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Over its fifty-year history, the MiG-15 aircraft has gained wide world fame and needs no special introduction. It became the first mass-produced jet fighter in service with both the USSR Air Force and many other countries of the world. A lot has been written about the MiG-15, but, unfortunately, mainly about its service outside the Soviet Union. We think it is not worth bothering the reader with a retelling of foreign publications about the work on the production, improvement and operation of the aircraft in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries, there are already plenty of materials about this. Therefore, we will focus on the little-known pages of the biography of the "fifteenth" in the USSR, as well as his combat work in the sky of the Korean Peninsula in 1950-53.
The main and most striking event in the combat career of the MiG-15 was the Korean War. MiGs began combat operations from the beginning of November 1950. The first fighters in the sky over North Korea appeared 151 GvIAD, which included 28 and 72 GvIAP, and 28 IAD, consisting of 139 GvIAP and 67 IAP. The regiments of these divisions, armed with the MiG-15 with the RD-45F engine (hereinafter simply the MiG-15), were based at the airfields of Northeast China, Mukden, Anshan and Liaoyang. On November 1, the MiGs of the 151st GvIAD and the 28th IAD carried out several group flights to the Sinuiju area and conducted two air battles with F-51 and F-80 fighters, the pilots of the 72nd GvIAP lieutenants Chizhu and Khominich were credited with two victories, the first for Soviet pilots in the Korean War: one over the Mustang and one over the Shooting Star.
The very first battles with UN aircraft showed that the MiG is significantly superior to its "opponents" F-51, F-80 and F9F in almost all respects, with the exception of horizontal maneuverability. The MiG-15 turned out to be a deadly enemy for the B-29, the main striking force of the US Far Eastern Air Force. The US Air Force and Navy, which formed the basis of the United Nations aviation, lost the undivided air supremacy that they had enjoyed almost from the very beginning of the Korean War. For them, the appearance of a new Soviet fighter over Korea, which has excellent flight and tactical characteristics, turned out to be an unpleasant surprise, which is why the Americans called the MiG-15 "Korean surprise."
At the end of November 1950, 64 IAK was formed from the 151st Guards, 28th and 50th IAD, specially designed for combat operations over North Korea. However, after the formation of the corps 28 IAD did not participate in the battles, in December it was relocated to the area of the city of Qingdao, where it began to train pilots of the Chinese Air Force in flying jet technology. 151 GvIAD also took up “pedagogy”, having temporarily switched off from the hostilities. The entire burden of the air war fell on the shoulders of the pilots of the 29th GvIAP and 177th IAP of the 50th division.
50 IAD was the first to come to the Korean War on the MiG-15bis. The first sorties of the Encores were carried out on November 30 from the Anshan airfield to intercept bombers in the Sinuiju region, but they did not meet with the enemy. The next day, the flight of the 29th GvIAP group to the same area and with the same task ended in an air battle, the first for the MiG-15bis in the Korean War. On the evening of December 3, the 29th GvIAP relocated to the Andong forward airfield, the 177th IAP began operating from Andong on December 15 with one AE, and from December 25 with the entire composition.
The very first battles with American fighters revealed a serious design and manufacturing defect - a weak design of the elevator in the area of the weight balancer and the external mount to the stabilizer. The high speeds and overloads common in aerial combat repeatedly led to the deformation of the elevator. In two cases, the deformation of the rudders, and possibly their destruction, led to the loss of two aircraft and the death of two pilots.
After the arrival of the called team of finalizers from the production plant, the engineering and technical staff of the 50th IAD and factory specialists jointly cured all the MiG-15bis of the division from the ill-fated defect - reinforcing pads were riveted to the stabilizers and elevators in the area of \u200b\u200bthe outer bracket for mounting the rudder and the weight balancer. In total, 5 stabilizers and 15 weight balancers were repaired; on 35 MiGs, the elevators were completely replaced. And although in the 50th division there were several cases of deformation of the rudders later, there were no more accidents due to the weak design of the horizontal tail either in the 50th IAD or in other units and formations of the 64th Corps that fought in Korea later.
In the December battles, the pilots of the 50th IAD also encountered a whole "bunch" of very unpleasant phenomena that occur at high speeds and Mach numbers. The division's documents report that: "... at a speed of 1050-1100 km / h, the MiG-15 is poorly controlled and unstable, which makes it difficult to aim and fire at enemy aircraft." What exactly is meant by this, the archival document does not explain, but we are unlikely to be mistaken in asserting that the pilots of the 50th IAD, and possibly the entire 64th Corps, for the first time met with the “fallen tree”, and with a decrease in the effectiveness of the rudders, and with feedback on the roll when the rudder is deflected, and with the weighting of control at transonic speeds, which were discussed above.
In December 1950, the Americans, concerned about the situation in the sky over North Korea, brought F-84 Thunderjet and F-86 Saber fighters into battle. The F-84, which was superior to the Shooting Star, but nevertheless, was an enemy of the same class for the MiG as the F-80, could not seriously affect the course of air battles, but the Saber, which first met with the MiG-15bis December 17, 1950, significantly changed the picture of the air war. In the month and a half preceding the appearance of the F-86, Soviet regiments lost 3 vehicles from enemy fighter fire and lost the same number from December 17 to December 31, in less than a dozen battles with Sabers. The first meeting of the "fifteenth" and "eighty-sixth" ended in victory for the American pilot: Major Efromeenko's MiG-15bis was shot down in an air battle. Our pilot, for the first time in combat conditions, successfully ejected. On December 21, the first victory over the F-86 was counted, it was won by Captain Yurkevich from 29 GvIAP, however, according to American data, the first Saber was lost only the next day, it was shot down by Captain Vorobyov from 177 IAP.
Our pilots highly appreciated the new enemy. In their opinion, the 50th IAD, MiG-15bis and F-86 were approximately equivalent, as recorded in the documents, and the main advantage of the MiG was a more powerful weapon - three cannons against six 12.7-mm machine guns, while the Saber had superiority in horizontal maneuver . And surprisingly, the documents of the 50th IAD say that the F-86 and MiG-15bis "have equal qualities on the verticals"! But now it is well known that until the end of the war, not a single UN aircraft, including the new Saber modifications that appeared later, surpassed the MiG-15bis in vertical maneuver! In our opinion, the secret here is simple - the same documents state that our fighters searched for the enemy at a speed of 750-800 km/h, thus excluding falling into the speed range starting from 950 km/h, where problems with stability and controllability of the MiG. The pilots of the Sabers, on the contrary, kept their speed close to the limit while patrolling, and when meeting MiGs, their excess could easily be “exchanged” for altitude. In addition, our pilots were probably afraid to maneuver with large overloads at high speeds - they were too fresh in the memory of the disaster due to the destruction of the elevator mount. And air combat without energetic maneuvers is nonsense. Only when the fighters of the divisions that fought in Korea after the 50th increased the search speed to 900-950 km / h, everything fell into place - on the vertical, the MiG-15bis easily caught up with the Saber and just as easily left it.
The battles also revealed the shortcomings of the ASP-ZN sight and the S-13 camera gun. At target speeds of more than 600 km/h and an angle of more than 2/4, the sight did not develop the correct lead angle, and at target speeds of more than 800 km/h it could provide accurate shooting only at angles of no more than 1/4. If the speed of the target exceeded 600 km / h, then the photo-movie gun did not fix it even at a 2/4 angle.
In early February 1951, 151 GvIAD replaced the 50th division on Andong, which returned to the Union. By this time, the 28th and 72nd GvIAPs had transferred their MiG-15s to the 3rd IAD of the PLA Air Force and received the MiG-15bis from the regiments of the 50th IAD. On February 8, the 28th GvIAP began combat operations from Andong, on March 2nd the 72nd GvIAP squadron joined it, another AE of this regiment appeared on March 14th. Two more months of active combat with the F-80, F-86 and B-29 allowed the pilots of the 64 IAK to formulate requirements for improving the MiG-15bis, which first appeared in the documents of the Corps. Mostly, the pilots demanded from the creators of the aircraft:
Increase the efficiency of brake pads;
Increase flight duration;
Improve visibility of the rear hemisphere;
Give the opportunity to fly at М>0.92 (Restriction of the Chief Designer);
Eliminate the "valezhka";
Increase ammunition;
Equip aircraft of 64 IAK with aircraft transponder SRO-1 "Bariy-M" (identification "friend or foe");
Improve handling at high speeds and altitudes;
Install a minimum fuel pressure automatic device on the engine to prevent the engine from stopping during abrupt operation of the throttle at high altitudes (according to modern terminology, an automatic throttle response and discharge);
Equip the aircraft with an anti-g suit;
Improve booking;
To reduce the visibility of aircraft in the air, replace the "white" shiny color of the aircraft with a colorless varnish for a matte one.
At the beginning of April 1951, 151 GvIAD finished hostilities and moved to Anshan - to the second echelon of 64 IAK. On Andong, it was replaced by 176 GvIAP and 196 IAP 324 IAD. The flight echelon of the 176th regiment flew to the forward airfield on April 1, the next day, aircraft of the 196th regiment arrived in Andong. The division was armed with 62 MiG-15s. On these machines, the pilots of the 324th IAD fought tense battles from April 3 to the end of the month. On the MiG-15, they also carried out one of the most famous and successful battles of 64 IAK, reflecting a raid by 48 B-29s (under cover of a large number of fighters) on bridges across the river. Yalujiang near Andong on April 12. However, it was difficult to fight the Sabers on the MiG-15, and as a result of the persistent demands of the flight crew and the command of the 324th IAD, at the end of April, the division exchanged materiel with the 151st GvIAD, receiving 47 encores. From that moment on, the regiments and divisions of the 64 IAK fought only on the MiG-15bis. At the end of May, 324 IAD received 16 new "encores" of the 13th series of plant No. 153.
On May 8, the 18 GvIAP 303 IAD began hostilities from the Andong airfield, with the commissioning of the new Miaogou forward airfield, two other regiments of the 303 division, 17 and 523 IAP, were relocated to it in late May - early June, which since mid-June went into battle. At the beginning of the next month, the 18th Guards Regiment also moved to Miaogou. The 303rd division was armed with the MiG-15bis. Losses of 303 and 324 IAD were replenished with aircraft received from MAP factories and transferred from other units.
The 11 months of participation of the 303rd and 324th IADs in the Korean War was the period of the greatest success of the 64th Corps. Having mastered the skies over the Korean Peninsula, the well-trained pilots of these divisions fought successfully against the Sabers and repelled attacks by UN strike aircraft, performing the main and only task of the 64 IAK, which was to cover bridges, crossings and airfields in the area of the city of Kosovo from air strikes. Andong, the Suphun hydroelectric power station, industrial enterprises, administrative centers, facilities for the rear of the KPA and CPV troops and transport communications of Northeast China and North Korea north of the Pyongyang-Wonsan border. From the beginning of autumn 1951, American fighter-bombers did not dare to appear in the "MiG Alley" - an area bounded from the north and west by the river. Yalujiang and the West Korea Bay, and from the south and east by the border - Anju-Hichkhon-Jian, - without the powerful cover of the Sabers. The Bomber Command of the US Far East Air Force generally abandoned the use of B-29s north of Pyongyang during daylight hours, transferring them to night operations. The reason for this was the heavy losses of the bomber groups suffered in battles with the MiGs of the 303rd IAD from October 22 to October 27, 1951. "Superfortress" 307 BAG, under the powerful cover of fighters that attacked the Namsi airfield, the Americans lost 10 bombers. All the damage to the fighters of the 303rd division, inflicted by the B-29 gunners in the October battles, amounted to only a few holes - the calculating devices of the Superfortress aiming systems were not designed for the speed with which the MiGs broke through to the bombers through the fighter cover.
Many first-class pilots fought in 303 and 324 IAD. Unfortunately, due to lack of space, we can not only tell about them all, but even just list their names. We will name only those who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for successful combat work in the Korean sky. Of the 22 "Korean" Heroes, 18 fought in 303 and 324 IAD. Here they are (after the surname in brackets the number of official victories in Korea is given): E.G. Pepelyaev (19), N.V. Sutyagin (22), D.P. Oskin (15), L.K. Schukin (15), SM. Kramarenko (13), A.P. Smorchkov (12), M.S. Ponomarev (12), S.A. Bakhaev (11), G.U. Ohai (11), D.A. Samoilov (10), SP. Subbotin (9), N.G. Dokashenko (9), G.I. Ges (8), G.I. Pulov (8), F.A. Shebanov (6), G.A. Lobov (4), B.A. Obraztsov (4), E.M. Stelmakh (2). B.S. Abakumov (5), V.N. Alfeev (7), B.V. Bokach (6), I.M. Zaplavnev (7), L.N. Ivanov (7), A.I. Mitusov (7).
The richest combat experience of the pilots of the 303rd and 324th IAD, obtained in intense battles with almost all types of enemy aircraft in service with the US Air Force Far East, made it possible to most fully and accurately assess all the main advantages and disadvantages of the MiG-15bis and develop recommendations for its further improvement. Naturally, in the first place, the MiG-15bis was compared with the Saber, an aircraft of the same purpose as the MiG, created almost simultaneously.
