A Brief History of Japanese Military Aviation

The origin and formation of the Pacific Sub-float The first submarines in the Siberian flotilla (as the flotilla of ships of the Pacific Ocean was called in the 90th century) appeared during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. They were originally sent to reinforce coastal defenses.

The origin and pre-war development of Japanese aviation

Back in April 1891, one enterprising Japanese Chihachi Ninomiya successfully launched models with a rubber motor. He later designed a large model driven by a clockwork on a pusher screw. The model flew successfully. But the Japanese army showed little interest in her, and Ninomiya abandoned his experiments.

On December 19, 1910, Farman's and Grande's planes made their first flights in Japan. Thus began the era of heavier-than-air aircraft in Japan. A year later, one of the first Japanese pilots, Captain Tokigwa, designed an improved version of the Farmayaa, which was built by the aeronautical unit in Nakano near Tokyo, and which became the first aircraft produced in Japan.

Following the acquisition of several types of foreign aircraft and the release of their improved copies, in 1916 the first aircraft of the original design was built - the Yokoso-type flying boat, designed by First Lieutenant Chikuhem Nakajima and Second Lieutenant Kishichi Magoshi.

The big three of the Japanese aviation industry - Mitsubishi, Nakajima and Kawasaki - began their activities in the late 1910s. Mitsubishi and Kawasaki were previously heavy industries, and Nakajima was backed by the powerful Mitsui family.

Over the next fifteen years, these firms produced exclusively foreign-designed aircraft - mainly French, British and German designs. At the same time, Japanese specialists were trained and trained at enterprises and in higher engineering schools in the United States. However, by the early 1930s, the Japanese army and navy came to the conclusion that it was time for the aviation industry to stand on its own feet. It was decided that in the future only aircraft and engines of our own design would be accepted into service. This, however, did not stop the practice of purchasing foreign aircraft to get acquainted with the latest technical innovations. The basis for the development of Japan's own aviation was the creation in the early 30s of aluminum production facilities, which made it possible by 1932 to produce 19 thousand tons annually. "winged metal".

By 1936, this policy gave certain results - the Japanese independently designed the Mitsubishi Ki-21 and SZM1 twin-engine bombers, the Mitsubishi Ki-15 reconnaissance aircraft, the Nakajima B51Ch1 carrier-based bomber and the Mitsubishi A5M1 carrier-based fighter - all equivalent or even superior to foreign models.

Beginning in 1937, as soon as the "second Sino-Japanese conflict" broke out, the Japanese aviation industry closed a veil of secrecy and dramatically increased aircraft production. In 1938, a law was passed requiring state control over all aviation companies with a capital of more than three million yen, the government controlled production plans, technology and equipment. The law protected such companies - they were exempted from taxes on profits and capital, and their export obligations were guaranteed.

In March 1941, the aviation industry received another impetus in its development - the imperial fleet and army decided to expand orders to a number of companies. The Japanese government could not provide funds for the expansion of production, but guaranteed the provision of loans by private banks. Moreover, the navy and army, which had production equipment at their disposal, rented it out to various aviation firms, depending on their own needs. However, army equipment was not suitable for the production of naval products and vice versa.

During the same period, the army and navy established standards and procedures for accepting all types of aviation materials. A staff of technicians and inspectors oversaw production and compliance with standards. These officers also exercised control over the management of firms.

If you look at the dynamics of production in the Japanese aircraft industry, it can be noted that from 1931 to 1936 the production of aircraft increased three times, and from 1936 to 1941 - four times!

With the outbreak of the Pacific War, these Army and Navy services also participated in production expansion programs. Since the fleet and the army issued orders independently, the interests of the parties sometimes clashed. What was missing was interaction, and, as you might expect, the complexity of production from this only increased.

Already in the second half of 1941, problems with the supply of materials became more complicated. Moreover, the deficit immediately became quite acute, and the distribution of raw materials was constantly complicated. As a result, the army and navy established their own control over raw materials depending on their spheres of influence. Raw materials were divided into two categories: materials for production and materials for expanding production. Using the next year's production plan, the headquarters distributed raw materials in accordance with the requirements of the manufacturers. The order for components and assemblies (for spare parts and for production) was received by manufacturers directly from the headquarters.

