Submarine torpedo range. A torpedo is a deadly steel cigar. Prospects for the development of torpedo weapons

12.03.2020

Header photo - Chinese 533 mm Yu-6 torpedo. Well, like a Chinese one - in fact, this is a 211TT1 torpedo, developed with Chinese money by the Russian Central Research Institute Gidropribor, and equipped with a Russian remote control hose reel (which is still not on domestic torpedoes, since this is again developed with Chinese money).

Let's start with history. Back in 1964, the USSR Navy, which had not yet fallen into final insanity, held a competition for draft designs of a promising universal torpedo UST - both thermal and electric. Despite the fact that thermal performance characteristics at depths up to 600 m were obtained significantly higher than electric ones, for further development, under the pretext of the imminent appearance in the US Navy of submarines with an immersion depth of up to 1000 m, an electric torpedo was adopted. The model for her battery was a captured American Mk-44 torpedo with a battery activated by sea water.

In the period 1964-1980. electric torpedoes with VKhIT were developed and put into service - SET-72 (40 knots, 8 km), UMGT-1 (41 knots, 8 km), USET-80 (speed over 45 knots, 18 km). The anode material of the VKhIT is a special alloy based on magnesium, and the cathode material is silver chloride. Subsequently, based on the results of joint work of the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor" and VNIAI, the cathode material was replaced by copper chloride.

The choice of the "electric direction" for the development of universal torpedoes of the Navy in the USSR led to:

the obviously significant lag of the universal torpedoes of the Navy from the torpedoes of the US Navy in terms of speed, range, and effective salvo positions
heavy weight of torpedoes
high cost of torpedo weapons of the Navy
limited battery life of torpedoes (no more than a decade and a half)
decrease in performance characteristics of torpedoes during operation (typical of all electric torpedoes)
due to low salinity, the use of new torpedoes in the Baltic Sea was excluded
dependence of power on conditions, casting doubt on the "official performance characteristics"

Here is a quote from the book “Such is the torpedo life” Gusev R.A. 2004

« SET-72 ... About twenty shots were fired in combat configuration. ... The conditions under which the industry promised a speed of 40 knots could not be found anywhere. We have some shortfall in speed.»

In torpedoes, the following conditional generations are distinguished according to the technologies used:

1 - straight torpedoes.
2 - torpedoes with passive SSN (50s).
3 - the introduction of active high-frequency SSN (60s).
4 - low-frequency active-passive SSN with Doppler filtering.
5 - introduction of secondary digital processing (target classifiers) with a massive transition of heavy torpedoes to hose remote control.
6 - digital SSN with an increased frequency range.
7 - ultra-wideband SSN with fiber-optic hose remote control.

With water cannons as a propulsion for a torpedo, the situation is as follows: the first design of a water cannon was developed by American specialists back in the late 60s (for the Mk48 mod.1 torpedo). The advantages of a water jet over coaxial propellers are obvious - it works stupidly quieter, and the problem of overflowing the telecontrol cable for a water jet is an order of magnitude less than for open propellers. However, there are also disadvantages - the main of which is the lower efficiency of the water jet compared to coaxial propellers. The efficiency of the water cannon developed a little later by the Americans (based on the torpedo of a stolen American torpedo) of our UMGT-1 torpedo was 0.68. At the end of the 80s, after a long working out of the water cannon of the new torpedo "Physicist-1" (UGST), its efficiency was increased to 0.8 - which is still worse than that of the Pindos, but not significantly.

You ask - why not directly tear the geometry of the Pindos water cannon? That's what they thought in Gidropribor when they made torpedoes. I was genuinely amused by this approach. Academicians have not got into the well-known paradox of scale. Mk48 weighs 1800 kg, and our UGST - more than 2200 kg. If you put an American water cannon on it, we will have a shortage of thrust, and, accordingly, speed. Scale up proportionally? This is exactly what Gidropribor did, forgetting that at the same time it would be necessary to proportionally reduce the density of water. And even the collapsed efficiency did not open their eyes to the essence of the problem. Only in the 80s did one upstart tell them what the matter was - and the matter moved.

Interestingly, due to the efforts of the Germans, relative parity has now been achieved in the battle of thermal torpedoes with electric ones. German electric torpedoes Atlas DM2A4 with a disposable battery based on AlAgO have energy close to thermal torpedoes of the same weight and dimensions (American Mk48 ADCAP) on single-component fuel.

However, such a solution - AlAgO batteries - is monstrously expensive, and most importantly, it is not suitable for practical shooting. Therefore, the Germans officially export DM2A4 torpedoes with cheaper AgZn (silver-zinc) batteries, respectively, their performance characteristics are not at all as high as stated for the torpedoes of the German fleet. Russian electric torpedoes also use disposable batteries based on AgZn technology (copied from the American 60s) - which predetermined their low energy.

Worse, in the USSR they overslept the fact that massive torpedo firing- this is an axiom of modern Western torpedoism. While in the West, a bet was made on torpedoes suitable for organizing inexpensive reusable practical firing, this did not bother anyone in the USSR. Torpedoes were stubbornly designed in the same way as rockets - counting on a single "flight".

The reason for the requirement for mass firing is the complex and changing environmental conditions in which torpedoes are used. The so-called "unitary breakthrough" of the US Navy - the adoption in the late 60s and early 70s of the Mk46 and Mk48 thermal torpedoes with dramatically improved performance characteristics instead of electric torpedoes, was associated precisely with the need to shoot a lot to work out and master new complex systems homing, control and telecontrol. According to its characteristics, the unitary fuel OTTO-2 was frankly average and inferior in terms of energy to the peroxide-kerosene pair already successfully mastered in the US Navy by more than 30%. But this fuel made it possible to significantly simplify the construction of torpedoes, and most importantly, to dramatically, by more than an order of magnitude, reduce the cost of a shot. This ensured the mass firing, successful refinement and development of new torpedoes with high performance characteristics in the US Navy.

Having adopted the Mk48 mod.7 torpedo in 2006 (at about the same time as the state tests of the Physicist-1), the US Navy managed to fire more than 300 rounds of Mk48 mod.7 Spiral 4 torpedoes (4th modification of the software of the 7th torpedo model). This is not counting the many hundreds of shots (during the same time) of the previous Mk48 "mods" from the modifications of the latest model (mod.7 Spiral 1-3).

It is clear that Russia never dreamed of anything like this for many reasons, including the unsuitability of our torpedoes for multiple launches.

In electric torpedoes, we have engines that at the end of the distance warm up to 600-650 degrees or more, the iron of the magnetic circuits glows cherry, and the brushes sparkle so that they eat away half the thickness of the collector in one start (by the way, such an afterburner of engine modes leads to monstrous intensity of interference in the torpedo's on-board electrical network), and disposable batteries are very expensive - as a result, cheaper reusable lead batteries with reduced battery voltage were used for practical firing in the USSR, which made it possible to extend the life of the engine - but sharply reduced the speed and range of torpedoes , turning practice shooting into unrealistic clowning. Only now, through the efforts of Dagdiesel and SFedU, a brushless motor BPMM has been created, which has good durability, significantly better efficiency, low interference, and allows (if lithium-polymer batteries are used) to get a truly reusable electric torpedo for inexpensive practical shooting.

By the way, despite the fact that AlAgO batteries have record-breaking energy performance, today in foreign torpedoism there is a steady trend to use much less energy-intensive, but providing the possibility of mass torpedo firing, universal lithium-polymer batteries (for example, popular Black Shark caliber torpedoes are transferred to them 53 cm and Black Arrow 32 cm by WASS), - even at the cost of a significant reduction in performance characteristics (reducing the range at maximum speed by about half).

