American nuclear weapons. US nuclear arsenal. An alarming military strategy

Every year, the systems installed here more and more resemble museum exhibits. At the top, more and more international treaties are being concluded, according to which these wells are closed one by one. But every day, yet another US Air Force crew descends into concrete dungeons in anticipation of something that absolutely should not happen ...

An inconspicuous ranch about fifteen meters from a bumpy two-lane road southeast of Great Falls, Montana. A primitive one-story building, a chain link fence, a garage set in the outskirts and a basketball backboard right above the driveway.

However, if you look closely, you can notice some funny details - a red-and-white lattice tower of a microwave radio tower rises above the buildings, here is a helicopter landing pad on the front lawn, plus another UHF cone antenna sticking out of the lawn like a white fungus. You might think that some university agricultural laboratory or, say, a weather station has settled here - only a red banner on the fence confuses, notifying that anyone who tries to arbitrarily enter the territory will be met with fire to kill.

Inside the building, the security service scrupulously examines each incoming. The slightest suspicion - and guards with M4 carbines and handcuffs will immediately appear in the room. The massive entrance door moves vertically upwards - so even winter snow drifts will not block it.

After the checkpoint, the interior becomes the same as in a regular barracks. In the center there is something like a wardroom - a TV, sofas with armchairs and several long tables for common meals. Further from the hall exits to the cabins with bunk beds. Standard government-issued posters about stupid talkers and ubiquitous spies are hung on the walls.

One of the armored doors in the living area leads to a small side room. Here sits the flight security controller (FSC), a non-commissioned officer, the commander of the security of the launcher. A three-meter chest next to it is packed with M4 and M9 carbines. There is another door in this arsenal, which neither the dispatcher nor the guards should enter in any case, unless an emergency situation requires it. Behind this door is an elevator that goes six floors underground without stopping.

In a calm voice, FSC announces the ciphers for calling the elevator over the phone. The elevator will not rise until all passengers have left it and the front door in the security room is locked. The steel elevator door is opened by hand in much the same way as the blinds are rolled up, which in small shops protect windows and doors at night. Behind it is a small cabin with metal walls.

It will take us less than a minute to descend 22 m underground, but there, at the bottom of the hole, a completely different world will open before us. The elevator door is built into the smoothly curved black wall of the circular hall. Along the wall, breaking its monotony, thick columns of shock absorbers are installed, which should absorb the shock wave if a nuclear warhead explodes somewhere nearby.

Outside the walls of the hall, something rumbled and clanged exactly as the lifting gates of an old castle should clang, after which a massive hatch smoothly leaned outward, 26-year-old Air Force Captain Chad Dieterle is holding on to the metal handle. A good meter and a half thick, this shockproof plug is screen-printed with the letters INDIA. Dieterle, Commander of the Launch Control Center (LCC) India, is now halfway through the 24-hour watch, and this launch position itself was organized here at Malmstrom Air Force Base, back when the parents of this brave Air Force captain went to school.

LCC India is connected by cables to fifty other mines scattered in a 10-kilometer radius. Each silo contains one 18-meter Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
The Air Force command refuses to report the number of warheads on each missile, but it is known that there are no more than three. Each of the heads can destroy all life within a radius of ten kilometers.
Having received the appropriate order, Dieterle and his henchmen in half an hour can send these weapons to any part of the globe. Lurking in silence underground, he turns an inconspicuous ranch, lost in the expanses of Montana, into one of the most strategically important points on the planet.

Small but effective

America's nuclear arsenal—about 2,200 strategic warheads that can be delivered by 94 bombers, 14 submarines, and 450 ballistic missiles—is still the backbone of the entire national security system. Barack Obama never tires of declaring his desire for a world completely free of nuclear weapons, but this does not contradict the fact that his administration in relation to nuclear policy unequivocally postulates: “As long as there are stocks of nuclear weapons in the world, the United States will maintain its nuclear forces in state of full and effective combat readiness.

Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of nuclear warheads in the world has dropped drastically. True, now states such as China, Iran or North Korea are deploying their own nuclear programs and designing their own long-range ballistic missiles. Therefore, despite high-flown rhetoric and even sincere good intentions, America should not yet part with its nuclear weapons, as well as with aircraft, submarines and missiles that could deliver them to the target.

The missile component of the American nuclear triad has been in existence for 50 years, but year after year it finds itself at the center of tense discussions between Moscow and Washington. Last year, the Obama administration signed a new START III treaty with Russia on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms. As a result, the nuclear arsenals of these two countries must be limited to less than 1,550 strategic warheads within a seven-year period. Of the 450 active US missiles, only 30 will remain. In order not to lose the support of the "hawks" and simply skeptical senators, the White House has proposed adding $ 85 billion to modernize the remaining nuclear forces over the next ten years (this amount must be approved at the next meeting of Congress). "I will vote to ratify this treaty...because our president is clearly intent on making sure that the remaining weapons are truly effective," Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander said.

Nuclear missile umbrella

So why does the Strategic Missile Force, a symbol of the end of the Cold War, remain at the center of defensive strategy, politics, and diplomacy of the 21st century? If we take three types of delivery vehicles (aircraft, submarines and ballistic missiles), then of them, intercontinental ballistic missiles remain the means of the most prompt response to aggression from the enemy, and indeed the most operational weapon that allows a preemptive strike. Submarines are good because they are almost invisible, nuclear bombers are capable of delivering precision pinpoint strikes, but only intercontinental missiles are always ready to deliver an irresistible nuclear strike anywhere in the world, and they can do it in a matter of minutes.

