” on September 28, 1939, the “Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany”. Stalin was convinced that war with Germany could not be avoided, but the Soviet Union and the army were not ready for this war.

To prepare the country for defense, it was necessary to gain time. In a conversation with W. Churchill in August 1942, when it came to the suddenness of the Nazi attack on the USSR, Stalin said: “…I didn’t need any warnings. I knew that the war would start soon, but I thought that I could win six months or so, and then it was winter. To open hostilities, looking at the winter, Hitler will not. That is why it was forbidden to succumb to the provocations carried out by the Germans on the border, to deploy Red Army troops in the border zone, to fight violators of the airspace.

The Germans, on the other hand, carefully and scrupulously prepared for the attack. In 1940 - 1941, the activities of all types of German intelligence were noticeably intensified. A large number of reconnaissance and sabotage groups were thrown into the territory of Belarus with the tasks of reconnaissance of state and military facilities, the deployment and combat strength of military units, and the places of residence of the commanders of the Red Army. With the outbreak of hostilities, they were given the task of physically destroying commanders, committing sabotage, disrupting communications, and creating panic among the civilian population. The intelligence department of Canaris ("Abwehr") during this period, managed to reveal the main forces of the Red Army in the border zone and in depth.

Working in cooperation with Finnish, Hungarian, Italian, Romanian intelligence, German intelligence had accurate data on the number and locations of Soviet divisions, their condition and weapons, almost everything was known about the Air Force and air defense systems.

But, and the intelligence of the Red Army was on top. She timely and accurately reported on the plans of Nazi Germany and the timing of a possible invasion. The concentration and deployment of the German Armed Forces, numbering 8 million five hundred thousand people, was revealed, the Ground Forces "5 million 200 thousand" had 214 divisions, this group consisted of about 4300 tanks, 5000 aircraft, 47000 guns and mortars.

Military intelligence and personally the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov repeatedly reported to Stalin and the government about the prepared enemy for the attack. There was a lot of information and intelligence, sometimes contradictory, that it was not easy to sort out this informational chaos. The great master of disinformation and lies, Goebbels, and he got confused. In his diary on May 25, 1945. he's writing: - “... With regard to Russia, we managed to organize excellent disinformation. Because of the continuous "canards", they no longer know what is false and what is true abroad. Later, on June 18, he writes: “... The masking of our plans against Russia has reached its highest point. We have plunged the world into a whirlpool of rumors so much that we ourselves will not understand them. ”. And, indeed, Hitler personally, his diplomatic corps and the General Staff made great efforts to hide their aggressive intentions and mislead Stalin and the leadership of the Soviet Union. On February 15, 1941, at the beginning of the strategic deployment of the German Armed Forces, the Chief of the General Staff (OKW) Keitel issued a special directive to disinform the enemy. At the first stage, until mid-April 1941, it was ordered to create false intentions to invade England. The 2nd stage, when it will be impossible to hide the preparation for the attack, is to keep the enemy as long as possible in the confusion about the true plans of the Barbarossa. In pursuance of the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General Brauchitsch ordered the start of Operation Highfish (an imaginary landing on the southern coast of England). The commander of the Army Group "Center" ordered the construction of various fortifications along the border of the USSR, supposedly designed to defend against possible Russian attacks. Works should not be masked. On the railway they showed that for each arriving train, two depart, and all this, ostensibly, to prepare for the landing in England. Attached to the plan "Barbarossa", “On misleading Moscow” it was said: “The regrouping of troops, in no case should give the impression of an attack on the East. Spread rumors about, allegedly, the replacement of military formations, the arrival of troops for rest before landing in England. Works to improve the road network, justify economic goals. Events should be carried out with demonstrative methods, even if it is necessary to sacrifice people and material parts.. And they donated. Almost every day, reconnaissance and sabotage groups were sent to the south coast of England, sometimes by force up to a platoon, with the aim of "reconnaissance" of the landing sites, terrain and defensive forces of the British. These groups, as a rule, died or were taken prisoner. The troops arriving at the border were given maps of the landing areas, dictionaries and phrasebooks in English. The German soldiers released on leave impressed their acquaintances with a good knowledge of the English language, but warned that this was kept in strict confidence.

On the coast of Germany, the construction of berths was imitated. Command posts were placed, radio exchanges were intensively conducted with landing ships. A request was received for the provision of merchant ships of the Soviet Union for the transfer of the second echelon of amphibious assault to England.

The Gestapo did not interfere with the actions of our diplomats and intelligence correspondents in collecting intelligence, on the contrary, together with the Goebbels department, such an avalanche of disinformation was brought down on them, which confused them with their heads.

As always, before the invasion and seizure of foreign territories, Hitler himself personally shouted to the whole world about the "peacefulness" of Germany, they say, with difficulty, but I made the final decision to put an end to the aggressor and crush England. In his personal letter to Stalin on December 31, 1940, Hitler writes: “... The struggle with England has entered a decisive phase. I intend, no later than the summer, to decisively put an end to this protracted issue. I am forced to keep 70 divisions in Poland for reorganization and training in areas inaccessible to British aviation and intelligence. Troops from March will begin to be transferred to the coast of the canal, and new units will arrive in their place. Rumors about the impending German attack on the USSR are absurd and nonsense. Please don't believe any rumors. The deterioration of relations between our countries is the only salvation for the British. It is useful to keep Churchill in the dark about our plans. I will try to arrange a meeting with you before the destruction of England in late June-early July 1941. Please accept our congratulations on the New Year with wishes of health and success to you personally!”.

Well, let's face it, a letter from "a bosom and faithful friend", or rather, Judas!

This sophisticated swindler, scoundrel and scoundrel, never kept his word, even as the leader of the country. His entire foreign policy was based on lies, deceit and deceit. For him, nothing was sacred - no honor, no conscience. In a letter to Stalin, already on May 14, 1941, almost on the eve of the attack, he again deceived: “... A large number of my troops have accumulated along the borders with the Soviet Union, which may have given rise to rumors now circulating about a possible military conflict between us. I assure you, with the honor of the head of state, that this is not so. But I do not at all exclude the possibility of an accidental armed conflict, which, under conditions of such a concentration of troops, can take on very large dimensions, when it will be difficult or simply impossible to determine what was its root cause. It will be no less difficult to stop this conflict. I want to be very frank with you. I fear that one of my generals will deliberately enter into such a conflict in order to save England from her fate and frustrate my plans. Around June 15-20, I am planning a massive transfer of troops to the West from your border. At the same time, I earnestly ask you not to succumb to any provocations that may take place on the part of my generals who have forgotten their duty.(Tell me, what a sincere friend, Comrade Stalin found, but in fact - a scoundrel of the highest category, who believes that he alone is smart and holds God by the beard, and the rest are suckers and fools). …And, of course, of course, try not to give them any reason. If provocation by any of my generals cannot be avoided, I ask you to show restraint, do not take retaliatory actions and inform me immediately. I continue to hope for our meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler.

Of course, what a hello, this should be the answer so that the opponent has no doubt that they believed him. That is a boomerang.

Some historians, due to the fact that Stalin did not give permission for the announcement of general mobilization and the occupation of troops on the border, conclude that Stalin believed Hitler. Such a conclusion is erroneous, because they underestimate Stalin's strategic thinking, his wisdom and foresight. Stalin absolutely did not trust Hitler. He could not succumb to the provocation of Hitler and Churchill (they are the same field of berries) and give them a chance to trumpet our “intention” to attack Germany to the whole world, confirming this with aerial photographs of the concentration of our troops on the border and declaring us aggressors.

One can imagine on whose side the sympathies of the peoples of the world community would be. And we desperately needed the sympathy and support of the peoples of the states occupied by the Nazis and the peoples of the world community. This was shown by the Finnish War, which confirmed our weakness and the country's unpreparedness for a big war. But it was a reconnaissance war in battle. And this war showed that the USSR needed time to prepare for a big war, and Germany needed to hurry up and not delay until after the completion of the English company.

Therefore, Stalin, objectively assessing our economic and military capabilities, did everything to win the support of the peoples of not only the European countries occupied by Nazi Germany, but also the peoples of the world, which speaks of his wisdom and far-sightedness. And the withdrawal of troops to combat positions on the border in the strategic plan could not give a special advantage. And yet, none of the military leaders in the government had such a volume of information that Stalin owned and kept in his head. Therefore, all judgments, even of great commanders, in relation to Stalin's activities on the eve and during the war from their "bell tower" are subjective! The country urgently needed about six months for the new weapons and equipment launched into mass production to be able to enter the newly created mechanized and tank corps and armies, and for the new aircraft to arrive in aviation units and formations.

I do not understand the position of some "historians" in favor of those who betrayed our Great Motherland, who insist that Stalin did not believe the reports of his intelligence officers. He believed, but that didn't make it any easier for him. He had full and detailed information about the plans and possibilities not only of Hitler, but also, no less important, of the possibilities of his country. If we assume that he did not believe his own, but believed Hitler, then how can one explain the fact that the graduation of cadets from military schools and academies, usually carried out in July-August, in 1941 was carried out at the end of April? I am the commander of the Turkestan, and then the Central Asian military district, General of the Army Nikolai Grigoryevich Lyashchenko, a graduate of the Academy. M.V. Frunze with a gold medal, said that on May 3, 1941, a government reception of graduates with honors from military educational institutions took place in the Kremlin, during which it was forbidden to make any notes. I. Stalin made a big speech at the reception. Describing the international situation, he warned “of the inevitability of war with fascist Germany. When will this war break out? In a week or a month, it depends on Hitler and diplomacy, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. But in any case, immediately sort out the combat readiness of your units and formations and be ready to complete the assigned tasks in a short time. What's this? How does is called?

This suggests that he also knew the possible date of aggression, but wanted to delay it, and, of course, he hoped for the ability of our diplomacy to gain time. And in order for the international community not to take us for the aggressor, and fascist Germany for the victim, it was necessary to calculate everything and see the possible finale of this war.

Lyashchenko N.G. was appointed commander of the Infantry Regiment. Arriving at the unit, dealing with the state of combat readiness and combat readiness of the unit, he was horrified. The regiment is disarmed. Under the guise of rearmament, all the old weapons are mothballed and put into storage, but there are no new weapons, and it is not known when they will be. He decided to report to the division commander on the state of affairs in the regiment and Comrade Stalin's requirements for the combat readiness of the troops. The division commander took him to the corps commander, who, after listening to the report of N.G. Lyashchenko, decided to convene a meeting of corps management officers, commanders of units and formations and demanded that the weapons be immediately reopened and distributed to personnel, and only after receiving new weapons, the old ones should be handed over to the warehouse. After a meeting with the corps commander, the head of the special department of the corps, inviting him to his office, threatened: “What are you talking about? Do you know what kind of chatter you will be? But Nikolai Grigorievich was not from the timid, he fought with the Basmachi in Central Asia and was already then a well-deserved person. The question is, who did this counterintelligence officer work for?

This state of affairs is no exception. They write that the attempts of the commanders of the troops of the military districts, commanders of the armies and commanders of divisions to do something to increase the combat readiness of the troops entrusted to them were cruelly suppressed. By whom? Not like the heads of special departments, traitors to the motherland? The Germans, and the enemy in general, usually recruit people from structures that are uncontrolled, but powerful, who, without answering for practically anything, using the trust of their leadership, can do a lot (harm).

And today, a potential adversary (and he always exists, there is no need to be naive and simpletons, the nature of imperialism is unchanged), taking advantage of the carelessness, but most likely irresponsibility of state officials who easily believe benevolent speeches, penetrate and introduce their agents of influence into all the structures of our states, especially in all uncontrolled and powerful ones, in order to gradually take over everything that they could not fascist intervention and the collapse of the USSR.

