Italo Greek war 1940 memories. Italo-Greek War. Attack on Greece
Consequences
Yugoslavia ceased to exist. On April 21 and 22, the division of Yugoslavia was completed at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy in Vienna.
The territory was divided into the following parts: the northern part of Slovenia was included in Germany; the southern part of Slovenia and Dalmatia - part of Italy; Vojvodina (Bačka) and the northwestern part of Slovenia are part of Hungary; most of Macedonia and the eastern regions of Serbia are part of Bulgaria; Kosovo and Metohija, the western regions of Macedonia and the eastern regions of Montenegro are part of Albania.
The Independent State of Croatia (including Bosnia-Herzegovina), the Kingdom of Montenegro (the throne remained unoccupied) and the Republic of Serbia were formed. At the same time, Montenegro was occupied by Italian troops, and Serbia by German troops, but local governments and administrative-state structures, as well as armed forces, were created there.
(Greek: Ελληνοϊταλικός Πόλεμος)
Greek war(ital. Guerra di Grecia) - war between Italy and Greece, which lasted from October 28, 1940 to April 23, 1941. It is believed that this conflict began the Second World War in the Balkans.
The war was preceded by the sinking of the destroyer Elli on August 15, 1940 by an “unknown” submarine, during the Orthodox celebration of the Day of the Virgin Mary, in the roadstead of the island of Tinos, and other provocations of fascist Italy, after which Greece carried out a partial mobilization. The Italian ultimatum was presented to the Greek Prime Minister, General Metaxas, on October 28, 1940, at 3 am. The ultimatum was rejected. The Italian invasion began at 5:30.
The Italian offensive took place in the coastal zone of Epirus and Western Macedonia. The Italian 3rd Mountaineer Division "Giulia" (11,000 soldiers) was tasked with advancing south along the Pindus Ridge to cut off Greek forces in Epirus from the Greek region of Western Macedonia. The brigade of Colonel K. Davakis (2000 soldiers) stood in its way. Having held back the onslaught of “Julia” and received reinforcements, Davakis launched a counter-offensive, after which the Greek army launched a counter-offensive on both the Epirus and Macedonian fronts and transferred military operations to the territory of Albania. In January 1941, the Greek army occupied the strategic mountain pass of Klisura (Occupation of the Klisura Gorge).
The victories of the Greek army in this war became the first victories of the armies of the anti-fascist coalition over the Axis countries. The famous Greek archaeologist and participant in that war, M. Andronikos writes that “when Italy decided to invade Greece, the Axis forces dominated Europe, having previously defeated the French and British and concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Only insular England still resisted. Neither Mussolini nor any “reasonable” person expected Greek resistance under these conditions. So when the world learned that the Greeks were not going to surrender, the first reaction was surprise, which gave way to admiration when news began to arrive that the Greeks had not only accepted the battle, but were winning.” In March 1941, having received reinforcements and under the direct supervision of Mussolini, the Italian army attempted to launch a counteroffensive (Italian Spring Offensive). The Greek army repelled the attack and was already 10 km from the strategic Albanian port of Vlora.
On April 6, 1941, saving the Italians, Nazi Germany was forced to intervene in the conflict, after which the conflict was called the Greek operation.
14. World War II
(ending)
Attack on Greece
Another underdeveloped project of Mussolini was his plan to drag Greece and Yugoslavia into the war. The Germans warned him again and again that it was unwise to create new enemies, but he attributed their warnings solely to jealousy of his “parallel” war and desire to seize the Balkans for himself. Between July and September three or four different plans for attacking the Balkan countries were prepared. They were either accepted or rejected in accordance with the constantly changing capricious mood of the Duce.
Ciano, who was especially concerned about provoking a war against Greece, came up with a plan to assassinate the Greek king and naively imagined that the bombing of Athens alone would be enough to force the Greeks to capitulate. Mussolini also assumed that the “liquidation” of Greece would be profitable and easy.
However, he still considered it a wise move to pretend to Hitler that Italy had no serious intentions of attacking Greece or Yugoslavia, and that all his forces were concentrated on the invasion of Egypt, as required by the Axis strategy. Following this assumption, the Germans again offered to send their tanks to Africa in early October, but the offer was again rejected - Mussolini decided that the Italians would be able to win the first battles on their own. He went even further, boasting to Hitler that, despite the objections of his advisers, he had given Graziani clear orders to launch a further offensive on October 15 and that a hundred Italian heavy tanks were already in position in full readiness.
Alas, these hundreds of heavy tanks simply did not exist in reality. Mussolini probably forgot that a few days earlier he had ordered further, even wider demobilization. More than half of the entire Italian army was now under orders to return to civilian life, as their leader decided that he could not afford to maintain a full military force through the winter. The demobilization order was given without any consultation; the General Staff only added a very important amendment that no further military operations were envisaged until May 1941.
Perhaps the Duce read this amendment too hastily and inattentively, since in his order he insisted on an attack on Egypt. However, on reflection, he agreed to postpone the offensive until December - only to return to the previous project of attacking Greece. Again, Mussolini did not consider it necessary to consult with the generals. The headquarters were given instructions to prepare for the start of action within two weeks, and “if anyone decides to complain about the difficulties associated with the defeat of the Greeks, I refuse to be called an Italian.”
