On the problems of using airborne troops in peacekeeping operations. Russia in Yugoslavia Rostov guys who served the UN 554 opb

In the 1990s, Yugoslavia demonstrated to the whole world what the collapse of the former Soviet Union could lead to under a slightly different set of political circumstances: protracted and bloody civil wars broke out on the territory of the constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia during the collapse of the vertical of state power, the acute problem of refugees and the forced intervention of the world communities.

In various territories and lands (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania, the adjoining water area of ​​the Adriatic, etc.) since 1992, a whole range of operations has unfolded, in which the UN, OSCE, NATO, and the EU took part , WEU, as well as a number of countries as members of coalitions to conduct individual operations.

At the same time, a number of operations were in the nature of coercive actions (sea and air blockade of part of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, separate components of the operation in Albania, air operation of pressure on the FRY, etc.). The other part of the operations was in the nature of a preventive deployment (Macedonia). There were also operations and their individual components that correspond to the classical understanding of peacekeeping (for example, the post-Dayton organization of elections in Bosnia under international control, etc.). Not all of these operations were conducted by the UN itself (see Chapter 1 on the role of the OSCE, NATO and the WEU in individual operations), and some (the air operation to pressure the authorities of the FRY) did not have a UN mandate at all. In general, the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia and Albania has introduced many innovations and changes in the practice of UN peacekeeping.

The scale and strength of the Russian contingent that has taken part in operations in this region (changing from 900 troops in 1992 to a maximum of 1,500 in 1994 and somewhat exceeding 1,000 at the present time) is, although significant, let's say in comparison with operations in Moldova and South Ossetia (in 2000, 460 and 462 Russian peacekeepers were stationed there respectively), but far from decisive. For comparison, it suffices to mention that only the ground component of the forces of the SFOR operation amounted to 33,400 military personnel from different countries, not counting civilians.

In many ways, however, Russia's involvement in operations in the former Yugoslavia was and remains unique.

Firstly, this is an atypical situation in which the Russian military and not only Western military “observers”, but also NATO combat units, which have been training for decades for a “big war”, acted together in solving the tasks set by the UN.

Secondly, the degree of military force used in these operations as a whole was extremely high, on average much higher than in most of all other operations of previous decades, with the exception of Desert Storm. As a result, the increased requirements for military professionalism and the ability of the Russian military to actually interact with the military of other countries, and not only those that were previously allies under the Warsaw Pact, worked.

Thirdly, given the ethnic and historical proximity or interconnection of certain countries with one or another warring force, it was especially difficult to maintain an unbiased, equidistant attitude of peacekeepers to the parties to conflicts. Although the unofficial “pro-Serbian” orientation of the Russian peacekeepers only counterbalanced the unofficial “pro-Croatian”, “pro-Muslim” or “anti-Serbian” orientation of some Western countries participating in the coalitions, in general, Russia does not play the nationalist “card” in this complex of conflicts. and takes a position as a relatively unbiased mediator.

Fourth, Russia's cooperation with other countries and organizations in conducting operations in the former Yugoslavia was significantly affected by Russia-NATO contradictions in connection with NATO expansion and NATO's actions without a UN mandate in the FRY in 1999. More broadly, peacekeeping cooperation in Yugoslavia was and remains influenced by the intersection and clash of interests of the great powers in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole.

Parts and formations of the Russian landing troops were first involved in the UN peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia already in 1992. At that time, there were no specially trained peacekeeping contingents in Russia (with the exception of a small group of military observers from previous UN operations, which had experience only in non-combat operations “under the banners” of the UN). A special Russian motorized rifle battalion for landing in Yugoslavia was formed from the Airborne Forces on the basis of the Presidential Decree “On the direction of the Russian contingent to Yugoslavia to participate in UN peacekeeping operations” and the order of the Commander of the CIS Joint Armed Forces[i]. The size of the contingent was determined at 900 armed with small arms and equipped with 150 vehicles and 15 armored personnel carriers. The battalion was formed and underwent abbreviated training and instruction in 6 weeks.

Both the simple structure of the contingent (headquarters, headquarters company, five motorized rifle companies), as well as light weapons and the absence of communications, intelligence, and reinforcement units indicated that Russia did not have adequate experience in participating in forceful peacekeeping operations and was preparing for "classic" peacekeeping, in which weapons are only used for a "show of force". But the real situation of the civil war in Yugoslavia made it necessary, even during the UNPROEP / UNPROFOR operation, even before the transition to SFOR / SFOR, to change the rules of combat contact and increase the combat power of the contingent. The battalion requested and received from Russia another 54 modern BTR-80s, 82mm artillery pieces, mobile anti-tank missile launchers and portable anti-aircraft systems. The "separation" of the belligerents required action according to the rules of a serious war.

In 1994, the 554th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion was reinforced by the 629th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion, and the total number of Russian troops in Yugoslavia reached 1,500 people. on 95 armored combat vehicles.

When the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1031 on the former Yugoslavia on December 15, 1995, the Russian contingent received a new status, changed its structure (brigade) and scale. First of all, in connection with the adoption in the Russian Federation in the same year of a new law on the participation of Russian contingents in peacekeeping operations, the question of the participation of Russian peacekeepers in the UN operation was submitted for discussion by the Russian parliament. The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation confirmed the decision on Russia's participation in the operation, and in mid-February 1996. By his decree, the President of the Russian Federation increased the permitted number of contingents to 1,600 people.