The American nuclear missile umbrella is now deployed over the whole world. “As representatives of the Air Force, we are convinced that America is obliged to keep at gunpoint and under threat any enemy object, wherever it may be, no matter how serious the protection it may cover, no matter how deep it is hidden,” he said. Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, who just stepped down in January as head of the Global Strike Command, the agency that controls nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles.

The launch positions of strategic missiles represent a major achievement in engineering terms. All these mines were built in the early 1960s, and since then they have been in full combat readiness 99% of the time. More interestingly, the Pentagon built these launch sites for only a few decades. When the MinutemanIII missiles are retired, all silos and launchers at Malmstrom Base will be mothballed and buried for a period of 70 years.

So, the Air Force has the most powerful weapons in the world, and the equipment to control these weapons was created in the space age, and not at all in the 21st century of information technology. Nevertheless, these old launch systems do their job much better than one might think. “Building a system that will stand the test of time and still perform brilliantly,” says Klotz, “is a true triumph of engineering genius. These guys in the 1960s thought through everything to the smallest detail, generously laying in a few redundant levels of reliability.

Thousands of dedicated officers at three air force bases - Malmstrom, base them. F.E. Warren in Wyoming and Mino in North Dakota spare no effort to keep the silo launchers in constant combat readiness.

The Minuteman III was retired in the 1970s with a retirement date set for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the series' lifespan by another decade. In response to this demand, the leadership of the Air Force drew up a schedule for the reorganization of the existing missile bases. A tangible fraction of those billions of dollars that were recently promised by the White House should go towards this.

Norm is perfection

Let's return to the India Launch Control Center, hidden under an inconspicuous ranch. Little has changed inside since the Kennedy administration. Of course, teletype paper printers have given way to digital screens, and upstairs servers provide the underground crew with Internet access, and even live television when the situation is calm. However, the electronics here - hefty blocks inserted into wide metal racks and studded with many shining lights and illuminated buttons - resemble the scenery from the first versions of the Star Trek television series. Something really literally asks for an antique shop. Dieterle, with an embarrassed smile, pulls out a nine-inch floppy disk from the console - an element of the ancient, but still well-functioning Strategic Automatic Command and Control System.

The missiles themselves and the equipment installed at ground level can still be somehow upgraded, but with underground mines and the launch centers themselves, everything is much more complicated. But time does not spare them. It is very difficult to fight corrosion. Any movement of the ground can break the underground communication lines.

The India Launch Control Center is one of 15 centers where the Malmstrom Air Force Base missilemen are on duty. “Take an ordinary house that is already 40 years old,” says Colonel Jeff Frankhauser, commander of the base maintenance team, “and bury it underground. And then think about how you will repair everything there. That's the same situation with us."

This missile base includes 150 nuclear ballistic missiles scattered across 35,000 km2 of launch sites in the mountains, hills and plains of Montana. Due to the large distance between the mines, the USSR could not disable all launch positions and command posts with one massive missile strike, which guaranteed America the possibility of a retaliatory strike.

This elegant doctrine of mutual deterrence implied the mandatory existence of a developed infrastructure. In particular, all these mines and command posts are interconnected by hundreds of thousands of kilometers of underground cables. The fist-thick bundles are woven from hundreds of insulated copper wires and laid in jackets that are pressurized. If the air pressure in the pipe drops, the maintenance team concludes that a crack has formed somewhere in the containment.

The communication system spread across the surrounding expanse is a constant concern for the personnel of the Malmstrom base. Every day, hundreds of people - 30 teams on control panels, 135 maintenance workers and 206 security fighters - go to work, keeping this whole economy in order. Some command posts are three hours away from the base. Heroes offended by fate, who are called Farsiders at the base, yearn in them. Every day jeeps, trucks and bulky self-propelled units dart along the surrounding roads to extract missiles from underground, and the total length of roads at this base is 40,000 km, 6,000 of which are primers ennobled with gravel.

The slogan reigns here: “Our norm is perfection,” and in order to ensure that no one ever forgets about this tough principle, a whole army of controllers looks after the staff. Any mistake may result in suspension from duty until the violator retakes the qualification exam. Such captious control applies to all services of the missile base.

The cook will receive a strict reprimand from the officer for using expired sauce for the salad or not cleaning the hood over the stove in time. And rightly so - food poisoning can undermine the combat readiness of a launch platoon with the same success as an enemy commando team would. Caution to the point of being paranoid is a basic principle for all who serve on this base. “At first glance, it may seem that we are playing it safe,” says Colonel Mohammed Khan (until the very end of 2010 he served at the Malmstrom base as commander of the 341st Missile Battalion), “but look at this matter seriously, here we have real nuclear warheads ".

Weekdays of the bunker

To launch a nuclear ballistic missile, one turn of the key is not enough. If an appropriate command arrives at the India launch center, Dieterle and his deputy, Captain Ted Jivler, must verify the encryption sent from the White House with the cipher stored in the center's steel safes.
Then each of them will take their own triangular switch, fixing their eyes on the electronic clock ticking between the blocks of electronic equipment. At a given moment, they must turn the switches from the "ready" position to the "start" position. At the same moment, two rocket men on the other launcher will turn their switches - and only after that the ballistic missile will break free.