Problems with raw materials were complicated by the constant shortage of labor, in addition, neither the navy nor the army were engaged in the management and distribution of labor. Manufacturers themselves, as soon as they could, recruited and trained personnel. In addition, with surprising myopia, the armed forces constantly called in civilian workers, completely inconsistent with their qualifications or the needs of production.

In order to unify the production of military products and expand the production of aircraft in November 1943, the Japanese government created the Ministry of Supply, which was in charge of all production issues, including labor reserves and the distribution of raw materials.

To coordinate the work of the aviation industry, the Ministry of Supply has established a certain system for developing a production plan. The General Staff, on the basis of the current military situation, determined the requirements for military equipment and sent them to the naval and military ministries, which, after approval, sent them for approval to the ministries, as well as to the corresponding naval and army general staffs. Further, the ministries coordinated this program with manufacturers, determining the needs for capacities, materials, human resources and equipment. Manufacturers determined their capabilities and sent a protocol of approval to the Ministries of the Navy and the Army. The ministries and general staffs together determined a monthly plan for each manufacturer, which was sent to the Ministry of Supply.

For production purposes, components and parts of aviation equipment were divided into three classes: under control, distributed by the government and supplied by the government. "Controlled materials" (bolts, springs, rivets, etc.) were produced under government control but distributed to manufacturers. Government-distributed "assemblies (radiators, pumps, carburetors, etc.) were produced according to special plans by a number of subsidiaries for deliveries to manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft engines directly to the assembly lines of the latter. Assemblies and parts "supplied" by the government (wheels, weapons, radio equipment, etc. .p.) were ordered directly by the government and delivered at the direction of the latter.

By the time the Ministry of Supply was formed, an order was issued to stop the construction of new aviation facilities. It was obvious that there was enough capacity, and the main thing was to increase the efficiency of existing production. To strengthen control and management in production, numerous controllers from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and observers from the Navy and Army, who were at the disposal of the regional centers of the Ministry of Supply, presented themselves to them.

Despite this rather impartial system of production control, the army and navy did their best to maintain their special influence by sending their own observers to aircraft, engine building and related industries, and also did everything to maintain their influence in those plants that were already under their control. . In terms of the production of weapons, spare parts and materials, the navy and army created their own capacities, and even without informing the Ministry of Supply.

Despite the enmity between the navy and the army, as well as the difficult conditions under which the Ministry of Supply worked, the Japanese aviation industry was able to constantly increase aircraft production from 1941 to 1944. In particular, in 1944, production at controlled factories alone increased by 69 percent compared with the previous year. The production of engines increased by 63 percent, propellers - by 70 percent.

Despite these impressive successes, it was still not enough to counter the enormous power of Japan's adversaries. Between 1941 and 1945 the United States produced more aircraft than Germany and Japan combined.

Japan's imperialist circles continue to actively build up the country's military potential under the guise of creating "defensive forces" of which aviation is an integral part.

Judging by reports in the foreign press, the revival of the Japanese Air Force began in the 1950s within the framework of the "public security corps" created with the direct assistance of the Pentagon. After the transformation of this corps into "self-defense forces" (July 1954), aviation was singled out as an independent branch of the armed forces. By this time, its strength was about 6300 people, it had approximately 170 obsolete American-made aircraft. In 1956, the Air Force (16 thousand people) already included two aviation wings, four control and warning groups, and six aviation schools. Aircraft were based at eight airfields.

According to the foreign press, the formation of the Air Force was basically completed by the beginning of the 60s. They included a combat aviation command with three aviation branches that had aviation wings (four fighter and one transport). The pilots were trained in the aviation training command, and ground specialists - in five aviation technical schools, united in the training technical center, which was then transformed into the aviation technical command. At that time, the MTO command, which included three supply centers, was engaged in the supply of units and subunits. In total, there were 40 thousand people in the Air Force.