Despite his high position as army commander, Graziani learned of the invasion of Greece after it had begun, listening to the news on the radio. The chiefs of staff of the navy and air force found out a few days before the start of the campaign. Mussolini ignored weak attempts at protest, and they were too intimidated to insist. Incredibly, Mussolini told Hitler that he had no confidence in any of his senior officers and therefore preferred to make decisions at his own risk.
As a result, seemingly obvious mistakes were made. The naval commanders could have warned him that there were no ports suitable for landing a large army on the opposite coast of the Adriatic Sea. The staff officers knew that the seasonal rains were due to begin a few days before the planned offensive. This threatened great difficulties in mountainous areas, for which not even appropriate maps had been drawn up and where there were no roads at all. The command also did not have enough time to issue winter clothing to the attacking army, although the temperature dropped below zero.
Mussolini subsequently presented false evidence to justify himself for these mistakes. Before publishing one of the documents, he deleted from it the official request of the chiefs of staff to double the number of troops and give them several more months to prepare. And although the generals can well be blamed for not being persistent in their objections, the main responsibility falls on Mussolini. It was he who chose precisely such compliant, weak-willed officers. Acting in true fascist style, they were taught not to argue or object.
To reassure the command, the Duce stated that the confidential information at his disposal nullifies all “technical objections.”
Unfortunately, this information was false. For example, Mussolini said that he could count on receiving help from Bulgaria. But this help never acquired any material form and there was nothing to receive it for.
Mussolini's trump card was secret information that the Greek generals had been bribed and would not engage in battle. Millions of lire were used to bribe them, but nevertheless it had no practical effect. Mussolini expected a rebellion to break out in Greece, but instead came news of his own Albanian mercenaries deserting en masse and defecting to the enemy.
“Incidents” that took place in Greece were brought to light, which were supposed to be used as a pretext so that the Duce could then claim that he was forced to defend Italy against “aggression.” He assured his doubting generals that it would be a "blitzkrieg" like the one the Germans staged in Poland: Brutal bombing of the main cities of Greece will bring victory in “a matter of hours.” Mussolini announced that he might go to the front himself to take personal command, and moved his headquarters to southern Italy in preparation for his upcoming ceremonial entry into Athens. Apparently he considered it unnecessary to stop demobilizing the army, or was afraid that changing this decision would demonstrate the inconsistency of fascist policies in front of hundreds of thousands of Italian soldiers, or simply forgot about it.
The war was supposed to begin on the morning of October 28. The Italians hoped to take the Greeks by surprise, but Ciano was so unrestrained that he talked about it for days on end. As a result, a valuable advantage was lost. The Germans learned about such an unwise idea a week before the offensive. Hitler rushed to Italy for urgent negotiations, but arrived too late. He brought with him the chief of the general staff and made it clear that he expected a serious discussion of military affairs, but Marshal Badoglio, Keitel's Italian colleague, did not know about the upcoming negotiations until the very moment they began: Mussolini did not want to share the glory of the commander with anyone.
Hitler tried his best not to hurt the feelings of his ally dictator, but behind the scenes he was beside himself with anger. He simply could not understand the decision to enter into such an unprofitable war, especially during the rainy season, and rightly feared that any military failure would cause serious damage to the Axis in the eyes of neutral states such as Bulgaria, Turkey, Spain and Yugoslavia. This war also allowed the British to create a base in Greece for their aircraft, from which they could bomb the oil fields in Ploiesti and, by blocking the sea route from Romania, through which Italy received most of the oil, thereby creating an overload on the transalpine railways.
From that moment on, Hitler lost almost all confidence in military cooperation with Italy.
But the main problem was that, despite the undeniable superiority of the Italian air force, the Greeks drove the occupying army back into Albania within a week, and for the next three months Mussolini was forced to fight a desperate defensive war. He received his next blow on November 11, when half of the Italian navy was disabled in Taranto harbor during an attack by British carrier aircraft. Mussolini always dogmatically denied the benefits of aircraft carriers. Planning a short war, he did not take advantage of the nine months of non-participation in hostilities to strengthen the vital fleet station at Taranto. Of course, the Duce hid this failure, although he continued to claim that he was the only leader who told his people the truth. But from now on, many Italians began to listen to English radio to learn about the events taking place, and this turned out to be the biggest defeat for the fascists in the field of propaganda, where until now Mussolini had been almost invulnerable.
Greek soldiers in battles with the Italians, 1941
The Italians were beaten by the Duce’s most despised “Levantines” - this especially infuriated him. He said that the army was resuming its offensive operation and would methodically “wipe from the face of the earth” every city in Greece with more than 10,000 inhabitants. Mussolini's commanders could have pointed out to him that this was completely impossible, and although some of them, justifiably worried about their promotion, continued to maintain the Duce's illusion of an imminent victory, Marshal Badoglio found the courage to declare that this campaign was forced on the General Staff by For purely political reasons, the military knew from the very beginning that this was a gamble. Mussolini finally heard that his own unprofessionalism and delusions of grandeur led Italy to defeat.
Having expressed all this in the presence of strangers, Badoglio immediately lost his position as chief of the general staff. Mussolini preferred to shift the blame for all failures onto others.