Each mine is suitable for only one launch. In the very first seconds, electronic components, ladders, communication cables, safety sensors and sump pumps will burn out or melt in it. Above the hills of Montana, a ring of smoke will rise, ridiculously exactly repeating the outlines of a mine vent. Relying on a column of reactive gases, the rocket will break out into outer space in a matter of minutes. Another half an hour, and the warheads would begin to fall on their targets.

The striking power of the weapons entrusted to these rocket men, and the entire measure of responsibility entrusted to them, is clearly emphasized by the harsh situation in the bunker. In the far corner is a simple mattress, fenced off with a black curtain so that the light does not hit the eyes. “It's not a great pleasure to wake up in this nook,” says Dieterle.

And it's time for us to return to the world that rocket scientists call "real". Dieterle pulls on the handle of the black shockproof plug until it begins to rotate smoothly. He gives us a reserved smile as we leave, and the door slams shut behind us with a heavy thud. We go up, and there, below, Dieterle remains and the same as him, in tense eternal expectation.

The Yankees themselves never produced nuclear materials, but purchased them from the Union. Then these merchants stopped updating nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. And now the United States is not a formidable nuclear power, but a horde of screamers ...

The truth about US nuclear weapons

Despite the fact that scientific and technological progress makes its own adjustments to our lives, and to the tactics of warfare, and life itself does not stand still, the factor nuclear deterrence no one has canceled - and in the coming decades it is unlikely to cancel. It was nuclear weapons, despite their power and irreversible consequences, that throughout the Cold War served as the last red line beyond which lay a compromise between the USSR and the USA.

And now, when we see how tensions are growing again along the West-Russia line, the factor of nuclear deterrence is once again becoming key. And of course, we are interested in knowing what state America's nuclear forces are in, how much their state corresponds to that deliberately ostentatious role superpowers, which high-ranking US officials have never been shy about declaring.

Despite the recently declared statements by US officials about "reducing reliance on nuclear weapons", as evidenced by the "Report on the strategy of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States of America" ​​sent by the US Secretary of Defense to the US Congress in June 2013, he is still assigned critical role in "ensuring the national security of the United States, its allies and partners."

And in a special White House fact sheet accompanying the above report, it is noted that US President Barack Obama has committed to provide significant investment to modernize the US nuclear arsenal.

According to the State Department, currently deployed in the United States 809 carriers of nuclear weapons out of 1015 available. Are in combat readiness 1688 combat blocks. For comparison, in Russia there are 473 carrier out of 894 available, which carry 1400 warheads. In accordance with the current START-3 agreement, by 2018 both countries should reduce their nuclear forces to the following indicators: 800 nuclear weapons carriers should be in service, 700 of which can be deployed at a time, and the total number of nuclear warheads ready for use, should not exceed 1550 units.

So, over the next few years, the United States will have to write off and dispose of a fairly large number of nuclear warheads, aircraft and missiles. Moreover, such a reduction should hit delivery vehicles hard: by 2018, the United States will be forced to decommission about 20% available carriers of nuclear weapons. The reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, in turn, will proceed on a smaller scale.

At the time of the beginning of the transformation, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States had a fairly large number of warheads and their carriers. According to the agreement in force at the time START-1(signed in 1991), in service with the United States were 1238 carriers and almost 6000 nuclear charges.

current treaty START-3 has much tighter limits. Thus, the allowable number of deployed warheads is about 4 times less than the START-1 agreement allowed. In this regard, over the past 12 years, the American command has had to decide how exactly and at the expense of which component of the nuclear triad to carry out the reduction.

Using its right to independently decide the quantitative and qualitative issues of the state of nuclear forces, the United States has already determined what its nuclear shield will look like by 2018. According to reports, ballistic missiles located in silo launchers will remain the main delivery vehicle.

By the specified date, the United States intends to keep on duty 400 product model LGM-30G Minuteman III. 12 strategic submarines Ohio will carry 240 missiles UGM-133A Trident-II. It is planned to reduce their ammunition load from 24 missiles to 20. Finally, as part of the aviation part of the nuclear triad, 44 bomber B-52H and 16 B-2. As a result, about 700 carriers will be deployed at the same time.

And everything seems to be great. If not for one "but". Nuclear weapons in the United States, everything, down to the last warhead, was produced ... back during the Cold War, that is until 1991 when the Soviet Union existed!

According to available information, over the past 25 years, the United States has not produced a single (!) new nuclear warhead, which cannot but affect the capabilities of the nuclear triad in a corresponding way, since such products can lose their qualities during long-term storage.

It is also necessary to remember that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the American military and designers, believing that the United States would henceforth never have an adversary equal to the USSR, and that Russia had left the orbit of a superpower forever, did not pay due attention to the development of new carriers of nuclear weapons. .

Moreover, the production of the main strategic bombers of the US Air Force Boeing B-52 Stratofortress ended already half a century ago, and the bombers of the latest generation Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit were built in a series of only 21 units, which, of course, cannot be considered a strike force.

So: last nuclear warhead It was made in the USA back in 1991. And that’s all, in America they decided that from now on nuclear weapons are a thing of the past, and now the “nuclear club”, created as a counterbalance to the USSR, is no longer needed ...

By the way, it is also worth noting that the last nuclear tests in the United States were carried out in 1992 year. And this despite the fact that the average age of an American nuclear warhead is more than 30 years, that is, many of them were produced and deployed even before the Reagan presidency. Who can guarantee that these warheads are still capable of doing what they were designed to do? No one can give such a guarantee for the current US nuclear triad ...