The main advantages of the MiG-15bis in combat with the F-86 were a significantly larger practical ceiling, a decisive superiority in maximum rate of climb and vertical maneuver at all altitudes, especially at high altitudes. About how these advantages of the MiG were manifested in battle, says D. A. Samoilov, who fought in Korea as part of the 523 IAP:
“On September 9, 1951, I made the first flight as a leading pair and shot down one F-86 on the same flight. It turned out as follows. We flew in six in the Anju region, where, basically, all the air battles began - there were crossings there, the Americans often stormed them. And now we are being told from a ground observation point: “Who is going in six? You're being attacked by 24 Sabers!" We looked, and they - now, close. What to do? Ojai led the six. He immediately went to the loop, I was on the left and went to the left combat turn, and the right pair went to the right combat turn. So, like a fan, they seem to have dispersed. Eight Sabers immediately followed me. They attacked us from above, they had an advantage in speed, and at the first stage they even seemed to be approaching. They have already begun to shoot from a distance of 1000 m. I shout to Mishka Zykov, the follower: “Hold on!” - he was inside me on a U-turn. And I did not turn anything else, but started a left upward spiral. Sabers attacked us at an altitude of about 6-6.5 thousand meters and drove thousands, probably up to 11. But already at about 10.5, I saw that one four of the Sabers fell off and went down. And my speed was also almost at the limit, I could barely walk. But, I see, after that four, another pair fell off, and somewhere around 11 thousand, the last pair could not stand it either - it fell off and went down. I looked around - the sky is clear, there is no one, made a half-turn - and behind her. They may not have expected me to follow them. In short, I caught up with this pair and shot down one plane.
In battles, it turned out that the MiG-15bis, compared to the F-86, at all altitudes has a slightly higher maximum horizontal flight speed, better acceleration characteristics. However, the pilots of the 64th IAK expressed a desire to increase the maximum horizontal flight speed by 100-150 km / h, since the superiority of the MiG-15bis was not great. The increase in speed data would be facilitated by an increase in engine thrust, as an option - with the help of afterburner. Such an event "killed" several "hares" at once: an increase in thrust would give a significant improvement in throttle response, and success in battle often depended on how quickly the aircraft gained maximum speed when it was lost in aerobatics, quickly accelerated when catching up with the enemy or moving away from him. In addition, an increase in thrust would improve the vertical maneuver. The advantage of the MiG in the verticals, which ensured success in the battle with the Saber, was well known to the enemy and it was expected that the Americans would try to eliminate it by improving the vertical maneuver of the F-86. Another "hare": a quick acceleration to maximum speed after dropping the PTB would allow flying to the battle area in the most favorable engine mode, thereby increasing the range.
At first glance, claims to the range and duration of the MiG-15bis may seem strange, because it cannot be said that the MiG was radically inferior to the Saber in these parameters, especially since the American fighters were based much further from the main combat zone of the Anju region (MiGs - 120 km, F-86 - 260-295 km), however, the real combat The situation turned everything upside down. MiGs were flown to intercept in large groups and the duration of the flight was determined by the aircraft that took off first, averaging 40-50 minutes. For quick interception, the flight to the battle area was carried out at high speeds, while the speed differed from the maximum only by a margin to keep the followers in the ranks. Accordingly, the engines most of the flight, sometimes up to 80% of the flight time, worked in combat mode, which significantly increased fuel consumption. The flight profile was based not on the conditions of maximum range and duration, but on the basis of maximum safety from enemy attacks. Climbing along the route was not used, the gathering of groups in battle formations and the occupation of combat heights were carried out over airfields. The exit from the battle and return to the base were carried out at maximum speeds, the descent for landing was carried out over the airfield. In addition, for attacks on American fighter-bombers, MiGs had to descend to low altitudes, which also significantly increased fuel consumption. Hanging tanks helped little, as they were usually dumped when they still had 30-40% of fuel left, and sometimes even completely full. The Sabers were in a much better position. Taking advantage of the restrictions on the area of operation of the MiGs (the coast of the West Korean Gulf and the Pyongyang-Wonsan border), caused by purely political reasons, the F-86 flew to the combat area, patrolled it and returned to their bases according to the most advantageous profile in the most advantageous engine operating mode, completely using fuel from PTB. As a result, in the Anju area, the eight Sabers could be up to 30-40 minutes, and the MiG squadron - 15bis - a maximum of 20.
The main advantages of the Saber were the high maximum allowable dive speed and the best horizontal maneuver.
The chief designer for the MiG-15bis set a limit of M = 0.92. Strict enforcement of this limitation would make it difficult to successfully fight the F-86. The battles with the Sabers took place at speeds often exceeding M = 0.92, because both the enemy and our fighters pressed close to the sound barrier. In the combat mode of the engine, the maximum speed of the MiG-15bis along the horizon at altitudes of 5000-12000 m corresponded to M = 0.89-0.92 and there was no speed reserve for descending with the engine running. With a sharp descent with the engine running at maximum speed, the Saber left the MiG even if the latter's pilot exceeded the Mach number allowed by the Chief Designer. The experience of the battles showed that the success of the MiG-15bis in the confrontation with the F-86 was due primarily to the fact that the flight crew of the 64th IAK perfectly mastered piloting at M> 0.92. Usually, battles were fought at Mach numbers up to 0.95-0.96, but large numbers of M were not uncommon - often during a dive for the Saber at high altitude, the arrow of the machmeter reached the stop corresponding to M = 0.98. Therefore, in battle, if it was possible to follow the instruments, the pilots looked not at the machmeter, but at the true speed indicator. The MiG-15bis Uist.max = 1050-1070 km / h (for altitudes of 5000-10000 m M = 0.91-0.99) and was approximately the same for all altitudes and all aircraft. Many pilots reached Uist = 1100 km/h, incl. and at an altitude of 9000-10000 m (M-1.0). The main obstacle to achieving high speeds was the deterioration of the stability and controllability of the MiG, which manifested itself in such phenomena as “falling”, rollback and excessive efforts on the control stick.
"Valezhka" was the main factor limiting the maximum speed of the MiG-15bis, and, subject to the Chief Designer's limit M = 0.92, it appeared only at low altitudes. It started at approximately the same true speed for all altitudes, different for different aircraft, but on average 1050 km / h, which for altitudes of 5000-10000 m corresponded to М = 0.91-0.97. Above 3000 m, the "falling" was parried by the ailerons and the rudder to Uist = 1070-1100 km / h. Below 3000 m, the ailerons were not effective, and rudder actions were dangerous due to roll feedback. Therefore, when a "fall" occurred at low altitude, the pilots immediately released the air brakes and slowed down. All improvements to the MiG-15bis, undertaken to eliminate the "falling", were directed against the variety that arose at low altitudes due to wing deformation. No measures were taken to combat the high-altitude "falling" associated with the peculiarities of the flow around the MiG-15 wing at M>0.92.
The roll back reaction occurred at М = 0.86-0.87, some pilots noted its termination at М>0.95. This phenomenon was mastered by the pilots, they got used to it. All maneuvers at high speeds were performed with one stick or with the deflection of the rudder in the direction opposite to the generally accepted one. At the same time, it was necessary to operate the pedals with very small, “metered” movements, checking the reaction of the aircraft “by touch”. The rollback reaction was not among the most serious defects, but the pilots noted that it distracts from the combat mission.
The pilots of the MiG-15bis demanded an increase in the maximum allowable dive speed and requested that the limit on the number of M be replaced with a limit on Wist. At the same time, it was noted that an increase in the maximum allowable speed would require a reduction in effort on the control stick, because. when approaching M = 1, the control became difficult in the literal sense - the efforts that had to be applied to the RSS to increase the overload by one increased sharply and reached 25 kg. The conduct of the battle was likened to doing weightlifting - on a maneuver with a triple, for example, overload, the pilot had to pull the handle with a force of half a centner. According to the pilots of 64 IAK, a power elevator was needed.
MiGs, having an advantage on the verticals, tried to fight on this type of maneuver, so there were no sufficiently complete data to compare the horizontal maneuverability of the MiG-15bis and F-86. However, the experience of battles has clearly shown that the initial, unsteady part of the turn, which begins at high speed, is better for the F-86 due to the greater efficiency of air brakes, which makes it possible to lose speed faster, reduce the radius of the turn and "cut" the MiG-15bis, higher than the MiG efficiency of the ailerons, making the introduction into the turn more energetic, less effort on the control stick per unit of overload and the best load-bearing properties of the wing. The MiG, at speeds close to the maximum, could not create the overload necessary to perform a sufficiently energetic maneuver. The characteristics of the steady turn of both aircraft, according to the estimates of the flight crew of 64 IAK, were close, and the outcome of the battle was determined by the level of enemy piloting. The pilots of the Corps concluded that it was necessary to study in detail the maneuverability of the MiG-15bis, primarily at high speeds, including at M>0.92, because. in combat, exit at the speed of the most advantageous turn was not practiced.
The pilots asked to increase the effectiveness of the air brakes. This would increase the capabilities of the MiG-15bis both in combat on bends and when diving behind the Saber. Having brake flaps of a large area, the F-86 performed a coup at any height and speed, including the maximum one, and in the area of a steep dive it could perform additional turns. On the MiG-15bis, which has air brakes with an area half that of the Saber, this was impossible.
The gun armament of the MiG-15bis was considered excellent by our pilots, in their opinion the guns were one of the main "trump cards" of the MiG, but the ASP-ZN sight and the C-13 photo-machine gun caused a lot of criticism. In addition to the shortcomings mentioned above, pilots noted that during vigorous maneuvers, the moving reticle of the sight “leaves” the pilot’s field of view or blurs, making it impossible to aim. This disadvantage was exacerbated by the fact that the pilot saw on the reflector either a fixed or a moving reticle, and if the sight switch was set to “gyro”, and in a maneuverable battle the movable reticle “left” behind the hood of the aircraft or blurred, then it was necessary to switch the sight to “not under . ”, as a result, time was lost, and sometimes the very opportunity to open fire was lost. The pilots expressed the desire to have both grids on the reflector at the same time. In addition, the pilots reasonably demanded that the optical rangefinder be replaced with a radar one, because. could not control the range to the target in combat using the ASP-ZN range drum due to the fact that for this it was necessary to shift the gaze from the target to the drum. The radio rangefinder would also improve the quality of shooting, freeing the pilot from framing the target with a rangefinder ring. The main disadvantages of the C-13 were the low “rate of fire”, which needed to be at least doubled, and the lack of a time delay after releasing the combat buttons of the cannons, as a result of which the camera gun stopped working when there were another 20-30 shells between the gunner and the target.
In addition to the above, the pilots of the Corps demanded (note that some of these requirements were put forward during state tests of the experimental S-2 and S-3 and military tests of the first production MiG-15):
Install the tail guard. The main reason for our losses were sudden enemy attacks from the rear hemisphere. The view back on the MiG-15bis was hampered by the thick covers of the lantern, the armored headboard and the pilot's deep landing in the cockpit. The review needed to be improved;
Install an aircraft-to-aircraft identification system, as at ranges exceeding 2 km, it was impossible to distinguish the MiG from the Saber;
Install a multi-channel VHF radio station;
Set an artificial horizon that allows aerobatics. Available on the MiG-15bis AGK-47B with a roll of more than 30 ° gave incorrect readings;
Equip the MiG-15bis with an autonomous engine start;
Provide the pilot with an anti-g suit;
Significantly improve the pilot's armor protection;
Duplicate elevator control wiring;
Install the second ejection and canopy release control kit on the right side of the ejection seat. In the event of a pilot being wounded in the left hand lying on the ore and not covered by armor, it was very difficult to leave the plane;
Equip the ejection seat and parachute with automatic opening of seat belts and parachute. The absence of these devices repeatedly led to the fact that the wounded pilot, who lost consciousness during the ejection, died, falling to the ground along with the seat.
Some of the wishes previously expressed by the corps pilots have already been met. Instead of the ART-1K fuel regulator on the MiG 64 IAK engines, the ART-8V appeared, the same “minimum fuel pressure automatic”, which the pilots of the 151st GvIAD also asked for, the Corps began to receive aircraft equipped with Barium-M - the transponder of the state identification system. On January 3, 1952, the Ministry of Aviation Industry issued Order No. 10 "On the MiG-15bis", which ordered to paint the 64 IAK fighters with matte paint, equip the MiG-15bis with brake flaps of an increased area, install a backup control of the catapult and obliged the plant No. 153 until February 15 1952 to equip 60 Encores with three-channel VHF radios RSIU-ZM "Klen" and send them to the 64th Corps.
First they began to solve the simplest problem - the problem of coloring. To do this, a team of painters from plant No. 21 and a representative of GIPI-4 were sent to Northeast China. However, the color options proposed by GIPI-4 did not satisfy the pilots of the Corps. Therefore, in 64 IAK, they developed several of their own camouflage options that reduce the visibility of the MiG in the air and, having tested them and choosing the most suitable one, in February 1952, they began repainting the entire fleet of fighters.