An important role in the subsequent development of the Japanese air force was played by the third and fourth five-year programs for the construction of the armed forces. Under the third program (1967/68 - 1971/72 financial years), obsolete F-86F and F-104J fighters were replaced by F-4EJ aircraft (Fig. 1), produced by the Japanese industry under an American license. RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft were purchased. To replace the transport piston aircraft C-4G, our own transport jet aircraft C-1 was created (Fig. 2), and for the training of the flight crew, the T-2 supersonic training aircraft was designed (Fig. 3). On the basis of the latter, a single-seat close air support aircraft FS-T2 was developed.

Rice. 1. Fighter F-4EJ "Phantom"

During the implementation of the fourth program (1972/73 - 1976/77 financial years), the main task of which is considered to be the radical modernization of the Japanese armed forces, including the Air Force, the supply of new aircraft continues. As reported in the foreign press, by April 1, 1975, there were already about 60 F-4EJ fighters in the air force (a total of 128 aircraft are planned to be purchased). From the second half of 1975, the arrival of FS-T2 aircraft was expected (68 units ordered).

The country's air defense system began to be created in the early 60s. Along with fighter aircraft, which formed its basis, it included missile units of missiles. In 1964, there were already two groups of Nike-Ajax missiles (each with an anti-aircraft missile division). According to the plans of the third program for the construction of the armed forces, two groups of Nike-J missiles (Japanese version of the missile) were formed. In 1973, another group of these missiles was added to them. At the same time, Nike-Ajax missiles were replaced by Nike-J missiles.

Rice. 2. Transport aircraft S-1

Below is a brief description of the current state of the Japanese Air Force.

Composition of the Japanese Air Force

Rice. 3. Training aircraft T-2

Japan Air Force Organization

Rice. 4. Scheme of the organization of the Japanese Air Force

Air Combat Command is not the highest operational unit of the Air Force. It consists of a headquarters located in Fuchu (near Tokyo), three aviation sectors, a separate fighter aviation group on about. Okinawa, individual units and divisions, including the reconnaissance aviation squadron.

The aviation direction is considered a specific operational-territorial organizational unit, characteristic only for the Japanese Air Force. In accordance with the territorial division of the country into three air defense zones (Northern, Central and Western), three aviation directions have been created. The commander of each of them is responsible for aviation activities and air defense in his area of ​​responsibility. The general scheme of the organization of the aviation direction is shown in fig. 5. Organizationally, the directions differ only in the number of aviation wings and groups of missiles.

Rice. 5 Scheme of organization of the aviation direction

The northern aviation direction (headquarters at the Misawa airbase) covers about. Hokkaido and the northeastern part of about. Honshu. The fighter aviation wing and a separate fighter aviation group armed with F-4EJ and F-1U4J aircraft, as well as the Nike-J SAM group, are located here.

The Central Aviation Direction (Irumagawa Air Base) is responsible for the defense of the central part of the island. Honshu. It includes three fighter aviation wings (F-4FJ, F-104J and F-86F aircraft) and two groups of Nike-J missiles.

The western aviation direction (Kasuga airbase) provides cover for the southern part of about. Honshu, as well as the islands of Shikoku and Kyushu. Its combat forces consist of two fighter aviation wings (F-104J and F-86F aircraft), as well as two groups of Nike-J missiles. For the defense of the Ryukyu archipelago on about. Okinawa (Paha airbase) deployed a separate fighter aviation group (F-104J aircraft) operationally subordinate to this direction and the Nike-J SAM group, which is part of it. There are also units here: logistics, control and warning, as well as the base.

As reported in the foreign press, the fighter aviation wing (Fig. 6) is the main tactical unit of the Japanese Air Force. It has a headquarters, a battle group (two or three fighter air squadrons), an MTO group consisting of five detachments for various purposes, and an airfield service group (seven to eight detachments).

Rice. 6 Organization diagram of the fighter aviation wing

The control and warning wing operates in the zone of its direction (air defense sector). Its main task is the timely detection of air targets, their identification, as well as informing the commanders of air defense units and subunits about an air enemy and pointing fighters at him. The wing includes: headquarters, an air situation control group, three to four control and warning groups, logistics and basic maintenance groups. The control and warning wings of the Northern and Western aviation directions are subordinated to one mobile detection and warning detachment each, designed to strengthen radar cover in the most important directions or to replace failed stationary radars.