We must not forget that we remain an object of the vital interests of the Western countries, as an appendage of raw materials and cheap labor. Therefore, “People, be vigilant!”, as Julius Fucik once called. It is known that the commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, General Guderian, during June 20-21, who studied Soviet territory through binoculars, wrote in his memoirs: “Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they suspect nothing of our intentions. The coastal fortifications of the Western Bug were not occupied by Russian troops. The prospects for maintaining the moment of surprise were so great that the question arose whether, under such circumstances, it was worthwhile to carry out artillery preparation for an hour, as provided for by the order". But this tactical surprise does not provide much advantage in such a large-scale war.

G.K. Zhukov speaks of another suddenness that determined the course and outcome of the initial period of the war. And he's right. He wrote: “What does surprise mean when we talk about actions of this magnitude. A sudden crossing of the border, a sudden attack, in itself, did not solve anything. The main surprise was that for us it turned out to be a surprise - their 6-8 times superiority in forces in decisive directions. For us, it turned out to be suddenness and the scale of the concentration of their troops, and the force of their blow. This is the main thing that predetermined our losses in the first period of the war. And he also says: “The German army at the beginning of the war was better than our army, better prepared, armed, psychologically it was more prepared for war. She had the experience of waging a modern war, and a victorious one at that. The German General Staff, the German headquarters then worked better than ours.

We learned during the war and learned, and began to beat the Germans, but it was a long process. And the troops in the initial period were unstable, not only retreated, but also fled, and fell into a panic. In the beginning, we fought poorly not only at the top, but also at the bottom.” The heavy losses of our troops in the initial period of the war are also explained by the fact that the Germans found a fertile foothold in the lands that had just been annexed to the USSR and paid agents of influence trained by them.

I, analyzing the situation that developed before the start of the Nazi invasion of our territory, I think, what would happen if I. Stalin, listening to the reports of his eminent commanders, gave permission to cover the border and concentrate troops in the border zone? It would have been even worse for us, there could have been much more losses, and then there would have been no one to offer stubborn resistance to the Nazis. And it would be very difficult to cover Moscow. Therefore, our real losses in the initial period of the war in that situation could not lead to defeat, since we retained our main forces, stretched their rear supply lines, and also made our sworn enemies think about their future - under the yoke of fascism, if they win.

The heroism of the bulk of the working people who tasted the charms of the Socialist Motherland and their selfless work, as well as the skillful use of the advantages of the socialist system and the contradictions in the camp of world imperialism by our government, led us to victory over fascism.

WAR FOR THE MIND...

Our patriotic leaders do not think about why, even having destroyed our Great Motherland, "our friends" continue to falsify our Heroic History? What is the ultimate goal of the deeply thought-out insidious work aimed at eradicating the spirit of patriotism, great friendship and brotherhood between our peoples from the consciousness of the former citizens of the Great Power? They understand that only when they achieve this will it be possible to unhinderedly carry out the task of fragmenting the post-Soviet territory into semi-developed, semi-colonial, conveniently exploited state entities. First of all, the territories of the Russian Federation, where 8 (eight) regional formations have already been formed, can be subjected to such fragmentation, which can make it easier for them to complete this task.

The territories of Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and other now sovereign states of the CIS may be subjected to fragmentation.

Where do the roots of this monstrous evil that shook our new world grow?

Let's remember the world economic, and not only economic, but, most likely, the socio-political world crisis of the 30s of the twentieth century. To what state has this world crisis - a satellite of the capitalist socio-political and economic system - put the world community?

This crisis led to the activation of ambitious individuals and the formation of totalitarian regimes, on the one hand, and on the other hand, as a counterbalance to this, the activation of the world communist movement. Here is the "Holodomor" within the USSR itself, and the end result - fascist regimes, the Second World War and the GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR against the rabid enemies of humanity, which ended in the Victory of our people thanks to the brotherhood and Great friendship and patriotism, love and selfless devotion of Soviet citizens to the high ideals of communism. But the "war" received a different continuation, because the goal set by the rulers of Great Britain and the United States, who claim to world domination, has not been fully achieved. And the goal was very simple, but very insidious and inhuman - by provoking a world bloody slaughter, to put an end to communism, and at the same time to competitors for world domination, fascist Germany and Japan. If in relation to Germany and Japan the goal was achieved, then in relation to communism and the USSR they miscalculated. And this despite the fact that they did everything, even providing “humanitarian” assistance, so that in a long, exhausting and bloody war we suffered as many losses as possible in able-bodied people, in the economy, and, especially, and most importantly, sought to undermine the faith of our citizens in communism and in their government.

And the second front was opened only in 1944 because the USSR could independently defeat Nazi Germany and liberate continental Europe from the yoke of fascism, and spread its communist ideology to the entire Old World without "allies". This would have crossed out the entire strategic plan of the organizers of this global provocation.

The USSR emerged from this bloody war not weakened, but militarily strengthened, not only possessing weapons and experience in modern warfare, but also gaining tremendous world authority and instilling faith in the billions of our planet in the communist future of mankind. Now the ghost of communism is haunting all the continents of our planet. And by the end of the 40s - the beginning of the 50s, he firmly settled in Latin America on the Island of Freedom - Cuba, in Asia in the Middle Kingdom, forming the PRC, on the Korean Peninsula, forming the DPRK, in Indochina, forming the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in Libya, Angola, Congo (Kinshasa) and in many countries that have received sovereignty from the colonial yoke of the imperialists. And the world's financial and economic tycoons could not reconcile themselves to such a situation in the world. Therefore, even before the end of the 2nd World War, anticipating its results, the US Secretary of State, the conductor of the foreign policy of these bigwigs, A. Dulles outlined a program of psychological warfare against the USSR. It will probably be useful for our citizens to know what and how they planned. Here is part of his keynote speech at the US Congress:

“The war will end, everything will somehow settle down, settle down. And we will throw everything we have - all the gold, all the material power to fool and fool people .... The human brain, the consciousness of people are capable of change. Having sowed chaos there, we will quietly replace their values with false ones and force them to believe in these false values. How? We will find our like-minded people, our allies in Russia itself. Episode after episode, the grandiose tragedy of the death of the most recalcitrant people, the final, irreversible extinction of its self-consciousness will be played out ....

From literature and art, for example, we will gradually erase their social essence, wean artists, we discourage them from engaging in depiction ...., the study of those processes that occur in the depths of the masses. Literature, theaters, cinema - everything will depict and glorify the basest human feelings .... We will in every possible way support and raise the so-called artists, who will plant and hammer into the human consciousness the cult of sex, violence, sadism, betrayal, in a word, any kind of immorality...

In government, we will create chaos and confusion. We will imperceptibly, but actively and constantly promote the tyranny of officials, bribe-takers, unscrupulousness. Bureaucracy and red tape will be elevated to virtue. Honesty and decency will be ridiculed and will not be needed by anyone, will turn into a relic of the past. Rudeness and arrogance, lies and deceit, drunkenness and drug addiction, animal fear of each other and shamelessness, betrayal ...

Nationalism and enmity among peoples, above all enmity and hatred for the Russian people – all this we will deftly and imperceptibly cultivate, all this will blossom into a double flower… And only a few, very few, will guess or even understand what is happening. But we will put such people in a helpless position, turn them into a laughingstock, find a way to slander them and declare them the dregs of society. We will uproot spiritual roots, vulgarize and destroy the foundations of spiritual morality. We will undermine the mores and moral foundations of the Russian people in this way, generation after generation. We will take on people from childhood, youthful years, we will place the main stake on youth, we will begin to corrupt, corrupt, corrupt it. We will make them cynics, vulgarities, cosmopolitans.”

The cited part of A. Dulles' keynote speech is impressive in that he sees the situation in Russia today in decades. However, this speech does not even hint at the practical methods of US action in this psychological warfare. In the struggle for public consciousness, the ideological sphere of the USSR was to become the main opponent of the United States. The best way to win is to invariably infiltrate it and make it work without arousing suspicion. The only way to act in this direction is to act under ultra-Marxist slogans, under the guise of boundless devotion to the party. Which was carried out by the corrupt ideologists of the CPSU, who were the fifth column of the West, the main striking force of the psychological war against the USSR. Having mastered the mass media, the most powerful weapon of mass destruction of modern times, they almost realized their inhuman program. Under the slogan of freedom and glasnost, they replicated only what denounces our past and present. I became convinced of this when I tried to convey to our citizens my position on the then discussed problems of our existence. The article “I am Soviet”, in which I considered citizenship, not nationality, to be a priority in our society. And he justified this by the fact that today there is no need to give any benefits, which, of course, were given to representatives of certain nationalities and nationalities, in order to somehow equalize in their social development. And also by the fact that those who hide their nationality, they do not disguise themselves as small nations, but disguise themselves as Russians or Ukrainians. And he believed that the most compelling argument was that all the nations of the world live in the USA and in their main identity document there is no “nationality” column, but there is “citizenship”. This article of mine was published only in our district newspaper "For the Glory of the Motherland", although it was also sent to the central newspapers. A very large article "Russian language and national pride" was published in the magazine "Communist" No. 13 for 1988 in a somewhat abridged form, and in "Turkmenskaya Iskra" - in full in two issues on the first basement page. In this article, I substantiated the urgent need for knowledge of the Russian language as a language of interethnic communication, a UN language and a language in the world of science and technology. Therefore, he believed that in all republics the state language should be Russian, equal to the indigenous national language. And such articles as “How to save the Soviet Union for us” and “Do we need such a number of false communists”, sent to all the central newspapers of the USSR, were not published in any of them. Again, only "Turkmenskaya Iskra" printed in full on the first page. As a result of my active pro-Soviet life position, I was seconded to the DPRK as the Chief Military Adviser - the senior group of Soviet military specialists, so that I could write letters from far away. And I wrote letters to corrupt agents, implementers of the treacherous program - M. Gorbachev and A. Yakovlev. But none of them answered any of my letters. That's what Glasnost was like.

And such activities as propaganda, intelligence, classical espionage, disinformation, elimination of objectionable patriotic leaders (car accidents) played an auxiliary role.

W. Churchill's speech in Fulton and Directive No. 20/1, approved on August 18, 1948 by the US National Security Council, "US Aims towards Russia", were the beginning of the Third World Information and Psychological War. This directive became the basis for actions in a war of a qualitatively new type, where “information”, that is, disinformation, serves as a weapon, and the struggle is for a purposeful change in public consciousness. The task was to introduce into the public consciousness such false ideas about the surrounding world that would allow them to further manipulate both the population of the country and its ruling elite.

In this war, the impact on the consciousness of people is carried out actively both from outside and from within the country, using agents of influence embedded in all the power and uncontrolled structures of the state, and moreover, it was the latter that played its role as the gravedigger of the Great Power. We know from the history of European events, for example, when the Civil War was going on in Spain in 1936-1939. and the four columns of General Franco were advancing on Madrid, then the main role in the fall of the cradle of the Spanish Revolution was played by agents embedded in the governing bodies of the revolution, and the supporters of the general in the city itself. This agency and Franco's supporters were popularly nicknamed the "Fifth Column".

The "Fifth Column" during the Second World War was called the fascist agents in various countries. The basis of the fifth column in the USSR before the Great Patriotic War and during it were "unfinished" people opposed to the socialist socio-political system. The basis of the fifth column in the post-war USSR was made up of people introduced by our “well-wishers” into the ideological sphere, which directly influenced public consciousness. After the aforementioned directive of the US National Security Council and the corresponding financial injections, after 1948 and the “death” of I. Stalin, they occupy a dominant position. If they had not removed I. Stalin, who enjoyed the boundless love of not only the Soviet people, not only the peoples of liberated Europe, but also the peoples of the former colonies who gained freedom and sovereignty thanks to our Great Victory, then the implementation of the directive of the US National Security Council would have been impossible. After all, under I. Stalin, after just 3 years, the card system was canceled, and every year in March-April, prices for consumer goods were reduced. The country developed by leaps and bounds, increasing the Gross Domestic Product by 25-28% annually.