In January and February 1952, the 324th and 303rd IADs completed combat work in the Korean sky and, having transferred their aircraft and technical staff to the 97th and 190th IADs that replaced them, departed for the Soviet Union. 16 IAP and 148 GvIAP of the 97th division received all MiGs - 15bis of the 324th IAD and 6 "encores" of the 303rd division. 256, 494 and 821 IAP 190 IAD received new “encores” of the 20th series and the remaining vehicles of the regiments of the 303rd IAD from factory No. 153. In March 1952, the 97th division handed over its aircraft to the 190th IAD and the night 351st IAP, in exchange for the new MiG-15bis of factory No. 153, equipped with RSIU-ZM radios. Later, the 97th IAD was replenished with aircraft of the 27th and 28th series of the Novosibirsk plant, and the 190th IAD was replenished with the 26th.
The regiments of the 97th and 190th divisions operated from the airfields of Andong, Miaogou, Anshan, Mukden-Western and Dapu (commissioned from the end of June 1952). The beginning of the combat work of these formations cannot be called successful. In terms of the level of training, their pilots were noticeably inferior to their predecessors, the entry into battle was short and the pilots of the 303rd and 324th IAD did not have time to fully transfer their experience. At the same time, at the end of 1951 - the beginning of 1952, there was a sharp qualitative and quantitative improvement in the UN aviation group, especially its fighter component - from December 1951, the second Saber air wing, armed with new F-86E, entered the battle, by February 52- who managed to gain the necessary combat experience. Since February, the intensity of combat operations in the air has continuously increased and what happened was what should have happened - 64 IAK lost the initiative, UN aviation gained freedom of action over almost the entire territory of North Korea. But the pilots of the 97th and 190th IADs managed the seemingly impossible - after going through the most difficult unsuccessful battles of March-April, in May they began to return the initiative to their own hands. Of course, this did not come without a trace. By July 1952, the flight personnel of the 97th and 190th IADs were exhausted to the limit. Further participation of divisions in the war could lead to very high and unjustified losses.
From September 1951, the 351st IAP, a night regiment of the 64th Corps, armed with piston La-11s, began combat operations with sorties from Anshan. On these machines, night fighters quite successfully fought the B-26, but Lavochkin could not resist the B-29, which switched to operations in the MiG Alley at night, from November 51st. It was decided to connect the MiG-15bis to night operations. Of all the serial Soviet fighters of that time, he most fully met the requirements for an interceptor of aircraft like the B-29, which was clearly demonstrated in daytime battles with "fortresses". In addition, the MiG-15bis, which had the OSP-48 blind landing equipment, was better than the La-11 for flying at night and in adverse weather conditions (SMU). The presence on board of the "encore" of the SRO was also very valuable. Its mark on the indicator of the circular view of the ground-based radar made it much easier for the targeting officer to control his fighters and aim them at the target. Thanks to the installation of its own transponder code on each of the MiGs in the air, the guidance officer could not only distinguish his aircraft from enemy aircraft, but also distinguish our fighters from each other.
Above: Major Kultyshev on a stepladder, in the middle: Captain Karelin on a stepladder, below: in the cockpit of Art. Lieutenant Ikhsangaliyev.
The MiG weapons were also more powerful, but the biggest advantage of the MiG-15 weapons was its layout. MiG guns were located under the forward fuselage, which hid their muzzles from the pilot's eyes. Unlike the "fifteenth", the La-11 weapon was located in the upper part of the fuselage under the engine hood - right in front of the cockpit. As a result, after the first round, the muzzle flame of the cannons, especially bright in the darkness of the night, blinded the Lavochkin pilot for some time and, as a rule, he lost his target. Therefore, a repeated night attack on La-11 was possible only against a well-lit target. The MiG-15 was devoid of this shortcoming.
The first "night lights" on MiGs were the pilots of the 324 IAD, one link of which, from December 1951, began night interceptions. After the departure of the 324th IAD, the baton was taken over by the night AE of the 97th division, in addition, one squadron of the 351st IAP, which received 12 aircraft from the 16th and 148th regiments, began to retrain on the MiG-15bis. Retraining was completed by mid-May, and on the 16th, having relocated to Andong, MiGs 351 IAP entered the battle. At the same time, the 133rd IAD squadron, which arrived at the KTVD in early April, began hostilities at night from the Miaogou airfield. On June 10, night MiGs achieved their first success, destroying 2 B-29s in one battle and heavily damaging another, the last one crashed during an emergency landing in South Korea. In the West, this fight is put on a par with Black Tuesday. During the fighting, a fundamental drawback of the MiG - 15bis as a night interceptor was revealed - the absence of a surveillance and aiming radar on it. The pilots of the Corps demanded that the MiG be equipped with an onboard locator.
In the summer of 1952, another change of divisions of 64 IAK took place. In the first half of July, 147 GvIAP, 415 and 726 IAP 133 IAD were relocated to the advanced airfields of Andong and Dapu, in August 32 and 216 IAD replaced the 97th and 190th divisions. The 518th, 676th and 878th regiments of the 216th IAD began sorties from Miaogou and Dapu, the 224th, 535th and 913th IAP of the 32nd division in 1952 operated from the airfields of the 2nd line with the exception of night AE 535 IAP, which operated from Andong since the end of November. In September, the 578th IAP of the VVS of the 5th Navy began combat operations (as the Pacific Fleet was called at that time). The regiment arrived at the KTVD without aircraft and technical staff and was operationally subordinate to the 133rd division, replacing the pilots of the 726th IAP on Andong.
In the second half of January 1953, the regiments of the 133rd IAD moved to the airfields of the 2nd line, on Andong and Dapu they were replaced by the regiments of the 32nd IAD, which operated from these airfields until the end of the Korean War. In March-April, one squadron of 913 IAP was based at the new Kuandyan airfield.
In February, 351 and 578 IAP departed for the Soviet Union, they were replaced by 298 IAP and 781 IAP of the Air Force of the 5th Navy. The 298th regiment conducted combat operations at night from the Andong and Miaogou airfields, and the 781st, which did not have its own aircraft, was operationally subordinate to the 216th IAD, replacing its pilots at the Dapu and Miaogou airfields. This composition - 32, 216 IAD, 298 and 352 IAP at the advanced airfields of Andong, Miaogou, Dapu and regiments of 133 IAD at the airfields of the 2nd echelon Mukden-Western and Anshan - was preserved until the end of the Korean War.
From the second half of 1952, the intensity of combat operations in the air during daylight hours continued to increase. Fights, in which more than a hundred aircraft participated from each side, became commonplace. Such air battles, consisting of many skirmishes of units and squadrons, covered almost the entire territory of North Korea. Particularly fierce fighting took place in the MiG Alley and over the adjacent regions of Northeast China. The fighting did not subside even with the worsening of the weather. Interception sorties in the SMU became common, especially since the spring of 1953. Sometimes the battles were fought in the rain, with a 10-point cloud cover, when the horizontal visibility barely exceeded a kilometer, and sometimes in such conditions the pilots of 64 IAK had to chase fighter-bombers at low altitude , between the hills.
The intensity of hostilities at night also steadily increased, reaching its climax in late 1952 - early 1953. In the air battles of December-January, the US Air Force Far East Bomber Command lost 8 B-29s, which was comparable to the losses in October 1951. As a result, the Americans refused and From the night use of B-29s north of Pyongyang under simple weather conditions, since February, Superfortresses have invaded MiG Alley only in bad, and more often very bad, weather at the darkest time of the day. However, the use of B-29 in SMU had little effect on their effectiveness, because. the bombing was carried out by the Americans with the help of the Shoran radio-technical system, which was independent of the weather. At the same time, the effectiveness of the MiGs' actions decreased to almost zero - in the absence of an onboard radar, the successful interception of the Superfortress at night in the clouds was an impossible task.
In 1952-53 the qualitative improvement of the UN aviation grouping continued. Since the summer of 1952, fighter wings began to receive the F-86F, the most advanced of the Saber modifications that fought in Korea. Its main difference from the F-86E was the engine with a 20% increase in thrust, which significantly improved the high-altitude characteristics, rate of climb and vertical maneuver of the new Saber, making it much more difficult to fight with it. In the spring of 1953, two fighter-bomber wings and one fighter-bomber squadron began combat operations on the F-86F-25 and F-86F-30, rearming from the F-51 and F-80 to the strike version of the Saber. At the end of 1952, the F3D and F-94 night fighters, equipped with airborne search and targeting radars, began combat operations, and jet fighter-bombers operated in MiG Alley at night.
In 1952-53. the pilots of the 64th IAK did not have such high-profile successes as in 1951. This is due to the fact that the fighters of the 97th, 190th, 133rd, 216th and 32nd IADs had to fight in more difficult conditions, in addition, the average level of training of the pilots of these divisions was noticeably lower than from their colleagues from 303 and 324 IAD. However, in these divisions there were many excellent air fighters. The fact that their combat accounts look more modest than those of their predecessors does not in the least detract from their merits - the air situation was different, in addition, at the beginning of 1952, another tightening of the system for confirming downed enemy aircraft took place. Unfortunately, as in the case of the pilots of 303 and 324 IAD, we cannot mention them all. To name just a few (after the surname, the number of official victories in Korea is given in brackets): V.M. Zabelin (9), M.I. Mikhin (9, awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union), S.A. Fedorets (7), A.S. Boytsov (6, awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union), N.M. Zameskin (6), A.T. Bashman (5), G.N. Berelidze (5), G.F. Dmitryuk (5), A.A. Olenitsa (5), B.N. Siskov (5), V.I. Belousov (4), V.A. Zhuravel (4), V.P. Lepikov (4), B.C. Mikheev (4), V.A. Utkin (4), M.F. Yudin (4), A.A. Alekseenko (4), A.M. Balabaykin (4), A.I. Krylov (4), G.A. Nikiforov (4), F.G. Afanasiev (3), I.P. Vakhrushev (3), K.N. Degtyarev (3), A.N. Zakharov (3), N.I. Ivanov (3), A.T. Kostenko (3), P.V. Minervin (3), A.R. Prudnikov (3), P.F. Shevelev (3), N.I. Shkodin (3). Of the night fighters, the A.M. Karelin (6 V-29, awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union) and Yu.N. Dobrovichan (3 V-29).
In 1952-53. MiG-15bis 64 IAK underwent a large number of improvements, during which the wishes of the pilots of the Corps, expressed in 1951, were fulfilled.
At the beginning of 1952, all MiG-15bis that did not have a Bariy-M transponder were equipped with it, and from February they put into operation a state identification system. In addition to the use of the SRO for its intended purpose, it was used outside the box in night combat operations - a code was set on the airborne transponders of each of the MiGs in the air.
In March 1952, 16-mm armored backs appeared on the ejection seats of the MiGs, more powerful armored headrests, and pyrocylinders were armored. Due to the increased weight of the seat, the squibs were replaced with more powerful ones. In the same spring, ejection seats were equipped with AD-3 seat belt opening machines, and parachutes with KAP-3 opening machines. Now, after ejection, regardless of the condition of the pilot, the seat was separated from him and the parachute opened at a certain height. In the second half of the summer, a second catapult bracket for the right hand appeared on the seats.
At the end of August, the installation of enlarged brake flaps on the MiG-15bis 64 IAK began, while their area increased from 0.5 to 0.82 m. other "encores" of the Corps. This improvement greatly improved the maneuverability of the MiG.
Speaking at the tactical flight conference in the fall of 1952, M.I. Mikhin, who fought in 518 IAP, described one of his battles, carried out on an aircraft not yet equipped with enlarged brake flaps:
“08/19/52 in the area southwest of Sakushu (now Sakchu - author) 25-30 km, I found two F-86s following on opposite intersecting courses at a distance of 2.5-3 km at an altitude of 9300 m with a heading of 220 in elongated right "bearing". Our group of 6 MiG-15s followed in the right "bearing" of pairs at an interval of 500-600 m and a distance of 800-1000 m from a pair. Having received an order from the commander of the AE, Captain Molchanov: “Attack the enemy!”, - I am paired with Art. Lieutenant Yakovlev performed a right combat turn and ended up on the left rear, above the enemy at a distance of 600-700 m. The enemy began to perform a right turn, I switched to the left side and, approaching a distance of 500 m, opened fire, but the route passed from behind. Having adjusted my aiming, I opened fire again from a distance of 250-300 m, as a result of which the F-86 was covered by the highway, caught fire and began to fall randomly. The exit from the attack is made to the right up.
This battle showed that the F-86 can be shot down on a turn, but only in its first part, since the F-86, after releasing the brake flaps, turns with a smaller radius than the MiG-15.
