Air Force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Air force DPRK North Korea photo No help and no hope

The first operation of the DPRK Air Force during the so-called. The “War to Liberate the Fatherland” (this is the official name of the war in Korea that took place in June 1950-July 1953) was the attack by Yak-9 fighters on aircraft stationed on the territory of Seoul International Airport on June 25, 1950. Before the start of the UN operation three months later North Korean pilots on Yak-9 fighters had five confirmed air victories: one B-29, two L-5s, one F-80 and F-51D each, while not suffering losses. The situation completely changed when the air forces of the countries of the international coalition settled in the South, and the DPRK air forces were almost completely destroyed. The remaining aircraft were transferred across the Chinese border to the cities of Mukden and Anshan, where in November 1950, together with the Chinese Air Force, the United Air Force was created. The PRC continued to provide shelter and assistance to its southern neighbor, and by the end of hostilities in 1953, the CPV Air Force had approximately 135 MiG-15 fighters. A peace treaty between North and South Korea was never signed, and since then there has been a tenuous peace between the two camps.

From 1969 to the present, the DPRK Air Force has not shown high activity, with the exception of individual false attacks by jet aircraft in the area of ​​​​the Demilitarized Zone (DZ) / Line of tactical operations, which are supposedly aimed at testing the reaction time of South Korean air defense. For example, since 2011, North Korean MiG-29 fighters have several times forced South Korean F-16s and F-15Ks to intercept.

Selection and training

Cadets for the Air Force are selected from other branches of the Armed Forces, called up or recruited on a voluntary basis. The aircrew are selected from the most successful members of the Youth Red Guard (composed of 17-25 year old young people) and usually come from politically influential families, distinguished by a higher educational level than the average North Korean.

The first step for those who want to become a military pilot in the DPRK is the Air Force Academy. Kim Chaeka in Chongjin, where cadets train for four years. Their flight service begins with 70 hours of flight practice on Nanchang CJ-6 training aircraft, which are Chinese copies of the Soviet Yak-18. 50 such aircraft were received in 1977-1978. They are based at two airfields on the east coast at Chongjin and Gyeongsong. Later, after receiving the rank of second lieutenant or "Sowi", cadets move on to a 22-month advanced course at the Gyeongsong Officer Flight School. It includes 100 flight hours on MiG-15UTI combat training fighters (50 were purchased in 1953-1957) or approximately the same obsolete MiG-17 fighters, which are deployed at the nearby Oran air base.

After graduating from flight school with the rank of first lieutenant or "Jungwi", the freshly baked pilot is assigned to a combat unit for further two years of study, after which he is considered fully prepared. Future helicopter pilots are trained on Mi-2 helicopters, and transport aviation pilots on An-2. An officer can look forward to 30 years of service, but promotion to higher ranks, the highest of which is General of the Air Force or "Deajang", requires many additional courses, and the highest positions are political appointments.

Training follows rigid Soviet-era doctrine, and must conform to the highly centralized command and control structure of the Air Force. By interviewing defectors to South Korea, it becomes clear that poor aircraft maintenance, fuel shortages that limit flying time, and also a generally unsatisfactory training system prevent the training of pilots of the same level as their Western opponents.

Organization

The current structure of the DPRK Air Force includes headquarters, four aviation divisions, two tactical aviation brigades and such a number of sniper brigades (special forces) that are designed to carry out an airborne assault in the enemy rear in order to disorganize it during the fighting.

The main headquarters is located in Pyongyang, it directly controls the special flight detachment (VIP transportation), the Gyeongsong officer flight school, intelligence, electronic warfare, test units, as well as all air defense units of the DPRK Air Force.

Offensive and defensive weapons are part of three aviation divisions stationed in Kaesong, Deoksan and Hwangju, which are responsible for the use of numerous anti-aircraft artillery systems and air defense systems. The remaining air division in Oran is intended for operational training. Two tactical transport brigades have their headquarters in Tachon and Seondeok.

Aviation divisions and tactical brigades have at their disposal several airfields, almost all have fortified hangars, and some have individual elements of infrastructure hidden in the mountains. But not everyone is assigned "their" aircraft. The DPRK's war plan provides for the dispersal of aircraft from the main bases in order to complicate their destruction by a preventive strike.

The Air Force has not only "stationary" air bases at its disposal: the DPRK is entwined with a network of long and straight highways, which are crossed by other highways with the help of large concrete bridges. And although this can be observed in other countries, in the DPRK there is no private transport, moreover, women are even forbidden to drive a bicycle. Goods are transported by rail, and road transport is very small. Highways are designed for the rapid movement of military units across the country, as well as alternate airfields in case of war.

The main task of the DPRK Air Force is air defense, which is carried out by an automated airspace control system, which includes a network of radar stations located throughout the country and covering the air situation over the Korean Peninsula and southern China. The entire system consists of a single air defense district in which all operations are coordinated from a combat command post at the headquarters of the DPRK Air Force. The district is divided into four sector commands: northwestern, northeastern, southern, and the Pyongyang Air Defense Subsector. Each sector consists of a headquarters, an airspace control center, an early warning radar regiment(s), an air defense regiment(s), an air defense artillery division, and other independent air defense units. If an intruder is detected, the alarm is raised in the fighter units, the aircraft themselves take to the air, and the air defense system and anti-aircraft artillery take the target for escort. Further actions of air defense systems and artillery should be coordinated with the headquarters of fighter aviation and the combat command post.

The main nodes of the system are based around semi-mobile early warning radars, including Russian early warning radars and 5N69 guidance systems, two of which were delivered in 1984. These systems, whose declared detection range is 600 km, are supported by three ST-68U missile detection and control radars received in 1987-1988. They can simultaneously detect up to 100 air targets at a maximum range of 175 km and are optimized for detecting low-flying targets and guiding S-75 air defense missiles. Older P-10 systems, 20 of which entered service in 1953-1960, have a maximum detection range of 250 km, and five more relatively newer P-20 radars with the same detection range are elements of the radar field system. It includes at least 300 fire control radars for cannon artillery.

It is unlikely that the North Koreans have only these systems. North Korea often finds ways to circumvent international sanctions designed to prevent new weapons systems from falling into their hands.

Operational Doctrines

The actions of the DPRK Air Force, which number reaches 100,000 people, are determined by two main provisions of the basic doctrine of the North Korean army: joint operations, the integration of guerrilla warfare with the actions of regular troops; and "war on two fronts": coordinating the operations of regular troops, guerrilla actions, as well as the actions of special operations forces deep in South Korea. Four main tasks of the Air Force follow from this: air defense of the country, landing of special operations forces, tactical air support for ground forces and fleet, transport and logistics tasks.

Armament

The solution to the first of the four tasks, air defense, lies with the fighter aviation, which consists of about 100 Shenyang F-5 fighters (Chinese copy of the MiG-17, 200 of which were received in the 1960s), the same number of Shenyang F-6 / Shenyang F-6C (Chinese version of the MiG-19PM), delivered in 1989-1991.

The F-7B fighter is a Chinese version of the later versions of the MiG-21. 25 MiG-21bis fighters remain in service, which are the remnants of those 30 former Kazakh Air Force vehicles illegally purchased in Kazakhstan in 1999. The DPRK Air Force received at least 174 MiG-21s of various modifications in 1966-1974. Approximately 60 MiG-23s, mainly modifications of the MiG-23ML were received in 1985-1987.

The most powerful DPRK fighters are the MiG-29B / UB, those that remained from the 45 purchased in 1988-1992. Approximately 30 of them were assembled at the Pakchon aircraft factory, which was specifically designed to assemble this particular type of aircraft. But the idea fell through due to the arms embrago imposed by Russia as a result of disputes over payments.

North Korean ingenuity is undeniable, and there is no reason to believe that, given the regime's focus on military matters, they can't keep planes that are long overdue in a scrap yard, as is the case with Iran. Of these aircraft, only the MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-29 are armed with air-to-air missiles: 50 R-27 (purchased in 1991), 450 R-23 (deliveries in 1985-1989) and 450 R-60s purchased at the same time. More than 1,000 R-13 missiles (a Soviet copy of the American AIM-9 Sidewinder) were received in 1966-1974, but their service life should have expired by now. Additional deliveries may have taken place in violation of international sanctions.

The strike force is represented by up to 40 Nanchang A-5 Fantan-A attack aircraft delivered in 1982, the remaining 28-30 Su-7B fighter-bombers acquired in 1971, and up to 36 Su-25K / BK attack aircraft received at the end 1980s The DPRK maintains a significant number (80 or more) of Harbin H-5 front-line bombers (a Chinese copy of the Soviet Il-28) in flight condition, some of which belong to the reconnaissance modification of the HZ-5.