As the army continued to roll back into Albania, not only Hitler and Badoglio, but also many others became convinced of the unforgivable mistake that the Duce had made in opening a new front in the Balkans: it was clear to everyone that the arena for the offensive was North Africa. One tank specialist sent to Libya argued that if Mussolini had accepted German help, by that time the small British forces in Egypt would have been destroyed without much difficulty.
But Mussolini, having convinced himself that tanks would be of little use in the desert sands, still hoped to cope with Egypt on his own. However, Hitler realized that the Italians had too little chance of victory without his help. Knowing how important it was to seize the Suez Canal, he, on the other hand, understood that the Duce’s personal prestige was at stake, and therefore did not want to criticize his actions too much.
From that time on, relations between the two national leaders took on a completely new character. Hitler continued to show a friendly attitude towards Mussolini, although he no longer thought anything of him. The Duce became increasingly irritated by his ally. Making sarcastic remarks about Hitler's rouged cheeks and his supposed sexual proclivities, he could not hide his envy of the younger, somewhat taller, and most importantly, more successful leader. Some noted Mussolini's obvious hostility, even some bewilderment at how the Germans could fall under the influence of such an ordinary person. His resentment became increasingly apparent as Italy became increasingly dependent on German aid. He liked to say that the Führer did not have the decisive gestures or manner of behaving like a soldier that a dictator should have. Reveling in this advantage, he believed that Hitler's pitiful appearance had a detrimental effect on other dictators.
All this talk was a disguise for Mussolini's acute dissatisfaction with being overshadowed by someone, a cover for a growing sense of helplessness and humiliation: as the rickety structure of fascism became increasingly exposed in the light of day, the Duce could not help but think about the future.
The 1935 attack on militarily backward Abyssinia resulted in a brutal eight-month war in which the Italians, with the help of tanks, artillery, aircraft and chemical weapons, barely managed to defeat an army that was still armed with muzzle-loading bronze cannons, shields and spears. In the summer of 1940, the Italians, who tried to grab a piece of France, which had already been virtually destroyed by the Wehrmacht, suffered a humiliating and crushing defeat from the already morally broken French.
However, these circumstances did not seem to bother Mussolini at all. Already in the summer of 1940, as part of the Duce’s ambitious plan to transform the Mediterranean Sea into the internal sea of Italy, he outlined a new “victim” for himself - Greece, the springboard for the attack on which was to become Albania, occupied in the spring of 1939. The Italians began preparing for the attack with a series of provocations, including the sinking of the Greek cruiser Ellie by an “unknown submarine.” In Athens, this caused a natural response - the Greek army was partially mobilized and put on combat readiness.
To attack Greece, two Italian army corps were concentrated in Albania - the 25th and 26th - with a total of 87 thousand people, 163 tanks and 686 guns. The main blow was to be delivered by the 25th Corps, which included three infantry, one tank divisions and a mobile task force. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Ioannina, Metsovon. Another Italian corps, consisting of four divisions, was deployed to conduct active defense on the left wing of the Italo-Greek front. An infantry division stationed in Italy was allocated for the landing of troops on the island of Corfu and its occupation. The operation was also to be supported by the main forces of the Italian fleet.
In peacetime, the Greek army had covering forces on the border with Albania consisting of two infantry divisions, two infantry brigades, 13 separate infantry battalions and 6 mountain batteries. Their total strength was 27 thousand people, supported by 20 tanks and 220 guns. However, the mobilization that began due to Italian provocations led to the fact that by the beginning of the Italian aggression the strength of the Greek armed forces had already grown to 120 thousand people, and in total the General Staff of the Greek Army planned to deploy 15 infantry and one cavalry division, 4 infantry brigades and reserve forces of the Main command. True, part of these forces was planned to be deployed on the border with Bulgaria.
Thus, Italy was preparing to attack Greece with forces inferior in number to the already deployed Greek army, which, given previous experience, was at least adventurous. Obviously, the Italian command placed its main bet on the technical superiority of its armed forces. And this bet, it should be noted, was theoretically completely justified.
The Italian invasion army, in addition to the fleet, artillery and tanks, was ready to support a very impressive air force group. First of all, it was the Air Force grouping directly in Albania, commanded by General F. Ranza. The main striking force consisted of three bomber groups: the 39th (51st and 69th squadrons) and 40th (202nd and 203rd squadrons) of the 38th Bombardment Regiment, as well as the 105th Independent Bombardment Group ( 254th and 255th squadrons). True, the 38th regiment had only 24 obsolete SM.81 bombers, but the 105th group was fully equipped with more modern SM.79s, of which there were 31 units. In addition, the Albania Air Command included the 72nd separate reconnaissance group of the 25th, 42nd and 120th squadrons), which was armed with 25 reconnaissance aircraft and light bombers Ro.37bis. The bulk of the aircraft were fighters from the 160th separate fighter group. The group consisted of three squadrons: the 394th, armed with 14 obsolete CR.32 biplane fighters, the 393rd with 46 slightly newer CR.42 biplane fighters, and the 395th, armed with 47 G.50bis monoplanes. Most of the Italian aircraft in Albania were based at airfields in Gjirokasta and Korça, as well as in Tirana.