How the maneuvering characteristics of the MiG-15bis, which received more effective air brakes, have changed, is well illustrated by the materials of the 32 IAD flight tactical conference held in August 1953. They still did not recommend chasing the Sabers on a dive and leaving them with a sharp decline , including due to the continued superiority of the F-86 in the effectiveness of air brakes. It was also not recommended to get involved in battles with the Sabers on a horizontal maneuver. At the same time, it was noted that if the F-86s reached the rear of the MiG at a distance of actual fire, then it was impossible to leave in a straight line or with a climb, it was necessary to take the battle on a turn. In this case, the MiG pilot, who has mastered his machine well, has every chance of success even in a battle with a numerically superior enemy. An experienced pilot could successfully pursue the Saber in a dive. Speaking at the conference, the inspector-pilot of the division for piloting technique and flight theory, Major A.T. Kostenko proved these points with examples from his own combat experience:
“On February 19, 1953, in the patrol area of the Suphun HPP, I met a pair of F-86s that were turning towards me. I went on the attack and approached at a distance of 100-200 m under the angle of 2/4, at this time the leader of the second pair of art. Lieutenant Aleksandrov opened barrage fire on a collision course. The lead F-86 pair makes a sharp turn to the right with a climb, and the wingman makes a left turn. I also made a left turn and started chasing the Saber in a dive. When the Saber started withdrawing, I opened fire and shot it down...
On May 17, 1953, I flew out in a group with the regiment commander (913 IAP - author) - the leader of the 2nd pair. In the patrol area over the Suphun hydroelectric power station, when performing a left turn, we were attacked by a pair of F-86s from the left from behind from a 3/4 angle. I gave the command: “We are under attack, turn to the left,” and turned to the enemy, the leading pair and my wingman went climbing in a straight line, and I was left alone and began to fight with a pair of Sabers. The height was 13000 m.
The battle began on a turn with a decrease. At the beginning of the turn, the F-86 began to tail me, I released the air brakes and began to pull sharply. When the speed decreases, the MiG-15 turns better and sharply reduces the radius of the turn. On the second turn, I went to the tail of the F-86 and began to fire at the wingman from a 2/4 angle, approaching the enemy. The Sabers do a left coup under me, I also do a coup and chase them. The enemy performs a left combat turn. While diving, my speed reached 1050 km / h, it is very difficult to immediately bring the plane into a combat turn, I extinguished the speed to 900 km / h, after which I made a combat turn to the left and turned out to be above the F-86, where I again began the battle on a turn with guidance fire on the slave. The enemy made another coup with a dive turn to the right and stopped fighting, went towards the bay. I gave another queue for a dive and went to the landing airfield, because. fuel was running out.
The air battle ended at an altitude of 3000 M in a draw, because. my lead correction turned out to be less than it should be when shooting from a 2/4 angle. ”
Installation of the TC-27 periscope on the sliding part of the lantern.
According to the characteristics of the steady turn, the MiG-15bis was still somewhat superior to the Saber, which was well illustrated by the following example. On July 16, 1953, a MiG-15bis unit from 913 IAP under the command of Captain Pushchin covered its airfield during the landing of MiGs that had come from a combat mission. The link was above the 3rd turn. At this time, a pair of F-86s jumped out from behind the clouds and attacked the MiGs from the left from behind. From the command post they gave the command: "Turn to the left." The link began a left turn, performed 3 turns, during which time the enemy was not able to reach the tail of our fighters and get close to the distance of actual fire. Only on the 4th bend, the pilot of Art. Lieutenant Pavlov reduced the roll, the Sabers took advantage of this, opened fire and shot him down.
The MiG-15bis retained its superiority over the F-86F in rate of climb, the vertical maneuver of the MiG also remained better due to significantly lower weight with approximately the same engine thrust, which manifested itself in less time for performing figures and a slower loss of speed during piloting. However, the improvement in the F-86F's vertical maneuver significantly narrowed the gap between the MiG and the Saber, requiring greater attention in combat with it, precise piloting, and full use of the capabilities of the MiG-15bis. From the speech of the flight commander of the 224 IAP captain G.N. Berelidze:
“Having found the enemy in your tail, you must immediately perform a sharp maneuver in order to prevent aimed fire at yourself ... the maneuver is carried out with a climb. In order for the initial trajectory to be steeper, at the first moment it is necessary to release the brake flaps, and then go into a spiral with a climb ...
In most cases, the enemy strives to retain the ability to fire preemptively by creating an energetic turn, and loses the initial advantage in speed, gradually falling behind. This lag is exacerbated by the fact that with almost the same thrust of the MiG-15 and F-86 engines, the weight of the enemy aircraft is much greater. If at the same time the F-86 pilot does not notice the perniciousness of his position in time and does not give up the pursuit, then you and the enemy will find yourself at opposite ends of the circle described by the aircraft with an advantage in height, which at the right time can easily be turned into speed. Having chosen a convenient moment when the enemy weakens the energy of the turn or goes into a straight line, it is easy for you to go on the attack on the F-86 ...
Here are two typical examples from personal experience:
On March 27, 1953, together with my wingman, I attacked 6 enemy aircraft. Our fire disrupted the enemy's battle formations, but one pair managed to reach my tail. My wingman could not provide me with direct support, since he himself contacted the F-86 in battle. I performed an upward spiral in the manner described above, and after a while I myself ended up in the tail of the enemy aircraft. However, in this case, he could not complete the attack due to lack of fuel.
On 06/06/53, the group in which I was flying with my wingman was suddenly attacked from above by six F-86s from behind. Fighting off enemy attacks, I found myself without a wingman and was attacked by the last pair of Sabers. I switched to an energetic ascending spiral and already on the second turn of it I was significantly higher than the enemy. Taking advantage of the large gap in distance between the leading and winged F-86, he went on the attack on the leading Saber and shot him down.
In September 1952, the MiG-15bis 64 IAK began replacing single-channel shortwave radio sets RSI-6K with three-channel VHF stations RSIU-ZM. This significantly improved the quality of radio communications, facilitated the command of large fighter forces, and removed the problem of interaction between aircraft equipped with different radios.
The following month, 64 IAK received 18 sets of the Sirena radar warning system (SPO) for testing in combat conditions. 15 sets were installed on aircraft 133 and 216 IAD. Having tried the "Siren" in battles, the pilots spoke of it with enthusiasm and demanded that all MiG Corps be equipped with it.
In November 1952, the ASP-ZN sights began to be replaced by a more advanced ASP-ZNM modification. The main difference of the new sight was the presence of an electromagnetic damper, due to which, during sharp and energetic evolutions of the aircraft, the deviation of the gyroscope was limited within a small lead angle, for which the sight was designed, i.e. about 8 . Limiting the deviation of the gyroscope eliminated the blurring of the sight reticle and reduced the time of aiming and developing the lead angle.
At the end of December, the factory crews and the technical staff of the 64 IAK began equipping the MiG-15bis with an autonomous engine start.
In April-May 1953, all MiG-15bis of the 64th Corps were equipped with SPO, in June they began to install new ejection seats with improved armor protection. In the last month of the Korean War, MiGs began to be developed for the use of PPK-1 anti-g suits. Also, by the end of the war, TC-27 periscopes appeared on the movable parts of the lanterns of the hull aircraft, which improved the view of the rear hemisphere.
Thus, during the Korean War, many of the requirements of the 64 IAK pilots were met, mainly those related to equipment and did not require a significant alteration of the aircraft. Of this block of requirements, only those related to the sight and the photo-movie gun remained unsatisfied. By the end of the Korean War, sights with a radio rangefinder had not yet been mass-produced, equipping the MiG with an onboard radar also practically did not leave the stage of experimental work. Why the photo-movie machine gun was not improved is not clear, especially since the technical staff of 64 IAK offered options for improving the mass-produced S-13. Perhaps this was not considered a priority. The fulfillment of another block of requirements related to improving the stability and controllability of the MiG-15bis, increasing its flight characteristics, installing an uprated engine, etc. would have entailed a radical redesign of the airframe, which was inexpedient - in 1952, the serial production of "encores" was completed, they were replaced by the MiG-17 in the assembly shops of aircraft factories. Therefore, the requirements put forward by the Korean War were taken into account to the fullest extent already in the modifications of the "seventeenth".
The Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. During the fighting, 64 IAK fighters, mainly on the MiG-15 and MiG-15bis, carried out 63229 sorties, conducted 1683 group air battles during the day and 107 single battles at night, in which 1097 enemy aircraft were shot down , including 647 F-86s, 186 F-84s, 117 F-80s, 28 F-51s, 26 Meteor F.8s, 69 B-29s. Losses amounted to 120 pilots and 335 aircraft, including combat losses - 110 pilots and 319 aircraft. There is little accurate and reliable information about the actions of Chinese and Korean pilots. It is known that the first non-Soviet unit on the MiG-15, the 7th IAP of the Chinese Air Force, began operating in Korea on December 28, 1950. In the summer of 1951, the United Air Army was formed, which included units and formations of the PLA and KPA Air Forces, including two Chinese divisions armed with MiG-15s. A year later, OVA units began to receive MiG-15bis. By the end of the war, the OVA included 7 fighter divisions armed with 892 aircraft, including 635 MiG-15s and MiG-15bis. Our archival documents give the following results of the combat operations of the United Air Army: 22,300 combat sorties were carried out, 366 air battles were conducted, in which 271 enemy aircraft were shot down, including 181 F-86s, 27 F-84s, 30 F-80s, 12 F-51, 7 "Meteor" F.8, their losses amounted to 231 aircraft and 126 pilots. Official American data give the following figures for the losses of aviation of the UN Forces (Air Force, aviation of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States, squadrons of the South African and Australian Air Forces): 2837 aircraft, including 78 F-86s, 18 F-84s, 15 shot down in air battles F-80 and RF-80, 12 F-51s, 5 Meteor F.8s, 17 V-29s. It is difficult to say what the real losses of the enemy are. Apparently, as in most such cases, the true losses lie between our and American figures.
During the Korean War, the MiG-15bis proved to be a reliable, unpretentious machine. As the technicians later recalled, there was no such aircraft either before or after the "fifteenth". Many machines have developed a 200-hour factory warranty and continued to fight on. Some planes have exceeded the 400 hour mark. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the lion's share of these hours was combat raid - operation in extreme conditions, often outside the established restrictions. The vast majority of the MiG-15bis of the 64th Corps left the combat formation in only one case - death in battle. The same planes, which passed a similar fate, inherited from one regiment to another, fought until the end of the war. Some "encores" who entered the battle in December 1950 survived until July 53rd. There were legends about the survivability of the MiG. Some of the vehicles that returned from air combat looked more like a sieve than an airplane. Just a few examples.
In May 1952, MiG-15bis No. 0615388 st. Lieutenant Veshkin from 821 IAP. The pilot, wounded by fragments of the lantern, flew 110 km on the damaged aircraft, when approaching the airfield, the engine stopped and the pilot landed on the fuselage 5 km from the airfield. When viewed on the plane, 154 inlet holes were counted, 39 large-caliber bullets hit the engine, damaging all the turbine blades and nozzle apparatus. The plane was restored in 8 days.
September 16, 1952 damaged in an air battle MiG-15bis No. 2915328 of Major Karataev from 535 IAP. The aircraft received 119 entrance holes, 24 hits fell on the engine. Two combustion chambers were pierced, 16 turbine blades were beaten off, all nozzle blades were burned, fuel tank No. 2 exploded, the left brake flap burned out, tank No. 1 received 8 holes, the hydraulic tank was broken and the hydraulic system failed. Nevertheless, the pilot managed to get out of the battle, reach the Dagushan airfield and make a normal landing. The plane was restored in 16 days.
To the above, it must be added that the largest number of holes recorded in the documents is 204.
The survivability of the MiG-15bis, as well as the skill of the pilot, is clearly illustrated by the following example: on June 20, 1951, Captain Ges from 176 GvIAP attacked the F-51 from a distance of less than 100 meters. Shell explosions destroyed the Mustang, the left plane flying off hit the tail of the MiG, severely damaging the stabilizer and elevator and jamming the longitudinal control. At that moment, a pair of captain Gesya was attacked by 4 F-86s, knocking out the MiG of the led senior lieutenant Nikolaev and wounding him. On an almost uncontrollable plane, Captain Ges evaded the attack and began to cover his comrade. Having allowed a wounded wingman to land, Ges began to experiment and, using the engine, flaps and air brakes, he picked up a mode in which the damaged fighter descended at a slight angle, making it possible to land. And Captain Ges did not miss this opportunity, safely landing the wounded car.
On December 22, 1950, during the Korean War (1950-1953), the first major air battle took place between Soviet and American pilots. Side losses: two MiG-15 "Fagot" against five F-86 "Saber".
Jet Firstborns
The American F-86 Saber and the Soviet MiG-15 Bassoon are the first swept-wing jets.
Even during the war years, the Americans tried to implement the NA-140 jet fighter project, but it did not work out. After the defeat of Germany in 1945, specialists were sent there to study German developments in the field of jet aircraft. Based on the data obtained, the NA-140 project was converted to a swept wing, which had advantages over a straight wing at speeds of about M = 0.9. The new project was approved by the US Army Air Force on November 1, 1945. The first production aircraft were assembled at the Inglewood factory in May 1948. In June 1948, the aircraft received a new designation - F-86. It was adopted by the US Air Force in 1949. The first 19 F-86A units (of which only 15 aircraft were originally combat-ready) arrived in Korea on December 16, 1950. On December 17, their first sighting battle with the MiG-15 took place (no mutual losses), and on December 22, the Sabers and Fagots suffered serious losses: 5 to 2 in favor of the MiG-15.