In order for you to understand how important it is to have mass firing for testing the design of torpedoes, I will tell you a simple story: the British Navy, during the testing period of the StingRay mod.1 torpedo (mass production since 2005), conducted 3 series of firing:

The first - May 2002 at the AUTEC range (Bahamas) 10 torpedoes against Trafalgar-type submarines (with evasion and the use of SGPD), 8 guidance was received.
The second - September 2002 for submarines at medium and shallow depths and lying on the ground (the last one was unsuccessful).
The third - November 2003, after the software was finalized at the BUTEC test site (Shetland Islands) on the Swiftshur-type submarine, 5 out of 6 guidance was received.
In total, during the testing period, 150 shots torpedo StingRay mod.1. Moreover, it is necessary to take into account the fact that during the development of the previous StingRay (mod.0) torpedo, about 500 firings were carried out.

Thus, the economic indicators of the operation of torpedoes are a very important requirement, and directly affect the quality of finishing and development of torpedoes in the fleet, and, accordingly, the possibility of disclosing the full performance characteristics incorporated in the design of torpedoes. They are used by people, and if people do not know the capabilities of weapons well, the result will be far from optimal.

The foundation of mass torpedo firing in the US Navy is the low cost of a shot, which is obtained, among other things, due to the participation of the fleet in the operation (re-preparation) of torpedoes. The latter is a fundamental issue. Back in the 90s, some of our specialists put forward an unsubstantiated thesis that allegedly "in the west, the Navy does not operate torpedoes, but industry does everything." The falsity of this thesis is confirmed by the documents of the US Navy, most clearly - the textbook of a class 2 torpedo pilot (which is freely available). Here is a page of the US Navy Class 2 Torpedo Operator textbook describing the equipment and technology for re-preparing the Mk 48 torpedo:

By the way, the difference between our and American approaches to design is clearly visible here. The "American" can be divided into compartments, retaining almost all connections and the ability of the nodes to function. The Soviet thermal torpedo is completely non-functional with this disconnection.

In the US Navy, a huge (in comparison with us) volume of torpedo firing is provided not at the expense of financial costs (as some "specialists" claim), but precisely due to the low cost of a shot. For example, the Mk50 torpedo was withdrawn from the US Navy ammunition precisely because of the high cost of operation - for it, the launch cost (including the operation of the torpedo and subsequent reloading) was about $ 53K, and this was considered unacceptably expensive, because for the Mk46 the launch cost is only $ 12K (data from 1995). The launch cost for the heavier Mk48 is higher than for the Mk46 - but not by several times.

By the way, do you even know how much a modern torpedo costs? Hold on to a chair - $5 million or more. More expensive than the T-90A tank with all the giblets. Shooting these things once is economic madness. Nevertheless, in the USSR, this is exactly what they were doing.

Well, okay, okay - here's a real government purchase 253/08/02 (2008) - for the supply of 15 USET-80 torpedoes with a total value of 421,874 thousand rubles. Yes, yes - 421 million rubles, 28 million each (then it was about a million dollars) per torpedo. And I'll tell you a secret - no one promised that for such a price these torpedoes are 100% remake. These were sorted torpedoes from the remnants.

The timing and stages of development of torpedoes in the US Navy are shown in the diagram:

Thank God, due to the degradation of technology and lack of money, they will miss these deadlines - but we must understand that our projectors, who promise to “create a new torpedo in 3 years,” lie like they breathe. For 3 years, you can only create bullshit from old units, a kind of running layout that does not have a set of significant advantages.

By the way, the purchase of new torpedoes by the US Navy has not been made since 1993. until 2006 However, thanks to upgrade kits, even the latest Mk-48 mod.7 torpedo can be obtained by refining older Mk-48 modifications. Serial production of Mk 48 Mod 7 torpedoes began in June 2006 - but it is difficult to say how real this production is, and not the modernization of torpedoes taken from storage.

By the way, in terms of the noise of torpedoes, the situation is as follows: the Mk48 is noisy at 40 knots, about the same as a nuclear submarine at 15 knots. This is from the stern - from the bow, of course, much less. The Russian UGTS also has a similar noise level.

The main conclusion from this is the possibility of carrying out covert torpedo attacks with modern torpedoes from long ranges (over 20–30 km). In this case, the target does not hear the moment of launch, and accordingly detects the torpedo only when it gets close.

However, effective shooting at such long ranges is impossible without remote control (TU).

In foreign torpedo building, the task of creating effective and reliable remote control was solved at the end of the 60s with the creation of a tubular boat reel TU, which ensured high reliability, a significant reduction in restrictions on maneuvering submarines with TU, and multi-torpedo salvos with TU.

Here is an example of a telecontrol hose reel for a German 533 mm torpedo DM2A1 (1971):

At the end of the 60s, in the west, they came to a telecontrol hose reel, which remained on the rear cover of the TA when fired. At the same time, the bleed of the wire to compensate for the post-volley maneuvering of the submarine was carried out through a protective "hose". Hose remote control made it possible to dramatically increase the reliability of communications, reduce restrictions on the speed and maneuvering of submarines with telecontrol, and ensure firing of multi-torpedo volleys with remote control, incl. at the smallest depths. As a result, the effectiveness of submarine torpedo weapons has increased and firing positions at a distance have significantly increased.

All the necessary studies of the hose reel were also made by us, however, the fleet stood in the way of implementation. The need to remove the coil from the rear cover of the TA after the shot and remove the “hose” from the torpedo tube required the manual work of a sailor. In the TTZ of the Navy, there was a rigid requirement for automatic reloading of the TA, which was feasible only in the case of a towed coil.

(By the way, I never understood this problem - what prevents you from moving the coil in the apparatus along with the torpedo, like a piston, almost to the cut of the apparatus - where to hold it with a cable in the working position, and then, after exhausting the need, shoot the cable from the cover of the apparatus and push the coil out of the boat with the same system that pushes the torpedo out).

The new (export) UGST torpedo was developed according to the TTZ of the Navy, so a towed coil should definitely be installed there. Trying to somehow improve the design, the developers created a new BLK, placing it vertically. But all the shortcomings of the towed scheme remained.

Meanwhile, even short-term remote control dramatically increases the effectiveness of a volley at submarines in real conditions, and the possibility of realizing firing positions at surface ships following an anti-torpedo zigzag at a distance of more than 11-13 km is possible only with remote control.

Well, in conclusion - here's a greeting from the beautiful USSR, P. Kolyadin "Notes of the military representative":

Here I am, as a district military representative, signing the cost of a 53-65K torpedo in the amount of 21,000 rubles. And the cost of USET-80 is 360,000 rubles. One silver battery costs about 70,000 rubles, i.e. 3 thermal torpedoes. But you could design a thermal torpedo with the same performance characteristics (multi-purpose) and much cheaper, more profitable for the country!

The designers of the Branch for the combustion of solid hydro-reactive fuel were pioneers in torpedo construction, and this was associated with the search for fuels of different burning rates and, in connection with this, the designs of the combustion chamber and the entire ECS.

More than 10 years were spent on these surveys: from 1970 to 1975, combustion testing was carried out on slow-burning fuel (MGRT), and since 1975 they switched to fast-burning (BGRT) with a high burning rate (40 mm / s, instead of 5-6 mm/sec.). This entailed a radical reconfiguration of the entire energy compartment and the design of the steam generator. The energy compartment began to consist of six barrels, each of which housed three sequentially docked BGRT charges, 1 m long and 154 mm in diameter (the length of the charge was determined by its transport strength).