The direct support of the troops is carried out by most of the delivered in 1985-1986. 47 Mi-24D helicopters, of which only 20 are estimated to remain operational. They, like the Mi-2 helicopters, are armed with Malyutka and Fagot anti-tank missiles, produced in the DPRK under a Soviet license.

Part of the H-5 bombers is adapted to launch the North Korean version of the Chinese CSS-N-1 anti-ship cruise missile, designated the KN-01 Keumho-1. The missile has a range of 100-120 km, 100 were fired in 1969-1974. In 1986, five Mi-14PL anti-submarine helicopters were received, but their current condition is unknown.

It is believed that the DPRK has UAVs in service, it is also known that the Russian Malachite complex with ten Shmel-1 tactical UAVs was purchased in 1994. It will not be a surprise to learn that Pyongyang used them as models for the development of its own UAVs.

Logistic support is provided by Air Koryo, the state-owned air carrier, but at the same time being the transport regiment of the DPRK Air Force. Today, the airline's fleet consists of a single Il-18V (delivered in the 1960s), as well as three Il-76TDs (in operation since 1993). Other types of aircraft are represented by the An-24 family, four Il-62Ms, the same number of Tu-154Ms, and a pair of Tu-134s and Tu-204s. The company also operates an unknown number of helicopters. Although their main purpose is military, they carry a civilian registration, which allows them to fly outside the DPRK.

At present, there are no clear signs of North Korea's modernization of its aviation, despite the fact that a high-ranking North Korean procurement delegation visited Russia last August.

missile defense

Of course, the DPRK air defense system is based on three main "pillars" - air defense systems. This is the S-75 air defense system, in 1962-1980. 2000 missiles and 45 launchers were delivered, and this system is the most numerous. Many of them have recently been deployed near the 38th parallel, and most of the remaining ones protect three corridors - one along Kaesong, Sariwon, Pyongyang, Pakchon and Sinuiju on the west coast. The other two run along the east coast between Wonsan, Hamheung and Sinpo, and between Chongjin and Najin.

In 1985, 300 missiles and eight launchers for S-125 air defense systems were delivered, most of them covering high-value objects, especially Pyongyang and military infrastructure. In 1987, four launchers and 48 S-200 SAM missiles were purchased. These long-range systems for medium and high altitudes use the same guidance radars as the S-75. Four regiments armed with this type of air defense system are deployed next to their counterparts with S-75 air defense systems (optimized to combat high-altitude targets).

Another numerous type of air defense system is the KN-06 - a local copy of the Russian two-digit S-300 air defense system. Its firing range is estimated at 150 km. This truck-mounted system was first publicly displayed at a military parade marking the 65th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean Workers' Party in October 2010.

Significant efforts are being expended on making it more difficult to destroy missile systems and their associated radars from the air. Most of North Korea's early warning, target tracking and missile guidance radars are located either in large underground WMD-proof concrete bunkers or in excavated mountain shelters. These facilities consist of tunnels, a control room, crew quarters, and blast-resistant steel doors. If necessary, the radar antenna is lifted to the surface by a special elevator. There are also many false radars and missile launchers, as well as spare sites for the air defense systems themselves.

The DPRK Air Force is also responsible for the use of MANPADS. The most numerous are MANPADS "Strela-2", but at the same time in 1978-1993. approximately 4,500 North Korean copies of the Chinese HN-5 MANPADS were delivered to the troops. In 1997, Russia gave the DPRK a license to manufacture 1,500 Igla-1 MANPADS. The Strela-2 is a first-generation MANPADS that can only be guided by near-infrared radiation, mostly engine exhaust. On the other hand, Igla-1 is equipped with a dual-mode (infrared and ultraviolet) guidance head, which can be aimed at less powerful radiation sources emanating from the aircraft airframe. Both systems are optimized for use against low-flying targets.

Speaking about artillery air defense systems, it should be noted that their backbone is the 100-mm KS-19 guns developed in the 1940s. 500 guns of this type were delivered in 1952-1980, followed by 24 guns in 1995. More deadly are about 400 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns - 57-mm ZSU-57 and 23-mm ZSU 23/4, received in 1968-1988. This arsenal covers large cities, ports, large enterprises. North Korea has also developed its own self-propelled 37mm anti-aircraft gun, called the M1992, which bears a strong resemblance to Chinese designs.

State is outcast

The existing weapons made it possible to create one of the densest air defense systems in the world. The emphasis on air defense systems and cannon artillery is a direct result of Pyongyang's inability to acquire modern fighter jets or even spare parts for the antiques that make up the majority of the DPRK's air force. Probing the positions of China and Russia in 2010 and 2011 was rejected by both countries. As a rogue state on the world stage, the CPV has gained a reputation as a non-binding payer for goods already delivered, and even China, which has been North Korea's ally and aide for many years, is showing irritation at its southern neighbor's demeanor. Much to Beijing's annoyance, it is deliberately refusing to create a market economy of the type that has proved so successful in China's reforms.

Maintaining the status quo and continuing to oppress their own people are the main driving forces behind the leaders of the DPRK. It turns out that it is much cheaper to create or threaten to create nuclear weapons that can harass and threaten potential external aggressors than to buy and maintain modern military forces. The North Korean leadership was quick to learn from the fate of Colonel Gaddafi, who succumbed to Western demands and destroyed his nuclear capability and other weapons of mass destruction by joining the "good guys" club.

Korean peninsula

The second task facing the DPRK Air Force is to deploy special operations forces to the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that there are up to 200,000 men in the North Korean army who are called upon to carry out such a task. The landing is largely carried out thanks to 150 An-2 transport aircraft and its Chinese counterpart Nanchang / Shijiazhuang Y-5. In the 1980s Around 90 Hughes 369D/E helicopters were secretly purchased to circumvent sanctions, and it is believed that today 30 of them are still capable of taking off. This type of helicopter makes up a large part of South Korea's air fleet, and if special operations forces infiltrate south of the border, they can confuse the ranks of the defenders. Interestingly, South Korea also has an unknown number of An-2s, presumably with similar tasks.

The next largest type of helicopter in service with the PRCDR is the Mi-2, of which there are about 70. But they have a very small payload. Probably, the Mi-4 veteran is also in service in small quantities. The only modern types of helicopters are the Mi-26, four copies of which were received in 1995-1996. and 43 Mi-8T/MTV/Mi-17, at least eight of which were obtained illegally from Russia in 1995.

Should we be afraid of North Korea?

The North Korean military exists solely to protect the Fatherland and threaten to invade South Korea. Any such invasion would begin with a massive attack from the South from low altitudes, with Special Operations Air Force being deployed across the front lines to “shutdown” strategic installations before a ground offensive across the Demilitarized Zone (DZ). Although such a threat may seem fantastic due to the state of the DPRK air force, it cannot be completely discounted. The importance that South Korea attaches to its own defense testifies to this. Over the past twenty years, four new North Korean air bases have been established near the DZ, reducing the flight time to Seoul to a few minutes. Seoul itself is a major target, one of the largest cities in the world, with a population of over 10 million. More than half of South Korea's population lives in the surrounding agglomeration of Incheon and Gyeonggi Province, which is the second largest in the world: 25 million people live here and most of the country's industry is located.

There is no doubt that even if the North suffers huge losses as a result of the conflict, it will also be devastating for the South. The shock to the global economy will also be severe. It is worth mentioning that at the end of 2010, when the northerners shelled the South Korean island, there were also major maneuvers during which a large-scale air raid was practiced, which was supposedly an imitation of a large-scale war. The result, to some extent, turned into a farce, as during the exercise there were collisions of aircraft, low reliability, weak command and control, and an unsystematic plan were revealed.

No one can say in which direction the current leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong-un, will lead the country, and to what extent he is just a puppet in the hands of the old guard, who has usurped power. What you can be sure of is that there are no signs of change on the horizon. And the world community looks at the country with suspicion, and the latest nuclear tests on February 12, 2013, only strengthened it in this.