The development of this aircraft began on April 15, 1947 in OKB-155 of A.I. Mikoyan, who was tasked with developing a front-line fighter with a jet engine and a pressurized cabin. For the first time on a domestic production aircraft, it was decided to use a swept wing. On December 18, the production of the first prototype was completed. December 30, 1947 test pilot V.N. Yuganov lifted it into the sky for the first time. March 15, 1948, the MiG-15 was put into serial production at the plant number 1 named after. Stalin. Soon he began to enter the army.
To provide air cover for the Chinese army that entered the Korean War, the USSR sent the 64th Fighter Air Corps armed with the MiG-15 to China. Soon they entered into the first battle with American aircraft, which came as a complete surprise to the US Air Force, who did not expect that they would have to face the latest Soviet fighter. The American F-80s used so far were inferior to the MiGs in speed due to their straight wing. To combat the new air enemy, only the F-86 Sabers that had begun to enter service were urgently sent to the Far East. From the end of December 1950 until the end of the war in July 1953, the MiG-15 and F-86 became the main opponents in the skies of Korea.
According to the main flight and tactical data, the Soviet MiG-15 fighter and the American F-86 Saber were equal, but each had its own strengths and weaknesses. The MiG was superior to the Saber in rate of climb and specific thrust-to-weight ratio. The F-86 picked up speed faster in a dive, was more maneuverable, and had a longer flight range. The essential point was that the F-86 pilots used anti-g suits, which their Soviet counterparts could only dream of.
However, the F-86 was outgunned. 6 large-caliber "saber" machine guns "Colt Browning", despite the high rate of fire (1,200 rounds per minute), were inferior to three MiG guns: two 23-mm caliber and one 37-mm. Their shells pierced any armor. These planes met on December 22, 1950 in a tough fight.
Fighting in the Korean sky
I could not find detailed documentary evidence of that battle. But the transcript of the tactical flight conference of the formation, which took place on July 25-26, 1951, has been preserved in the archive. On it, the most productive pilot of the Korean War spoke about a similar battle Nikolay Sutyagin.“The task was carried out by a dozen,” Nikolai said to the audience. — shock link — Major Pulov, cover link - Captain Artemchenko right above and a couple Perepelkin. I was in cover flight with a wingman Senior Lieutenant Shulev. At the time of the left turn in the Sensen area, I lagged behind the pair of Captain Artemchenko at a distance of 400–500 m. . I gave the command: “Attack, cover” and with a left combat turn, at the moment of which I released the brakes and removed the gas, followed by a half-turn followed by a pair of F-86s. On the second loop we were already in the "tail" of the F-86-x, and in the upper position I fired two short bursts at the wingman. The lines passed: one with an undershoot, the other with an overshoot. I decided to come closer. After exiting the dive, a pair of F-86s turned to the right, and then to the left with a climb. Due to this lapel, the distance decreased to 200-300 meters. Noticing this, the enemy made a coup. After releasing the brakes, we followed the F-86 at an angle of 70-75 degrees towards the sea. Having approached to a distance of 150-200 meters, I opened fire on the wingman. F-86 was shot down."
The story is also documented about another duel with the Sabers. On June 22, 1951, at the time of the turn, the formation of Soviet pilots led by Nikolai Sutyagin entered the “tail” of the four F-86s. Skillful maneuver, and our pilots are already in the "tail" of the F-86. Noticing the MiGs, the Americans, after a left turn, went into a dive. Sutyagin at a distance of 400-500 meters opened fire on the wingman. But the second pair of Americans went into the “tail” link, this was noticed by the led senior lieutenant Shulev - he with a sharp maneuver got out of the blow. The leader of the first American pair, noticing that they were shooting at the follower, went to the "oblique loop". But he could not resist the skill of Sutyagin, who, in the upper position, having already approached 250-300 meters, opened fire on him. F-86 blazed and began to fall. A little later, another Saber was destroyed.
The Korean War record holder Nikolai Sutyagin conducted 66 air battles, personally shot down 21 aircraft. He has 15 F-86 Saber, 2 F-80 Shooting Star, 2 F-84 Thunderjet and 2 piston Gloucester Meteor.
Contractions... on paper
Unfortunately, we lost another fight - for the truth about that war and its heroes. While our secret services classified materials about her, American researchers of the Korean War “took” all the records for themselves. For example, in the book “MiG Alley”, published in Texas in 1970, Sutyagin’s exploits are, of course, silent, but the first jet ace in history is called Captain James Jabara, on account of which 15 air victories (6 less than our fighter!). In total, 39 US pilots are noted, who shot down from 15 to 5 of our aircraft.
Of course, one must pay tribute to the courage and skill of the American pilots, they fought with dignity, and sometimes on an equal footing with the Soviet aces. But our account is more solid. Nikolai Sutyagin - 21 aerial victories. 20 fights won Colonel Anatoly Pepelyaev. 15 enemy aircraft destroyed Captain Lev Shchukin, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Smorchkov and Major Dmitry Oskin. Another 6 Soviet pilots scored 10 or more victories. 5 or more victories on account of 43 Soviet pilots.
Until now, the United States is trying to correct the overall outcome of the air war. Thus, in the "Encyclopedia of Aviation" (New York, 1977) it is noted that during the war American pilots shot down 2,300 aircraft of the USSR, China and the DPRK, the losses of the USA and their allies - 114. The ratio is 20: 1. Impressive? However, immediately after the war, when it was difficult to hide the total losses, the documentary book “Air power is the decisive force in Korea” (Toronto - New York - London, 1957) was published. It stated that the US Air Force only lost in combat battles about 2,000 aircraft, they then estimated the losses of "communist" aircraft more modestly - at about 1,000 aircraft. However, these figures are likely to be far from the truth.
To date, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces has declassified some documents from the Korean War. Here is the general data. Soviet pilots of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps (during the war it alternately - from six months to one year - included ten divisions) conducted 1,872 air battles, during which 1,106 enemy aircraft were shot down, of which F-86 - 650 units. Hull losses: 335 aircraft. The ratio is 3:1 in favor of Soviet pilots, including the latest machines (MiG-15 and F-86 Saber) - 2:1.
The data of the warring parties differ not only as a result of subjectivity. The Americans and I have different calculation technologies. The Americans recorded their victories only on the photo-cinema gun (FKP), because. the situation in Korea did not allow them to receive confirmation from the ground. This method, according to Hero of the Soviet Union K.V. Sukhova, was about 75% effective, since only a hit was recorded, which did not always mean the destruction of the aircraft.
In Soviet air units, there was a stricter procedure for registering victories. First of all - the personnel of the FKP. Then - the testimonies of partners. But the main thing was the confirmation of the ground units, without which the downed aircraft, as a rule, did not count. In addition, representatives of the regiment went to the site of the fall of the enemy’s car, photographed it and had to bring some detail, best of all, a factory tag. The testimonies of the pilots themselves were almost ignored.
It is impossible not to take into account the fact that the defeats of Korean and Chinese pilots, who, of course, were “green” in comparison with the pilots of the USSR and the USA, were also included in the American victories.
From the SP dossier:
TTX F-86
Wingspan 11.32 m
length 11.45 m
height 4.5 m
Weight, kg:
empty 4582,
maximum takeoff 6128
Maximum speed, km/h:
near the ground 1086
at an altitude of 10,000 m - 1112
Rate of climb near the ground, m/s 38
Maximum flight range, km
Crew, pers. one
TTX MiG-15bis.
Wingspan: 10.08 m
Aircraft length: 10.1 m
Parking height: 3.7 m
Empty weight: 3680 kg
Takeoff weight maximum: 6105 kg
Maximum ground speed: 1076 km/h
Landing speed: 178 km/h
Maximum rate of climb near the ground: 50 m/s
Maximum flight range 2520 km
Armament:
cannon - 1 × 37 mm (N-37D, 40 shells), 2 × 23 mm (NR-23KM, 80 shells each)
bombing - it is possible to suspend two air bombs of 50 or 100 kg.
The Korean conflict had been going on for almost six months by the morning of November 30, 1950, when an American Air Force B-29 Superfortress bomber raiding an air base in North Korea was slightly damaged by a fighter that was moving too fast, and therefore it could not be identified, and the bomber's gunner did not have time to fix it at all using the guidance system of his machine gun. Lockheed F-80 rectangular wing jet fighters escorting the bomber launched a symbolic pursuit, but as they accelerated, the unidentified fighter quickly became a dot and then disappeared altogether.
The report of the bomber crew caused an organized panic in the American chain of command. Although the pilots' description of the invading aircraft did not match any of the examples used in that theater of operations, US intelligence officials quickly made an educated guess. They said that it was a MiG-15 fighter, most likely taken off from an air base in Manchuria. Prior to this incident, analysts believed that Stalin only gave permission for the MiGs to be used to defend Shanghai against Chinese Nationalist bomber raids. This MiG was a grim omen: Chinese involvement in Korea was growing, and Soviet technology was spreading.
For the crews in the cockpits of the hulking Super Fortresses, this aircraft, rapidly cutting through their formations, became a source of suffocating fear. “In my opinion, everyone was scared,” says former B-29 pilot Earl McGill, describing a noticeable lack of radio communication during the flight of his four-engine Boeing aircraft - these were the machines that ended World War II - shortly before the attack on Namsi Air Base, located near the border between North Korea and China. “In the course of preparation for the first task, we were provided with information about the interception that took place. I was more terrified that day than ever before in my life, even when I was flying B-52s (in Vietnam).” There used to be a lot of dark humor in the conversations in the pilots' quarters. “The guy who did the briefing on the upcoming route looked like a funeral director,” adds McGill. He conducted this briefing in a special top hat worn by undertakers.
On one catastrophic day in October 1951 - it was nicknamed "Black Tuesday" - MiGs shot down six out of ten "Superfortresses". McGill's first encounter with these aircraft was typically brief. “One of the shooters saw him. Only a small silhouette was visible,” McGill recalls. - That's when I saw him ... - the arrows opened fire on him. The centralized firing system on the bomber provided some protection against fighters, McGill emphasizes.
The pilot of the MiG-15 aircraft, Porfiry Ovsyannikov, was then the target on which the arrows of the B-29 bomber fired. “When they started shooting at us, the smoke was coming, and now think, either the bomber was set on fire, or the smoke from the machine guns?” He recalled in 2007, when historians Oleg Korytov and Konstantin Chirkin interviewed him to create an oral stories of combat pilots who took part in the Second World War, as well as in the Korean War (These interviews are posted on the lend-lease.airforce.ru/english website). Russian historians asked Ovsyannikov to evaluate the small arms of the B-29 aircraft. His answer: "Very good." However, MiG pilots could open fire from a distance of about 700 meters, and from such a distance, as McGill emphasizes, they were able to attack a group of B-29 bombers.
“The MiG-15s came as a big surprise to us,” said National Air and Space Museum curator Robert van der Linden. Compared to the North American A-86 Saber, which was urgently put into service after the introduction of the MiG-15, we can say that "MiGs were faster, they had better rate of climb and greater firepower," he notes. And the pilots who flew the Saber fighters knew it.
“You are absolutely right, it was humiliating,” says retired Air Force Lieutenant General Charles “Chick” Cleveland, recalling his first encounter with the MiG-15 fighter. He flew a Saber in Korea in 1952 with the 334th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron. A few weeks earlier, the squadron commander, famed World War II ace George Andrew Davis, had died in combat with a Soviet fighter. (Davis was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.) At that moment, Cleveland, having laid a sharp turn to get away from the MiG, exceeded the parameters for stalling the Sabers and briefly went into a tailspin - according to him, all this happened "in the midst of an air battle." Cleveland, despite his mistake, was able to stay alive and then became the ace of the Korean War, having 5 confirmed downed MiGs, as well as two unconfirmed ones. Today he is the president of the American Fighter Aces Association and he still respects his opponent, whom he had to fight 60 years ago. “Oh, it was a beautiful aircraft,” he says by phone from his home in Alabama, “It should be remembered that in Korea this small MiG-15 was able to successfully do what all these Focke-Wulfs and "Messerschmites" during the Second World War - he squeezed the bomber aircraft of the United States of America out of the airspace. From November 1951, B-29s remained on the ground during daylight hours, and combat missions were only flown at night.
Inevitably, the history of the MiG-15 returns to duels with the Sabers, and this rivalry determined the outcome of the air war in Korea. However, the connection between MiGs and Sabers began during the previous war. Both of them drew inspiration from a concept that arose from a desperate search for weapons at the end of World War II, when the Allied air forces were outnumbered by the German air force. In a desperate situation, the Luftwaffe High Command held a competition. The winner of the "Extraordinary Fighter Competition" was the aircraft presented by the head of the design bureau of the Focke-Fulff company Kurt Tank (Kurt Tank) and received the designation TA-183; it was a single-engine jet fighter model with a high T-tail. In 1945, British troops entered the Focke-Fulf factory at Bad Eilsen and confiscated blueprints, models, and wind tunnel data, all of which they promptly shared with the Americans. And when Berlin fell, the Soviet troops went to the German Air Ministry and found a complete set of drawings for the TA-183 aircraft, as well as invaluable data on wing tests. Less than two years later, and only a few weeks apart, the United States of America and the Soviet Union introduced a single-engine 35-degree winged jet with a short fuselage and T-tail. The two planes looked so much alike in Korea that the American pilots, eager to chalk up a MiG, shot down several Sabers by mistake.