Fiat CR.32 fighter from the 163rd separate squadron.
In general, only this group was superior in its capabilities to the Greek Air Force combined, both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, that was not all. Directly from Italy, bombers of the 4th territorial zone under the command of General A. Bonol were preparing to support the strike group of ground forces. It included:
- 35th Bomber Regiment on Z.506 seaplanes as part of the 86th and 95th groups;
- 37th Bomber Regiment on SM.81 and BR.20 aircraft as part of the 55th and 116th groups;
- 47th Bomber Regiment on the latest Z.1007bis bombers as part of the 106th and 107th groups;
- 50th separate bomber group on Z.1007bis;
- 96th separate group of dive bombers on German Ju87B/R.
The fighters were represented by the 2nd separate fighter group consisting of three squadrons (150th, 151st and 152nd) on CR.32 and G.50bis aircraft
In total, the 4th Territorial Group had 40 Z.1007bis, 19 BR.20, 18 SM.81, 20 Ju87, 23 Z.506, 33 G.50bis and 9 CR.32. 
Finally, one should not discount the so-called Aviation of the Aegean Sea under the command of General U. Longo. It consisted of three separate fighter squadrons - the 161st on Ro.43/44 seaplanes (these float-borne reconnaissance biplanes were also used as fighters), the 162nd on the CR.42 and the 163rd on the CR.32, and bombers: The 39th Bombardment Regiment, consisting of the 56th (SM.81) and 92nd (SM.79) Groups, as well as the 34th Independent Bombardment Group on the SM.79. Reconnaissance aircraft included two separate squadrons of Z.501 seaplanes (147th and 185th), and the Sezione Soccorso group on Z.506. In total, the Aegean aviation consisted of 82 combat aircraft. 
The Air Force of Greece, which did not have its own aviation industry, was naturally much more modestly equipped. They were commanded by 57-year-old General Alexander Parados, under whose command there were a little more than one and a half hundred combat and training vehicles. The country's fighter aviation was concentrated in the 1st Fighter Regiment (Mire Dioxes) of Lieutenant Colonel E. Kelades, which was armed with Polish P.24F and six P.24G fighters, evenly distributed among three squadrons - 21st, 22nd and 23rd th. By October 28, out of 36 R.24s, 24 were operational. The regiment's fighters were dispersed across the airfields of Kalambaka, Ioannina, Larissa and Thessaloniki and could cover the group in the area of the Greek-Albanian border. The P.24 was far from being the most advanced aircraft for the early 1940s, but it could easily fight on equal terms with the Italian CR.42 fighter, one of the main ones for this theater of operations at that time; it was noticeably superior to the CR.32, but in most characteristics it was inferior to the G .50bis. Another fighter squadron, the 24th, was included in the air defense of the capital and was armed with nine modern French MB.151 fighters. 
The 3rd Regiment's interaction with the army (Mire Stratiotkis Synergassias) was very bad with materiel. Three of his four squadrons flew very ancient French machines Breguet XIX (1st and 2nd squadrons) and Potez 25 (4th squadron), of which there were 18 and 17 units, respectively. Only the 3rd Squadron, armed with 15 German Hs.126 short-range reconnaissance and spotter units, had relatively modern equipment.
But the Greek bomber aviation - the 2nd Bomber Regiment (Mire Vomuardistou) - was armed with relatively modern equipment. The 31st squadron flew the French twin-engine Potez 633 (11 in service, 8 operational), the 32nd flew the British twin-engine Blenheim IV (12 in service, 11 operational), and the 33rd flew the British single-engine Battle "(12 in service, 10 operational). 
Finally, the 4th Naval Aviation Regiment (Mire Naflikis Synergassias) had three more squadrons: the 11th with nine British obsolete Fairy IIIF float reconnaissance aircraft, the 12th with a dozen German Do 22G flying boats and the 13th with nine British twin-engine reconnaissance aircraft "Anson".
In addition, in the training units, along with 42 Avro 621 and 626 training biplanes, there were six B-534 fighters and two Gladiators, as well as six ancient Horsley Mk.II torpedo bombers.
Thus, the Greek Air Force could oppose the aggressor with 45 fighters, 35 bombers and four dozen reconnaissance aircraft and light bombers, as well as thirty naval aircraft. In other words, the Greek Air Force was inferior in numbers even to the aviation group that the Italians created only in Albania. The Italian Air Force in the area of future combat operations had a noticeable quantitative and some qualitative superiority over the Greeks.
On the first day of hostilities, October 28, the weather was not conducive to aviation activity, however, 8 SM.81 from the 38th regiment carried out the first raid on the communications of the Greek army in the Kalambaka area. Following them, the territory of Greece was attacked by 13 Z.1007 from the 47th regiment, BR.20 SM.81 from the 47th regiment and SM.79 from the 105th group. Greek fighters did not counteract these raids, but anti-aircraft artillery was able to damage one SM.81, which was able to cross the Adriatic and was forced to land near the Italian town of Otranto. The next day there were practically no flights due to weather conditions, and on October 30 the first air battle of this war took place. 