Combat personnel of the DPRK Air Force. According toAir forceIntelligence as amended by the ACT Center

Originalpublications: Air Forces Monthly, April 2013 - Sergio Santana

Translation by Andrey Frolov

Air Defense and Aviation of North Korea is represented by
KN-06 aka 번개-5호 aka Pon "gae-6 - 16 S-300 PT vehicles were purchased from an unnamed country along with documentation for the production of 5V55KD missiles. It's just that technologically they can do just that. Then art deco processing was done. To hide where the firewood comes from. The radar imitating the radar from the HQ-9 and S-300V is just an imitation and a flare emitter. The real guidance comes from the 5N63 installation, which stands on the sidelines :). The stock of missiles is already more than 200 missiles. What can the S-300 PT - 6 target and 12 missile channels.Range from 5 to 75 km, height up to 27 km.The acquisition took place by barter - slaves in the Russian Federation in exchange for complexes from Ukraine. :)
S-200 75 missiles BUT, how many of them will fly is a big question, they are not produced, and the resource has long ended. Most likely, if the pair takes off already cool. So purely radar.
S-125 300 missiles and the same BUT.
S-75, but the production of these 11D missiles is in both versions. A total of 180 launchers, and more than 2,000 missiles in stock. the disadvantages of this system are that their radio command guidance is well suppressed. Range up to 34 km, at an altitude of up to 27 km. Missile speed Mach 3. This is the main air defense of the DPRK.
There were 75 S-25 missiles in 1961, but this has long been gone. These are essentially purely radar stations. How many of them are working...
Kub-M1 - there were 18 pieces. Why was it? Because missiles are not produced for them. So it’s also purely radar with mockups.
Buk-M1 - 8 pieces from an unnamed country. There are no those docks for missiles. Rockets were sold 50 pieces. It is capable of hitting aircraft from 3 to 35 km, missiles - 25 km at a height of 22 km, the maximum speed of targets is 800 m / s. Julia? You? How can you :)
Also in the DPRK, copies of the 9K38 Igla MANPADS are being made with a range of up to 5 kilometers. They could even be seen in Syria. In total, more than 1000 complexes were manufactured, but most of them were sold.
We have old arrows. But they will shoot from them from the strength of 100 or even less.
there are 1200 barrels of 23 mm anti-aircraft guns (in assemblies of 2,4,6,8) and the production of cartridges for them.
Aviation
of all Aviation, the real threat is
MiG-29 is 30 vehicles 9-12A aka MiG-29A and 5 vehicles 9-51 aka MiG-29UB without radar. Of which about 23 vehicles are combat ready. And also there is a sufficient supply of ammunition for them. Which is updated a little through the illegal market.
MiG-23 is 48 MiG-23MF and 8 MiG-23UB vehicles. BUT .... Of these, 18 MiG-23MF vehicles are combat-ready. And two MiG-23UBs can take off and land.
Su-25 is 26 simple and 8 UB. Almost all of them fly, but only now they are still attack aircraft.
The rest is flying garbage, most of which is no longer flying originals and Chinese copies of the MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21, Il-28, Su-7, An-2. They are suitable only for museums, well, or as flying targets. In total, there are 700 such targets in the open media. Which of course is complete nonsense. MiG-15 and MiG-17 - 60 years. Their engines have long since exhausted their resources. If a few pieces for a museum look go up, that's already cool. MiG-19 45 years old. here, well, two dozen can take off. IL-28 is the same. There were fewer of them. Su-7 was not enough if one takes off cool. MiG-21 officially it was 26 pieces. But spare parts for them can still be obtained easily. Therefore, there are 20 of them flying. But which one is the rival for the F-16 or F-15K ... funny. An-2 ... corncob ... with a machine gun ... arctic fox. In total, there are 80 such aircraft targets in the sky, if they raise it, it will be a fascinating shooting of targets :).
So 41 cars that can really fight in the air. 43 cars that can try to show the attack and die. That's all Air Force.
Oh yes, helicopters.
Mi-24 is listed as 20, flies 12. Mi-14 is listed as 8 flies 3. Mi-8 is listed as 40 flies 32. Polish copies of Mi-2 are listed as 46 flies 12.
But the main helicopter is unexpectedly the American MD500, also known as the Hughes OH-6 Cayuse, and yes it is produced in the DPRK. How do you like these pies? The basis of the North Korean helicopter forces is the AMERICAN MILITARY helicopter. At the same time, not only the helicopters themselves were sold to the DPRK, but also a complete set of technical documentation, including the Allison Model 250 engine. In my opinion, this is enchanting :). Armament or two blocks of 70 mm nurses with 7 missiles each. Or two 12.7 mm machine guns. Either other NURS units of the same size and weight, or 4 ATGMs of the Kornet type. 5 passengers.
At the moment, 96 cars have been produced and all are active. The armament of this helicopter, of course, has nothing to do with air defense, but it can be rather unpleasant for the enemy. The DPRK has no problems with NURS, since they are not difficult to manufacture and are produced.
The air defense fleet is practically absent and is represented only by anti-aircraft machine guns, and even those are only 300 barrels.
Of the above, from the point of view of air defense, only kits provided in the course of cooperation with the Russian Federation pose a serious threat.
Namely, S-300PT disguised as KN-06 up to 75 km, Buk-M1 up to 35 km, and S-75 up to 34 km. In addition, 41 MiG-29 and MiG-23 aircraft with a full range of ammunition. In addition, for low-flying targets at altitudes up to 5 km, the danger is the high saturation of Igla-1 MANPADS, 43 Su-25 and MiG-21 aircraft and 140 OH-6, Mi-24, Mi-8 helicopters.
However, this state of affairs is only due to the repair problem existing in the DPRK. The DPRK has its own CNC and they were supplied to the Russian Federation. However, the level of materials science is at the level of the 1970s and has failures. This leads to the fact that not everyone can manufacture engine parts for the MiG-23 in the DPRK. There are also technological failures - the DPRK cannot fix the radar of the MiG-29, but it can fix it for the MiG-19. They can repair any body part of the MiG-29, but they are not able to repair the engine. They can make an allison 250 engine, but they can't do anything with a MiG-21 engine.
The key industries for the DPRK are materials science, engine physics, locators, and their allies - which is why so many students from the DPRK study it. When they master this they will need a number of equipment that they have already purchased and are purchasing. Then they will be able to lift many of the landed machines. However, this will increase the number of dangerous cars by only 80%.
But time does not only work for the DPRK. The thing is that the DPRK has mastered the production of serious missiles that raise the air defense radius of the DPRK from 35 to 75 kilometers. And it's a matter of time when there will be more.
Already at the current moment, the ROK itself is not capable of suppressing the air defense of the DPRK without serious losses. However, for a coalition with a powerful fleet and a ground segment, which will increase the concentration of means of destroying air defense by five times, it will allow blocking the DPRK within the territory of the North, preventing a breakthrough through the DMZ not only by land but also by air.
The forces of the coalition, in the form in which it is possible, if there is a war within a year from the current one, it is enough to destroy aircraft in three days of fighting, helicopters in a month, to suppress air defense in a month in safe combat mode. However, this requires massive missile strikes on the territory of the DPRK. For which the RK does not have enough strength on its own. A much higher saturation of air defense in the region is needed - which would allow the safe operation of flights by the aviation of the South and the Coalition. Otherwise, there will be losses.

North Korea threatened the US with a preemptive nuclear strike. Assessing the capabilities of North Korea in a probable military conflict with the United States. The real nuclear potential of the DPRK. What is the error of analysts who assess today the nuclear potential of the DPRK. The blow may come from where it is least expected. North Korea will defeat the US Navy and destroy their main bases in the Pacific.

Laugh, laugh, couch analysts from the State Department, who consider the main strength of the Korean People's Army the number of its personnel. Only then, if anything, do not be surprised.

The North Korean army is called upon to fight two main enemies - South Korea and the United States. And its capabilities imply not just resistance to the aggressor, but inflicting a military defeat on it in the region, and in a short time.

Five virtues of the DPRK and the Korean People's Army proper

1. The main advantage of the Korean People's Army of the DPRK is by no means its numbers and weapons, which are largely outdated, but have not lost their ability to cause destruction. And not even the presence of nuclear weapons and carriers.

The main advantage of the KPA and its advantage over potential adversaries is the presence in the country state ideology.

The North Koreans are devoted to their country, the ideals of socialism and their leaders, the last of which is Kim Jong-un, who is tirelessly slandered by the Western media, presenting him as an inadequate politician and tyrant who shoots his guilty subordinates with mortars. The last one is a clear throw.

In terms of discipline and morale, the KPA is superior to its opponents, this is the main advantage.

2. The second main advantage of the DPRK is its own military-industrial complex, capable of autonomously and serially producing various types of weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium and short-range missiles, multiple launch rocket systems, ships and submarines, tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery installations, howitzers, mortars, portable anti-aircraft missile systems, anti-tank missiles, small arms and cartridges, in short, everything except aircraft. There is no aircraft industry in the military-industrial complex of the DPRK yet. They are also capable of developing new types of weapons, including nuclear.

The country has about 200 underground factories in its mountainous part, producing all types of components and weapons for the ground and missile forces, capable of operating autonomously for a long time in a nuclear war.

The DPRK is an arms exporting country, the main buyers are the countries of Africa and Asia, the export of the military-industrial complex as of 2015 is estimated at 100 million US dollars by the US Federal Reserve.