A nuclear or thermonuclear "bomb" is an extremely complex product and requires careful and constant maintenance. In the warhead of a nuclear charge, radioactive fissile materials are constantly decaying, as a result of which the content of active material is reduced. Worse, the radiation emitted in this case (in the hard spectrum) leads to serious degradation of the remaining components of the system, from fuses to electronics.

There is another serious problem in the US nuclear industry that they prefer not to talk about. Scientists those who specialize in nuclear weapons are aging and retiring at a rate alarming to the Pentagon. Already by 2008, more than half of the nuclear specialists in the US national nuclear laboratories were over 50 years old (in 2015 - 75%, and more than 50% were over 60 years old), and among those who are under fifty, there are very few competent specialists. And where will they come from if nuclear charges and warheads have not been produced for more than 25 years - and new ones have not been designed for more than three decades?!

Recently, the government was forced to remove all fissile materials from the Los Alamos laboratory - they were stored there in unsuitable conditions for this, some of the materials generally disappeared in an unknown direction. And recently, a congressional commission revealed another fact that is most unpleasant for the Pentagon: the United States no longer has the technological capabilities, as well as the factory facilities, to produce some elements for warheads. It's gotten to the point where older charges serve as a source of spare parts to keep others in any working order.

America's means of delivering nuclear weapons is also far from young. The last B-52, which forms the backbone of US strategic aviation, it is ridiculous to say, was put into service during the Caribbean crisis (!), More 50 years(!) back. They no longer produce engines or spare parts - to maintain at least some of the machines in good condition, aviation technicians dismantle decommissioned bombers for spare parts. There was even a project to remake the B-52 for engines and part of the avionics from a civilian Boeing 747 - but this one was eventually scrapped, and connecting the civilian and military platforms together turned out to be an unsolvable task.

The U.S. had high hopes for the B-1B supersonic bomber - but the development of air defense systems made it a pointless target even before deployment in Air Force units, and now they are, for the most part, rusting uselessly in parking lots.

Then the US decided to bet on a stealth bomber B-2 Spirit- however, their price (more than 2 billion dollars per unit) turned out to be unaffordable even for the US military budget. And most importantly, after the collapse of the USSR, the latest MiG-29 fighters with the H-019 radar were delivered to the United States from the former GDR, and during the tests it turned out that their radars normally detect “invisible” B-2s even against the background of the earth. This suggested that the newer MiG-31 and Su-27 radars are also capable of selecting such a target, and at a much greater range and with greater accuracy. In other words, “invisibility” turned out to be nothing more than, and it became unclear to the Pentagon: why pay 2.5 billion for such aircraft. As a result, the Spirit project was closed, and now only American propaganda has views of this car, still trying to present it as one of the pinnacles of American achievements and the overseas military-industrial complex.

What do we end up with: nuclear triad, despite peppy and optimistic statements by senior officials of the Pentagon and the White House, the US is in a deplorable state - and there is a tendency only to worsen. Nuclear warheads and charges become obsolete morally and physically, scientists and engineers retire, and there is no equivalent replacement for them, the charge delivery vehicle, this applies to the entire nuclear “triad”, no longer meets modern requirements - and every year more and more. The funding included in the military budget is not enough even to maintain the current, very deplorable state of nuclear charges and delivery vehicles. What can we say about new technical solutions that are ahead of their time - this has long been out of the question. How much longer in this scenario will America be able to remain in practice, and not on paper, a nuclear power? Ten years? Twenty? Hardly that long...

The real state of the US military. Nuclearweaponandtechnique

Daily Show "US Nuclear Arsenal"

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The development of American nuclear forces is determined by the US military policy, which is based on the concept of "possibility of opportunities." This concept proceeds from the fact that in the 21st century there will be many different threats and conflicts against the United States, uncertain in time, intensity and direction. Therefore, the United States will concentrate its attention in the military field on how to fight, and not on who and when will be the enemy. Accordingly, the US armed forces are faced with the task of having the power to not only withstand a wide range of military threats and military means that any potential adversary may have, but also guarantee the achievement of victory in any military conflicts. Proceeding from this goal, the United States is taking measures to maintain long-term combat readiness of its nuclear forces and improve them. The United States is the only nuclear power that has nuclear weapons on foreign soil.

Currently, two branches of the US armed forces have nuclear weapons - the Air Force (Air Force) and the Navy (Navy).

The Air Force is armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Minuteman-3 with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs), heavy bombers (TB) B-52N and B-2A with long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and free-range nuclear bombs. fall, as well as tactical aircraft F-15E and F-16C, -D with nuclear bombs.

The Navy is armed with Trident-2 submarines with Trident-2 D5 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) ​​equipped with MIRVs and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

To equip these carriers in the US nuclear arsenal, there are nuclear munitions (NWs) produced in the 1970-1980s of the last century and updated (renewed) in the process of sorting in the late 1990s - early 2000s:

- four types of warheads of multiple warheads: for ICBMs - Mk-12A (with a W78 nuclear charge) and Mk-21 (with a W87 nuclear charge), for SLBMs - Mk-4 (with a W76 nuclear charge) and its upgraded version Mk-4A (with nuclear charge W76-1) and Mk-5 (with nuclear charge W88);
- two types of warheads of strategic air-launched cruise missiles - AGM-86B and AGM-129 with a nuclear charge W80-1 and one type of sea-based non-strategic cruise missiles "Tomahawk" with YaZ W80-0 (land-based missile launchers BGM-109G were eliminated under the Treaty INF, their YAZ W84 are on conservation);
- two types of strategic air bombs - B61 (modifications -7, -11) and B83 (modifications -1, -0) and one type of tactical bombs - B61 (modifications -3, -4, -10).