A pair of Greek Henschel-126s were conducting reconnaissance in the area of the front line when they were suddenly attacked by a patrol of Fiat CR.32s from the 394th Squadron. The leading Italian flight, Lieutenant M. Frascador, opened fire too early and missed, and the Greeks hastened to hide in the nearest cloud. However, this time fate was not kind to the Greek pilots and after some time the pair caught the eye of five CR.42s led by the commander of the 160th group, Lieutenant Colonel Zanni. As a result of the ensuing battle, the Italians shot down the Henschel pilot E. Yannaris. The plane crashed near the village of Vassiliada, and the crew died. This was the first official loss of the Greek Air Force in World War II. The second Henschel also did not return to its airfield and its fate is still unknown. One Italian fighter was damaged by return fire from the riflemen. 
Overall, bad weather continued to hamper high air force activity. So 10 SM.81 of the 38th regiment, due to heavy clouds, were unable to find the target and returned back with bombs, and the 160th group, which did not have time to celebrate its morning success, suffered its first losses. In the afternoon, fighters of the 394th and 395th squadrons took off to attack the airfields of Florina and Kastoria, but due to heavy clouds they were not only unable to complete the mission, but also lost two CR.32s. At about 17.30, the pilot of one of them, Lieutenant M. Louis, arrived on foot at the base in Korça. The second missing pilot, Lieutenant D. Carlo, was eventually captured.
It was only on November 1 that the weather finally allowed the Italian Air Force to significantly increase its activity. Once again, the crews of the 3rd Regiment became victims of Italian fighters, this time a pair of Breguets from the 1st Squadron, who inadvertently caught the eye of a trio of CR.32s from the 394th Squadron. Both Greek reconnaissance aircraft were quickly shot down, fortunately this time their crews survived.
At 8.35, one of the largest Greek cities and ports of Thessaloniki was raided. It was attacked by 10 SM.79s of the 105th Group with an escort of five Fiat CR.42s of the 393rd Squadron. The bombers were led by none other than Lieutenant Colonel G. Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law and Italian Foreign Minister. The Greeks raised seven P.24s of the 22nd squadron to intercept, but the Italians were able to engage the interceptors in battle. As a result, the Fiat pilots reported the destruction of one R.24 and another “probably”, and the bomber gunners added to them one more “definitely” shot down and two “probably”. One Fiat was damaged in an air battle. In Thessaloniki, an Italian raid killed 35 people.
An equally representative group attacked the Larissa airfield, where the 23rd and 32nd squadrons of the Greek Air Force were based. Ten Z.1007 Cants were flown by the commander of the 260th Squadron, 106th Group, 47th Regiment, Bruno Mussolini, the eldest son of the Italian dictator, and another of the Cants was piloted by his other son, Vittorio. North of Ioannina, the Italian bombers were intercepted by several P.24s of the 21st Squadron, but were able to escape, taking advantage of their superior speed. However, the Greek pilots reported the destruction of one Kant, although in fact the damaged bomber was able to fly to its base.
Heavy fighter Bristol Blenheim Mk.IF of the 30th Squadron in Greece.
In response to Italian attacks on Greece on the evening of November 1, the Blenheims of the 32nd Squadron attacked Korça airfield. On the way back, one bomber fell behind and lost its bearings in the darkness. The crew made an emergency landing in the Larissa area, where they were immediately “captured” by local peasants who mistook the pilots for Greek-speaking Italians. As a result, the crew commander, Lieutenant Maravelis, had to perform Greek folk dances in front of the heated peasants to prove that he was their compatriot.
We do not know the results of the raid on Korca, but on the same day the 150th separate fighter group on CR.42 (363rd, 364th and 365th squadrons) was transferred to Albania from Turin. The fighters were located at the Valona airfields, Tirana and Gjirokaster. And the next day also the 24th separate fighter group on the G.50bis (354th, 355th and 361st squadrons). A little later, the 395th squadron was expelled from the 105th group, and the 361st from the 24th group, from which the 154th separate fighter group was formed.
Meanwhile, the Italian offensive, which had begun vigorously, also abruptly stopped. The Greek group operating on the border with Albania received six divisions for reinforcement, the Italians were firmly stuck in the Greek defense, and on November 1, the commander-in-chief of the Greek army A. Papagos gave the order to launch a counterattack on the northern flank of the defense. For the Italians, another shameful page in their military history was beginning.
But while the Italian Air Force continued to attack on November 2 at an ever-increasing pace. In the morning, SM.81s of the 37th regiment bombed the island of Corfu, followed by 6 Ju87s for the same purpose. By the way, this was the first combat mission of the Italian Stukas. Greek airfields were again subjected to raids by Italian bombers. So five Ju87s struck Ioannina, followed by another 10 Z.1007s of the 47th Regiment. Nine more “Kants” worked on Larissa. Greek fighters simply did not have time to respond to all threats, especially since their combat effectiveness had noticeably decreased over the previous days. Thus, to repel the raid on Larissa, only one R.24 took off, which was shot down and burned along with its pilot.