The younger generation does not know that in grocery stores in one corner there was a barrel of black caviar, and in the other corner with red caviar, and the sellers with the help of a scoop took it out to let the buyers go. Someone will think, probably, it was expensive - no. Even as a student, it was available to me. But I loved the cod liver in oil, which cost only 48 kopecks. A can of cod liver and half a loaf of bread ensured satiety for the whole day. And the fact that in 1951 gray bread in workers' canteens was free of charge and was served on dining tables along with spices is probably forgotten by many, but our youth does not know. After all, anyone could go into the dining room, buy tea for 3 kopecks, anoint bread with mustard, sprinkle with salt and satisfy hunger. After only 5-6 years, there were no more beggars in the country.

Such a situation in the USSR and the emerging socio-political situation in the world did not suit the world rulers in any way. It was necessary to take decisive action to stop the victorious approach of communism across our planet. What to do? Eternal question. And that's what! Provoke a war between North and South Korea and hand over Communist North Korea to the world community as the aggressor. Thus discredit the Communist regime. The idea was very carefully developed. Accusing North Korea of aggression, get the sanction of the UN Security Council, put together an international military coalition "to curb the aggressor." The military contingent of 15 states, the basis of which was the US armed forces, under the command of General MacArthur, began to implement the insidious plan of this world provocation of the 20th century during the lifetime of I.V. Stalin.

The troops of North Korea, almost without resistance from the South Korean troops and the population, almost completely liberated South Korea from the American invaders, stretched their troops throughout South Korea. The North Koreans already believed that victory had been achieved with little bloodshed. They failed to organize a blockade of this Busan bridgehead. And of course, having military-technical superiority, the coalition troops landed on the bridgehead, in the area of the large port city of Pusan, held by the Americans. They, not meeting the organized resistance of the troops of North Korea, since they were scattered throughout South Korea, reached the border of the PRC.

It was then that the Commander-in-Chief of the Coalition Forces, General MacArthur, like a soldier, gave out the main secret of this worldwide provocation, stating: "Finally, the most convenient moment has come, if the Soviet Union intervenes in this war, to destroy it with an atomic bomb, accusing it of aggression." The Soviet Union, having tested its atomic bomb only in 1949, understood what direct intervention in this provocative war unleashed by the imperialists could lead to. Although our planes, piloted by Li Xi Qing, showed the Americans "Kuzkin's mother", shooting down their planes in a ratio of 4: 1 in our favor, which had a sobering effect on the pretenders to world domination. And then there's the inexhaustible strength of the Chinese volunteers convinced them of the failure of this global provocation and agree to the status quo on the 38th parallel.

They were convinced that during the life of I.V. Stalin, all their provocations were doomed to failure. Therefore, the task was set - to eliminate the Leader of the World Communist and Labor Movement. That is, to decapitate Communism, liquidating I.V. Stalin, an epoch-making personality who enjoyed great prestige in the world community. And entrust this to his immediate environment. I remember how the "Voice of Freedom" broadcast: "The era of Stalin is over, the era of D. Eisenhower is beginning." Systematically and carefully, so that God forbid the masses would not guess, after 65 years, following the directive of the US National Security Council, we have created beggars in the post-Soviet space.

Who is guilty? Ask you, dear readers. The answer to this question is easy on the one hand and very difficult on the other. First, our undoubted faith in the printed word, radio and television is to blame. Faith in your Government, in your civil servants and bosses, faith in their honesty and infallibility. Our "friends" managed to make the most of our mentality.

It is very difficult because it is difficult to believe that such a Great Power, representing a new earthly civilization, could be destroyed overnight without a single shot with the help of paper printed around the clock, turned into a world currency.

The main weapon of mass destruction in this war turned out to be the mass media, which were skillfully led by corrupt agents of influence. After the elimination of I. Stalin, the leading part of the ideological sphere of the USSR, consciously, planned and well led from across the ocean, participated in the struggle against our country. Already in 1990, at the final stage of the information war, all the actions of the media were clearly coordinated, strictly programmed and aimed at completing the defeat of our Great Motherland.

Remember how often various so-called political scientists from the screen, almost all television channels broadcast that there is no influence of external forces in everything that happens in our country. This is so that, God forbid, we do not guess who is conducting this process. It was said that the socialist system had objectively exhausted itself. This is absurd. Humanity will return to the socialist system, because the capitalist system will lead the world to a general socio-political and economic catastrophe. The financial and economic crisis of the thirties of the twentieth century and the current confirmation of this. And the USSR was the only self-sufficient state in the world. In our Great Motherland, without leaving its borders, it was possible to swim in the sea in winter and ski in summer. There is nothing to say about the riches of our land. The entire periodic table was available in abundance.

Head of the Government of the USSR N.I. Ryzhkov complains in his memoirs: “How difficult the path of an honest policy is in a country where entire sections of the people have not been taught and even weaned to think independently on issues of economics, politics, and ideology. How many more people are unable to see historical falsity, theoretical squalor, undisguised populism behind a bright verbal wrapper! I don’t blame anyone for this intellectual infantilism, but I just think how much work society still has to put in to educate generations that no one, no political thimble-makers will be able to deceive and lead them nowhere, into the abyss.”

But after all, in a total, carefully programmed information war, not only ordinary people, but also quite educated, morally stable intellectuals become victims. By the end of the 1980s, the country was brought to the brink of destruction. I and many people had a premonition of an impending tragedy, but we were powerless to prevent it, to organize a rebuff, since all the media ended up in the hands of traitors to the Motherland well-funded from abroad. We were also powerless because we did not know about the insidious methods and means of manipulating the public consciousness and could not adequately assess the situation and strongly protest. In the final stage, a powerful concentration of means of influencing society was used. Empty shelves in grocery stores, while everything in warehouses is rotten, mountains of spoiled sausage thrown out in the forest, a coupon system for supplying the population with consumer goods, and so on. It's just that the country was brought to a nightmarish state, so that at the X-hour the people would not be outraged. And the fact that during the national referendum more than 80% of the Soviet people voted for the preservation of the USSR, no longer had any legal force. This was not only an informational, but also an economic war, which we lost.

All evil spirits from almost all over Europe greedily rushed to tear the Soviet land to pieces, to expand their "living space".

Well, let's face it, a letter from "a bosom and faithful friend", or rather, Judas!

Of course, what a hello, this should be the answer so that the opponent has no doubt that they believed him. That is a boomerang.

WAR FOR THE MIND...

The territories of Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and other now sovereign states of the CIS may be subjected to fragmentation.

Where do the roots of this monstrous evil that shook our new world grow?

And such activities as propaganda, intelligence, classical espionage, disinformation, elimination of objectionable patriotic leaders (car accidents) played an auxiliary role.

Accession of Western Ukraine to the USSR

Back in 1939, no one could have imagined that, by annexing Western Ukraine to the USSR, the then Soviet leaders with their own hands rolled a kind of “Trojan horse” onto the then common territory for all of us - the territory of Russian-Ukrainian statehood.
The Soviet leadership, when deciding to include a region that was absolutely alien in social and historical terms to the USSR, did not at all take into account all the complexity and all the features of the military-political situation that had developed at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Galicia.
Probably, the large-scale military-diplomatic events of the autumn of 1939 were not noticed by the Soviet leaders at that time of their strategic miscalculation, which manifested itself only decades later in the future of the 21st century. However, blaming the same Stalin for annexing new lands to his country is also not true, since any state never has extra lands.
But the implementation of Sovietization, and even on the eve of the start of the world war in a troubled, border region, was, of course, one of the most serious mistakes of the country of the Soviets. Although the Soviet secret services then worked quite effectively and the leadership of the USSR was probably very well informed about what was happening in the cities and villages of pre-war Galicia, and, nevertheless, stubbornly continued Sovietization right up to the very beginning of the war.
Pavel Sudoplatov, a well-known veteran of the Soviet special services, described the situation in Western Ukraine in 1939 in his memoirs:
“Galicia has always been a stronghold of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, supported by such leaders as Hitler and Canaris in Germany, Beneš in Czechoslovakia and Austrian Federal Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss. The capital of Galicia, Lvov, became the center where refugees from Poland fled from the German occupation troops flocked. Polish intelligence and counterintelligence transported to Lvov all their most important prisoners - those who were suspected of playing a double game during the German-Polish confrontation in the 1930s.

I learned about what was going on in Galicia only in October 1939, when the Red Army occupied Lvov. The first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Khrushchev, and his People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Serov, went there to carry out a campaign of Sovietization of Western Ukraine on the spot. My wife was sent to Lvov together with Pavel Zhuravlev, the head of the German branch of our intelligence. I was worried: her unit dealt with German agents and underground organizations of Ukrainian nationalists, and in Lvov the atmosphere was strikingly different from the state of affairs in the Soviet part of Ukraine.
In Lvov, the Western capitalist way of life flourished: wholesale and retail trade was in the hands of private traders, who were soon to be liquidated during the Sovietization. The Ukrainian Uniate Church enjoyed great influence, the local population supported the organization of Ukrainian nationalists, headed by Bandera's people. According to our information, the OUN acted very actively and had significant forces at its disposal. In addition, she had rich experience in underground activities, which, alas, Serov's "team" did not have.
The counterintelligence service of Ukrainian nationalists was able to quite quickly track down some safe houses of the NKVD in Lvov. The method of their surveillance was extremely simple; they started it near the building of the city department of the NKVD and accompanied everyone who came out of there in civilian clothes and in boots, which betrayed him as a military man: Ukrainian Chekists, hiding their uniforms under their coats, forgot such a “trifle” as shoes. They apparently did not take into account that in Western Ukraine only the military wore boots. However, how could they know about this when in the Soviet part of Ukraine everyone wore boots, since it was simply impossible to get other shoes.”
The fact that the OUN was a very serious opponent was evidenced by the example of the same bourgeois Poland, where in the 20-30s Ukrainian nationalists quite actively fought against Polish domination in Galicia, and not only through propaganda, but also with the help of terror, they were able to even get to one of the key ministers of the Polish government, Minister of the Interior B. Peratsky, who was the initiator of the creation of concentration camps in the country and a supporter of decisive measures against Ukrainian nationalists, in 1934 Peratsky was killed during a terrorist attack. This attempt was organized by Stepan Bandera, who in 1936, together with the direct perpetrators, was sentenced to death, later commuted to life imprisonment.
We must pay tribute to the Soviet secret services, which, long before entering the territory of Galicia, monitored the activities of the OUN and even carried out short and effective special operations directly against the leaders of the Western Ukrainian nationalists themselves, the NKVD seemed to have a premonition that the fight against Ukrainian nationalists would be long and bloody.
Yes, back in 1938. NKVD officer Pavel Sudoplatov destroyed the then head of the OUN, the former commander of the Sich Riflemen corps Yevgeny Konovalets.
Soon after unification with the USSR, the nationalists realized that Soviet Ukraine was not their ideal of Ukrainian statehood and that they were not on the path with the Soviets.
As a result, with the start of the war, the USSR got its opponents, in addition to the German Wehrmacht, also an entire rebel army represented by the OUN, and all this in the strategically important southwestern direction, where Galicia, together with Transcarpathia, was the gateway to the southern regions of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic and further to the southern part of Germany.

The soldiers are considering trophies captured in battles in Western Ukraine.

The population of Lvov welcomes the troops of the Red Army, who entered the city.

A group of delegates from the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine at the city theater.