The Russian brigade received in Yugoslavia an area of ​​​​responsibility of 1,750 square kilometers, which included a line of separation of the warring parties 275 kilometers long. An American brigade, a Turkish brigade, as well as the joint Sever brigade, which consisted of the peacekeeping contingents of Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Poland, served in the immediate vicinity of the Russian peacekeepers.

The tasks carried out in Bosnia by the Russian contingent also included control at five checkpoints, patrolling numerous roads and territories, reconnaissance, search and inspection of objects. Throughout the participation in the SFOR / IFOR operations in 1997-1999, in which, in agreement with the UN, NATO forces played a leading role, the Russian brigade was not involved in mass battles. Losses of 4 people killed and 11 wounded occurred mainly as a result of mine explosions.

The question of political importance was the building of the chain of command. For "ideological" reasons, it was considered wrong to agree to the direct subordination of the Russian contingent to the command of NATO structures, although it was the NATO command that, in accordance with the UN mandate, carried out the overall coordination of operations. A special military-political condition was agreed through diplomatic channels: the commander of the Russian brigade, General L. Shevtsov, received the status of Deputy Commander of the entire operation in the former Yugoslavia and reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief of NATO Ground Forces in Central Europe.

The Russian command group in the NATO Supreme Headquarters in Europe (SHAPE) solved tasks not only of a military nature, but also of a political and diplomatic nature. Among them, in particular, coordination of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords with the Bosnian military-political leadership, as well as organizing and holding meetings of joint reconciliation commissions, in which representatives of the Bosnian political forces and the military leadership of the SFOR operation participated.

By March 1999, when the NATO air operation in the FRY, which began without the sanction of the UN Security Council, led to the freezing of Russia-NATO relations and the formal withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, the overall result of cooperation between Russian peacekeepers and the military of the coalition countries was generally positive. The crisis was not caused by internal factors in the development of the operation in Bosnia itself, but became a projection into the peacekeeping sphere of “macropolitical” tension in Russia-NATO relations.

The political complaints about NATO's actions in the FRY can be summarized as follows:

• The Alliance violated the UN Charter by launching a coercive operation on the territory of a sovereign state against the will of the legally elected government of the country and without a mandate from the UN Security Council;
• The operation was performed outside NATO's area of ​​direct responsibility, limited, in accordance with the Washington Treaty of 1949, by the territory of the member countries;
• The operation was exceeding the limits of the necessary use of force because not all channels of political influence have been exhausted;
• Operation violates the prerogatives of regional organizations, since, firstly, the OSCE as the leading regional collective security organization was pushed aside by NATO and there was also no OSCE mandate, secondly, NATO itself never recognized itself (and was not recognized by the UN) as a regional security organization and, thirdly, operations with elements of coercive action (bombing and blockade) fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the UN Security Council, and not regional organizations and agreements;
• The operation is controversial from the point of view of being classified under the category of "humanitarian intervention", since the fact of the genocide of the Albanian population of Kosovo (which could be the basis for such intervention) was not recorded and confirmed by the UN or the OSCE, and the flows of refugees from Kosovo after the start of the intervention (bombing) significantly exceeded the refugee flows before the operation;
• Finally, NATO and the Western powers set a dangerous precedent by openly ignoring Russian protests and the position of powers such as China and India, which, among others, have spoken out at the UN against forceful intervention.

At the same time, it is obvious that Russia reacted not only and not so much to the events in the former Yugoslavia itself (although opposition to the bombings was consistent and supported by public opinion within Russia), but to the exclusion of Russia from the process of making cardinal decisions on problems of common European security (which, undoubtedly, , included the decision to bomb Yugoslav territory).

It should be realistically realized that the Russian leadership did not stand aside from the use of military force in the Yugoslav conflict in general, and the recognition of the need for coercive actions, including against the government of S. Milosevic, in particular. The political problem consisted primarily in the violation by the North Atlantic Alliance (and the leadership of a number of Western powers) of the rules and procedures for making decisions on the use of force in the international community. As soon as 11 weeks after the start of the bombing, the UN Security Council still managed to adopt an agreed resolution on the international operation in Kosovo and the FRY, the Russian military-political leadership persistently returned the Russian contingent to the international intervention forces (the famous paratrooper raid led by General Zavarzin from Bosnia to Pristina airport in Kosovo). Cooperation between Russia and NATO in the area of ​​peacekeeping was immediately unfrozen. At the same time, although the bombing as a type of influence on the government of S. Milosevic was stopped, other coercive elements in the operation (for example, a strictly controlled embargo on the supply of weapons to the parties to the conflict) remained.