Already in the evening, ten Kants from the 50th separate air group tried to strike Thessaloniki again, but this time they were stopped by the fighters of the 22nd squadron. The fighters took revenge for previous failures. Three Z.1007s were seriously damaged, one of them landed on Greek territory and the crew was captured, the other two managed to reach Brindisi. Another “Kant” seemed to have safely survived all the attacks of the R.24 of Lieutenant Marinos Mitralexis, who was stuck behind it. The Greek eventually ran out of ammunition, but he decided not to give up and hit the fighter’s propeller on the bomber’s tail. The bomber lost control and crashed northeast of Thessaloniki, near the town of Langados. Mitralex was also forced to land the damaged fighter near his victim, while the Greek lieutenant captured the Italian crew, with the exception of his pilot, Second Lieutenant B. Rasqualotto, who did not survive the rough encounter with the ground. For his feat, Mithralexis received a number of awards, including the highest military order of Greece. After the latter capitulated under the pressure of the Germans, he fled to North Africa. The national hero of Greece died in 1948 during a routine tinting flight. 
But let's go back to the evening of November 2, 1940. Shocked by the furious onslaught of the enemy, the pilots of the Italian bombers did not tempt fate and, having gotten rid of the bombs, turned back. For their success, the Greeks had to pay for one fighter that was forced to land after being rammed, another was also forced to land, having used up all its fuel in battle, and one was damaged in an air battle. The next day, the Italians tried to take revenge by sending another nine Z.1007 from the 47th Regiment to Thessaloniki, this time under the cover of the G.50bis of the 24th Group. During the air battle, Greek fighters, together with anti-aircraft artillery, managed to shoot down one Kant and one G.50, but they themselves lost one of their precious fighters. Thus, in two days, the 22nd squadron, despite the successes achieved, lost, although not all irretrievably, a third of its aircraft. The strength of the Greek fighters was dwindling, while the Italian Air Force was only increasing its pace.
The outbreak of the Greek counteroffensive, however, forced the Italian command to transfer the efforts of its air force from communications, cities and airfields to troops at the front. So on November 4, 4 Ju87 and one experienced Italian twin-engine dive bomber SM.86 worked on the Greek positions. Bombers from Albania worked against the troops at the front, where on November 5 the 104th separate bomber group was additionally transferred to SM.79. The constant presence of Italian aviation over the front made the work of Greek reconnaissance aircraft very problematic. Thus, on November 4, the Breguet group was subjected to another beating. Three of these vehicles had the misfortune of running into a CR.42 patrol of the 365th squadron, as a result of which one of them was shot down and burned along with the crew, another burned out after an emergency landing, and only one managed to escape from its pursuers.
However, the Italians also remembered other goals. Thus, “Kants” from the 50th separate group attacked the port of Volos. Fighters from squadrons 21 and 23 scrambled to intercept and reported the destruction of three bombers, two of which were accounted for by D. Castaros. The Greeks even indicated the crash sites of the Italian aircraft, but the Italians denied their losses in this flight, with the exception of the Z.1007 damaged by anti-aircraft fire.
Despite the efforts of the Italian Air Force, the Greeks on the ground continued to successfully push back the enemy. The 3rd Army Corps of the Greek Army, which went on the offensive on November 1, in stubborn battles, was able to break through the defenses of the Italian 26th Corps and forced them to retreat to Korça, entering the territory of Albania. To the south, on November 3, the Greeks launched a counterattack on the left wing of the Italian 25th Corps, which had broken through to Greek soil, as a result of which the Italian Giulia division operating there was surrounded and defeated, losing about 5,000 people. During the battles on November 3-4, the Greeks liberated two villages previously captured by the Italians, and the surviving Italian units rolled back abroad, after which there was a temporary lull in this area. The Italian offensive continued only on the coastal flank, where the strongest group of two infantry and a tank division operated. But here, too, the Italian offensive finally ran out of steam by November 8, after which the order was given to go on the defensive at the achieved lines while awaiting reinforcements.
Greek poster from 1940
The Italian command, realizing that it was losing the initiative, hurried to strengthen its group in Albania, deploying Army Group Albania there as part of the 9th and 11th armies. The Air Force group in Italy operating against Greece also received reinforcements. To the forces previously located here, on November 3, the 41st separate bomber group (204th and 205th squadrons) with two dozen Z.1007s was added, and on November 11, the 372nd separate fighter squadron, equipped with a dozen of the latest Italian MC.200 fighters.
After fierce air battles in the first days of November, the weather gave the Greek pilots a respite. However, the overwhelming numerical superiority of the air enemy did not promise any favorable prospects for the Greeks. Despite the bravery and courage of its personnel, the Greek Air Force was essentially losing the war in the air. Unfortunately for them, the Italian Air Force, in terms of training and combat proficiency, differed favorably from the Italian army itself and had already managed to severely batter the few Greek aviation. However, the Italian aviators also had nothing to brag about. They were unable to defeat the Greek Air Force, nor did they disrupt the mobilization and transfer of Greek units, although the weather, which interfered with the normal activities of the Air Force, was largely to blame. But the fact remained: the significant superiority of the Italians in aviation had not yet brought them any significant benefits. Meanwhile, help arrived for the Greeks.