Smersh vs Abwehr. Secret operations and legendary scouts Maxim Zhmakin

Chapter 1. The situation on the eve of the Great Patriotic War

Chapter 1. The situation on the eve of the Great Patriotic War

For several decades now, many historians have suggested that the German attack on the USSR in June 1941 was not so unexpected. It is assumed that the Soviet leadership had all the necessary information about the upcoming event, including the exact date of the start of the offensive and the direction of the strikes. The study of historical documents allows us to clarify this burning issue. Not much is known about the work of the intelligence agencies of the Soviet Union, and some issues still remain a mystery. It is alleged that intelligence was significantly weakened by Stalin's repressions before the war, but this did not prevent it from obtaining valuable information about the general intentions of Germany and preparations for war with the USSR. JV Stalin preferred not to rely on information from intelligence officers, trusting A. Hitler and the non-aggression pact, and wanted to delay the war as long as possible. Therefore, he tried not to provoke Germany.

Allegedly for this reason, the Soviet leadership could not correctly determine the timing of the proposed invasion, which is why the tragedy of 1941 happened. At the same time, the many-voiced choir of researchers unanimously lays the blame on Stalin, who did not pay such important reports worthy of attention. We think that not everything is so clear. Only a few are wondering why, in fact, he acted the way he did. The answer has always been determined by political conjuncture. So, during the Khrushchev "thaw" during the implementation of measures to debunk the personality cult of Stalin, the blame was completely placed on him. Under L. I. Brezhnev, they recalled the inconsistency of intelligence data that disorientated the supreme commander in chief. Surprisingly, so far many aspects of the general history of Soviet intelligence remain in the shadows, while numerous works are focused on individual intelligence officers or episodes of intelligence activities.

Judging by official documents, at least 5 departments were responsible for intelligence in the Soviet Union: the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO), the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD, since February 1941 - the People's Commissariat of State Security - NKGB), the People's Commissariat of the Navy (NK VMF) , the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) and the Comintern. The founding date of military intelligence is considered to be 1918. Since 1939, it has been included in the 5th department of the People's Commissariat of Defense. On July 26, 1940, military intelligence, as the Intelligence Directorate, was included in the General Staff. It was headed by Lieutenant-General F.I. Golikov, who at the same time was Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

The organizational foundations of the intelligence service of the NKVD, formed in 1920, changed several times over 19 years. Since the summer of 1939, it became the 5th department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD under the leadership of P. M. Fitin. Since February 1941, the department has become the 1st Directorate of the NKGB. Reconnaissance on the water was carried out by the 1st Directorate of the NK Navy under the leadership of Rear Admiral N.I. Zuykov, which before the war merged into the structure of the Main Naval Staff.

The topic of a significant weakening of intelligence after the repressions of 1937-1938. very popular, but not well researched. The high-ranking Soviet intelligence officer P. A. Sudoplatov wrote in his memoirs that, despite the tangible damage caused to intelligence as a result of the elimination of many experienced personnel, connections with agents for the most part were not lost, and in subsequent times only expanded. During the years of repression, the volume of incoming intelligence decreased sharply, but the situation soon recovered. True, it is not known at what level. Most likely, the repressions turned out to be the most destructive for the fate of illegal agents abroad, many of whom were forced to return to Moscow, where they were repressed. As for the central intelligence apparatus, it is unlikely that it will be possible to assess the consequences of repressions for it, since the necessary documents are missing.

Radio intelligence work was of great importance. In the 1930s a joint radio intelligence unit worked under the NKVD and the NKO, but in the fall of 1938 it was disbanded. Radio intelligence specialists of the NKVD intercepted and deciphered the diplomatic documentation of foreign embassies. At the beginning of 1941, a group of these specialists became part of the 5th Directorate of the NKGB, responsible for deciphering activities. Her impressive achievement can be considered the decipherment of Japanese diplomatic codes.

Even before the war, there was a corresponding unit in military intelligence. On October 4, 1939, four OSNAZ radio divisions became part of the Ukrainian Front. They were engaged in radio interception on the territory of southern Poland. In the same autumn, a reconnaissance post of the 363rd OSNAZ radio division appeared in Lithuania on the Belorussian front. His tasks were radio interceptions from the territories of East Prussia and the northeast of Warsaw. Other border districts were also equipped with similar radio divisions, which later became the corresponding fronts. In total, by the beginning of the war, there were 16 OSNAZ radio divisions. In addition, 6 radio divisions and a radio regiment were under the main command. Little is known about these units, since documents about their activities have not been published. They were engaged in radio intercepts, direction finding of the headquarters of the enemy troops, wiretapping and creating radio interference in the border zone. The leadership was carried out by the Intelligence Directorate, whose departments were located in each military district.

Recently, the available historical materials have been selected by researchers somewhat one-sidedly: intelligence, they say, worked well, the leadership had all the information, but allowed the war. Thus, they are trying to shift all the blame onto Stalin, while deliberately forgetting that at the time the data was received, the situation was not unambiguous. Sudoplatov noted on this occasion that the leadership made a mistake in assessing intelligence information, but first it would be worthwhile to deal with its content. Just from the point of view of the actual value and accuracy of the reports, serious studies have not been carried out, and the selective study of individual intelligence materials only distorts the overall picture. In addition, it happened that published historical materials contradicted reality and each other. In order to make an objective conclusion about the pre-war situation, it is necessary to assess the reliability of intelligence data.

Quite often it is said that Stalin knew about the plan "Barbarossa" (invasion of the USSR) only a week after A.

Hitler on December 18, 1940 In fact, everything is somewhat more complicated. On December 29, 1940, the Soviet military attache in Berlin, Major General V. I. Tupikov, reported to Moscow about Germany's preparations for the war with the USSR, which would begin in March 1941. He insisted that the information needed to be further verified. On January 4, 1941, after verification, the previously received data were confirmed on the basis of some special order from Hitler, which the source of the message did not personally see. In addition, the attack plan was postponed to a later date - the spring of 1941.

Without detracting from the significant merits of the intelligence officers, it should be noted that the data presented are inaccurate, and the results of the verification turned out to be disinformation. The order to prepare for an armed conflict with the USSR appeared in June-July 1940, while in December Hitler signed the strategic plan for the war. In general, it can be argued that Soviet intelligence provided the leadership of the USSR with information about some decision that was directly related to the Soviet Union, but it was not possible to find out the details.

Between June 1940 and June 1941, military intelligence provided the military and political leadership of the USSR with over 300 reports. They contained information about Germany's active preparations for war with the Soviet Union.

Based on the available historical documents, it cannot be concluded that Soviet intelligence revealed the political and military intentions of the German command. Data on the directions of advance were contradictory and sometimes unreliable. Since the Germans were going to strike the main blow through Belarus, they deliberately spread false information about the upcoming strike against Ukraine or the Baltic states. Also, intelligence was not aware of the exact nature of the hostilities. In the minds of the Soviet command, the idea of \u200b\u200bthe upcoming protracted war prevailed, but, as it turned out, Hitler was planning a blitzkrieg. Intelligence supported precisely the erroneous version.

The main tasks of reconnaissance before the war were to obtain information about the military preparations of Germany, the pulling of troops to the borders of the Soviet Union and the quantitative assessment of enemy groupings. Recently, materials have been published on which one can judge the results of this work.

First of all, it should be noted that all quantitative data on the military potential of the enemy were significantly overestimated. For example, intelligence reported that by the end of 1938 the enemy was armed with

7300 tanks and 5160 aircraft. In fact, by September 1, 1939, the Germans had only 3474 tanks and 4288 aircraft. The initially inflated information taken as a basis further increased even more: by October 1939, German aviation was "replenished" with 340-400 aircraft (as a result - 5500-6000), which actually by that time was 4756. But at the same time, the production capacity of the aviation industry the enemy were underestimated: if in 1939 they were supposed to be at the level of 330350 aircraft per month, then in reality they amounted to 690.

In March 1940, new information was obtained. On September 1, 1939, 13,900 aircraft were counted. This number remained until the summer of 1940, since it was assumed that the industry would make up for the loss of 600,700 aircraft every month. In fact, by May 1, 1940, the enemy had more than 2 times fewer aircraft (5895), but the industry in 1940 produced an average of 902 aircraft per month. The estimates of the Intelligence Directorate on the pace of German aircraft construction "came true" in 1943, and on tanks - in 1944.

Estimates of the German army manpower were also overestimated. Successful German military campaigns in Europe and Scandinavia were seen as factors influencing the valuation upwards. Summary data are presented in Table 1 (the actual position is marked in brackets).

Table 1. Estimates of the number of German troops

As of March 1, 1941, the German armed forces were estimated at 8,000,000 men, 12,000 tanks, more than 52,000 guns, and 20,700 aircraft. In reality, these figures were less: the number of combat personnel was 6,954,000 people, there were 5,008 tanks, 33,189 guns, and 5,259 aircraft.

Beginning in October 1939, Soviet intelligence focused on identifying German formations near our borders. As it turned out, after the completion of the active phase of military operations in Poland, the German troops turned west. Since intelligence data on the quantitative estimates of the German forces in the east in the autumn of 1939 - winter 1940 were not published, it is not possible to assess the effectiveness of the work of the intelligence officers. In March 1940, it was assumed that 32 German divisions were in Poland and East Prussia. In fact, there were 10 divisions. At the end of May 1940, 20 infantry and 2 tank divisions were identified, despite the fact that there were actually 7 infantry divisions. Intelligence data correctly testified to the fact that army units were moving from east to west, but the quantitative estimate was significantly overestimated. The same thing happened with the subsequent transfer of troops from west to east by the end of the summer of 1940. 30–40 divisions were indicated, while in reality there were only 15.

In the submitted documents with intelligence reports, there are no concerns about the redeployment of German troops. This is also explained by the fact that on July 9, 1940, the German military attache in Moscow, E. Köstring, informed the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army about the planned activities.

The documents contain inconsistencies in various estimates of the number of German troops in the east. Intelligence of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs reported that by July 16, 1940, the Germans had 40 infantry and 2 tank divisions, while the Intelligence Department of the headquarters of the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO) counted 28 infantry divisions. A week later, the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO) reported 50 infantry divisions, 2 tank brigades and 2 tank regiments, the intelligence of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs - about 50 infantry and 4 tank divisions, and the Intelligence Department of the headquarters of the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO)

About 40 infantry divisions and 5 tank brigades. What is the reason for such disagreements and what was their influence on the overall assessment of the German grouping in the east, has not been clarified.

At that time, the German army in the east was achieving defensive goals and preparing the terrain for a future war in engineering terms. Soviet intelligence monitored this activity, but did not give any alarms, as they assumed that the defenses in the territory east of the Vistula were outdated and partially destroyed during the First World War. Therefore, the actions of the Germans to strengthen the defensive lines were perceived quite calmly (Tables 2, 3).

Table 2. The total number of German units on the border with the USSR

Table 3. The total number of German units in the areas

On November 6, 1940, the intelligence of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs reported that since the beginning of October the number of German troops near the borders of the Soviet Union had decreased, as some units were transferred to Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. A similar conclusion was issued by the intelligence headquarters of the KOVO. Very little is known about data from November 1940 to March 1941. In addition, there is no way to compare them with the real state of affairs. There is information from April 1941 until the start of the war. The increase by the Germans of the eastern grouping by 6 infantry and 3 tank divisions was revealed by Soviet intelligence in February - March 1941. In reality, 7 infantry divisions were added, and their total number by March was 33. In mid-April, the Intelligence Directorate announced the replenishment of the group in East Prussia and Poland 3 infantry and 2 motorized divisions. As a result, the total number of divisions increased to 78. And again, intelligence, having determined the fact of the transfer, made a mistake in the details. There were 52 divisions in total. Intelligence recorded in the east since the beginning of the year (January-April) the arrival of 6,995 wagons of ammunition and 993 wagons of fuel.