The Nike-J SAM group can hit air targets at medium and high altitudes. It consists of a headquarters, a three- or four-battery missile defense division (nine launchers per battery), an MTO detachment and a service detachment.

The aviation logistics detachment is responsible for organizing the supply of units and subunits with military equipment, weapons, ammunition and other military equipment.

A separate reconnaissance aviation squadron (Irumagawa airfield), directly subordinate to the headquarters of the combat aviation command, is equipped with RF-4E and RF-80F aircraft. It has a headquarters, an MTO detachment and an airfield maintenance detachment.

The Aviation Training Command provides training for the Air Force flight personnel. It includes a headquarters, one fighter and three training aviation wings, as well as a training squadron. Training is conducted on T-1A, T-2, T-33A and F-86F aircraft.

The aviation technical command, which unites five aviation technical schools, trains specialists for the support and support services of the air force.

The MTO command is engaged in long-term planning, procurement and distribution of military equipment, weapons and supplies in accordance with the needs of combat and auxiliary units and units of the Air Force. Three supply bases are subordinated to the MTO command.

The units of central subordination include the transport aviation wing and the rescue aviation wing. The first is intended for the airlift of troops and cargo, as well as for the landing of airborne assault forces. The wing includes: a headquarters, a transport aviation group, including two aviation squadrons and a training aviation detachment (C-1, YS-11 and C-40 aircraft), as well as logistics and airfield maintenance groups. The task of the second wing is to search for and rescue the crews of aircraft (helicopters) that have crashed directly over the territory of Japan or over coastal waters. The constituent elements of the wing are the headquarters, eight rescue teams stationed in various regions of the country, a training squadron and a logistics team. It is armed with MIJ-2, T-34 aircraft and S-G2, Y-107 helicopters.

The air defense of Japan is organized and conducted according to a unified plan of command of the armed forces using F-4EJ, F-104J, F-8GF fighters and Nike-J missiles from the air force. In addition, for these purposes, the 3UR available in the ground forces of Japan (seven anti-aircraft groups - up to 160 launchers) are involved. Airspace surveillance is carried out by 28 radar posts. An automated system is used for centralized control of air defense forces and means.

The combat training of the personnel of the Japanese Air Force is aimed primarily at working out the tasks of the country's air defense. The crews of tactical fighters and transport aircraft are trained to perform the tasks of air support and support the actions of the ground forces and, to a lesser extent, the naval forces.

The Japanese military leadership believes that the capabilities of the country's aviation do not meet the modern requirements of warfare in full seas, primarily because most of the aircraft in service are worn out. In this regard, measures are being taken to replace obsolete F-86F and F-104J fighters. To this end, Japanese specialists are studying the combat capabilities of foreign fighters (American F-16, F-15 and F-14, Swedish, French and others), the production of which could be mastered at Japanese enterprises under licenses. In addition, Japanese firms are increasing the production of modern F-4FJ, FS-T2, C-1 and T-2 aircraft.

Information about the Japanese Air Force published in the foreign press shows that the aircraft equipment in their arsenal is constantly improving in quality, and the organizational structure is being systematically improved. Characteristic in the construction of the Air Force is that they are increasingly equipped with aircraft of their own production.

Aviation of Japan in the Second World War. Part one: Aichi, Yokosuka, Kawasaki Andrey Firsov

Japanese Army Aviation

Japanese Army Aviation

The Japanese army gained its first flight experience back in 1877 using balloons. Later, during the Russo-Japanese War near Port Arthur, two Japanese balloons made 14 successful reconnaissance ascents. Attempts to create devices heavier than air were made by private individuals as early as 1789 - mostly muscle cars, but they did not attract the attention of the military. Only the development of aviation in other countries in the early years of the 20th century caught the attention of Japanese officials. On July 30, 1909, a research organization for military aeronautics was established on the basis of the University of Tokyo and the personnel of the army and navy.