The allocation to the Russian contingent in Kosovo of a zone of responsibility in the predominantly Albanian sector led to the difficult fulfillment of peacekeeping functions, the partial blocking of elements of the contingent by the local population. Nevertheless, Russia has returned to the list of countries actively participating in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

Some of the lessons learned from the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia can be summarized as follows:

• There has been a certain "specialization" of various international organizations in conducting operations in conflict regions. The UN cannot cope in modern conditions with the organization of military operations to establish peace (peace enforcement), if the conflict has the scale of a real civil war. This requires a well-functioning integrated military organization. Involving NATO is assessed in UN circles as a whole as effective and, apparently, will continue to be practiced if there is a consensus in the ranks of NATO itself. The WEU failed to prove itself effectively even in the "hothouse" conditions of carrying out elements of operations "under the wing" of NATO. The OSCE skillfully carries out activities to restore the political infrastructure and hold free elections in conflict regions. The UN, on the other hand, ensures the general political coordination of the interests of the powers regarding the conflict and intervention in it, and this function (coordination of the interests of the major powers regarding the conflict) is becoming increasingly important.
• Yugoslavia demonstrated how the stages of disruption of interaction between the organizations of the international community (UN. OSCE) and the great powers (the first such disruption occurred during the conclusion of the Dayton agreements on Bosnia outside the UN and the OSCE, the second - during the deployment of NATO actions in the FRY contrary to the position of a number of great powers) , and the stages of their well-coordinated interaction. Experience shows that, as before, in the international community, the positive involvement of the UN, the OSCE, and other multilateral mechanisms in the process of peacemaking cannot be replaced by the will and strength of individual powers. The international community still considers the joint action of "great powers" and "great organizations" as the norm, and not their opposing efforts to each other.
• At the same time, as a relatively new formula of interaction, the practice of transferring operations by the United Nations to created adhoc coalitions of powers. It is expedient for Russia to develop the practice of participating in such coalitions and apply it to the development of coalition participation in peacekeeping in the CIS.

Operations in the former Yugoslavia showed the need (and possibility) for close political interaction between broad groups of powers in real-time mode of the unfolding conflict (we are talking not only about the relatively successful maintenance of consensus in ambiguous conditions by NATO countries, but also about the practice of coordinating decisions in adhoc coalitions of countries operating in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo). This is an important example for Russia, which needs to use mechanisms for political consultations and maintaining consensus among the CSTO countries.

[i] Order dated February 26, 1992. Strictly speaking, due to the well-known hopes for maintaining a unified military infrastructure of the CIS, the contingent at first was not “Russian”, it represented the entire former Soviet Union, all CIS countries, and only later in Yugoslavia began to talk about separate Russian and separate Ukrainian contingents.

A year later, the "ceiling" was lowered to 1400 people, and the actual number in the late 90s. did not exceed 1340 people.

Farewell, Eastern Slavonia!

The paratroopers of the 554th separate battalion of "blue helmets" successfully completed a peacekeeping mission as part of the UN forces in the Balkans.

The peacekeeping operation of UNTAES - the UN Interim Administration in Western Srem, Baranya and Eastern Slavonia has entered its final phase. Since October 1997, by air, railroad and the Danube River, the phased withdrawal of the main forces of the mission - Russians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Czechs, Belgians - continues ...
On October 26, in a solemn ceremony, the flags of Russia and the UN were lowered at the airfield near Klisa, where the headquarters of the 554th Russian separate battalion of "blue helmets" had been located for five long years. Now the leadership of Croatia, which "integrated" the ancestral Serbian lands of Western and Eastern Slavonia with the help of the United Nations, is urging the military to leave. And only the Serbian population doomedly looks at the backs of the "blue helmets" that deceived their aspirations and hopes.

To the sound of the anthem, the flags of Russia and the UN are slowly lowered down the flagpoles. This not an ordinary event took place at 16.30 on October 26, 1997 at the Klis airfield, where the headquarters of the 554th Russian battalion of the United Nations is located. The honorable mission - to deliver these banners to their homeland - was entrusted to paratrooper officers Captain Vitaly Starikov, deputy company commander for educational work, and Lieutenant Sergey Sergeyev, commander of the best platoon.
No matter how laconic and strict this ceremonial was, I noticed: on the faces of the officers and soldiers, standing for the last time in general, in battalion formation before leaving for their homeland, a chill ran through. I looked at the battalion commander - Colonel Vladimir Osipenko, his deputies - Colonel Yuri Yakush. Hero of Russia, Lieutenant Colonel Svyatoslav Golubyatnikov, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Rybalko, Alexei Badeev, company commanders - Majors Sergei Selivanov and Alexei Ragozin, contract sergeants - Yuri Klimenko, Vladislav Baev, Andrey Aktaev ... And other, painfully familiar faces of those who for five and a half years with dignity and honor carried out difficult peacekeeping tasks as part of a battalion in Eastern Slavonia, increased the glory of "RUSBAT-1".

There is not enough space to name all the names, because during these years the battalion had 11 rotations, 15 thousand soldiers and officers of the Airborne Forces passed through it. I will only mention the names of the battalion commanders, colonels:
- Viktor Loginov,
- Leonida Arshinova,
- Sergei Voznesensky,
- Alexandra Kobyleva,
- Alexandra Nizhegorodova,
- Mikhail Zhdanenya,
- Vladimir Osipenko.
Each of them, to the best of their abilities and abilities, together with the headquarters, all the personnel, contributed to the peacekeeping activities of the Russian UN battalion, sought to ensure that Russian peacekeepers adequately represent our Armed Forces in the largest operation of the "blue helmets", which received in 1992 UNPROFOR's official name is "UN Peace Defense Force".
And although the Russians had absolutely no experience in such international missions, our "RUSBAT" eventually became known in all four sectors into which the territory of the former Yugoslavia was divided. I had the opportunity to visit our UN battalion more than once and I can say with full responsibility: the 554th battalion was the first to enter its zone of responsibility in the East sector, where until recently there were fierce battles and more than 50 percent of the cities and villages of Eastern Slavonia, including the infamous Vukovar, stood in ruins: he was the first to deploy his "checkpoints" here - control posts between Serbs and Croats on a 110-kilometer front line: he was the first in the sector to ensure that the former opponents began to store heavy weapons, went to the first negotiations " .