Soviet intelligence overestimated the capabilities of the enemy. The Germans, on the contrary, underestimated the Soviet potential. In the first year of the war, 3 unpleasant moments were highlighted that contradicted the data of German intelligence: its underestimation of the number of Soviet troops, the effectiveness of their anti-aircraft artillery, the possibility of a quick recovery of forces after the devastating campaigns of the summer of 1941

The conclusions made by the Intelligence Directorate on the basis of information about the regrouping of German troops in late April - early May 1941, in principle, corresponded to reality. So, on May 5, it was reported that the essence of the redeployment of German troops was to strengthen the grouping against the USSR along its western and southwestern borders, including in Romania and Finland, to develop the success of the African campaign against Great Britain, to support the Nazi military contingent in Scandinavia, in order to if necessary, to speak from the territory of Norway against Great Britain, Sweden and the Soviet Union.

As of April 25, Soviet intelligence counted 95-100 divisions in the eastern German grouping, and ten days later - 103-107. Noting the strengthening of the troops, the Intelligence Directorate, first of all, expected the active activity of Germany in the Middle East, and not the invasion of the USSR. Intelligence reported that Germany had approximately 9 parachute divisions. However, this was Nazi disinformation in order to convince the USSR of its intention to use aviation against England. In fact, the German group was equipped with only 1 airborne and 1 infantry (air landing) divisions. However, the main conclusion of the Intelligence Directorate remained true: Germany continues to build up its forces on the border with the Soviet Union.

By June 1, 1941, the Intelligence Directorate summed up: the transfer of German troops was mostly completed, 120-122 divisions were deployed against the Soviet Union, with 44-48 spares in Germany itself, 122-126 were deployed against Great Britain. It was assumed that the headquarters of 2 army groups and 6 armies were located near the borders of the Soviet Union, which was not entirely correct. In fact, there were 3 army group headquarters, 7 army headquarters, and 3 tank group headquarters. On June 4, this message was in production, and on June 23 it was signed for printing in the office. An approximate match between the estimated and actual number of German troops was discovered only on June 21, when Germany allocated the appropriate grouping for the invasion: 3 army groups, 7 armies and 4 tank groups - 123 divisions, 2 brigades and 1 infantry regiment, as well as 4 divisions in Northern Norway .

In addition, there are quite revealing documents of Soviet military planning, which estimated the expected number of German troops for the war with the Soviet Union. For example, in July and September 1940, it was noted that Germany would put forward about 173 divisions, then in March 1941 this estimate increased to 200 divisions, and in May fell to 180. In any case, such calculations turned out to be too high, so they based on the incorrect conclusion that preparations for war would continue for a long time. The intelligence department calculated that 41.6% of German divisions were concentrated against the USSR, which is 1% less than even against Great Britain. Based on this information, it was impossible to speak about the completion of the preparatory phase. In reality, as of June 21, 62% of the Wehrmacht divisions were concentrated against the Soviet Union.

As a result, Soviet intelligence was unable to provide the country's leadership with reliable information about the composition of the German armed forces and their eastern grouping, which made it difficult to adequately assess the threat to the country.

In the intelligence of our western border military districts before the war, there was an acute shortage of trained personnel; local residents had to be involved in the work, who did not have access to important information, whose messages reached the addressee late, because they were sent by couriers. In addition, agents were not trained to work in conditions of war and sabotage, because it was believed that it would take place on foreign territory. German counterintelligence managed to limit the leakage of information as much as possible through tight control at the border.

On the Soviet side, air reconnaissance was carried out by 10 reconnaissance aviation regiments consisting of 157 aircraft. The effectiveness of this type of reconnaissance was low due to the lack of photographic equipment and qualified personnel. Only in May 1941 was it planned to replenish the air regiments with specialists and aircraft by mid-summer. The return on military and radio intelligence without experienced professionals was negligible. Only from May 24, 1941, undercover reconnaissance of the border troops purposefully began to work on tracking Germany's preparations for a war against the Soviet Union. The interaction between various types of intelligence and departments, along with the mutual exchange of information, was poorly organized. Since agents were not introduced into the headquarters of the enemy, Germany's plans remained unknown. It got to the point that the Soviets did not know anything even when, on June 18, the German military authorities informed the command staff of each company about the impending attack. The effectiveness of border intelligence was low, and the information was contradictory. Because of what, the higher command could not clearly see the whole situation as a whole and draw the appropriate conclusions. Often the district headquarters did not know anything at all about the German groups, so what happened during the surprise invasion took place.

Despite the fact that, on the whole, the information transmitted by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the border districts was correct, due to their inconsistency and the lack of organization of interaction between the intelligence services, the higher headquarters had a poor idea of the overall picture. For example, on June 21, 1941, the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District reported that German troops were being concentrated near the border of the USSR and in the regions of East Prussia. According to the information of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the ZapOVO from the same number, the enemy grouping was determined in 45–46 divisions. It was noted that the enemy in the zone against the ZapOVO had taken its initial position and that forces and means were being increased in all directions. The intelligence department of the headquarters of the KOVO testified the day before that the movement of German troops to the border of the Soviet Union was confirmed by various sources.

However, incorrect assessments of the enemy led to well-known results, which can be clearly seen from the unsuccessful military operations of the Southwestern and Southern fronts, whose forces outnumbered the German groupings in these directions. The fact that the Germans were accumulating forces near the border was noticed by the intelligence of the Southwestern Front, but they could not determine the main grouping, so the fighting was unsuccessful. In addition, it was not possible to accurately establish the total number of the enemy contingent, which did not allow a correct assessment of the potential danger. For the Southern Front, the consequences of unreliable intelligence data were even worse. As of July 2, 1941, the number of German troops was estimated at 9 - 10 divisions, while in fact there were 5 infantry divisions and 5 brigades. The number of expected enemy tanks was generally determined to be prohibitive (900-960) in comparison with reality (60). As a result, the conclusion about the direction of the enemy's strike turned out to be incorrect, and an overestimation of the enemy forces led to a logical decision to withdraw Soviet troops to the Dniester. It was intelligence that was to blame for the rather low effectiveness of the actions of the Southern Front, which distorted the real picture more than clarified it.

Many authors, in confirmation of the fact that the Soviet leadership knew in advance about the invasion, cite information from the sources of the Starshina and Korsikanets. From Berlin, they provided Soviet intelligence with comprehensive and reliable information about Germany's military preparations. There are many interesting and valuable details in these reports. However, the people who acted as sources did not have access to secret documents: their information was contradictory regarding the main issue - the timing of the attack. For this reason, other information was perceived critically.

The topic of whether Soviet intelligence provided all the necessary information to the country's top leadership, which for some reason did not heed the warnings, is the most debatable. Over the course of many decades, many historians, former and current employees of intelligence structures have broken copies of it.

In a report dated March 20, 1941, Starshina pointed to the fact that Germany was preparing for a war with the Soviet Union, but immediately noted that the chances of a real invasion were 50/50, or it would turn out to be a bluff. Sources assumed that on April 14, 1941, after the defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece, Germany would issue an ultimatum to the Soviet Union. On April 24, it was reported that the Germans had reoriented from the USSR to the Middle East. On April 30, it was reported that the war would begin precisely with the USSR. On May 1, information appeared about the upcoming ultimatum of the German leadership, which wanted to free its hands for operations in the Middle East. On May 11, it was reported that before the ultimatum, Germany would try to demoralize the USSR with the help of a “war of nerves”. On May 14, it became clear that the attack on the USSR had been postponed. On June 9 news of the ultimatum resurfaced, as did the decision to delay the attack on the Soviets until the middle of the month. But already on June 11, a report arrived that the decision had been made, and on June 16, Germany allegedly turned out to be completely ready for an attack. Stalin imposed a very irritated resolution on such a leapfrog of opinions, advising the People's Commissar of State Security V.N. Merkulov to send the source away (in obscene terms) and calling him not a source, but a disinformer. Today we can already confidently say that the last reports of June 11 and June 16, 1941 contained the most important information, but then these reports, given their previous inconsistency, did not look convincing.

Moreover, in the intelligence reports of the NKGB until the German invasion, there were no conclusions about the immediate threat of war. Like military intelligence, NKGB intelligence correctly identified that Germany was building up forces, but the purpose of this remained unknown.

Here we must pay tribute to the effectiveness of the German counterintelligence, which, by order of the command, tried in every possible way to hide military preparations in the east, for which constant and targeted disinformation was carried out through all available channels. For example, on September 6, 1940, German counterintelligence and intelligence were instructed to act in such a way as to convince Russia of the presence of strong German groups in the east and, accordingly, mask the real number of troops. They were tasked with spreading rumors at every opportunity about the active replacement of army units, creating the illusion of the direction of the main attack to the south and a low concentration of troops in the north, as well as an overestimated number and better condition of military formations, especially tank ones. On February 15, 1941, a directive from the German leadership appeared, according to which public opinion was to be kept in the dark about the real plans of Germany until April. The main method of disinformation was to focus on the alleged invasion of England, as well as on minor operations.

On May 12, 1941, the 2nd stage of disinformation began, and on May 22, the intensity of the movement of echelons to the east increased. All this was presented as a maneuver to cover the attack on England. The Germans carefully ensured that the troops did not learn ahead of time about the real intentions of the leadership. A rumor was started about the transfer of troops to the west. Moreover, the activities of the Germans in the Balkans, the capture of Crete, the victorious march of the tank corps of E. Rommel in Libya, the activation of agents in Iraq, Syria and Iran served as quite convincing evidence of Germany's aggressive plans for the Middle East. Nobody in the West doubted this. Especially the British, who wondered tensely when and from where the British troops in this region would be attacked. The leaders of the Western countries believed that Germany, at least in the first half of 1941, would not attack the USSR. The political leadership of the Soviet Union also fell into the trap of German disinformation. The main responsibility for this lies with Soviet intelligence, which failed to fully and definitely recognize the real intentions of Germany (no one removes the blame from the political leadership, but strictly in the context of the topic of this chapter, it should be noted that politicians, by the nature of their activities, usually do not have professional the skills of information analysis, and even more so - the assessment of its reliability). However, not a single intelligence service in the world could do this.

Germany by any means tried to spread the version that the armed conflict by the Soviets was a last resort for her. Ultimate negotiations were proclaimed as priority. For this reason, information about the ultimatum from April 1941 was available in most intelligence reports coming from different countries and sources. In the political and intelligence circles of the Soviet Union, there were numerous rumors about the expected or ongoing negotiations between the 2 countries. The USSR even tried to initiate them in the second half of June.

The Soviet leadership was well aware of the inevitability of war with Germany, but believed that its beginning would be connected with the results of Soviet-German negotiations and with the end of the Anglo-German war. From the intelligence reports it followed that Germany would go on a campaign to the east only after the solution of the English question either by defeat or by the conclusion of peace, and that she would not fight on 2 fronts. Stalin definitely did not believe in the latter either.

In such a situation, Soviet intelligence was especially actively interested in possible contacts between Germany and Britain and the United States. A serious danger was the possibility of an Anglo-German conspiracy. Besides, there were good reasons for that. For example, the flight of the Deputy Fuhrer for the party R. Hess by plane to England in May 1941 looked very suspicious. According to intelligence officers, this could just be an attempt at conspiracy, although England tried to keep everything a secret. Most likely, in this way she tried to put pressure on the USSR in order to involve him in the war with Germany.