In 1910, the "society" sent Captain Yoshitoshi Tokugawa to France, and Captain Kumazo Hino to Germany, where they were to acquire and master aircraft control. The officers returned to Japan with the Farman biplane and the Grade monoplane, and on December 19, 1910, the first flight of the aircraft in Japan took place. During 1911, when Japan had already acquired several types of aircraft, Captain Tokugawa designed an improved version of the Farman aircraft, which was built by the army aeronautical unit. After training a few more pilots abroad, they began training flights in Japan itself. Despite the training of a fairly large number of pilots and their training in 1918 in the French Air Force, Japanese army pilots did not participate in the battles of the First World War. However, during this period, Japanese aviation had already acquired the appearance of a separate branch of the armed forces - an air battalion was created as part of the army transport command. In April 1919, the unit had already become a division under the command of Major General Ikutaro Inouye.

As a result of a trip to France by the mission of Colonel Faure, which included 63 experienced pilots, several aircraft were acquired that gained fame during the battles of the First World War. Thus, the SPAD S.13C-1 was adopted by the Japanese Imperial Army, the Nieuport-24C-1 was produced by Nakajima as a training fighter, and the Salmson 2A-2 reconnaissance aircraft was built on Kawasaki under the designation "Otsu type 1". Several machines, including the Sopwith "Pap" and "Avro" -504K, were purchased from the UK.

By May 1, 1925, an army air corps was organized, which finally elevated aviation to a military branch along with artillery, cavalry and infantry. Lieutenant General Kinichi Yasumitsu was placed at the head of the air headquarters of the corps ("Koku Hombu"). By the time the air corps was organized, it included 3,700 officers and up to 500 aircraft. Almost immediately after this, the first Japanese-designed aircraft began to enter the corps.

During the first decade of the existence of the air division, and then the corps, he took an insignificant part in the battles in the Vladivostok region in 1920 and in China in 1928 during the "Qingyang Incident". However, over the next decade, the Army Air Forces already played a significant role in the numerous conflicts unleashed by Japan. The first of these was the occupation of Manchuria in September 1931, and in January 1932, the "Shanghai Incident". By this time, the army's air force already had several types of Japanese-designed aircraft in service, including the Mitsubishi Type 87 light bomber, the Kawasaki Type 88 reconnaissance aircraft, and the Nakajima Type 91 fighter. These aircraft allowed the Japanese to easily gain superiority over the Chinese. As a result of these conflicts, the Japanese organized the puppet state of Manchukuo. Since that time, the Japanese Army Aviation has launched an extensive program of modernization and expansion of its forces, leading to the development of many of the types of aircraft with which the Japanese entered the Second World War.

During this rearmament program, on July 7, 1937, fighting resumed in China, which escalated into a full-scale war - "the second Sino-Japanese incident." In the initial period of the war, army aviation was forced to give up leadership in conducting the main offensive operations of the aviation of its eternal rival, the fleet, and limited itself only to covering ground units in the Manchuria region, forming new units and subunits.

By this time, the main unit of army aviation was an air regiment - "hiko rentai", consisting of fighter, bomber and reconnaissance (or transport) squadrons ("chutai"). The first experience of fighting in China required the reorganization of units, and a specialized, smaller unit was created - a group ("sentai"), which became the basis of Japanese aviation during the Pacific War.

Sentai usually consisted of three chutais with 9-12 aircraft and a headquarters unit - "sentai hombu". The group was led by a lieutenant commander. Sentai united in air divisions - "hikodan" under the command of a colonel or major general. Typically, the Hikodan consisted of three sentai in various combinations of "sentoki" (fighter), "keibaku" (light bomber) and "yubaku" (heavy bomber) units. Two or three hikodan were "hikosidan" - the air army. Depending on the needs of the tactical situation, separate subunits of a smaller composition than the sentai were created - "dokuri dai shizugo chutai" (separate squadron) or "dokuri hikotai" (separate air wings).

The high command of the army aviation was subordinated to the "daikhonei" - the imperial supreme headquarters and directly to the "sanbo soho" - the chief of staff of the army. Subordinate to the chief of staff was "koku sokambu" - the highest aviation inspection (responsible for the training of flight and technical personnel) and "koku hombu" - air headquarters, which, in addition to combat control, were responsible for the development and production of aircraft and aircraft engines.