Not once during the numerous armed conflicts flaring up between Serbs and Croats, our battalion did not withdraw, did not surrender the lines they occupied, did not leave the local population to the mercy of fate, as the vaunted French and British did repeatedly, not to mention the Kenyans, Jordanians, Argentines ... Moreover, when the situation in Sarajevo sharply escalated in February 1994, two companies of the battalion made a swift march through the mountains of Bosnia and, with their decisive actions, actually prevented the bombing of Serbian positions by NATO aircraft, for which they received gratitude from the then UN Secretary General Boutros Tali. Our peacekeeping paratroopers did not flinch even at the most dramatic moment of the UNPROFOR operation - in the summer of 1995, when the Croatian army, violating all international agreements, seized Krajina and Western Slavonia by force. In a matter of days, three sectors where the UN forces were located then fell. Only the East sector survived. He survived mainly because there were positions of the Russian battalion, and the headquarters of the Airborne Forces planned a parachute landing operation to support him from the air in case of an attack by Croatian troops.
During the peacekeeping mission on Serbian soil, our paratroopers paid a heavy price - 21 officers and contract soldiers were killed and 48 wounded. The first on this woeful list is Sergeant Alexander Butorin, who was blown up by an anti-tank mine on January 20, 1993. The last one is senior lieutenant Dmitry Moiseev, who died on October 7 this year as a result of multiple hemorrhages in the lungs.
I repeat: the Russian military contingent of the UN has successfully passed the first test of peacekeeping activities in the Balkans. Belgian lieutenant-general Hanset, commander of the UN forces in Eastern Slavonia, confirmed this in an interview with a Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent. Which, unfortunately, cannot be said about our politicians and their foreign policy line in the Balkans in general and in the Serbian Krajina in particular. Alas, for many years, especially when Andrei Kozyrev was the head of the Foreign Ministry, it was carried out inconsistently, with an eye to the West. I have witnessed more than once when, at the talks in Belgrade and Sarajevo, our high representatives fawned over the envoys of the United States and Western Europe, thinking more about their career than caring about Russian interests in the Balkans.

I will refer only to one, in my opinion, a very eloquent example. Now, on Smolenskaya Square, they apparently prefer not to remember how in the spring of 1995, at the initiative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, a non-aggression peace treaty was concluded between Croatia and Serbian Extreme. Fulfilling it, Russian peacekeepers were forced to move control posts for several kilometers, while several people were blown up by mines. But less than a year later, Croatian troops, in collusion with the United States and the countries of Western Europe, seized Serbian Krajina by force along with its capital, Knin. More than 10 thousand Serbs died, and about 200 thousand became refugees. And what about Russia, a member of the UN Security Council? Our Foreign Ministry did not even dare to make an official protest against the barbarism of the Croats. What else can be said?
And there were many such examples. If behind the Russian contingent in Eastern Slavonia, as, for example, behind the Belgian one, there is no state that knows what it wants, a logical question arises: was it worth it to get involved here in this way at all?
Summing up the UN peacekeeping operation in the Balkans, the role played by the Russians, the Yugoslav mass media and ordinary people always divides it into its constituent parts: official politicians and "laborers" of this peacekeeping mission - soldiers and officers of the military contingent, "our military UN observers, representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs... It is not difficult, I think, to guess to whom the mute reproach sounds, and to whom - words of sincere gratitude.
Here is what Dragoljub Jvkovic, secretary of the Ten community for relations with UNTAES, said at the farewell rally of the Russian "blue helmets":
- In this difficult hour of parting, on behalf of the entire Serbian people, I express gratitude to the officers and soldiers of Russia for your humane mission, for reliable protection and Slavic kindness. I will not hide the fact that we see off the "blue helmets" with bitterness, especially the Russians. The decision of the UN Security Council to withdraw the military contingent of the mission is difficult for our people. But a bad peace is better than any war."

I will not prevaricate, the Croats speak differently:
“Our people have always perceived Russian soldiers as defenders of Serbian aggressors,” an elderly railway worker Jovan Petrakovich told me angrily at the loading station in the Croatian town of Vinkovci. - You only prevented us from defending our lands, dwellings ...
Of course, every resident of the local communities, Croatian and Serbian, has his own view on the stay of the Blue Helmets, including Russian ones.
... By November 1, the 554th UN battalion had already removed all control posts in a 120-kilometer area of ​​responsibility and was engaged in the planned transfer of people and military equipment from Eastern Slavonia to Russia.
“The main forces of our battalion are already 50 percent on their way home,” Battalion Commander Colonel Vladimir Osipenko told me at the battalion headquarters. - Others are completing the preparation of goods and equipment for shipment. Since October 20, the remaining Russian military contingent has been assigned the following tasks: guarding the residence of the Head of the Interim Administration in the town of Bobota, ensuring the safety of UN civilian personnel and protecting property at the Klis airfield, as well as monitoring the general situation in the area of ​​​​responsibility ...
I will add to the above that in the area of ​​responsibility of the Russian battalion, the transfer of powers for the implementation of the Erdut Agreement to the transitional police under the leadership of the UN civilian police has successfully taken place. Now Slovak sappers, under the cover of Russians, are demining the front-line territories of Eastern Slavonia. Our doctors continue to treat the local population. Every day, 30-40 local residents come to the medical center of the battalion for examination and consultations. And, perhaps, the dentist captain of the medical service Valery Germanov is especially popular among our military doctors. He has a kind soul and golden hands, no one knows no refusal - neither Serbs nor Croats.