In the twentieth of May 1941, intelligence reported that negotiations with Hess were continuing. On the other hand, according to the information of the British residency, a new attempt at an Anglo-German conspiracy failed. Given these conflicting reports, and confident that Germany would not attack the USSR until the potential threat from the northwest was eliminated, Stalin probably no longer heeded the "warnings." It is still not entirely clear how detailed the Soviet leadership was aware of Hess's mission. Be that as it may, Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov believed that because of his flight and the threat of the Anglo-German alliance, Soviet military offensive preparations were slowed down. The study of the German military archives makes it possible to clarify curious points related to the activities of Soviet intelligence to disinform Germany. First of all, this is a purposeful demonstration of Soviet peacefulness and readiness for mutually beneficial economic ties. To explain the military preparations, the version of the split that existed between the political and military leadership of the USSR over relations with Germany was brought to the German leadership. Allegedly, under pressure from the military, Stalin was forced to take certain military actions. In order for part of the German troops to withdraw from southern Poland, a rumor was spread about the concentration of the main groupings of the Soviet army against East Prussia. The Soviet Union also tried to misinform the enemy with incorrect and outdated military plans. In addition, Germany was inspired by the idea that the concentration of its troops in Eastern Europe causes anti-German sentiments in Soviet society and leadership, while Stalin positioned himself as a pro-German leader.

In the spring of 1941, warning rumors were launched about the preparation of the Soviet air force for raids on Berlin in the event of a German attack, about the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In order to persuade Germany to negotiate, the danger of war with the Soviet Union was emphasized in every possible way, especially on 2 fronts.

As a veteran of Soviet intelligence, Lieutenant General M. A Milshtein, noted, “the main difficulty of our intelligence was not to obtain information, but to make the political and military leadership believe in it.”

Unfortunately, Soviet disinformation was not very effective due to the fact that Hitler usually received only information that corresponded to his ideas about the Soviet Union as a "colossus with feet of clay." Therefore, the German leadership counted on quick victories and did not imagine that the march to the east would be so difficult. Soviet intelligence was especially successful in misinforming the enemy in terms of misleading him about the real number of our armed formations. Summary tables on this issue are presented below, the numbers in brackets are the actual number (Tables 4, 5).

Table 4. Estimated size of the Red Army

Table 5. Assessment of the deployment of Soviet troops in areas

The Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, in addition to misinforming the alleged enemy, were actively preparing for activities in the context of an impending war. On April 18, 1941, an instruction appeared to residencies in Europe to switch to work under wartime conditions. The military intelligence sent the same order along its line.

It was supposed to replenish the residencies in Poland and Germany with professionals and equip them with new radio equipment. In May - June 1941, by agreement with the Czechoslovak government in exile, coordination of intelligence activities was established, Czechoslovak formations were formed in the Soviet Union to carry out sabotage activities on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The children of Soviet diplomatic staff were evacuated from Berlin. On June 16, 1941, just when a report arrived about Germany's readiness for war with the USSR, which Stalin did not believe, a special group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs was formed under the leadership of P. A. Sudoplatov to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines. The task was set before the group: from July 1, if necessary, to begin the elimination of enemy fuel depots located along the Soviet borders.

As for the start date of the war, Soviet intelligence did a pretty good job of providing the political leadership of the country with many different dates, but choosing the right one turned out to be not such an easy task. According to Sudoplatov, before the start of the war, the intelligence services of the NKVD and the General Staff did not have departments for processing and analyzing incoming information. They were formed later. In our opinion, this is not entirely true. In the Main Directorate of State Security there was an information and analytical department of the 5th department, headed by M. A. Alakhverdov. Yes, and in the Intelligence Directorate there was an information department that supplied notes to the authorities, which were then sent to the leadership of the country and the army. Only now the quality of the work of analytical structures was rather low, and, according to the well-known journalist and historian L.A. Bezymensky, intelligence often depreciated the information obtained, passing it on to Stalin without analysis. Perhaps a certain atmosphere of despotism played a role here, in which any more or less important conclusions were left to be made by the leader.

In 1995, employees of the Moscow City Archive compiled a collection of documents "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table." In their opinion, the incoming intelligence did indeed indicate that Germany was undertaking full-scale preparations for an attack on the USSR. Further, the compilers admit that the analysis of the incoming information was not made, as well as the conclusions. Therefore, the lack of generalizing conclusions is a shortcoming of the intelligence work. It is summarized that “being reported to the leadership of the country in a fragmented form, information about military preparations did not create a convincing holistic picture of ongoing events, did not answer the main question: what is the purpose of these preparations, whether the rulers of Germany have made a political decision to attack, when aggression should be expected. what will be the strategic and tactical goals of the enemy's military operations.

In his memoirs, Marshal of the USSR G.K. Zhukov wrote: “From the first post-war years to the present, in some places in the press there is a version that on the eve of the war we allegedly knew the Barbarossa plan, the direction of the main attacks, the width of the deployment front German troops, their number and equipment ... Let me state with all responsibility that this is pure fiction.

Soviet intelligence was unable to rely in their research on a single serious document about Germany's plans in the east. That is, there were sources, “their own people”, in the military-political leadership of the enemy, but there was no access to the documents of the German command. In this connection, most of the information was based on rumors, which reflected changes in Germany's "mood" towards the Soviet Union. Naturally, this could not but affect the adequacy of the estimates given by the Soviet leadership regarding the pre-war situation as a whole. In fairness, it must be said that none of the intelligence services of the world and no government had any idea about the true intentions of Germany in June 1941. Probably, British intelligence knew the most, since it had a system for deciphering some German military ciphers, although also only partially. This situation has developed thanks to the sophisticated measures of German counterintelligence to maintain secrecy and disinformation of everything and everyone.

Scout V. A. Kirpichenko wrote: “Intelligence in the pre-war period fulfilled its duty. She used all available information about Germany's preparations for war. There was a mass of irrefutable material from very solid sources. The fact that they were not given due importance - this did not depend on intelligence. Further in the text, he agrees that intelligence, along with reliable information, also provided disinformation (again, the problem of assessing and analyzing the incoming information emerges).

In early 2010, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation published materials about Willy Lehman, a Soviet agent who worked for the Gestapo under the pseudonym Breitenbach A/201. It is believed that this scout served as the prototype of Stirlitz. Through his contact in Berlin, on June 19, 1941, he warned the top leadership of the USSR about the outbreak of war, giving the exact date and time. Apparently, this message was lost among many others.

There were enough channels for obtaining the necessary information, so it seems that the awareness of the Soviet leadership should have been at a high level. For some reason this didn't happen. The most logical reason seems to be the poor coordination of the work of intelligence agencies and the virtual absence of a centralized analysis of incoming information. Intelligence often even competed with each other.

Summing up, we can state the following. Judging by historical materials, the intelligence service performed its work quite professionally and indeed provided all the necessary information to the country's leadership. However, no unequivocal convincing conclusions were drawn about Germany's intentions before the war. It is hardly possible to blame the special services for this, since the intelligence services of all developed countries found themselves in a similar situation at that time. It can be said that the intelligence officers obtained the maximum possible information, which turned out to be excessively contradictory due to the successful disinformation activities of Germany. The weak analytical apparatus of the intelligence agencies did not allow us to isolate the main thing from all the information. The Soviet leadership was disoriented. Of course, this does not relieve the authorities of responsibility for the fact that they could not create a more effective mechanism for receiving and processing intelligence information, but this is a completely different topic.

Where there was access to government documents (England, USA, Japan), impressive results were achieved. The Soviet counterintelligence worked quite effectively, hiding from Germany both the actual composition of the USSR armed forces and the implementation of a significant part of the pre-war measures. Unfortunately, the results of disinformation spread by Soviet intelligence turned out to be much more modest than that of their German counterparts.

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Chapter 3

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1. BORDER TROOPS OF THE WESTERN DISTRICTS ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR The growing military threat on the western border of the USSR did not go unnoticed by the Soviet leadership. In this regard, in 1939-1941. a number of measures were taken to strengthen the border troops,

The whole of February was occupied with a careful study of cases directly related to the activities of the General Staff. He worked 15-16 hours a day, often staying overnight in his office. I cannot say that I immediately became aware of the many-sided activities of the General Staff. All this did not come at once. I was greatly assisted by N. F. Vatutin, G. K. Malandin, A. M. Vasilevsky, V. D. Ivanov, A. I. Shimonaev, N. I. Chetverikov and other workers of the General Staff.

With what did we come to the beginning of the war, was the country ready, its armed forces to adequately meet the enemy?

An exhaustive answer to this most important question in the totality of political, economic, social and military aspects, taking into account all objective and subjective factors, requires a huge amount of research work. I am sure that our scientists and historians will cope with this task.

For my part, I am ready to express my opinion, first of all, on the military side of the matter, restoring the overall picture to the best of my ability and describing the events of the anxious months and days of the first half of 1941.

Let's start with the most important development of our economy and industry, the basis of the country's defense capability.

The third five-year plan (1938-1942) was a natural continuation of the second and first. It is known that those two five-year plans were overfulfilled. As far as industry is concerned, it doubled during the four years of the first five-year plan, and the 2.1-fold increase planned for the second five-year plan was practically completed by a 2.2-fold increase. The XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the growth of industrial output by 1.9 times for five years. Were there any grounds for considering this plan unrealistic, impracticable? No. Vice versa.

By June 1941, the gross industrial output had already reached 86 percent, and the freight turnover of railway transport, 90 percent of the level planned for the end of 1942. 2,900 new plants, factories, power stations, mines, mines and other industrial enterprises were put into operation.

If we take capital investments in their monetary terms, the plan provided for the creation of new and reconstruction of old enterprises in the amount of 182 billion rubles against 103 billion rubles in the second and 39 billion in the first five-year plan. This shows that even taking into account the rise in the cost of construction in recent years, more production capacities were put into operation than in the two previous five-year plans taken together.

How was the situation with the heavy and the defense industry itself? The report to the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the next plan for the development of the national economy noted that in the course of the implementation of past plans, due to the aggravation of the international situation, serious amendments had to be made to the development of heavy industry, significantly increasing the planned rate of growth of the defense industry. According to the Third Five-Year Plan, the heavy and defense industry continued to develop especially rapidly.

Indeed, the annual output of the entire industry increased by an average of 13 percent, and that of the defense industry by 39 percent. A number of machine-building and other large plants were transferred to the production of defense equipment, and the construction of powerful special military plants was launched.

The Central Committee of the Party helped enterprises that produced new military equipment in supplying scarce raw materials and the latest equipment. In order for the large defense factories to have everything they needed and ensure the implementation of tasks, experienced party workers and prominent specialists were sent there as party organizers of the Central Committee. I must say that I.V. Stalin himself did a lot of work with defense enterprises, knew dozens of plant directors, party organizers, and chief engineers well, met with them, trying to fulfill his plans with his characteristic perseverance.

Thus, from an economic point of view, there was a fact of steady and rapid, I would even say forced, development of the defense industry.

At the same time, it should not be forgotten that, firstly, this gigantic growth was to a large extent achieved at the cost of the exceptional labor exertion of the masses, and secondly, it largely occurred due to the development of light industry and other industries that directly supplied the population with products and goods. In the same way, it must be borne in mind that the rise of heavy and defense industries took place in a peaceful economy, within the framework of a peace-loving, and not a paramilitary state.

Therefore, even greater pressure or tilt in this direction would practically mean a transition from the rails of the country's peaceful development to the rails of military development and would lead to a change, a degeneration of the very structure of the national economy, its militarization to the direct detriment of the interests of the working people.

Naturally, from the standpoint of the post-war years, it is easy to say that more emphasis should be placed on one type of weapon, and less on another. But even from these positions it would be impossible to wish for any cardinal, general economic change in the pre-war economy.

I'll say more. Remembering how and what we, the military, demanded from industry in the very last months of peace, I see that sometimes we did not fully take into account all the real economic possibilities of the country. Although from our own, so to speak, departmental point of view, we were right.

For example, objective circumstances limited the proposals of the People's Commissar of Defense to expand the mass production of the latest models of aircraft, tanks, artillery tractors, trucks, communications equipment and other military equipment.