With the arrival of new aircraft of Japanese design and production, as well as the training of flight personnel, the aviation of the imperial army was increasingly used in battles in China. At the same time, Japanese army aviation twice participated in short-term conflicts with the Soviet Union near Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. The clash with Soviet aircraft had a serious impact on the views of the Japanese army. In the eyes of the army headquarters, the Soviet Union became the main potential adversary. With an eye to this, requirements for new aircraft and equipment were developed and military airfields were built along the border with Transbaikalia. Therefore, the air staff first of all demanded from the aircraft a relatively short flight range and the ability to operate in severe frosts. As a result, army planes turned out to be completely unprepared for flights over the expanses of the Pacific Ocean.

During the planning of operations in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, army aviation, due to its technical limitations, had to primarily operate over the mainland and large islands - over China, Malaya, Burma, the East Indies and the Philippines. By the beginning of the war, army aviation from the available 1,500 aircraft allocated 650 to the 3rd Hikosidan for an attack on Malaya and to the 5th Hikosidan, operating against the Philippines.

3rd hikosidan included:

3rd hikodan

7th hikodan

10th hikodan

70th Chutai - 8 Ki-15;

12th hikodan

15th hikotai

50 Chutai - 5 Ki-15 and Ki-46;

51st Chutai - 6 Ki-15 and Ki-46;

83rd hikotai

71st Chutai - 10 Ki-51s;

73rd Chutai - 9 Ki-51s;

89th Chutai - 12 Ki-36;

12th Chutai - Ki-57

5th hikosidan included:

4th hikodan

10th hikotai

52nd Chutai - 13 Ki-51s;

74th Chutai - 10 Ki-36s;

76th Chutai - 9 Ki-15s and 2 Ki-46s;

11th Chutai - Ki-57.

During the first nine months of the war, the aviation of the Japanese army achieved impressive success. Only in Burma did the British pilots and American volunteers meet with rather serious resistance. With the growth of Allied resistance on the borders of India, the Japanese offensive stalled by July 1942. During the battles of this period, Japanese pilots proved themselves well in battles with the "collection" of aircraft samples that the Allies had collected in the Far East.

From the autumn of 1942 to October 1944, the Japanese army was embroiled in a war of attrition, suffering ever-increasing losses in the battles in New Guinea and China. Despite the fact that the Allies gave priority to the war in Europe, during these two years they managed to achieve a numerical superiority of their aircraft in Asia. There they were opposed by all the same aircraft of the Japanese army, developed before the war and already rapidly aging. The Japanese did not have to wait for the arrival of modern cars in large numbers. This was especially true for bombers. Both the Mitsubishi Ki-21 and the Kawasaki Ki-48 had too little bomb load, weak armament, and an almost complete lack of armor protection for the crew and tank protection. The fighter units that received the Ki-61 Hien were in a slightly better position, but the army's fighter aviation was still based on the poorly armed and low-speed Ki-43 Hayabusa. Only the reconnaissance officer Ki-46 was up to the task.

By October 1944, as the war entered a new phase and the Allies landed in the Philippines, the Japanese army began to receive modern Mitsubishi Ki-67 bombers and Nakajima Ki-84 fighters. New machines could no longer help the Japanese in the face of the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Allied aviation, defeats followed one after another. In the end, the war came to the doorstep of Japan itself.

The raids on the Japanese Islands began on June 15, 1944, first from bases in China, then from the Pacific Islands. The Japanese army was forced to deploy numerous fighter units to protect the metropolis, but all available Ki-43, Ki-44, Ki-84, Ki-61 and Ki-100 fighters did not have the necessary flight performance to effectively counter the raids " Superfortresses". In addition, Japanese aviation turned out to be completely unprepared to repel night raids. The twin-engine Kawasaki Ki-45 turned out to be the only acceptable night fighter, but the lack of a locator and low speed made it ineffective. All this was superimposed by a constant shortage of fuel and spare parts. The Japanese command saw a way out in the use of a fairly large mass of obsolete aircraft in suicidal (tayatari) kamikaze sorties, which were first used in the defense of the Philippines. The capitulation of Japan put an end to all this.