Is it possible to revive a country without the values ​​of brotherhood and friendship of peoples?
The Bulletin of the Bashkir State Pedagogical University published an article dedicated to the activities of an active participant in the international movement "Teachers for Peace and Mutual Understanding" Alfiya Fatkullina

SERVING THE IDEALS OF PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

At the end of last year, the Bashkir State Pedagogical University celebrated its 40th anniversary and literally on the same days honored the veteran of the university Fatkullina Alfiya Fazylzhanovna, who turned 80 years old.

80 years is such an age height from which the path traveled is seen in the most significant events, deeds, people. All insignificant memory erases. And it is very important when meeting with such people to penetrate into the experience they have accumulated, to try on today, to preserve and pass on to the future. And Alfiya Fazylzhanovna's experience in patriotic and international education is truly invaluable. For almost half a century, she studied and summarized the experience of schools in Bashkiria and the entire Soviet Union, being the chairman of the republican section of patriotic and international education at the Bashkir branch of the Pedagogical Society of the RSFSR, a member of the scientific council on problems of patriotic and international education of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR, a member of the scientific and methodological section of the patriotic and international education of youth under the Central Committee of the Komsomol.

She has participated in more than 50 conferences and seminars. It seems that such a vital need to serve people and the practice of patriotism and internationalism is largely due to the spirit of the times, which shaped the mind and heart of a girl, a girl and a specialist - a teacher, a scientist. When she was 14 years old, the Great Patriotic War began. She knows well what "everything for the front, everything for victory" means. Her graduation party was covered with joy and happiness of the Victory.

In 1945, she became a student at the Chelyabinsk Pedagogical Institute. I was in Chelyabinsk in 1968 and I know how proud the Urals are of their contribution to the victory, especially their tanks and Magnitogorsk. I can imagine what a patriotic spirit reigned here in the 40s and 50s!

The pathos of victory and the pathos of the restoration of the country gave rise to beautiful poems and songs, feature films and performances. The very air of the country was filled with patriotism, feelings of brotherhood and friendship of peoples, and it was not difficult for the school, the teacher to participate in the education of these holy feelings. Moreover, there were pioneer and Komsomol organizations operating at the school, the ideology of which was the formation of collectivism, patriotism and internationalism.

Scientists and teachers, party and Komsomol workers thought out and implemented a system of patriotic and international education. The merit of Alfiya Fazylzhanovna is the development of the concept, methodology, methodology and system of patriotic and international education in a multinational school, taking into account the age characteristics of children. The educational and methodological manuals published by her, books were highly appreciated in the country, and her speeches at pedagogical seminars, work at the faculty for advanced training of school leaders of the republic contributed to the practical application of her recommendations in the schools of the republic.

The clubs of international friendship (KIDs) and museums of military and labor glory became a special pride of our heroine. Only in Ufa, 89 clubs and 43 museums were created. The experience of the club of international friendship of school No. 86, which was led by the German language teacher Lind E.I., was summarized and recommended to educational institutions. The KID worked remarkably well at the Serafimovskaya secondary school (headed by Zhemaletdinov G.K.), who maintained close relations with the KIDs of the Baltic states, especially Lithuania and Latvia.

It is no coincidence that it was in Ufa, on the basis of the Pedagogical Institute, in the spring of 1977 that the All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference “Issues of Patriotic and International Education in the Light of the Decisions of the XXV Congress of the CPSU” was held. More than 200 people took part in it: philosophers, sociologists, historians, teachers, subject teachers, heads of kindergartens, clubs and museums.

The changes that took place in the 1990s, including the slogan of “de-ideologization,” turned out to be serious costs in the public and individual consciousness. The collapse of the USSR, the economic crisis hit primarily such feelings as pride in the country, friendship and brotherhood of peoples.

The cult of national isolation, individualism has become one of the reasons for the growth of aggression, intolerance in all social relations, from national to family and interpersonal. The ideas of patriotism and internationalism were, at best, consigned to oblivion, at worst, anathema.

All this became a mental pain for Alfiya Fazylzhanovna, because she understands that patriotism, friendship and brotherhood of peoples are the psychological foundation of both the present and the future of Russia. Without these values ​​it is impossible to revive and raise the country not so much economically as spiritually. In recent years, both the authorities and part of the intelligentsia have begun to understand this. Words are heard more and more often about the need to educate a patriot and a citizen. New holidays - the Day of Russia, the Day of the Republic, the Day of Concord, the Day of the Flag, are gradually gaining ideological and emotional saturation. But in order for the holidays to have the effect of civic education, a huge work of the intelligentsia, especially creative and pedagogical, is required. The school, the entire pedagogical community, through the state, can become a social customer for the creation of poems and songs, rituals and attributes, scripts and compositions, television programs and films, textbooks and manuals that help to nourish a great feeling of love for the Motherland from early childhood. Unfortunately, the government has not yet organized this work. Even government concerts dedicated to civil holidays often cause embarrassment with half-naked girls and pop content. And involuntarily recall May 19 - Pioneer Day, October 29 - Komsomol Day. What wonderful songs, poems, traditions, scripts, films. The best poets, writers, composers, directors, athletes considered it an honor to fulfill the orders of the Komsomol Central Committee. It is a pity that modern youth organizations have not yet revealed their purpose - the organization and education of children and youth.