In the end, the aggregate scheme of the torpedo was chosen, consisting of 2 circuits:

- closed in the working fluid (Rankine cycle: water vapor-condensate), consisting of a feed pump, a direct-flow steam generator and series-connected aggregate and propulsion turbines, as well as a condenser;

- open, consisting of a sea water pump that supplies water to the combustion chamber and to move the fuel pellet, combustion chamber, steam generator gas path, water heater entering the combustion chamber, and a profiled nozzle at the outlet of the steam generator overboard. Figuratively speaking, the torpedo was designed by analogy with a living organism: a path open for food and closed for blood circulation. In a word, the ESU was designed for very high steam parameters (superheated) up to 100 atm. pressure.

Bench results gave grounds to start sea trials of UGST. By this time, Yu.M. Krasnykh developed a system for measuring the parameters of a moving torpedo from aboard a firing ship via a wired communication line of a telecontrol system - the TIS-1 system. But unforeseen circumstances arose. The closer the designers advanced the work to sea trials, the stronger was the pressure of the 4GU SMEs to suspend work. An experimental batch of UGST torpedoes was manufactured at the plant. CM. Kirov in Alma-Ata.

At the same time, R&D "Shkval" was in production. Two experienced, very complex developments. The head of the Glavka ordered the production of the Shkval ROC to be given a "green light" to the detriment of the production of the Tapir ROC. Such an order was clearly aimed at disrupting the development of the ROC. Alexey Alexandrovich Panov, Director of the Branch, addressed me with a request to help in the production of an experimental batch. Deadlines were pressed. I took measures, according to which, the production of an experimental batch was completed in 1983, the materiel was submitted to Feodosia for testing.

Having received the material part at the sighting station in Feodosia, the group of the chief designer forced the tests. From 1983 to 1985, 24 torpedo launches were carried out. In September 1985, a full-range launch of the torpedo was scheduled. The entire group of the chief designer gathered for this launch, which included me, the newly appointed senior military representative at the Branch.

The work was carried out from the torpedo tube of the test vessel at the high-speed mode of the torpedo, checking the switching of combustion from one barrel to another, while determining the external noise and visual traces of the torpedo.

The torpedo overcame a given distance without a trace with minimal external noise, split up at the “stop” command, dumped the remnants of burning fuel, the PZO surfaced, and the sunken materiel was raised according to the worked-out diving-free lifting scheme. It was a success! The creators triumphed - finally Victory!

The creators of the hydro-reactive fuel from Zagorsk, the Chief Engineer of the Krylov Research Institute, were invited to this launch. The scheme and design of the torpedo struck the invited experts with its compactness, originality, and reliability of the operation of the scheme, created for the first time in a torpedo volume with such parameters.

I reported to the High Commission that the world's first full-scale firing of a thermal torpedo with a closed cycle (up to a depth of 1000 m) was carried out at the test site in Feodosia for the first time in the world. The data obtained indicate high performance characteristics: the torpedo is traceless, external noise is an order of magnitude less than that of serial torpedoes, the speed and range reach the values \u200b\u200bspecified in the technical specifications. The torpedo also showed modernization opportunities to improve its performance characteristics and one of the main advantages is its versatility, being on ships in the ammunition load for more time than all existing serial torpedoes, which ensures the duration of the navigation of the carriers. In addition, he expressed his personal positive attitude towards this development, emphasizing its versatility as a thermal torpedo to the maximum depth and the originality of the design, which was first used in the world torpedo building.

However, the negative attitude towards the development on the part of SMEs continued to grow and was accompanied by an increase in supporters to suspend this development. The struggle that took place in the upper spheres of the Ministry and the Navy is evidenced by such a factor, obviously, as the final stage of the confrontation.

I got a call from the plant manager. S.M. Kirov from Alma-Ata Shnurnikov V.A. and said that the Head of the 4th Main Directorate demanded that he provide comparative information on the labor intensity of the 53-65K serial torpedo and the new Tapir development. The director was indignant that this information would not be objective, because. the serial torpedo 53-65 has been in production for several years, and the experimental design torpedo has not yet been accepted into the series and, naturally, its labor intensity will obviously be greater than that of the serial one. Nevertheless, the director complied with the instructions and gave information: the labor intensity of manufacturing a 53-65K torpedo in mass production is 5500 norm/hours, and the labor intensity of the experimental UGST is 7800 norm/hours! A couple of days later, Shpurnikov V.A. called again. He said that the Head of the Glavka ordered to withdraw the previous comparative information on labor intensity and give others, in which the labor intensity of the new development would be an order of magnitude greater. Shnurnikov V.A. gave, as requested by the Boss, 55,000 standard hours, commenting to me: "as ordered!".

With such forceful methods on the part of the Ministry, development was first transferred from experimental design to research, and then stopped altogether!

My report to the UPV to Vice Admiral Butov S.A. did not significantly influence the decision on the fate of the unique development; she was closed.

The current UGST completely copies the scheme of the Mk-48 power plant - the same fuel, the same engine. This scheme could have been torn apart in the early 70s - but then the clowns from the top (the Central Committee and the SMEs) demanded to "get ahead of the Americans." And when the lead began to turn out, they urgently began to pedal dead-end developments, like the Flurry, and disrupt the progressive ones. This is what the real USSR was like.

Interesting article Maxim Klimov "On the appearance of modern submarine torpedoes" was published in the magazine "Arsenal of the Fatherland" No. 1 (15) for 2015. With the permission of the author and the editors of the journal, its text is offered to blog readers.

Chinese 533-mm torpedo Yu-6 (211TT1 developed by the Russian Central Research Institute Gidropribor), equipped with a Russian telecontrol hose reel (c) Maxim Klimov

Real performance characteristics of foreign torpedoes (deliberately underestimated by somedomestic "specialists") and their "complex characteristics"

Mass-dimensional and transport characteristics of modern foreign torpedoes of caliber 53 cm in comparison with our export torpedoes UGST and TE2:

When comparing domestic and foreign torpedoes, it is obvious that if for UGST there is some lag behind Western models in terms of performance characteristics, then for this TE2 the lag in terms of performance characteristics is very large.

Given the secrecy of information on modern homing systems (SSN), control (CS) and telecontrol (STU), it is advisable to evaluate and compare them to identify the main generations of the development of post-war torpedo weapons:

1 - straight torpedoes.

2 - torpedoes with passive SSN (50s).

3 - the introduction of active high-frequency SSN (60s).

4 - low-frequency active-passive SSN with Doppler filtering.

5 - introduction of secondary digital processing (classifiers) with a massive transition (heavy torpedoes) to hose remote control.

6 - digital SSN with an increased frequency range.

7 - ultra-wideband SSN with fiber-optic hose remote control.

Torpedoes in service with the navies of Latin America

In connection with the closeness of the performance characteristics of new Western torpedoes, it is of interest to evaluate them.

Torpedo Mk48

The transport characteristics of the first modification of the Mk48 - mod.1 are known (see Table 1).

Starting with the mod.4 modification, the length of the fuel tank was increased (430 kg of OTTO II fuel instead of 312), which already gives an increase in the cruising range at a speed of 55 knots over 25 km.