Of course, there were many shortcomings and difficulties in the industrial and defense spheres, which we will talk about later. Due to the huge scope of construction, there was a shortage of skilled labor, lack of experience in mastering the production of new weapons and organizing their mass production. The need for military equipment and weapons was rapidly moving forward and forward.

Equipping the armed forces with means of combat, including the latest technology, took place according to specific decisions of the government. Only the leadership of the country was given the right - and no one else - to decide: when and what to remove from service, what and when to take into service.

The procedure for the adoption of a new type of weapons in mass production was as follows.

The samples first passed factory tests, in which military representatives took part, then military ones, and only after that the People's Commissariat of Defense gave its opinion. The government, with the participation of the people's commissar of defense, the people's commissars of the military industry and chief designers, considered the presented new types of weapons and military equipment and made the final decision on their production.

All this took quite some time. It also happened like this: while the process of manufacturing and testing new equipment was underway, the designers had already prepared a new, more advanced model, and it is quite natural that in this case the issue of putting into service was postponed until the newest model was fully tested.

The military was often scolded for being too insistent in asking to expedite the adoption of one or another model for service. They were told: "Why are you flogging a fever? When necessary, we will bombard you with planes, tanks, shells."

Now you are scolding us, - the military answered, - because we insistently demand, and if a war happens, then you will say why you demanded badly.

Of course, then we, the military leaders, understood that there were many primary tasks in the country and everything had to be solved on the basis of big politics. But it turned out that big politics, led by I.V. Stalin, in her assessments of the threat of war, proceeded from erroneous assumptions.

On the whole, the huge production capacities created during the two pre-war five-year plans, and especially in the three pre-war years, provided the basis for the country's defense capability.

From a military point of view, the Party's line on the accelerated development of industry in the eastern regions, the creation of backup enterprises in a number of branches of engineering, oil refining and chemistry, was of exceptional importance. Three quarters of all new blast furnaces, a second powerful oil base between the Volga and the Urals, metallurgical plants in Transbaikalia, the Urals and Amur, the largest non-ferrous metallurgy enterprises in Central Asia, heavy industry in the Far East, car assembly plants, aluminum plants and pipe rolling enterprises were built here. , hydroelectric power stations. During the war, together with the enterprises evacuated here, an industrial base was created in the east of the country, which ensured the repulse of the enemy and his defeat.

I would like to say a few words about the material reserves laid down on the eve of the war. They pursued the goal of ensuring the transfer of the economy to a war footing and the food of the troops until the economy was fully operational for the needs of the war. From 1940 to June 1941, the total value of state material reserves increased from 4 billion to 7.6 billion rubles34.

This included reserves of production capacity, fuel, raw materials, energy, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and food. These stocks, laid down on the eve of the war, although they were rather modest, helped the national economy, despite the difficult year of 1941, quickly pick up the pace and scope necessary for the successful conduct of the war.

And so, the pulse of heavy industry, the defense industry, beat faster, reached its highest tension and fullness in the pre-war years and months. Stricter, as it were, the life of the state as a whole became more collected.

Extraordinary IV session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in September 1939 adopts the "Law on universal military duty". Under the new law, persons who are over 19 years old are called up to the army, and for those who have graduated from high school, the draft age is set at 18 years old. For a more perfect mastery of military affairs, the terms of active service were increased: for junior commanders of the ground forces and the Air Force - from two to three years, for the rank and file of the Air Force, as well as the rank and file and junior commanders of the border troops - up to four years, on ships and in parts of the fleet - up to five years.

The fulfillment of the Third Five-Year Plan in general and the tasks in the field of heavy and defense industry in particular, as well as the threat of a military attack on the USSR, required an increase in the amount of working time devoted to the national economy. In this regard, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on June 26, 1940, adopts the Decree "On the transition to an eight-hour working day, to a seven-day week and on the prohibition of unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions." A new system of training a skilled labor force is being created in vocational and railway schools, schools of factory training, which trained an average of 800,000 to 1 million people a year.

At the same time, in the middle of 1940, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a Decree "On liability for the production of low-quality products and for non-compliance with mandatory standards by industrial enterprises." Strict measures were introduced to improve the management of enterprises, discipline, responsibility and order were strengthened.

The state apparatus and the management of industry are also undergoing serious changes, becoming more flexible, cumbersomeness and excessive centralization are being eliminated. The people's commissariat of the defense industry is divided into four new people's commissariats - aviation, shipbuilding, ammunition, weapons. The People's Commissariat for Mechanical Engineering is divided into the People's Commissariats for heavy, medium and general engineering.

New people's commissariats are being created (for road transport, construction, etc.), which are directly related to strengthening the country's defense. The work of the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR is being reorganized. On its basis, economic councils for the defense industry, metallurgy, fuel, machine building, etc. are being created. Major statesmen, deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR N. A. Voznesensky are appointed chairmen of the councils. A. N. Kosygin, V. A. Malyshev and others.

All these changes were caused exclusively by the increased volume of work, the requirements of preparation for active defense against aggression, the possibility of which grew with each passing month.

With regard to the conditions of the time, and also in connection with the new "Law on General Military Duty", the central military apparatus and local military administration bodies are also being reorganized. In the autonomous republics, regions and territories, military commissariats are being created, and a new regulation on their activities is being put into effect.

Big, fundamental issues in the People's Commissariat of Defense were considered at the Main Military Council of the Red Army. The Chairman of the Main Military Council was the People's Commissar of Defense, its members were the Deputy People's Commissars and one of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Particularly important issues were usually resolved in the presence of I. V. Stalin and other members of the Politburo of the Central Committee

By the decision of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government of March 8, 1941, the distribution of duties in the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR was specified.

The leadership of the Red Army was carried out by the People's Commissar of Defense through the General Staff, his deputies and the system of main and central directorates. He was directly subordinated to the Main Armored Directorate, the Office of Affairs, the Financial Directorate, the Personnel Directorate and the Bureau of Inventions.

Before the war, duties within the People's Commissariat of Defense were distributed as follows.

Deputy People's Commissar, Chief of the General Staff General of the Army G.K. Zhukov - Communications Directorate, Fuel Supply Directorate, Main Air Defense Directorate, General Staff Academy and M.V. Frunze Academy.

First Deputy People's Commissar Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny Main Quartermaster Directorate, Sanitary and Veterinary Directorate of the Red Army, Department of Material Funds.

Deputy People's Commissar for Artillery Marshal of the Soviet Union G. I. Kulik Main Artillery Directorate, Chemical Defense Directorate and Artillery Academy.

Deputy People's Commissar Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov - Main Military Engineering Directorate, Defense Construction Directorate.

Deputy People's Commissar for Combat Training General of the Army K. A. Meretskov Inspectorate of all military branches, Directorate of Military Educational Institutions and Combat Training of the Red Army.

Deputy People's Commissar, Lieutenant General of Aviation P. V. Rychagov - Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force.

Deputy People's Commissar, Army Commissar 1st Rank A.I. Lenin, Military Law Academy and military-political schools.

I want to remind you that the General Staff of the Red Army was headed by: from 1931 - A. I. Egorov, from 1937 - Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov, from August 1940 to February 1941 - General of the Army K. A. Meretskov.

Let us now see what our armed forces looked like on the eve of the war. At the same time, for the convenience of the reader and to facilitate the conclusions, it would be better if we set out all this according to the following scheme: what has already been done by the people, the party and the government, what we were going to do in the near future and what we did not have time to do or failed to do. Of course, all this is in basic terms, using a small amount of data.

Rifle troops. In April 1941, a wartime staff was introduced for rifle troops. The rifle division - the main combined arms formation of the Red Army - included three rifle and two artillery regiments, anti-tank and anti-aircraft divisions, reconnaissance and engineer battalions, a communications battalion, rear units and institutions. According to the wartime states, the division was to have about 14 and a half thousand people, 78 field guns, 54 anti-tank 45-mm guns, 12 anti-aircraft guns, 66 mortars of 82-120 mm caliber, 16 light tanks, 13 armored vehicles, more than three thousand horses. Fully equipped divisions could represent a fairly mobile and formidable combat unit.

In 1939, 1940 and the first half of 1941, the troops received more than 105 thousand light, heavy and heavy machine guns, more than 100 thousand machine guns. This is despite the fact that the production of small arms and artillery weapons at that time somewhat decreased, because obsolete types were discontinued, and new ones, due to complexity and design features, were not so easy to put on stream.

In mid-March 1941, S. K. Timoshenko and I asked I. V. Stalin's permission to call up the reserve staff for rifle divisions in order to be able to retrain him in the spirit of modern requirements. At first our request was denied. We were told that the draft of the assigned reserve personnel in such numbers could give the Germans a pretext to provoke a war. However, at the end of March it was decided to call up 500,000 soldiers and sergeants and send them to the border military districts for resupplying in order to bring the number of rifle divisions to at least 8,000 men.

In order not to return to this issue, I will say that a few days later it was allowed to call on another 300 thousand assigned personnel to staff fortified areas and other branches and branches of the armed forces, the artillery of the reserve of the High Command, engineering troops, signal troops, air defense and military logistics services. -air forces. So, on the eve of the war, the Red Army received an additional 800,000 men. The collection was planned to be held in May-October 1941.

As a result, on the eve of the war in the border districts, out of one hundred and seventy divisions and two brigades, 19 divisions were equipped with up to 5-6 thousand people, 7 cavalry divisions had an average of 6 thousand people each, 144 divisions had a strength of 8-9 thousand people each. In the interior districts, most divisions were kept on a reduced staff, and many rifle divisions were just being formed and began combat training.

Armored troops. Speaking earlier about the Soviet tank industry, I have already emphasized the high rates of its development and the great perfection of the designs of domestic vehicles. By 1938, compared with the early thirties, tank production had more than tripled. In connection with the new requirements for the defense of the country, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government set the designers and tank builders the task of creating tanks with more powerful armor protection and weapons, with high mobility and reliability in operation.

Talented teams of designers under the leadership of Zh. Ya. Kotin create a heavy KV tank, the design bureau of M. I. Koshkin, A. A. Morozov and N. A. Kucherenko - the famous medium tank T-34. Motor builders gave a powerful diesel tank engine V-2. The KV and T-34 turned out to be the best of the machines created on the eve of the war. And during the war, they confidently maintained superiority over similar types of enemy vehicles. It was necessary to establish their mass production as soon as possible.

At the direction of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Defense Committee in December 1940, having studied the situation with the production of new tanks, reported to the Central Committee that some factories were not fulfilling the plans, there were great difficulties in working out the technological process, arming troops with KV and T-34 tanks was underway. at an extremely slow pace. The government has taken the necessary steps. At the same time, resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars, which were of exceptional importance for the defense of the country, were adopted on the organization of mass production of tanks in the Volga region and the Urals.

From January 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army received more than seven thousand tanks, in 1941 the industry could produce about 5.5 thousand tanks of all types. As for the KV and T-34, by the beginning of the war, the factories managed to produce only 1861 tanks. This, of course, was very little. Practically new tanks only from the second half of 1940 began to enter the armored schools and the troops of the border districts.

Organizational problems were added to the difficulties connected with the quantitative side of the matter. Perhaps the reader remembers that our army was a pioneer in the creation of large mechanized formations of brigades and corps. However, the experience of using such units in the specific conditions of Spain was assessed incorrectly, and the mechanized corps in our army were liquidated. Meanwhile, even in the battles at Khalkhin Gol, we achieved positive results by using tank formations. Tank formations were widely used by Germany in its aggressive actions against the countries of Europe.

It was necessary to urgently return to the creation of large armored formations.

In 1940, the formation of new mechanized corps, tank and mechanized divisions began. 9 mechanized corps were created. In February 1941, the General Staff developed an even broader plan for the creation of armored formations than was envisaged by government decisions in 1940.