None of these fighters was a copy of the Tank model. Primitive aeronautical research, as well as the limited availability of engines and the materials used at the time, inevitably led to the similarity of the models being developed. The MiG-9 was the first jet aircraft developed by the Mikoyan and Gurevich (MiG) design bureau located in Moscow. The primitive MiG-9 engine - a twin BWM engine captured in Germany - was not enough for the expected performance of the MiG-15, but Moscow had little experience in creating superior models. Instead, the MiG-15 was originally equipped with the Rolls-Royce Nene engine - excellent in its innovativeness and thoughtlessly delivered to the USSR by the British.
Wanting to bring a thaw to Anglo-Soviet relations, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee invited Soviet scientists and engineers to the Rolls-Royce factory to study how British engines of excellent quality were made. In addition, Atlee offered license production to the USSR, and this was done in response to a solemn promise to use these engines only for non-military purposes. This proposal startled the Americans, who protested loudly. And what about the Soviets? Ukrainian-born Soviet aviation historian Ilya Grinberg believes that “Stalin himself could not believe it. He said: “Who in their right mind would sell us such things?” Greenberg, a professor of technology at the State University of New York at Buffalo, emphasizes that the presence of Artem Mikoyan himself in the delegation is “Mi” from the name “MiG "- was supposed to serve as a warning about the consequences of the proposed deal: Rolls-Royce engines delivered to the USSR in 1946 were urgently installed on MiG-15 aircraft and successfully passed flight tests. By the time this fighter was ready for mass production, all the engineering problems associated with the technology of the Rolls-Royce Nene engine had been solved, and as a result, a copy of it appeared under the designation Klimov RD-45. The British, according to Greenberg, complained about the violation of the license agreement, but "the Russians just told them: look, we made some changes, and now this can be considered our own development."
But, as in the case of copying cars from Western Europe in the post-war Soviets, the engines produced in the USSR were inferior in quality to the originals. The period from the beginning of the use of Klimov engines to their failure was measured in hours. “Based on the state of the Soviet aircraft industry at the time, it could be assumed that quality control at MiG enterprises was inferior to the level that existed in the West,” Grinberg notes. Materials for high-pressure parts were not up to standard. Permissions were insufficient. In fact, some of the problems on the MiG aircraft were related to the wings, which did not fully meet the requirements. Greenberg describes an archival photograph of the production line for installing engines for the first generation of MiG-15 fighters. “What can be said here? he remarks hesitantly. “These are not people in white overalls in high-tech production at all.”
However, by this time, another Soviet design bureau, headed by Andrei Tupolev, copied to the last rivet two Boeing B-29 aircraft that made an emergency landing on Soviet territory during World War II. Greenberg argues that the accuracy achieved in production under the Tupolev project was transferred to work under the MiG program. In fact, "the project to copy the B-29 pulled forward not only the Soviet aviation industry," he emphasizes. Although the MiGs continued to be inexpensive to build and unnecessarily spartan, the final version of this aircraft, which flew in 1947, proved to be durable and reliable.
The first wave of F-86 fighter pilots from the 4th Wing included World War II veterans. Obviously, they had to confront inexperienced Chinese pilots at the controls of the MiG-15, trained by Russian specialists. However, it soon became clear that North Korean MiGs were not being flown by recent graduates of flight schools. Saber fighter pilots called the mysterious MiG-15 pilots "honchos", which means "bosses" in Japanese. We now know that most North Korean MiGs were powered by battle-hardened Soviet air force pilots.
Chick Cleveland describes encounters with MiG pilots whose skills went beyond classroom training. Cleveland was approaching the Amnokkan River at an altitude of about 12,000 meters when a MiG flying at high speed appeared ahead of him. The speed of both planes was approaching Mach number when they flew next to each other. "I said to myself: This is no longer teaching, now everything is real." Using the superiority of the Sabers in speed and turning radius, he used acceleration and ended up in the tail of the MiG. "I got really close to him and it looked like he was sitting next to me in the living room."
Remembering in that moment the stories of World War II pilots who, in the midst of dogfight, forgot to press the trigger, Cleveland looked down for a moment to check the position of the toggle switches on his Saber. “When I looked up again, this MiG was no longer in front of me.” Cleveland looked forward, backward "and around him along the entire horizon" - nothing. There was only one chilling possibility left. “I swiveled my F-86 slightly and of course it was right under me.” It was a deft attempt to switch roles, performed by the MiG pilot, who sharply limited the supply of fuel and, slowing down, found himself below and then behind the enemy, graying on his tail. “I gradually became a fox, and he turned into a dog,” Cleveland says with a laugh. However, after several maneuvers, the Saber regained its position and again found itself on the tail of the Russian pilot, who was forced to resort to "classic MiG tactics" - he began to climb sharply. Cleveland fired several rounds at the engine and fuselage of the MiG, after which it slowly shifted to the left, dived down and went towards the ground. Given the characteristics of the MiG, diving at high speed was indicative of a crash, not an escape strategy.
Due to the fact that the MiGs questioned the superiority of the United States in the air, the Americans tried by all means to get their hands on Soviet technology, but they managed to get the MiG-15 capable of flying only in September 1953, when the North Korean defector pilot No Geum Sok (No Kum-Sok) landed his fighter jet at Kimpo Air Base in South Korea. Flights on the Korean MiG were supposed to clearly demonstrate what kind of machines the American pilots had to deal with. To evaluate the Soviet fighter, the best pilots of the United States Air Force - Captain Harold Collins (Harold "Tom" Collins), from the test division of the Field Wright airbase (Field Wright) and Major Charles Yeager (Charles "Chuck" Yeagger) were sent to Kadena airbase (Kadena) in Japan. On September 29, 1953, the first Western pilot took to the air in a mysterious MiG. This flight confirmed the expected excellent qualities, but also revealed the less pleasant characteristics of the MiG-15 aircraft. “A defector pilot told me that the MiG-15 tends to stall when accelerating even in one G, and also breaks into a tailspin, from which it often cannot get out,” Collins noted in 1991, giving an interview for a collection of memoirs "Test Flights at Old Wright Field". “A white stripe was drawn on the front panel, which was used to center the steering knob when trying to get out of a spin. He said that before his eyes, his instructor went into a tailspin and then died.
Test flights showed that the speed of the MiG-15 did not exceed Mach 0.92. In addition, the aircraft control system was ineffective when diving down and performing sharp maneuvers. During dogfights in Korea, American pilots watched as MiG-15 fighters approached the limits of their capabilities, after which they suddenly fell into a tailspin at high speed and collapsed, often losing wings or tails.
Soviet pilots knew the characteristics of the Sabers as well as American pilots knew the capabilities of MiGs. “You won’t make me attack them at maximum turning speed,” stressed Soviet MiG-15 pilot Vladimir Zabelin in one of his oral presentations, translated in 2007. “In that case, he could easily be on my tail. When I myself went behind them, they knew that they could only get away from me as a result of horizontal maneuvers ... Usually I attacked them from behind and a little lower ... When he began the maneuver, I tried to intercept him. If I didn't knock him down during the first third of the turn, I had to stop attacking and go away."
The Finnish Air Force purchased MiG-21 aircraft from the Soviet Union in 1962, and also received four MiG-15 trainers so that their pilots could become familiar with the exotic characteristics of the MiG cockpit. Retired test pilot Colonel Jyrki Laukkanen concluded that the MiG-15 was a well-controlled and agile aircraft “provided you knew its limitations and did not go beyond safe piloting. Essentially, you had to keep your speed under Mach 0.9 and under 126 knots (186 kilometers per hour); otherwise, controllability began to be lost. Landing could be difficult due to manually inflated air brakes, which quickly lost their effectiveness. "If they were warming up, then you were left with no other options for steering or braking other than turning off the engine and watching where you ended up - it usually ended up on the grass."
Laukkanen believes that there were certain oddities in the cockpit of the MiG-15. "The artificial horizon at the MiG-15 was unusual." The upper part of this device, representing the sky, was brown, while the lower part, as a rule, denoted the earth and was blue. This device was made in such a way that when lifting, the symbol of the aircraft fell down. “It worked as if it had been assembled upside down,” Laukkanen marvels. "But it wasn't like that." The fuel gauge on the MiG-15 was also, in his opinion, "particularly unreliable", which is why Finnish pilots learned to read fuel amounts with their watches. As Chief Test Pilot, Laukkanen has logged over 1,200 hours of flight time in a delta wing MiG-21 aircraft. (He was also the only Finn to fly solo in a P-51 Mustang.) “In my opinion, the MiG-15 had no particular mystique,” he says. - My favorite aircraft, which, unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to fly, was the F-86 Saber.
A more objective indicator of the relative strength of the MiG and Saber fighters is the number of enemy aircraft shot down, but this kind of data on the ratio of losses is difficult to obtain. So, for example, at the end of the Korean War, Chick Cleveland had four downed MiGs, two presumably downed and four damaged MiGs. “And when was the last time he saw a MiG in a deadly high-speed dive down? My wingman and I pursued him during a high-speed descent and an attempt to hide in the clouds at an altitude of about 700 meters. I was sure that he couldn't do it. But we didn't see the plane bail out or hit the ground, and so it was counted as suspect." After careful research by another Saber pilot half a century later, his "probable" MiG was eventually replaced with a confirmed downing by the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records. In 2008, he belatedly became known as an ace.
The Soviet method of confirming the results, according to Porfiry Ovsyannikov, was not particularly accurate. “We made attacks, returned home, landed, and I made a report,” he said. - We participated in an air battle! I attacked the B-29. And it's all. In addition, the enemy spoke openly about this and reported data on the radio: “In such and such a place, our bombers were attacked by MiG fighters. As a result, one of our planes fell into the sea. The second one was damaged and crashed while landing in Okinawa." Then the film from the camera mounted on the gun was developed and we studied it. It was shown there that I opened fire at close range. As for the other pilots, some did it and some didn't. They believed me, that's all."
Immediately after the end of the war, the superiority of the Sabers was greatly exaggerated. 792 MiGs were reported shot down, while the US Air Force acknowledged the loss of only 58 Sabers. The Soviets, for their part, admitted the loss of about 350 MiGs, but they claimed that they shot down an incredibly large number of F-86-640 aircraft, which accounted for the majority of this type of fighters stationed in Korea. “All I can say is that the Russians are terrible liars,” says Saber pilot Cleveland. “At least in this case.”
In 1970, the United States Air Force conducted a study code-named "Saber Measures Charlie" and the number of casualties in air combat involving MiGs was increased to 92 - resulting in a seven-to-one casualty ratio for the F-86. After the collapse of the USSR, the archives of the Soviet air force became available to scientists, and as a result, the loss of Soviet MiG fighters in Korea was set at 315 aircraft.
If we limit the statistics to a certain period, we can draw important conclusions. Writer and retired Air Force Colonel Doug Dildy points out that when Chinese, Korean and newly arrived Soviet pilots fly the MiG-15, the statistics actually show a nine-to-one loss ratio in favor of the Sabers. But if we take the statistics of the battles of 1951, when the Americans were opposed by Soviet pilots who fought against the Luftwaffe during the Great Patriotic War, then the loss ratio is almost completely equalized - 1.4 to 1, that is, only slightly in favor of the Sabers.
Data from the air war in Korea provide support for this interpretation. When the honchos returned to the Soviet Union, the less experienced Soviet pilots who came to replace them could no longer compete on equal terms with the F-86 pilots. The Chinese lost a quarter of the aircraft from the first generation of MiGs in air battles with an upgraded version of the Sabers, which forced Mao Zedong to suspend MiG flights for a month. The Chinese received upgraded MiG-15bis fighters in the summer of 1953, but at that time a ceasefire agreement was already planned. The MiG-15 aircraft were soon replaced by the MiG-17, which received the necessary improvements - mainly due to the cloning of technologies from two captured F-86 Saber fighters.
By the spring of 1953, Soviet pilots remaining in Korea began to avoid collisions with American aircraft. Stalin died at that time, a truce in Panmunjom seemed inevitable, and no one wanted to be the last victim of the war. Ilya Grinberg sums up the opinions of people who have been in the cockpit of this good-quality fighter: “Soviet pilots at the controls of the MiG-15 considered air battles in Korea simply as work to be done. Ultimately, they did not defend their homeland there. They considered the Americans adversaries, not enemies."
While the outstanding aircraft of the Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau was making a name for itself in the West, Soviet citizens had almost no idea what the name meant. The F-86 Saber aircraft became a symbol of American air superiority in 1950s pop culture - it was included in movie scripts, appeared on the covers of magazines, and also on stencils of metal boxes for school lunches. However, in those years, the MiG-15 fighter remained a mystery to the Soviet public. "We didn't even know what the name meant, and we didn't find out until much later than you think," says Greenberg. “In any Russian aviation magazine you can see the image of the MiG-15, but the caption will always be this: a modern jet fighter.”