As early as April 13, 1939, after the Italian occupation of Albania, Great Britain guaranteed the independence of Romania and Greece. Naturally, as soon as Italy attacked Greece, the latter's government immediately turned to Great Britain for help. Already on November 1, British troops landed on the Greek island of Crete, which allowed them to control the entire eastern Mediterranean. Not directly on the continent, the British decided to limit themselves to assistance in the form of air units. Since the British already believed in October, based on intelligence data, that an Italian invasion of Greece was imminent, as early as October 22, the British Air Forces in the Middle East received orders to prepare squadrons for possible deployment to Greece. Therefore, already on November 3, the first eight Blenheims of the 30th squadron of the Royal Air Force, as well as 4 obsolete Bombay bombers of the 216th squadron, used as transport vehicles, flew to Greece. It is interesting that the 30th squadron was going to be used not only as a bomber squadron, but also as a squadron of heavy fighters, for which one of its flights was equipped with Blenheim I bombers, and the other with Blenheim IF heavy fighters, the main difference of which was a four-machine gun container installed under the fuselage in place of the bomb bay. It was in this role that the British pilots set out on their first mission on November 4 - patrolling the coast. The British caught the eye of the Z.501 flying boat, which they tried to shoot down, but without much success. IF Blenheim crews also carried out patrols over Athens from time to time.
The build-up of the British group continued at an accelerated pace. On November 5, five more Blenheims from No. 84 Squadron arrived in Greece, followed by six Wellington bombers from No. 70 Squadron the next day. The British were stationed at the Eleusis airfield near the Greek capital; Air Vice-Marshal D. D'Albiac was appointed to command the British air force in Greece. Already on November 6, the 30th Squadron undertook its first action over Albania: three Blenheims carried out a reconnaissance flight over southern Albania. In the Sarande area, the crews discovered two ships, on which they dropped bombs. Later, British Blenheim crews paid a courtesy visit to Valona airfield, resulting in three bomb-damaged SM.81s of the 38th Regiment. The CR.32s of the 394th squadron, raised to intercept them, could only admire the tails of the fleeing British, although Captain N. Magaldi managed to fire a burst of machine guns at one of the bombers. The fired Blenheim returned safely to its base, but after landing, the already dead gunner Sergeant E. Childs was taken out of the plane.
Encouraged by their first success, the British decided to throw “heavy artillery” in the form of Wellingtons at Italian airfields. On November 7, all six vehicles of the 70th Squadron went on a raid on Valona, capable of causing much more trouble than the relatively light Blenheim: the Wellington's bomb load was almost four times higher than that of the Blenheim. But the Italians learned a lesson from previous events and, on the way to the British target, they met the CR.42 of the 150th group. As a result, one of the Wellingtons exploded in the air, another was shot down and burned, two bombers were seriously damaged, but were able to get home. 
Vikkers Wellington bomber of No. 70 Squadron, North Africa.
Well, the Greeks, meanwhile, continued to accumulate forces for a decisive offensive. The British landing on Crete and the calm situation on the Greek-Bulgarian border allowed the Greek command to transfer significant forces to the front, achieving a very significant superiority over the Italians. Although the latter managed to deploy on the basis of the 25th and 26th corps in Albania the 11th and 9th armies, numbering a total of eight infantry, one tank and one cavalry brigades, as well as a number of separate regiments and battalions, the Italian command there were serious supply problems. The capacity of the two main Albanian ports of Valona and Durres was not enough for a full supply, but even if the cargo reached Albania, getting it from the port to its destination was no less a problem due to the shortage of literally everything, from trucks to pack mules. Italian transport aviation strained all its strength to transport people, effectively disrupting the supply of Italian troops in Africa, but it could not carry heavy loads. By mid-November, the Greeks concentrated three army corps against the Italians: the 1st, consisting of two infantry and cavalry divisions, as well as a separate detachment in the coastal sector, the 2nd, consisting of one infantry division, as well as infantry and cavalry brigades in the center (t .n. Pindus sector) and the 3rd Corps, consisting of four infantry divisions, one of which was in the second line. The Greeks had three more infantry divisions and one brigade in reserve. By November 12, the Greeks sent 100 of their own to the 50 settlement battalions the Italians had. And on November 14, the general offensive of the Greek army began.
1939. 04.07-10 Italy occupied Albania
1940.10.14 “There is a political necessity to occupy Greece” B. Mussolini.
1940.10.15 At a meeting of the Italian high command, the plan for the operation against Greece was discussed.
Mussolini: “It is necessary to occupy the Ionian Islands, in particular the island of Corfu at the entrance to the Adriatic Sea, and then capture Thessaloniki in order to strengthen Italy’s position in the Mediterranean and maintain Italian influence in Greece.”
The day of the offensive was set for 10/26/1940 (Then postponed due to weather to 10/28)
1940.10.28 At half past five in the morning, Italian units under the command of General Visconti Prasca crossed the Greek border. Among the forces of the battle were the 2nd (25th and 26th) army corps, which included 8 divisions (6 infantry, 1 tank and 1 mountain rifle), a separate operational group (“Littorio”) (3 regiments) - a total of 87 (out of 157 thousand in Albania) thousand people, 163 tanks (according to other sources 250), 686 guns, 380 (400) aircraft.
1940.11.01 The commander-in-chief of the Greek army A. Papagos ordered a counterattack on the open left flank of the enemy (26th AK). In two days of fighting, the Italians in the Korca area were driven back into Albanian territory. 4 English squadrons arrived in Crete. TASS denied rumors about the supply of Soviet military aircraft to Greece.