In addition, the first design of the water cannon was developed by American specialists back in the late 60s (Mk48 mod.1), the efficiency of the water cannon developed a little later by our UMGT-1 torpedo was 0.68. At the end of the 80s, after a long development of the water cannon of the new torpedo "Physicist-1", its efficiency was increased to 0.8. Obviously, American specialists carried out similar work, with an increase in the efficiency of the Mk48 torpedo water cannon.

Taking into account this factor and the increase in the length of the fuel tank, the statements of the developers about achieving a range of 35 km at a speed of 55 knots for modifications of the mod.4 torpedo seem to be justified (and repeatedly confirmed by the export supply line).

The statements of some of our specialists about the "compliance" of the transport characteristics of the latest modifications of the Mk48 with the early ones (mod.1) are aimed at masking the lag in the transport characteristics of the UGST torpedo (due to our stringent and unreasonable safety requirements, which forced the introduction of a limited-capacity fuel tank).

A separate issue is the maximum speed of the latest modifications of the Mk48.

It is logical to assume an increase in the speed of 55 knots achieved since the beginning of the 70s to “at least 60”, if only by increasing the efficiency of the water cannon of new modifications of the torpedo.

When analyzing the transport characteristics of electric torpedoes, it is necessary to agree with the conclusion of A.S. Kotov "electric torpedoes surpassed thermal ones in terms of transport characteristics" (for electric ones with AlAgO batteries and thermal ones using OTTO II fuel). The calculated data check performed by him on the DM2A4 torpedo with AlAgO battery (50 km at 50 kt) turned out to be close to the one declared by the developer (52 kt at 48 km).

A separate issue is the type of batteries used in the DM2A4. AgZn batteries are “officially” installed in DM2A4, in connection with which some of our experts accept the calculated characteristics of these batteries as analogues of domestic ones. However, representatives of the developer stated that the production of batteries for the DM2A4 torpedo in Germany was impossible for environmental reasons (plant in Greece), which clearly indicates a significantly different design (and characteristics) of the DM2A4 batteries in comparison with domestic AgZn batteries (which do not have special production restrictions). on ecology).

Despite the fact that AlAgO batteries have record energy performance, today in foreign torpedoism there is a steady trend to use much less energy-intensive, but providing the possibility of mass torpedo firing, universal lithium-polymer batteries (Black Shark torpedoes (caliber 53 cm) and Black Arrow (32 cm ) by WASS), even at the cost of a significant reduction in performance characteristics (reducing the range at maximum speed by about half from DM2A4 for Black Shark).

Massive torpedo firing is an axiom of modern Western torpedoism.

The reason for this requirement is the complex and variable environmental conditions in which torpedoes are used. The “unitary breakthrough” of the US Navy, the adoption of the Mk46 and Mk48 torpedoes with dramatically improved performance characteristics in the late 60s and early 70s, was associated precisely with the need to shoot a lot to work out and master new complex homing, control and telecontrol systems . According to its characteristics, the unitary fuel OTTO-2 was frankly average and inferior in terms of energy to the peroxide-kerosene pair already successfully mastered in the US Navy by more than 30%. But this fuel made it possible to significantly simplify the construction of torpedoes, and most importantly, to sharply, by more than an order of magnitude, reduce the cost of a shot.

This ensured the mass firing, successful refinement and development of new torpedoes with high performance characteristics in the US Navy.

The British Navy during the testing period of the StingRay mod.1 torpedo (a series from 2005) conducted 3 series of firing:

The first - May 2002 at the AUTEC range (Bahamas) 10 torpedoes against Trafalgar-type submarines (with evasion and the use of SGPD), 8 guidance was received.

The second - September 2002 for submarines at medium and shallow depths and lying on the ground (the latter was unsuccessful).

The third - November 2003, after finalizing the software at the BUTEC test site (Shetland Islands) on Swiftshur-type submarines, 5 out of 6 guidance was received.

In total, during the testing period, 150 firings of the StingRay mod.1 torpedo were carried out.

However, here it is necessary to take into account the fact that during the development of the previous StingRay (mod.0) torpedo, about 500 tests were carried out. To reduce this number of firings for mod.1, the system for collecting and recording data from all firings, and implementing a “dry test site” on its basis for preliminary testing of new CLO decisions based on these statistics, allowed.

A separate and very important issue is the testing of torpedo weapons in the Arctic.

The US and UK navies conduct them on a regular basis during the periodic ICEX exercises with mass torpedo firing.

For example, during ICEX-2003, the Connecticut submarine launched within 2 weeks, and the personnel of the ICEX-2003 station retrieved 18 ADSAR torpedoes from under the ice.

In a number of tests, the Connecticut submarine attacked with torpedoes a target simulator provided by the US Naval Submarine Warfare Center (NUWC), but in most cases, the submarine, using the ability to remotely control the weapon, (telecontrol) used itself as a target for its own torpedoes.

Page of the textbook "Torpedist Class 2 US Navy"with a description of the equipment and technology for re-preparation of the Mk 48 torpedo

In the US Navy, a huge (in comparison with us) volume of torpedo firing is provided not at the expense of financial costs (as some "specialists" claim), but precisely due to the low cost of a shot.

Due to the high cost of operation, the Mk50 torpedo was withdrawn from the US Navy ammunition load. There are no figures for the cost of firing a Mk48 torpedo in open foreign media, but it is obvious that they are much closer to $12 thousand - Mk46 than to $53 thousand - Mk50, according to 1995 data.

The principal issue for us today is the timing of the development of torpedo weapons. As analysis of Western data shows, it cannot be less than 6 years (actually more):

Great Britain:

. modernization of the Sting Ray torpedo (mod.1), 2005, development and testing took 7 years;

. modernization of the Spearfish torpedo (mod.1) has been carried out since 2010. It is planned for service in 2017.

The timing and stages of development of torpedoes in the US Navy are shown in the diagram.

Thus, the statements of some of our specialists about the “possibility of developing” a new torpedo in “3 years” have no serious grounds and are a deliberate deception of the command of the Navy and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the country's leadership.

Extremely important in Western torpedo building is the issue of low noise torpedoes and shots.

Comparison of external noise (from the stern) of the Mk48 mod.1 torpedo (1971) with the noise level of nuclear submarines (probably of the Permit, Sturgeon types of the late 60s) at a frequency of 1.7 kHz:

At the same time, it should be taken into account that the noise level of the new modifications of the Mk48 torpedo in low-noise driving mode should be significantly less than the NT-37C and be much closer to the DM2A3.

The main conclusion from this is the possibility of carrying out covert torpedo attacks with modern foreign torpedoes from long ranges (over 20-30 km).

Shooting at long ranges is impossible without effective remote control (TU).

Telecontrol hose reel of a German 533 mm DM2A1 torpedo (1971)

Modern Western hose remote control systems are highly reliable and impose virtually no restrictions on submarine maneuvering. To prevent the telecontrol wire from getting into the screws on many foreign diesel-electric submarines, protective cables are stretched on the stern rudders. With a high probability, we can assume the possibility of remote control up to the full speed of diesel-electric submarines.

Protective cables on the stern rudders of the Italian non-nuclear submarine Salvatore Todaro of the German project 212A

The remote control hose reel is not only not a “secret” for us, but in the early 2000s, the Central Research Institute “Gidpropribor” developed and handed over to the Chinese Navy a hose LKTU for the 211TT1 product.

Half a century ago, in the West, it was realized that the optimization of the parameters of the components of the torpedo complex should not be carried out separately (components), but taking into account ensuring maximum efficiency precisely as a complex.