3. The third advantage of the DPRK is the actual armament of the KPA.

Today, according to data from various sources, the KPA is armed with:

Rocket troops.

Hwaseong-5 and Hwaseong-6 short-range missiles (an improved version of the R-17 "Scud") - at least 600 units.

Medium-range missiles Nodon and Musudan (an improved version of the Soviet SLBM-27 with a launch range of 2700-4000 km) - at least 200 units.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles Taepkhodong with a launch range of 10 - 12 thousand km - about 100 units.

Ground Forces of the KPA. The numbers are impressive.

Artillery pieces - about 21,000 units.

Multiple launch rocket systems, various types, including 240 mm caliber (similar to "Hurricane") - about 4,000 units in total. The main striking force of the SV KPA.

Self-propelled guns "Koksan" and "Juche Po", modern, caliber 170, 152 and 122 mm - about 2000 units.

Tanks - about 3,500 units, mostly Soviet T-55 and T-62, but there are the latest secret tanks of our own production, close to the T-90 in their characteristics, about 200 units. And about 3000 more obsolete and quite modern armored vehicles.

Air defense of the DPRK - outdated Soviet air defense systems, S-125 and S-200, up to two regiments, anti-aircraft guns (up to 10,000 units), MANPADS - also up to 10,000 units. Let me remind you that the newest "stealth aircraft" F-117 of the US Air Force was shot down from an outdated C-125.

Navy of the DPRK

The DPRK fleet includes 3 URO frigates (2 Najin, 1 Soho), 2 destroyers, 18 small anti-submarine ships, 4 Soviet submarines of project 613, 23 Chinese and domestic submarines of project 033.

The latter are carriers of Musudan SLBM missiles with a launch range of up to 4,000 km.

In addition, 29 small submarines of the Sang-O project, more than 20 midget submarines, 34 missile boats.

The DPRK is armed with fire support boats, 56 large and more than 100 small patrol boats, 10 Hante small landing ships (capable of carrying 3-4 light tanks), up to 120 landing boats (including about 100 Nampo, created by based on the Soviet P-6 torpedo boat) and about 130 hovercraft.

DPRK Air Force

The data is classified, but according to most experts, the DPRK army is armed with 523 fighters and 80 bombers.

Including Soviet MiG-29 and Su-25.

I will also return to the DPRK Air Force below.

4. The fourth advantage of the KPA of the DPRK is its strength and combat readiness.

In percentage terms, North Korea's army is the largest in the world. With a population of 24.5 million people, the country's armed forces number 1.1 million people (4.5% of the population). The army of the DPRK is recruited, the service life is 5-10 years.

In 2015, the DPRK leadership decided that the North Korean army should increase dramatically in numbers. To do this, the country has introduced compulsory military service for women who have so far served on a voluntary basis. From now on, all girls who have reached the age of 17 are required to serve in the army. However, some concessions were made to women: the service life of Korean women will be "only" 3 years.

And that's just KPA.

The DPRK also has a worker-peasant army (reservists) - up to 3.5 million people.

The DPRK ground forces have several defense echelons (offensive)

The first one is located on the border with South Korea. It includes infantry and artillery formations. In the event of a possible war, they must break through the South Korean border fortifications, or not allow enemy troops to go deep into the state.

The second echelon is behind the first. It consists of ground forces, tank and mechanized formations. His actions also depend on who starts the war first. If North Korea, then the second echelon will move deep into the South Korean defenses, including the capture of Seoul. If the DPRK is attacked, then the second echelon will have to eliminate the enemy's breakthroughs.

The task of the third echelon is in the defense of Pyongyang. It is also a training and reserve base for the first two echelons.

The fourth echelon is located on the border with China and Russia. It belongs to training-reserve connections. It is customary to call it the "echelon of last resort."

It follows that the combat readiness of the KPA is at a very high level. In fact, the country lives in a state of war.

Special mention should be made of the troops of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) of the KPA.

The number of SOF DPRK is about 120,000 people. Their spirit and level of training exceeds the boundaries of reason.

On September 18, 1996, a KPA Navy Shark-class submarine ran aground near the city of Gangneung on the east coast of South Korea. The crew members and special forces on board tried to get out by land. They were asked to surrender, to which fire was opened in response.

During the battles with the enemy, 13 fighters died in battle, another 11 special forces committed suicide, and only one managed to break out of the encirclement and break into the DPRK through the demilitarized zone.

The DPRK MTR is the elite of the country, the North Korean special forces are ready to carry out any task, including on the American continent, and, if necessary, die on orders.

5. And, finally, the fifth advantage of the KPA of the DPRK is the presence of nuclear weapons.

Only the fifth, not the first and not the second.

Five shortcomings or weaknesses of the KPA DPRK

1. Limited fuel resources will allow deployed combat operations to be carried out for no more than a month.

2. The impossibility of Pyongyang holding a long-term defense due to insufficient food.

3. There are no means of modern technical reconnaissance, which reduces the effectiveness of artillery fire;

4. Coastal defense is carried out with the help of obsolete missiles, and the fleet as a whole is not distinguished by autonomy and secrecy.

5. There are no modern air forces, modern air defense systems, and the available means will only allow a few days to counteract enemy forces.

Nuclear program of the DPRK

You need to write a separate article about this, but there is enough similar material on the net.

Short

In 1980, the DPRK began building its own Magnox 5 MW(e) reactor and fuel assembly plant. At the same time, a plant for refining uranium ore (to UO2) was built in Pyansan. Since 1985, the construction of a 50 MW(e) reactor at Nengbyon, a 200 MW(e) at Taechon, and an SNF reprocessing facility at Nengbyon has been underway.

On January 10, 2003, the DPRK officially notified the Chairman of the UN Security Council and the participants in the NPT about the abandonment of the decision to suspend the procedure for withdrawing from the Treaty, which it had taken on June 11, 1993.

The motivation is the need to protect the highest national interests in the face of "increasing hostile policies and pressure" from the United States. The DPRK believes that since January 11, 2003, it is formally free from obligations under the NPT, as well as under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

I think that the main mistake of all experts assessing the current nuclear potential of the DPRK is that they estimate the amount of possible accumulated weapons-grade plutonium.

They estimate the number of nuclear weapons charges at 12-23 today.

However, for some reason, everyone forgot about uranium warheads. But in vain.

Back in the 1950s, it was known that North Korea had up to 26 million tons of uranium reserves, of which about 4 million tons were suitable for industrial development.

At the end of the 20th century, the DPRK acquired Pakistani centrifuges for separating uranium isotopes, copied them, mass-produced (over 2000 centrifuges in 1999) and reached the level of concentrate production (80%) - up to 200 tons per year.

Isotope separation lines even then made it possible to produce annually up to 500 kg of weapons-grade uranium enriched in the 235 isotope up to 93%.

The news broke today:

By 2020, Pyongyang can create up to 79 nuclear warheads. This conclusion was made by the head of the planning department of the Institute named after King Sejong the Great Lee Sang-hyun, based on the estimated amount of nuclear material available in the North.

The development of a nuclear program in the long term is not a rational choice, but quite justified in the short term, the expert said at a seminar on October 18, presenting a strategy for achieving denuclearization in the UK. According to Lee Sang Hyun, the North could accumulate 300 kg of highly enriched uranium and up to 50 kg of plutonium. Considering this, it can be assumed that Pyongyang will be able to produce 4-8 warheads per year.

These are the assessments given by "experts" in the West, by the way, the experts are Koreans. Only they are southern.

Plutonium production is carried out in nuclear reactors, and their work, even if they are hidden, can be detected from satellites, but the production of weapons-grade uranium, if carried out deep underground, can be hidden, guided by common sense, necessity and expediency.

The common sense here is that the produced weapons-grade uranium can also be used for peaceful purposes, diluting it depleted to the reactor level (4%) and then manufacturing fuel elements.

But what prevents or would prevent the Koreans from producing warheads and cannon-type detonators from weapons-grade uranium for their own thermonuclear charges and storing them in such a capacity?!

Nothing interfered, and the declaration of the DPRK as a "rogue country" only spurred this on.

Based on the available figures, it can be assumed that the DPRK for ten years, starting from the late 90s, remaining isolated, increased the growth rate in the extraction of uranium ore, in the production of concentrate, in the separation of isotopes and reached the level of 1-2 tons of weapons-grade uranium in year. Thus, it can also be assumed that the DPRK currently has not 12-23 plutonium charges in service, but in addition to them, about 500 (at least) uranium charges produced in the DPRK over the past 17 years.