The Mk-12 warheads with YaZ W62, which were in the active arsenal, were completely disposed of in mid-August 2010.

All of these nuclear warheads belong to the first and second generation, with the exception of the V61-11 aerial bomb, which some experts consider as third generation nuclear warheads due to its increased ability to penetrate the ground.

The modern US nuclear arsenal, according to the state of readiness for the use of nuclear warheads included in it, is divided into categories:

The first category is nuclear warheads installed on operationally deployed carriers (ballistic missiles and bombers or located at weapons storage facilities of air bases where bombers are based). Such nuclear warheads are called "operationally deployed".

The second category is nuclear warheads that are in the "operational storage" mode. They are kept ready for installation on carriers and, if necessary, can be installed (returned) on missiles and aircraft. According to American terminology, these nuclear warheads are classified as "operational reserve" and are intended for "operational additional deployment." In essence, they can be considered as "return potential".

The fourth category is reserve nuclear warheads put into the "long-term storage" mode. They are stored (mostly in military warehouses) assembled, but do not contain components with a limited service life - the tritium-containing assemblies and neutron generators have been removed from them. Therefore, the transfer of these nuclear warheads to the "active arsenal" is possible, but requires a significant investment of time. They are intended to replace nuclear warheads of an active arsenal (similar, of similar types) in the event that mass failures (defects) are suddenly found in them, this is a kind of "safety stock".

The US nuclear arsenal does not include decommissioned but not yet dismantled nuclear warheads (their storage and disposal is carried out at the Pantex plant), as well as components of dismantled nuclear warheads (primary nuclear initiators, elements of the second cascade of thermonuclear charges, etc.).

An analysis of openly published data on the types of nuclear warheads of nuclear warheads that are part of the modern US nuclear arsenal shows that nuclear weapons B61, B83, W80, W87 are classified by US specialists as binary thermonuclear charges (TN), nuclear weapons W76 - as binary charges with gas (thermonuclear ) amplification (BF), and W88 as a binary standard thermonuclear charge (TS). At the same time, the nuclear weapons of aviation bombs and cruise missiles are classified as charges of variable power (V), and the nuclear weapons of ballistic missile warheads can be classified as a set of nuclear weapons of the same type with different yields (DV).

American scientific and technical sources give the following possible ways to change power:

- dosing of the deuterium-tritium mixture when it is supplied to the primary node;
- change in the release time (in relation to the time process of fissile material compression) and the duration of the neutron pulse from an external source (neutron generator);
- mechanical blocking of X-ray radiation from the primary node to the compartment of the secondary node (in fact, the exclusion of the secondary node from the process of a nuclear explosion).

The charges of all types of air bombs (B61, B83), cruise missiles (W80, W84) and some warheads (with charges W87, W76-1) use explosives that have low sensitivity and resistance to high temperatures. In nuclear weapons of other types (W76, W78 and W88), due to the need to ensure a small mass and dimensions of their nuclear weapons while maintaining a sufficiently high power, explosives continue to be used, which have a higher detonation velocity and explosion energy.

At present, the US nuclear warhead uses a fairly large number of systems, instruments and devices of various types that ensure their safety and exclude unauthorized use during autonomous operation and as part of a carrier (complex) in the event of various kinds of emergencies that can occur with aircraft, underwater boats, ballistic and cruise missiles, air bombs equipped with nuclear warheads, as well as with autonomous nuclear warheads during their storage, maintenance and transportation.

These include mechanical safety and arming devices (MSAD), code blocking devices (PAL).

Since the early 1960s, several modifications of the PAL system have been developed and widely used in the United States, with the letters A, B, C, D, F, which have different functionality and design.

To enter codes in PAL installed inside the nuclear warhead, special electronic consoles are used. PAL cases have increased protection against mechanical impacts and are located in the nuclear warhead in such a way as to make it difficult to access them.

In some nuclear warheads, for example, with nuclear warheads W80, in addition to the KBU, a code switching system is installed that allows cocking and (or) switching the power of nuclear weapons on command from the aircraft in flight.

Aircraft monitoring and control systems (AMAC) are used in nuclear bombs, including equipment installed in the aircraft (with the exception of the B-1 bomber), capable of monitoring and controlling systems and components that ensure the safety, protection and detonation of nuclear warheads. With the help of AMAC systems, the command to fire the CCU (PAL), starting with the PAL B modification, can be given from the aircraft just before the bomb is dropped.

The US nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern nuclear arsenal, use systems that ensure their incapacitation (SWS) in the event of a threat of capture. The first versions of the SVS were devices that were able to disable individual internal components of the nuclear warhead on command from the outside or as a result of direct actions of persons from the personnel serving the nuclear warhead who have the appropriate authority and are located near the nuclear warhead at the moment when it becomes clear that the attackers (terrorists) may gain unauthorized access to it or seize it.

Subsequently, SHS were developed that automatically trigger when unauthorized actions are attempted with a nuclear warhead, first of all, upon penetration into it or penetration into a special “sensitive” container in which a nuclear warhead equipped with SHS is located.

Specific implementations of SHS are known that allow for partial decommissioning of nuclear warheads by an outside command, partial decommissioning using explosive destruction, and a number of others.