To do this, in the west (unlike the Soviet Navy):

. work began on a sharp decrease in the noise of torpedoes (including at low frequencies - workers for the sonar submarine);

. high-precision control devices were used, which ensured a sharp increase in the accuracy of torpedo movement;

. the requirements for the performance characteristics of the GAK PL have been clarified for the effective use of remote-controlled torpedoes over long distances;

. the automated combat control system (ASBU) was deeply integrated with the SAC or became part of it (to ensure the processing of not only the "geometric" information of firing tasks, but also interference and signal)

Despite the fact that all this has been introduced into the navies of foreign countries since the beginning of the 70s of the last century, we still have not realized this!

If in the West a torpedo is a high-precision complex for covertly hitting targets from a long distance, then we still have “torpedoes are melee weapons.”

The effective firing distances of western torpedoes are approximately 2/3 of the length of the telecontrol wire. Taking into account 50-60 km on torpedo coils, common for modern Western torpedoes, effective distances are obtained up to 30-40 km.

At the same time, the effectiveness of domestic torpedoes, even with telecontrol at distances of more than 10 km, is sharply reduced due to the low performance characteristics of telecontrol and the low accuracy of outdated control devices.

Some experts argue that submarine detection distances are allegedly small and therefore "large effective distances are not needed." One cannot agree with this. Even in a collision at a “dagger distance”, in the process of maneuvering during a battle, an increase in the distance between submarines is very likely (and the US Navy submarines specially practiced a “distance gap” with care for the effective salvo distances of our torpedoes).

The difference in the effectiveness of the foreign and domestic approaches is a “sniper rifle” versus a “pistol”, and given the fact that we do not determine the distance and conditions of the battle, the result of this “comparison” in battle is obvious - in most cases we will be shot (including . in the presence of "promising" (but with an outdated ideology) torpedoes in the ammunition load of our submarines).

In addition, it is also necessary to dispel the misconception of some experts that “torpedoes are not needed against surface targets, because there are missiles. From the moment the first missile (ASM) leaves the water, the submarine not only loses stealth, but becomes the object of attack by enemy aircraft anti-submarine weapons. Given their high efficiency, a salvo of anti-ship missiles puts submarines on the brink of destruction. Under these conditions, the ability to carry out a covert torpedo attack on surface ships from long distances becomes one of the requirements for modern and promising submarines.

It is obvious that serious work is needed to eliminate the existing problems of domestic torpedoes, primarily research on the subject:

. modern noise-immune ultra-wideband SSNs (in this case, the joint development of SSNs and new countermeasures is extremely important);

. high-precision control devices;

. new batteries of torpedoes - both powerful disposable and reusable lithium-polymer batteries (to ensure high firing statistics);

. fiber-optic high-speed remote control, providing multi-torpedo salvos at a distance of several tens of kilometers;

. stealth torpedoes;

. integration of the “board” of torpedoes and the SJSC PL for the integrated processing of signal and noise information;

. development and testing by firing of new methods of using remote-controlled torpedoes;

. testing torpedoes in the Arctic.

All this certainly requires a large shooting statistics (hundreds and thousands of shots), and against the background of our traditional "savings" this seems unrealistic at first glance.

However, the requirement for the presence of submarine forces in the Russian Navy also means the requirement for modern and effective torpedo weapons, which means that all this great work needs to be done.

It is necessary to eliminate the existing backlog from developed countries in torpedo weapons, with the transition to the generally accepted world ideology of submarine torpedo weapons as a high-precision complex that ensures the destruction of covert targets from long distances.

Maxim Klimov

ARSENAL OF THE HOMELAND | №1 (15) / 2015

The first torpedoes differed from modern ones no less than a wheeled steam frigate from a nuclear aircraft carrier. In 1866, the Skat carried 18 kg of explosives over a distance of 200 m at a speed of about 6 knots. Shooting accuracy was below any criticism. By 1868, the use of coaxial screws rotating in opposite directions made it possible to reduce the yaw of the torpedo in the horizontal plane, and the installation of a pendulum rudder control mechanism stabilized the depth of travel.

By 1876, Whitehead's brainchild was already sailing at a speed of about 20 knots and covered a distance of two cables (about 370 m). Two years later, torpedoes had their say on the battlefield: Russian sailors sent the Turkish patrol steamer Intibakh to the bottom of the Batumi raid with “self-propelled mines”.

Submarine torpedo room
If you do not know what destructive power the "fish" lying on the shelves have, then you can not guess. On the left are two torpedo tubes with open covers. The top one is not loaded yet.

The further evolution of torpedo weapons until the middle of the 20th century is reduced to an increase in the charge, range, speed and ability of torpedoes to stay on course. It is of fundamental importance that for the time being the general ideology of the weapon remained exactly the same as in 1866: the torpedo was supposed to hit the side of the target and explode on impact.

Direct-going torpedoes are still in service today, periodically finding use in the course of all sorts of conflicts. It was they who sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano in 1982, which became the most famous victim of the Falklands War.

The English nuclear submarine Conqueror then fired three Mk-VIII torpedoes at the cruiser, which have been in service with the Royal Navy since the mid-1920s. The combination of a nuclear submarine and antediluvian torpedoes looks funny, but let's not forget that the cruiser built in 1938 by 1982 was more of a museum than a military value.

A revolution in the torpedo business was made by the appearance in the middle of the 20th century of homing and telecontrol systems, as well as proximity fuses.

Modern homing systems (SSN) are divided into passive - "catching" physical fields created by the target, and active - looking for the target, usually with the help of sonar. In the first case, it is most often about the acoustic field - the noise of propellers and mechanisms.

Somewhat apart are the homing systems that locate the wake of the ship. Numerous small air bubbles remaining in it change the acoustic properties of water, and this change is reliably “caught” by the torpedo sonar far astern of the past ship. Having fixed the trace, the torpedo turns in the direction of the target movement and searches, moving in a “snake”. Wake tracking, the main method of homing torpedoes in the Russian Navy, is considered reliable in principle. True, a torpedo, forced to catch up with a target, spends time and precious cable tracks on this. And the submarine, in order to shoot "on the trail", has to get closer to the target than would be allowed in principle by the range of the torpedo. The chances of survival do not increase.

The second most important innovation was the telecontrol systems for torpedoes that spread in the second half of the 20th century. As a rule, the torpedo is controlled by a cable that unwinds as it moves.

The combination of controllability with a proximity fuse made it possible to radically change the very ideology of using torpedoes - now they are focused on diving under the keel of an attacked target and exploding there.

Mine nets
Squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander II" during tests of the anti-mine network of the Bullivant system. Kronstadt, 1891
Catch her with a net!

The first attempts to protect ships from a new threat were made in a matter of years after its appearance. The concept looked unpretentious: folding shots were attached on board the ship, from which a steel net hung down to stop torpedoes.

On tests of new items in England in 1874, the network successfully repelled all attacks. Similar tests conducted in Russia a decade later gave slightly worse results: the net, designed for a tensile strength of 2.5 tons, withstood five out of eight shots, but the three torpedoes that pierced it got entangled with propellers and were still stopped.

The most striking episodes of the biography of anti-torpedo nets relate to the Russo-Japanese war. However, by the beginning of the First World War, the speed of torpedoes exceeded 40 knots, and the charge reached hundreds of kilograms. To overcome obstacles, special cutters began to be installed on torpedoes. In May 1915, the English battleship Triumph, which was shelling Turkish positions at the entrance to the Dardanelles, was, despite lowered nets, sunk with a single shot from a German submarine - a torpedo broke through the defense. By 1916, the lowered "chain mail" was perceived more as a useless load than as protection.