And it’s not a fact that uranium is only those that are analogous to the “Baby” dropped on Hiroshima. To ignite a thermonuclear reaction with "solid fuel" lithium-6 deuteride, it doesn't matter what to use: uranium or plutonium. Less plutonium is needed - about 5 kg. Uranium - 50 kg. The efficiency (efficiency factor) of the implosion-type plutonium charge is an order of magnitude higher than that of the cannon-type U-235 counterpart, in every sense it is cheaper. We produce energy and have plutonium as waste. But if you have your own uranium, it is easier to use it. No noise, no extra light.

The error of experts is that in their assessments they proceed from profit. They just don't know how to think differently. North Korea is a country of socialism.

So, it is logical to assume that the DPRK today has about 500 nuclear and thermonuclear charges of various types.

And this exactly corresponds to the number of carriers that the DPRK is armed with!

North Korea has:

600 short range missiles.

100 ICBMs and 200 medium-range missiles.

What, according to "analysts", are they stuffed with a conventional warhead?!

I understand that their high expert level allows them to express an opinion that the US leadership listens to, this is normal for the US, especially when someone like Psaki represents their president, this certainly says a lot, but what do their military think? Shooting missiles worth tens of millions of dollars, with a range of 4,000 - 12,000 km, stuffed with 750 kg of TNT, this is probably cool for the United States, but not for the DPRK.

And this is not all carriers of nuclear weapons in the DPRK.

Based on the indirect data I received, I dare to suggest that the DPRK has turned the shortcomings of its armed forces into virtues.

So, the shortcomings: the limited period of warfare in terms of fuel and food supplies, weak air forces, obsolete types of aircraft, the presence of old missiles of the DPRK coast guard, outdated air defense systems of air defense systems - all these are shortcomings.

But as I said earlier, the main advantage of the DPRK is the presence of a state communist ideology, and today the third generation of its bearers serves in the KPA. For them, to give their lives for the country, for the ideas of socialism, for their leader in a difficult hour of trials is their duty and the highest honor. And, I believe, they were able to solve the problem of transforming shortcomings into virtues.

The DPRK may have units of suicide pilots and suicide bombers in its Navy as part of its Air Force.

In order for the prerequisites for the creation of such units to appear, generations of those born and raised in the spirit of selfless devotion to the Juche ideas are required, and this is the case in the DPRK.

Unlike religious fanatics - Wahhabis, their choice is a conscious duty to their homeland and people, they do not seek to go to heaven, where they will be met by 72 virgins of the kingdom of paradise. And therefore their level is head and shoulders above that of Islamic radicals, remember this, ladies and gentlemen. You are dealing with intellectual warriors who are ready to give their lives on orders, with warriors who control even if not the newest, but high-quality military equipment, possibly armed with nuclear weapons.

Based on the foregoing, I also dare to assume that the DPRK has up to 100 "medium-range supersonic cruise missiles" with nuclear warheads, capable of operating in formation at extremely low altitudes and breaking through with a high probability ship and ground air defense and missile defense of the US Navy and several dozen submarines - nuclear torpedoes controlled by intellect by no means of artificial origin. And that's all besides missiles.

Of course, that all this should be kept a special secret for everyone, except for those who are supposed to know.

Such an assumption, based on an analysis of the totality of all factors of the DPRK in the context of its confrontation with an "exceptional nation", leads to the conclusion that the United States today, with all its military might, is not capable of defeating the DPRK, they will suffer a military defeat from them in the region and, as a result, globally, and in a very short time.

The DPRK will not wait until the US 3rd and 7th fleets line up their battle formations near the DPRK to shoot another country with Tomogawks, as was the case with Iraq and Libya, but using the surprise factor, it will attack them with a preemptive strike. Their bases in TO, in Japan, on Guam, as well as the main naval base on the US coast in San Diego, will be subjected to air and underwater strikes. Washington will also be under attack.

The US will lose dozens of its warships, possibly aircraft carriers and submarines.

At the same time, they are massively attacking South Korea, but they are unlikely to use nuclear weapons against them. What for? They still have to live and reconcile with the South Koreans. The northerners will go to liberate them, liberate them from the dictates of the United States.

A suicide attack is familiar to the United States, but then, in the 40s, Japanese kamikazes did not have the training that North Korea has today, they did not have nuclear weapons, and their effectiveness was relatively low. Although the very effect of the attacks was shocking.

Yes, the US will be able to respond with its own ballistic missiles, but that would mean that both China and Russia would enter into a nuclear war.

Which will end badly for everyone, and especially for the United States.

Realizing this, they will not answer, but will try to appeal to the world community, but who will stand up for them in this case? Having lost most of their ships and retreated, they will suddenly turn into what they have always been in principle: miserable and cowardly warriors, relying in their aggression solely on high technology and the strength of their $ USD.

Margarita, KONT, 19.10. sixteen.

P.S. For the training of suicide bombers, in addition to the main ideological base, it is also necessary to have a special long-term or (in war conditions) many-month program that allows at the first stage to overcome the fear of death - the fundamental root of all fears and death itself at the second stage. The fact that such a training program in the DPRK is taking place, I judged by indirect signs. For what - I won’t say, analysts from the special services have their own criteria, I have mine. And everything stated here is just my private version.

Main conclusion:

DPRK Air Force North Korea photo , the People's Democratic Republic is one of the most secret states in the world. Even in the era of the dominance of satellite reconnaissance means, their composition and organization are far from being fully known.

The flag of the DPRK Air Force (left) and the emblem of the Air Force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (right)

The date of creation of the DPRK Air Force is August 20, 1947. By the middle of 1950, they included one mixed air division (57th assault air regiment - 93 Il-10, 56th fighter - 79 Yak-9, 58th training - 67 training and communications aircraft) and two airfield technical battalions .
In the early days of the war on the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK Air Force acted quite actively, but very soon suffered heavy losses. By August 21, 1950, only 20 serviceable fighters and one attack aircraft remained in service. In the winter of 1950-1951, only light night bombers Po-2, Yak-11 and Yak-18 operated at the front from the air force. At the same time, within the framework of the Joint (Chinese-Korean) Air Army (JVA) on the territory of the PRC, North Korean aviation was being recreated.
By mid-1951, it included 156 aircraft and 60 trained pilots. The arrival of MiG-15 jet fighters began, gradually becoming the main type of combat aircraft of the North Korean Air Force. On the account of North Korean pilots during the Korean War, 164 official air victories.

The leader of North Korea, has the military rank of marshal, Kim Jong-un photo with employees of the 1st Guards Division of the Air Force and Air Defense

Despite the presence of a fairly developed military industry (including missiles), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not produce its own aircraft.
In subsequent decades, the DPRK Air Force developed on the basis of the supply of Soviet aircraft. There were also planes from China. To date, the North Korean Air Force has (according to various sources) from 1,100 to 1,500 and even (according to various sources) 1,700 aircraft and helicopters. The number of personnel reaches 110 thousand people. The structure and locations of air units are far from completely known.

Air force bases of the DPRK (North Korea), far from complete data

The most numerous type of combat aviation of the DPRK Air Force is fighter. The most modern aircraft in its composition are the MiG-29, delivered from the USSR at the turn of the 80s and 90s of the last century. Machines of this type are in service with the 57th Fighter Aviation Regiment, stationed in Onchon and included in the air defense system of the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang.

The MiG-29 fighter is in service with North Korea, judging by the photo, the state of the air fleet is deplorable, the plane is painted with paint resembling oil, and this is one of the government’s propaganda, after all, the leader is present in the photo

MiG-23ML fighters serve in the 60th Air Regiment (Pukchang). The most widespread type of fighter is the MiG-21 - the DPRK Air Force has about 200 such aircraft of several modifications, including Chinese copies of the "twenty-first" (J-7). They are armed with the 56th IAP in Hwangju, the regiment in Toksan and a number of other units. Finally, there are about a hundred extremely obsolete J-6 and J-5 aircraft (Chinese "clones" of the Soviet MiG-19 and MiG-17F, respectively) in service, which are completely unsuitable for air combat in modern conditions.

MiG-19 of the DPRK Air Force at the air base of South Korea (relations between the two neighboring states are very tense), in fact, a Chinese-made aircraft that makes exact copies of our MIGs

In the photo - J-6, hijacked on May 23, 1996 by Captain Lee Chol-soo to South Korea, see photo above, this is the same aircraft. There are about a hundred extremely outdated J-6s and J-5s in service.