The best people of the BSPI were engaged in the education of young people at that time. Since 1992, she has been a member of the coordinating council of the international movement "Educators for Peace and Mutual Understanding". She took an active part in the work of international congresses (Norway - 1998, Austria - 1998, France - 2000, Germany - 2003, India - 2004). Now she is actively involved in the movement "For a Culture of Peace". On her initiative, an information and methodological center for the culture of peace was created at the Belarusian State Pedagogical University. For her personal contribution to science in 2002, Alfiya Fazylzhanovna was elected in 2002 a full member of the Academy of Pedagogical and Social Sciences.

Optimism, vitality, creative activity cause surprise and deep respect for this woman. And you believe that the work of her life will be continued by new generations of students, teachers, and scientists.

V.V. Goneeva,
Veteran of Pedagogical University

Marat Egorov: a word about the world
The newspaper Vestnik Mir of December 25, 2008 published an article by the chairman of the Belarusian Peace Foundation and vice-president of the International Association of Peace Foundations Marat Yegorov "You can't stop the wind with your palm!", in which a veteran of the Great Patriotic War expresses his thoughts on peacekeeping and peacekeepers

YOU CAN'T STOP THE WIND WITH YOUR PALM!
(printed in abbreviated form)

If humanity wants to survive, and not burn out in the flames of a new world war, it must find the strength in itself to step over the accumulated grievances, grief, death of loved ones, fires and explosions. And all together to go along the single road of the world.

A real peacekeeping organization is essentially a kind of metronome. He is able to make people's hearts beat in a single rhythm - the rhythm of calm creation and confidence in the future.

In the entire history of mankind, more than 15,000 wars have taken place, which have claimed over 3.5 billion lives. New types of weapons are capable of destroying all life on our planet.

In any case, the guiding principle of the fighters for peace must be humanism. It includes universal responsiveness, mercy, readiness to help in grief, need, to protect from violence. Peacekeeping implies activity in upholding peace on Earth, as the most important condition for further human progress, moral responsibility for the fate of peoples, and the preservation of life on earth.

Peace can only be achieved when the ice of alienation between peoples is melted. This can only be done through friendship at all levels: from children to presidents.

For the happiness of living in peace and tranquility, a lot of blood and tears of previous generations of people have been shed. We live only because millions of earthlings gave their lives for it.

Monuments testify to this. They are not only a tribute to the past, to those whose time has run out. According to the monuments, new conscientious and gifted people verify their future. Obelisks and memorials can be torn down and forgotten. But time is an impartial judge. It calls people People, and all the rest - little people. It'll be this way forever!

Everyone must find their peak and overcome it. By the height of the peak, they judge what kind of opportunities and abilities a person had. Everest is not for everyone.

VETERANS OF A KIND ARE LIVING MONUMENTS.

Their life is not for everyone
Would come on the shoulder.
Their courage has been tested by the war.
I don't want their glory for myself.
Their payment for it was double.
They will not be among us very soon.
Doctors are powerless to prolong their age.
Their wisdom is our strength.
Their memory is our sister's conscience.

These words are written not by hand, but by the heart of a front-line soldier - Yuri Mikhailovich Beledin from Volgograd.

Do universities now teach a concrete - historical approach to the analysis of the past? It is impossible to ignore the real background against which this or that event took place. Modern standards to it, in my opinion, are not applicable, and their consequences are fraught with errors in the future. It is necessary to perceive the facts of the past without a shadow of irony and speculation.

Peacekeeping is not a one-time assignment, not an unfortunate burden, but a vocation and high confidence of the people. It must be justified, it must be proud and cherish. It’s not enough just to “do your duty”. It is important not to smolder, but to burn - to warm people with the warmth of their hearts. Light up their path to a peaceful future, like the legendary Danko.

PEACEKEEPER. This is not a job or a hobby. This is the meaning of human life, its highest destiny. The creation of the world means the absolute harmony of the life around us. That is why the peacemakers were called in the Holy Scriptures "sons of God." They always followed God's providence, the most secret aspirations of the Almighty. That is why our peacemaking activity correlates with Divine peacemaking. That is why, honoring the fighters for peace, occasionally honoring them with our modest awards, we pay tribute to their deeds, their selfless work.

I was lucky to take part in the international action "Peace in the Middle East", which brought together representatives of 120 countries. We walked through the streets of the cities of Palestine and Israel, making an impassioned appeal to people who had been at war with each other for centuries to rise above their prejudices. We chanted: Peace, Pis, Sholom, Salam Aleichem. And we felt that our calls reach the hearts of not only ordinary people, but also the rulers of these countries.

On the picture: Marat Yegorov with the flag of the Republic of Belarus - a participant in the international action "Peace in the Middle East".