To ensure the security and protection against unauthorized actions of the existing US nuclear arsenal, a number of measures are used to ensure detonation safety (Detonator Safing - DS), the use of heat-resistant shells pit (Fire Resistant Pit - FRP), low-sensitivity high-energy explosives (Insensitive High Explosive - IHE), providing increased nuclear explosion safety (Enhanced Nuclear Detonator Safety - ENDS), the use of command disable systems (Command Disable System - CDS), protection devices against unauthorized use (Permissive Action Link - PAL). Nevertheless, the overall level of safety and security of the nuclear arsenal from such actions, according to some American experts, does not yet fully correspond to modern technical capabilities. protection.

In the absence of nuclear tests, the most important task is to ensure control and develop measures to ensure the reliability and safety of nuclear warheads that have been in operation for a long time, which exceeds the originally specified warranty periods. In the United States, this problem is being solved with the help of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which has been operating since 1994. An integral part of this program is the Life Extension Program (LEP), in which nuclear components requiring replacement are reproduced in such a way as to correspond as closely as possible to the original technical characteristics and specifications, and non-nuclear components are upgraded and replace those nuclear warhead components whose warranty periods have expired.

NBP testing for signs of actual or suspected aging is performed by the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign (ESC), which is one of the five companies included in the Engineering Campaign. As part of this company, regular monitoring of nuclear warheads of the arsenal is carried out through a thorough annual examination of 11 nuclear warheads of each type in search of corrosion and other signs of aging. Of the eleven nuclear warheads of the same type selected from the arsenal to study their aging, one is completely disassembled for destructive testing, and the remaining 10 are subjected to non-destructive testing and returned to the arsenal. Using the data obtained as a result of regular monitoring with the help of the SSP program, problems with nuclear warheads are identified, which are eliminated within the framework of the LEP programs. At the same time, the main task is to “increase the duration of existence in the arsenal of nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components by at least 20 years with an ultimate goal of 30 years” in addition to the initial expected service life. These terms are determined based on the analysis of the results of theoretical and experimental studies on the reliability of complex technical systems and aging processes of materials and various types of units and devices, as well as generalization of data obtained in the process of implementing the SSP program for the main units of nuclear warheads by determining the so-called failure function, characterizing the entire set of defects that may arise during the operation of nuclear warheads.

Possible lifetimes of nuclear charges are determined primarily by the lifetimes of plutonium initiators (pits). In the United States, to address the issue of possible life spans of previously produced pits that are stored or operated as part of nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern arsenal, a research methodology has been developed and is being used to assess the change in properties of Pu-239 over time, characterizing the process of its aging. The methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of data obtained during field tests and a study of the properties of Pu-239, which is part of the pits tested under the SSP program, as well as data obtained as a result of experiments on accelerated aging, and computer simulation of processes occurring during aging.

Based on the results of the studies, models of the plutonium aging process were developed, which allow us to assume that nuclear weapons remain operational for 45-60 years from the moment of production of the plutonium used in them.

The work carried out within the framework of the SSP allows the United States to keep the above types of nuclear warheads, developed more than 20 years ago, most of which were subsequently upgraded, in its nuclear arsenal for quite a long time, and to ensure a sufficiently high level of their reliability and safety without nuclear testing. .

Every year, the systems installed here more and more resemble museum exhibits. At the top, more and more international treaties are being concluded, according to which these wells are closed one by one. But every day, the next crews of the US Air Force descend into concrete dungeons in anticipation of something that absolutely should not happen ...

Another day of service The next watch carries suitcases with secret documents, fastened with steel cables to overalls. People will descend into the bunker on a 24-hour watch, taking control of ballistic missiles hidden under the grasslands of Montana. If the fateful order comes, these young Air Force officers will not hesitate to unleash their apocalyptic weapons.

An inconspicuous ranch about fifteen meters from a bumpy two-lane road southeast of Great Falls, Montana. A primitive one-story building, a chain link fence, a garage set in the outskirts and a basketball backboard right above the driveway.

However, if you look closely, you can notice some funny details - a red-and-white lattice tower of a microwave radio tower rises above the buildings, here is a helicopter landing pad on the front lawn, plus another UHF cone antenna sticking out of the lawn like a white fungus. You might think that some university agricultural laboratory or, say, a weather station has settled here - only a red banner on the fence confuses, notifying that anyone who tries to arbitrarily enter the territory will be met with fire to kill.

Inside the building, the security service scrupulously examines each incoming. The slightest suspicion - and guards with M4 carbines and handcuffs will immediately appear in the room. The massive entrance door moves vertically upwards - so even winter snow drifts will not block it.

After the checkpoint, the interior becomes the same as in a regular barracks. In the center there is something like a wardroom - a TV, sofas with armchairs and several long tables for common meals. Further from the hall exits to the cabins with bunk beds. Standard government-issued posters about stupid talkers and ubiquitous spies are hung on the walls.

The Malmstrom Air Force Missile Base controls 15 launchers and 150 silos. Its entire economy is spread over a territory of 35,000 km 2. The control bunkers were dug deep and spaced so far apart to survive a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union and retain the possibility of a nuclear retaliatory strike. To disable such a system, the warheads must hit each launch position without missing.

One of the armored doors in the living area leads to a small side room. Here sits the flight security controller (FSC), a non-commissioned officer, the commander of the security of the launcher. A three-meter chest next to it is packed with M4 and M9 carbines. There is another door in this arsenal, which neither the dispatcher nor the guards should enter in any case, unless an emergency situation requires it. Behind this door is an elevator that goes six floors underground without stopping.