Aircraft and helicopter fleet of the DPRK Air Force (approximate data)

Fighters DPRK Air Force North Korea photo

• MiG-29/29UB - quantity 35/5
• MiG-23ML - 56 units
• MiG-21 PFM/bis/UM - 150
• J-7-40
• J-6-98
• J-5-ok. 100

MiG-21 is the most massive DPRK Air Force fighter, about 200 pieces are in service

Bombers North Korean Air Force

• H-5-80

Fighter-bombers, attack aircraft North Korea photo

• Su-7BMK -18 Su-25K/UBK - 32/4

Transport aircraft, Il-76-3 pieces, Il-62 - 2, An-24 - 6, An-2 - about 300
Educational,

• CJ-6-180
• JJ-5-135
• L-39C-12

Korean Air Force helicopters

• Mi-26-4
• Mi-8-15
• Mi-2-ok. 140
• Z-5 - approx. 40
• MD 500 - approx. 90

Also obsolete is bomber aviation, numbering about 80 H-5 aircraft - Chinese copies of Soviet Il-28 front-line bombers, related to the level of technology of the middle of the 20th century. They are equipped with regiments in Orang and Uizhu. According to Western sources, no more than half of all H-5s are in flight condition. Probably about the same percentage of combat readiness in other branches of aviation. Fighter-bomber and attack aircraft are concentrated in the 55th air regiment stationed in Sunchon. It includes about two dozen obsolete Su-7BMKs and about twice as many as modern Su-25s.
Auxiliary aviation
The basis of military transport aviation is a large number (about 300) of light single-engine An-2s. Carrying out ordinary transportation in peacetime, in the military they are supposed to be used for landing reconnaissance and sabotage groups behind enemy lines. Heavier aircraft (for example, An-24 or Il-7b) in the Air Force - a few units. The situation is somewhat corrected by the use of Air Core for military transportation - formally civilian, but actually part of the Air Force. 1996 Training aviation is represented by about three hundred Chinese-made G-6 (copy of the Yak-18) and JJ-5 (two-seat version of the J-5), as well as a dozen Czechoslovak L-39Cs. The training of flight personnel is carried out at several air bases concentrated in the north-eastern part of the country. The North Korean helicopter fleet is dominated by light vehicles.
Among them, American-made MD 500 helicopters, acquired in Germany as civilians, and already armed in North Korea, stand out.

MD 500 Helicopters Inc purchased in Germany, later the Malyutka ATGM was installed as a weapon on them

Air defense systems of North Korea

S-200 on a launcher in the museum Hungary

North Korea has a very powerful and deeply echeloned (albeit obsolete) air defense system. In particular, there is:

• 24 launchers for long-range S-200 air defense systems,
• 240 medium-range complexes S-75 and 128 - S-125.
• Military air defense is represented by the Krug, Kub, Strela and Igla MANPADS. And the anti-aircraft artillery park is measured by an astronomical figure - 11 thousand anti-aircraft guns!

On June 5, 1950, at 3 p.m. KST, a pair of Yak-9P fighters with North Korean Air Force markings appeared over the Gimpo airfield near Seoul, where the Americans were being evacuated at a feverish pace in anticipation of the imminent capture of the South Korean capital by North Korean ground searches. The Yaks fired on the KDP tower, destroyed a fuel tank, and then damaged a C-54 military transport aircraft belonging to the US Air Force, which was on the ground. At the same time, a link of "yaks" was damaged by 7 aircraft of the South African Air Force at the Seoul airport. At 19:00, the Yaks again stormed Gimpo - they finished off the S-54s. It was the first combat episode of the Korean War and the debut of the North Korean Air Force.

The formation of the North Korean Air Force began much earlier than the events described above. Less than three months after the end of World War II, the great leader of the Korean people, Kim Il Sung, had already given a speech "Let's Create a New Korean Air Force" (November 29, 1945). It was necessary to create aviation, like the army as a whole, in fact from scratch - those air bases and aircraft repair enterprises that remained in Korea from the Japanese were concentrated mainly in the south of the peninsula and went to the Americans, and then South Korea. The training of the air forces of the "new Korea" began (according to the experience of the "great northern neighbor") with the organization of air clubs in Pyongyang, Sinju, Chongjin - where the aviation units of the Soviet occupation forces were based. The instructors, programs and aircraft were Soviet: Po-2, UT-2, Yak-18 (perhaps there were also Yak-9U, La-7, Yak-11).A serious problem was the selection of flight technical personnel. Those Koreans who served in the Japanese Air Force during the war years were declared "enemies of the people" - they were supposed to be caught and judged. After the arrival of the Soviet troops, the intelligentsia, the bourgeoisie, and other most literate representatives of Korean society fled to the American zone of occupation, probably foreseeing what the “bright kingdom of socialism” in Korean style could become in reality. On the other hand, the basis of the Korean population was illiterate peasants who had very vague ideas about aviation.A simple "plowman-rice grower" could be relatively easily trained to shoot from a PPSh or a Mosin rifle, having previously hammered into his head a few theses from the "Provisional People's Committee of North Korea Program", but make him a pilot was quite a difficult task.

In part, this problem was solved at the expense of military specialists from the Soviet Army who transferred to the service of Kim Il Sung (from among suitable, literally and figuratively, persons - Soviet Chinese, Koreans, Buryats, etc.). aviation schools, the communists tried to attract the most literate young people, and first of all, from among the students, both boys and girls. The "first sign" of the new Air Force in the north of Korea was the regular flights of Li-2 and S-47 military transport aircraft from Pyongyang to the Soviet Primorye (Vladivostok, Khabarovsk) and China (Harbin), which began and began at the end of 1917. The flights were carried out by mixed Soviet-Korean crews. The main task of these flights was to maintain regular communication between the "Provisional Committee", and then the government of the DPRK, with the "fraternal parties".

In 1948, the troops of the USSR and the USA left the Korean Peninsula. Almost immediately, the "Provisional People's Committee of North Korea" announced the creation of the Korean People's Army - the KPA, and only six months later the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was formed - such an unconventional sequence allowed Pyongyang by the end of 1948 to have a fairly powerful army of several divisions, equipped with Soviet weapons.

Of course, Soviet (sometimes Chinese) military advisers sat in all headquarters. The DPRK Air Force was commanded by General Van Len and his adviser, Colonel Petrachev. Officially, by the middle of 1950, one mixed air division was under their control, but its numbers significantly exceeded the Soviet one. According to American estimates, the DPRK was armed with 132 combat aircraft, including 70 Yak-3, Yak-7B, Yak-9 and La-7 fighters, as well as 62 Il-10 attack aircraft. The exact number is represented by Soviet military advisers: 1 AD (1 ShAP - 93 Il-10, 1 IAP - 79 Yak-9. 1 UchAP - 67 training aircraft and communications aircraft), 2 aviation technical battalions. Total - 2829 people. The backbone of the Armed Forces was made up of both former Soviet aviation specialists and flight technical personnel who passed in 1946-50. training in the USSR, China and directly on the territory of the DPRK.

Thus, in the reports of American pilots in the first weeks of the war, there are references to air encounters with North Korean jet fighters of the "redan" scheme (Yak-17, Yak-23 or even Yak-15), from which American historians conclude that the DPRK Air Force On the eve of the war, they began to master jet technology. There is no confirmation of this in Soviet sources, although it is known that the Chinese at that time (that is, when training on the MiG-15, and the MiG-15UTI did not yet exist) trained on the Yak-17UTI. These aircraft were available, in particular, in Mukden. However, North Korean and Chinese La-5s seemed to American pilots in the skies of Korea. Pe-2, Yak-7, Il-2 and even Aircobras!

Talking about the causes and course of the Korean War is beyond the scope of this narrative, so we will touch on these events briefly. We are interested in this war insofar as these events somehow affected the formation of the North Korean Air Force. Initially, the fighting went well for Pyongyang; tank columns moved forward almost unhindered, and "yaks" and "silts" provided them with air support. For "battles" in the area of ​​Seoul and Taejon, some units of the Korean People's Army even received guards ranks. Among them were four infantry and one tank brigade, four infantry and two anti-aircraft artillery regiments, a detachment of torpedo boats. Among others, the fighter regiment of the DPRK Air Force was also awarded the title of "Guards Taejong". To this day, this unit is the only guard among the North Korean Air Force.

So, at the initial stage, success was on the side of North Korea. This continued until the United States intervened in the war. As a result, by the beginning of August 1950, the aviation of the northerners was defeated and ceased to provide any significant resistance to the UN troops. The remnants of the Air Force flew to Chinese territory. Continuous attacks by American aircraft forced the KPA ground units to switch to night combat operations. But after the landing on September 15, 1950, in the rear of the DPRK troops in the Incheon area, the amphibious assault of UN troops and the simultaneous launch of the American counteroffensive from the Busan bridgehead, the Korean People's Army was forced to launch a "temporary strategic retreat" (translated into Russian - drapanula to the north). As a result, by the end of October 1951, the North Koreans had lost 90% of the territory, and their army was almost completely defeated.