Taking into account the number of armored troops in the German army, the people's commissar and I asked to use the existing tank brigades and even cavalry formations in the formation of mechanized corps as the closest to tank troops in their "maneuvering spirit".

I.V. Stalin, apparently, at that time did not yet have a definite opinion on this issue and hesitated. Time passed, and only in March 1941 was it decided to form the 20 mechanized corps that we requested.

However, we did not calculate the objective possibilities of our tank industry. To fully equip the new mechanized corps, 16.6 thousand tanks of only new types were required, and in total about 32 thousand tanks. There was practically nowhere to take such a number of cars from within one year, there was also a lack of technical, command personnel.

Thus, by the beginning of the war, we were able to equip less than half of the formed corps. It was they, these corps, that were the main force in repelling the first blows of the enemy, and those that had just begun to form turned out to be prepared only for the period of the Stalingrad counteroffensive operation, where they played a decisive role.

Artillery. According to updated archival data, from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army received from industry 29,637 field guns, 52,407 mortars, and 92,578 guns and mortars in total, including tank guns. in the state of parts and connections. The military artillery of the border districts was mainly equipped with guns up to standard standards.

Immediately on the eve of the war, we had sixty howitzer and fourteen cannon artillery regiments of the RGK. The artillery reserve of the High Command, given the specifics of the war with Germany, we did not have enough.

In the spring of 1941, we began the formation of ten anti-tank artillery brigades, but we failed to fully equip them by June. In addition, poor cross-country artillery thrust did not allow off-road maneuvering, especially in the autumn-winter period. And yet, anti-tank artillery brigades played an exceptional role in destroying enemy tanks. In some cases, this was the only reliable means of deterring his massive tank attacks.

Marshal G. I. Kulik, being the main speaker to I. V. Stalin on artillery issues, did not always correctly orient him in the effectiveness of one or another type of artillery and mortar weapons.

So, for example, according to his "authoritative" proposal, 45- and 76.2-mm guns were discontinued before the war. During the war, it was necessary with great difficulty to re-organize the production of these guns at the Leningrad factories. The 152-mm howitzer, which passed all the tests and showed excellent qualities, according to the conclusion of G. I. Kulik, was not accepted for service. The situation was no better with mortar weapons, which during the war showed high combat quality in all types of combat. After the war with Finland, this shortcoming was eliminated.

By the beginning of the war, G. I. Kulik, together with the Main Artillery Directorate, did not appreciate such a powerful rocket weapon as the BM-13 ("Katyusha"), which put enemy units to flight with the very first volleys in July 1941. The Defense Committee only in June adopted a resolution on its urgent serial production.

We must pay tribute to our armed forces for their efficiency and creative diligence. They did everything possible so that 10-15 days after the start of the war, the troops received the first batches of this formidable weapon.

At one time, more could have been done with regard to mortars. The program was clear - it was determined by the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 30, 1940 "On increasing the production of mortars and mines." However, on the required scale, the army began to receive 82-mm and 120-mm mortars only before the war itself. In June 1941, in quantitative and qualitative terms, our mortars were already significantly superior to the German ones.

JV Stalin considered artillery to be the most important means of war, and paid much attention to its improvement. At that time D.F. Ustinov was the People's Commissar of Armaments, B. L. Vannikov was the People's Commissar of Ammunition, and Generals I. I. Ivanov and V. G. Grabin were the chief designers of artillery systems.

All these people I.V. Stalin knew them well, met with them often and trusted them completely.

Signal troops, engineering troops. Railways and highways. The commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which worked in the middle of 1940, rightly pointed out that the number of engineer troops in peacetime could not ensure their normal deployment in case of war35.

On the eve of the war, the personnel units of these troops were increased, new units were formed, the general training of engineering troops, the structure and operational calculation of communications units improved; communications chiefs of formations began to be more involved in preparing communications for operations in wartime conditions; the troops began to receive new engineering equipment and communications. However, we did not have time to get rid of all the shortcomings in the engineering and signal troops before the start of the war.

At the end of February, together with the People's Commissar of Defense, we considered in detail the question of the progress in the construction of fortified lines along the state border, the state of railways, highways and dirt roads and communications.

Generals N. F. Vatutin, G. K. Malandin and A. M. Vasilevsky reported in detail on the state of affairs. The conclusions were basically as follows.

The highway network in the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine was in poor condition. Many bridges could not withstand the weight of medium tanks and artillery, and country roads required major repairs.

My first deputy N. F. Vatutin made a detailed report to People's Commissar S. K. Timoshenko on the condition of the railways of all border military districts.

The border railway areas are not well adapted for the mass unloading of troops, N. F. Vatutin reported. - This is evidenced by the following figures. The German railways going to the Lithuanian border have a capacity of 220 trains per day, while our Lithuanian railway, which goes to the borders of East Prussia, has only 84. The situation is no better in the territory of the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine: here we have almost half as many rail lines than the enemy. Railway troops and construction organizations during 1941 will clearly not be able to carry out the work that needs to be done.

In response, the people's commissar noted that in 1940, on the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the People's Commissariat of Railways developed a seven-year plan for the technical reconstruction of western railways. However, nothing serious has been done so far, except for changing the gauge and elementary work to adapt railway structures for loading and unloading troops and weapons.

We already knew that the mobilization plan of the country's railways developed and approved by the government in the event of a war in the People's Commissariat of Communications did not exist at that time.

Well, - said S.K. Timoshenko, finishing our conversation, - I agree with your considerations. I'll try again to report...

We said goodbye. Going out into the street, we decided to take a little walk with Nikolai Fedorovich. It was a clear January day. The trees on Gogolevsky Boulevard stood in silver hoarfrost. Our thoughts were gloomy ...

On February 18, 1941, the commander of the Western Military District, D. G. Pavlov, sent report No. 867 addressed to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and S. K. Timoshenko. He asked to allocate significant funds for the construction of dirt roads and, in particular, wrote:

"I believe that the Western theater of military operations must necessarily be prepared during 1941, and therefore I consider it absolutely impossible to extend the construction for several years."

It is fair to say that the demand of the commander of the Western District, I.V. Stalin, should have been treated with great attention, since D.G. Pavlov made reasonable proposals. I consider it necessary to quote some excerpts from his report of February 18, 1941.

"The presence and condition of highways, dirt roads and railways within the BSSR does not at all meet the needs of the ZapVO.

In a detailed report submitted by me to the People's Commissar of Defense dated January 29, 1941, applications were made for the construction and repair in 1941 of the dirt roads and railways that the district desperately needs, which include:

a) construction of new highways - 2360 km;

b) construction of pound tractor tracks - 650 km;

c) overhaul of the most damaged sections of existing highways - 570 km;

d) implementation of a number of major measures to restore bridges and equip roads;

e) construction of new railways with a length of 819 km;

f) reconstruction and development of railways - 1426 km, of which - 765 laying on the finished track.

859 million rubles will be required to carry out works on road and earth construction...

In addition, 642 million rubles are required for the construction of 819 kilometers of railway tracks, their reconstruction and development. I think that the Western theater of operations must be prepared without fail during 1941, and therefore I consider it absolutely impossible to extend the construction for several years.

Road construction of all kinds can be solved in 1941 by releasing the above mechanisms; wide attraction of the able-bodied population of the USSR with carts and horses. I consider it possible and necessary for the construction of roads, bridges ... to release stone, gravel, wood and other building materials for free.

Second question. It is necessary to truly bring the Western theater of operations into a truly defensive state by creating a series of defensive belts to a depth of 200-300 kilometers, building anti-tank ditches, gouges, bogging dams, scarps, and field defensive structures.

The above activities will also require a large amount of manpower ... For such work it is inappropriate to detach troops and disrupt the course of combat training.

Considering that all citizens of the Soviet Union must take part in the defense of the country, not in words, but in deeds; Considering that any delay may cost unnecessary sacrifices, I make a proposal:

tenth-grade students and all students of higher educational institutions, instead of taking vacations, should be organized in an organized manner for defensive and road construction, creating from them platoons, companies, battalions under the command of commanders from military units. Transportation and meals for students to organize free of charge at the expense of the state (Red Army ration).

I believe that only with a positive solution to these issues can and should the probable theaters of military operations be prepared for war and build cheaply and quickly roads in the required quantity.

Major General N. I. Galich, the head of the communications troops of the Red Army, reported to us about the lack of modern communications equipment and the lack of sufficient mobilization and emergency supplies of communications equipment.

Indeed, the radio network of the General Staff was provided with radio stations of the PAT type only by 39 percent, and with radio stations of the RAF type and replacing them with 11-AK and others - by 60 percent, by charging units - by 45 percent. The frontier Western Military District had radio stations for only 27 percent, the Kyiv Military District - for 30 percent, the Baltic Military District - for 52 percent. The situation was approximately the same with other means of radio and wire communications.

Before the war, it was believed that in the event of war, the means of the People's Commissariat of Communications and the RF People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs would be used to lead the fronts, internal districts and reserve troops of the High Command in the event of war. The communication centers of the High Command, the General Staff and the fronts will receive everything they need from the local bodies of the People's Commissariat of Communications. But they, as it turned out later, were not prepared for work in war conditions.

I was familiar with the state of local communications agencies from maneuvers and command and staff field exercises, when I used their services on a rental basis. Even then, we doubted the ability of local authorities to provide the armed forces with stable communications during the war.

All these circumstances led to the main shortcoming in the training of commanders, headquarters of formations and army formations: the lack of the ability to control troops well in complex and rapidly changing combat conditions. Commanders and staffs avoided using radio communications, preferring wire communications. What came of it in the first days of the war is known. Internal radio communication in combat aviation units, in the airfield network, in tank units and units where wired communication is generally not applicable, was carried out poorly.

JV Stalin did not sufficiently appreciate the role of radio equipment in modern mobile warfare, and leading military workers were unable to prove to him in a timely manner the need to organize mass production of army radio equipment. Of course, this is not a matter of one year. It is clear to everyone that this should have been done many years before the war, but this was not done.

There was no underground cable network necessary to serve operational and strategic authorities at all.

Urgent measures were needed to bring the telephone and telegraph network, radio and radio broadcasting network into proper order.

Conversations on these issues with the People's Commissariat of Communications did not lead to anything. And not because someone did not want to do extra work: improving the organization of communications was a very obvious need. The People's Commissariat could not physically fulfill the requirements of the army. What was done in late 1940 - early 1941 to improve local communications and the connection of individual centers with Moscow, could not solve the problem.

After listening to our messages, S. K. Timoshenko said:

I agree with your assessment of the situation. But I think that it is hardly possible to do anything serious to immediately eliminate all these shortcomings. Yesterday I visited Comrade Stalin. He received Pavlov's telegram and ordered him to be told that, with all the justice of his demands, we do not have the opportunity today to satisfy his "fantastic" proposals.

Air Force. I have already said that the Party and government have always paid great attention to the development of Soviet aviation. In 1939, the Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the construction of nine new aircraft factories and seven aircraft engine factories: the next year, seven more factories, already from other sectors of the national economy, were reorganized to produce aviation products, the enterprises were equipped with first-class equipment. By the end of 1940, the aircraft industry was growing by more than 70 percent compared to 1939. At the same time, new aircraft engine enterprises and aircraft instrument factories are being built on the sites of enterprises transferred to the aircraft industry from other sectors of the national economy.

According to updated archival data, from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army received 17,745 combat aircraft from industry, of which 3,719 were new types.

On the eve of the Second World War The international situation on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (WWII). Relations with Germany

A global provocation “or who is manipulating us?”

A global provocation “or who is manipulating us?”

Chapter 1. The situation on the eve of the Great Patriotic War

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