In the mid-1960s, an inexplicable and typical Soviet bureaucracy change of policy took place, and this fighter, deprived of the cover of secrecy, ended up in public parks. “I remember very well when the MiG-15 was exhibited in our district park,” Grinberg says. The plane was not put on a pedestal and was not part of some kind of monument, as is often done now, but it was simply driven into the park and put brake pads under the wheels. “I remember very well how excited I was when I saw this MiG for the first time. We, children, climbed on it, admired its cabin and all its devices.
And ten years earlier, information about the successes of the MiG-15 in Korea gradually began to spread among the pilots of the air forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, as well as some states of Africa and the Middle East. Ultimately, this fighter was used by the air forces of 35 countries.
MiG-15 (according to NATO classification Fagot, MiG-15UTI version - Midget) is the first mass-produced Soviet fighter, which was designed by the Mikoyan and Gurevich Design Bureau in the late 40s of the last century. It is the most massive jet combat aircraft in aviation. The fighter made its first flight on December 30, 1947, the first production aircraft took off exactly one year later on December 30, 1948. The first combat units that received the MiG-15 were formed in 1949. In total, 11,073 fighters of all modifications were built in the USSR. They were widely exported to China, North Korea and the Warsaw Pact countries, as well as to a number of countries in the Middle East (Syria, Egypt). In total, taking into account the aircraft that were produced under license in Czechoslovakia and Poland, the total number of fighters produced reached 15,560 pieces.
History of creation
The jet engines RD-10 and RD-20, mastered by the Soviet industry in their time, had completely exhausted their capabilities by 1947. There was an urgent need for new engines. At the same time, in the West at the end of the 40s, motors with a centrifugal compressor, which were also called the "Whittle turbine", were considered the best engines. The power plant of this type was quite reliable, simple and undemanding in operation, and although these engines could not develop high thrust, this scheme became in demand in the aviation of many countries for several years.
It was decided to start designing a new Soviet jet fighter precisely for these engines. To this end, at the end of 1946, a delegation from the USSR went to England, which in those years was considered the leader in the world jet engine building, which included the chief designers: engine engineer V. Ya. Klimov, aircraft designer A. I. Mikoyan and a leading specialist in aviation materials science S. T. Kishkin. The Soviet delegation purchased in the UK the most advanced Rolls-Royce turbojet engines at that time: Nin-I with a thrust of 2040 kgf and Nin-II with a thrust of 2270 kgf, as well as Derwent-V with a thrust of 1590 kgf . Already in February 1947, the USSR received Derwent-V engines (30 units in total), as well as Nin-I (20 units), in November 1947, 5 Nin-II engines were also received.
In the future, the novelties of English engine building were quite successfully copied and put into mass production. "Nin-I" and "Nin-II" received the RD-45 and RD-45F indices, respectively, and the "Dervent-V" was named RD-500. Preparations for the serial production of these engines in the USSR began in May 1947. At the same time, the specialists of the Design Bureau of Plant No. 45, which was engaged in the RD-45 engines, spent a total of 6 Nin engines, including 2 engines of the second version, on the analysis of materials, drawing drawings and long-term tests.
The appearance in the USSR of new engines made it possible to start designing jet fighters belonging to a new generation. Already on March 11, 1947, the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed a decree on plans for experimental aircraft construction for the current year. As part of this plan, the design team, headed by A. I. Mikoyan, was approved for the creation of a jet front-line fighter with a pressurized cabin. The aircraft was planned to be built in 2 copies and presented for state tests in December 1947. In fact, work on a new fighter in OKB-155 A. I. Mikoyan began in January 1947.
The projected fighter was named I-310 and the factory code "C". The first prototype of the machine, designated C-1, was approved for flight tests on December 19, 1947. After ground testing procedures, the aircraft, piloted by test pilot V.N. Yuganov, took off on December 30, 1947. Already at the first stage of testing, the new aircraft showed excellent results. In this regard, on March 15, 1948, the fighter, which received the designation MiG-15 and was equipped with an RD-45 engine, was put into production. The construction of the aircraft was carried out at the plant No. 1 named after. Stalin. In the spring of 1949, military tests of a new front-line fighter began at the Kubinka airbase near Moscow in the 29th Guards Aviation Regiment. The tests lasted from May 20 to September 15, in total 20 aircraft participated in them.
Design description of the MiG-15
The front-line jet fighter MiG-15 was a mid-wing fighter with a swept wing and plumage, the design of the aircraft was all-metal. The fuselage of the aircraft had a circular cross section and a semi-monocoque type. The tail section of the fuselage was detachable, using internal flanges for mounting and carrying out comprehensive maintenance of the engines. In the forward part of the fuselage was the engine air intake, which covered the cockpit on both sides.
The wing of the fighter was single-spar and had an oblique transverse beam, which formed a triangular niche for the retractable landing gear. The wing of the aircraft consisted of 2 detachable consoles, which were docked directly with the fuselage of the machine. Power beams of frames passed through the fuselage, which acted as a continuation of the power beam of the wing and spar.
The aircraft wing had ailerons with sliding flaps on rail carriages and internal aerodynamic compensation. The shields could deviate on landing up to 55 °, on takeoff - up to 20 °. On top of the wing were placed 4th aerodynamic ridges, which prevented the flow of air along the wing and separation of the flow at the end of the wing during flight with high angles of attack. The plumage of the fighter was cruciform, the stabilizer and keel were two-spar. The rudder consisted of 2 parts located under and above the stabilizer.
The fighter's chassis was three-wheeled, with a nose strut and linkage of the wheels. The release and cleaning of the landing gear, as well as 2 brake flaps in the rear fuselage, were carried out using a hydraulic system. The brakes had the wheels of the main chassis, the brake system was pneumatic. The control of the fighter was tough and consisted of rocking chairs and rods. On the latest versions of the MiG-15, hydraulic boosters were introduced into the aircraft control system. The power plant of the machine consisted of one RD-45F engine with a centrifugal compressor. The maximum thrust of the engine was 2270 kgf. The version of the MiG-15 bis fighter used a more powerful VK-1 engine.
The armament of the aircraft was cannon and included a 37 mm NS-37 cannon, as well as 2 23 mm NS-23 cannons. All guns were located in the lower part of the aircraft fuselage. To facilitate the reloading process, the guns were mounted on a special removable carriage, which could be lowered with a winch. Under the wing of a fighter, it was possible to hang 2 additional fuel tanks or 2 bombs.
Combat use of vehicles in Korea
The pause in the combat use of fighters after the Second World War lasted only 5 years. Historians had not yet had time to finish their works on past battles, as new air battles unfolded in the sky over Korea. Many experts called these military actions a kind of training ground for running in new military equipment. It was in this war that for the first time in the air, jet fighters and fighter-bombers fully tested their capabilities. Particular importance was given to the confrontation between the American Saber F-86 and the Soviet MiG-15.
The main opponents of the Korean War MiG-15 and Saber "F-86
For 3 years of combat operations in the skies over Korea, Soviet internationalist pilots from the 64th Fighter Air Corps conducted 1,872 air battles, in which they were able to shoot down 1,106 American aircraft, of which about 650 Sabers. At the same time, the losses of MiGs amounted to only 335 aircraft.
Both the American Saber and the Soviet MiG-15 were the first generation of jet fighters, both aircraft differing slightly in their combat capabilities. The Soviet fighter was 2.5 tons lighter, but the Saber compensated for the extra weight with a more high-torque engine. The speed of the aircraft near the ground and the thrust-to-weight ratio were almost identical. At the same time, the F-86 maneuvered better at low altitudes, and the MiG-15 gained an advantage in rate of climb and acceleration at high altitude. The American could also stay in the air longer due to the "extra" 1.5 tons of fuel. The fighters fought the main battles in transonic flight mode.
Fighters had different approaches only in armament. The MiG-15 had a much larger one-second salvo due to cannon armament, which was represented by two 23-mm and one 37-mm cannon. In turn, the Sabers were armed with only 6 12.7 mm machine guns (versions with 4 20 mm guns appeared at the very end of the war). In general, the analysis of the "questionnaire" data of the machines did not allow an inexperienced expert to make a choice in favor of a potential winner. All doubts could be resolved only in practice.
Already the first air battles demonstrated that, contrary to many forecasts, technological progress has practically not changed the content and form of air combat. He retained all the laws and traditions of the past, remaining group, maneuverable and close. All this was explained by the fact that there was no revolution in the armament of aircraft. Cannons and machine guns from piston fighters, active participants in the last war, migrated on board the new jet fighters. That is why the "lethal" distance for attacks has remained almost the same. The relative weakness of a single salvo, as in World War II, forced it to be compensated by the number of fighter barrels involved in the attack.
At the same time, the MiG-15 was created for air combat and was fully consistent with its intended purpose. The designers of the machines were able to preserve the ideas that were still characteristic of the MiG-1 and MiG-3 aircraft: machine speed, altitude and rate of climb, which allowed the fighter pilot to focus on conducting a pronounced offensive battle. One of the strongest sides of the fighter was its higher destructive potential, which gave it a tangible gain in the main stage of the battle - the attack. However, in order to win, it was necessary to accumulate a positional and informational advantage in the previous stages of air combat.
Rectilinear flight, which combined rendezvous with a target with an attack, became available to fighters only 30 years later - after the appearance of medium-range missiles and radars on aircraft. The MiG-15 combined approach to the target along with a steep maneuver and entry into the rear hemisphere. In the event that the Saber noticed a Soviet fighter at a distance, he sought to impose on him a maneuverable battle (especially at low altitudes), which was unprofitable for the MiG-15.
Although the Soviet fighter was somewhat inferior to the F-86 in horizontal maneuvering, this was not so noticeable as to completely abandon it if necessary. The activity of effective defense was directly related to the flight of a pair of pilots and the implementation of the "shield and sword" principle in battle. When one of the planes carried out the attack, and the second was engaged in cover. Experience and practice have shown that a pair of MiG-15s operating in a coordinated and inseparable way is practically invulnerable in close maneuver combat. The experience that Soviet fighter pilots, including regimental commanders, received during the Great Patriotic War also played a role. The stack formation and the principles of group combat were still at work in the skies of Korea.
The performance characteristics of the MiG-15:
Dimensions: wingspan - 10.08 m, length - 10.10 m, height - 3.17 m.
Wing area - 20.6 square meters. m.
Aircraft weight, kg.
- empty - 3 149;
- normal takeoff - 4 806;
Engine type - 1 turbojet engine RD-45F, maximum thrust 2270 kgf.
The maximum speed near the ground is 1,047 km/h, at a height of 1,031 km/h.
The practical flight range is 1,310 km.
Practical ceiling - 15,200 m.
Crew - 1 person.
Armament: 1 x 37 mm NS-37 cannon (40 rounds per barrel) and 2 x 23 mm NS-23 cannons (80 rounds per barrel).
Information sources:
- http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fighter/mig15.html
- http://www.opoccuu.com/mig-15.htm
- http://www.airforce.ru/history/localwars/localwar1.htm
- http://en.wikipedia.org/
The truly legendary MiG-15 fighter (NATO code Fagot) was the first Soviet production aircraft of this type in the new jet era. Thanks to its powerful and efficient cannon armament and excellent maneuverability, the machine proved to be excellent in air battles in the sky of the Korean Peninsula and became the basis for the further development of fighter aircraft of the USSR and Russia.
History of creation
The development of a jet fighter of a fundamentally new design began at the Mikoyan Design Bureau as part of the aircraft construction plan for the new 1947. At the same time, the document provided for the complete curtailment of work on piston engines, as having no prospects for development.
The terms of reference provided for the following parameters of the machine, which received the designation I-310:
- The use of a Rolls-Royce Nin turbojet engine or its domestic equivalent;
- The speed of the fighter at the surface of the earth is not less than 1000 km/h;
- Maximum speed at an altitude of 5000 m - not lower than 1020 km / h;
- Time to reach a height of 5000 m - no more than 3.2 minutes;
- Runway length - no more than 800 m;
- The maximum flight altitude is not less than 13000 m;
- Flight range - about 1200 km at altitudes not lower than 10000 m;
- The armament of the fighter was supposed to be one 45 mm air gun and two faster-firing 23 mm. External points were provided for the suspension of small bombs with a total weight of up to 200 kg or an additional tank for kerosene.
It took a little more than a year to develop the drawings of the new machine of the MiG Design Bureau and translate them into metal. A prototype machine was assembled by the beginning of December 1947. The first flight took place on New Year's Eve - December 30.
Pilot V.N. piloted the car. Yuganov.
A few months later, the second prototype of the fighter flew, which was controlled by S.N. Anokhin. Test tests of the machine were carried out at an accelerated pace and, according to a good tradition, even before they were completely completed, the machine was adopted by the USSR Air Force under the designation MiG-15. This happened in mid-March 1948, and the tests themselves continued until the end of May of the same year.
State tests of the future legendary MiG-15 aircraft took place in the summer, while the characteristics of the machine, albeit not by much, but exceeded the requirements described in the terms of reference.