The situation was corrected by the deployment of Marshal Peng Dehuai's Corps of Chinese People's Volunteers to Korea under the cover of the Soviet 64th Air Defense Fighter Corps, equipped with MiG-15 aircraft. The Chinese volunteers pushed back the Americans and their allies beyond the 38th parallel, but were stopped at these lines. As for the DPRK Air Force, in the winter of 1950-51. only the regiment of night bombers, widely described in the literature, was active, flying first on the Po-2, then on the Yak-11 and Yak-l8. But, as strange as it may seem, there was real value from their combat work. No wonder the Yankees seriously discussed the "Problem of Po-2". In addition to the fact that "crazy Chinese alarm clocks", as the Americans called them, constantly crushed the enemy's psyche, they also inflicted significant damage. Subsequently, a couple of squadrons from the 56th Fighter Aviation Regiment and some Chinese air units were connected to night work - both of them mainly flew La-9/11!.In November-December 1950, the formation of the Sino-Korean Joint Air Army (JVA) began. It was dominated by the Chinese, and the Chinese General Liu Zhen also commanded the OVA. On June 10, 1951, the KPA Air Force had 136 aircraft and 60 well-trained pilots. In December, two Chinese fighter divisions on the MiG-15 began combat operations. Later, the KPA air division joined them (by the end of 1952 their number was brought to three).

However, the activity of Korean aviation left much to be desired. The IA and ZA 64IAK bore the brunt of the fight against enemy aircraft, so the Soviet units were the basis of the DPRK air defense, and the Koreans and Chinese played a supporting role throughout most of the war. And although their air defense was, it was in the appropriate condition.

Almost the only air defense units were groups of "aircraft hunters", created by order of Kim Il Sung on 12/2/1950. aircraft with the help of improvised means - from heavy and light machine guns to cables stretched between the tops of nearby hills. According to North Korean propaganda, some groups (for example, the crew of the Hero of the DPRK Yu Gi Ho) managed to fill up 3-5 enemy aircraft in this way! Even if we consider this information exaggerated, the fact remains that the "shooter-hunters" have become a mass phenomenon at the front and spoiled a lot of blood for the UN pilots.

On the day of the signing of the armistice on June 27, 1953, North Korean aviation was still ineffective, but it already exceeded the pre-war numbers. Various experts estimate its strength during this period at 350-400 aircraft, including at least 200 MiG-15s. All of them were based on Chinese territory, since the pre-war airfields in North Korea were destroyed and were not restored during the war. By the end of 1953, the Corps of Chinese Volunteers was withdrawn from the territory of the DPRK and positions on the 38th parallel came under the control of KPA units. A deep reorganization of all branches of the North Korean army began, accompanied by extensive deliveries of new military equipment from the USSR.

For the Air Force, a dozen airbases were built at an accelerated pace, a unified air defense system was created along the 38th parallel with radar stations, VNOS posts, and communication lines. The "front line" (as the DPRK still calls the separation zone) and major cities were tightly covered by anti-aircraft artillery. In 1953, the complete transition of the DPRK Air Force to jet technology began: the next three years, large batches of MiG-15s were received from the USSR and China. Even before the end of the war, the first Il-28 jet bombers arrived, ten of them took part in the "Victory Parade" on July 28, 1953 over Pyongyang.

Major organizational changes also took place in military aviation - the air defense command, naval and army aviation were separated from the Air Force.
The air defense headquarters included an air target detection system, anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft. Naval aviation included several fighter squadrons covering major ports, and a small number of Il-28s designed for reconnaissance and attacking naval targets. Since 1953, army aviation has also carried out all civil air transportation within the DPRK, their volume was especially large in the first post-war years, while bridges, highways and railways remained unrepaired. In addition to the old Po-2 and Li-2, army aviation received An-2, Il-12 and Yak-12. According to unverified data, it was in 1953-54. The North Koreans began airlifting their agents to the South. At the same time, army aviation planes not only dropped paratroopers, but also made secret landings on the territory of South Korea. One of the An-2s, completely painted black, was captured by the South Korean security service during a similar operation and is still on display in the military museum. However, the South Korean Air Force was also very active in sending spies to the DPRK. One of their successful operations, carried out jointly with the Americans, was the “Hunt for the Mig”: on September 21, 1953, Senior Lieutenant of the North Korean Air Force Kim Sok No, attracted by the promise of a reward of 100 thousand dollars, hijacked a MiG-15bis ni Yug. This allowed the Americans, who until then had only the wreckage of downed MiGs, to conduct comprehensive tests of the aircraft, first in Okinawa, then in the USA.

In general, violations of the demarcation line on land, at sea and in the air, as well as mutual unprovoked shelling, have occurred hundreds of times since the 1950s. The most frequently mentioned in the literature is one of the episodes that occurred on February 2, 1955 over the Sea of ​​Japan. Then eight North Korean MiG-15s unsuccessfully tried to intercept an American reconnaissance aircraft RB-45 Tornado, photographing the coast of the DPRK under the cover of US Air Force F-86 Saber fighters. As a result of the air battle, two "flashes" were shot down, the Americans had no losses. On November 7, 1955, another scandalous incident occurred, when an An-2 UN plane with Polish observers on board, which was officially flying over the demilitarized zone, crashed near the 38th parallel. There is reason to believe that South Korean air defense shot him down by mistake.

In 1956, the 20th Congress of the CPSU introduced the concept of "personality cult" into the international lexicon. A deep rift has formed in the world communist movement between supporters and opponents of Stalinism. In the DPRK, the Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea disapproved of the "culmination of the intrigues of the anti-Party counter-revolutionary factionalists and revisionists" and began a grandiose purge of the party ranks. At this time, the term "Juche" ("help to oneself", in the sense of building socialism in a single Korea, was used for the first time, and even relying solely on one's own strength). In North Korea, not only the Soviet, but even the Chinese leadership was now considered insufficiently sustained in ideological terms. However, this did not prevent us from continuing to equip the army with the latest weapons from the USSR and the PRC, while at the same time subjecting the most competent military and technical specialists from among those trained in the socialist countries to repression.

The strengthening of the armed forces in 1956 was in full swing: the navy was formed, the organizational construction of the Air Force was completed, and the modernization of the army began. Several dozen MiG-17F fighters, Mi-4 and Mi-4PL helicopters entered service. In 1958, the Koreans received MiG-17PF interceptor fighters from the USSR. On March 6, 1958, a pair of American T-6A training aircraft that violated the "front line" was fired upon by anti-aircraft artillery, and then attacked by "migi". One of the Texans was shot down, its crew died. The North Koreans said that the Americans "made a reconnaissance flight" ...

In 1959, Kim Il Sung solemnly announced the "victory of Juche socialism" and set out to lead the Korean people straight to communism! And in South Korea, by this time, the local "leftists", with the support of northern agents, had brought the former Lisymanov government to a complete loss of control of the situation. The situation in 1960 was saved by the South Korean generals, who, having discarded the "ideals of democracy", carried out a military coup with the full approval of the United States, harshly surprising the organized opposition in the country and thereby providing the conditions for the subsequent "economic miracle". American troops in South Korea received tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles - Sergeant, Honest John and Lance missiles, and somewhat later - Pershing. The South Korean army, together with the 7th Infantry Division stationed in the South, practiced the use of weapons of mass destruction during the exercises. In the early 60s, the South Koreans erected along the 38th parallel the construction of the so-called "reinforced concrete wall" (a chain of fortifications reinforced not only by conventional minefields, but also, according to some reports, by nuclear land mines), which became the subject of constant sharp criticism from the DPRK . However, to this noise, the North Koreans built a strip of much more powerful and carefully camouflaged fortifications on the armistice line.

In 1961, the Treaty on Mutual Assistance and Defense Cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK was signed with a host of additional secret protocols that have not yet been declassified. In accordance with them, the DPRK Air Force received in 1961-62. supersonic MiG-19S fighters and S-25 Berkut anti-aircraft missile systems.

The KHA received aviation and artillery chemical munitions, and personnel began training in combat under conditions of chemical and radiation contamination. After 1965, MiG-21F fighters and S-75 Dvina anti-aircraft missile systems appeared in service with North Korean aviation.

In December 1962, Kim Il Sung at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of China announced a new course of "parallel economic and defense development." The measures he proposed provided for the complete militarization of the economy, the transformation of the entire country into a fortress, the arming of the entire people (i.e., the entire population are professional soldiers), and the modernization of the entire army. This "new course" determines the entire life and policy of the DPRK up to the present; North Korea spends up to 25% of its gross national product on its armed forces.