(IMG:http://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2011-04/1303281376_2712117058_5c8c8fd7bf_o_1300783343_full.jpg) Fence off with a wall

The energy of the blast wave decreases rapidly with distance. It would be logical to put an armored bulkhead at some distance from the outer skin of the ship. If it withstands the impact of the blast wave, then the damage to the ship will be limited to the flooding of one or two compartments, and the power plant, ammunition cellars and other vulnerable places will not be affected.

Apparently, the former chief builder of the English fleet, E. Reid, was the first to put forward the idea of a constructive PTZ in 1884, but his idea was not supported by the Admiralty. The British preferred to follow the traditional way at that time in the projects of their ships: to divide the hull into a large number of watertight compartments and cover the engine and boiler rooms with coal pits located along the sides.
Such a system for protecting a ship from artillery shells was repeatedly tested at the end of the 19th century and, on the whole, looked effective: the coal piled in the pits regularly “caught” the shells and did not catch fire.

The anti-torpedo bulkhead system was first implemented in the French Navy on the experimental battleship Henri IV, designed by E. Bertin. The essence of the idea was to smoothly round the bevels of the two armored decks down, parallel to the side and at some distance from it. Bertin's design did not go to war, and it was probably for the best - the caisson built according to this scheme, which imitated the Henri compartment, was destroyed during testing by an explosion of a torpedo charge attached to the skin.

In a simplified form, this approach was implemented on the Russian battleship "Tsesarevich", built in France and according to the French project, as well as on the EDB of the "Borodino" type, which copied the same project. The ships received, as anti-torpedo protection, a longitudinal armored bulkhead 102 mm thick, separated from the outer skin by 2 m. This did not help the Tsesarevich much - having received a Japanese torpedo during the Japanese attack on Port Arthur, the ship spent several months under repair.

The English Navy relied on coal pits until about the time the Dreadnought was built. However, an attempt to test this protection in 1904 ended in failure. The ancient armored ram "Belayle" acted as a "guinea pig". Outside, a 0.6 m wide cofferdam filled with cellulose was attached to its hull, and six longitudinal bulkheads were erected between the outer skin and the boiler room, the space between which was filled with coal. The explosion of a 457-mm torpedo made a hole 2.5x3.5 m in this structure, demolished the cofferdam, destroyed all the bulkheads except the last one, and swelled the deck. As a result, the Dreadnought received armored screens that covered the cellars of the towers, and subsequent battleships were built with full-sized longitudinal bulkheads along the length of the hull - the design idea came to a single solution.

Gradually, the design of the PTZ became more complicated, and its dimensions increased. Combat experience has shown that the main thing in constructive protection is depth, that is, the distance from the explosion site to the ship's innards covered by protection. The single bulkhead was replaced by intricate structures consisting of several compartments. To push the "epicenter" of the explosion as far as possible, boules were widely used - longitudinal attachments mounted on the hull below the waterline.

One of the most powerful is the PTZ of the French Richelieu-class battleships, which consisted of an anti-torpedo and several dividing bulkheads that formed four rows of protective compartments. The outer one, which had an almost 2-meter width, was filled with foam-rubber filler. Then followed a row of empty compartments, followed by fuel tanks, then another row of empty compartments, designed to collect spilled fuel from the explosion. Only after that, the blast wave had to stumble upon an anti-torpedo bulkhead, after which another row of empty compartments followed - in order to definitely catch everything leaked. On the battleship Jean Bar of the same type, the PTZ was reinforced with boules, as a result of which its total depth reached 9.45 m.

On American battleships of the North Caroline type, the PTZ system was formed by a boule and five bulkheads - though not from armor, but from ordinary shipbuilding steel. The boule cavity and the compartment following it were empty, the next two compartments were filled with fuel or sea water. The last, inner, compartment was again empty.
In addition to protecting against underwater explosions, numerous compartments could be used to equalize the roll, flooding them as needed.

Needless to say, such a waste of space and displacement was a luxury only allowed on the largest ships. The next series of American battleships (South Dacota) received a boiler-turbine installation of other dimensions - shorter and wider. And it was no longer possible to increase the width of the hull - otherwise the ships would not have passed through the Panama Canal. The result was a decrease in the depth of the PTZ.

Despite all the tricks, the defense always lagged behind the weapons. The PTZ of the same American battleships was designed for a torpedo with a 317-kilogram charge, but after they were built, the Japanese had torpedoes with charges of 400 kg of TNT and more. As a result, the commander of the North Caroline, which received a hit by a Japanese 533-mm torpedo in the fall of 1942, honestly wrote in his report that he had never considered the underwater protection of the ship to be adequate for a modern torpedo. However, the damaged battleship then remained afloat.

Do not reach the goal

The advent of nuclear weapons and guided missiles has radically changed the way we look at armament and defense of a warship. The fleet parted ways with multi-turreted battleships. On the new ships, the place of gun turrets and armor belts was taken by missile systems and radars. The main thing was not to withstand the hit of an enemy projectile, but simply to prevent it.

The approach to anti-torpedo protection has changed in a similar way - boules with bulkheads, although they have not completely disappeared, have clearly receded into the background. The task of today's PTZ is to shoot down a torpedo on the right course, confusing its homing system, or simply destroy it on the way to the target.

The "gentleman's set" of modern PTZ includes several commonly used devices. The most important of them are sonar countermeasures, both towed and fired. A device floating in water creates an acoustic field, in other words, it makes noise. The noise from the GPA means can confuse the homing system, either by imitating the noise of the ship (much louder than itself), or by "clogging" the enemy hydroacoustics with interference. Thus, the American AN / SLQ-25 Nixie system includes torpedo diverters towed at a speed of up to 25 knots and six-barrel launchers for firing GPA weapons. This is accompanied by automation that determines the parameters of attacking torpedoes, signal generators, own sonar systems and much more.

In recent years, there have been reports of the development of the AN / WSQ-11 system, which should provide not only the suppression of homing devices, but also the defeat of anti-torpedoes at a distance of 100 to 2000 m). A small anti-torpedo (caliber 152 mm, length 2.7 m, weight 90 kg, range 2–3 km) is equipped with a steam turbine power plant.

Tests of prototypes have been carried out since 2004, and adoption is expected in 2012. There is also information about the development of a super-cavitating anti-torpedo capable of reaching speeds of up to 200 knots, similar to the Russian Shkval, but there is practically nothing to tell about it - everything is carefully covered with a veil of secrecy.

Developments in other countries look similar. French and Italian aircraft carriers are equipped with a jointly developed SLAT PTZ system. The main element of the system is a towed antenna, including 42 radiating elements and side-mounted 12-tube devices for firing self-propelled or drifting means of the Spartakus GPA. It is also known about the development of an active system that fires anti-torpedoes.

It is noteworthy that in a series of reports about various developments, there has not yet been information about something that could knock a torpedo off course, following the ship's wake.

The Udav-1M and Paket-E/NK anti-torpedo systems are currently in service with the Russian fleet. The first of them is designed to destroy or divert torpedoes attacking the ship. The complex can fire two types of projectiles. Projectile diverter 111СО2 is designed to divert a torpedo from the target.