The maximum speed of the MiG-15 aircraft, based on the results of several runs, ranged from 1028 to 1042 km / h at altitudes of 5 and 2.62 km, respectively. At the same time, test pilots noted the simple and predictable control of the aircraft, accessible to pilots of average qualification.
But shortcomings were also noted, which were supposed to be finalized on a control copy intended for additional tests.
The third prototype MiG-15 received brake flaps on the sides of the fuselage, an automatic fire extinguishing system in the engine compartment, the introduction of weight compensators on the rudder, and the wing geometry was somewhat changed.
It was this sample that became the standard for mass production of the MiG-15 fighter with the RD-25F turbojet engine, which began to enter military units in the spring of 1949.
At this time, a more powerful and advanced engine of the VK-1 model, which was based on the RD-25F units and had almost identical weight and size indicators, passed acceptance tests. But due to the optimization of fuel combustion processes, the engine thrust increased by 20% in a wide range of altitudes.
The first sample of the MiG-15 fighter with such an engine was ready by the fall of 1949. The main changes affected the rear fuselage, since the VK-1 had a longer length and diameter of the nozzle extension. To reduce the load on the controls, a hydraulic booster was introduced and the profiles of the elevators and rudders were changed.
The large dimensions of the engine required a change in the shape of one of the fuselage tanks, due to which the fuel supply was reduced by 60 liters. On the outer part of the fuselage of the fighter, new hatches for servicing the units appeared.
If an artillery system consisting of NS-37 and NS-23 guns was installed on MiG-15 vehicles with RD-25F, then more advanced H-37D and NR-23KM guns were placed on the upgraded version. At the same time, the new guns were closer to the axis of the aircraft, which increased the accuracy of fire.
Fighter design
Structurally, the MiG-15 was a mid-wing monoplane with a large sweep angle. The horizontal planes of the tail had almost the same angle of inclination and were located closer to the top of the vertical stabilizer.
This decision was dictated by the desire to remove the elevators from the flow disturbed by the wings. Because of this layout feature, the MiG-15 aircraft had a rudder divided into two sections. The control of the steering parts was synchronous.
Aileron planes (with additional trimmers) and flaps were installed on the trailing edge of the fighter wings.
The design of the flaps had fixed positions, which were used in takeoff and landing modes.
In front of the fuselage of the MiG-15 there was an air intake, divided into two symmetrical channels by a sealed cockpit and the main rubber fuel tank located behind the cockpit.
In addition to the main tank, which held 1250 liters, there was an additional tank of 160 liters, located closer to the tail of the aircraft. A separate electrically driven pump was used to pump this volume into the main tank.
To control the fuel supply on the MiG-15, there was a sensor installed in the main tank. The emergency balance was a fuel supply of less than 300 liters. To maintain the weight distribution of the MiG-15 aircraft, fuel was produced from the tanks according to a special scheme.
Behind the transverse partition, a turbojet engine of the RD-25F model was installed, which was replaced on the MiG-15 bis with the VK-1, which had large thrust parameters.
For maintenance and replacement of the engine, there was a connector through which the tail section could be separated from the main part of the fuselage.
The engine had an emergency fire extinguishing system with manual activation using a button on the instrument panel. When ignited, foam is supplied from two cylinders directly to the combustion chamber and to the outer part of the turbojet engine.
Under the lower part of the fuselage of the semi-monocoque fighter, a little further than the air intake entrances, a quick-detachable carriage frame with a 37 mm cannon and a pair of 23 mm was installed. On the ground, the carriage extended from the fuselage, and the change of ammunition took no more than 20 minutes.
To control the results of the shooting, there was a C-13 photo-machine gun mounted on the first frame of the MiG-15 fuselage power set.
The wing of the MiG-15 aircraft was built according to a single-spar scheme. To reinforce the structure, there is one transverse beam, which plays the role of the wall of the main landing gear niche. The wings could be removed along the parting line with the fuselage, while power elements passed through it, with which a spar and a plane beam were connected on each side.
The cockpit of the MiG-15 with a large glass area and thin elements of the binding frame was equipped with a forced supply of fresh air and an ejection seat. To prevent fogging, the glazing was made of two layers of plexiglass with a thickness of 4 to 8 mm.
There were silica gel granules in the air gap, which were periodically replaced with fresh ones. In the frontal part of the fighter's cockpit there was armored glass with a thickness of 64 mm, fixed in an aluminum frame.
When closing the lantern, the joint was sealed with a special rubber seal with pumping from a pneumatic system.
On the dashboard there were also instruments for controlling the aircraft during the flight, as well as navigation aids and a control panel for the aircraft landing system. The radio system of the MiG-15 fighter included a shortwave radio station and an automatic "friend or foe" identifier.
The electrical system with a voltage of 36 volts was powered by an onboard generator and battery. Additionally, on the side of the fuselage there was a connector for power supply from a ground source.
To protect the pilot from bullets, an armor plate 10 mm thick was mounted on the front of the cockpit. This plate was fixed on the fourth frame, which served as the basis for the nose landing gear.
A hydraulic system was used to control all the landing gear and additional brake flaps of the MiG-15 fighter, installed on the sides of the fuselage in the tail section. At the same time, a pneumatic drive was used to brake the wheels of the aircraft.
The hydraulic drive was carried out from a pump installed on the drive box of the TRD mechanisms. The working pressure of the liquid based on a mixture of glycerol and alcohol was at least 13.5 atmospheres.
Pneumatic actuators of the MiG-15 worked from several cylinders of compressed air. Refueling of tanks was carried out at the airfield, there was no onboard compressor for pumping.
Various designs and configurations
In the documentation for early aircraft, there is a version of the MiG-15S fighter, which is a machine with a turbojet engine of the RD-45F model, two NR-23 guns and a number of changes in the cockpit and airframe equipment. Such machines were not mass-produced.
For the version with external tanks, the designation MiG-15PB was reserved, but since all production aircraft had suspension points, it was abandoned.
On the basis of the first MiG-15 aircraft, several prototypes were built, on which various weapons and equipment options were tested.
The third serial aircraft under the designation "SV" was used to test the modernized cannon armament, which included the NR-23 and N-37D guns.
In addition to this change, the design of the machine was also affected - a trim tab appeared on the plane of the left aileron, anti-flutter weights on the wings, electrical equipment and a sight were improved. During the tests, numerous problems were revealed with the installation of new 23 mm air guns, which were solved only on the MiG-15 bis fighter.
Part of the experimental solutions tested on the "SF" was subsequently implemented on the upgraded fighters.
Around this time, the CO variant with an experienced retractable sight was tested. The design did not show any advantages and was not developed in the series. In the summer of 1950, several MiG-15 SSH and SU fighters with 23 mm guns of the Sh-3-23 model were tested. They were not accepted as the main armament of the Mikoyan fighters.
Increasing production volumes of the new MiG-15 fighter necessitated the training of a large number of pilots. To do this, on the basis of the serial machine, the MiG-15UTI training aircraft (NATO designation Midget) was created.
The car had a double cabin and developed lower speeds than a serial fighter. To practice air combat skills, the aircraft had one 12.7 mm UBK-E machine gun with 150 rounds of ammunition and an NR-23 cannon with 80 rounds. On the lower part of the planes there were two suspension points for bombs with a caliber of 50 and 100 kg.
The MiG-15P UTI, equipped with the RP-1 model radar, was produced in a small series.
The instructor's cabin was located at the rear and was obtained by reducing the size of the fuel tank. Both seats could be separated from the MiG-15 UTI aircraft using catapults. At the same time, the glazed lantern was fired with a special squib.
Based on the modernized MiG-15 bis fighter, there was a reconnaissance version of the "CP", armed with only one NR-23 cannon. Instead of the rest, photographic equipment was installed.
The increase in flight range was achieved by an additional supply of fuel with a volume of 1200 liters, located in two external tanks. The SD-UPB escort fighter, which was released in 1951 in a single batch of 49 vehicles, could be equipped with the same tanks.
Decommissioned aircraft were often converted into radio-controlled targets, and passed according to the documents under the designation MiG-15M.
In addition to serial modifications, there were many experimental vehicles on which various versions of cannon and rocket weapons, as well as radar stations, were tested.
On the basis of the MiG-15 bis aircraft, an experimental MiG-17 "SI" was created, which became the ancestor of a new family of fighters.
Specifications
The 37 and 23 mm caliber guns used on the fighters had the same ammunition load, consisting of 40 large-caliber and 160 small-caliber shells (80 per barrel).
Flight characteristics
| Parameter | MiG-15 | MiG-15 bis | MiG-15 UTI |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ground speed, km/h | 1042 | 1076 | 1010 |
| Speed at the altitude limit of 5000 m, km/h | 1021 | 1045 | 1004 |
| Speed at the altitude limit of 10000 m, km/h | 974 | 987 | - |
| Lift off speed, km/h | 230 | 227 | - |
| Approach speed, km/h | 174 | 170 | - |
| Ceiling, m | 15100 | 15500 | 14150 |
In addition to the USSR, the production of the MiG-15 fighter was carried out under license at aircraft factories in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and China. Polish cars were equipped with licensed engines and were designated Lim-1 or Lim-2 (similar to Soviet 15 and 15 bis).
On their basis, training vehicles and photo reconnaissance vehicles were produced. The total production of machines did not exceed 1000 copies, which were put into service only by the national air force.
Czechoslovak S-102 and S-103 fighters were produced in large volumes and actively exported. The main machine of Czech production was the training version of the CS-102, replicated in more than 2000 copies. It was also actively exported to many countries.
Interestingly, the later vehicles produced by Czechoslovakia had the Soviet designation MiG-15.
The main manufacturer of the aircraft is the USSR, which produced at least 11 thousand copies of the aircraft. According to other reports, the number of produced MiG-15 fighters of all types is more than 13.1 thousand aircraft. The aircraft was actively supplied to the armed forces of various states, including capitalist ones.
Combat use of the aircraft
The serial MiG-15 fighter appeared at the peak of the tense situation in Southeast Asia, which resulted in a war between North and South Korea. In the course of active hostilities, many types of new Soviet and American weapons were tested in combat.
Used at the beginning of the war, American F-80s with a straight wing had no chance in battles with MiGs.
Later, the F-86 Saber fighter, which had a very similar layout, became the main rival of the Soviet aircraft.
At the same time, the flight and speed characteristics of the machines were approximately the same. The difference was in the better maneuverability of the Saber at low altitudes, but the MiG-15 had a noticeably better rate of climb and higher flight speed at medium and high altitudes.
The main difference between the machines was the armament, which consisted of three guns on the Soviet machine and six heavy machine guns on the American. Only the most recent Saber models, which appeared towards the end of the Korean War, received more powerful weapons from four 20-mm cannons.
A big plus was the presence of a radio rangefinder on the F-86, which made it possible to start fire from great distances.
On the MiG-15 fighter, a similar device appeared only in 1952.
Since air combat tactics have not changed since the Second World War, the MiG-15 fighter was more suitable for active operations. Due to the high weight of the volley and the destructive effect of the shells, the chances of victory for the Soviet vehicle were much higher.
During the battle, American pilots sought to take the MiG-15 to low altitudes in order to compensate for weak firepower with high maneuverability.
After the end of the war in Korea, the MiG-15 took part in many armed conflicts, but could not prove themselves anywhere else. Among the conflicts involving these aircraft, it is worth noting the confrontation between China and Taiwan, the Sinai War and the Arab-Israeli wars of the 60s.
By the time the Vietnam War began, the MiG-15 was considered completely obsolete and was not used in battles. However, the machine was widely used to train flight crews in piloting skills for new Soviet fighters.
MiG-15 fighters turned out to be the most productive aircraft in the Air Force of the People's Republic of China and Korea. During the use in the Korean War, at least 1377 victories were won with the loss of 566 aircraft.
Among the downed enemy aircraft are at least 78 (the number of losses recognized by the United States) F-86 Saber fighters, which at that time was the most modern aircraft in the US Air Force. The most famous ace of the Korean War, Yevgeny Pepelyaev, flew various versions of the MiG-15 aircraft and scored 23 confirmed air victories.
The high flight performance of the MiG-15 fighter was the reason for the persistent desire of the Americans to get a flight copy of the fighter.
For driving the car, a reward of 100 thousand US dollars was announced, which was a very significant amount in the 50s. But the first copy of the MiG-15 came to the Americans after the end of hostilities in Korea. After carrying out a complex of tests, the car ended up in the National Air Force Museum, where it is located today.
During the Korean War, MiG-15 fighters actively resisted American air raids using B-29 Superfortress strategic bombers.
In one of the air battles in the fall of 1950, MiG-15 fighters shot down at least 12 "superfortresses" and several escort vehicles. This battle, which went down in the history of the US Air Force as "Black Tuesday", dramatically changed the tactics of using strategic bombers, which began to be used only at night.
No less famous pilot of the MiG-15 aircraft was the first cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, who served for two years in a combat aviation regiment of the Northern Fleet, armed with such machines. Yu. Gagarin died during the next training flight on the MiG-15 UTI training aircraft.
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