The sixties and seventies for the DPRK Air Force became a time of numerous border conflicts:
- On May 17, 1963, ground-based air defense systems fired on an American OH-23 helicopter, which then made an emergency landing on the territory of the DPRK;
- On January 19, 1967, the South Korean patrol vessel "56" was attacked by North Korean ships, then it was finished off by MiG-21 aircraft;
- On January 23, 1968, northern aircraft and helicopters attacked the US Navy auxiliary ship Pueblo, and then aimed their ships and boats at it; the ship was captured and towed to one of the naval bases of the DPRK;
- On April 15, 1969, air defense missilemen shot down a four-engine reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force of the EU-121 type;
- June 17, 1977, MiG-21 aircraft shot down an American CH-47 Chinook helicopter;
- On December 17, 194 North Korean ground air defense shot down an American OH-58D helicopter, one pilot of the helicopter died and the second was captured.

In all cases, the North Koreans claimed that the attacked planes, helicopters and ships deliberately invaded the air and sea space of the DPRK for espionage purposes, while the South Koreans and the Americans denied this. Considering that in those same years, South Korean aircraft repeatedly violated the borders of the USSR (let us recall the "Boeings" shot down near Arkhangelsk and over Sakhalin), then the position of the DPRK seems more or less plausible.

In turn, the South Koreans during this period sank a couple of North Korean ships (North Korea was now shouting about an "act of vandalism" against "defenseless trawlers"), and also repeatedly noted the violation of their airspace by North Korean planes and helicopters. In the 1980s, Pyongyang's hopes that a large-scale military conflict would break out between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, under the cover of which the DPRK could also defeat South Korea, did not come true. On the contrary, the end of the 20th century was a time of massive collapse of communist regimes in countries that were once "friendly to the USSR". However, the USSR itself is no longer there, and such "apologists for communism" as Albania and Romania went bankrupt much earlier than the "big brothers". In the Far East, China and Vietnam are also slowly but surely moving away from Marxist ideology. Apart from Cuba and some African countries, which would be glad to come to an agreement with the West, but do not yet know how to do it, by the beginning of the 90s, the only stronghold of communism was, in fact, only the DPRK. Despite the loss of almost all allies and the growing pressure from the "free world", the ruling circles of North Korea are still full of faith in the final victory of communism in their particular country.

Their confidence is supported by the fact that the KPA is still one of the most powerful armies in the world. True, the complete secrecy of North Korea allows foreign military analysts to make only the most rough estimates of the general state of the country, and in particular the technical equipment of its armed forces. In the DPRK itself, they write little and very one-sidedly about the Korean People's Army: it can be said that the North Koreans have surpassed their Soviet and Chinese friends in the field of window dressing and secrecy. Of course, state propaganda constantly claims that the KPA is invincible, and its unsurpassed fighters and commanders are ready to fight "one on one". American experts partially agree with this, believing that "the North Koreans have outdated weapons and military equipment, but their morale is exceptionally high, they are well-trained soldiers accustomed to iron discipline." Which, however, did not prevent the "great commander" Kim Il Sung at all party congresses from regularly scolding his marshals for "loss of vigilance, lack of fighting spirit and peaceful mood among the troops." The basis of the combat power of the Korean People's Army is tens of thousands of artillery pieces and up to 7 thousand armored vehicles, from obsolete Soviet tanks T-55 and T-62, Chinese T-59 to more modern T-72M, BMP- 2, BTR-70. Some Western experts are overly optimistic that the anti-tank weapons available to the South Koreans and the US troops deployed in Korea are capable of "turning the North Korean tank armada into the world's largest scrap metal dump."

The Americans write no less cheerfully about North Korean military aviation, arguing that "the DPRK Air Force is in worse technical condition than the Iraqi Air Force. The planes are so old that their first pilots have already become grandfathers. Today's pilots are poorly trained, their annual flight time is calculated no more than than seven hours. If they manage to get their torpedoes into the air, then most likely they will fly in a southerly direction and, in the tradition of kamikazes, direct their planes to the first ground object they encounter.

One can hardly rely on such statements, although it is absolutely clear that the equipment of the Soviet-Chinese production, which is in service with the DPRK Air Force, is mainly represented by obsolete models and is poorly adapted to modern war conditions, and the flight personnel trained according to outdated methods and in conditions of acute fuel shortage, really has little experience. But on the other hand, North Korean aircraft are safely hidden in underground hangars, and there are plenty of runways for them. In the complete absence of private cars and a small number of trucks, the DPRK has built a mass of highways with concrete pavement and arched reinforced concrete tunnels (for example, the Pyongyang-Wonsan highway), which in case of war will undoubtedly be used as military airfields. Based on this, it can be argued that it is unlikely that a first strike will "turn off" North Korean aviation, especially given the powerful air defense system, which US intelligence considers "the densest anti-missile and anti-aircraft defense system in the world."

In the air defense of the DPRK, according to Western analysts, more than 9 thousand anti-aircraft artillery systems are deployed at firing positions: from light anti-aircraft machine gun installations to the most powerful 100-mm anti-aircraft guns in the world, as well as self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-57 and ZSU-23-4 "Shilka". In addition, there are several thousand anti-aircraft missile launchers - from stationary systems S-25, S-75, S-125 and mobile "Kub" and "Strela-10" to portable launchers, "the calculations of which do not know the word fear." In qualitative terms, the DPRK Air Force is also by no means a continuous collection of rusty tins. True, even by the beginning of the 90s, they still had more than 150 MiG-17s and 100 MiG-19s (including their Chinese versions of Shenyang F-4 and F-6, respectively), as well as 50 Harbin H-5 bombers (Chinese version Soviet Il-28) and 10 Su-7BMK fighter-bombers. But by the beginning of the 80s, military aviation had begun a new stage of modernization: in addition to the previously available 150 MiG-21s, a batch of 60 MiG-23P fighter-interceptors and MiG-23ML front-line fighters was received from the USSR, and 150 from the PRC. attack aircraft Q-5 Phanlan. Army aviation, which had only the bottom of a dozen Mi-4 helicopters, received 10 Mi-2s and 50 Mi-24s. In May-June 1988, the first six MiG-29s arrived in the DPRK, and by the end of the year, the transfer of the entire batch of 30 aircraft of this type and another 20 Su-25K attack aircraft was completed. At the end of the 80s, two dozen American Hughes 500 helicopters, acquired in a roundabout way through third countries, became an unexpected replenishment of the Air Force; they are unarmed and are used for communications and air surveillance.

Obsolete aircraft (MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19) in the same years were transferred to "fraternal countries fighting against world imperialism" - primarily Albania, as well as Guinea, Zaire, Somalia. Uganda, Ethiopia. Iraq in 1983 received 30 MiG-19 fighters used during the war with Iran. The same planes, stationed on Iraqi airfields as decoys, took on the air strike of the multinational forces during Operation Desert Storm.

It should be noted that the DPRK does not have civil aviation as such. Any flights, whether it is the delivery of food and medicine to remote areas, domestic passenger flights or the chemical treatment of fields, are carried out by aircraft and helicopters bearing Air Force identification marks. Up to now, about 200 An-2s and their Chinese Y-5 counterparts form the backbone of this "military-civilian" aviation fleet. Until the beginning of the 70s, flights to the "fraternal countries" were carried out on five Il-14s and four Il-18s, then the DPRK air fleet was replenished with 12 An-24s (according to other sources, some of them belong to the An-32 type), three Tu154B and the "presidential" Il-62, on which Kim Il Sung "made a number of official foreign visits. After the collapse of the USSR, the air fleet of North Korea was replenished with a certain number of civilian aircraft bought cheaply from the eseng "independent airlines"; the largest of them were several Il -76 In early 1995, the DPRK signed an international treaty to open its airspace to foreign passenger flights, which resulted in North Korean aircraft flying overseas being given the civilian markings of the newly formed Joseonminhan Airline, but still being operated by the military. crews.

By the beginning of the 90s, there were more than 100 CJ-5 and CJ-6 piston aircraft (Chinese modification of the Yak-18), 12 Czechoslovak-made L-39 jet aircraft, as well as several dozen combat training MiG-21, MiG -23, MiG-29 and Su-25. It is quite natural to assume that the training of pilots for aircraft of more modern types greatly exceeds the average level of "seven flying hours per year." These include, first of all, pilots of the elite 50th Guards and 57th Fighter Aviation Regiments, armed with MiG-23 and MiG-29 aircraft; they are based near Pyongyang and cover the capital of the DPRK from the air. Instructors who trained aviation specialists in many countries of the "third world" have also accumulated considerable experience. We should not forget that the DPRK has ground-to-ground missiles of various types, many of which are produced at its own factories. Saddam Hussein frightened the United States and Israel with the North Korean "Scuds" during the conflict in the Persian Gulf. Then the Americans managed to shoot down no more than 10 percent of the missiles launched by Iraq with their latest Patriot anti-aircraft systems, despite the fact that these launches were carried out with very little intensity.

So the North Korean Air Force today is still a rather impressive force that the Americans have to reckon with.