On this day, each of us imagined ourselves as a sower of goodness and believed that our words are a kind of seeds that will surely bring wonderful shoots of goodness not only to the inhabitants of this long-suffering territory, but to all of humanity. It seemed to us that the Palestinians and Israelis realized the need to preserve the most valuable, the most important thing - the right to life ...

Marat Egorov

History of 554 opb of the UN Peacekeeping Forces in the letters of a veteran
In connection with the preparation for publication on the Internet of the electronic version of the Book of Memory "In the Service of Peace. 1973-2008", the bulletin publishes correspondence with a veteran of the 554th battalion, reserve major Andrei Goncharov

The electronic Book of Memory of Russian peacekeepers has a section dedicated to the contingents of the UN peacekeeping forces. It will publish the names of participants in the UN peacekeeping operations carried out on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

As you know, the list of the Russian contingent of UN peacekeeping forces, currently published on the website of the Museum of Peacekeeping Operations in the section "", was compiled on the basis of data provided to the Museum of Peacekeeping Operations by the Personnel Department of the Airborne Forces in the late 90s.

In the years that passed before the end of UN operations in the former Yugoslavia, several hundred more Russian servicemen became participants in the peacekeeping process, who, having worthily fulfilled their peacekeeping duty in the Balkans, were awarded the UN medal "In the Service of Peace."

Andrey GONCHAROV's letters not only name the new names of participants in peacekeeping operations, but also describe the history of 554 opb - the first peacekeeping battalion of the Russian armed forces.

From: V.V. Gergel
To whom: A. Goncharov
the date: 04.01.2009 16:55
Subject: Book of Memory

Dear Andrey!

Good afternoon!

Valery Vladimirovich Gergel is writing to you - a participant in the first UN peacekeeping operation (UNTSO 1973-1976).

In 1992, the first Book of Memory of Soviet and Russian peacekeepers was published under the title "In the Service of Peace. 1973-1993". It published a complete list of the 554th battalion, which was once provided to us by the Commander of the Airborne Forces, General Podkolzin, and the personnel department of the Airborne Forces.

On the picture: Damascus (Syria), 1976. United Nations Truce Supervision Authority in Palestine (UNTSO). The building of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC).

At an evening dedicated to the National Day of one of the groups of UN military observers.

From right to left: Lieutenant Colonel Vasily Marenko, senior UN military observer group in Syria, Major Anatoly Isaenko, UN military observer, representative of the German armed forces, military attache of the Soviet embassy in Syria.

Other photos can be found in the publications.

Recently, a dispute has flared up in Russian society between the leadership of the Airborne Forces and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces about the directions for reforming the Airborne Forces. Colonel General Yury Baluyevsky, head of the Main Operational Directorate - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, announced on November 21 that the airborne troops would be relieved of their unusual peacekeeping functions in order to increase their combat readiness. The headquarters of the Airborne Forces confirmed this information and said that the regular number of troops would decrease by 5.5 thousand military personnel. Already this year, the 10th Airborne Regiment in Gudauta (Abkhazia), the 237th Infantry Regiment of the 76th Airborne Division (Pskov) and the 283rd Podolsk Aviation Squadron will be disbanded.

Meanwhile, the final decision to deprive the Airborne Forces of peacekeeping functions has not been made, since the President of the Russian Federation has not yet signed a document on directions for further military development in Russia. According to a number of mass media, the headquarters of the Airborne Forces agree with the reduction of some units and subunits, but the leadership of the troops is categorically against depriving the Airborne Forces of peacekeeping functions. The headquarters of the Airborne Forces connects its arguments on this matter with the following circumstances:

First, there is the order of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 17, 1997, where it is noted that the Airborne Forces in peacetime should form the basis of the troops participating in peacekeeping operations.

Secondly, airborne troops are mobile. The peculiarities of their training, the tactics of their actions, the transportability of weapons and equipment make it possible to deploy airborne units over long distances in a short time. According to the paratroopers, it was this circumstance that became one of the main reasons for involving the Airborne Forces in 1998-2000 in more than 30 operations to resolve interethnic conflicts, eliminate the consequences of emergencies, maintain or restore international peace and security. Transnistria and South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Armenia (liquidation of the consequences of the earthquake). Central Asia and Chechnya - this is not a complete list of the regions where the Airborne Forces operate.

Thirdly, the headquarters of the Airborne Forces believe that the Airborne Forces have developed a coherent system for training and replacing peacekeeping units. Since January 1, 2000, the 245th Training Center for Peacekeeping Forces (Ryazan) has been operating, on the basis of which training and rotation of personnel of peacekeeping contingents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Abkhazia are being carried out.

Fourthly, over the eight-year period of participation in peacekeeping operations in the Airborne Forces, benevolent and respectful relations have developed between the command of peacekeeping units and personnel with the local administration and residents of the conflicting parties, close interaction has been organized with the military contingents of other states, representatives of various international organizations (UN , OSCE, etc.).

Fifth, reprofiling the Airborne Forces for purely combat missions is unprofitable in material terms. According to the calculations of the headquarters of the Airborne Forces, the total financial costs for the transportation of peacekeeping units from the areas of application will be about 900 million rubles:

a) in conclusion:

- by rail - 138-150 million rubles;

- by air transport - 254-280 million rubles.

Total: 392-430 million rubles.

b) by input:

- by rail - 168-180 million rubles;

- by air transport - 288-300 million rubles.