111SZG barrage-deep shells make it possible to form a kind of minefield in the path of an attacking torpedo. At the same time, the probability of hitting a straight-moving torpedo with one salvo is 90%, and for a homing one - about 76. The "Packet" complex is designed to destroy torpedoes attacking a surface ship with anti-torpedoes. Open sources say that its use reduces the likelihood of a ship being hit by a torpedo by about 3–3.5 times, but it seems likely that this figure was not tested in combat conditions, as well as all the others.

In the autumn of 1984, events took place in the Barents Sea that could lead to the start of a world war.

An American missile cruiser suddenly burst into the combat training area of the Soviet northern fleet at full speed. This happened during a torpedo throwing by a Mi-14 helicopter link. The Americans launched a high-speed motor boat, and raised a helicopter into the air for cover. The Severomorsk aviators realized that their goal was to capture the latest Soviet torpedoes.

The duel over the sea lasted almost 40 minutes. With maneuvers and air currents from the propellers, the Soviet pilots did not allow the annoying Yankees to approach the secret product until the Soviet one safely brought it on board. The escort ships that arrived in time by this time forced the American out of the range.

Torpedoes have always been considered the most effective weapon of the Russian fleet. It is no coincidence that NATO secret services regularly hunt for their secrets. Russia continues to be the world leader in terms of the amount of know-how applied to the creation of torpedoes.

Modern torpedo a formidable weapon of modern ships and submarines. It allows you to quickly and accurately strike at the enemy at sea. By definition, a torpedo is an autonomous, self-propelled and guided underwater projectile, in which about 500 kg of explosive or nuclear warhead is sealed. The secrets of developing torpedo weapons are the most protected, and the number of states that own these technologies is even less than the number of members of the "nuclear club".

During the Korean War in 1952, the Americans planned to drop two atomic bombs each weighing 40 tons. At that time, a Soviet fighter regiment operated on the side of the Korean troops. The Soviet Union also had nuclear weapons, and a local conflict could escalate into a real nuclear catastrophe at any moment. Information about the intentions of the Americans to use atomic bombs became the property of Soviet intelligence. In response, Joseph Stalin ordered the development of more powerful thermonuclear weapons to be accelerated. Already in September of the same year, the Minister of the shipbuilding industry, Vyacheslav Malyshev, submitted a unique project for Stalin's approval.

Vyacheslav Malyshev proposed to create a huge nuclear torpedo T-15. This 24-meter projectile of 1550 millimeters was supposed to have a weight of 40 tons, of which only 4 tons accounted for the warhead. Stalin approved the creation torpedoes, the energy for which was produced by electric batteries.

These weapons could destroy major US naval bases. Due to the increased secrecy, builders and nuclear scientists did not consult with representatives of the fleet, so no one thought about how to serve such a monster and shoot, in addition, the US Navy had only two bases available for Soviet torpedoes, so they abandoned the supergiant T-15.

In exchange, the sailors proposed to create a conventional caliber atomic torpedo, which could be used on all. Interestingly, the caliber of 533 mm is generally accepted and scientifically justified, since the caliber and length are actually the potential energy of the torpedo. It was possible to covertly strike at a potential enemy only at long distances, so the designers and naval sailors gave priority to thermal torpedoes.

On October 10, 1957, the first underwater nuclear tests were carried out in the Novaya Zemlya area. torpedoes caliber 533 mm. The new torpedo was fired by the S-144 submarine. From a distance of 10 kilometers, the submarine fired one torpedo salvo. Soon, at a depth of 35 meters, a powerful atomic explosion followed, its damaging properties were recorded by hundreds of sensors placed on those located in the test area. Interestingly, during this most dangerous element, the crews were replaced by animals.

As a result of these tests, the navy received the first nuclear torpedo 5358. They belonged to the class of thermal engines, since their engines operated on vapors of a gas mixture.

The nuclear epic is just one page in the history of Russian torpedo building. More than 150 years ago, the idea to create the first self-propelled naval mine or torpedo was put forward by our compatriot Ivan Aleksandrovsky. Soon, under the command, for the first time in the world, a torpedo was used in a battle with the Turks in January 1878. And at the beginning of World War II, Soviet designers created the highest-speed torpedo in the world 5339, which means 53 centimeters and 1939. However, the true dawn of domestic torpedo building schools occurred in the 60s of the last century. Its center was TsNI 400, later renamed Gidropribor. Over the past period, the institute handed over 35 different samples to the Soviet fleet torpedoes.

In addition to submarines, naval aviation and all classes of surface ships, the rapidly developing fleet of the USSR, were armed with torpedoes: cruisers, destroyers and patrol ships. The unique carriers of these weapons, torpedo boats, also continued to be built.

At the same time, the composition of the NATO bloc was constantly replenished with ships with higher performance. So in September 1960, the world's first nuclear-powered Enterprise was launched with a displacement of 89,000 tons, with 104 units of nuclear weapons on board. To combat aircraft carrier strike groups with strong anti-submarine defenses, the range of the existing weapon was no longer enough.

Only submarines could approach the aircraft carriers unnoticed, but it was extremely difficult to conduct aimed fire at the guards covered by ships. In addition, during the years of World War II, the American Navy learned to counteract the torpedo homing system. To solve this problem, Soviet scientists for the first time in the world created a new torpedo device that detected the wake of the ship and ensured its further defeat. However, thermal torpedoes had a significant drawback - their characteristics fell sharply at great depths, while their piston engines and turbines made loud noises, which unmasked the attacking ships.

In view of this, the designers had to solve new problems. This is how an aircraft torpedo appeared, which was placed under the body of a cruise missile. As a result, the time of destruction of submarines was reduced several times. The first such complex was named "Metel". It was intended to be fired upon by submarines from escort ships. Later, the complex learned to hit surface targets. Submarines were also armed with torpedoes.

In the 70s, the US Navy reclassified its aircraft carriers from strike aircraft carriers to multipurpose ones. For this, the composition of the aircraft based on them was replaced in favor of anti-submarine ones. Now they could not only launch air strikes on the territory of the USSR, but also actively counteract the deployment of Soviet submarines in the ocean. To break through the defenses and destroy multi-purpose aircraft carrier strike groups, Soviet submarines began to arm themselves with cruise missiles launched from torpedo tubes and flying hundreds of kilometers. But even this long-range weapon could not sink the floating airfield. More powerful charges were required, therefore, specifically for nuclear-powered ships of the "" type, the designers of "Gidropribor" created a torpedo of an increased caliber of 650 millimeters, which carries more than 700 kilograms of explosives.

This sample is used in the so-called dead zone of its anti-ship missiles. It aims at the target either independently or receives information from external sources of target designation. In this case, the torpedo can approach the enemy simultaneously with other weapons. It is almost impossible to defend against such a massive blow. For this, she received the nickname "aircraft carrier killer."

In everyday affairs and worries, the Soviet people did not think about the dangers associated with the confrontation of the superpowers. But each of them was targeted in the equivalent of about 100 tons of US military equipment. The bulk of these weapons was taken out into the world's oceans and placed on underwater carriers. The main weapon of the Soviet fleet against were anti-submarine torpedoes. Traditionally, electric motors were used for them, the power of which did not depend on the depth of travel. Such torpedoes were armed not only with submarines, but also with surface ships. The most powerful of them were. For a long time, the most common anti-submarine torpedoes for submarines were the SET-65, but in 1971, the designers for the first time used remote control, which was carried out underwater by wires. This dramatically increased the accuracy of the submarines. And soon the USET-80 universal electric torpedo was created, which could effectively destroy not only, but also surface ones. She developed a high speed of over 40 knots and had a long range. In addition, it struck at a depth that was inaccessible to any NATO anti-submarine forces - over 1000 meters.