1940.11.02 The pace of the offensive of the main, right-flank group of Italians began to decrease.
1940.11.03 The Greeks launched successful counterattacks in the Pindus mountain range, in the center of the front. The Alpine division “Julia” found itself in a particularly difficult situation, which broke far ahead, trying to overcome the foothills of Pindus. Having suffered heavy losses, the division was forced to retreat to its original positions.
1940.11.07/08 On November 7, Italian troops went on the defensive (according to another source, Mussolini gave the order to go on the defensive on November 8). On the 10th day of the war, the Italian advance was stopped.
1940.11.12/14 The Greeks launched an offensive on November 14 (the 12th in another source) with 12 infantry, 2 cavalry divisions and 3 brigades.
1940.11.12 Hitler signed Directive No. 18, which provided for “... if necessary, an offensive from the territory of Bulgaria to seize continental Greece north of the Aegean Sea.”
1940.11.21 The Italians were expelled from Greek territory. The Greek army entered Albania, where it was supported by local partisans.
1940.11.25 Negotiations in Sofia on the conclusion of an agreement on mutual assistance between the Secretary of the NKID A. A. Sobolev, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria B. Filov and Tsar Boris III, “which will help Bulgaria in the implementation of its national aspirations not only in Western, but also in Eastern Thrace " At the same time, the USSR offered Greece supplies of weapons.
12/1940/04 Italian troops, united in Army Group “Albania” (9th and 11th armies), were preparing to launch a counterattack, but just before the start of the planned offensive, the Greeks resumed their offensive. The front was broken through and Mussolini fired P. Bodaglio (Chief of the General Staff).
12/1940/13 Hitler approved Directive No. 20, which provided for the seizure of Greece (Plan Marita).
1940.12. end The new chief of the general staff, Hugo Cavaliero, stopped the Greek offensive. Germany suggested that Greece not allow the expansion of the British presence, but Athens' attempts to achieve German mediation in relation to Italy failed.
1941.01. beginning The Italians launched a counterattack with the forces of one AK, which was repulsed by the Greeks; the elite division “Tuscan Wolves” suffered a particularly severe defeat.
1941.01.11 Hitler signed Directive No. 22, which provided for assistance to Italy by transferring German troops to Libya and Albania.
1941.01.14-16 During the Anglo-Greek negotiations, the Greeks demanded the landing of 8-9 British divisions.
1941.01.18 The Greek leadership, not wanting to irritate Germany, refused the English proposal to use 2-3 divisions.
1941.01.19 Negotiations were held in Salzburg on the provision of military assistance to Italy from the Reich. In addition to Rommel’s corps, which was sent to Libya, an agreement was reached to transfer one Wehrmacht mountain division to Albania.
1941.01.21 The dispatch of German troops to Albania was postponed indefinitely due to the acceleration of the transfer of troops to Libya.
1941.02.08 The question of the landing of British troops was again raised before Greece, although Greece’s position did not change.
1941.02.10 The British leadership decided to suspend the offensive in Libya and begin preparing troops for transfer to the Balkans.
1941.02.16-23 Advance of Greek troops with the aim of eliminating the ledge occupied by Italian troops southeast of Kelciure with enveloping attacks from the north and west and then, building on success along the highway, breaking through to Vlora (Vlona). The most fierce fighting took place between February 16 and 23. The Greeks managed to storm the commanding heights at Tepelena, but they did not have enough forces to complete the breakthrough. The Italians already had 21 divisions in Albania and outnumbered their enemy.
1941.02.21 It was decided to land British troops in Greece.
1941.02.22-23 Greece’s consent to the landing of British troops during negotiations.
03/1941 The transfer of British troops to Greece began. British soldiers began to disembark at Piraeus. Mussolini arrived in Albania.
1941.03.09 Having concentrated 26 divisions against 15 Greek ones, the Italian command began an offensive on the central section of the front.
1941.03.14 Counterattack of the Greeks.
1941.03.16 Italians retreat to their previous positions. The offensive cost Italy 12 thousand people.
1941.03.28-29 Battle at Cape Matapan between the Italian (1 battleship, 8 cruisers and 13 destroyers) fleet, which tried to prevent the supply of British troops in Greece, and provided this supply with the English fleet (3 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 aircraft carrier and 13 destroyers) . British victory: 3 cruisers, 2 destroyers were sunk and the Italian battleship was damaged.
1941.03.31 The end of the transfer of the British expeditionary force to Greece. In total, over 60 thousand people (1 tank brigade, 1 Australian and 1 New Zealand divisions), covered by 9 squadrons.
1941.04.06 Beginning of the Balkan campaign of the Wehrmacht.
1941.04.11-24 Offensive of Italian troops in Albania and Greece.
1941.04.21 German-Greek protocol of surrender. Italian troops did not reach the Albanian-Greek border. Mussolini ordered an advance until the Greeks sued for peace.
1941.04.24 The Greeks in Thessaloniki signed a protocol of surrender to Germany and Italy. The war cost Italy 38 thousand killed, 50 thousand wounded and 12 thousand frostbitten. Greece's losses in the war with Italy and Germany (October 1940-April 1941) amounted to 20 thousand killed soldiers and officers and 225 thousand prisoners.
"History of Wars"