In a calm voice, FSC announces the ciphers for calling the elevator over the phone. The elevator will not rise until all passengers have left it and the front door in the security room is locked. The steel elevator door is opened by hand in much the same way as the blinds are rolled up, which in small shops protect windows and doors at night. Behind it is a small cabin with metal walls.

It will take us less than a minute to descend 22 m underground, but there, at the bottom of the hole, a completely different world will open before us. The elevator door is built into the smoothly curved black wall of the circular hall. Along the wall, breaking its monotony, thick columns of shock absorbers are installed, which should absorb the shock wave if a nuclear warhead explodes somewhere nearby.

Outside the walls of the hall, something rumbled and clanged exactly as the lifting gates of an old castle should clang, after which a massive hatch smoothly leaned outward, 26-year-old Air Force Captain Chad Dieterle is holding on to the metal handle. A good meter and a half thick, this shockproof plug is screen-printed with the letters INDIA. Dieterle, Commander of the Launch Control Center (LCC) India, is now halfway through the 24-hour watch, and this launch position itself was organized here at Malmstrom Air Force Base, back when the parents of this brave Air Force captain went to school.

The mines and the launch control panel, located at a depth of 22 m underground, are guarded around the clock. "Rocket monkeys", as they call themselves, train in a training silo - the same as real rockets. They replace the cables leading to the gyroscopes and on-board computers. These computers are hidden in bulky boxes that protect electronics from radiation.

LCC India is connected by cables to fifty other mines scattered in a 10-kilometer radius. Each silo contains one 18-meter Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

The Air Force command refuses to report the number of warheads on each missile, but it is known that there are no more than three. Each of the heads can destroy all life within a radius of ten kilometers.

Having received the appropriate order, Dieterle and his henchmen in half an hour can send these weapons to any part of the globe. Lurking in silence underground, he turns an inconspicuous ranch, lost in the expanses of Montana, into one of the most strategically important points on the planet.

Small but effective

The US nuclear arsenal—about 2,200 strategic warheads that can be delivered by 94 bombers, 14 submarines, and 450 ballistic missiles—is still the backbone of the entire national security system. Barack Obama never tires of declaring his desire for a world completely free of nuclear weapons, but this does not contradict the fact that his administration in relation to nuclear policy unequivocally postulates: “As long as there are stocks of nuclear weapons in the world, the United States will maintain its nuclear forces in state of full and effective combat readiness.

Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of nuclear warheads in the world has dropped drastically. True, now states such as China, Iran or North Korea are deploying their own nuclear programs and designing their own long-range ballistic missiles. Therefore, despite high-flown rhetoric and even sincere good intentions, America should not yet part with its nuclear weapons, as well as with aircraft, submarines and missiles that could deliver them to the target.

The missile component of the American nuclear triad has been in existence for 50 years, but year after year it finds itself at the center of tense discussions between Moscow and Washington. Last year, the Obama administration signed a new START III treaty with Russia on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms. As a result, the nuclear arsenals of these two countries must be limited to less than 1,550 strategic warheads within a seven-year period. Of the 450 active US missiles, only 30 will remain. In order not to lose the support of the "hawks" and simply skeptical senators, the White House has proposed adding $ 85 billion to modernize the remaining nuclear forces over the next ten years (this amount must be approved at the next meeting of Congress). “I will vote to ratify this treaty … because our president is clearly determined to make sure that the remaining weapons are really effective,” Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander said.

Mine of intercontinental ballistic missile. These mines hide their terrible nature behind a completely inconspicuous appearance. Some trucker will pass by on the highway and not even look back. He will never know that these 30-meter-deep mines hide nuclear weapons, maintained in a state of continuous alert.

Nuclear missile umbrella

So why does the Strategic Missile Force, a symbol of the end of the Cold War, remain at the center of defensive strategy, politics, and diplomacy of the 21st century? If we take three types of delivery vehicles (aircraft, submarines and ballistic missiles), then of them, intercontinental ballistic missiles remain the means of the most prompt response to aggression from the enemy, and indeed the most operational weapon that allows a preemptive strike. Submarines are good because they are almost invisible, nuclear bombers are capable of delivering precision pinpoint strikes, but only intercontinental missiles are always ready to deliver an irresistible nuclear strike anywhere in the world, and they can do it in a matter of minutes.

The American nuclear missile umbrella is now deployed over the whole world. “As representatives of the Air Force, we are convinced that America is obliged to keep at gunpoint and under threat any enemy object, wherever it may be, no matter how serious the protection it may cover, no matter how deep it is hidden,” he said. Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, who just stepped down in January as head of the Global Strike Command, the agency that controls nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles.

The launch positions of strategic missiles represent a major achievement in engineering terms. All these mines were built in the early 1960s, and since then they have been in full combat readiness 99% of the time. More interestingly, the Pentagon built these launch sites for only a few decades. When the MinutemanIII missiles are retired, all silos and launchers at Malmstrom Base will be mothballed and buried for a period of 70 years.

So, the Air Force has the most powerful weapons in the world, and the equipment to control these weapons was created in the space age, and not at all in the 21st century of information technology. Nevertheless, these old launch systems do their job much better than one might think. “Building a system that will stand the test of time and still perform brilliantly,” says Klotz, “is a true triumph of engineering genius. These guys in the 1960s thought through everything to the smallest detail, generously laying in a few redundant levels of reliability.