In the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the plants and testing grounds of the Gidropribor Institute ended up on the territory of seven new sovereign states. Most of the enterprises were looted. But scientific work on the creation of a modern underwater gun in Russia was not interrupted.

midget combat torpedo

Like unmanned aerial vehicles, torpedo weapons will be used with increasing demand in the coming years. Today, Russia is building fourth-generation warships, and one of their features is an integrated weapon control system. For them, small-sized thermal and universal deep-sea torpedoes. Their engine runs on unitary fuel, which is essentially liquid gunpowder. When it burns, enormous energy is released. This torpedo universal. It can be used from surface ships, submarines, and also be part of the combat units of aviation anti-submarine systems.

Technical characteristics of a universal deep-sea homing torpedo with remote control (UGST):

Weight - 2200 kg;

Charge weight - 300 kg;

Speed - 50 knots;

Travel depth - up to 500 m;

Range - 50 km;

Homing radius - 2500 m;

Recently, the US Navy has been replenished with the latest Virginia-class nuclear submarines. Their ammunition includes 26 modernized Mk 48 torpedoes. When fired, they rush to a target located at a distance of 50 kilometers at a speed of 60 knots. The working depths of the torpedo for the purpose of invulnerability to the enemy are up to 1 kilometer. The Russian multi-purpose submarine of project 885 "Ash" is called upon to become the enemy of these boats under water. Its ammunition capacity is 30 torpedoes, and so far its secret characteristics are in no way inferior.

And in conclusion, I would like to note that torpedo weapons contain a lot of secrets, for each of which a potential enemy in battle will have to pay a heavy price.

Torpedo engines: yesterday and today

OJSC "Research Institute of Morteplotekhnika" remains the only enterprise in the Russian Federation that carries out the full-scale development of thermal power plants

From the founding of the enterprise to the mid-1960s. the main attention was paid to the development of turbine engines for anti-ship torpedoes with an operating range of turbines at depths of 5-20 m. Anti-submarine torpedoes were then designed only for the electric power industry. In connection with the conditions for the use of anti-ship torpedoes, the maximum possible power and visual stealth were important requirements for power plants. The requirement for visual stealth was easily met through the use of a two-component fuel: kerosene and a low-water solution of hydrogen peroxide (HPO) with a concentration of 84%. The combustion products contained water vapor and carbon dioxide. The exhaust of combustion products overboard was carried out at a distance of 1000-1500 mm from the torpedo controls, while the steam condensed, and carbon dioxide quickly dissolved in the water so that the gaseous combustion products not only did not reach the surface of the water, but also did not affect the rudders and torpedo propellers.

The maximum turbine power achieved on the torpedo 53-65 was 1070 kW and provided movement at a speed of about 70 knots. It was the fastest torpedo in the world. To reduce the temperature of the fuel combustion products from 2700–2900 K to an acceptable level, sea water was injected into the combustion products. At the initial stage of work, salts from sea water were deposited in the flow path of the turbine and led to its destruction. This happened until trouble-free operation conditions were found that minimize the effect of sea water salts on the performance of a gas turbine engine.

With all the energy advantages of hydrogen peroxide as an oxidizing agent, its increased fire and explosion hazard during operation dictated the search for the use of alternative oxidizing agents. One of the options for such technical solutions was the replacement of MFW with gaseous oxygen. The turbine engine developed at our enterprise has been preserved, and the torpedo, which received the designation 53-65K, has been successfully operated and has not been withdrawn from service with the Navy so far. The rejection of the use of MPV in torpedo thermal power plants has led to the need for numerous research works to search for new fuels. In connection with the appearance in the mid-1960s. nuclear submarines with high speeds of underwater movement, anti-submarine torpedoes with electric power turned out to be ineffective. Therefore, along with the search for new fuels, new types of engines and thermodynamic cycles were investigated. The greatest attention was paid to the creation of a steam turbine plant operating in a closed Rankine cycle. At the stages of preliminary both bench and offshore testing of such units as a turbine, steam generator, condenser, pumps, valves and the entire system, fuel was used: kerosene and MPV, and in the main version - solid hydro-reactive fuel with high energy and operational performance .

The steam turbine plant was successfully tested, but work on the torpedo was stopped.

In the 1970-1980s. Much attention was paid to the development of open-cycle gas turbine plants, as well as combined cycle with the use of an ejector in the gas exhaust system at great working depths. Numerous Otto-Fuel II type liquid monopropellant formulations were used as fuel, including those with metal fuel additives, as well as using a liquid oxidizer based on ammonium hydroxyl perchlorate (HAP).

A practical way out was the direction of creating an open cycle gas turbine plant using Otto-Fuel II type fuel. A turbine engine with a power of more than 1000 kW was created for a 650 mm caliber impact torpedo.

In the mid 1980s. Based on the results of the research work carried out, the management of our company decided to develop a new direction - the development of axial piston engines for universal torpedoes of 533 mm caliber using Otto-Fuel II type fuel. Piston engines, compared to turbine engines, have a weaker dependence of efficiency on the depth of the torpedo.

From 1986 to 1991 an axial piston engine (model 1) with a power of about 600 kW was created for a universal torpedo of 533 mm caliber. It successfully passed all types of bench and sea tests. In the late 1990s, due to the reduction in the length of the torpedo, a second model of this engine was created by upgrading in terms of simplifying the design, increasing reliability, eliminating scarce materials and introducing multi-mode. This engine model is adopted in the serial design of a universal deep-sea homing torpedo.

In 2002 JSC "Research Institute of Morteplotekhnika" was entrusted with the creation of a power plant for a new light anti-submarine torpedo of 324 mm caliber. After analyzing various types of engines, thermodynamic cycles and fuels, the choice was made, as for a heavy torpedo, in favor of an open-cycle axial piston engine using Otto-Fuel II type fuel.

However, when designing the engine, the experience of weaknesses in the design of a heavy torpedo engine was taken into account. The new engine has a fundamentally different kinematic scheme. It has no friction elements in the fuel supply path of the combustion chamber, which eliminated the possibility of a fuel explosion during operation. The rotating parts are well balanced and the accessory drives have been greatly simplified resulting in reduced vibration activity. An electronic system for smooth regulation of fuel consumption and, accordingly, engine power has been introduced. There are practically no regulators and pipelines. With an engine power of 110 kW over the entire range of required depths, at shallow depths, it allows doubling the power while maintaining performance. A wide range of engine operating parameters allows it to be used in torpedoes, anti-torpedoes, self-propelled mines, sonar countermeasures, as well as in autonomous underwater vehicles for military and civil purposes.

All these achievements in the field of creating torpedo power plants were possible due to the presence of unique experimental complexes at JSC "Research Institute of Morteplotekhnika", created both on their own and at the expense of state funds. The complexes are located on the territory of about 100 thousand m2. They are provided with all the necessary power supply systems, including air, water, nitrogen and high-pressure fuel systems. The test complexes include systems for the disposal of solid, liquid and gaseous combustion products. The complexes have benches for testing prototype and full-scale turbine and piston engines, as well as engines of other types. There are, in addition, stands for testing fuels, combustion chambers, various pumps and devices. The stands are equipped with electronic control systems, measurement and registration of parameters, visual observation of the tested objects, as well as alarm and equipment protection.

Submarine torpedo range. A torpedo is a deadly steel cigar. Prospects for the development of torpedo weapons

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