Total: 456-480 million rubles.

In addition, officers believe that this can lead to a disruption in the fulfillment of peacekeeping missions, a disruption in the management of units and subunits, a disruption of the well-functioning system of interaction and comprehensive support.

Reference

The beginning of the participation of units and subunits of the Russian Airborne Forces in peacekeeping peacekeeping operations was laid in March 1992, when the Russian 554th Separate UN Infantry Battalion of 900 people, formed on the basis of the Airborne Forces, was sent to the former Yugoslavia.

In February 1994, in accordance with the political decision of the Russian leadership, part of the forces of the 554th brigade was redeployed to the area of ​​​​the city of Sarajevo and, after a corresponding reinforcement, was transformed into the 629th brigade of the UN with operational subordination to the Sarajevo sector and the task of separating the warring parties, control to comply with the ceasefire agreement.

After the transfer of authority from the UN to NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 629th UN Security Guard in January 1996 ceased peacekeeping missions and was withdrawn to Russian territory.

Based on the decision of the UN Security Council on the phased reduction of the military component of the UN mission in Eastern Slavonia in October 1997, the 554th brigade was transformed into a Security Group and reduced to 203 people. In June 1998, the Security Group was withdrawn to the territory of Russia.

Since May 1994, on the basis of the Agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia on a ceasefire and separation of forces, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPFM) were created. The main task is to separate the conflicting parties, maintain law and order, create conditions for a return to normal life in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, prevent the resumption of the armed conflict, and protect important facilities and communications.

As part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces, there is an airborne battalion of the 10th separate airborne regiment of the Airborne Forces.

Units of the 10th OPDP to carry out peacekeeping missions are deployed as follows:

- one airborne battalion in the Gali region,

- one paratrooper platoon in the Kador Gorge,

- one airborne platoon performs tasks for the protection and defense of the Headquarters of the KPM in the city of Sukhumi. The service is organized at one control post and six observation posts: in the Gali district - 6, in the Kador Gorge - 1.

In January 1996, a separate airborne brigade of 1,500 people, formed on the basis of the Airborne Forces, was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in the peacekeeping operation of the multinational forces.

The area of ​​​​responsibility of the brigade is 1750 square meters. km, the total length of the controlled line of separation of the parties is 75 km.

Tasks performed by the Russian brigade:

- separation of the opposing sides;

– maintaining law and order, returning to the conditions of normal life in the designated area of ​​responsibility;

– participation in the provision of humanitarian assistance;

- Assistance in the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of December 14, 1996.

The tasks are carried out by serving at four control posts and patrolling routes in the area of ​​responsibility, as well as conducting reconnaissance and checking objects and planned targets. The brigade units are deployed in the base areas of Uglevik, Priboi, Simin-Khan and Vukosavtsy.

The number of the Russian military contingent was reduced in 1999 and currently stands at 1150 people, armored vehicles - 90 units, automotive vehicles - 232 units.

In June 1999, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution N 1244, on the basis of a decree of the President of the Russian Federation, and in accordance with the “Agreed Points of Russian Participation in the KFOR Forces” signed by the Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation and the United States on June 18, 1999 in Helsinki, a decision was made to sending to Kosovo (FRY) a military contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation numbering 3,616 people, of which about 2,500 are paratroopers.

The main tasks are:

– Creation of security conditions for the return and residence of refugees and displaced persons;

– ensuring public safety;

- implementation of mine clearance and destruction of unexploded ordnance and explosive objects;

– fulfillment of duties for the implementation of border control;

- joint activities with units of the KFOR forces for the operation of the Pristina (Slatina) airfield;

- ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of their forces, the international civilian presence and the personnel of other international organizations.

The tasks are carried out by serving in base areas and at control and observation posts by a security and maintenance group, patrolling routes in the area of ​​​​responsibility, as well as conducting reconnaissance and checking objects. Subdivisions of the Russian military contingent (RVK) are deployed in the base areas - the Slatina airfield, Banya, Velika Hocha, Kosovska Kamenitsa, Don Karmenyana, Srbica and Kosovo Polje.

Tasks are performed at 15 control posts, 14 observation posts. 13 guard posts, patrolling 23 routes, mobile patrol in 3 settlements. 19 reserve groups, 4 helicopters are in constant readiness. In order to ensure their own security, 10 guards are appointed, patrol groups - 15, checkpoints - 8, 3-6 columns are escorted daily. The number of units of the Airborne Forces as part of the RVC in Kosovo:

- personnel - 2445 people,

- armored vehicles - 131 units,

- automotive equipment - 387 units.

Thus, at present, the Airborne Forces in three peacekeeping operations - in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo together with NATO, in Abkhazia as part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces are involved in: - personnel - about 5,600 people; - armored vehicles - more than 320 units; – automotive equipment – ​​more than 950 units.

56th Guards Separate Airborne Assault Brigade (Kamyshin) At the end of 1989, the brigade was reorganized into a separate airborne assault brigade (OVDBR). The brigade passed "hot spots": Afghanistan (12.1979-07.1988), Baku (12-19.01.1990 - 02.1990), Sumgayit, Nakhichevan, Meghri, Julfa, Osh, Ferghana, Uzgen (06.06.1990), Chechnya (12.94-10.96, Grozny, Pervomaisky, Argun and since 09.1999).
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