Thousands of dedicated officers at three air force bases - Malmstrom, base them. F.E. Warren in Wyoming and Mino in North Dakota spare no effort to keep the silo launchers in constant combat readiness.

The Minuteman III was retired in the 1970s with a retirement date set for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the series' lifespan by another decade. In response to this demand, the leadership of the Air Force drew up a schedule for the reorganization of the existing missile bases. A tangible fraction of those billions of dollars that were recently promised by the White House should go towards this.

Norm is perfection

Let's return to the India Launch Control Center, hidden under an inconspicuous ranch. Little has changed inside since the Kennedy administration. Of course, teletype paper printers have given way to digital screens, and upstairs servers provide the underground crew with Internet access, and even live television when the situation is calm. However, the electronics here - hefty blocks inserted into wide metal racks and studded with many shining lights and illuminated buttons - resemble the scenery from the first versions of the Star Trek television series. Something really literally asks for an antique shop. Dieterle, with an embarrassed smile, pulls out of the console a nine-inch floppy disk - an element of the ancient, but still well-functioning Strategic Automatic Command and Control System.

Thousands of officers at US Air Force bases keep silo launchers on alert. Since 2000, the Pentagon has spent more than $7 billion to modernize this branch of the military. All work was aimed at ensuring that the Minuteman III model safely reached the retirement date, which was set for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the service life of this series for another ten years.

The missiles themselves and the equipment installed at ground level can still be somehow upgraded, but with underground mines and the launch centers themselves, everything is much more complicated. But time does not spare them. It is very difficult to fight corrosion. Any movement of the ground can break the underground communication lines.

The India Launch Control Center is one of 15 centers where missilemen from Malmstrom Air Force Base are on duty. “Take an ordinary house that is already 40 years old,” says Colonel Jeff Frankhouser, commander of the base maintenance team, “and bury it underground. And then think about how you will repair everything there. That's the same situation with us."

This missile base includes 150 nuclear ballistic missiles scattered across 35,000 km2 of launch sites in the mountains, hills and plains of Montana. Due to the large distance between the mines, the USSR could not disable all launch positions and command posts with one massive missile strike, which guaranteed America the possibility of a retaliatory strike.

This elegant doctrine of mutual deterrence implied the mandatory existence of a developed infrastructure. In particular, all these mines and command posts are interconnected by hundreds of thousands of kilometers of underground cables. The fist-thick bundles are woven from hundreds of insulated copper wires and laid in jackets that are pressurized. If the air pressure in the pipe drops, the maintenance team concludes that a crack has formed somewhere in the containment.

The communication system that spreads across the surrounding expanse is a matter of constant concern for the personnel of the Malmstrom base. Every day, hundreds of people - 30 teams at the control panels, 135 maintenance workers and 206 security fighters - go to work, keeping this whole economy in order. Some command posts are three hours away from the base. Heroes offended by fate, who are called Farsiders at the base, yearn in them. Jeeps, trucks and bulky self-propelled units dart around the surrounding roads every day to extract missiles from underground, and the total length of roads at this base is 40,000 km, 6,000 of which are primers improved with gravel.

The mines were built on small plots purchased from the previous owners. You can freely wander along the fence, but you just have to go behind it, and the security service can open fire to kill.

The slogan reigns here: “Our norm is perfection,” and in order to ensure that no one ever forgets about this tough principle, a whole army of controllers looks after the staff. Any mistake may result in suspension from duty until the violator retakes the qualification exam. Such captious control applies to all services of the missile base.

The cook will receive a strict reprimand from the officer for using expired sauce for the salad or not cleaning the hood over the stove in time. And rightly so - food poisoning can undermine the combat readiness of a launch platoon with the same success as an enemy commando team would. Caution to the point of paranoia is a basic principle for all who serve on this base. “At first glance, it may seem that we are playing it safe,” says Colonel Mohammed Khan (until the very end of 2010 he served at the Malmstrom base as commander of the 341st Missile Battalion), “but look at this matter seriously, here we have real nuclear warheads ".

Weekdays of the bunker

To launch a nuclear ballistic missile, one turn of the key is not enough. If an appropriate command arrives at the India launch center, Dieterle and his deputy, Captain Ted Jivler, must verify the encryption sent from the White House with the cipher stored in the center's steel safes.

Then each of them will take their own triangular switch, fixing their eyes on the electronic clock ticking between the blocks of electronic equipment. At a given moment, they must turn the switches from the "ready" position to the "start" position. At the same moment, two rocket men on the other launcher will turn their switches - and only after that the ballistic missile will break free.

Each mine is suitable for only one launch. In the very first seconds, electronic components, ladders, communication cables, safety sensors and sump pumps will burn out or melt in it. Above the hills of Montana, a ring of smoke will rise, ridiculously exactly repeating the outlines of a mine vent. Relying on a column of reactive gases, the rocket will break out into outer space in a matter of minutes. Another half an hour, and the warheads would begin to fall on their targets.

The striking power of the weapons entrusted to these rocket men, and the entire measure of responsibility entrusted to them, is clearly emphasized by the harsh situation in the bunker. In the far corner is a simple mattress, fenced off with a black curtain so that the light does not hit the eyes. “It’s not a great pleasure to wake up in this nook,” says Dieterle.

And it's time for us to return to the world that rocket scientists call "real". Dieterle pulls on the handle of the black shockproof plug until it begins to rotate smoothly. He gives us a reserved smile as we leave, and the door slams shut behind us with a heavy thud. We are going up, and there, below, Dieterle remains and the same as him, in tense eternal expectation.